I.
Introduction
A. Basic Concept(s)
II. General Principles (Rule 128)
A. Definition
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G.
LUCERO, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga, respondent.
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a
motion with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga after he
had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the
record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace
court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her
witnesses in connection with their testimony, on the strength
of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.
The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter
of this proceeding.
According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's
attorney to the Court of First Instance in support of his
motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the
preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of
the peace informed him of the charges and asked him if he
pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea
of not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor
objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection
was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel
announced his intention to renounce his right to present
evidence," and the justice of the peace forwarded the case
to the court of first instance.
Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after
renouncing his right to present evidence, and by reason of
that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for
trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent
judge did not act in excess of his jurisdiction or in abuse of
discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return
the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and
Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R. No. L-1336, recently
promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the
peace had allowed the accused, over the complaint's
objection, to recall the complainant and her witnesses at the
preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-
examined, we sustained the justice of the peace's order. We
said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not curtail the sound
discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said
that "while section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the
defendant's right in the preliminary investigation, there is
nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority,
inherent in a court of justice, to pursue a course of action
reasonably calculated to bring out the truth."
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a
matter of right, compel the complaint and his witnesses to
repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary
examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We
called attention to the fact that "the constitutional right of
an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him
does not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence
of a preliminary examination be an infringement of his right
to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without
infringing the constitutional right of an accused under the
due process clause to a fair trial.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The
minority went farther than the majority and denied even any
discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge
holding the preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is
dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ.,
concur.
G.R. No. 190846, February 03, 2016
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JOSE G.
HOSANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review
on certiorari1 challenging the August 28, 2009
decision2 and November 17, 2009 resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
88645.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Facts
The respondent Jose G. Hosana (Jose) married Milagros C.
Hosana (Milagros) on January 14, 1979.4During their
marriage, Jose and Milagros bought a house and lot
located at Tinago, Naga City, which lot was covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
21229.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On January 13, 1998, Milagros sold to the petitioner
Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (Tomas) the subject property, as
evidenced by a deed of sale executed by Milagros herself
and as attorney-in-fact of Jose, by virtue of a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by Jose in her
favor.6 The Deed of Sale stated that the purchase price
for the lot was P200,000.00.7 After the sale, TCT No.
21229 was cancelled and TCT No. 32568 was issued in the
name of Tomas.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On October 19, 2001, Jose filed a Complaint for
Annulment of Sale/Cancellation of Title/Reconveyance
and Damages against Milagros, Tomas, and the Register of
Deeds of Naga City.9 The complaint was filed before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Naga City. In the
complaint, Jose averred that while he was working in
Japan, Milagros, without his consent and knowledge,
conspired with Tomas to execute the SPA by forging Jose's
signature making it appear that Jose had authorized
1
Milagros to sell the subject property to
Tomas.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In his Answer, Tomas maintained that he was a buyer in
good faith and for value.11 Before he paid the full
consideration of the sale, Tomas claimed he sought advice
from his lawyer-friend who told him that the title of the
subject lot was authentic and in order.12 Furthermore, he
alleged that the SPA authorizing Milagros to sell the
property was annotated at the back of the
title.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a cross-claim against Milagros and claimed
compensatory and moral damages, attorney's fees, and
expenses, for litigation, in the event that judgment be
rendered in favor of Jose.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The RTC declared Milagros in default for her failure to file
her answer to Jose's complaint and Tomas' cross-
claim.15 On the other hand, it dismissed Tomas' complaint
against the Register of Deeds since it was only a nominal
party.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits
ensued.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose presented his brother, Bonifacio Hosana (Bonifacio),
as sole witness. Bonifacio testified that he learned of the
sale of the subject property from Milagros' son.18 When
Bonifacio confronted Milagros that Jose would get angry
because of the sale, Milagros retorted that she sold the
property because she needed the money. Bonifacio
immediately informed Jose, who was then in Japan, of
the sale.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Jose was furious when he learned of the sale and went
back to the Philippines. Jose and Bonifacio verified with
the Register of Deeds and discovered that the title
covering the disputed property had been transferred to
Tomas.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Bonifacio further testified that Jose's signature in the SPA
was forged.21 Bonifacio presented documents containing
the signature of Jose for comparison: Philippine passport,
complaint-affidavit, duplicate original of SPA dated 16
February 2002, notice of lis pendens, community tax
certificate, voter's affidavit, specimen signatures, and a
handwritten letter.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, Tomas submitted his own account of
events as corroborated by Rosana Robles (Rosana), his
goddaughter. Sometime in December 1997, Tomas
directed Rosana to go to the house of Milagros to confirm
if Jose knew about the sale transaction. Through a phone
call by Milagros to Jose, Rosana was able to talk to Jose
who confirmed that he was aware of the sale and had
given his wife authority to proceed with the sale. Rosana
informed Tomas of Jose's
confirmation.23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
With the assurance that all the documents were in order,
Tomas made a partial payment of P350,000.00 and
another P350,000.00 upon the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Deed of Sale). Tomas noticed that the
consideration written by Milagros on the Deed of Sale was
only P200,000.00; he inquired why the written
consideration was lower than the actual consideration
paid. Milagros explained that it was done to save on
taxes. Tomas also learned from Milagros that she needed
money badly and had to sell the house because Jose had
stopped sending her money.24chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The RTC Ruling
In its decision dated December 27, 2006,25 the RTC
decided in favor of Jose and nullified the sale of the
subject property to Tomas. The RTC held that the SPA
dated June 10, 1996, wherein Jose supposedly appointed
Milagros as his attorney-in-fact, was actually null and
void.
Tomas and Milagros were ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify Jose the amount of P20,000.00 as temperate
damages.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The CA Ruling
Tomas appealed the RTC's ruling to the CA.
In a decision dated August 28, 2009,27 the CA affirmed the
RTC ruling that the deed of sale and the SPA were void.
However, the CA modified the judgment of the RTC: first,
by deleting the award of temperate damages; and second,
by directing Jose and Milagros to reimburse Tomas the
purchase price of P200,000.00, with interest, under the
principle of unjust enrichment. Despite Tomas' allegation
that he paid P700,000.00 for the subject lot, the CA found
that there was no convincing evidence that established
this claim.28chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas filed a motion for the reconsideration of the CA
decision on the ground that the amount of P200,000.00 as
reimbursement for the purchase price of the house and
lot was insufficient and not supported by the evidence
formally offered before and admitted by the RTC. Tomas
contended that the actual amount he paid as
consideration for the sale was P700,000.00, as supported
by his testimony before the
RTC.29chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The C A denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit" in a resolution dated November 17,
2009.30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Petition
Tomas filed the present petition for review
on certiorari to challenge the CA ruling which ordered the
reimbursement of P200,000.00 only, instead of the actual
purchase price he paid in the amount of
P700,000.00.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Tomas argues that, first, all matters contained in the
deed of sale, including the consideration stated, cannot
be used as evidence since it was declared null and
void; second, the deed of sale was not specifically offered
to prove the actual consideration of the sale;32third, his
testimony establishing the actual purchase price of
P700,000.00 paid was uncontroverted;33 and, fourth, Jose
must return the full amount actually paid under the
principle of solutio indebiti.34chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
2
Jose, on the other hand, argues that first, Jose is
estopped from questioning the purchase price indicated in
the deed of dale for failing to immediately raise this
question; and second, the terms of an agreement reduced
into writing are deemed to include all the terms agreed
upon and no other evidence can be admitted other than
the terms of the agreement
itself.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The Issues
The core issues are (1) whether the deed of sale can be
used as the basis for the amount of consideration paid;
and (2) whether the testimony of Tomas is sufficient to
establish the actual purchase price of the
sale.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
OUR RULING
We affirm the CA ruling and deny the petition.
Whether Tomas paid the purchase price of P700,000.00 is
a question of fact not proper in a petition for review
on certiorari. Appreciation of evidence and inquiry on the
correctness of the appellate court's factual findings are
not the functions of this Court, as we are not a trier of
facts.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This Court does not address questions of fact which
require us to rule on "the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts,"37 except in the following
cases:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10)
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The present case does not fall under any of these
exceptions.
Whether Tomas sufficiently proved that he paid
P700,000.00 for the subject property is a factual question
that the CA had already resolved in the negative.39 The CA
found Tomas' claim of paying P700,000.00 for the subject
property to be unsubstantiated as he failed to tender any
convincing evidence to establish his claim.
We uphold the CA's finding.
In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence.40 Moreover, the parties must
rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent.41chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence."42 Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence that is more convincing to the court
as it is worthier of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.43chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We agree with the CA that Tomas' bare allegation that he
paid Milagros the sum of P700,000.00 cannot be
considered as proof of payment, without any other
convincing evidence to establish this claim. Tomas' bare
allegation, while uncontroverted, does not automatically
entitle it to be given weight and credence.
It is settled in jurisprudence that one who pleads payment
has the burden of proving it;44 the burden rests on the
defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff
to prove non-payment.45 A mere allegation is not
evidence,46 and the person who alleges has the burden of
proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of
evidence, which in civil cases is preponderance of
evidence.
The force and effect of a void contract is distinguished
from its admissibility as evidence.
The next question to be resolved is whether the CA
correctly ordered the reimbursement of P200,000.00,
which is the consideration stated in the Deed of Sale,
based on the principle of unjust enrichment.
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in relying on the
consideration stated in the deed of sale as basis for the
reimbursable amount because a null and void document
cannot be used as evidence.
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument.
A void or inexistent contract has no force and effect from
the very beginning.47 This rule applies to contracts that
are declared void by positive provision of law, as in the
case of a sale of conjugal property without the other
spouse's written consent.48 A void contract is equivalent to
nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. 49 It
cannot be validated either by ratification or
prescription.50 When, however, any of the terms of a void
contract have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has
been given under it.51chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is basic that if a void contract has already "been
performed, the restoration of what has been given is in
order."52 This principle springs from Article 22 of the New
Civil Code which states that "every person who through an
act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall
return the same." Hence, the restitution of what each
party has given is a consequence of a void and inexistent
contract.
While the terms and provisions of a void contract cannot
3
be enforced since it is deemed inexistent, it does not
preclude the admissibility of the contract as evidence to
prove matters that occurred in the course of executing
the contract, i.e., what each party has given in the
execution of the contract.
Evidence is the means of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact,
sanctioned by the Rules of Court.53 The purpose of
introducing documentary evidence is to ascertain the
truthfulness of a matter at issue, which can be the entire
content or a specific provision/term in the document.
The deed of sale as documentary evidence may be used as
a means to ascertain the truthfulness of the consideration
stated and its actual payment. The purpose of introducing
the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms
written in the contract, which is an obligatory force and
effect of a valid contract. The deed of sale, rather, is
used as a means to determine matters that occurred in
the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of
what each party has given under the void contract to
allow restitution and prevent unjust enrichment.
Evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and
is not excluded by the law of these rules.54There is no
provision in the Rules of Evidence which excludes the
admissibility of a void document. The Rules only require
that the evidence is relevant and not excluded by the
Rules for its admissibility.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Hence, a void document is admissible as evidence because
the purpose of introducing it as evidence is to ascertain
the truth respecting a matter of fact, not to enforce the
terms of the document itself.
It is also settled in jurisprudence that with respect to
evidence which appears to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be
liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admit them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the
court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent.
On the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later
to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied
by completely discarding them or ignoring
them.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the deed of sale was declared null
and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting the
sale of conjugal property without the spouse's consent. It
does not, however, preclude the possibility that Tomas
paid the consideration stated therein. The admission of
the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the liberal
policy of the court to admit the evidence: which appears
to be relevant in resolving an issue before the courts.
An offer to prove the regular execution of the deed of
sale is basis for the court to determine the presence of
the essential elements of the sale, including the
consideration paid.
Tomas argues that the Deed of Sale was not specifically
offered to prove the actual consideration of the sale and,
hence, cannot be considered by the court. Tomas is
incorrect.
The deed of sale in the present case was formally offered
by both parties as evidence.57 Tomas, in fact, formally
offered it for the purpose of proving its execution and the
regularity of the sale.58chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The offer of the deed of sale to prove its regularity
necessarily allowed the; lower courts to consider the
terms written therein to determine whether all the
essential elements59 for a valid contract of sale are
present, including the consideration of the sale. The fact
that the sale was declared null and void does not prevent
the court from relying on consideration stated in the deed
of sale to determine the actual amount paid by the
petitioner for the purpose of preventing unjust
enrichment.
Hence, the specific offer of the Deed of Sale to prove the
actual consideration of the sale is not necessary since it is
necessarily included in determining the regular execution
of the sale.
The consideration stated in the notarized Deed of Sale
is prima facie evidence of the amount paid by the
petitioner.
The notarized deed of sale is a public document and
is prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated
therein.60chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Prima facie evidence is defined as evidence good and
sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment
of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or
defense and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will
remain sufficient.61chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the present case, the consideration stated in the deed
of sale constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount
paid by Tomas for the transfer of the property to his
name. Tomas failed to adduce satisfactory evidence to
rebut or contradict the consideration stated as the actual
consideration and amount paid to Milagros and Jose.
The deed of sale was declared null and void by a positive
provision of law requiring the consent of both spouses for
the sale of conjugal property. There is, however, no
question on the presence of the consideration of the sale,
except with respect to the actual amount paid. While the
deed of sale has no force and effect as a contract, it
remains prima facie evidence of the actual consideration
paid.
As earlier discussed, Tomas failed to substantiate his
claim that he paid to Milagros the amount of P700,000.00,
instead of the amount of P200,000.00 stated in the deed
of sale. No documentary or testimonial evidence to prove
payment of the higher amount was presented, apart from
Tomas' sole testimony. Tomas' sole testimony of payment
is self-serving and insufficient to unequivocally prove that
Milagros received P700,000.00 for the subject property.
Hence, the consideration stated in the deed of sale
remains sufficient evidence of the actual amount the
petitioner paid and the same amount which should be
4
returned under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Unjust enrichment exists "when a person unjustly retains
a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity, and good conscience." 62 The
prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public
policy of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil
Code.63chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return
what he or Milagros received under the void contract
which presumably benefitted their conjugal partnership.
Accordingly, the CA correctly ordered Jose to return the
amount of P200,000.00 since this the consideration stated
in the Deed of Sale and given credence by the lower
court. Indeed, even Jose expressly stated in his comment
that Tomas is entitled to recover the money paid by him
in the amount of P200,000.00 as appearing in the
contract.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for review
on certiorari. The decision dated August 28, 2009 and the
resolution dated November 17, 2009, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88645 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company vs. Ley
Construction and Development Corporation,
G.R. No. 185590, December 3, 2014
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’
Decision1 dated September 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75590
dismissing the appeal of petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company assailing the dismissal of its complaint by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 56, and the
Resolution2 dated December 5, 2008 denying the Bank’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals adopted the following recital of facts in
the Decision3 dated July 3, 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No.
91-1878:
This is an action for recovery of a sum of money and damages
with a prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
attachment filed by the plaintiff Philippine Banking
Corporation4 against the defendants, namely: Ley
Construction and Development Corporation (hereafter
“LCDC”) and Spouses Manuel and Janet C. Ley (hereafter
“[defendant]-spouses”).
The complaint alleges that: Defendant LCDC, a general
contracting firm, through the oral representations of
defendant-spouses, applied with plaintiff, a commercial
bank, for the opening of a Letter of Credit. Plaintiff issued,
on April 26, 1990, Letter of Credit DC 90[-]303-C in favor of
the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises Limited, in the
amount of Eight Hundred Two Thousand Five Hundred U.S.
Dollars (USD 802,500.00). The letter of credit covered the
importation by defendant LCDC of Fifteen Thousand (15,000)
metric tons of Iraqi cement from Iraq. Defendant applied for
and filed with plaintiff two (2) Applications for Amendment
of Letter of Credit on May 3, 1990 and May 11, 1990,
respectively.
Thereafter, the supplier-beneficiary Global Enterprises, Inc.
negotiated its Letter of Credit with the negotiating bank
Credit Suisse of Zurich, Switzerland. Credit Suisse then sent a
reimbursement claim by telex to American Express Bank
Ltd., New York on July 25, 1990 for the amount of Seven
Hundred Sixty[-]Six Thousand Seven Hundred Eight U.S.
Dollars (USD 766,708.00) with a certification that all terms
and conditions of the credit were complied with.
Accordingly, on July 30, 1990, American Express Bank
debited plaintiff’s account Seven Hundred Seventy Thousand
Six Hundred Ninety[-]One U.S. Dollars and Thirty Cents (USD
770,691.30) and credited Credit Suisse Zurich Account with
American Express Bank, Ltd., New York for the negotiation of
Letter of Credit. On August 6, 1990, plaintiff received from
Credit Suisse the necessary shipping documents pertaining to
Letter of Credit DC 90-303-C that were in turn delivered to
the defendant. Upon receipt of the aforesaid documents,
defendants executed a trust receipt. However, the cement
that was to be imported through the opening of the subject
Letter of Credit never arrived in the Philippines.
The prompt payment of the obligation of the defendant LCDC
was guaranteed by [defendant]-spouses under the Continuing
Surety Agreement executed by the latter in favor of the
defendant.
The obligation covered by the subject Letter of Credit in the
amount of USD 802,500.00 has long been overdue and
unpaid, notwithstanding repeated demands for payment
thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, instituted the instant complaint
for recovery of the following amounts: Twenty[-]Three
[M]illion Two Hundred [F]ifty[-]Nine Thousand One Hundred
Twenty[-]Four Pesos and Fourteen Centavos
(PHP23,259,124.14) as of June 15, 1991, inclusive of interest
and penalty, plus additional interest thereon of Thirty
percent (30%) per annum; attorney’s fees equivalent to
Twenty[-]Five percent [25%] of the total obligation; and costs
of suit.
In support of its cause of action against defendant, plaintiff
presented the testimony of Mr. Fenelito Cabrera, Head of the
Foreign Department of plaintiff’s Head Office. (T.S.N. dated
June 16, 1995, p. 4) There being no other witness to be
presented by the plaintiff (Order dated June 27, 1997), the
plaintiff filed its formal offer of exhibits dated July 18, 1997
to which defendant filed its comments/objections to formal
offer of evidence dated February 23, 1998. In an order dated
March 4, 1998, Exhibits “A” to “N” to “N-4” including [their]
sub-markings were admitted for the purposes they were
respectively offered. However, on defendants’ motion for
reconsideration dated [March 30,] 1998 that was duly
opposed by the plaintiff in its opposition dated June 3, 1998,
this Court partially granted defendants’ motion for
reconsideration. Consequently, Exhibits “D”, “E”, “H”, “I”,
“J”, “K”, “L”, and “M” and their sub-markings were not
admitted for not being properly identified and authenticated
by a competent witness. Only Exhibits “A”, “B”, “C”, “C-1”,
and “N”, “N-1” to “N-4” remain admitted in evidence.
(Order dated September 9, 1998)
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to
evidence on the ground that plaintiff’s witness Mr. Fenelito
Cabrera was incompetent to testify with respect to the
transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant and that
5
the plaintiff’s documentary exhibits were not properly
identified and authenticated.5
The trial court found that the Bank’s only witness, Fenelito
Cabrera, was incompetent to testify on the documents
presented by the Bank during the trial. Cabrera was with the
Bank’s Dasmariñas Branch and not with the Head Office from
March 1990 to June 1991, the period the transaction covered
by the documents took place. Thus, he could not have
properly identified and authenticated the Bank’s
documentary exhibits. His lack of competence was even
admitted by the Bank’s counsel who did not even ask Cabrera
to identify the documents. As the documents were not
identified and duly authenticated, the Bank’s evidence was
not preponderant enough to establish its right to recover
from LCDC and the spouses Ley.6
The trial court further ruled that only the following
documents remained admitted in evidence:
Exhibit Document
“A” Continuing Surety Agreement dated
July 25, 1989
“B” Application and Agreement for
Commercial Letter of Credit
“C” and “C-1” Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C
“N” and “N-1” to Statement of Outstanding Obligations
“N-4”
For the trial court, these were insufficient to show that LCDC
and the spouses Ley were responsible for the improper
negotiation of the letter of credit. Thus, the trial court
concluded in its Decision dated July 3, 2001 that the Bank
failed to establish its cause of action and to make a
sufficient or preponderant case.7 The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the demurrer to evidence is granted. The case
is dismissed.8
The Bank appealed to the Court of Appeals. It claimed that
the trial court erred in granting the demurrer to evidence of
LCDC and the spouses Ley on the ground that the Bank failed
to establish its cause of action. The Bank insisted that, even
without considering the exhibits excluded in evidence by the
trial court, the Bank was able to prove by preponderant
evidence that it had a right and that right was violated by
LCDC and the spouses Ley. It explained that the trial court
was wrong in considering only Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “C-1,”
“N” and “N-1” to “N-4” as the following documents were
also admitted in evidence and should have been considered
in the resolution of the demurrer to evidence.9
Exhibit Document
“F” Register Copy or Memorandum on the
Letter of Credit
“G” Trust Receipt No. TRI432/90 dated
August 16, 1990
“G-1” Bank Draft
“G-2” Bill of Exchange
The Bank asserted that the consideration of Exhibits “F,” “G”
and “G-1” to “G-2” would have established the following:
(a) On August 16, 1990, LCDC and the spouses Ley received
from the Bank the necessary shipping documents relative to
the Letter of Credit evidencing title to the goods subject
matter of the importation which the Bank had previously
received from Credit Suisse;
(b) Upon receipt of the shipping documents, LCDC and the
spouses Ley executed a trust receipt, Trust Receipt No.
TRI432/90, in favor of the Bank covering the importation of
cement under Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C;
(c) The issuance of the trust receipt was an
acknowledgement by LCDC and the spouses Ley of their
receipt of the shipping documents and of their liability to the
Bank;
(d) By signing the trust receipt, constituted an admission by
LCDC and the spouses Ley that the Letter of Credit was in
order, including the Bank’s payment of the amount of
US$766,708.00 under the Letter of Credit.10
Thus, even with only the testimony of Cabrera and Exhibits
“A,” “B,” “C,” “C-1,” “N” and “N-1” to “N-4” and “F,” “G”
and “G-1” to “G-2,” the demurrer should have been denied
and LCDC and the spouses Ley held liable to the Bank.
Moreover, the Bank contended that its Exhibits “D,” “E,”
“H,” and “I” should have been also admitted in evidence
because LCDC and the spouses Ley effectively admitted the
authenticity of the said documents when they stated in the
pre-trial brief which they submitted during the pre-trial of
the case at the trial court:
III. DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS
Defendants shall adopt the documents submitted by plaintiff
and marked as Annexes “A”, “B”, “C”, “D”, “E”, “E-1”, “F”,
“G”, “G-1”, “H” and “H-1” in the plaintiff’s complaint.
Defendants reserve the right to mark or adopt such other
documentary evidence as may be discovered or warranted to
support its claim in the course of the trial. x x x.11
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the Bank’s appeal. It
observed that Cabrera, the Bank’s only witness, prepared
and properly identified Exhibits “F,” “G,” “N” and “N-1” to
“N-4” only. The Bank’s counsel even admitted in open court
during Cabrera’s direct examination that Cabrera was
incompetent to testify on the rest of the Exhibits. The trial
court was therefore correct in not giving any evidentiary
weight to those Exhibits not properly identified by Cabrera.12
For the Court of Appeals, the statement in the pre-trial brief
that LCDC and the spouses Ley “shall adopt” Annexes “A,”
“B,” “C,” “D,” “E,” “E-1,” “F,” “G,” “G-1,” “H” and “H-1”
of the Bank’s complaint did not constitute an admission of
the said documents by LCDC and the spouses Ley. However,
the appellate court noted that LCDC and the spouses Ley
admitted the existence and authenticity of the Bank’s
Exhibits “A,” “B,” “C,” “C-1,” and “G.”13
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals ruled that the following
Exhibits of the Bank were admitted in evidence:
Exhibit Document
“A” Continuing Surety Agreement dated
July 25, 1989
“B” Application and Agreement for
Commercial Letter of Credit
6
 “C” and “C-1” Letter of Credit No. DC 90-303-C
“F” Register Copy or Memorandum on the
Letter of Credit
“G” Trust Receipt No. TRI432/90 dated
August 16, 1990
“N” and “N-1” to Statement of Outstanding Obligations
“N-4”
Even upon inclusion and consideration of the above-
mentioned exhibits, the Court of Appeals held that the Bank
still failed to show that LCDC and the spouses Ley were
directly responsible for the improper negotiation of the
letter of credit. Thus, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated September 4, 2008, dismissed the appeal and affirmed
the decision of the trial court.14 The dispositive portion of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the RTC,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 56, Makati City in
Civil Case No. 91-1878 is AFFIRMED.15
The Court of Appeals denied the Bank’s motion for
reconsideration, prompting the Bank to file this petition.
The Bank insists that it has been able to establish its cause of
action not only through preponderance of evidence but even
by the admissions of LCDC and the spouses Ley. It maintains
that its cause of action is not predicated on the improper
negotiation of the letter of credit but on the breach of the
terms and conditions of the trust receipt.16
The petition fails.
First, the Bank’s petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. In
particular, it contravenes the elementary rule of appellate
procedure that an appeal to this Court by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court “shall raise
only questions of law.”17 The rule is based on the nature of
this Court’s appellate function – this Court is not a trier of
facts18 – and on the evidentiary weight given to the findings
of fact of the trial court which have been affirmed on appeal
by the Court of Appeals – they are conclusive on this
Court.19 While there are recognized exceptions to the
rule,20 this Court sees no reason to apply the exception and
not the rule in this case.
The conceptual distinction between a question of law and a
question of fact is well-settled in case law:
There is a “question of law” when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and
which does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the
other hand, there is a “question of fact” when the doubt or
controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. x x x.21
The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its
cause of action by preponderant evidence is essentially a
question of fact. Stated in another way, the issue which the
Bank raises in this petition is whether the evidence it
presented during the trial was preponderant enough to hold
LCDC and the spouses Ley liable.
The required burden of proof, or that amount of evidence
necessary and sufficient to establish one’s claim or defense,
in civil cases is preponderance of evidence.22 Preponderance
of evidence is defined as follows:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value
of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of evidence” or “greater weight of the credible
evidence.” Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which,
in the last analysis, means probability to truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier
of belief than that which is offered in opposition
thereto.23 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
As preponderance of evidence refers to the probability to
truth of the matters intended to be proven as facts, it
concerns a determination of the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts based on the evidence presented. Thus, a
review of the respective findings of the trial and the
appellate courts as to the preponderance of a party’s
evidence requires that the reviewing court address a
question of fact.
Moreover, a demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Evidence is the
means, sanctioned by the Rules of Court, of ascertaining in a
judicial proceeding the truth respecting a matter of
fact.24 As such, the question of sufficiency or insufficiency of
evidence, the basic issue presented by the Bank, pertains to
the question of whether the factual matters alleged by the
Bank are true. Plainly, it is a question of fact and, as such,
not proper subject of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was
incumbent upon the Bank to demonstrate that this case fell
under any of the exceptions to this rule but it failed to do so.
Second, the Bank attempts to avoid the “only questions of
law” rule for appeals filed under Rule 45 by invoking the
misapprehension of facts exception.25 According to the Bank,
the trial and the appellate courts misapprehended the facts
with respect to the determination of the basis of the Bank’s
cause of action.26 In particular, the Bank contends that both
the trial and the appellate courts erred in the consideration
of the proper actionable document upon which the Bank
based its cause of action. The Bank asserts that its cause of
action is not grounded on the Letter of Credit but on the
Trust Receipt.
The Bank’s reference to the Trust Receipt as its “primary
actionable document”27 is mistaken and misleading.
The nature of the cause of action is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint.28 A party’s cause of action is not
what the party says it is, nor is it what the designation of the
complaint states, but what the allegations in the body define
and describe.29
In this case, the Bank’s allegations as to the basis of its cause
of action against LCDC and the spouses Ley, however, belie
the Bank’s claim. In particular, the relevant portion of the
Bank’s Complaint30 reads:
1.2 The defendants:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a. Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) is a
general contracting firm engaged in the construction of
buildings, infrastructures, and other civil works with
principal office at Mapulang Lupa St., Malinta, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila where it [may be] served with summons and
other processes of this Court.
b. Sps. Manuel and Janet C. Ley, the major stockholders of
defendant (LCDC) with business address at 23rd Floor Pacific
7
Star Bldg., Makati Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila where the
processes of this Honorable Court [may be] served upon them
are impleaded herein in their capacity as Surety for the
obligation incurred by defendant LCDC with the herein
plaintiff by virtue of a Continuing Surety Agreement they
executed in favor of the plaintiff, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex “A”;
2. STATEMENT OF CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT
LCDC AND SPOUSES MANUEL AND JANET LEY
2.1 In conjunction with its business, defendant LCDC sought
to import “Iraqi Cement” from Iraq thru its supplier “Global
Enterprises, Limited” with address at 15 A. Tuckeys Lane,
Gibraltar.
2.2 To finance this importation, defendant LCDC applied with
the plaintiff for the opening of Letter of Credit as evidenced
by the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of
Credit, copy of which is marked as Annex “B” and made
integral part hereof.
2.3 Acting on defendant[’]s oral representation and those
stated in its application (Annex “B”), plaintiff issued on April
26, 1990 its Letter of Credit No. DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the
supplier Global Enterprises Limited, as beneficiary in the
amount of U.S. Dollars: EIGHT HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND
FIVE HUNDRED (US $802,500) for the account of defendant,
covering the importation of 15,000 metric tons of Iraqi
Cement from Iraq, copy of the Letter of Credit is marked as
Annex “C” and made integral part hereof;
2.4 On May 3, 1990, defendant applied for and filed with
plaintiff an Application for Amendment of Letter of Credit,
copy of which is attached as Annex “D” hereof, and another
application for amendment was filed on May 11, 1990 copy of
which is marked as Annexes “E” and “E-1” hereof;
2.5 After these amendments were communicated to the
negotiating bank, Credit Suisse of Zurich, Switzerland, the
beneficiary negotiated its Letter of Credit therewith.
Thereafter, Credit Suisse sent a reimbursement claim by
telex to American Express Bank Ltd., New York on July 25,
1990 for the amount of US$766,708.00 with a Certification
that all terms and conditions of the credit were complied
with;
2.6 Accordingly, on July 30, 1990, American Express Bank
debited plaintiff’s account US$770,691.30 and credited
Credit Suisse Zurich Account with American Express Bank
Ltd., New York for the negotiation of Letter of Credit;
2.7 On August 6, 1990, plaintiff received from Credit Suisse
the necessary shipping documents pertaining to Letter of
Credit DC 90-303-C all of which were in turn delivered and
received by the defendant on August 16, 1990 as evidenced
by their acknowledgment appearing on the plaintiff’s register
copy, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “F”;
2.8 Upon defendant’s receipt of the shipping documents and
other documents of title to the imported goods, defendant
signed a trust receipt manifesting its acceptance/conformity
that the negotiation of the LC is in order. A copy of the TR
and the draft issued by the defendant as a means of paying
its LC obligation to the plaintiff are hereto attached and
marked as Annexes “G” and “G-1” hereof;
2.9 Sometime during the 3rd week of August, defendant
LCDC informed the plaintiff that the expected shipment of
cement subject matter of the LC was allegedly held up in
Iraq purportedly on account of the trade embargo imposed
against it by the United Nation[s] and sought assistance from
the plaintiff to secure no-dollar import permit from the
Central Bank as defendant was negotiating with its supplier
Global Enterprises Limited, Inc. for an alternate shipment of
Syrian Cement.
2.10 Plaintiff acceded to the request of the defendant and
conformably secured the requested approval from Central
Bank to allow the defendant to import cement on a no-dollar
basis, a copy of the defendant’s request as well as the
Central Bank approval are hereto attached as Annexes “H”
and “H-1”.
2.11 About two months after the plaintiff has obtained the
requested Central Bank approval (Annex “H-1”)[,] plaintiff
was again advised by the defendant that the alternate
shipment of Syrian Cement is no longer forthcoming and that
defendant LCDC after a series of negotiation with its supplier
has agreed with the latter for a reimbursement of the value
of the negotiated Letter of Credit.
2.12 While defendant was negotiating with its supplier for
that replacement of Syrian cement, defendant advised
plaintiff not to initiate any move as it might jeopardize
defendant’s negotiation with its supplier.
2.13 In December 1990, four (4) months from defendant’s
receipt of the shipping and export documents from plaintiff,
as it became perceptible that defendant’s negotiation with
its supplier for reimbursement or replacement would fail[,]
defendant for the first time asked for copies of the
beneficiary’s draft, the Charter Party Agreement even as it
contested the validity of defendant’s obligation to plaintiff.
2.14 For the first time, defendant also began to assail the
validity of the payment made by the plaintiff to the supplier
(Global Enterprises Ltd.) through Credit Suisse, with the
intention of avoiding the payment of its lawful obligation to
reimburse the plaintiff the amount of US $802,500 which
obligation is now long overdue and unpaid notwithstanding
repeated demands.
2.15 The obligation covered by the aforesaid Letter of
Credit bears interest and charges at the rate of 30% per
annum which rate [may be] increased or decreased within
the limits allowed by the law.
2.16 The prompt payment of the obligations contracted by
defendant LCDC from the plaintiff inclusive of the subject
Letter of Credit is guaranteed by defendant Sps. Manuel and
Janet Ley by making themselves jointly and severally liable
with the defendant LCDC in accordance with the terms of a
Continuing Surety Agreement which they executed in favor of
the plaintiff (Annex “A”).31 (Emphases supplied.)
That the Bank’s cause of action was hinged on the Letter of
Credit is unmistakable. Taken as a whole, the Bank’s
allegations make a cause of action based on the Letter of
Credit. The Trust Receipt was mentioned incidentally and
appears only in paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint.32 In stark
contrast, the Letter of Credit figures prominently in the
Complaint as it is mentioned in almost all of the paragraphs
of Part 2 (Statement of Cause of Action Against Defendant
LCDC and Spouses Manuel and Janet Ley). More tellingly, in
paragraph 2.15, the Bank speaks of “the obligation covered
by the aforesaid Letter of Credit.” 33
Moreover, under paragraphs 1.2(b) and 2.16 of the
Complaint, the spouses Ley have been impleaded as co-
8
defendants of LCDC on account of their execution of a
Continuing Surety Agreement in the Bank’s favor to
guarantee the “prompt payment of the obligations
contracted by defendant LCDC from the plaintiff inclusive of
the subject Letter of Credit.”34 In short, the Bank seeks to
hold liable (1) LCDC for its obligations under the Letter of
Credit, and (2) the spouses Ley for their obligations under
the Continuing Surety Agreement which stands as security for
the Letter of Credit and not for the Trust Receipt.
Another significant factor that contradicts the Bank’s
assertion that its “primary actionable document” is the Trust
Receipt is the manner it pleaded the Letter of Credit and the
Trust Receipt, respectively.
The relevant rule on actionable documents is Section 7, Rule
8 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Action or defense based on document. – Whenever
an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or
document, the substance of such instrument or document
shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy
thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit,
which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said
copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.
An “actionable document” is a written instrument or
document on which an action or defense is founded. It may
be pleaded in either of two ways:
(1) by setting forth the substance of such document in the
pleading and attaching the document thereto as an annex, or
(2) by setting forth said document verbatim in the pleading.35
A look at the allegations in the Complaint quoted above will
show that the Bank did not set forth the contents of the
Trust Receipt verbatim in the pleading. The Bank did not
also set forth the substance of the Trust Receipt in the
Complaint but simply attached a copy thereof as an
annex. Rather than setting forth the substance of the Trust
Receipt, paragraph 2.8 of the Complaint shows that the Bank
simply described the Trust Receipt as LCDC’s manifestation
of “its acceptance/conformity that the negotiation of the
[Letter of Credit] is in order.”36
In contrast, while the Bank did not set forth the contents of “In consideration of your arranging, at my/o[u]r request[,]
the Letter of Credit verbatim in the Complaint, the Bank set for the establishment of this commercial letter of credit
forth the substance of the Letter of Credit in paragraph 2.3 (thereinafter referred to as the [“]Credit[”]) substantially in
of the Complaint and attached a copy thereof as Annex “C” accordance with the foregoing, I/we hereby covenant and
of the Complaint. The Bank stated that it “issued on April agree to each and all of [the] provisions and conditions
26, 1990 its Letter of Credit No. DC 90[-]303-C in favor of the stipulated on the reverse side hereof.”40
supplier Global Enterprises Limited, as beneficiary[,] in the
amount of U.S. Dollars: EIGHT HUNDRED TWO THOUSAND
The above stipulation actually appears on the Application
FIVE HUNDRED (US$802,500.00) for the account of defendant
and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit, the Bank’s
[LCDC], covering the importation of 15,000 metric tons of
Exhibit “B.” It is the contract which contains the provisions
Iraqi Cement from Iraq.”37
and conditions governing the legal relationship of the Bank
and LCDC, particularly their respective rights and
Thus, the Bank’s attempt to cling to the Trust Receipt as its
obligations, in connection with the Bank’s issuance of Letter
so-called “primary actionable document” is negated by the
of Credit No. DC 90-303-C. The importance of the provisions
manner of its allegations in the Complaint. Thus, too, the
and conditions supposed to be stipulated on the reverse side
trial and the appellate courts did not misapprehend the facts
of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of
when they considered the Letter of Credit as the basis of the
Credit is underscored by the following note appearing below
Bank’s cause of action.
the space for the signature of Janet Ley:
Third, a look at the Letter of Credit, the actionable
IMPORTANT: PLEASE READ PROVISIONS AND CONDITIONS ON
document on which the Bank relied in its case against LCDC
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF BEFORE SIGNING ABOVE.41
and the spouses Ley, confirms the identical findings of the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.
However, the Bank’s Exhibit “B” has nothing on its reverse
In Keng Hua Paper Products Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we side. In other words, the reverse side of the Application and
held38: Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit is a blank
page.42 Even the copy of the Application and Agreement for
In a letter of credit, there are three distinct and Commercial Letter of Credit attached to the Bank’s
independent contracts: (1) the contract of sale between the Complaint also has nothing on its back page.43
buyer and the seller, (2) the contract of the buyer with the
issuing bank, and (3) the letter of credit proper in which the A cause of action – the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another44 – has three essential elements:
bank promises to pay the seller pursuant to the terms and
conditions stated therein. x x x.
(1) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;
(2) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such
Here, what is involved is the second contract – the contract
right; and
of LCDC, as the buyer of Iraqi cement, with the Bank, as the
(3) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the
issuer of the Letter of Credit. The Bank refers to that
right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to
contract in the Petition for Review on Certiorari and the
the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action
Memorandum filed by the Bank in this case when the Bank
for the recovery of relief from the defendant.45
argues that, as LCDC and the spouses Ley have admitted the
issuance of the Letter of Credit in their favor, they are
Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action
“deemed to have likewise admitted the terms and conditions
arises only upon the occurrence of the last element, giving
thereof, as evidenced by the stipulation therein appearing
the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for
above the signature of respondent Janet Ley,”39 viz:
recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.46 In this
case, however, even the legal rights of the Bank and the
correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently
9
established by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank’s
evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern
its legal relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of
the provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back
of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of
Credit. Even assuming arguendo that there was no
impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and the
Bank’s cause of action was simply for the collection of what
it paid under said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not
discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of
action against LCDC.
This failure of the Bank to present preponderant evidence
that will establish the liability of LCDC under the Letter of
Credit necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose liability is
supposed to be based on a Continuing Surety Agreement
guaranteeing the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.
The Court therefore finds no reason to disturb the rulings of
the courts a quo as the petition put forward insufficient basis
to warrant their reversal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156284 | 02062007
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator
of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez,
Petitioner, - versus -
MARIA RITA GOMEZ-SAMSON, MARCIAL
SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, and the
REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF PASIG and MARIKINA, RIZAL,
Respondents.
AUGUSTO GOMEZ, as Special Administrator
of the Intestate Estate of Consuelo Gomez,
Petitioner, - versus -
ARISTON A. GOMEZ, SR. (who died during
the pendency of the cases below and
substituted by his surviving wife, LUZ
BAYSON GOMEZ, and children
namely:ARISTON B. GOMEZ, JR., MA. RITA
GOMEZ-SAMSON, JESUS B. GOMEZ, MA.
TERESA G. BLOOM, MARIANO B. GOMEZ, and
CARLOS B. GOMEZ) and ARISTON B. GOMEZ,
JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Which came first, the chicken or the egg?
This age-old question has spurned millions of debates
in scientific and religious circles, and has stimulated the
imagination of generations of children and adults. Many
profess that they are certain of the answer, and yet their
answers are divergent.
The case at bar involves a similarly baffling question,
but in significantly lesser proportions of philosophical
mystery. Petitioner claims that, in the two Deeds of Donation
he is impugning, the signatures of the donee were jotted down
before the bodies of the Deeds were typewritten.Respondents
maintain that the bodies of the Deeds were encoded first, and
then, a clashing presentation of expert witnesses and
circumstantial evidence ensued. Petitioners expert claims she
is certain of the answer: the signature came first. Respondents
expert, on the other hand, says that it is impossible to
determine which came first accurately. As both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondents,
petitioner is furious how these courts could adopt an opinion
that was neither here nor there.
However, as it is with the chicken and egg riddle, is
the person certain of which came first necessarily the one who
is more credible?
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
Decision[1] and Resolution[2] dated 4 September 2002 and 27
November 2002, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 40391 affirming the Joint Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City dated 8 April 1992 in Civil Cases
No. 36089 and No. 36090.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
On February 15, 1980, [petitioner]
instituted these cases, to wit: (1) Civil Case
No. 36089, entitled: Augusto Gomez, as
Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Maria
Rita Gomez-Samson, Marcial Samson, Jesus
B. Gomez, and the Registers of Deeds of Pasig
and Marikina, Rizal, Defendants; and (2) Civil
Case No. 36090, entitled: Augusto Gomez, as
Special Administrator of the Intestate Estate
of Consuelo Gomez, Plaintiff, versus Ariston
Gomez, Sr., and Ariston B. Gomez, Jr.,
Defendants, both in the Regional Trial Court,
Pasig City.
CONSUELO, ARISTON, SR. and Angel,
all surnamed Gomez, were sister and
brothers, respectively. MARIA-RITA Gomez-
Samson, JESUS Gomez and ARISTON Gomez,
JR. are the children of ARISTON, SR. while
AUGUSTO Gomez is the child of Angel.
In Civil Case No. 36089, plaintiff
AUGUSTO alleged in his complaint that
CONSUELO, who died on November 6, 1979,
was the owner of the following real
properties:
(a) A parcel of land, with all the
improvements thereon, situated
in Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by
10
 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 340233 in
her name, x x x;
(b) A parcel of land, with all the
improvements thereon, situated in
Marikina, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 353818
in her name, x x x,
(c) A parcel of land, with all the
improvements thereon, situated
in Pasig, Metro Manila, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 268396
in her name, x x x;
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants
Rita and Jesus fraudulently prepared and/or
caused to be prepared a Deed of
Donation Intervivos; that in the said
document, Consuelo donated the above
described properties to defendants Rita and
Jesus; that the said defendants forged or
caused to be forged the signature of the
donor, Consuelo; that the notarial
acknowledgement on the said document was
antedated to April 21, 1979; that on the basis
of the said document defendants sought the
cancellation of the certificates of title in the
name of Consuelo and the issuance of new
ones in the names of defendants Rita and
Jesus.
On the basis of the foregoing, plaintiff prayed
that the Deed of Donation Intervivos be
declared false, null and void ab initio, and/or
be nullified; that TCT Nos. 340233, 353818,
and 268396 be reinstated or be replaced by
titles in the name of the Intestate Estate of
Consuelo Gomez; and, that defendants be
ordered to pay damages, by way of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation plus costs.
On April 24, 1980, private defendants, and
nominal defendants Registers of Deeds of
Pasig and Marikina, Rizal, filed their common
answer, denying the material allegations in
the complaint and asserting that a copy of
the deed of donation was submitted to the
Notarial Section of the CFI of Quezon City as
early as July 2, 1979; that the said document
is valid and not a forgery or otherwise subject
to similar infirmity; that the said document
being valid, the properties covered therein
passed in ownership to private defendants, as
early as April 20, 1979; that defendants have
the perfect and absolute right to cause the
cancellation of TCT Nos. 340233, 353818, and
26839 and request for the issuance of new
certificates of titles in their respective
names; that they have the right to use,
enjoy, possess, dispose and own these
properties; that no law was violated by the
nominal defendants when the old certificates
of title were cancelled and new certificates
were issued in the name of the private
defendants, hence, plaintiff has no cause of
action against the nominal defendants
neither has the court jurisdiction over the
foregoing issue.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral
damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary
damages of P500,000.00; attorneys fees
of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff
be made jointly and severally liable with the
estate of Consuelo Gomez.
In Civil Case No. 36090, the same plaintiff
alleged in his complaint that Consuelo was
also the sole and absolute owner of the
following personal properties:
(a) Seventy-five (75)
common shares of stock of V-Tri Realty, Inc.
with a total par value of P75,000.00 and
covered by Stock Certificate No. 003;
(b) Eleven thousand eight
hundred fifty three (11,853) common shares
of stock of First Philippine Holdings
Corporation with a total par value
of P118,530.00 covered by Stock Certificates
Nos. A-02614 (7,443 shares) and A-02613
(2,040 shares) and A-09018 (2,370 shares);
(c) Jewelries and
collectors items, contained in Consuelo
Gomezs Safe Deposit Box No. 44 at the PCI
Bank, Marikina Branch, which were
inventoried on January 9, 1980 per Order of
the Court in Special Proceedings No. 9164;
(d) A four-door sedan 1978
Mercedes Benz 200 with Motor No. 11593810-
050706, Serial/Chassis No. 12302050-069893,
Plate No. A6-252 and LTC Registration
Certificate No. 0140373 valued
at P200,000.00, more or less at the time
Consuelo Gomez died;
(e) A four-door sedan 1979
Toyota Corona with Motor No. 12RM-031643,
Serial/Chassis No. RT-130-901150, Plate No.
B-09-373 and LTC Registration Certificate No.
0358757, valued at P50,000.00, more or less
at the time Consuelo Gomez died;
(f) Two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) including accrued
interests on money market placement with
the BA Finance Corporation per its promissory
note No. BAT-0116 dated March 9, 1978.
that after the death of Consuelo, defendants
fraudulently prepared and/or caused to be
prepared a Deed of Donation Intervivos; that
in the said document Consuelo donated the
above described properties to defendants
Ariston, Sr. and Ariston, Jr.; that the said
defendants forged or caused to be forged the
signature of the donor, Consuelo; that the
notarial acknowledgment on the said
document was antedated to April 21, 1979;
that on the basis of the said document
defendant Ariston, Sr., [in] December 1978,
effected or tried to effect a change of the
LTC registration of the two (2) vehicles; that
defendant Ariston, Jr., for his part, pre-
terminated the money market placements
11
with BA Finance and received checks in the
sums of P187,027.74 and P4,405.56; that
with the exception of the jewelries, which
are with the bank, defendant Ariston, Sr., has
benefited and will continue to benefit from
the use of the two (2) vehicles and from the
dividends earned by the shares of stocks.
On the basis of the foregoing, the plaintiff
prayed that the Deed of
Donation Intervivos be declared false, null
and void ab initio, and/or be nullified; that
defendant Ariston, Sr., be ordered to deliver
the stock certificates, jewelries, collectors
items, and vehicles in his possession plus all
the cash dividends earned by the shares of
stock and reasonable compensation for the
use of the two (2) motor vehicles; that
defendant Ariston, Jr. be ordered to pay the
amount of P191,533.00 received by him from
BA Finance, with interest from the time he
received the amount until he fully pays the
plaintiff; and, damages, by way of attorneys
fees and expenses of litigation, plus costs.
On March 19, 1980, defendants Ariston, Sr.
and Ariston Jr., filed their answer, denying
the material allegations in the complaint and
asserting that a copy of the Deed of Donation
was submitted to the Notarial Section of the
CFI of Quezon City as early as July 2, 1979;
that the said document is valid and not a
forgery or otherwise subject to similar
infirmity; that the said document being valid,
the properties covered therein passed in
ownership to defendants, as early as April 20,
1979; and that defendants have the perfect
and absolute right to use, enjoy, possess and
own these properties.
Defendants thereafter prayed for moral
damages of P2,000,000.00; compensatory
damages of P1,000,000.00; exemplary
damages of P500,000.00; attorneys fees
of P200,000.00; and that individual plaintiff
be made jointly and severally liable with the
estate of Consuelo Gomez.
On May 27, 1980, the plaintiff filed a Motion
to Consolidate, in both cases, which the trial
court in Civil Case No. 36090 granted in its
Order dated June 6, 1980. Whereupon, the
records of Civil Case No. 36090 were
transmitted to the RTC, Branch 23.
After appropriate proceedings, the trial court
directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda thirty (30) days from
their receipt of the transcript of stenographic
notes.
In its joint decision dated April 8, 1992, the
trial court dismissed the complaints.[3]
The dispositive portion of the RTC Joint Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, it is Ordered:
1. That the instant complaints be
dismissed;
2. That the replevin bonds nos. 2223,
2224, 2225, and 2226 of the Stronghold
Insurance Company, Incorporated be
cancelled;
3. That Augusto Gomez and the
estate of the late Consuelo Gomez, jointly
and solidarily, should pay to Ariston Gomez,
Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorneys fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all
the amounts, except on costs and attorneys
fees, commencing from February 15, 1980,
until fully paid.[4]
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the Court
of Appeals. The latter affirmed the RTCs Joint Decision in
the 4 September 2002 assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision
is AFFIRMED in toto.[5]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
Resolution dated 27 November 2002.
Petitioner filed the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari, bringing forth before us the following issues for
our consideration:
1) Whether or not the instant
petition presents several exceptions to the
general rule that an appeal
by certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise
questions of law and that factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are binding on this
Honorable Court;
2) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals Decision is based on a
misapprehension of facts and on inferences
that are manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
3) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in its finding of fact
that Consuelo Gomez herself paid the donors
tax of the properties subject of the donation
on 09 October 1979 when the evidence on
record point to the contrary;
12
 4) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in giving credence to
the testimony of former judge Jose
Sebastian, the Notary Public who notarized
the assailed Deeds of Donation;
5) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in dismissing the
irregularities apparent on the face of the
assailed Deeds of Donation as mere lapses of
a non-lawyer who prepared them;
6) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in totally disregarding
the very unusual circumstances relative to
the alleged totally execution and
notarization of the assailed Deeds of
Donation;
7) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly
mistaken in inferring that respondents were
able to sufficiently and substantially explain
the reason for the belated transfer of the
pertinent properties covered by the assailed
Deeds of Donation;
8) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred and is manifestly
mistaken in not giving due weight to the
expert opinion of the NBI representative,
which the lower court itself sought; and
9) Whether or not the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in not finding that the
totality of circumstantial evidence presented
by petitioner produced a single network of
circumstances establishing the simulation
and falsification of the assailed Deeds of
Donation.[6]
As acknowledged by petitioner, findings of fact of the
trial court, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals,
are binding on the Supreme Court.[7] Petitioner, however,
seeks refuge in the following established exceptions[8] to this
rule:
1) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible.[9]
2) When there is grave abuse of discretion
in the appreciation of facts.[10]
3) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.[11]
4) Where the Court of Appeals manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if
properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion;[12] and
5) Where the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the
respondent, or where the findings of fact
of the Court of Appeals are premised on
absence of evidence but are
contradicted by the evidence of
record. [13]
Weight and Credibility of the Expert Witnesses
The core issue in this Petition, as in that in the lower
courts, is whether petitioner was able to prove that the Deeds
of Donation were merely intercalated into two sheets of paper
signed by Consuelo Gomez (Consuelo).
The only direct evidence presented by petitioner on
this matter is the testimony of Zenaida Torres, Document
Examiner[14] of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI). Respondents, on the other hand, presented their own
expert witness, Francisco Cruz, Chief of Document
Examination[15]of the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. Other direct
evidence presented by respondents includes testimonies
positively stating that the Deeds of Donation were signed by
Consuelo in their completed form in the presence of Notary
Public Jose Sebastian. These testimonies are that of Jose
Sebastian himself, and that of several of the respondents
including Ariston Gomez, Jr. (Ariston, Jr.), who allegedly
drafted said Deeds of Donation.
As the testimony of Zenaida Torres is the single most
important evidence of petitioner, it is imperative to examine
the lengthy discussion of the trial court analyzing her
testimony, and the contradictory findings of Francisco Cruz.
Zenaida Torress testimony, as noted by the trial
court, was that she had examined the two Deeds of Donation,
denominated as Documents No. 401 and No. 402, and her
findings were that the signatures therein were indeed those
of Consuelo. However, she opined that Documents No. 401
and No. 402 were not typed or prepared in one continuous
sitting because the horizontal lines had some variances
horizontally. Nevertheless, she admitted that the vertical
lines did not show any variance.
Zenaida Torres also testified that with respect to
Document No. 401, the typewritten words Consuelo C. Gomez
were typed after the handwritten signature Consuelo C.
Gomez. This is based on her analysis of the letter o in the
handwritten signature, which touches the letter n in the
typewritten name Consuelo C. Gomez. She could not,
however, make any similar findings with respect to Document
No. 402, because the typewritten words Consuelo C. Gomez
and the handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez do not even
touch in the latter document.
Zenaida Torres failed to convince the trial court that
the Deeds of Donation were not prepared in one sitting:
13
 To start with, it is very significant
that Torres herself admits that the signatures
of Consuelo in the Donations 401 and 402 are
genuine.
(This is contrary to the allegations of
Augusto in his complaint; wherein he alleged
that the signatures of Consuelo were
forged. In fact, as per the allegations, in
Augustos complaint, the signatures were
forged, after the death of Consuelo).
(In effect, Augusto is now trying to
shift the thrust of his attack, to a scenario
wherein Consuelo allegedly signed two
papers in blank, and thereafter, said
Donations 401 and 402 were typed on top.)
Furthermore, Torres fell apart
during, cross-examination. Torres admitted
that she had not taken any specialized
studies on the matter of Questioned
Documents, except on one or two seminars
on Questioned Documents. She admitted that
she had not passed the Board Exams, as a
Chemist; she further admitted that she has
not written any thesis or similar work on the
subject matter at issue.
Regarding non-typing in one
continuous sitting, she admitted that she had
never seen the typewriter used to type the
Donations 401 and 402, nor even tried to get
hold of it, before she made the report; that
there were no variances insofar as the
vertical alignments of the typewritten
documents were concerned; that there were
only variances insofar as the horizontal
alignments are concerned; she admitted that
if anybody had wanted to incorporate a
document into a blank sheet of paper, on top
of a signature, the normal step to be taken
would be to be careful on horizontal
alignment, which can be seen via the naked
eye; and not the vertical alignment. Yet, the
vertical alignment, as admitted by her, was
perfect.
In fact, she had to admit that it is
possible that if the paper roller is loose, the
horizontal alignment will have a variance;
whereas, the vertical alignment would have
no variance, and there would be nothing
sinister about this. She had to admit this,
because she was confronted with an
authority on the matter, more particularly
the book of Wilson Harrison (vide Exhibit
17). She admitted that she had not used
bromide when she took the photographs of
the two (2) Donations 401 and 402, which
photographs she later on enlarged. She
admitted that when she had taken the
photographs of the two (2) Donations, she
had not put the typewritten pitch measure on
top. She admitted that when the photographs
were enlarged, the alignment of the
typewritten words became distorted; more
so when a typewriter pitch measure is not
used, when photographing the documents.
In effect, insofar as the issue of
typewriting in one sitting or not, is
concerned, the testimony of Torres was
completely discredited (Vide TSN of May 19,
1986).[16]
On the other hand, the trial court gave weight to the
testimony of Francisco Cruz:
Cruz testified on this point that the
Donations 401 and 402 were both typed in
one continuous sitting. He elucidated clearly
on how he arrived at this conclusion.
To start with, he was able to
determine that the typewriter used was the
elite typewriter, because as per Cruz, when
his typewriting measuring the instruments
were placed over the documents, there were
twelve (12) letters that went inside one inch,
which is a characteristic of an elite
typewriter.
Secondly, he noticed that the color
tone of the typewriter ink is the same, thru
the entire documents.
As per Cruz, this is another
indication that the Donations 401 and 402
were prepared in one continuous sitting,
because, as per Cruz, if the typewriter is
used one time and sometime after that, the
typewriter is used again, the color tone will
most probably be different.
He further concluded that both the
horizontal and vertical alignments are in
agreement. He explained how he arrived at
this conclusion.
As per Cruz, by using an instrument
which is a typewriting measuring instrument
produced by the Criminal Research Co., Inc.
in the USA and placing said instrument to test
the vertical alignment from the top down to
the bottom, there is a perfect vertical
alignment.
In fact, as per Cruz, when he took
photographs of the documents, he had
already placed the typewriting measuring
instrument over the document and he showed
to the court the enlarged photographs,
indicating clearly that all the vertical
alignments are all in order.
He also found out that the horizontal
and vertical alignments are in agreement.
He explained that the slight
variances as to the spacing of the words Know
All Men By These Presents and the words That
I Consuelo C. Gomez, single, of legal age,
Filipino, and a resident of 24 Pine Street,
New Marikina Subdivision, Marikina, there is
a slight disagreement in the spacing, but not
in the alignment.
14
 He explained that the normal reason
for such discrepancy in the spacing is because
the typist sometimes tries to push the
variable spacer; the [button] on the left side
of the roller, and if you press that round
[button], there will be a variance spacing
namely one space, two spaces, and three
spaces; and these are not attached so there
is a variable in the spacing.
In short, this was due to the pushing
of the variable paper by the typist.
Furthermore, he emphasized that
the left margins are aligned and this signifies
that there was typing in one continuous
sitting, because if you type on a paper and
re-insert it again, there are differences in the
left hand margin. All of his findings appear in
the blow up photographs which were marked
as Exhibits 31 to 34.
He even pointed out the differences
in the Jurat wherein admittedly, Judge
Sebastian inserted the date 21st and 1 (page
number), 401 (document number), I (book
number), and 82 (series); and also his
signature Jose R. Sebastian and his PTR
Number (vide pages 12 to 19, TSN of April 25,
1982).
All attempts by opposite counsel to
discredit the testimony of Cruz on this issue,
proved futile.[17]
As stated above, petitioner also alleges that the
signature Consuelo C. Gomez was written before the
typewritten name Consuelo C. Gomez. In this second round of
analysis of the respective testimonies of Zenaida Torres and
Francisco Cruz, the trial court arrived at the same conclusion:
[ZENAIDA TORRESS] FINDINGS ARE
BASED SOLELY ON A SINGLE HANDWRITTEN
LETTER O, WHICH TOUCHES (DOES NOT EVEN
INTERSECT) THE TYPEWRITTEN LETTER
N. BASED ON THIS, WITHOUT MORE, TORRES
CONCLUDED THAT THE TYPEWRITTEN NAME
CONSUELO C. GOMEZ CAME AFTER THE
HANDWRITTEN SIGNATURE CONSUELO C.
GOMEZ.
We need but cite authorities on the
matter (with which Authorities Torres was
confronted and which authorities she had to
admit), which read as follows:
The Intersection of Ink Lines with
Typescript. It is often stated that is possible
to determine whether an ink line which
intersects typescript was written before or
after the typing. The theory is simple; most
typewriter inks are greasy and an ink line
tends to shrink in width as it passes over a
greasy place on the paper. If, indeed, an ink
line is observed to suffer a distinct reduction
in width every time it intersects the
typescript it may safely be concluded that
the ink line was written after the typescript.
In practice, however, ink lines
written across typescript are rarely seen to
suffer any appreciable shrinkage in width,
since the amount of oily medium transferred
from the ribbon to the paper is rarely
sufficient to have any effect. Indeed, if the
ink happens to be alkaline, surplus ink,
instead of shrinking, may spread out into the
typescript to increase the width of the
inkline at the intersection. In the case the
proof that the ink followed the typescript
would be the presence of a swelling rather
than a shrinkage.
Experience has shown that it is
rarely possible for any definite opinion as to
the order of appearance on the paper for
intersecting ink lines and typescript to be
justified on the [meager] amount of
evidence which generally available.
A similar state of affairs will be
found to hold for carbon paper and waxer;
which have much in common with
typewriter ribbons in the way the mark they
make on paper react with intersecting ink
lines. (Wilson, Suspect Documents; Exhibits
19; 19-A; 37; 37-D; underscoring ours).
In fact, the very authority of Torres
on the matter, states as follows:
Sequence of Writing
Intersecting writing strokes may
have distinctive patterns, depending upon
the order of writing the lapse of time
between the two writings, the density of the
two strokes and the kind of inks, writing
instruments, and paper used. With a
binocular microscope or a hand-magnifier
aided by skillfully controlled light and
photography, the true order of preparation
may be revealed and demonstrated to a lay
observer.
What appears to be the obvious
solution may not always be the correct
answer.For example, the line of deepest
color usually appears on top even if it was
written first.Careful study and testing is
necessary before reaching a
conclusion. Some of the more common
criteria for determining sequence are
considered in the following paragraphs.
If we considered the intersection of
two writing strokes or the intersection of
writing and typewriting the majority of
problems are covered. Substantial,
repeated intersections of two writings offer
a higher probability of success than a single
indifferent intersection, such as a weak
stroke crossing another which only very
infrequently can produce a clear indication
of the order of writing. (Exhibits V and V-1
(underscoring ours).[18]
15

The trial court again sided with Francisco Cruz who
testified, citing authorities,[19] that it is impossible to
determine accurately which came first, because there were
no intersections at all.[20]The trial court added: [i]n fact,
common sense, without more, dictates that if there are no
intersections (between the typewritten and the handwritten
words), it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
determine which came first.[21] The Court of Appeals found
nothing erroneous in these findings of the trial court.[22]
Petitioner claims that the testimony of Zenaida
Torres, having positively maintained that the handwritten
signatures Consuelo C. Gomez in both Deeds of Donation were
affixed before the typewritten name of Consuelo C. Gomez,
cannot possibly be overcome by the opinion of Francisco Cruz
that was neither here not there.[23]
Petitioner also puts in issue the fact that Zenaida
Torres was a court-appointed expert, as opposed to Francisco
Cruz who was merely designated by respondents. Petitioner
also assails the credibility of Francisco Cruz on the ground that
he had once testified in favor of respondent Ariston, Jr.[24]
Finally, petitioner stresses that Zenaida Torres
conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of
Donation that were then in the possession of the Notarial
Register of Quezon City. On the other hand, Francisco Cruz
conducted his tests, with respect to Document No. 401, on the
original in the possession of Ariston, Jr.
On the first point, we agree with petitioner that
positive evidence[25] is, as a general rule, more credible than
negative evidence.[26] However, the reason for this rule is that
the witness who testifies to a negative may have forgotten
what actually occurred, while it is impossible to remember
what never existed.[27]
Expert witnesses, though, examine documentary and
object evidence precisely to testify on their findings in
court. It is, thus, highly improbable for an expert witness to
forget his examination of said evidence. Consequently,
whereas faulty memory may be the reason for the negative
testimonies delivered by ordinary witnesses, this is unlikely to
be so with respect to expert witnesses. While we, therefore,
cannot say that positive evidence does not carry an inherent
advantage over negative evidence when it comes to expert
witnesses,[28] the process by which the expert witnesses
arrived at their conclusions should be carefully examined and
considered.
On this respect, Prof. Wigmore states that the
ordinary expert witness, in perhaps the larger proportion of
the topics upon which he may be questioned, has not a
knowledge derived from personal observation. He virtually
reproduces, literally or in substance, conclusions of others
which he accepts on the authority of the eminent names
responsible for them.[29] In the case at bar, the expert
witnesses cited sources as bases of their
observations. Francisco Cruzs statement that no finding or
conclusion could be arrived at,[30] has basis on the sources
presented both by him and by Zenaida Torres. Both sets of
authorities speak of intersecting ink lines. However, the
typewritten words Consuelo C. Gomez barely touch and do not
intersect the handwritten signature Consuelo C. Gomez in
Document No. 401. In Document No. 402, said typewritten
words and handwritten signature do not even touch.
In the case at bar, therefore, the expert testimony
that no finding or conclusion can be arrived at, was found to
be more credible than the expert testimony positively stating
that the signatures were affixed before the typing of the
Deeds of Donation. The former expert testimony has proven to
be more in consonance with the authorities cited by both
experts.
As regards the assertion that Zenaida Torres
conducted her tests on the carbon originals of both Deeds of
Donation found in the notarial registrar, whereas Francisco
Cruz merely examined the original in the possession of Ariston,
Jr. with respect to Document No. 401, suffice it to say that
this circumstance cannot be attributed to respondents. After
the examination of the documents by Zenaida Torres, fire
razed the Quezon City Hall. The carbon originals of said Deeds
were among the documents burned in the fire. Petitioner
never rebutted respondents manifestation concerning this
incident, nor accused respondents of burning the Quezon City
Hall.
Other than the above allegations, petitioners attack
on the entire testimony of Francisco Cruz (including the part
concerning whether the Deeds were typed in one continuous
sitting) rests primarily in the contention that, while Zenaida
Torres was court-appointed, Francisco Cruzs testimony was
solicited by respondents, one of whom had previously solicited
such testimony for another case.
In United States v. Trono,[31] we held:
Expert testimony no doubt
constitutes evidence worthy of meriting
consideration, although not exclusive on
questions of a professional character. The
courts of justice, however, are not bound to
submit their findings necessarily to such
testimony; they are free to weigh them, and
they can give or refuse to give them any value
as proof, or they can even counterbalance
16
 such evidence with the other elements of adduced during trial, as well as with the witness deportment, 4) The bodega mentioned in Doc. No. 402 was not
conviction which may have been adduced
during the trial. (Emphasis supplied.) actions, ability, and character upon the witness stand. The owned by Consuelo. If the Deeds were executed by
trial court is consequently given the discretion in weighing all Consuelo, she would surely have known this fact as
these circumstances in its determination of the expert witness she was the treasurer of V-TRI Realty
Similarly, in Espiritu v. Court of
credibility, as it is in a better position than the appellate Corporation;[37]
Appeals[32] and Salomon v. Intermediate Appellate
courts to observe the demeanor of these witnesses. As there 5) If Doc. 401 is superimposed on Doc. 402, the
Court,[33]this Court held:
is no evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the trial signature of Consuelo on both documents appear
court in such determination, the latter is not reviewable by almost in the same place;[38]
Although courts are not ordinarily bound by
expert testimonies, they may place whatever this Court. 6) The whole of both Deeds of Donation, including
weight they choose upon such testimonies in the notarial acknowledgement portion and the TAN
accordance with the facts of the case. The Alleged patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Numbers and Residence Certificates of the
relative weight and sufficiency of expert Deeds of Donation
testimony is peculiarly within the province of signatories, were typed with only one
the trial court to decide, considering the typewriter. The only portions that seemed to have
ability and character of the witness, his As previously mentioned, the testimony of Zenaida
actions upon the witness stand, the weight been typed with a different machine are the date
Torres constitutes the only direct evidence presented by
and process of the reasoning by which he has (21st) below the acknowledgement and the filled-in
supported his opinion, his possible bias in petitioner to prove that the Deeds of Donation were merely
numbers of the Doc. No. ___; Book No. ___; Page
favor of the side for whom he testifies, the intercalated over the signature of Consuelo. Petitioner,
fact that he is a paid witness, the relative No. ___ portion, the name Jose R. Sebastian above
however, also presents the following circumstantial evidence
opportunities for study or observation of the the words NOTARY PUBLIC and the PTR Number with
matters about which he testifies, and any and arguments to prove the same, claiming that there are
date and place of issue;[39]
other matters which serve to illuminate his patent irregularities on the face of the assailed Deeds of
statements. The opinion of the expert may 7) The PTR Number and its date and place of issue
Donation:
not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be appear in the right hand side of the name and
considered by the court in view of all the
signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it;[40]
facts and circumstances in the case and when 1) Both deeds are each one-page documents
common knowledge utterly fails, the expert 8) The inserted date (which was typed with the
contained in a letter size (8 x 11) paper, instead of
opinion may be given controlling effect (20 same machine used for typing the name of notary
Am. Jur., 1056-1058). The problem of the the usual legal size (8 x 14) paper, and typed single
public Jose Sebastian) is different from the date of
credibility of the expert witness and the spaced, with barely any margin on its four sides;[34]
evaluation of his testimony is left to the the clause In WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties
2) In Doc. 401, three parcels of land located in
discretion of the trial court whose ruling hereunto set their hands in Quezon City, on the
thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of two different municipalities were purportedly
an abuse of that discretion. (Underscoring 20th day of April/1979 (which was typed with
donated to two donees in the same document;[35]
supplied.) another machine; the one used in typing the body
3) In Doc. 402, shares of stock in two
of the deed and the body of the
corporations, jewelries and collectors items in a
acknowledgment);[41]
Thus, while the expert witness possible bias in favor bank deposit box, two registered cars, cash and
9) The TAN Numbers and the Residence
of the side for whom he or she testifies, and the fact that he money placement in another bank, and a bodega
Certificate Numbers of the purported donor and
or she is a paid witness, may be considered by the trial court, were donated to three donees in the same
donees have already been typed with the same
the latter should weigh the same with all the other evidence document;[36]
17
 machine that was used in typing the body of the
deed and the body of the acknowledgement;[42]
10) It is highly questionable that a supposedly well-
educated person like Ariston Gomez, Jr. would not
have thought of preparing at least five copies of
each document as there were four donees and one
donor.[43]
The Court of Appeals ruled:
As to the alleged intercalation of the text of
the deeds of donation above the supposedly priorly
affixed signature of CONSUELO on a blank sheet of
bond paper, as shown by the one-page document in a
letter size paper, typed single space with barely any
room left on the top, bottom and left and right
margins, as well as the lack of copies thereof, it has
been explained that the same was due to the fact that
the said documents were prepared by defendant
ARISTON, JR., a non-lawyer inexperienced with the
way such documents should be executed and in how
many copies. x x x.
xxxx
Accordingly, it is not surprising that someone
as unfamiliar and inexperienced in preparing a deed
of donation, or any deed of conveyance for that
matter, as ARISTON, JR., prepared the documents
that are the subject matter of the case at bar in the
manner that he did.[44]
Petitioner counters that the alleged irregularities do
not relate to the proper construction or manner of writing the
documents as would necessitate the expertise of
lawyer. Rather, they relate to matters as basic as observing
the proper margins at the top, left, right and bottom portions
of the document, using the appropriate paper size and number
of pages that are necessary and observing appropriate spacing
and proper placement of the words in the document.
All these alleged irregularities are more apparent
than real. None of these alleged irregularities affects the
validity of the subject Deeds of Donation, nor connotes fraud
or foul play. It is true that the condition and physical
appearance of a questioned document constitute a valuable
factor which, if correctly evaluated in light of surrounding
circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine
or forged.[45] However, neither the expert witnesses, nor our
personal examination of the exhibits, had revealed such a
questionable physical condition.
Legal documents contained in 8 x 11 paper are neither
unheard of, nor even uncommon. The same is true with regard
to single-spaced legal documents; in fact, petitioners
Supplemental Memorandum was actually single-spaced.
That the subject Deeds of Donation appear to have
conveyed numerous properties in two sheets of paper does not
militate against their authenticity. Not all people equate
length with importance. The simplicity and practicality of
organizing the properties to be donated into real and personal
properties, and using one-page documents to convey each
category, are clearly appealing to people who value
brevity. The same appeal of conciseness had driven petitioner
to make a single-spaced Supplemental Memorandum whose
only object was to summarize the arguments he has laid down
in the original twice-as-long Memorandum,[46] an endeavor
that we, in fact, appreciate.
a
The allegation concerning the use of one typewriter
to encode both Deeds of Donation, including the notarial
acknowledgment portion, TAN, and residence certificates, is
purely paranoia.Being in the legal profession for many years,
we are aware that it is common practice for the parties to a
contract to type the whole document, so that all the notary
public has to do is to input his signature, seal, and the numbers
pertaining to his notarial registry.
The use of single-paged documents also provides an
explanation as to why the PTR number and the date and place
of issue are found in the right-hand side of the name and
signature of Jose Sebastian, instead of below it. We agree with
respondents that it is irrational, impractical, and contrary to
human experience to use another page just to insert those
minute but necessary details. Such use of single-paged
documents, taken together with the fact that the Deeds of
Donation are of almost the same length, are also the reasons
why it does not baffle us that the signatures of Consuelo
appear at around the same portions of these Deeds. Indeed,
we would have been suspicious had these documents been of
varying lengths, but the signatures still appear on the same
portions in both.
The only observations concerning the physical
appearance of the subject Deeds of Donation that truly give
us doubts as to their authenticity are the relatively small
margins on the sides of the same, the lack of copies thereof,
and the alleged inclusion in Document No. 402 of a bodega
allegedly not owned by Consuelo. However, these doubts are
not enough to establish the commission of fraud by
respondents and to overturn the presumption that persons are
innocent of crime or wrong.[47]Good faith is always
presumed.[48] It is the one who alleges bad faith who has the
burden to prove the same,[49] who, in this case, is the
petitioner.
18
 The small margins in the said Deeds of Donation, while
indicative of sloppiness, were not necessarily resorted to
because there was a need to intercalate a long document and,
thus, prove petitioners theory that there were only two pieces
of paper signed by Consuelo. Respondents admit that the use
of one sheet of paper for both Deeds of Donation was
intentional, for brevitys sake. While the ensuing litigation
could now have caused regrets on the part of Ariston, Jr. for
his decision to sacrifice the margins for brevitys sake, there
still appears no indication that he did so maliciously.Indeed,
law professors remind bar examinees every year to leave
margins on their booklets. Despite the importance examinees
put into such examinations, however, examinees seem to
constantly forget these reminders.
The testimonies of Ariston Gomez, Sr. (Ariston, Sr.),
Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita Gomez-Samson (Maria Rita), and
Notary Public Jose Sebastian tend to show that there were one
original and two copies each of Documents No. 401 and No.
402. Of these documents, it was the original of Document No.
402 and a duplicate original of Document No. 401 which were
actually presented by petitioner himself before the trial court,
through the representative of the notarial registrar of Quezon
City, who testified pursuant to a subpoena. The latter two
documents were submitted to the NBI for examination by
petitioner and by the NBI Handwriting Expert, Zenaida Torres.
Petitioner testified that he could not find copies of
the two Deeds of Donation with the Bureau of Records
Management. He, however, was able to find certified true
copies of these documents with the Register of Deeds and the
Land Transportation Commission.[50]
According to the testimony of Ariston, Jr., the original
of Document No. 401 was separated from the brown envelope,
containing the other copies of the Deeds of Donation, which
Jose Sebastian left with respondents, as they were trying to
fit the same into a certain red album. On the other hand,
Maria Rita testified that one copy each of the duplicate
originals of Documents No. 401 and No. 402 were lost. Maria
Rita explained that when she was about to leave for Spain to
visit her sister in Palma de Mallorica, her father, Ariston, Sr.,
gave her the brown envelope, containing duplicate originals of
the Deeds of Donation in question, to show to her sister in
Palma de Mallorica.[51] Maria Rita explained in detail how her
handbag was stolen as she was praying in a chapel while
waiting for the connecting flight from Madrid to Palma de
Mallorica. The handbag allegedly contained not only duplicate
originals of the said Deeds of Donation, but also other
important documents and her valuables. Maria Rita presented
the police report of the Spanish police authorities[52] and her
letter to the Valley National Bank of U.S.A.,[53] regarding these
losses.
Notary public Jose Sebastian retained two copies of
the Deeds of Donation in his files. Jose Sebastian explained
that he did so because Consuelo wanted two copies of each
document. Since Jose Sebastian had to transmit to the
Notarial Registrar duplicate originals of the document, he had
to photocopy the same to keep as his own copies, and transmit
to the Notarial Registrar whatever duplicate original copies he
had. Jose Sebastian did not notice that, instead of retaining a
duplicate original of Document No. 402, what was left with
him was the original.[54]
While it cannot be denied that the unfortunate
incidents and accidents presented by respondents do arouse
some suspicions, the testimonies of Ariston, Jr., Maria Rita,
and Jose Sebastian had been carefully examined by the trial
court, which found them to be credible. Time and again, this
Court has ruled that the findings of the trial court respecting
the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and
respect since it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses as they testified before the court. Unless
substantial facts and circumstances have been overlooked or
misunderstood by the latter which, if considered, would
materially affect the result of the case, this Court will
undauntedly sustain the findings of the lower court.[55]
All petitioner has succeeded in doing, however, is to
instill doubts in our minds. While such approach would
succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases,
plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn
findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially
when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. It
must be stressed that although this Court may overturn a
conviction of the lower court based on reasonable doubt,
overturning judgments in civil cases should be based on
preponderance of evidence, and with the further qualification
that, when the scales shall stand upon an equipoise, the court
should find for the defendant.[56]
Respondents also point out that Ariston, Jr., the
person they claim to have prepared said Deeds of Donation,
was never confronted during the trial with all these alleged
irregularities on the face of the Deeds of Donation. As such,
the trial court was never given a chance to determine whether
Ariston, Jr. would have given a rational, logical and
acceptable explanation for the same.
19
 Respondents are correct. As the alleged irregularities
do not, on their faces, indicate bad faith on the part of
respondents, it is necessary for petitioner to confront
respondents with these observations. Respondents would not
have thought that the Deeds of Donation would be impugned
on the mere basis that they were written on short bond paper,
or that their margins are small.Respondents were thus
deprived of a chance to rebut these observations by
testimonies and other evidence, and were forced to explain
the same in memoranda and briefs with the appellate courts,
where these observations started to crop up. It would have
been different if the date of the documents had been after
Consuelos death, or if there had been obvious alterations on
the documents. In the latter cases, it would have been the
responsibility of respondents counsel to see to it that Ariston,
Jr. explain such inconsistencies.
Payment of donors tax before the death of Consuelo
In ruling that there had been no antedating or
falsification of the subject Deeds of Donation, the Court of
Appeals was also persuaded by the following evidence: (1) the
finding that it was the deceased CONSUELO herself who paid
the donors tax of the properties subject of the donation, as
evidenced by the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank
(PCIB) check she issued to the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) on 9 October 1979, in the amount
ofP119,283.63, and (2) the testimony and certification dated
22 November 1979 of Jose Sebastian that the said documents
were acknowledged before him on 21 April
1979.[57] Respondents had presented evidence to the effect
that Consuelo made an initial payment of P119,283.63 for the
Donors Tax on 9 October 1979, while respondent Ariston, Sr.,
supplied the deficiency of P2,125.82 on 4 December 1979.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred in its finding of fact that Consuelo herself paid the
donors tax of the properties subject of the donation on 9
October 1979, as the evidence allegedly shows that the Donors
Tax was paid on 4 December 1979, or a month after Consuelos
death.[58] Petitioner thereby calls our attention to his Exhibit
O, a certificate dated 4 December 1979 issued by Mr. Nestor
M. Espenilla, Chief of the Transfer Taxes Division of the BIR,
confirming the payment of the donors tax. The certificate
reads:
LUNGSOD NG QUEZON
December 4, 1979
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that MS. CONSUELO
C. GOMEZ of 8059 Honradez St., Makati,
Metro Manila, paid donors tax on even date
in the amount of P121,409.45 inclusive of
surcharge, interest and compromise
penalties as follows:
RTR No. 2814499, PTC Conf. Receipt
No. 2896956 P119,283.63
RTR No. 2814500/PTC Conf. Receipt
No. 2896957 2,125.82
---------------
T o t a l P121,409.45
This certification is issued upon
request of Mr. Ariston Gomez, Sr.
(SGD)NESTOR M. ESPENILLA
Chief, Financing, Real Estate and
Transfer
Taxes Division
TAN E2153-B0723-A-7[59]
Petitioner highlights the fact that the Revenue Tax
Receipts (RTRs) and the Confirmation Receipts for the
payments supposedly made by Consuelo on 9 October 1979 and
by respondent Ariston, Sr. on 4 December 1979 bore
consecutive numbers, despite being issued months
apart.Petitioner also points to the fact that the tax was stated
in the certification to have been paid on even date -- meaning,
on the date of the certification, 4 December 1979.
Petitioner presented further the check used to pay
the Donors Tax, which, petitioner himself admits, was signed
by Consuelo.[60] Petitioner draws our attention to the words
RECEIVED BIR, P.T.C. CUBAO BR., NON-NEGOTIABLE, T-10
DEC. 4. Petitioner concludes that Philippine Trust Company
Bank, Cubao Branch, received the check on 4 December
1979 as a collection agent of the BIR.
Respondents, on the other hand, presented the
following documents to prove payment of the Donors Tax
before the death of Consuelo on 6 November 1979:
1) The covering letter to the BIR Commissioner
dated 24 September 1979 and prepared by Mariano A. Requija,
accountant of Consuelo and Ariston, Jr., which included the
Donors Tax Return for the properties covered by the two Deeds
of Donation. The letter was stamped received by the BIR
Commissioner on 8 October 1979;[61]
2) Another letter dated 24 September 1979 executed
by Mariano A. Requija containing the breakdown of the
donations received by the BIR on 8 October 1979;[62]
3) A schedule of gifts which was also dated 24
September 1979 and which was also received by the BIR on 8
October 1979, enumerating all the donated properties
included in the Deeds of Donation.[63]
20
 4) The Donors Tax Return covering the properties
transferred in the two Deeds of Donation filed, received, and
receipted by the BIR Commissioner on 8 October 1979;[64]
5) The 9 October 1979 PCIB Personal Check No. A144-
73211 issued by Consuelo in favor of the BIR Commissioner in
the amount of P119,283.63.[65]
6) An Authority to Issue Tax Receipt issued by the BIR
Commissioner on 21 October 1979 for a total amount
of P119,283.63.[66]
Before proceeding further, it is well to note that
the factum probandum[67] petitioner is trying to establish here
is still the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of Donation on
blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of
Consuelo. The factum probans[68] this time around is the
alleged payment of the Donors Tax after the death of
Consuelo.
Firstly, it is apparent at once that there is a failure of
the factum probans, even if successfully proven, to prove in
turn the factum probandum. As intimated by respondents,
payment of the Donors Tax after the death of Consuelo does
not necessarily prove the alleged intercalation of the Deeds of
Donation on blank pieces of paper containing the signatures of
Consuelo.
Secondly, petitioner failed to prove this factum
probandum.
Ariston, Jr. never testified that Consuelo herself
physically and personally delivered PCIB Check No. A144-73211
to the BIR. He instead testified that the check was prepared
and issued by Consuelo during her lifetime, but that he,
Ariston, Jr., physically and personally delivered the same to
the BIR.[69] On the query, however, as to whether it was
delivered to the BIR before or after the death of Consuelo,
petitioner and respondents presented all the conflicting
evidence we enumerated above.
The party asserting a fact has the burden of proving
it. Petitioner, however, merely formulated conjectures based
on the evidence he presented, and did not bother to present
Nestor Espenilla to explain the consecutive numbers of the
RTRs or what he meant with the words on even date in his
certification. Neither did petitioner present any evidence that
the records of the BIR Commissioner were falsified or
antedated, thus, letting the presumption that a public official
had regularly performed his duties stand. This is in contrast to
respondents direct evidence attesting to the payment of said
tax during the lifetime of Consuelo. With respect to
respondents evidence, all that petitioner could offer in
rebuttal is another speculation totally unsupported by
evidence: the alleged fabrication thereof.
Credibility of Jose Sebastian
Petitioner claims that no credence should have been
given to the testimony of the notary public, Jose Sebastian, as
said Jose Sebastian is the same judge whom this Court had
dismissed from the service in Garciano v.
Sebastian.[70] Petitioner posits that the dismissal of Judge Jose
Sebastian from the service casts a grave pall on his credibility
as a witness, especially given how, in the course of the
administrative proceedings against him, he had lied to mislead
the investigator, as well as employed others to distort the
truth.
Petitioner further claims that the reliance by the
Court of Appeals on the 22 November 1979Certification by
Jose Sebastian is misplaced, considering the questionable
circumstances surrounding such certification. Said
certification, marked as petitioners Exhibit P, reads:
November 22, 1979
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAO
Executive Judge
CFI Quezon City
Sir:
In connection with the discrepancies noted
by the Acting Clerk of Court in my notarial
report pertaining to another document
submitted to the Notarial Section last July 2,
1979 I have the honor to certify that
documents Nos. 401 and 402 referring to
Donations Inter Vivos executed by Donor
Consuelo C. Gomez in favor of Donees Ma.
Rita Gomez-Samson et. al. were signed in my
presence by all the parties and their
instrumental witnesses on April 21, 1979 in
my office. I hereby further certify that said
two documents among other documents were
reported by me in accordance with law
on July 2, 1979, for all legal intents and
purposes.
In view of the above, it is respectfully
requested that the certified true copies of
the said two documents officially requested
by one of the Donees be issued.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) JOSE R. SEBASTIAN
Notary Public[71]
Petitioner points out that the Certification was made
after the death of Consuelo, and claims that the same appears
to be a scheme by Jose Sebastian to concoct an opportunity
21
for him to make mention of the subject Deeds of
Donation intervivos, despite the plain fact that the latter had
utterly no relation to the matter referred to by Jose Sebastian
in the opening phrase of the letter.[72]
It is well to note that, as stated by the Court of
Appeals, Jose Sebastian was originally a witness for petitioner
Augusto. As such, Rule 132, Section 12, of the Rules of Court
prohibits petitioner from impeaching him:
SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his
own witness. Except with respect to
witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and
(e) of section 10, the party producing a
witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.
A witness may be considered as
unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the
court upon adequate showing of his adverse
interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or
his having misled the party into calling him to
the witness stand.
The unwilling or hostile witness so
declared, or the witness who is an adverse
party, may be impeached by the party
presenting him in all respects as if he had
been called by the adverse party, except by
evidence of his bad character. He may also
be impeached and cross-examined by the
adverse party, but such cross-examination
must only be on the subject matter of his
examination-in-chief.
This rule is based on the theory that a person who
produces a witness vouches for him as being worthy of credit,
and that a direct attack upon the veracity of the witness would
enable the party to destroy the witness, if he spoke against
him, and to make him a good witness, if he spoke for him, with
the means in his hands of destroying his credit, if he spoke
against him.[73]
Neither had there been declaration by the court that
Jose Sebastian was an unwilling or hostile witness. Jose
Sebastian is also neither an adverse party, nor an officer,
director nor a managing agent of a public or private
corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.[74]
Be that as it may, even if Jose Sebastian had been
declared by the court as an unwilling or hostile witness, the
third paragraph of Section 12 as quoted above, in relation to
Section 11[75] of the same Rule, only allows the party calling
the witness to impeach such witness by contradictory evidence
or by prior inconsistent statements, and never by evidence of
his bad character. Thus, Jose Sebastians subsequent dismissal
as a judge would not suffice to discredit him as a witness in
this case.
We have also ruled in People v. Dominguez,[76] which,
in turn cited Cordial v. People,[77]that:
(E)ven convicted criminals
are not excluded from
testifying in court so long as,
having organs of sense, they
can perceive and perceiving
can make known their
perceptions to others.
The fact of prior criminal conviction alone
does not suffice to discredit a witness; the
testimony of such a witness must be
assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same
way the testimony of other witnesses must
be examined for its relevance and
credibility. x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
The effect of this pronouncement is even more
significant in this case, as Jose Sebastian has never
been convicted of a crime before his testimony, but
was instead administratively sanctionedeleven
years after such testimony. Scrutinizing the testimony of Jose
Sebastian, we find, as the trial court and the Court of Appeals
did, no evidence of bias on the part of Jose Sebastian. On top
of this, Jose Sebastians testimony is supported by the records
of the notarial registry, which shows that the documents in
question were received by the Notarial Registrar on 2 July
1979, which was four months before the death of Consuelo
on 6 November 1979.
Alleged unusual circumstances relative to the execution
and notarization of the subject Deeds of Donation
The last set of circumstantial evidence presented by
petitioner to prove the alleged intercalation of the subject
Deeds of Donation on two blank papers signed by Consuelo are
the following allegedly unusual circumstances relative to the
execution and notarization of the said deeds. According to
petitioner:
1. The signing and acknowledgement of the
Deeds of Donation on 21 April 1979 is highly
improbable and implausible, considering the fact
that Consuelo left the same day for the United
States on a pleasure trip;[78]
2. The flight time of Consuelo on 21 April
1979 was 11:00 a.m.. And even assuming that the
flight time was 1:00 p.m., as contended by
respondents, the ordinary boarding procedures
require Consuelo to be at the airport at least two
hours before flight time, or 11:00 a.m.. Petitioner
points out that respondents alleged time frame
(from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.) is not enough to
accomplish the following acts: respondents and
22
 Consuelo leaving Marikina at 7:00 a.m. and arriving
at the notary public Jose Sebastians house at Pag-
asa, Q.C. at about 8:00 a.m. to 8:30 a.m.; some
small talk with Jose Sebastian; Jose Sebastian
examining the documents; Jose Sebastian having a
closed meeting with Consuelo to discuss the
documents; Jose Sebastian reading the documents
to respondents line by line and asking the latter
whether they accepted the donation; Jose
Sebastian typing the notarial entries; the parties
signing the deeds; Jose Sebastian talking privately
with Consuelo, who paid the former in cash for his
services; Ariston Gomez, Jr. driving Consuelo and
other respondents back to Marikina, and dropping
the other respondents at their respective
residences; picking up Consuelos luggage; and
Ariston Gomez, Jr. bringing Consuelo to the Manila
International Airport;[79]
3. It is contrary to human experience for Consuelo
and respondents not to make a prior arrangement
with the notary public Jose Sebastian and instead take
a gamble on his being in his office;[80]
4. It is illogical for Consuelo to rush the execution
of the donations when she was in fact planning to
come back from her pleasure trip shortly, as she
did;[81]
5. The choice of a notary public from Quezon City is
highly suspect, when Consuelo and respondents reside
in Marikina. It is also illogical that Consuelo would have
chosen a notary public whom she met only on the same
day she executed the Deeds, especially when Consuelo
had a regular lawyer whose notarial services she
availed of only two weeks before her death;[82]
6. It is improbable that Consuelo paid Jose
Sebastian in cash, for there is no reason for her to
carry much cash in peso when she was about to leave
for the United States in that same morning;[83]
7. Maria Ritas residence certificate was obtained
from Manila when she is a resident of Marikina.Also,
Maria Rita obtained said residence certificate on 20
April 1979, and yet Maria Rita testified that she was
surprised to know of the donation only on 21 April
1979.[84] Also suspicious are the circumstances
wherein Ariston Gomez, Jr. obtained a residence
certificate on 17 April 1979, when he testified that he The claim that the flight time of Consuelo was
knew of the schedule for signing only on 20 April 1979, at 11:00 a.m. is hearsay thrice removed, and thus cannot be
and Consuelo had two residence certificates, as she
given any weight. Petitioner claims that he was told by his
used different ones in the Deeds of Donation and the
document notarized two weeks before her death;[85] twelve-year old son that Consuelo was leaving at 11:00
a.m. on 21 April 1979, such son having learned about this from
8. If Consuelo was really frugal,
the maid of Consuelo when the son called Consuelos house
she could have also made a will;[86]
that day.[89] This is in contrast to Maria Ritas positive
9. All the instrumental witnesses testimony that the flight time was at 1:00 p.m. on the same
of the Deeds of Donation are biased,
being themselves either donees of day.[90] Maria Rita joined Consuelo in this flight.
the other Deed of Donation, or a
relative of a donee;[87] and As regards petitioners claim that respondents alleged
10. Respondents were not able to time frame in the morning of 21 April 1979 was insufficient,
sufficiently and substantially explain this Court is not convinced. As held by the Court of Appeals,
the belated transfer of the properties petitioner did not present any proof that it had been
covered by the assailed Deeds of
Donation. Petitioner points to Maria impossible to perform those alleged acts within three
Ritas testimony that the real hours.[91] As argued by respondents, the one-paged documents
properties were transferred after the
can be read aloud without difficulty within five to ten minutes
death of Consuelo. While
respondents assert that the personal each. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that traffic
properties were transferred to them is usually very minimal on Saturday mornings, and was much
prior to Consuelos death, evidence
less of a problem in 1979.
shows otherwise.[88]
Respondents and Consuelos decision not to make a
This Court does not find anything suspicious in a
prior arrangement with notary public Jose Sebastian does not
person wanting to transfer her properties by donation to her
surprise us either. Respondents explain that, since the
loved ones before leaving for abroad via an airplane. While
telephone lines of Marikinawere inefficient in the year 1979,
many believe these days that taking the plane is the safest
they decided to take a calculated gamble. It is not at all
way to travel, this has not always been the case. The fear that
unreasonable to expect that Jose Sebastian would be at his
planes sometimes crash, now believed to be irrational, has
house on a Saturday, at around 8:00 a.m.
always been at the back of the minds of air
travelers. Respondents maintain in their testimonies before
With respect to the choice of a notary public
the RTC that the Deeds were completed to the satisfaction of
from Quezon City, we find the explanation relative thereto
Consuelo only on 20 April 1979. She allegedly wanted to have
satisfying. We quote:
the documents signed and notarized before she left for
abroad.
23
 Moreover, ARISTON, JR. disclosed
that they could not have gone to the notary
public whom his aunt, CONSUELO, knew
because she did not want to go to said notary
public since our cousins whom she didnt like
had access to him and she wanted to keep the
execution of the deeds confidential. Thus:
Q: And also you know for a fact that your
auntie had a regular Notary Public for the
preparation and notarization of legal documents
in the name of Atty. Angeles, now Congressman
Angeles of Marikina, is that correct?
A: It depends on the frame of time. Yes and No. He
was a regular Notary Public, but way before that date. But
after that, he fall out of graces of my auntie. He was not
anymore that regular.
Q: How long before April 30 did he fall out of
graces of your auntie, year before that?
A: I dont specifically remember but what I do
know is such confidential document like this, we would
not really go to Angeles.
Q: Even for notarization purposes?
xxxx
A: Even for notarization purposes, no sir. This
confidential nature, no.
ATTY. FERRY:
Are you saying that your auntie trusted more
Sebastian than Angeles?
A: No. He is trusting her own experience about
Atty. Angeles.
Q: Are you saying that she had sad experience with
Atty. Angeles in connection with the latters performance
of his duty as Notary Public, as a lawyer?
A: That is what she told me.
Q: When was that?
A: She will tell me that regularly.
xxxx
ATTY. FERRY:
Q: Mr. Gomez, you testified last April 6, 1989 that
after the execution of the two documents in question dated
April 20, 1979, Atty. Angeles fell out of the graces of your
auntie and you added that as a consequence, your auntie
did not avail of the notarial services of Atty. Angeles when
it comes to confidential matters, is that correct?
A: Yes. After that particular execution of the Deed
of Donation Inter Vivos, Atty. Angeles especially if the
documents are confidential in nature.
Q: You used confidential matters, did your aunt
spell out what these confidential matters are?
A: This particular document, Deed of Donation was
under the category confidential.
Q: But did you discuss this, the matter of
notarizing this document by Atty. Angeles with your auntie
such that she made known to you this falls under
confidential matters?
A: Yes we did.
Q: So in other words, you intimated to your auntie
that Atty. Angeles would possibly notarized these
documents?
A: No.
Q: How did it come about that your auntie gave
that idea or information that these documents should be
notarized by other notary public other than Angeles,
because it is confidential?
A: It came from her.
Q: Yes, did she tell you that?
ATTY. GUEVARRA:
Thats what he said. It came from her.
ATTY. FERRY:
My question is, how did it come about your auntie
told you that these two documents are of confidential
matters?
A: Well, no problem. I said that it has to be
notarized, she said more or less, ayaw ko kay Atty.
Angeles.
Q: She said that?
A: Thats correct.
Q: And you were curious to know why she told you
that?
A: No. I knew why she told me that. She said that
Atty. Angeles.well, my cousins whom she didnt like have
access to Atty. Angeles.[92]
The Court of Appeals had fully explained that the
belated transfer of the properties does not affect the
validity or effects of the donations at all, nor dent the
credibility of respondents factual assertions:
Per our perusal of the records, we find that the
defendants were able to sufficiently and substantially
explain the reason for the belated transfer of the pertinent
properties, i.e., after the death of CONSUELO. Thus, the
testimony of MA. RITA revealed, insofar as the real
properties are concerned, the following:
Q: Since you were already aware as you claim that
as early as when you went to the States in the company of
your auntie, Consuelo Gomez, these 2 parcels of land
together with the improvements consisting of a house were
transferred to you, you did not exert efforts after your
arrival from the States to effect the transfer of these
properties?
24
 A: No, I did not.
Q: Why?
A: Well, for delicadeza. My auntie was still alive. I
am not that aggressive. Tita Elo told me akin na iyon but I
did not transfer it in my name. Siempre nakakahiya.
Q: That was your reason for not effecting the
transfer of the properties in your name?
A: Yes, that was my reason.
Q: Did you not know that the deed supposedly
executed by Consuelo Gomez was a donation inter vivos,
meaning, it takes effect during her lifetime?
A: I do not know the legal term donation inter
vivos. I have also my sentiment.Tita Elo was very close to
us but I did not want to tell her: Tita Elo, ibigay mo Na iyan
SA akin. Itransfer mo na sa pangalan ko. It is not my
character to be very aggressive.
In addition, Article 712 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation
and by intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate
and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of
prescription.
Clearly, the issuance of the titles in the names of
the defendants is not the mode by which they acquired
ownership of the properties, but rather the fact that the
same were donated to them. The circumstance that
aforesaid properties were actually transferred in the names
of the donees only after the death of the donor, although
the deeds of donation were dated April 21, 1979, does not
by itself indicate that the said documents were
antedated.[93]
Petitioner seems to unduly foreclose the possibility
one which experience tells us is not a rare occurrence at all
that donations are often resorted to in place of testamentary
dispositions, often for the purpose of tax avoidance. Such
properties usually remain in the donors possession during his
or her lifetime, despite the fact that the donations have
already taken effect. Nevertheless, the purpose of utilizing
donation as a mode to transfer property is not in issue here.
Finally, the allegations concerning the payment of
Jose Sebastian in cash, the suggestion that Consuelo should
have also made a will, and the claim that all the instrumental
witnesses of the will are biased, are purely speculative.
In sum, all these circumstantial evidence presented
by petitioner had failed to comply with the strict requirements
in using circumstantial evidence, for which Section 4, Rule 133
of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
While the above provision seems to refer only to
criminal cases, it has been pointed out that in some
jurisdictions, no distinction is made between civil and criminal
actions as to the quality of the burden of establishing a
proposition by circumstantial evidence. In such jurisdictions
the rule is generally stated to be that the circumstances
established must not only be consistent with the proposition
asserted but also inconsistent with any other rational
theory.[94]
In all, what petitioner has succeeded in doing is to
raise doubts in our minds. Again, while such approach would
succeed if carried out by the accused in criminal cases,
plaintiffs in civil cases need to do much more to overturn
findings of fact and credibility by the trial court, especially
when the same had been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Leniency in the weighing of petitioners evidence
could only produce a mere equipoise:
When the scales shall stand upon an
equipoise and there is nothing in the
evidence which shall incline it to one side or
the other, the court will find for the
defendant.
Under this principle, the plaintiff must rely
on the strength of his evidence and not on the
weaknesses of the defendants claim. Even if
the evidence of the plaintiff may be
stronger than that of the defendant, there
is no preponderance of evidence on his side
if such evidence is insufficient in itself to
establish his cause of action.[95] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioners liability for damages
The last part of the trial courts decision, which was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals, involves the award
of damages in favor of Ariston, Jr. The trial court held Augusto
Gomez and the estate of the late Consuelo jointly and
solidarily liable for moral and exemplary damages, and
attorneys fees.
25
 The trial court held:
The records are clear, that plaintiff
was so desperate for evidence to support his
charges, that he repeatedly subpoenaed the
defendants themselves; at the risk of
presenting evidence contradictory to his
legal position and which actually happened,
when plaintiff subpoenaed Ariston Gomez
Jr., Ariston Gomez Sr., and Maria Rita
Gomez-Samson, as his witnesses.
All told, the court finds plaintiff was
motivated not by a sincere desire to insure
the totality of the estate of Consuelo, but
rather by his desire to cause injury to
defendants, and to appropriate for himself
and the rest of the Gomez brothers and
nephews, other than the donees, properties
which were clearly validly disposed of by
Consuelo, via Donations Inter Vivos.[96]
Our own examination of the records of the case,
however, convinces us of the contrary.Respondents never
assailed the authenticity of petitioners evidence, and merely
presented their own evidence to support their assertions. As
previously stated, petitioners evidence had successfully given
us doubts as to the authenticity of the subject Deeds of
Donation. While such doubts are not enough to discharge
petitioners burden of proof, they are enough to convince us
that petitioners institution of the present case was carried out
with good faith. The subpoenas directed against respondents
merely demonstrate the zealous efforts of petitioners counsel
to represent its client, which can neither be taken against the
counsel, nor against its clients.
While, as regards the alleged intercalation of the
Deeds of Donation on two blank sheets of paper signed by
Consuelo, the burden of proof lies with petitioner, the
opposite is true as regards the damages suffered by the
SO ORDERED.
respondents. Having failed to discharge this burden to prove
bad faith on the part of petitioner in instituting the case,
petitioner cannot be responsible therefor, and thus cannot be
held liable for moral damages.
This Court has also held that, in the absence of moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages, no
exemplary damages can be granted, for exemplary damages
are allowed only in addition to any of the four kinds of
damages mentioned.[97]
The attorneys fees should also be deleted, as it was
supposed to be the consequence of a clearly unfounded civil
action or proceeding by the plaintiff.
WHEREFORE, subject to the modification of the
assailed Decision, the Petition is DENIED.The Joint Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Cases No. 36089
and No. 36090, which was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the following
portion be DELETED:
3. That Augusto Gomez and the estate of the late
Consuelo Gomez, jointly and solidarily should pay to Ariston
Gomez, Jr. the following amounts:
Moral damages of P1,000,000.00;
Exemplary damages of P250,000.00
Attorneys fees of P200,000.00
And costs of suit; with legal interest on all
the amounts, except on costs and attorneys
fees, commencing from February 15, 1980,
until fully paid.
26
G.R. No. 177188 | December 4, 2008
EL GRECO SHIP MANNING AND MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - COMMISSIONER OF
CUSTOMS, Respondent
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by petitioner El
Greco Ship Manning and Management Corporation (El Greco),
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] of the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA) En Banc dated 14 March 2007 in C.T.A.
EB No. 162. In its assailed Decision, the CTA En Banc affirmed
the Decision[2] dated 17 October 2005 of the CTA Second
Division in CTA Case No. 6618, ordering the forfeiture of the
vessel M/V Criston, also known as M/V Neptune Breeze, for
having been involved in the smuggling of 35,000 bags of
imported rice.
The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as
follows:
On 23 September 2001, the vessel M/V Criston docked at the
Port of Tabaco, Albay, carrying a shipment of 35,000 bags of
imported rice, consigned to Antonio Chua, Jr. (Chua) and
Carlos Carillo (Carillo), payable upon its delivery to Albay.
Glucer Shipping Company, Inc. (Glucer Shipping) is the
operator of M/V Criston.[3]
Upon the directive of then Commissioner Titus Villanueva of
the Bureau of Customs (BOC), a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, was issued by
the Legaspi District Collector, on 23 September 2001 for the
35,000 bags of imported rice shipped by M/V Criston, on the
ground that it left the Port of Manila without the necessary
clearance from the Philippine Coast Guard. Since the earlier
Warrant covered only the cargo, but not M/V Criston which
transported it, a subsequent Warrant of Seizure and
Detention, Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, was issued
on 18 October 2001 particularly for the said vessel. The BOC
District Collector of the Port of Legaspi thereafter
commenced proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston
and its cargo under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A and
Seizure Identification No. 06-2001, respectively.[4]
To protect their property rights over the cargo, consignees
Chua and Carillo filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Tabaco, Albay, a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) assailing the authority of the Legaspi
District Collectors to issue the Warrants of Seizure and
Detention and praying for a permanent injunction against the
implementation of the said Warrants. Their Petition was
docketed as Civil Case No. T-2170.[5]
After finding the Petition sufficient in form and substance
and considering the extreme urgency of the matter involved,
the RTC issued a 72-hour TRO conditioned upon the filing by
Chua and Carillo of a bond in the amount of P31,450,000.00,
representing the value of the goods. After Chua and Carillo
posted the required bond, the 35,000 bags of rice were
released to them.[6]
The Legaspi District Collector held in abeyance the
proceedings for the forfeiture of M/V Criston and its cargo
under Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A pending the resolution by the
RTC of Civil Case No. T-2170. When the RTC granted the
Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. T-2170 filed by the BOC, the
Legaspi District Collector set the hearing of Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-
2001-A. A notice of the scheduled hearing of the
aforementioned seizure cases was sent to Glucer Shipping
but it failed to appear at the hearing so set. After a second
notice of hearing was ignored by Glucer Shipping, the
prosecutor was allowed to present his witnesses.[7]
In the meantime, while M/V Criston was berthing at the Port
of Tabaco under the custody of the BOC, the Province of
Albay was hit by typhoon Manang. In order to avert any
damage which could be caused by the typhoon, the vessel
was allowed to proceed to another anchorage area to
temporarily seek shelter. After typhoon Manang had passed
through Albay province, M/V Criston, however, failed to
return to the Port of Tabaco and was nowhere to be
found.[8]
Alarmed, the BOC and the Philippine Coast Guard
coordinated with the Philippine Air Force to find the missing
vessel. On 8 November 2001, the BOC received information
that M/V Criston was found in the waters of Bataan sporting
the name of M/V Neptune Breeze.[9]
Based on the above information and for failure of M/V
Neptune Breeze to present a clearance from its last port of
call, a Warrant of Seizure and Detention under Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 was issued against the vessel by
the BOC District Collector of the Port of Manila.[10]
For the same reasons, the Legaspi District Collector
rendered a Decision on 27 June 2002 in Seizure Identification
No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A
ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Criston, also known as M/V
Neptune Breeze, and its cargo, for violating Section 2530 (a),
(f) and (k) of the Tariff and Customs Code.[11]
In the meantime, El Greco, the duly authorized local agent
of the registered owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, Atlantic
Pacific Corporation, Inc. (Atlantic Pacific), filed with the
Manila District Collector, in Seizure Identification No. 2001-
208, a Motion for Intervention and Motion to Quash Warrant
of Seizure Detention with Urgent Prayer for the Immediate
Release of M/V Neptune Breeze. El Greco claimed that M/V
Neptune Breeze was a foreign registered vessel owned by
Atlantic Pacific, and different from M/V Criston which had
been involved in smuggling activities in Legaspi, Albay.[12]
Acting favorably on the motion of El Greco, the Manila
District Collector issued an Order[13] dated 11 March 2002
quashing the Warrant of Seizure and Detention it issued
against M/V Neptune Breeze in Seizure Identification No.
2001-208 for lack of probable cause that the said vessel was
the same one known as M/V Criston which fled from the
jurisdiction of the BOC Legaspi District after being seized and
detained therein for allegedly engaging in smuggling
27
activities. According to the decretal part of the Manila
District Collectors Order:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the authority vested in me by law,
it is hereby ordered and decreed that the Warrant of Seizure
and Detention issued thereof be Quashed for want of factual
or legal basis, and that the vessel M/V Neptune Brreze be
released to [El Greco] after clearance with the Commissioner
of Customs, proper identification and compliance with
existing rules and regulations pertinent in the premises.
On automatic review by BOC Commissioner Antonio
Bernardo, the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the District
Collector of the Port of Manila was reversed after finding
that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston were one and the
same and that the Legaspi District Collector had already
acquired prior jurisdiction over the vessel. The Decision
dated 15 January 2003 of the BOC Commissioner, contained
in his 2nd Indorsement[14] to the Manila District Collector,
decreed:
Respectfully returned to the District Collector, POM, the
within case folders in POM S. I. No. 2001-208, EL GRECO SHIP
MANNING AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
Claimant/Intervenor, with the information that the Decision
of that Port in the aforesaid case is hereby REVERSED in view
of the following reasons:
1. Subject vessel MV NEPTUNE BREEZE and MV CRISTON are
one and the same as shown by the vessels documents
retrieved by the elements of the Philippine Coast Guard from
MV CRISTON during the search conducted on board thereof
when the same was apprehended in Tabaco, Albay,
indicating therein the name of the vessel MV NEPTUNE
BREEZE, the name of the master of the vessel a certain
YUSHAWU AWUDU, etc. These facts were corroborated by
the footage of ABS-CBN taken on board the vessel when the
same was subjected to search.
2. Hence, prior jurisdiction over the said vessel was already
acquired by the Port of Legaspi when the said Port issued
WSD S.I. No. 06-2001-A and therefore, the Decision of the
latter Port forfeiting the subject vessel supercedes the
Decision of that Port ordering its release.
Seeking the reversal of the Decision dated 15 January 2003 of
the BOC Commissioner, El Greco filed a Petition for Review
with the CTA which was lodged before its Second Division as
CTA Case No. 6618. El Greco averred that the BOC
Commissioner committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering the forfeiture of the M/V Neptune Breeze in the
absence of proof that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston
were one and the same vessel.[15] According to El Greco, it
was highly improbable that M/V Criston was merely assuming
the identity of M/V Neptune Breeze in order to evade
liability since these were distinct and separate vessels as
evidenced by their Certificates of Registry. While M/V
Neptune Breeze was registered in St. Vincent and the
Grenadines[16] as shown in its Certificate of Registry No.
7298/N, M/V Criston was registered in the Philippines.
Additionally, El Greco argued that the Order dated 11 March
2002 of the Manila District Collector already became final
and executory for failure of the BOC Commissioner to act
thereon within a period of 30 days in accordance with
Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
On 17 October 2005, the CTA Second Division rendered a
Decision[17] in CTA Case No. 6618 sustaining the 15 January
2003 Decision of the BOC Commissioner ordering the
forfeiture of M/V Neptune Breeze. Referring to the crime
laboratory report submitted by the Philippine National Police
(PNP) stating that the serial numbers of the engines and the
generators of both M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze
were identical, the CTA Second Division concluded that both
vessels were indeed one and the same vessel. The CTA
Second Division further ruled that nothing in the provisions of
Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs Code could buttress
El Grecos contention that the Order dated 11 March 2002 of
the Manila District Collector already became final and
executory. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CTA
Second Division reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition for
Review is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision in the 2nd
Indorsement dated January 15, 2003 of then Commissioner
Bernardo is hereby AFFIRMED.[18]
In a Resolution[19] dated 7 February 2006, the CTA Second
Division denied the Motion for Reconsideration of El Greco
for failure to present issues that had not been previously
threshed out in its earlier Decision.
Undaunted, El Greco elevated its case to the CTA En Banc
through a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. EB No.
162, this time lamenting that it was being deprived of its
property without due process of law. El Greco asserted that
the CTA Second Division violated its constitutional right to
due process when it upheld the forfeiture of M/V Neptune
Breeze on the basis of the evidence presented before the
Legaspi District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 06-
2001 and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A, of which El
Greco was not notified and in which it was not able to
participate.[20]
In its Decision[21] promulgated on 14 March 2007, the CTA En
Banc declared that the CTA Second Division did not commit
any error in its disquisition, and dismissed the Petition of El
Greco in C.T.A. EB No. 162 for lack of merit. According to
the CTA En Banc, the appreciation and calibration of
evidence on appeal (from the ruling of the BOC) lies within
the sound discretion of its Division, and the latters findings
and conclusions cannot be set aside unless it has been
sufficiently shown that they are not supported by evidence
on record. The CTA En Banc thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Accordingly, the assailed Decision promulgated on October
17, 2005 and Resolution dated February 7, 2006 of the
Second Division of this Court, are hereby AFFIRMED.[22]
Without filing a Motion for Reconsideration with the CTA, El
Greco already sought recourse before this Court via this
Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
28
WHETHER OR NOT EL GRECO WAS DENIED OF ITS RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE AND M/V CRISTON
ARE ONE AND THE SAME VESSEL.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT M/V NEPTUNE BREEZE IS QUALIFIED TO BE
THE SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE UNDER SECTION 2531 OF THE
TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE.
The primordial issue to be determined by this Court is
whether M/V Neptune Breeze is one and the same as M/V
Criston which had been detained at the Port of Tabaco,
Albay, for carrying smuggled imported rice and had fled the
custody of the customs authorities to evade its liabilities.
El Greco insists that M/V Neptune Breeze and M/V Criston
are not the same vessel. In support of its position, El Greco
again presents the foreign registration of its vessel as
opposed to the local registration of M/V Criston.
The CTA En Banc, however, affirming the findings of the CTA
Second Division, as well as the Legaspi District Collector,
concluded otherwise.
We sustain the determination of the CTA En Banc on this
matter.
Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of facts of the CTA
are binding on this Court and can only be disturbed on appeal
if not supported by substantial evidence.[23] Substantial
evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion.[24]
A review of the records of the present case unveils the
overwhelming and utterly significant pieces of evidence that
more than meets the quantum of evidence necessary to
establish that M/V Neptune Breeze is the very same vessel as
M/V Criston, which left the anchorage area at Legaspi,
Albay, without the consent of the customs authorities therein
while under detention for smuggling 35,000 bags of imported
rice.
The crime laboratory report of the PNP shows that the serial
numbers of the engines and generators of the two vessels are
identical. El Greco failed to rebut this piece of evidence that
decisively identified M/V Neptune Breeze as the same as M/V
Criston. We take judicial notice that along with gross
tonnage, net tonnage, length and breadth of the vessel, the
serial numbers of its engine and generator are the necessary
information identifying a vessel. In much the same way, the
identity of a land motor vehicle is established by its unique
motor and chassis numbers. It is, thus, highly improbable
that two totally different vessels would have engines and
generators bearing the very same serial numbers; and the
only logical conclusion is that they must be one and the same
vessel.
Equally significant is the finding of the Legaspi District
Collector that all the documents submitted by M/V Criston
were spurious, including its supposed registration in the
Philippines. In a letter dated 14 March 2002, Marina
Administrator Oscar M. Sevilla attested that M/V Criston was
not registered with the Marina.
Finally, Customs Guard Adolfo Capistrano testified that the
features of M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were
similar; while Coast Guard Commander Cirilo Ortiz narrated
that he found documents inside M/V Criston bearing the
name M/V Neptune Breeze. These testimonies further
fortified the conclusion reached by the Legaspi District
Collector that M/V Criston and M/V Neptune Breeze were one
and the same.
We also take note that the purported operator of M/V
Criston, Glucer Shipping, was a total no-show at the hearings
held in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District
Collector. Despite being sent several notices of hearing to its
supposed address, Glucer Shipping still failed to appear in
the said proceedings. It becomes highly unfathomable for an
owner to ignore proceedings for the seizure of its vessel,
risking the loss of a property of enormous value.
From the foregoing, we can only deduce that there is
actually no Glucer Shipping and no M/V Criston. M/V Criston
appears to be a mere fictional identity assumed by M/V
Neptune Breeze so it may conduct its smuggling activities
with little risk of being identified and held liable therefor.
We cannot give much credence to the self-serving denial by
El Greco that M/V Neptune Breeze is not the same as M/V
Criston in light of the substantial evidence on record to the
contrary. The foreign registration of M/V Neptune Breeze
proves only that it was registered in a foreign country; but it
does not render impossible the conclusions consistently
reached by the Legaspi District Collector, the CTA Second
Division and the CTA en banc, and presently by this Court,
that M/V Neptune Breeze was the very same vessel used in
the conduct of smuggling activities in the name M/V Criston.
Neither can we permit El Greco to evade the forfeiture of its
vessel, as a consequence of its being used in smuggling
activities, by decrying denial of due process.
In administrative proceedings, such as those before the BOC,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.[25] The
29
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard
or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[26]
Although it was not able to participate in the proceedings in
Seizure Identification No. 06-2001 and Seizure Identification
No. 06-2001-A before the Legaspi District Collector, it had
ample opportunity to present its side of the controversy in
Seizure Identification No. 2001-208 before the Manila District
Collector. To recall, full proceedings were held before the
Manila District Collector in Seizure Identification No. 2001-
208. Even the evidence presented by El Greco in the latter
proceedings fails to persuade. The only vital evidence it
presented before the Manila District Collector in Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 was the foreign registration of
M/V Neptune Breeze. It was still the same piece of evidence
which El Greco submitted to this Court. Even when taken
into consideration and weighed against each other, the
considerably sparse evidence of El Greco in Seizure
Identification No. 2001-208 could not successfully refute the
substantial evidence in Seizure Identification No. 06-2001
and Seizure Identification No. 06-2001-A that M/V Neptune
Breeze is the same as M/V Criston.
Moreover, the claim of El Greco that it was denied due
process flounders in light of its ample opportunity to rebut
the findings of the Legaspi District Collector in Seizure
Identification No. 06-2001 and No. 06-2001-A before the CTA
Second Division in CTA Case No. 6618 and the CTA En Banc in
C.T.A. EB No. 162, and now before this Court in the Petition
at bar. Unfortunately, El Greco was unable to make full use
to its advantage of these repeated opportunities by offering
all possible evidence in support of its case. For example,
evidence that could establish that M/V Neptune Breeze was
somewhere else at the time when M/V Criston was being held
by customs authority at the Port of Legaspi, Albay, would
have been helpful to El Grecos cause and very easy to
secure, but is glaringly absent herein.
After having established that M/V Neptune Breeze is one and
the same as M/V Criston, we come to another crucial issue in
the case at bar, that is, whether the order of forfeiture of
the M/V Neptune Breeze is valid.
The pertinent provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code
read:
SEC. 2530. Property Subject to Forfeiture Under Tariff and
Customs Law. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, cargo, articles
and other objects shall, under the following conditions, be
subject to forfeiture:
a. Any vehicle, vessel or aircraft, including cargo, which shall
be used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of
articles or in conveying and/or transporting contraband or
smuggled articles in commercial quantities into or from any
Philippine port or place. The mere carrying or holding on
board of contraband or smuggled articles in commercial
quantities shall subject such vessel, vehicle, aircraft or any
other craft to forfeiture; Provided, That the vessel, or
aircraft or any other craft is not used as duly authorized
common carrier and as such a carrier it is not chartered or
leased;
xxxx
f. Any article, the importation or exportation of which is
effected or attempted contrary to law, or any article of
prohibited importation or exportation, and all other articles
which, in the opinion of the Collector, have been used, are
or were intended to be used as instruments in the
importation or exportation of the former;
xxxx
k. Any conveyance actually being used for the transport of
articles subject to forfeiture under the tariff and customs
laws, with its equipage or trappings, and any vehicle
similarly used, together with its equipage and appurtenances
including the beast, steam or other motive power drawing or
propelling the same. The mere conveyance of contraband or
smuggled articles by such beast or vehicle shall be sufficient
cause for the outright seizure and confiscation of such beast
or vehicle, but the forfeiture shall not be effected if it is
established that the owner of the means of conveyance used
as aforesaid, is engaged as common carrier and not chartered
or leased, or his agent in charge thereof at the time has no
knowledge of the unlawful act.
The penalty of forfeiture is imposed on any vessel engaged in
smuggling, provided that the following conditions are
present:
(1) The vessel is used unlawfully in the importation or
exportation of articles into or from the Philippines;
(2) The articles are imported to or exported from any
Philippine port or place, except a port of entry; or
(3) If the vessel has a capacity of less than 30 tons and is
used in the importation of articles into any Philippine port or
place other than a port of the Sulu Sea, where importation in
such vessel may be authorized by the Commissioner, with the
approval of the department head."[27]
There is no question that M/V Neptune Breeze, then known
as M/V Criston, was carrying 35,000 bags of imported rice
30
without the necessary papers showing that they were
entered lawfully through a Philippine port after the payment
of appropriate taxes and duties thereon. This gives rise to
the presumption that such importation was illegal.
Consequently, the rice subject of the importation, as well as
the vessel M/V Neptune Breeze used in importation are
subject to forfeiture. The burden is on El Greco, as the
owner of M/V Neptune Breeze, to show that its conveyance
of the rice was actually legal. Unfortunately, its claim that
the cargo was not of foreign origin but was merely loaded at
North Harbor, Manila, was belied by the following evidence -
the Incoming Journal of the Philippine Coast Guard,
Certification issued by the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) Port State Control Center of Manila,
and the letter dated 4 October 2001 issued by the Sub-Port
of North Harbor Collector Edward de la Cuesta, confirming
that there was no such loading of rice or calling of vessel
occurring at North Harbor, Manila. It is, therefore,
uncontroverted that the 35,000 bags of imported rice were
smuggled into the Philippines using M/V Neptune Breeze.
We cannot give credence to the argument of El Greco that
the Order dated 11 March 2002 of the Manila District
Collector, finding no probable cause that M/V Neptune
Breeze is the same as M/V Criston, has already become final
and executory, thus, irreversible, pursuant to Section 2313 of
the Tariff and Customs Code. According to said provision:
SEC. 2313. Review of Commissioner. The person aggrieved by
the decision or action of the Collector in any matter
presented upon protest or by his action in any case of seizure
may, within fifteen (15) days after notification in writing by
the Collector of his action or decision, file a written notice
to the Collector with a copy furnished to the Commissioner
of his intention to appeal the action or decision of the
Collector to the Commissioner. Thereupon the Collector shall
forthwith transmit all the records of the proceedings to the
Commissioner, who shall approve, modify or reverse the
action or decision of the Collector and take such steps and
make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to his
decision: Provided, That when an appeal is filed beyond the
period herein prescribed, the same shall be deemed
dismissed.
If in any seizure proceedings, the Collector renders a
decision adverse to the Government, such decision shall be
automatically reviewed by the Commissioner and the records
of the case elevated within five (5) days from the
promulgation of the decision of the Collector. The
Commissioner shall render a decision on the automatic
appeal within thirty (30) days from receipts of the records of
the case. If the Collectors decision is reversed by the
Commissioner, the decision of the Commissioner shall be
final and executory. However, if the Collectors decision is
affirmed, or if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
record of the case by the Commissioner no decision is
rendered or the decision involves imported articles whose
published value is five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) or more,
such decision shall be deemed automatically appealed to the
Secretary of Finance and the records of the proceedings shall
be elevated within five (5) days from the promulgation of the
decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector under
appeal, as the case may be: Provided, further, That if the
decision of the Commissioner or of the Collector under
appeal as the case may be, is affirmed by the Secretary of
Finance or if within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
records of the proceedings by the Secretary of Finance, no
decision is rendered, the decision of the Secretary of
Finance, or of the Commissioner, or of the Collector under
appeal, as the case may be, shall become final and
executory.
In any seizure proceeding, the release of imported articles
shall not be allowed unless and until a decision of the
Collector has been confirmed in writing by the Commissioner
of Customs. (Emphasis ours.)
There is nothing in Section 2313 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to support the position of El Greco. As the CTA en banc
explained, in case the BOC Commissioner fails to decide on
the automatic appeal of the Collectors Decision within 30
days from receipt of the records thereof, the case shall again
be deemed automatically appealed to the Secretary of
Finance. Also working against El Greco is the fact that
jurisdiction over M/V Neptune Breeze, otherwise known as
M/V Criston, was first acquired by the Legaspi District
Collector; thus, the Manila District Collector cannot validly
acquire jurisdiction over the same vessel. Judgment
rendered without jurisdiction is null and void, and void
judgment cannot be the source of any right whatsoever.[28]
Finally, we strongly condemn the ploy used by M/V Neptune
Breeze, assuming a different identity to smuggle goods into
the country in a brazen attempt to defraud the government
and the Filipino public and deprive them of much needed
monetary resources. We further laud the efforts of the
Commissioner of the Customs Bureau and the other executive
officials in his department to curb the proliferation of
smuggling syndicates in the country which deserves no less
than our full support.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is
DENIED. The Decision dated 17 October 2005 and Resolution
dated 7 February 2006 of the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc in
CTA EB No. 172 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 201796 January 15, 2013
GOVERNOR SADIKUL A. SAHALI and VICE-GOVERNOR RUBY
M. SAHALl, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(FIRST DIVISION), RASHIDIN H. MA TBA and JILKASI J.
USMAN, Respondents.
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in relation to
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court filed by Sadikul A. Sahali
(Sadikul) and Ruby M. Sahali (Ruby), assailing the Order1
dated May 3, 2012 issued by the First Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in EPC Nos. 2010-76 and
2010-77.
31
During the May 10, 2010 elections, Sadikul and private
respondent Rashidin H. Matba (Matba) were two of the four
candidates who ran for the position of governor in the
Province of Tawi-Tawi while Ruby and private respondent
Jilkasi J. Usman (Usman) ran for the position of Vice-
Governor.2
On May 14, 2010, the Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC)
proclaimed petitioners Sadikul and Ruby as the duly elected
governor and vice-governor, respectively, of the province of
Tawi-Tawi. In the statement of votes issued by the PBOC,
petitioner Sadikul garnered a total of 59,417 as against
private respondent Matba’s 56,013,3 while petitioner Ruby
prevailed over private respondent Usman, with votes of
61,005 and 45,127, respectively.4
Alleging that the said elections in the Province of Tawi-Tawi
were attended by massive and wide-scale irregularities,
Matba filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam5 with the
COMELEC. Matba contested the results in 39 out of 282
clustered precincts that functioned in the province of Tawi-
Tawi. The said election protest filed by Matba was raffled to
the First Division of the COMELEC and was docketed as EPC
No. 2010-76.
Usman also filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam6 with the
COMELEC, contesting the results in 39 out of the 282
clustered precincts in the Province of Tawi-Tawi. Usman’s
election protest was likewise raffled to the First Division of
the COMELEC and was docketed as EPC No. 2010-77. The
respective election protests filed by private respondents
Matba and Usman prayed, inter alia, for the technical
examination of the ballots, Election Day Computerized
Voters List (EDCVL), the Voters Registration Record (VRR),
and the Book of Voters in all the protested precincts of the
province of Tawi-Tawi.7
After Sadikul filed his Answer8 with counter-protest, a
preliminary conference was conducted by the COMELEC in
EPC No. 2010-76. On November 24, 2011, the COMELEC
issued a Preliminary Conference Order9 in EPC No. 2010-76.
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued an Order10 dated November
23, 2011 which directed the retrieval and delivery of the 39
ballot boxes containing the ballots in the 39 protested
clustered precincts as well as the election paraphernalia
therein.
Meanwhile, in EPC No. 2010-77, the COMELEC, after Ruby’s
filing of her Answer11 with counter-protest, conducted a
preliminary conference on January 4, 2012. On January 20,
2012, the COMELEC issued its Preliminary Conference
Order12 in the said case.
On January 17, 2012, the COMELEC resolved to consolidate
EPC No. 2010-76 and EPC No. 2010-77.
On February 9, 2012, the retrieval and delivery of the ballot
boxes and other election documents from the 39 protested
precincts were completed. On February 20, 2012, the
COMELEC First Division ordered the recount of the contested
ballots, directing the creation of five recount committees for
the said purpose.13
On February 24, 2012, Matba and Usman filed a Manifestation
and Ex-Parte Motion (Re: Order Dated 20 February 2012),
requesting that they be allowed to secure photocopies of the
contested ballots. Further, they moved for a technical
examination of the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters
for the contested precincts in the province of Tawi-Tawi by
comparing the signature and the thumbmarks appearing on
the EDCVL as against those appearing on the VRRs and the
Book of Voters.14
Private respondents Matba and Usman averred that, instead
of recounting the ballots in the pilot precincts constituting
20% of the protested precincts, the COMELEC First Division
should order the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia from the 38 clustered precincts that are the
subject of both election protests filed by them.
On March 5, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued an
Order15 which granted the said ex-parte motion filed by
Matba and Usman. Thus, the COMELEC First Division directed
its Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) to
conduct a technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia by comparing the signature and thumbmarks
appearing on the EDCVL as against those appearing on the
VRRs and the Book of Voters.
On March 9, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby jointly filed with the
COMELEC First Division a Strong Manifestation of Grave
Concern and Motion for Reconsideration (Of the Order Dated
March 5, 2012)16. They asserted that the March 5, 2012
Order issued by the COMELEC First Division, insofar as it
directed the technical examination of the EDCVL, the VRR
and the Book of Voters, should be reversed on account of the
following: first, the said Order was issued without due
process since the COMELEC First Division did not allow them
to oppose the said ex-parte motion; second, the COMELEC
First Division cannot just order a technical examination in
the absence of published rules on the matter; and third, the
COMELEC First Division could not just examine the said
election paraphernalia without violating the Precautionary
Protection Order issued by the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
in the protest case between Manuel Roxas and Jejomar
Binay.
On March 15, 2012, Matba and Usman filed with the COMELEC
First Division their counter-manifestation17 to the said
manifestation and motion for reconsideration filed by Sadikul
and Ruby. They asserted therein that Sadikul and Ruby were
not deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division
32
issued its March 15, 2012 Order. They averred that their
respective election protests and the Preliminary Conference
Orders issued by the COMELEC First Division all indicated that
they would move for the technical examination of the said
election paraphernalia. Nonetheless, they pointed out that
Sadikul and Ruby failed to express any objection to their
intended motion for technical examination of the said
election paraphernalia.
Further, Matba and Usman claimed that said motion for
technical examination is not a contentious motion since the
intended technical examination would not prejudice the
rights of Sadikul and Ruby considering that the same only
included the EDCVL, the VRR and the Book of Voters, and not
the ballots.
On March 23, 2012, Sadikul and Ruby then filed with the
COMELEC First Division their Reply18 to the counter-
manifestation filed by Matba and Usman. In turn, Matba and
Usman filed with the COMELEC First Division their
Rejoinder19 on March 30, 2012. On May 3, 2012, the
COMELEC First Division issued the herein assailed Order20
which denied the said motion for reconsideration of the
March 5, 2012 Order filed by Sadikul and Ruby. The COMELEC
First Division maintained that Sadikul and Ruby were not
deprived of due process. It pointed out that the intention of
Matba and Usman to ask for the technical examination of the
said election documents had always been apparent from the
filing of their separate election protests, preliminary
conference briefs and their intention to offer as evidence all
election documents and paraphernalia such as the EDCVL,
VRRs and Book of Voters on the protested precincts.
Further, the COMELEC First Division opined that the
insinuation asserted by Sadikul and Ruby that there are no
published rules governing the technical examination of
election paraphernalia is untenable. It pointed out that the
technical examination of election paraphernalia is governed
by Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804. As to
the Precautionary Protection Order issued in the protest case
between Manuel Roxas and Jejomar Binay, the COMELEC First
Division averred that it would request a clearance from the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal for the conduct of said
technical examination.
Hence, petitioners Sadikul and Ruby filed the instant petition
with this Court essentially asserting that the COMELEC First
Division committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when: first, it did not give them
the opportunity to oppose the motion for technical
examination filed by Matba and Usman; and second, it
ordered the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia despite the lack of sanction and published
rules governing such examination.
The petition is denied.
The petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari to assail an interlocutory order issued by the
COMELEC First Division is amiss. "A party aggrieved by an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC in an
election protest may not directly assail the order in this
Court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
remedy is to seek the review of the interlocutory order
during the appeal of the decision of the Division in due
course."21
Under the Constitution, the power of this Court to review
election cases falling within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC only extends to final decisions or
resolutions of the COMELEC en banc, not to interlocutory
orders issued by a Division thereof. Section 7, Article IX of
the Constitution mandates:
Sec. 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis ours)
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,22 this Court elucidated on the
import of the said provision in this wise:
We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This
decision must be a final decision or resolution of the
Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or even
a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on
Elections.
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the
Comelec en banc may be elevated to the Supreme Court is by
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, now expressly provided in Rule 64,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A
motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate remedy
provided by law. Failure to abide by this procedural
requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal of the
petition.
33
In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of
the Comelec must be reviewed by the Comelec en banc via a
motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision
may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. The pre-
requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
x x x.23 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Here, the Orders dated March 5, 2012 and May 3, 2012 issued
by the First Division of the COMELEC were merely
interlocutory orders since they only disposed of an incident
in the main case i.e. the propriety of the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia. Thus, the
proper recourse for the petitioners is to await the decision of
the COMELEC First Division in the election protests filed by
Matba and Usman, and should they be aggrieved thereby, to
appeal the same to the COMELEC en banc by filing a motion
for reconsideration.24
The petitioners, citing the case of Kho v. COMELEC,25
nevertheless insist that this Court may take cognizance of
the instant Petition for Certiorari since the COMELEC en banc
is not the proper forum in which the said interlocutory orders
issued by the COMELEC First Division can be reviewed.
The petitioners’ reliance on Kho is misplaced. In Kho, the
issue was whether a Division of the COMELEC may admit an
answer with counter-protest which was filed beyond the
reglementary period. This Court held that the COMELEC First
Division gravely abused its discretion when it admitted the
answer with counter-protest that was belatedly filed.
On the propriety of a filing a Petition for Certiorari with this
Court sans any motion for reconsideration having been filed
with the COMELEC en banc, it was held therein that, as an
exception, direct resort to this Court via certiorari assailing
an interlocutory order may be allowed when a Division of the
COMELEC commits grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction. Thus:
As to the issue of whether or not the case should be referred
to the COMELEC en banc, this Court finds the respondent
COMELEC First Division correct when it held in its order dated
February 28, 1996 that no final decision, resolution or order
has yet been made which will necessitate the elevation of
the case and its records to the Commission en banc. No less
than the Constitution requires that the election cases must
be heard and decided first in division and any motion for
reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
commission en banc. Apparently, the orders dated July 26,
1995, November 15 1995 and February 28, 1996 and the
other orders relating to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest are issuances of a Commission in division and
are all interlocutory orders because they merely rule upon an
incidental issue regarding the admission of Espinosa’s answer
with counter-protest and do not terminate or finally dispose
of the case as they leave something to be done before it is
finally decided on the merits. In such a situation, the rule is
clear that the authority to resolve incidental matters of a
case pending in a division, like the questioned interlocutory
orders, falls on the division itself, and not on the Commission
en banc. x x x
xxxx
Furthermore, a look at Section 2, Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure confirms that the subject case does not
fall on any of the instances over which the Commission en
banc can take cognizance of. It reads as follows:
"Section 2. The Commission en banc. - The Commission shall
sit en banc in cases hereinafter specifically provided, or in
pre-proclamation cases upon a vote of a majority of the
members of a Commission, or in all other cases where a
division is not authorized to act, or where, upon a unanimous
vote of all the members of a Division, an interlocutory
matter or issue relative to an action or proceeding before it
is decided to be referred to the Commission en banc." In the
instant case, it does not appear that the subject controversy
is one of the cases specifically provided under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure in which the Commission may sit en banc.
Neither is it shown that the present controversy a case where
a division is not authorized to act nor a situation wherein the
members of the First Division unanimously voted to refer the
subject case to the Commission en banc. Clearly, the
Commission en banc, under the circumstances shown above,
can not be the proper forum which the matter concerning
the assailed interlocutory orders can be referred to.
In a situation such as this where the Commission in division
committed grave abuse of discretion or acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in issuing interlocutory orders relative
to an action pending before it and the controversy did not
fall under any of the instances mentioned in section 2, Rule 3
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is not to refer the controversy to the
Commission en banc as this is not permissible under its
present rules but to elevate it to this Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.26 (Citations
omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, exceptionally, this Court may take cognizance of a
certiorari action directed against an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC when the following
circumstances are present: first, the order was issued
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and second, under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the subject of the controversy is a matter which
(1) the COMELEC en banc may not sit and consider or (2) a
Division is not authorized to act or (3) the members of the
Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en
banc.27
The exception in Kho does not apply in the instant case since
the COMELEC First Division is authorized to act on the ex-
parte motion for the technical examination of the said
34
election paraphernalia. The COMELEC First Division has
already acquired jurisdiction over the election protests filed
by Matba and Usman. Concomitant with such acquisition of
jurisdiction is the authority of the COMELEC First Division to
rule on the issues raised by the parties and all incidents
arising therefrom, including the authority to act on the ex-
parte motion for technical examination of said election
paraphernalia.
In Kho, the COMELEC First Division did not acquire
jurisdiction on the answer with counter-protest since it was
filed beyond the reglementary period and, consequently, did
not have any authority to act on the issues raised therein and
all incidents arising therefrom. Thus:
It is worthy to note that as early as in the case of Arrieta vs.
Rodriguez, this Court had firmly settled the rule that the
counter-protest must be filed within the period provided by
law, otherwise, the forum loses its jurisdiction to entertain
the belatedly filed counter-protest. In the case at bar, there
is no question that the answer with counter-protest of
Espinosa was filed outside the reglementary period provided
for by law. As such, the COMELEC First Division has no
jurisdictional authority to entertain the belated answer with
counter-protest much less pass upon and decide the issues
raised therein. It follows therefore that the order of July 26,
1995 which pertains to the admission of the answer with
counter-protest of Espinosa as well as the other consequent
orders implementing the order of admission issued by the
COMELEC First Division are void for having been issued
without jurisdiction. Even if petitioner Kho did not file a
motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 26, 1995
admitting the answer with counter-protest, the jurisdictional
infirmity, brought about by the late filing of the answer to
the protest, persist and can not be cured by the omission on
the part of the protestee-petitioner to seek a reconsideration
of the order dated July 26, 1995.28 (Citation omitted and
emphasis ours)
Even if this Court is to disregard the procedural lapse
committed by the petitioners and rule on the issues raised,
the instant petition would still be denied.
The petitioners claim that they were denied due process
when the COMELEC granted the motion for technical
examination filed by Matba and Usman without giving them
the opportunity to oppose the said motion.
This Court does not agree.
It bears stressing that the COMELEC, in election disputes, is
not duty-bound to notify and direct a party therein to file an
opposition to a motion filed by the other party. It is
incumbent upon the party concerned, if he/she deems it
necessary, to file an opposition to a motion within five days
from receipt of a copy of the same without awaiting for the
COMELEC’s directive to do so. On this score, Section 3, Rule
9 of COMELEC Resolution No. 880429 clearly provides that:
Sec. 3. No hearings on motions. – Motions shall not be set for
hearing unless the Commission directs otherwise. Oral
argument in support thereof shall be allowed only upon the
discretion of the Commission. The adverse party may file
opposition five days from receipt of the motion, upon the
expiration of which such motion is deemed submitted for
resolution. The Commission shall resolve the motion within
five days. (Emphasis ours)
If the party concerned, despite receipt of a copy of the
motion that was filed with the COMELEC, did not file an
opposition to the said motion, the motion would be deemed
submitted for resolution upon the expiration of the period to
file an opposition thereto.
It should be stressed that one of the factors that should be
considered in election protests is expediency. Proceedings in
election protests are special and expeditious and the early
resolution of such cases should not be hampered by any
unnecessary observance of procedural rules.30 "The
proceedings should not be encumbered by delays. All of
these are because the term of elective office is likewise
short. There is the personal stake of the contestants which
generates feuds and discords. Above all is the public interest.
Title to public elective office must not be left long under
cloud. Efficiency of public administration should not be
impaired. It is thus understandable that pitfalls which may
retard the determination of election contests should be
avoided."31
Here, the petitioners did not file an opposition to the said
motion for technical examination that was filed by Matba and
Usman on February 24, 2012. It was only after the COMELEC
First Division issued its March 5, 2012 Order that the
petitioners decided to register their opposition to the
intended technical examination, albeit in the form of a
motion for reconsideration of the said Order. Contrary to the
petitioners’ claim, Section 3, Rule 9 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804 gave them the opportunity to raise their objections
to the said motion for technical examination. However, for
reasons known only to them, petitioners did not file any
opposition to the said motion. Accordingly, it is the
petitioners themselves and not the COMELEC First Division
who should be faulted for their predicament.
Further, this Court cannot see how due process was denied
to the petitioners in the issuance of the COMELEC First
Division’s March 5, 2012 Order. The petitioners were able to
present their opposition to the said motion for technical
examination in their manifestation and motion for
reconsideration which they filed with the COMELEC First
Division on March 9, 2012. Indeed, the petitioners’ objections
to the technical examination of the said election
paraphernalia were exhaustively discussed by the COMELEC
First Division in its May 3, 2012 Resolution. Having filed a
motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC First Division’s
35
March 5, 2012 Order, the petitioners’ claim of denial of due
process is clearly unfounded.
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of
due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration.32
Anent the issue on the technical examination of election
paraphernalia, the petitioners contend that the COMELEC
First Division cannot order a technical examination of the
said election paraphernalia since there is as yet no published
rule therefor. They assert that Section 1, Rule 18 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, the rule relied upon by the
COMELEC First Division in ordering a technical examination,
is vague as it failed to provide the documents that should be
subjected to technical examination in election protest cases.
At the core of the petitioners’ assertion is the power of the
COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination of
the said election paraphernalia. This Court agrees with the
petitioners that Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8804 does not expressly authorize the conduct of
technical examination of election paraphernalia as it merely
provides for the procedure to be followed in the presentation
and reception of evidence in election protest cases.
Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, in part,
reads:
Sec. 1. Presentation and reception of evidence; order of
hearing. - The reception of evidence on all matters or issues
raised in the protest and counter-protests shall be presented
and offered in a hearing upon completion of (a) the recount
of ballots, or re-tabulation of election documents, or (b) the
technical examination, if warranted.
xxxx
While Section 1, Rule 18 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804
does not explicitly provide for the rule on the technical
examination of election paraphernalia, it does not mean,
however, that the COMELEC First Division does not have the
power to order the conduct of such technical examination.
The absence of a rule which specifically mandates the
technical examination of the said election paraphernalia
does not mean that the COMELEC First Division is barred from
issuing an order for the conduct thereof. The power of the
COMELEC First Division to order the technical examination
election paraphernalia in election protest cases stems from
its "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating to
the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial and city officials".33
Otherwise stated, the express grant of power to the
COMELEC to resolve election protests carries with it the
grant of all other powers necessary, proper, or incidental to
the effective and efficient exercise of the power expressly
granted. Verily, the exclusive original jurisdiction conferred
by the constitution to the COMELEC to settle said election
protests includes the authority to order a technical
examination of relevant election paraphernalia, election
returns and ballots in order to determine whether fraud and
irregularities attended the canvass of the votes.
There is no gainsaying that the COMELEC is mandated by law
to resolve election cases expeditiously and promptly. "For in
this specie of controversies involving the determination of
the true will of the electorate, time indeed is of paramount
importance second to none perhaps, except for the genuine
will of the majority. To be sure, an election controversy
which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of
the people’s choice, as gleaned from the medium of the
ballot, should be resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence
and regard to due process."34
Concomitant to the COMELEC’s duty to expeditiously resolve
election cases is the authority to resort to every reasonable
and efficient means available to it to settle the controversy.
The COMELEC is thus enjoined, "not only to maintain its
sense of urgency in resolving these cases, but also to explore
every reasonable and feasible means of ascertaining which
candidate was duly elected."35 Thus, this Court has
declared:
An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed
with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest is
to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board
of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is
sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was
the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An
election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication
of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates but
paramount to their claims is the deep public concern
involved and the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the
real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its
command who is the real candidate elected by the people.36
(Emphasis ours)
Here, the technical examination ordered by the COMELEC
First Division, by comparing the signature and the
thumbmarks appearing on the EDCVL as against those
appearing on the VRRs and the Book of Voters, is a
36
reasonable, efficient and expeditious means of determining
the truth or falsity of the allegations of fraud and
irregularities in the canvass of the votes in the province of
Tawi-Tawi. Accordingly, the COMELEC First Division did not
commit any abuse of discretion when it allowed the technical
examination of the said election paraphernalia.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions,
the petition is DENIED. The assailed Order dated May 3, 2012
issued by the First Division of the Commission on Elections in
EPC Nos. 2010-76 and 2010-77 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. NO. 170956 | May 12, 2010
FELISA R. FERRER, Petitioner, vs. DOMINGO CARGANILLO,
SERGIO CARGANILLO, SOLEDAD AGUSTIN and MARCELINA
SOLIS, Respondents
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The concept of social function of private property which
today is presented as one of the possible justifications for
agrarian and urban land reform has its roots in the
cosmogenic and philosophical concept which maintains that
man must answer to the Creator for the use of the resources
entrusted to him. It is an old concept and is ultimately
related to the genesis of society itself. Hence, the use,
enjoyment, occupation or disposition of private property is
not absolute. It is predicated on the social functions of
property. It is restricted in a sense so as to bring about
maximum benefits to all and not to a few chosen
individuals.[1]
This petition concerns four cases, involving herein petitioner
Felisa R. Ferrer, jointly heard by the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD), appealed to the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and
subsequently further appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
to wit:
1. DARAB Case No. 7862 Felisa R. Ferrer v. Domingo
Carganillo and Sergio Carganillo for Ejectment and Damages;
2. DARAB Case No. 7863 Felisa R. Ferrer v. Soledad
Agustin for Ejectment and Damages;
3. DARAB Case No. 7864 Rosa Pajarito, Elvira
Madolora and Anastacia Lagado represented by Felisa R.
Ferrer v. Marcelina Solis for Ejectment and Damages;
4. DARAB Case No. 7865 Irene Aguinaldo and Felisa
R. Ferrer v. Marcelina Solis for Ejectment and Damages.
For clarity, each case will be tackled independently as each
involved different set of facts.
Factual Antecedents
a) DARAB Case No. 7862
In her Complaint,[2] petitioner Felisa R. Ferrer (Felisa)
alleged that she is the owner of a 6,000-square meters lot
under Tax Declaration No. 42-06462, situated at Brgy.
Legaspi, Tayug, Pangasinan and being tenanted by
respondent Domingo Carganillo (Domingo). Without her
knowledge and consent, Domingo subleased the subject
landholding to his brother, herein respondent Sergio
Carganillo (Sergio) for P15,000.00. Felisa only knew of this
fact when she visited the place and found Sergio in actual
possession and cultivation of the landholding in question.
In his Answer,[3] Domingo denied that he mortgaged his
possessory rights to Sergio and asserted that he is still in
actual, continuous and peaceful possession of subject
property.
Meanwhile, upon a verbal complaint lodged by Felisa with
the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Tayug, Pangasinan, MARO
Legal Officer Dionisio G. Estimada (Estimada) conducted an
investigation on the matter.
In his December 19, 1997 Investigation Report,[4] Estimada
stated that based on the testimony he had gathered from
other people, the cultivation and possession of the subject
landholding was subleased by Domingo to Sergio as the
former was applying for work abroad.[5] In fact, Domingo
admitted the existence of the sublease.[6] Thus, based on
the foregoing, Estimada recommended that Sergio and
Domingo be ejected from the subject landholding.[7]
The Affidavit of Angela N. Clarion (Clarion) was also
submitted to corroborate the Investigation Report.[8] Clarion
averred that Domingo mortgaged his tenancy rights over the
subject agricultural land to Sergio, and that the latter is
presently cultivating the said land by virtue of such
mortgage.[9]
Ruling of the PARAD
In an Order[10] dated January 20, 1998, the PARAD required
the parties to submit their respective position papers within
20 days from said date. Felisa filed her position paper for all
the four cases, attaching thereto the Investigation Report of
37
Estimada, as well as the corroborating affidavits of Clarion
and Gelacio Gano (Gano). Sergio, on the other hand,
admitted that he helps his older brother, Domingo, in
cultivating the landholding[11] but he denied subleasing the
same from Domingo.[12]
In addition, respondents presented the affidavits of (1)
Mariano Orina
(Mariano), tenant of the adjacent agricultural land, who
attested that Domingo is the one who supervises the
activities in his tenanted land;[13] (2) Barangay Agrarian
Reform Council (BARC) Chairman Valentin Costales
(Costales), who stated that he does not know of any violation
that Domingo has committed against the landowner;[14] and
(3) Barangay Kagawad Arsenio R. Frago (Frago), who
maintained that Domingo has not violated any provision of
the Land Reform Code.[15]
On April 8, 1998, PARAD Rodolfo A. Caddarao (Caddarao)
issued a Decision[16] holding that:
In a situation such as this, the complainant has the burden of
proof to show by convincing evidence the truth of her
allegations. In the case at bar the complainant failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that there is
subleasing or mortgage of the property by the respondent
tenant. Hence, the herein action must necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint in the
instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence and
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, Felisa appealed to the DARAB.
Ruling of the DARAB
In her appeal memorandum[17] dated October 7, 1998, Felisa
asserted that the PARAD erred in failing to give credence to
the Investigation Report of the MARO legal officer. She
likewise presented for the first time an original copy of the
Katulagan[18] (Agreement) to prove that Domingo obtained a
loan in the amount of P15,000.00 from Sergio. Felisa argued
that she has established, by more than substantial evidence,
that Domingo has indeed conveyed his leasehold rights to
Sergio for said amount.
On January 27, 2004, the DARAB rendered its Decision[19]
affirming the findings of the PARAD that Felisa failed to
substantiate her allegation of subleasing.
Felisa thence elevated the matter to the CA through a
Petition for Review[20] dated December 6, 2004.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On August 22, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision[21] affirming
the DARAB Decision. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated January 27, 2004 and
the Resolution dated October 18, 2004 are hereby
AFFIRMED.[22]
Our Ruling
a) DARAB Case No. 7862
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in not finding that
Domingo subleased or mortgaged his landholding rights to
Sergio which warrants their ejectment from the subject
landholding. Petitioner asserts that: (1) the law is explicit
that the tenant and his immediate family must work directly
on the land; (2) Sergio cannot pass as Domingos immediate
family; (3) as evidenced by the Katulagan, Sergio has been
cultivating the land for more than two years prior to the
filing of the complaint; and (4) when Domingo subleased the
land to Sergio, he is considered as having abandoned the land
as a tenant.[23] She further stresses that respondents
admission, coupled with the finding of the DARAB that Sergio
is tilling the land, proved subtenancy. Consequently, she
prays that the lease tenancy relationship between the
contending parties be declared terminated.
Domingo, on the other hand, denies that he subleased or
mortgaged his tenancy rights to anyone. He claims that he
complied with all his obligations under the leasehold
agreement over the subject agricultural land, and thus prays
for the dismissal of the case.
The petition is impressed with merit.
The DARAB erred in disregarding the Katulagan (Agreement)
as evidence.
The DARAB held that the Katulagan is inadmissible in
evidence because it was not formally offered before the
PARAD, citing our ruling in People v. Mongado.[24] On
appeal, however, the CA considered the Katulagan, but
38
found the same to be a mere promissory note tending to
prove indebtedness and not as an evidence of mortgage.
We cannot subscribe with the reasoning of the DARAB. The
Rules of Court, particularly the Revised Rules on Evidence,
are specifically applicable to judicial proceedings, to wit:
Section 1. Evidence defined. Evidence is the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Sec. 2. Scope. The rules of evidence shall be the same in all
courts and in all trials and hearings except as otherwise
provided by law or these rules.[25] (Emphasis supplied)
In quasi judicial proceedings, the said rules shall not apply
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient.[26] In the instant case, the then
prevailing DARAB Rules of Procedures[27] provide that:
Section 2. Construction. These Rules shall be liberally
construed to carry out the objectives of agrarian reform and
to promote just, expeditious and inexpensive adjudication
and settlement of agrarian cases, disputes or controversies.
xxxx
Section 3. Technical Rules Not Applicable. The Board and its
Regional and Provincial Adjudicators shall not be bound by
technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in
the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all
agrarian cases, disputes or controversies in a most
expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice
and equity.
a) If and when a case comes up for adjudication wherein
there is no applicable provision under these rules, the
procedural law and jurisprudence generally applicable to
agrarian disputes shall be applied;
b) The Adjudication Board (Board), and its Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicators (RARADs) and Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicators (PARADs) hereinafter referred to as
Adjudicators, shall have the authority to adopt any
appropriate measure or procedure in any given situation or
matter not covered by these Rules. All such special measures
or procedures and the situations to which they have been
applied must be reported to the Board; and
c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall not apply even in
a suppletory character unless adopted herein or by resolution
of the Board. However, due process of the law shall be
observed and followed in all instances. (Emphasis supplied)
The DARAB Rules of Procedures explicitly provides that the
Agrarian Reform Adjudicators are not bound by technical
rules of procedure and evidence in the Rules of Court nor
shall the latter apply even in a suppletory manner. Thus, we
find that the DARAB erred in holding the Katulagan as
inadmissible since it was not formally offered and
admitted.[28] Moreover, reliance on our ruling in People v.
Mongado, i.e., that "[t]he court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered," is misplaced. We
simply cannot find any legal basis for the DARAB to cite our
ruling in a criminal case;[29] the fundamental rule found in
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court does not find any application
in this agrarian case.
Petitioner has sufficiently proven by clear and convincing
evidence the fact of subleasing.
The PARAD summed up the evidence presented by both
parties as follows:
In the instant case, the evidence for the complainant are as
follows:
1. Exhibit 1 Photocopy of an Investigation Report dated
December 19, 1997 submitted by Legal Officer I Dionisio
Estimada to the Legal Services Division of DAR wherein he
stated in his findings that Verily, the tenants, particularly
Domingo Carganillo, who actually and finally accepted that
he subleased the land to another is clear and blatant
violation against the landowner and co-owner for that
matter. Hence, he recommended that Domingo Carganillo
and Sergio Carganillo be ejected from the landholding.
2. Exhibit 2 Affidavit dated January 21, 1998 of one Angela
[Clarion] wherein she stated that she knew for a fact that
Domingo Carganillo mortgaged his tenancy rights in 1995 to
his brother Sergio Carganillo.
On the part of the respondent Domingo Carganillo, his
evidence are:
1. Exhibit 1 The affidavit of one Sergio Carganillo, the other
respondent and brother of respondent Domingo Carganillo
denying that the land was mortgaged by his brother to him
and stated that he usually help his brother to do some works
in the landholding.
2. Exhibit 2 Affidavit dated February 3, 1998 of one Mariano
Orina stating that being a tenant in the adjoining
landholding, he knows that Domingo Carganillo is always
present doing or supervising the activities in his field.
39

3. Exhibit 3 Sworn statement of Valentin Costales, the
incumbent Barangay Agrarian Reform Council Chairman of
the place where the property is located attesting that
Domingo and Sergio Carganillo never violated any agrarian
laws.
4. Exhbit 4 Sworn statement issued by one of the incumbent
Barangay Kagawads having jurisdiction of the land in suit,
stating also to the fact that respondents never violated any
agrarian laws.
The PARAD assessed the evidence submitted and held that
Felisa failed to discharge the burden of proof of establishing
her allegations, to wit:
After a careful assessment of the facts and evidence
presented, the Board is of the view and so holds that there is
no evidence showing that respondent Domingo Carganillo
subleased the land to his brother Sergio Carganillo. The
investigation report dated December 19, 1997 of Legal
Officer I Dionisio Estimada (Exhibit 1 of complaint) is not
conclusive. His conclusion that Domingo Carganillo accepted
to him that he subleased the property could not be accepted
by this Board as fact. There is no evidence showing that
Domingo Carganillo accepted said matter to him. The Board
cannot be compelled to accept the report as true since, in
the first place it had not ordered such investigation.
On appeal, the DARAB concurred with the findings of the
PARAD stating that:
One of the contentions invoked by the complainant-appellant
is that the landholding in question was subleased by herein
respondent-appellee to his co-respondent Sergio Carganillo,
who is in actual possession and cultivation thereof. This
contention, however, cannot be given due consideration. The
Honorable Adjudicator a quo correctly ruled that there was
no subleasing in this case.
At this juncture, it is better to define what a sub-lessee
means. In the case of Santiago vs. Rodrigo, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 33651-R, June 3, 1965, sub-tenant or sub-lessee has been
defined as a person who rents all, or a portion of the leased
premises, from the lessor for a term less than the original
one, leaving a reversionary interest in the first lessee. Sub-
leasing therefore, creates a new estate dependent upon, out
of, and distinct from, the original leasehold. However, this is
not true in the case at bar. Granting that Sergio Carganillo is
working on the land tenanted by respondent-appellee, such
is not in the nature of being a sub-lessee, but is merely
helping his brother as an immediate member of the family to
cultivate the land. The employment of respondent-appellees
brother to cultivate the landholding in question is not in any
way prejudicial to the interest of the landowner. Also, it was
ruled that the employment by the lessee of the members of
his immediate farm household does not come within the
prohibition (De Guzman v. Santos, 6 SCRA 796, November 30,
1962).
Since the issue of sub-leasing was not properly proved by
substantial evidence, the same cannot be given favorable
consideration.
On further appeal, the CA held thus:
Clearly, petitioners assertion that respondent Domingo
subleased the subject landholding to respondent Sergio
cannot be given weight. She failed to prove with sufficient
evidence neither the fact of subleasing the subject
landholding nor the mortgaging of the possessory rights
thereof to respondent Sergio. The document belatedly
presented by petitioner and denominated as Katulagan, is
merely a promissory note which is a proof of indebtedness
and not as evidence to prove mortgage.
We disagree with the findings of fact of the CA and the
agencies below. The confluence of evidence shows that
Felisa has clearly and convincingly established her allegation
that Domingo subleased his landholding to Sergio, to wit:
a) The investigation conducted by MARO Legal Officer
Estimada shows that Domingo admitted that the cultivation
and possession of the subject landholding was subleased to
Sergio as he was then applying for work abroad.[30]
b) In her complaint, Felisa stressed that in one of her visits
to the subject landholding prior to the filing of the said
complaint, she discovered that Sergio, the sublessee, was in
actual possession and cultivation of the landholding in
question.[31] Petitioner further contended that Domingo
subleased the said agricultural leasehold to Sergio for the
amount of P15,000.00.[32]
c) The Katulagan or Agreement establishes that indeed
Domingo was indebted to Sergio in the amount of
P15,000.00.
d) The affidavit of Clarion, a resident of the municipality
where the subject landholding lies, further corroborates the
said facts when she narrated the series of events leading up
to Sergios possession of said agricultural land:
xxxx
40
That I know for a fact that the above-described parcel of
land was under cultivation by one RICARDO PADILLO of Brgy.
Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan, formerly, but when the same
went abroad, he transferred his tenancy right to DOMINGO
CARGANILLO, who in the year 1995 mortgaged his tenancy
rights to SERGIO CARGANILLO, his own brother;
That at present, the said parcel of land is under the
cultivation of said SERGIO CARGANILLO;
xxxx
Domingo did not even affirm or deny in his answer that
Estimada conducted an investigation and during such
investigation, he admitted that he subleased subject
landholding. It is totally against our human nature to just
remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations. The natural instinct of man impels him to resist
an unfounded imputation. Hence, silence in such cases is
almost always construed as implied admission of the truth
thereof.
Likewise, the attestations of BARC Chairman Costales and
Barangay Kagawad Frago that Domingo never violated his
agreement with Felisa or any provision of the Land Reform
Code, are conclusions of law bereft of any factual basis.
Time and again, we have held that general statements,
which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof, are
unavailing and do not suffice.
In view of the sublease, Domingo and Sergio should be
dispossessed of the subject agricultural landholding.
Republic Act (RA) No. 3844 or the Agricultural Land Reform
Code[33] is the
governing statute in actions involving leasehold of
agricultural land. The pertinent provisions thereof state as
follows:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when
his dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is
shown that:
xxxx
(7) the lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in
violation of the terms of paragraph 2 of Section twenty
seven.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 37. Burden of Proof. The burden of proof to show the
existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of an
agricultural lessee shall rest upon the agricultural lessor.
The prohibition against subleasing an agricultural lease has
already been in our statute books even prior to the
enactment of RA 3844. RA 1199, of The Agricultural Tenancy
Act enacted in 1954, similarly provides that:
SECTION 24. Prohibitions to Tenant:
xxxx
(2) It shall be unlawful for a share-tenant to employ a sub-
tenant to furnish labor or any phase of the work required of
him under this Act, except in cases of illness or any
temporary incapacity on his part, in which eventuality the
tenant or any member of his immediate farm household is
under obligation to report such illness or incapacity to the
landholder. Payment to the sub-tenant, in whatever form,
for services rendered on the land under this circumstance,
shall be for the account of the tenant. (Emphasis supplied)
However, Section 4[35] of RA 3844 declared all share tenancy
to be contrary to public policy and, in its stead, provided for
the compulsory conversion of the sharing system into
leasehold system where the tenant continues in possession of
the land for cultivation.
In this case, Domingo subleased his agricultural landholding
to Sergio. It is prohibited, except in the case of illness or
temporary incapacity where he may employ laborers.
Domingo does not claim illness or temporary incapacity in his
Answer. Therefore, we hereby declare the dispossession of
Domingo and Sergio from the subject agricultural land of the
leaseholder.
b) DARAB Case No. 7863
Felisa is the owner of a parcel of land with an approximate
area of 4,667 square meters registered under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-51201.[36] She alleged that the
duly instituted lessee of the agricultural land is the late
Isabelo Ramirez (Isabelo).[37] During Isabelos lifetime, he
subleased said landholding to Soledad Agustin (Soledad),
without Felisas knowledge and consent.[38] She argued that
the said act of her now deceased tenant is a ground for
ejectment of Soledad, who is a mere sublessee.[39]
41

Ruling of the PARAD
After service of summons, Soledad filed her Answer dated
January 20, 1998 affirming that Isabelo was the duly
instituted tenant of the subject landholding. [40] Upon his
death, his possessory rights passed on to his surviving spouse,
who was not named in the Answer.[41] Soledad likewise
alleged that said surviving spouse continues to cultivate the
subject landholding.[42]
In compliance with the PARADs Order dated January 20,
1998[43] requiring the parties to submit their respective
position papers, Felisa filed a position paper for all four
cases,[44] attaching thereto a copy of the Investigation
Report of Estimada[45] and corroborating affidavit of
Gano.[46]
The Investigation Report of the MARO Legal Officer Estimada
stated that the lawful tenant was the late Isabelo and not
Soledad. Meanwhile, Gano declared in his affidavit that he
knew that Isabelo mortgaged his tenancy rights and
possession to Soledad. He further averred that Soledad is
presently cultivating said landholding, having acquired her
tenancy rights from Isabelo through the alleged mortgage.
On the other hand, Soledad submitted the following
affidavits: (1) her own affidavit wherein she denied that she
is Felisas tenant and contended that the true tenant is her
sister-in-law Marina O. Ramirez (Marina), the widow of her
brother, the deceased Isabelo; (2) Marina, who affirmed that
she is the true tenant of Felisa as evidenced by the renewal
of their leasehold contract dated May 30, 1997 and
corroborated Soledads statement that the latter does not
possess any landholding owned or administered by Felisa; (3)
BARC Chairman Costales, who declared that as per their
records, Soledad is not the registered tenant of the
petitioner nor has Soledad managed the activities of the said
landholding; (4) Timoteo Orina, owner of the adjoining
agricultural land, who attested that Soledad never became a
tenant, tiller or manager of subject landholding; and (5)
Silverio C. Bugayong, incumbent Barangay Kagawad of Brgy.
Amistad, who stated that Marina continued tilling the subject
land after the death of her husband.[47] In addition, Soledad
submitted the leasehold contract dated May 30, 1997 (Tulag
ti Panagabang ti Talon), which showed that the leasehold
formerly held by the deceased Isabelo is now with his widow,
Marina.
On April 13, 1998, PARAD Caddarao, dismissed the complaint
for lack of merit.[48]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal dated April 30,
1998 with the PARAD signifying her intention to elevate the
latters April 13, 1998 Decision.[49]
Ruling of the DARAB
On January 7, 2004, the DARAB promulgated a Decision
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit.[50]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In her Memorandum, petitioner asserted that the DARAB
failed to resolve the issue of non-payment of lease raised in
the companion cases.[51] The respondents did not file their
memorandum.
On August 22, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision affirming the
DARAB Decision.
Our Ruling
b) DARAB Case No. 7863
Felisa submits that the CA gravely erred in affirming the
DARAB Decision dated January 7, 2004 by assuming that the
case against Soledad was already subsumed in the said
Decision and in not ordering or remanding the case to the
DARAB for disposition or decision. Hence, Felisa now prays
that we take a second hard look at the assailed CA Decision
and Resolution in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
The new evidence presented by the petitioner in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation
to the DARAB cannot be admitted.
On March 24, 2004, Felisa filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration with Manifestation with the DARAB,
allegedly as an expanded discussion on what she averred in
her Motion for Reconsideration.[52]
We note though that aside from amplifying her arguments,
petitioner likewise attached and referred to new pieces of
evidence in the form of: (1) affidavit of Rudy O. Tubiera
dated September 14, 2001;[53] (2) affidavit of Liberato
Cabigas;[54] (3) affidavit of Alberto A. Millan dated July 26,
2002[55] and (4) survey plan.[56]
Section 12, Rule VIII of the 1994 DARAB New Rules of
Procedures provide that only one motion for reconsideration
42
shall be allowed a party which shall be based on the ground
that: (a) the findings of facts in the said decision, order or
resolution are not supported by substantial evidence, or (b)
the conclusions stated therein are against the law and
jurisprudence. As expressed by the Rule, the office of the
Motion for Reconsideration is not for the reception of new
evidence. Hence, when Felisa submitted new pieces of
evidence in her Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration,
she went beyond the stated purpose of the Motion for
Reconsideration. In which case, we rule that the new
evidence presented by Felisa in the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration with Manifestation to the DARAB cannot be
admitted.
Petitioner has not established her claim of sublease.
We exhaustively went over the Petition for Review and
Felisas Memorandum submitted to the CA and found the
same bereft of any issue, whether of fact or law, involving
the case against Soledad. In her petition before the CA,
Felisa presented the following arguments: (1) The DARAB
erred in holding that there exists no valid ground to warrant
the ejectment of Domingo and Sergio; and (2) The DARAB
erred in considering only the issue of subleasing without
giving credence to the issue of non-payment of lease rentals
as ground for ejectment. Nowhere in the discussion portion
of either pleadings can the name Soledad be found.
Moreover, the issue presented in the case against Soledad is
alleged subleasing and not non-payment of lease rentals. If
there is no issue presented, then there is no controversy to
resolve.
Similarly, in her appeal by certiorari before this Court, Felisa
did not expound specifically on her issues with the decisions
of the agencies below with respect to Soledad. Petitioner,
however, questions the CAs affirmation of the DARAB
Decision dated January 27, 2004.
We reiterate that the petitioner, as agricultural lessor, has
the burden of
proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the
ejectment of an agricultural lessee.[57] In support of her
allegations, Felisa presented the Investigation Report of
MARO Legal Officer Estimada and an affidavit of a resident of
the barangay where both the original leaseholder Isabelo and
the alleged sublessee, Soledad, reside. The full text of the
Investigation Report with respect to his factual findings on
the case against Soledad is as follows:
In the dispute against Soledad Agustin, the lawful tenant was
Isabelo Ramirez and not Soledad Agustin. In the
conference/mediation that was conducted it was discovered
that the cultivator and possessor of the land is actually
Isabelo Ramirez. This is also being covered by an Agricultural
leasehold Contract.
The findings of fact as expressed above are not relevant and
material to the question of sublease which the petitioner
alleges.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Gano reads as follows:
xxxx
That I know for a fact that the above-described parcel of
land was being cultivated formerly by the late, Isabelo
Ramirez, a resident of Brgy. Amistad, Tayug, Pangasinan,
Philippines;
That I also have the knowledge that prior to the death of said
Isabelo Ramirez, the same mortgaged his tenancy rights and
possession to Soledad Agustin and in fact, said Soledad
Agustin is at present cultivating and in possession of the
above-described landholding;
That to the best of my knowledge, the transfer of tenancy
rights and possession from Isabelo Ramirez to Soledad
Agustin by way of mortgage was made without the knowledge
and consent of the owners thereof;
That I know of the above facts because being a resident of
the same barangay with the former tenant and the present
tenant of the said landholding, it is of common knowledge in
our community that Soledad Agustin is presently cultivating
the same landholding and that she acquired such tenancy
rights from its former tenant by way of mortgage;
xxxx
In contrast to the Carganillo case above, the evidence
presented by Felisa with respect to Soledad is
uncorroborated and unsubstantial. Hence, we rule that Felisa
has not discharged her burden of establishing her claim of
sublease.
c) DARAB Case No. 7864 and d) DARAB Case No. 7865
In DARAB Case No. 7864, the first case against respondent
Marcelina Solis (Marcelina), Felisa represented that the
tenant of the landholding, Pedro Solis (Pedro), died in June
1997 and was survived by his wife, Marcelina.[58] She further
alleged that Marcelina took over the cultivation of the
14,000-square meter landholding without her knowledge and
consent.[59] In addition, during the lifetime of Pedro, the
latter failed to pay lease rentals for three consecutive years
from 1995 to 1997.[60] Hence, the case for ejectment
against Marcelina.[61]
43

With respect to the second case (DARAB Case No. 7865),
Irene Aguinaldo and Felisa co-owned a 6,830.5-square meter
landholding tenanted by Marcelina.[62] Felisa averred that
Marcelina has not fully paid the rental for the use of the land
on the third cropping season.[63] Hence, the second case for
ejectment against Marcelina.[64]
Ruling of the PARAD
In her Answer, Marcelina specifically denied Felisas
allegation of arrears in lease rentals from 1995 to 1997.[65]
With respect to the second complaint, she admitted that
while it is true that there were times that the subject
landholding were planted with palay on third cropping, this is
not regular.[66] Moreover, she averred that if ever the said
landholding were planted with palay on third cropping and
yields produce, the landowner is given her due share.[67]
After submission of their respective position papers, the
PARAD promulgated a Decision dated April 14, 1998
dismissing both cases for lack of merit and evidence.[68]
Rulings of the DARAB and the Court of Appeals
The DARAB dismissed the appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed the Decision of the PARAD in toto.[69] On Petition
for Review under Rule 43 to the CA, the appellate court
affirmed the ruling of the DARAB with respect to the issue of
non-payment of lease rentals. On which basis, the CA
dismissed the petition.
Our Ruling
c) DARAB Case No. 7864 and d) DARAB Case No. 7865
DARAB Case No. 7864 should be dismissed for failure of Felisa
to properly indicate the appealing party.
With respect to the first case against Marcelina, we resolve
to dismiss the appeal of Felisa. Section 5 of Rule 45 provides
that the failure of the petitioner to comply, among others,
with the contents of the petition for review on certiorari
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. Section 4
of the same rule mandates, among others, that the petition
should state the full name of the appealing party as the
petitioner. In this case, Felisa indicated in the caption as
well as in the parties portion of the petition that she is the
landowner. Even in the verification and certification of non-
forum shopping, Felisa attested that she is the petitioner in
the instant case. However, it appears in the PARAD records
that the owners of the subject 14,000-square meter
agricultural land are Rosa R. Pajarito (Pajarito), Elvira A.
Madolora (Madolora) and Anastacia F. Lagado (Lagado).[70]
Felisa is only the representative of the said landowners with
respect to the first case against Marcelina.[71] Thus, for
failure of Felisa to indicate the appealing party with respect
to the said case, the appeal must perforce be dismissed.
However, such failure does not affect the appeal on the
other three cases as Felisa is the owner/co-owner of the
landholdings subject of said three cases.
Procedural lapse aside, DARAB Case No. 7864 should still be
dismissed for failure of Felisa to establish her principals
claim.
In her Complaint dated October 6, 1997, Felisa, in
representation of landowners Pajarito, Madolora and Lagado,
alleged that Pedro failed to pay the lease rental for the
14,000-square meter land for agricultural years 1995, 1996
and 1997.[72] Subsequently, Pedro died and his widow,
Marcelina took over the tenancy and cultivation of the said
land.[73] On the other hand, Marcelina sufficiently rebutted
the allegation of non-payment by presenting evidence to
show that the landowners share was received by therein
complainants administrator, to wit:
Exhibit 1 Receipt dated March 30, 1995 issued by Irene M.
Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the produce of
the subject land;
Exhibit 4 Receipt dated October 21, 1995 issued by Irene M.
Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the produce;
Exhibit 5 Receipt dated March 23, 1996 issued by Irene M.
Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the produce;
Exhibit 7 Receipt dated November 17, 1996 issued by Irene
M. Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the
produce;
Exhibit 8 Receipt dated April 10, 1997 issued by Irene M.
Aguinaldo evidencing receipt of their share of the produce;
We hence agree with the PARAD that therein complainants
were unable to produce substantial proof to support their
allegation of non-payment.
DARAB Case No. 7865 should likewise be dismissed for failure
of Felisa to establish her claim.
With respect to the second case against Marcelina, Felisa
alleged that the landholding in question is principally
devoted to the planting of palay three times a year.[74]
However, Marcelina did not deliver her share in the third
cropping.[75]
44

In her Answer, Marcelina admitted that she is the tenant of
the subject parcel of land co-owned by Felisa and Irene
Aguinaldo.[76] Marcelina, however, averred that while it was
true that there were times that the landholding was planted
with palay on third cropping, this was not regular.[77] She
further asserted that she would give to the landowners their
due shares if ever there was third cropping.[78]
In an Order dated January 20, 1998, the PARAD directed the
parties to submit their position papers, affidavits of
witnesses and other evidence to support their respective
claims.[79]
Felisa submitted her position paper[80] for the four cases
subject of this Decision, together with the Investigation
Report of Estimada[81] and the affidavit of Camilo G.
Taganas.[82] The Investigation Report declared that the
former tenant who was the husband of Marcelina did not pay
any rental to Felisa[83] because he recognized only the other
co-owners of the land, who among others are the sisters of
Felisa.[84] In addition, in the affidavit of Camilo G. Taganas,
the authorized administrator of the subject parcel of land,
he declared that Marcelina did not deliver the share of the
landowners on the subject landholding.[85]
On the other hand, Marcelina filed her individual compliance,
supported by the following affidavits and the purposes for
which they were offered:
Exhibit 1 Notice of threshing and reaping dated March 14,
1995 addressed to Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo, administrator and
landowner of the property in question.
Exhibit 2 -- Receipt dated March 30, 1995 issued by Mrs.
Irene Aguinaldo acknowledging that respondent has duly
complied with her obligations for this season.
Exhibit 3 -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated Nov. 6,
1995 to the landowner.
Exhibit 4 Receipt issued to respondent by Mrs. Irene
Aguinaldo dated Nov. 10, 1995 acknowledging the fact that
shares due to them was duly given and delivered.
Exhibit 5 Receipt dated March 19, 1996 duly issued by Mrs.
Irene Aguinaldo, the landowner/administrator of the subject
property.
Exhibit 6 -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated March 5,
1996 to prove that respondent has been religiously fulfilling
her obligations.
Exhibit 7 -- Notice sent to Mrs. Aguinaldo dated Sept. 2, 1996
informing him that since they unreasonably refused to
receive the shares due them, it was sold and the proceeds
thereof was deposited in the bank.
Exhibit 8 -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated Nov. 7,
1996 proving that respondent has been faithfully complying
with her obligations.
Exhibit 9 -- Acknowledgment and/or receipt duly issued by
the landowner/administrator, Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo dated
November 17, 1996 to prove that the obligations of the
respondent for this date has been faithfully complied with.
Exhibit 10 -- Receipt dated April 4, 1997 issued and signed by
the landowner/administrator, Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo,
acknowledging the delivery of the legal shares due them;
Exhibit 11 -- Notice of threshing and reaping dated March 26,
1997 showing that obligations to do so was [sic]complied
with.
Exhibit 12 -- Notice of reaping and threshing dated Oct. 14,
1997 to prove that landowner of the landholding in question
was duly notified.
Exhibit 13 -- Certification from the office of the BARC and
issued by the BARC Chairman himself attesting to the fact
that shares due to landowners for Oct., 1997 was sold and
deposited because of the unjustified refusal to receive them.
Exhibit 14 -- Receipt bearing the amount which represents
the legal shares of the landowners and deposited in the
bank.
Exhibit 15 -- The name of the bank ROSBANK from which the
proceeds of the sold shares due to the landowner was
deposited and it was deposited by Pedro Solis and/or
Marcelina Solis in the name of Irene Aguinaldo.
Exhibit 16 -- The passbook with account no. T-01689-5,
containing the amount deposited due to the landowners for
those years stated therein.
Exhibit 17 -- Leasehold contract or Tulag ti Panagabang ti
Talon, executed by and between Irene Aguinaldo and Pedro
Solis, landowner and tenant, respectively. The purpose is to
prove that tenancy relationships exists and the same passes
to respondent Marclina Solis, the surviving spouse of Pedro
Solis upon his death.
Exhibit 18 -- Investigation report conducted by the office of
the BARC. The purpose of which is to show that the then
tenant and now succeeded by his wife Marcelina Solis, has
been duly complying with their obligations as bonafide
tenant thereof.
Exhibit 19 -- A sworn statement made by one Herminigildo P.
Vinluan, a resident and landowner of the lot adjacent or
adjoining to the subject property, attesting to the fact that
the then tenant and now succeeded by herein respondent
never failed to comply with their obligations.
Exhibit 20 -- A sworn statement made by one Arsenio B.
Orina, incumbent Brgy. Kgd. of the barangay where the
property is located attesting that respondent is indeed the
bonafide tenant of Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo.
Exhibit 21 -- Affidavit of Valentine O. Costales, the
incumbent BARC Chairman of Brgy. Amistad, Tayug,
Pangasinan, proving and attesting the fact that Pedro Solis
and now succeeded by his wife Marcelina Solis is the
bonafide tenant of the subject landholding and that they are
complying faithfully and religiously with their obligations as
such.
Exhibit 22 -- The sworn statement of Marcelina Solis, the
respondent and successor of the former tenant, swearing to
45
the Hon. Board and to the public, that she never failed or
neglected any of the obligations imposed by law.
As held earlier, the petitioner, as agricultural lessor, has the
burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for
the ejectment of an agricultural lessee. In the instant case,
we have carefully studied the evidence presented by the
petitioner and found the same wanting on the matter of third
cropping over the subject land. Other than the bare
allegations in her complaint before the PARAD, Felisa did not
present any evidence to establish her claim that the subject
agricultural land can regularly support a third cropping.
Neither did she present evidence to establish that their
leasehold agreement includes a provision on third cropping.
Hence, her allegation of non-payment of the leasehold
rentals for the third cropping likewise finds no support in
evidence.
In addition, we find that the evidence presented by Felisa is
inconsistent on major points. In her Complaint dated October
3, 1997, Felisa alleged that Marcelina is not delivering the
shares of the land with respect to the third cropping.[86]
However, the said statement is contradicted in the Estimada
Investigation Report where it was indicated that Marcelina is
not giving any rentals/shares to Felisa.
The contention of non-payment of the leasehold shares of
the landowner has been effectively rebutted by the evidence
presented by Marcelina. Through Marcelinas evidence, we
have established that she had regularly complied with the
leasehold contract, as supported by:
1. Notice of Reaping dated March 14, 1995
Receipt of Rental dated March 30, 1995 for 2nd crop 94-95
2. Notice of Reaping dated Nov. 6, 1995
Receipt of Rental dated November 10, 1995 for 1st crop 95
3. Notice of Reaping dated March 5, 1996
Receipt of Rental dated March 19, 1996 for 2nd crop 95-96
4. Notice of Reaping dated November 7, 1996
Receipt of Rental dated November 17, 1996 for 1st crop 96
5. Notice of Reaping dated March 26, 1997
Receipt of Rental dated April 5, 1997 for 2nd crop 96-97
6. Notice of Reaping dated October 14, 1997
Rental for 1st crop 1997 deposited in bank in land co-owner
Irene Aguinaldos name, as per BARC Certification dated
October 27, 1997.
In addition, we have held earlier that the additional pieces
of evidence Felisa attached and referred to in her
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation
cannot be admitted as reception of new evidence is not
within the office of a Motion for Reconsideration.
On the basis of the evidence presented, we cannot find
sufficient evidence to support Felisas claims. Hence, we
agree with the factual findings of the CA and the agrarian
tribunals that Felisa failed to discharge the burden of proving
her claim with the necessary quantum of proof.
With respect to all four cases, petitioner further alleges that
(1) the Decision of the DARAB dated January 27, 2004 and of
the CA dated August 22, 2005 only disposed of the first case;
and (2) the DARAB failed to issue a consolidation order
informing the parties of the consolidation of the four
appealed cases considering that these four cases have
different parties and causes of action.[87]
Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution states that no
decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. Petitioner argues that the CA practically closed its
eyes in affirming the Boards Decision.[88]
We do not agree. The Decision of the CA detailed the
evidence presented by the parties. Thereafter, it weighed
the respective pieces of evidence submitted by the
petitioner and the respondent and chose the one that to its
mind, deserved credence. Said Decision contained findings of
facts as well as an application of case law. The Decision
states, thus:
With respect to the issue of non-payment of lease rentals,
We affirm the ruling of the DARAB as follows:
With respect to Case No. 01-1567, we find [that] the
allegations of complainant that respondents husband, Pedro
Solis, deliberately failed to pay lease rentals for the crop
years 1995, 1996 and 1997 bereft of any evidence. The
complainants were unable to produce any proof to prove
their accusations.
On the other hand, respondent has shown (be) substantial
evidence that she or her husband have complied with the
duties of lawful tenant. The evidence submitted by
respondents (Exhibits 1 to 10) duly show that the
representatives of the complainants, Mrs. Irene R. Aguinaldo,
received the landowners share for agricultural year 1995 to
1997. This is shown specifically by Exhibits 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8.
Moreover, the complainants were informed of the date of
reaping and threshing as shown by other evidence.
As to case No. 01-1568, the Board again fails to find any
evidence showing that respondent Marcelina Solis
deliberately failed to deliver the produce for the third
cropping. The bare allegations of the complainant are
46
insufficient to prove that the said tenants have been remiss
[sic] in her duties.
Respondent Marcelina Solis, on the other hand, has
substantially proven by her evidence her compliance with her
obligation as a tenant. She has informed the complainants
through their administrator, Mrs. Irene Aguinaldo, the date
of threshing and reaping (Exhibits 1, 3, 6, 8, 11 and 12). She
also submitted evidence to show that the landowners share is
received by complainants administrator (Exhibit 2, 4, 5, 9
and 10). Other evidence submitted by respondent is Exh. 7,
wherein she informed Mrs. Aguinaldo that she deposited the
proceeds of the landowners share with the bank because she
(Mrs. Aguinaldo) refused to received (sic) it (Decision dated
April 14, 1998, pp. 4-5, Rollo pp. 61-62).
In appeals of agrarian cases, this Court cannot make its own
factual findings and substitute the same for that of the
DARAB, as the only function of this Court is to determine
whether the DARABs findings of fact are supported by
substantial evidence (Reyes vs. Reyes, 388 SCRA 471).
Substantial Evidence is that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion (Resngit-Marquez vs. Llamas, Jr., 385 SCRA 6).
[89]
In any event, there was an earlier statement of the facts and
the law involved in the decisions rendered by the PARAD
dated April 8, 1998, April 13, 1998 and April 14, 1998. In
these decisions, the facts and the law on which they were
based were clearly and distinctly stated. Furthermore, in this
case, the Court has exhaustively gone through the records
and made its own findings of facts, rather than further delay
the disposition of the case by remanding the records for
further proceedings.
With regard to the issue of consolidation, we find in the
records that although petitioner filed separate notices of
appeal for the four cases, she but filed one consolidated
Appeal Memorandum dated October 7, 1998 to the DARAB,
putting into the caption all the appealed cases.[90] She
persisted in consolidating the said cases in her Motion for
Reconsideration of the DARAB Decision, Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration with Manifestation dated March 24,
2004,[91] Petition for Review dated December 6, 2004 to the
CA,[92] Motion for Reconsideration (ad cautelam) dated
September 13 2005[93] and the Petition for Review on
Certiorari dated January 20, 2006 to this Court.[94] In all of
these pleadings where petitioner consolidated the said four
cases, petitioner sought the jurisdiction of this Court and the
agencies below for relief. Gainsaid on equitable ground of
estoppel, she cannot now come to this Court assailing the
consolidation of said cases, which was brought about by her
own acts.
WHEREFORE, we partially GRANT the petition.
1. In DARAB Case No. 7862, we hereby AUTHORIZE THE
DISPOSSESSION of respondents Domingo and Sergio Carganillo
from the subject landholding.
2. In DARAB Case No. 7863, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent Soledad Agustin for failure of
the petition to establish her claim.
3. In DARAB Case No. 7864, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent Marcelina Solis for failure of
the petitioner to establish her claim and to properly indicate
the appealing party in violation of Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
4. In DARAB Case No. 7865, we AFFIRM the dismissal of the
complaint against respondent Marcelina Solis for failure of
the petitioner to establish her claim.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N98
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by
petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing the Resolutions
dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by public
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No.
13-053. The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of
the Certificate of Candidacy of petitioner for the position of
Representative of the lone district of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a
registered voter and resident of the Municipality of Torrijos,
Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an Amended Petition
to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when
she is married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of
Batangas;1 (2) that she is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac,
Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which
is the residence of her husband, and at the same time, when
she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa,
Quezon City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional
Spouses of the House of Representatives;2 (3) that her date
of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4) that she is
not a permanent resident of another country when she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of
47
America;5 and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in
fact, an American citizen.6
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is
publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo I.
Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid and
binding marriage between them. According to petitioner,
although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was
solemnized in a religious rite, it did not comply with certain
formal requirements prescribed by the Family Code,
rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues
that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman
Mandanas, then his residence cannot be attributed to her.8
As to her date of birth, the Certificate of Live Birth issued by
the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3 July
1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is
a permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of
America is not supported by evidence.10
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013,
respondent filed a "Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly
Discovered Evidence and Amended List of Exhibits"11
consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an article
published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking
and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an
Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity of Document
executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, which provides a
database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating that
petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S.
passport; (2) a Certification of Travel Records of petitioner,
issued by Simeon Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and
Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration which
indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various
travels abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a
Resolution12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy of
respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the
declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a
citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply
with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the
COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the
oneyear residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for the
position of Representative for the lone district of
Marinduque.
Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First
Division, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 on 8
April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
and that she has not lost such status by simply obtaining and
using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her
marriage to an American citizen in concluding that she is a
naturalized American citizen. Petitioner averred, however,
that such marriage only resulted into dual citizenship, thus
there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements
under R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary
Public on 24 September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the
one-year residency requirement prescribed by the
Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a
naturalized citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin,
which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a
Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was
proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of
Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc final and executory, considering that more
than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed from the date of
promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining
its execution.17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before
Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which
officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises the following
issues:19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner
and who has already taken her oath of office for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque.
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
48
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of Respondent Tan’s
alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence
which became the basis for its Resolution of the case without
giving the petitioner the opportunity to question and present
controverting evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to
due process of law.
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it declared that Petitioner is not a Filipino
citizen and did not meet the residency requirement for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when, by enforcing the provisions of
Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional qualifications to
the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be a
non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not
confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this
Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET which has
jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her
eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House of
Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s
recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing its final and executory
judgment in SPA No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and
consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The need to
do so, and at once, was highlighted during the discussion En
Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was emphasized
that the term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed20 because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications" of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC
retains jurisdiction for the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with said
tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such
action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have
jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of the
House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s
supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House
of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point
has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a
Member of the House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v.
COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court ruled
that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC’s
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of
Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring to
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held
that:
49
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate
has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office
by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his
qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct of
election and contested returns – were transferred to the
HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the
same. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the
pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed
candidate who had not only taken an oath of office, but who
had also assumed office.
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the
Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the
COMELEC only after the candidate had been proclaimed,
taken his oath of office before the Speaker of the House, and
assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September 2007,
or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his
comment in which he brought to Our attention that on
September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the status
quo ante order of the Court, he had already been proclaimed
by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao
del Norte. On that very same day, he had taken his oath
before Speaker of the House Jose de Venecia, Jr. and
assumed his duties accordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has
already been transferred to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.)
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the
questioned candidate had already assumed office, and
hence, was already considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, unlike in the present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the
term of office of a Member of the House of Representatives
begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement,
petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken before
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. However, this is
not the oath of office which confers membership to the
House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of
Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall
take their oath or affirmation either collectively or
individually before the Speaker in open session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the
oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she
made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during plenary or in open session
and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on
18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May
2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no
longer any pending case on petitioner’s qualifications to run
for the position of Member of the House of Representative.
We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the
argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of
jurisdiction when she was proclaimed, which was four days
after the COMELEC En Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser
which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed
to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which
affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division
which was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated
on 14 May 2013, became final and executory on 19 May 2013
based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides:
50

Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-
proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or
cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance
candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after the
lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from
becoming final and executory, petitioner should have availed
herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by filing a
petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she
failed to do so. She would file the present last hour petition
on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, respondent
COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her
Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in
Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC committed
no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and
offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the admission
of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the
photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation
of her right to due process of law because she was not given
the opportunity to question and present controverting
evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to
strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally construed in
order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the Commission." In view of the fact that the
proceedings in a petition to deny due course or to cancel
certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the
"newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by
respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case
at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her
case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s
petition was filed up to 27 March 2013 when the First Division
rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5)
months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail
herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process
only requires that the party be given the opportunity or right
to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not
solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of
due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party
was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office
on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and
become eligible for public office, the law requires that she
must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the
Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of
proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that it
is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however,
specifically denied that she has become either a permanent
resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence
thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an
American passport which she continues to use until June 30,
2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The
burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial
evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly
failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by
becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and thereafter,
made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship,
she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore,
ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the
Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)
51
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In
moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that
petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her status is
that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof
shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the
same, or that she has reacquired such status in accordance
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention.
Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of
R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of
a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual
Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the said motion
is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated
24 September 2012.34 Petitioner explains that she attached
said Affidavit "if only to show her desire and zeal to serve the
people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity."35
We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the
rules," then it is an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to
her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address
the observations by the COMELEC as the assailed Resolutions
were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a
footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to
this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior
to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator,
take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in
the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath
of office is in order to make reference to what is already
part of the records and evidence in the present case and to
avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact
that was not previously passed upon by Respondent
COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of questions – Did
petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of
natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did she not
present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC?
And is this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-
born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as
required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since
she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her
appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she
is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born
Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being
presented for the first time before this Court, as it was never
raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of
allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec. 3 of
R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as
prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine
Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular
No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No.
91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus,
petitioner’s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot
be considered as the oath of allegiance in compliance with
R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was
clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however,
failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that
petitioner has lost her natural-born status, we quote with
approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division that
petitioner cannot be considered a resident of Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere
effectively abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, he
must still show that he chose to establish his domicile in the
Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his
domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner
had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to
RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has regained her domicile
in the Philippines. There being no proof that petitioner had
renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has
not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has
met the one-year residency requirement of the law and
never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, Marinduque
is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator of the
province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such
fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency.
For, petitioner has never regained her domicile in
Marinduque as she remains to be an American citizen. No
amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact
that she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the
USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.)
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and
cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the COMELEC
is given much discretion in the evaluation and admission of
evidence pursuant to its principal objective of determining of
whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in
Mastura v. COMELEC:38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will
not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is
52
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in support
of such findings should be applied with greater force when it
concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution
intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly
made independent by the Constitution itself — on a level
higher than statutory administrative organs. The COMELEC
has broad powers to ascertain the true results of the election
by means available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is
not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1âwphi1
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of
discretion" which warrants this Court’s exercise of certiorari
jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance is found in
Beluso v. Commission on Elections39 where the Court held:
x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse
of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of
discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the
arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary,
or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act
at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down
as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately
and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the
COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar
as it adds to the qualifications of Members of the House of
Representatives other than those enumerated in the
Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same meritless.
The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on
candidates for the House of Representatives who have
acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year residency
prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the
COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by
petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine
if she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
It simply applied the constitutional provision and nothing
more.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of
the COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 216914, December 06, 2016
SUBIDO PAGENTE CERTEZA MENDOZA AND BINAY LAW
OFFICES, Petitioner, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
ANDRES B. REYES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY ITS MEMBERS, HON.
AMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., GOVERNOR OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, HON. TERESITA J. HERBOSA,
CHAIRPERSON OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, AND HON. EMMANUEL F. DOOC, INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER OF THE INSURANCE COMMISSION,
Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari1 and prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality of
Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9160, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money
Laundering Council's authority to file with the Court of
Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry
into certain bank deposits and investments, including related
accounts based on probable cause.
In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections,
reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of
then Vice President Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family,
some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The
Office of the Ombudsman and the Senate conducted
investigations2 and inquiries3 thereon ostensibly based on
their respective powers delineated in the Constitution.
From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then
Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of
members of his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza
Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with
the article published in the Manila Times on 25 February 2015
entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in
pertinent part:
xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the
Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into the
bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law
office where a family member was once a partner.
xxxx
53
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family,
the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm,
where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former
partner.4
The following day, 26 February 2015, SPCMB wrote public
respondent, Presiding Justice of the CA, Andres B. Reyes, Jr.:
The law firm of Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay
was surprised to receive a call from Manila Times requesting
for a comment regarding a [supposed petition] filed by the
Republic of the Philippines represented by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council before the Court of Appeals seeking to
examine the law office's bank accounts.
To verify the said matter, the law office is authorizing its
associate Atty. Jose Julius R. Castro to inquire on the
veracity of said report with the Court of Appeals. He is
likewise authorized to secure copies of the relevant
documents of the case, such as the petition and orders
issued, if such a case exists.
As this is a matter demanding serious and immediate
attention, the Firm respectfully manifests that if no written
response is received within 24-hours from receipt of this
letter, we shall be at liberty to assume that such a case
exists and we shall act accordingly.
Hoping for your immediate action.
Respectfully yours,
For the Firm
CLARO F. CERTEZA5
Within twenty four (24) hours, Presiding Justice Reyes wrote
SPCMB denying its request, thus:
Anent your request for a comment on a supposed petition to
inquire into your law office's bank accounts, please be
informed that a petition of this nature is strictly confidential
in that when processing the same, not even the handling
staff members of the Office of the Presiding Justice know or
have any knowledge who the subject bank account holders
are, as well as the bank accounts involved.
Please be informed further that clearly under the rules, the
Office of the Presiding Justice is strictly mandated not to
disclose, divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or
indirectly, in any manner or by any means, the fact of the
filing of any petition brought before this Court by the Anti-
Money Laundering Council, its contents and even its entry in
the logbook.
Trusting that you find satisfactory the foregoing
explanation.6
By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article
entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay's assets" reporting that
the appellate court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-
parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts
of SPCMB:
The Court of Appeals (CA) has officially issued an order for
examination of Vice President Jejomar Binay's bank accounts.
In granting the petition of the Anti-Money Laundering Council
(AMLC), the CA also ordered the inspection of the bank
deposits of Binay's wife, children, and a law office connected
to him.
xxx xxx xxx
The bank accounts of the law office linked to Binay - the
Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay where Binay's
daughter, Makati City (Metro Manila) Rep. Mar-len Abigail
Binay was a partner, are also included in the probe, the
sources said.7
Forestalled in the CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary,
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and
interests in the purported ongoing unconstitutional
examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-
Money Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook direct
resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and
prohibition on the following grounds:
THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
INSOFAR AS IT ALLOWS THE EXAMINATION OF A BANK
ACCOUNT WITHOUT ANY NOTICE TO THE AFFECTED
PARTY:cralawlawlibrary
1. IT VIOLATES THE PERSON'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;
AND
2. IT VIOLATES THE PERSON'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY.
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ANTI-MONEY
LAUNDERING ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL, THE RESPONDENTS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
54
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION CONSIDERING
THAT:cralawlawlibrary
1.
THE REFUSAL OF RESPONDENT PRESIDING JUSTICE TO
PROVIDE PETITIONER WITH A COPY OF THE EX-PARTE
APPLICATION FOR BANK EXAMINATION FILED BY RESPONDENT
AMLC AND ALL OTHER PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, ORDERS,
RESOLUTIONS, AND PROCESSES ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT
COURT OF APPEALS IN RELATION THERETO VIOLATES
PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;
2.
A CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE ANY AND ALL
TRANSACTIONS PERTAINING TO PETITIONER'S BANK
ACCOUNTS VIOLATES THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
WHICH IS SACROSANCT IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION;
3.
A BLANKET AUTHORITY TO EXAMINE PETITIONER'S BANK
ACCOUNTS, INCLUDING ANY AND ALL TRANSACTIONS THEREIN
FROM ITS OPENING UP TO THE PRESENT, PARTAKES THE
NATURE OF A GENERAL WARRANT THAT IS CLEARLY INTENDED
TO AID A MERE FISHING EXPEDITION;
4.
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING ACT
THAT ALLOWS OR JUSTIFIES THE WITHHOLDING OF
INFORMATION AND/OR ANY COURT RECORDS OR
PROCEEDINGS PERTAINING TO AN EXAMINATION OF A BANK
ACCOUNT, ESPECIALLY IF THE COURT HAS ALREADY GRANTED
THE AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT THE EXAMINATION;
5.
THE PETITIONER DID NOT COMMIT, NOR HAS THE PETITIONER
BEEN IMPLEADED IN ANY COMPLAINT INVOLVING ANY
PREDICATE CRIME THAT WOULD JUSTIFY AN INQUIRY INTO ITS
BANK ACCOUNTS; AND
7.
THE EXAMINATION OF THE PETITIONER'S BANK ACCOUNTS IS A
FORM OF POLITICAL PERSECUTION OR HARASSMENT.8
In their Comment, the AMLC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), points out a supposed jurisdictional
defect of the instant petition, i.e., SPCMB failed to implead
the House of Representatives which enacted the AMLA and its
amendments. In all, the OSG argues for the dismissal of the
present petition, highlighting that the AMLC's inquiry into
bank deposits does not violate due process nor the right to
privacy:
1. Section 11's allowance for AMLC's ex-parte application for
an inquiry into particular bank deposits and investments is
investigative, not adjudicatory;
2. The text of Section 11 itself provides safeguards and
limitations on the allowance to the AMLC to inquire into bank
deposits: (a) issued by the CA based on probable cause; and
(b) specific compliance to the requirements of Sections 2 and
3, Article III of the Constitution;
3. The ex-parte procedure for investigating bank accounts is
necessary to achieve a legitimate state objective;
4. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the
bank records of a depositor;
5. The examination of, and inquiry, into SPCMB's bank
accounts does not violate Attorney-Client Privilege; and
6. A criminal complaint is not a pre-requisite to a bank
inquiry order.
In their Reply, SPCMB maintains that the ex-parte
proceedings authorizing inquiry of the AMLC into certain bank
deposits and investments is unconstitutional, violating its
rights to due process and privacy.
Before anything else, we here have an original action turning
on three crucial matters: (1) the petition reaches us from a
letter of the Presiding Justice of the CA in response to a
letter written by SPCMB; (2) SPCMB's bank account has been
reported to be a related account to Vice President Binay's
investigated by the AMLC for anti-money laundering
activities; and (3) the constitutionality of Section 11 of the
AMLA at its recent amendment has not been squarely raised
and addressed.
To obviate confusion, we act on this petition given that
SPCMB directly assails the constitutionality of Section 11 of
the AMLA where it has been widely reported that Vice
President Binay's bank accounts and all related accounts
therewith are subject of an investigation by the AMLC. In
fact, subsequent events from the filing of this petition have
shown that these same bank accounts (including related
accounts) were investigated by the Ombudsman and both
Houses of the Legislature. However, at the time of the filing
of this petition, SPCMB alleged that its accounts have been
inquired into but not subjected to a freeze order under
Section 10 of the AMLA. Thus, as previously noted, with its
preclusion of legal remedies before the CA which under the
AMLA issues the ex-parte bank inquiry and freeze orders,
Sections 10 and 11, respectively, SPCMB establishes that it
has no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to protect its rights and interests from the
55
purported unconstitutional intrusion by the AMLC into its
bank accounts.
The foregoing shall be addressed specifically and bears
directly on the disposition of the decision herein.
Additionally, we note that the OSG did not question how this
petition reaches us from a letter of the appellate court's
Presiding Justice, only that, procedurally, SPCMB should have
impleaded Congress.
On the sole procedural issue of whether SPCMB ought to have
impleaded Congress, the contention of the OSG though novel
is untenable. All cases questioning the constitutionality of a
law does not require that Congress be impleaded for their
resolution. The requisites of a judicial inquiry are
elementary:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy; party;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the
proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.9
The complexity of the issues involved herein require us to
examine the assailed provision vis-a-vis the constitutional
proscription against violation of due process. The statute
reads:
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. -
Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as
amended; Republic Act No. 6426, as amended; Republic Act
No. 8791; and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or
examine any particular deposit or investment, including
related accounts, with any banking institution or non-bank
financial institution upon order of any competent court based
on an ex parte application in cases of violations of this Act,
when it has been established that there is probable cause
that the deposits or investments, including related accounts
involved, are related to an unlawful activity as defined in
Section 3(i) hereof or a money laundering offense under
Section 4 hereof; except that no court order shall be
required in cases involving activities defined in Section
3(i)(1), (2), and (12) hereof, and felonies or offenses of a
nature similar to those mentioned in Section 3(i)(1), (2), and
(12), which are punishable under the penal laws of other
countries, and terrorism and conspiracy to commit terrorism
as defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 9372.
The Court of Appeals shall act on the application to inquire
into or examine any deposit or investment with any banking
institution or non--bank financial institution within twenty-
four (24) hours from filing of the application.
To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas may, in the course of a periodic or special
examination, check the compliance of a covered institution
with the requirements of the AMLA and its implementing
rules and regulations.
For purposes of this section, 'related accounts' shall refer to
accounts, the funds and sources of which originated from
and/or are materially linked to the monetary instrument(s)
or property(ies) subject of the freeze order(s).
A court order ex parte must first be obtained before the
AMLC can inquire into these related Accounts: Provided, That
the procedure for the ex parte application of the ex parte
court order for the principal account shall be the same with
that of the related accounts.
The authority to inquire into or examine the main account
and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements
of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the 1987 Constitution, which
are hereby incorporated by reference.10
The due process clause of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws. 11
The right to due process has two aspects: (1) substantive
which deals with the extrinsic and intrinsic validity of the
law; and (2) procedural which delves into the rules
government must follow before it deprives a person of its
life, liberty or property.12
As presently worded, Section 11 of the AMLA has three
elements: (1) ex-parte application by the AMLC; (2)
determination of probable cause by the CA; and (3)
exception of court order in cases involving unlawful activities
defined in Sections 3(i)(1), (2), and (12).
As a brief backgrounder to the amendment to Section 11 of
the AMLA, the text originally did not specify for an ex-parte
application by the AMLC for authority to inquire into or
examine certain bank accounts or investments. The extent of
this authority was the topic of Rep. of the Phils. v. Hon.
Judge Eugenio, Jr., et al. (Eugenio)13 where the petitioner
56
therein, Republic of the Philippines, asseverated that the
application for that kind of order under the questioned
section of the AMLA did not require notice and hearing.
Eugenio schooled us on the AMLA, specifically on the
provisional remedies provided therein to aid the AMLC in
enforcing the law:
It is evident that Section 11 does not specifically authorize,
as a general rule, the issuance ex-parte of the bank inquiry
order. We quote the provision in full:
SEC. 11. Authority to Inquire into Bank Deposits. —
Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 1405, as
amended, Republic Act No. 6426, as amended, Republic Act
No. 8791, and other laws, the AMLC may inquire into or
examine any particular deposit or investment with any
banking institution or non bank financial institution upon
order of any competent court in cases of violation of this
Act, when it has been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof or a money
laundering offense under Section 4 hereof, except that no
court order shall be required in cases involving unlawful
activities defined in Sections 3(i)1, (2) and (12).
To ensure compliance with this Act, the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas (BSP) may inquire into or examine any deposit of
investment with any banking institution or non bank financial
institution when the examination is made in the course of a
periodic or special examination, in accordance with the rules
of examination of the BSP. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, Section 11 also allows the AMLC to inquire into
bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial order in
cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235,
destructive arson and murder. Since such special
circumstances do not apply in this case, there is no need for
us to pass comment on this proviso. Suffice it to say, the
proviso contemplates a situation distinct from that which
presently confronts us, and for purposes of the succeeding
discussion, our reference to Section 11 of the AMLA excludes
said proviso.
In the instances where a court order is required for the
issuance of the bank inquiry order, nothing in Section 11
specifically authorizes that such court order may be issued ex
parte. It might be argued that this silence does not preclude
the ex parte issuance of the bank inquiry order since the
same is not prohibited under Section 11. Yet this argument
falls when the immediately preceding provision, Section 10,
is examined.
SEC 10. Freezing of Monetary Instrument or Property. — The
Court of Appeals, upon application ex parte by the AMLC and
after determination that probable cause exists that any
monetary instrument or property is in any way related to an
unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) hereof, may issue
a freeze order which shall be effective immediately. The
freeze order shall be for a period of twenty (20) days unless
extended by the court.
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze
order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary
provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to effectively
combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially,
Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte
application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance
absent in Section 11. If indeed the legislature had intended
to authorize ex parte proceedings for the issuance of the
bank inquiry order, then it could have easily expressed such
intent in the law, as it did with the freeze order under
Section 10.
Even more tellingly, the current language of Sections 10 and
11 of the AMLA was crafted at the same time, through the
passage of R.A. No. 9194. Prior to the amendatory law, it
was the AMLC, not the Court of Appeals, which had authority
to issue a freeze order, whereas a bank inquiry order always
then required, without exception, an order from a
competent court. It was through the same enactment that ex
parte proceedings were introduced for the first time into the
AMLA, in the case of the freeze order which now can only be
issued by the Court of Appeals. It certainly would have been
convenient, through the same amendatory law, to allow a
similar ex parte procedure in the case of a bank inquiry order
had Congress been so minded. Yet nothing in the provision
itself, or even the available legislative record, explicitly
points to an ex parte judicial procedure in the application for
a bank inquiry order, unlike in the case of the freeze order.
That the AMLA does not contemplate ex parte proceedings in
applications for bank inquiry orders is confirmed by the
present implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA,
promulgated upon the passage of R.A. No. 9194. With respect
to freeze orders under Section 10, the implementing rules do
expressly provide that the applications for freeze orders be
filed ex parte, but no similar clearance is granted in the case
of inquiry orders under Section 11. These implementing rules
were promulgated by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the
Insurance Commission and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and if it was the true belief of these institutions
that inquiry orders could be issued ex parte similar to freeze
orders, language to that effect would have been
incorporated in the said Rules. This is stressed not because
the implementing rules could authorize ex parte applications
for inquiry orders despite the absence of statutory basis, but
rather because the framers of the law had no intention to
allow such ex parte applications.
Even the Rules of Procedure adopted by this Court in A.M.
No. 05-11-04-SC to enforce the provisions of the AMLA
specifically authorize ex parte applications with respect to
freeze orders under Section 10 but make no similar
57
authorization with respect to bank inquiry orders under
Section 11.
The Court could divine the sense in allowing ex parte
proceedings under Section 10 and in proscribing the same
under Section 11. A freeze order under Section 10 on the one
hand is aimed at preserving monetary instruments or
property in any way deemed related to unlawful activities as
defined in Section 3(i) of the AMLA. The owner of such
monetary instruments or property would thus be inhibited
from utilizing the same for the duration of the freeze order.
To make such freeze order anteceded by a judicial
proceeding with notice to the account holder would allow for
or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order
could be issued. (Citations omitted.)
Quite apparent from the foregoing is that absent a specific
wording in the AMLA allowing for ex-parte proceedings in
orders authorizing inquiry and examination by the AMLC into
certain bank deposits or investments, notice to the affected
party is required.
Heeding the Court's observance in Eugenio that the remedy
of the Republic then lay with the legislative, Congress
enacted Republic Act No. 10167 amending Section 11 of the
AMLA and specifically inserted the word ex-parte appositive
of the nature of this provisional remedy available to the
AMLC thereunder.
It is this current wording of Section 11 which SPCMB posits as
unconstitutional and purportedly actually proscribed in
Eugenio.
We do not subscribe to SPCMB's position.
Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte
application and inquiry by the AMLC into certain bank
deposits and investments does not violate substantive due
process, there being no physical seizure of property involved
at that stage. It is the preliminary and actual seizure of the
bank deposits or investments in question which brings these
within reach of the judicial process, specifically a
determination that the seizure violated due process.14 In
fact, Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section
11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies'
effect on the direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and
investments:
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11
does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property
of the account holder. What the bank inquiry order
authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or
investments in banking institutions or non-bank financial
institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited
with such banks or financial institutions are not seized in a
physical sense, but are examined on particular details such
as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions.
Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to
be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically
seized or hidden by the account holder. Said records are in
the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be
destroyed at the instance of the account holder alone as that
would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of
the bank.15
At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the
inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the
AMLC still does not contemplate any form of physical seizure
of the targeted corporeal property. From this cite, we
proceed to examine whether Section 11 of the law violates
procedural due process.
As previously stated, the AMLA now specifically provides for
an ex-parte application for an order authorizing inquiry or
examination into bank deposits or investments which
continues to pass constitutional muster.
Procedural due process is essentially the opportunity to be
heard.16 In this case, at the investigation stage by the AMLC
into possible money laundering offenses, SPCMB demands
that it have notice and hearing of AMLC's investigation into
its bank accounts.
We are not unaware of the obiter in Eugenio17 and cited by
SPCMB, voicing misgivings on an interpretation of the former
Section 11 of the AMLA allowing for ex-parte proceedings in
bank inquiry orders, to wit:
There certainly is fertile ground to contest the issuance of an
ex--parte order. Section 11 itself requires that it be
established that "there is probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to unlawful activities," and it
obviously is the court which stands as arbiter whether there
is indeed such probable cause. The process of inquiring into
the existence of probable cause would involve the function
of determination reposed on the trial court. Determination
clearly implies a function of adjudication on the part of the
trial court, and not a mechanical application of a standard
pre-determination by some other body. The word
"determination" implies deliberation and is, in normal legal
contemplation, equivalent to "the decision of a court of
justice."
The court receiving the application for inquiry order cannot
simply take the AMLC's word that probable cause exists that
the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activity. It will have to exercise its own determinative
function in order to be convinced of such fact. The account
holder would be certainly capable of contesting such
probable cause if given the opportunity to be apprised of the
pending application to inquire into his account; hence a
notice requirement would not be an empty spectacle. It may
58
be so that the process of obtaining the inquiry order may
become more cumbersome or prolonged because of the
notice requirement, yet we fail to see any unreasonable
burden cast by such circumstance. After all, as earlier
stated, requiring notice to the account holder should not, in
any way, compromise the integrity of the bank records
subject of the inquiry which remain in the possession and
control of the bank. (Emphasis supplied)
On that score, the SPCMB points out that the AMLC 's bank
inquiry is preliminary to the seizure and deprivation of its
property as in a freeze order under Section 10 of the AMLA
which peculiarity lends itself to a sui generis proceeding akin
to the evaluation process in extradition proceedings
pronounced in Secretary of Justice v. Hon. Lantion.18 Under
the extradition law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs is bound
to make a finding that the extradition request and its
supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form
and substance before delivering the same to the Secretary of
Justice. We ruled:
[L]ooking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it
would appear that there was failure to abide by the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is
true that the extradition request was delivered to the
Department of Foreign Affairs on June 17, 1999, the
following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of
Justice received the request, apparently without the
Department of Foreign affairs discharging its duty thoroughly
evaluating the same and its accompanying documents. xxx.
xxxx
[T]he record cannot support the presumption of regularity
that the Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed
the extradition request and supporting documents and that it
arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request and its
annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. XXX.
The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings,
proper belongs to a class by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a
criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to say that it is
purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the
executive authority has the power: (a) to make a technical
assessment of the completeness and sufficiency of the
extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its
face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes
indicated are not extraditable; and (c) to make a
determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation. Hence, said
process may be characterized as an investigative or
inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in
the exercise of an administrative body's quasi-judicial power.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves:
(a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts
based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved. Inquisitorial
power, which is also known as examining or investigatory
power, is one of the determinative powers of an
administrative body which better enables it to exercise its
quasi-judicial authority. This power allows the administrative
body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate
the activities, of persons or entities coming under its
jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of information by means
of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses,
production of documents, or otherwise.
The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing,
and analyzing evidence, which is a useful aid or tool in an
administrative agency's performance of its rule-making or
quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is
indispensable to prosecution.19 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
The submission of AMLC requires a determination whether
the AMLC is an administrative body with quasi-judicial
powers; corollary thereto, a determination of the jurisdiction
of the AMLC.
Lim v. Gamosa20 is enlightening on jurisdiction and the
requirement of a specific grant thereof in the enabling law.
We declared that the creation of the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) by the Indigenous Peoples Rights
Act (IPRA) did not confer it exclusive and original, nor
primary jurisdiction, in all claims and disputes involving
rights of IPs and ICCs where no such specific grant is
bestowed.
In this instance, the grant of jurisdiction over cases involving
money laundering offences is bestowed on the Regional Trial
Courts and the Sandiganbayan as the case may be. In fact,
Rule 5 of the IRR is entitled Jurisdiction of Money Laundering
Cases and Money Laundering Investigation Procedures:
Rule 5.a. Jurisdiction of Money Laundering Cases. The
Regional Trial Courts shall have the jurisdiction to try all
cases on money laundering. Those committed by public
officers and private persons who are in conspiracy with such
public officers shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Rule 5.b. Investigation of Money Laundering Offenses. - The
AMLC shall investigate:
(1) suspicious transactions;
(2) covered transactions deemed suspicious after an
investigation conducted by the AMLC;
(3) money laundering activities; and
(4) other violations of the AMLA, as amended.
59

The confusion on the scope and parameters of the AMLC's
investigatory powers and whether such seeps into and
approximates a quasi--judicial agency's inquisitorial powers
lies in the AMLC's investigation and consequent initial
determination of whether certain activities are constitutive
of anti-money laundering offenses.
The enabling law itself, the AMLA, specifies the jurisdiction
of the trial courts, RTC and Sandiganbayan, over money
laundering cases, and delineates the investigative powers of
the AMLC.
Textually, the AMLA is the first line of defense against money
laundering in compliance with our international obligation.
There are three (3) stages of determination, two (2) levels of
investigation, falling under three (3) jurisdictions:
1. The AMLC investigates possible money laundering offences
and initially determines whether there is probable cause to
charge any person with a money laundering offence under
Section 4 of the AMLA, resulting in the filing of a complaint
with the Department of Justice or the Office of the
Ombudsman;21
2. The DOJ or the Ombudsman conducts the preliminary
investigation proceeding and if after due notice and hearing
finds probable cause for money laundering offences, shall file
the necessary information before the Regional Trial Courts or
the Sandiganbayan;22
3. The RTCs or the Sandiganbayan shall try all cases on
money laundering, as may be applicable.23
Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules
and Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises quasi-
judicial functions whether the actual preliminary
investigation is done simply at its behest or conducted by the
Department of Justice and the Ombudsman.
Again, we hark back to Lantion citing Ruperto v. Torres,23-a
where the Court had occasion to rule on the functions of an
investigatory body with the sole power of investigation:
[Such a body] does not exercise judicial functions and its
power is limited to investigating facts and making findings in
respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial
functions or merely investigatory functions: Adjudication
signifies the exercise of power and authority to adjudicate
upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it.
Hence, if the only purpose for investigation is to evaluate
evidence submitted before it based on the facts and
Circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a final pronouncement affecting the
parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment.
adjudicate in regard to the rights and obligations of both the
Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its only
power is to determine whether the papers comply with the
requirements of the law and the treaty and, therefore,
sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition. Such
finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no
power to determine whether or not the extradition should be
effected. That is the role of the court. The body's power is
limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition
petition can be filed in court.
It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary
investigations, the evaluation procedure is characterized by
certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result
in the deprivation of liberty of the prospective extraditee.
This deprivation can be effected at two stages: First, the
provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty
provides that in case of urgency, a contracting party may
request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged
after 60 days if no request is submitted (Paragraph 4).
Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of
20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged
(Section 20[d]). Logically, although the Extradition Law is
silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that once a
request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective
extraditee may be continuously detained, or if not,
subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-US
Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no
request is submitted. Practically, the purpose of this
detention is to prevent his possible flight from the Requested
State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective
extraditee during the pendency of the extradition petition in
court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).
Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective
extraditee's liberty as early as during the evaluation stage. It
is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.
Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that
the evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency
conducting an investigative proceeding, the consequences of
which are essentially criminal since such technical
assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and
ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extraditee, As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool"
for criminal law enforcement. In essence, therefore, the
evaluation process partakes of the nature of a criminal
investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to make
available to a respondent in an administrative case or
investigation certain constitutional rights that are ordinarily
60
available only in criminal prosecutions. Further, as pointed
out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there
are rights formerly available only at the trial stage that had
been advanced to an earlier stage in the proceedings, such as
the right to counsel and the right against self-
incrimination.24 (Citations omitted)
In contrast to the disposition in Lantion that the evaluation
process before the Department of Foreign Affairs is akin to
an administrative agency conducting investigative
proceedings with implications on the consequences of
criminal liability, i.e., deprivation of liberty of a prospective
extraditee, the sole investigative functions of the AMLC finds
more resonance with the investigative functions of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
That the AMLC does not exercise quasi-judicial powers and is
simply an investigatory body finds support in our ruling in Shu
v. Dee.25 In that case, petitioner Shu had filed a complaint
before the NBI charging respondents therein with falsification
of two (2) deeds of real estate mortgage submitted to the
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company (Metrobank). After its
investigation, the NBI came up with a Questioned Documents
Report No. 746-1098 finding that the signatures of petitioner
therein which appear on the questioned deeds are not the
same as the standard sample signatures he submitted to the
NBI. Ruling on the specific issue raised by respondent therein
that they had been denied due process during the NBI
investigation, we stressed that the functions of this agency
are merely investigatory and informational in nature:
[The NBI] has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even
determine probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency
whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes
investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or as public
welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. It also
renders assistance when requested in the investigation or
detection of crimes in order to prosecute the persons
responsible.
Since the NBI's findings were merely recommendatory, we
find that no denial of the respondent's due process right
could have taken place; the NBI's findings were still subject
to the prosecutor's and the Secretary of Justice's actions for
purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. We find
it significant that the specimen signatures in the possession
of Metrobank were submitted by the respondents for the
consideration of the city prosecutor and eventually of the
Secretary of Justice during the preliminary investigation
proceedings. Thus, these officers had the opportunity to
examine these signatures.
The respondents were not likewise denied their right to due
process when the NBI issued the questioned documents
report. We note that this report merely stated that the
signatures appearing on the two deeds and in the petitioner's
submitted sample signatures were not written by one and the
same person. Notably, there was no categorical finding in the
questioned documents report that the respondents falsified
the documents. This report, too, was procured during the
conduct of the NBI's investigation at the petitioner's request
for assistance in the investigation of the alleged crime of
falsification. The report is inconclusive and does not prevent
the respondents from securing a separate documents
examination by handwriting experts based on their own
evidence. On its own, the NBI's questioned documents report
does not directly point to the respondents' involvement in
the crime charged. Its significance is that, taken together
with the other pieces of evidence submitted by the parties
during the preliminary investigation, these evidence could be
sufficient for purposes of finding probable cause — the action
that the Secretary of Justice undertook in the present case.
As carved out in Shu, the AMLC functions solely as an
investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26
Thereafter, the next step is for the AMLC to file a Complaint
with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6.b.
Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman,27
where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation
stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's
denial of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of
the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate
Estrada's constitutional right to due process where the sole
issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of
determining whether an information should be filed and does
not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents during the pre-trial or even
during trial. We expounded on the nature of preliminary
investigation proceedings, thus:
It should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation is only for the determination of probable cause,
and "probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary
investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial
where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights,
such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers
to establish his innocence." Thus, the rights of a respondent
in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by
procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to "engender a well founded belief' as to
the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's
probable guilt thereof A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties'
evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as
61
may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has
been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor's findings
in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, it
being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and
the facts obtaining therein.
Likewise devoid of cogency is petitioner's argument that the
testimonies of Galarion and Hanopol are inadmissible as to
him since he was not granted the opportunity of cross-
examination.
It is a fundamental principle that the accused in a
preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine the
witnesses which the complainant may present. Section 3,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the
respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to propound
clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right
to examine or cross-examine. Thus, even if petitioner was
not given the opportunity to cross-examine Galarion and
Hanopol at the time they were presented to testify during
the separate trial of the case against Galarion and Roxas, he
cannot assert any legal right to cross-examine them at the
preliminary investigation precisely because such right was
never available to him. The admissibility or inadmissibility of
said testimonies should be ventilated before the trial court
during the trial proper and not in the preliminary
investigation.
Furthermore, the technical rules on evidence are not binding
on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a
preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we
find no compelling justification for a strict application of the
evidentiary rules. In addition, considering that under Section
8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the record of the
preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of
the case in the Regional Trial Court, then the testimonies of
Galarion and Hanopol may not be admitted by the trial court
if not presented in evidence by the prosecuting fiscal. And,
even if the prosecution does present such testimonies,
petitioner can always object thereto and the trial court can
rule on the admissibility thereof; or the petitioner can,
during the trial, petition said court to compel the
presentation of Galarion and Hanopol for purposes of cross-
examination. (Citations and emphasis omitted)
Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering
offenses and its determination of possible money laundering
offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts
allowed by court order, does not transform it into an
investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence,
Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court
order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right
to procedural due process.
We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is
violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant
that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of
AMLC's ex-parte application for a bank inquiry order and all
subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued
in relation thereto, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: (1)
partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a mere fishing
expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is
not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money
laundering offense; and (4) is a form of political harassment
[of SPCMB's] clientele.
We shall discuss these issues jointly since the assailed
Section 11 incorporates by reference that "[t]he authority to
inquire into or examine the main and the related accounts
shall comply with the requirements of Article III, Sections 2
and 3 of the 1987 Constitution." On this point, SPCMB
asseverates that "there is nothing in the AMLA that allows or
justifies the withholding of information and/or any court
records or proceedings pertaining to an examination of a
bank account, especially if the court has already granted the
authority to conduct the examination."
The theme of playing off privacy rights and interest against
that of the state's interest in curbing money laundering
offenses is recurring.28
The invoked constitutional provisions read:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized.
SEC. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public policy or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Once again, Eugenio29 offers guidance:
62
The Court's construction of Section 11 of the AMLA is
undoubtedly influenced by right to privacy considerations. If
sustained, petitioner's argument that a bank account may be
inspected by the government following an ex parte
proceeding about which the depositor would know nothing
would have significant implications on the right to privacy, a
right innately cherished by all notwithstanding the legally
recognized exceptions thereto. The notion that the
government could be so empowered is cause for concern of
any individual who values the right to privacy which, after
all, embodies even the right to be "let alone," the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized people.
One might assume that the constitutional dimension of the
right to privacy, as applied to bank deposits, warrants our
present inquiry. We decline to do so. Admittedly, that
question has proved controversial in American jurisprudence.
Notably, the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. Miller
held that there was no legitimate expectation of privacy as
to the bank records of a depositor. Moreover, the text of our
Constitution has not bothered with the triviality of allocating
specific rights peculiar to bank deposits.
However, sufficient for our purposes, we can assert there is a
right to privacy governing bank accounts in the Philippines,
and that such right finds application to the case at bar. The
source of such right is statutory, expressed as it is in R.A. No.
1405 otherwise known as the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955. The
right to privacy is enshrined in Section 2 of that law, to wit:
SECTION 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or
banking institutions in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its
political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may
not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or
upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the
money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
Because of the Bank Secrecy Act, the confidentiality of bank
deposits remains a basic state policy in the Philippines.
Subsequent laws, including the AMLA, may have added
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, yet the secrecy of bank
deposits still lies as the general rule. It falls within the zones
of privacy recognized by our laws. The framers of the 1987
Constitution likewise recognized that bank accounts are not
covered by either the right to information under Section 7,
Article III or under the requirement of full public disclosure
under Section 28, Article II. Unless the Bank Secrecy Act is
repealed or amended, the legal order is obliged to conserve
the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank
deposits.
Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be
specifically legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act
itself prescribes exceptions whereby these bank accounts
may be examined by "any person, government official,
bureau or office"; namely when: (1) upon written permission
of the depositor; (2) in cases of impeachment; (3) the
examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public
officials; and (4) the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been
recognized by this Court as constituting an additional
exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there
have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act.
Under Section 11, the AMLC may inquire into a bank account
upon order of any competent court in cases of violation of
the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable
cause that the deposits or investments are related to
unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i) of the law, or a
money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further,
in instances where there is probable cause that the deposits
or investments are related to kidnapping for ransom, certain
violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235,
destructive arson and murder, then there is no need for the
AMLC to obtain a court order before it could inquire into such
accounts.
It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating to
the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a
"litigation" encompassed in one of the exceptions to the Bank
Secrecy Act which is when "the money deposited or invested
is the subject matter of the litigation." The orientation of the
bank inquiry order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or
remedy. As earlier stated, the application for such does not
entail a full-blown trial.
Nevertheless, just because the AMLA establishes additional
exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean that the
later law has dispensed with the general principle
established in the older law that "[a]ll deposits of whatever
nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines x
x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature." Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are
absolutely confidential, and that nature is unaltered even by
the legislated exceptions referred to above. There is disfavor
towards construing these exceptions in such a manner that
would authorize unlimited discretion on the part of the
government or of any party seeking to enforce those
exceptions and inquire into bank deposits. If there are doubts
in upholding the absolutely confidential nature of bank
deposits against affirming the authority to inquire into such
accounts, then such doubts must be resolved in favor of the
former. Such a stance would persist unless Congress passes a
law reversing the general state policy of preserving the
absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts.
(Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
63
From the foregoing disquisition, we extract the following
principles:
1. The Constitution did not allocate specific rights peculiar to
bank deposits;
2. The general rule of absolute confidentiality is simply
statutory,30i.e. not specified in the Constitution, which has
been affirmed in jurisprudence;31
3. Exceptions to the general rule of absolute confidentiality
have been carved out by the Legislature which legislation
have been sustained, albeit subjected to heightened scrutiny
by the courts;32 and
4. One such legislated exception is Section 11 of the AMLA.
The warning in Eugenio that an ex-parte proceeding
authorizing the government to inspect certain bank accounts
or investments without notice to the depositor would have
significant implications on the right to privacy still does not
preclude such a bank inquiry order to be allowed by specific
legislation as an exception to the general rule of absolute
confidentiality of bank deposits.
We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened
scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and
authorization to AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain
bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides
safeguards before a bank inquiry order is issued, ensuring
adherence to the general state policy of preserving the
absolutely confidential nature of Philippine bank accounts:
(1) The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis
for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;
(2) The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of
probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that
the deposits or investments are related to an unlawful
activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense
under Section 4 of the AMLA;
(3) A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts
is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the
principal account which court order ex-parte for related
accounts is separately based on probable cause that such
related account is materially linked to the principal account
inquired into; and
(4) The authority to inquire into or examine the main or
principal account and the related accounts shall comply with
the requirements of Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution.
The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination
into the bank account are not undertaken whimsically and
solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In
particular, the requirement of demonstration by the AMLC,
and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes
the limits of such governmental action. We will revert to
these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss
the CA's denial of SPCMB's letter request for information
concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order
involving its accounts.
First. The AMLC and the appellate court are respectively
required to demonstrate and ascertain probable cause. Ret.
Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines,33 which
dealt with the adjunct provisional remedy of freeze order
under Section 10 of the AMLA, defined probable cause, thus:
The probable cause required for the issuance of a freeze
order differs from the probable cause required for the
institution of a criminal action, xxx.
As defined in the law, the probable cause required for the
issuance of a freeze order refers to "such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet,
prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity
and/or money laundering offence is about to be, is being or
has been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property subject thereof sought to be frozen is
in any way related to said unlawful activity and/or money
laundering offense."
In other words, in resolving the issue of whether probable
cause exits, the CA's statutorily-guided determination's focus
is not on the probable commissions of an unlawful activity (or
money laundering) that the office of the Ombudsman has
already determined to exist, but on whether the bank
accounts, assets, or other monetary instruments sought to be
frozen are in any way related to any of the illegal activities
enumerated under R.A. 9160, as amended. Otherwise stated,
probable cause refers to the sufficiency of the relation
between an unlawful activity and the property or monetary
instrument which is the focal point of Section 10 of RA No.
9160, as amended. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
Second. As regards SPCMB's contention that the bank inquiry
order is in the nature of a general warrant, Eugenio already
declared that Section 11, even with the allowance of an ex
parte application therefor, "is not a search warrant or
warrant of arrest as it contemplates a direct object but not
the seizure of persons or property."34 It bears repeating that
the ''bank inquiry order" under Section 11 is a provisional
remedy to aid the AMLC in the enforcement of the AMLA.
64
Third. Contrary to the stance of SPCMB, the bank inquiry
order does not contemplate that SPCMB be first impleaded in
a money laundering case already filed before the courts:
We are unconvinced by this proposition, and agree instead
with the then Solicitor General who conceded that the use of
the phrase "in cases of' was unfortunate, yet submitted that
it should be interpreted to mean "in the event there are
violations" of the AMLA, and not that there are already cases
pending in court concerning such violations. If the contrary
position is adopted, then the bank inquiry order would be
limited in purpose as a tool in aid of litigation of live cases,
and wholly inutile as a means for the government to
ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain an
intended prosecution of the account holder for violation of
the AMLA. Should that be the situation, in all likelihood the
AMLC would be virtually deprived of its character as a
discovery tool, and thus would become less circumspect in
filing complaints against suspect account holders. After all,
under such set-up the preferred strategy would be to allow
or even encourage the indiscriminate filing of complaints
under the AMLA with the hope or expectation that the
evidence of money laundering would somehow .surface
during the trial. Since the AMLC could not make use of the
bank inquiry order to determine whether there is evidentiary
basis to prosecute the suspected malefactors, not filing any
case at all would not be an alternative. Such unwholesome
set-up should not come to pass. Thus Section 11 cannot be
interpreted in a way that would emasculate the remedy it
has established and encourage the unfounded initiation of
complaints for money laundering.35 (Citation omitted)
Guided as we are by prior holdings, and bound as we are by
the requirements for issuance of a bank inquiry order under
Section 11 of the AMLA, we are hard pressed to declare that
it violates SPCMB's right to privacy.
Nonetheless, although the bank inquiry order ex-parte passes
constitutional muster, there is nothing in Section 11 nor the
implementing rules and regulations of the AMLA which
prohibits the owner of the bank account, as in his instance
SPCMB, to ascertain from the CA, post issuance of the bank
inquiry order ex-parte, if his account is indeed the subject of
an examination. Emphasized by our discussion of the
safeguards under Section 11 preceding the issuance of such
an order, we find that there is nothing therein which
precludes the owner of the account from challenging the
basis for the issuance thereof.
The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether
or not the appellate court, through the Presiding Justice,
gravely abused its discretion when it effectively denied
SPCMB's letter-request for confirmation that the AMLC had
applied (ex-parte) for, and was granted, a bank inquiry order
to examine SPCMB's bank accounts relative to the
investigation conducted on Vice-President Binay's accounts.
We recall the Presiding Justice's letter to SPCMB
categorically stating that "under the rules, the Office of the
Presiding Justice is strictly mandated not to disclose,
divulge, or communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in
any manner or by any means, the fact of the filing of the
petition brought before [the Court of Appeals] by the
[AMLC], its contents and even its entry in the logbook." Note
that the letter did not cite the aforementioned rules that
were supposedly crystal clear to foreclose ambiguity. Note
further that Rules 10.c.3 and 10.d of the IRR on Authority to
File Petitions for Freeze Order provides that:
Rule 10.c. Duty of Covered Institutions upon receipt thereof.
— are materially linked to the monetary instrument or property
Rule 10.c.1. Upon receipt of the notice of the freeze order,
the covered institution concerned shall immediately freeze
the monetary instrument or property and related accounts
subject thereof.
Rule 10.c.2. The covered institution shall likewise
immediately furnish a copy of the notice of the freeze order
upon the owner or holder of the monetary instrument or
property or related accounts subject thereof.
Rule 10.c.3. Within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of
the freeze order, the covered institution concerned shall
submit to the Court of Appeals and the AMLC, by personal
delivery, a detailed written return on the freeze order,
specifying all the pertinent and relevant information which
shall include the following:
(a) the account numbers;
(b) the names of the account owners or holders;
(c) the amount of the monetary instrument, property or
related accounts as of the time they were frozen;
(d) all relevant information as to the nature of the monetary
instrument or property;
(e) any information on the related accounts pertaining to the
monetary instrument or property subject of the freeze order;
and
(f) the time when the freeze thereon took effect.
Rule 10.d. Upon receipt of the freeze order issued by the
Court of Appeals and upon verification by the covered
institution that the related accounts originated from and/or
subject of the freeze order, the covered institution shall
freeze these related accounts wherever these may be found.
The return of the covered institution as required under Rule
10.c.3 shall include the fact of such freezing and an
65
explanation as to the grounds for the identification of the
related accounts.
If the related accounts cannot be determined within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the freeze order due to the
volume and/or complexity of the transactions or any other
justifiable factor(s), the covered institution shall effect the
freezing of the related accounts, monetary instruments and
properties as soon as practicable and shall submit a
supplemental return thereof to the Court of Appeals and the
AMLC within twenty-four (24) hours from the freezing of said
related accounts, monetary instruments and properties.
The foregoing rule, in relation to what Section 11 already
provides, signifies that ex-parte bank inquiry orders on
related accounts may be questioned alongside, albeit
subsequent to, the issuance of the initial freeze order of the
subject bank accounts. The requirements and procedure for
the issuance of the order, including the return to be made
thereon lay the grounds for judicial review thereof. We
expound.
An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered tainted
with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the abuse of
discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or
gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law.36 In this relation, case law states that
not every error in the proceedings, or every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.37 The degree of gravity, as above-described,
must be met.
That the propriety of the issuance of the bank inquiry order
is a justiciable issue brooks no argument. A justiciable
controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
conjectural or merely anticipatory.38
As previously adverted to in our discussion on the right to
privacy, the clash of privacy rights and interest against that
of the government's is readily apparent. However, the
statutorily enshrined general rule on absolute confidentiality
of bank accounts remains. Thus, the safeguards instituted in
Section II of the AMLA and heretofore discussed provide for
certain well- defined limits, as in the language of Baker v.
Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining the
validity of the exercise of such discretion by the appellate
court in denying the letter-request of SPCMB.39 In short,
Section II itself provides the basis for the judicial inquiry and
which the owner of the bank accounts subject of the AMLC
inquiry may invoke.
Undeniably, there is probable and preliminary governmental
action against SPCMB geared towards implementation of the
AMLA directed at SPCMB's property, although there is none,
as yet, physical seizure thereof, as in freezing of bank
accounts under Section 10 of the AMLA.40 Note, however,
that the allowance to question the bank inquiry order we
carve herein is tied to the appellate court's issuance of a
freeze order on the principal accounts. Even in Eugenio,
while declaring that the bank inquiry order under Section II
then required prior notice of such to the account owner, we
recognized that the determination of probable cause by the
appellate court to issue the bank inquiry order can be
contested. As presently worded and how AMLC functions are
designed under the AMLA, the occasion for the issuance of
the freeze order upon the actual physical seizure of the
investigated and inquired into bank account, calls into
motions the opportunity for the bank account owner to then
question, not just probable cause for the issuance of the
freeze order under Section I 0, but, to begin with, the
determination of probable cause for an ex-parte bank inquiry
order into a purported related account under Section II.
In enacting the amendment to Section II of the AMLC, the
legislature saw it fit to place requirements before a bank
inquiry order may be issued. We discussed these
requirements as basis for a valid exception to the general
rule on absolute confidentiality of bank accounts. However,
these very safe guards allow SPCMB, post issuance of the ex-
parte bank inquiry order, legal bases to question the
propriety of such issued order, if any. To emphasize, this
allowance to the owner of the bank account to question the
bank inquiry order is granted only after issuance of the
freeze order physically seizing the subject bank account. It
cannot be undertaken prior to the issuance of the freeze
order.
While no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the
part of the appellate court when it explained in its letter
that petitions of such nature "is strictly confidential in that
when processing the same, not even the handling staff
members of the Office of the Presiding Justice know or have
any knowledge who the subject bank account holders are, as
well as the bank accounts involved," it was incorrect when it
declared that "under the rules, the Office of the Presiding
Justice is strictly mandated not to disclose, divulge, or
communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in any manner
or by any means, the fact of the filing of any petition
brought before [the Court of Appeals] by the Anti-Money
Laundering Council, its contents and even its entry in the
logbook." As a result, the appellate court effectively
precluded and prevented SPCMB of any recourse, amounting
to a denial of SPCMB's letter request.
We cannot overemphasize that SPCMB, as the owner of the
bank account which may be the subject of inquiry of the
AMLC, ought to have a legal remedy to question the validity
and propriety of such an order by the appellate court under
Section 11 of the AMLA even if subsequent to the issuance of
a freeze order. Moreover, given the scope of inquiry of the
AMLC, reaching and including even related accounts, which
inquiry into specifies a proviso that: "[t]hat the procedure for
the ex-parte application of the ex-parte court order for the
principal account shall be the same with that of the related
66
accounts," SPCMB should be allowed to question the
government intrusion. Plainly, by implication, SPCMB can
demonstrate the absence of probable cause, i.e. that it is
not a related account nor are its accounts materially linked
to the principal account being investigated.41
In BSB Group, Inc. v. Go,42 we recounted the objective of
the absolute confidentiality rule which is protection from
unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the purpose of such
inquiry or investigation is merely to determine the existence
and nature, as well as the amount of the deposit in any given
bank account:
xxx. There is, in fact, much disfavor to construing these
primary and supplemental exceptions in a manner that would
authorize unbridled discretion, whether governmental or
otherwise, in utilizing these exceptions as authority for
unwarranted inquiry into bank accounts. It is then
perceivable that the present legal order is obliged to
conserve the absolutely confidential nature of bank deposits.
The measure of protection afforded by the law has been
explained in China Banking Corporation v. Ortega. That case
principally addressed the issue of whether the prohibition
against an examination of bank deposits precludes
garnishment in satisfaction of a judgment. Ruling on that
issue in the negative, the Court found guidance in the
relevant portions of the legislative deliberations on Senate
Bill No. 351 and House Bill No. 3977, which later became the
Bank Secrecy Act, and it held that the absolute
confidentiality rule in R.A. No. 1405 actually aims at
protection from unwarranted inquiry or investigation if the
purpose of such inquiry or investigation is merely to
determine the existence and nature, as well as the amount
of the deposit in any given bank account. Thus,
x x x The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B&B Forest Development
Corporation, as contemplated in the law. It merely required
Tan Kim Liong to inform the court whether or not the
defendant B&B Forest Development Corporation had a
deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for purposes of
the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold the
same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
It will be noted from the discussion of the conference
committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977 which later became Republic Act No. 1405, that it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place banks deposits
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment
Thus:
x x x Mr. Marcos: Now, for purposes of the record, I should
like the Chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means to
clarify this further. Suppose an individual has a tax case. He
is being held liable by the Bureau of Internal Revenue [(BIR)]
or, say, P1,000.00 worth of tax liability, and because of this
the deposit of this individual [has been] attached by the
[BIR].
Mr. Ramos: The attachment will only apply after the court
has pronounced sentence declaring the liability of such
person. But where the primary aim is to determine whether
he has a bank deposit in order to bring about a proper
assessment by the [BIR], such inquiry is not allowed by this
proposed law.
Mr. Marcos: But under our rules of procedure and under the
Civil Code, the attachment or garnishment of money
deposited is allowed. Let us assume for instance that there is
a preliminary attachment which is for garnishment or for
holding liable all moneys deposited belonging to a certain
individual, but such attachment or garnishment will bring out
into the open the value of such deposit. Is that prohibited
by... the law?
Mr. Ramos: It is only prohibited to the extent that the
inquiry... is made only for the purpose of satisfying a tax
liability already declared for the protection of the right in
favor of the government; but when the object is merely to
inquire whether he has a deposit or not for purposes of
taxation, then this is fully covered by the law. x x x
Mr. Marcos: The law prohibits a mere investigation into the
existence and the amount of the deposit.
Mr. Ramos: Into the very nature of such deposit. x x x
(Citations omitted)
What is reflected by the foregoing disquisition is that the law
plainly prohibits a mere investigation into the existence and
the amount of the deposit. We relate the principle to
SPCMB's relationship to the reported principal account under
investigation, one of its clients, former Vice- President
Binay. SPCMB as the owner of one of the bank accounts
reported to be investigated by the AMLC for probable money
laundering offenses should be allowed to pursue remedies
therefrom where there are legal implications on the inquiry
into its accounts as a law firm. While we do not lapse into
conjecture and cannot take up the lance for SPCMB on
probable violation of the attorney-client privilege based on
pure speculation, the extent of information obtained by the
AMLC concerning the clients of SPCMB has not been fully
drawn and sufficiently demonstrated. At the same time, the
owner of bank accounts that could be potentially affected
has the right to challenge whether the requirements for
issuance of the bank inquiry order were indeed complied
with given that such has implications on its property rights.
In this regard, SPCMB's obeisance to promulgated rules on the
matter could have afforded it a remedy, even post issuance
of the bank inquiry order.
Rule 10.b. of the IRR defines probable cause as "such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet,
prudent or cautious man to believe that an unlawful activity
and/or a money laundering offense is about to be, is being or
has been committed and that the account or any monetary
instrument or property sought to be frozen is in any way
67
related to said unlawful activity and/or money laundering
offense." Evidently, the provision only refers to probable
cause for freeze orders under Section 10 of the AMLA. From
this we note that there is a glaring lacunae in our procedural
rules concerning the bank inquiry order under Section 11.
Despite the advent of RA No. 10167, amending Section 11 of
the AMLA, we have yet to draft additional rules
corresponding to the ex-parte bank inquiry order under
Section 11. A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC entitled "Rule of Procedure
in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing
of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing,
Involving, or Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money
Laundering Offense Under Republic Act No. 9160, as
Amended," only covers what is already provided in the title.
As we have already noted, the bank inquiry order must
likewise be governed by rules specific to its issuance where
the AMLC regularly invokes this provision and which,
expectedly clashes with the rights of bank account holders.
Apart from Section 2, Rule IV of the 2009 Internal Rules of
the CA (IRCA) reads:
SEC. 2. Action by the Presiding Justice or Executive Justice.
— When a petition involves an urgent matter, such as an
application for writ of habeas corpus, amparo or habeas data
or for temporary restraining order, and there is no way of
convening the Raffle Committee or calling any of its
members, the Presiding Justice or the Executive Justice, as
the case may be, or in his/her absence, the most senior
Justice present, may conduct the raffle or act on the
petition, subject to raffle in the latter case on the next
working day in accordance with Rule III hereof.
(AMLA cases are limited to the first three most senior
Justices as stated in the law and are raffled by the Chairmen
of the First, Second and Third Divisions to the members of
their Divisions only.)
Nothing in the IRCA justifies the disallowance to SPCMB of
information and/or court records or proceedings pertaining
to the possible bank inquiry order covering its bank deposits
or investment.
We note that the Presiding Justice's reply to the request for
comment of SPCMB on the existence of a petition for bank
inquiry order by the AMLC covering the latter's account only
contemplates the provisions of Section 10 of the AMLA, its
IRR and the promulgated rules thereon. Such immediate and
definitive foreclosure left SPCMB with no recourse on how to
proceed from what it perceived to be violation of its rights as
owner of the bank account examined. The reply of the
Presiding Justice failed to take into consideration Section 54
of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC on Notice of Freeze Order which
reads:
SEC. 54. Notice of freeze order.- The Court shall order that
notice of the freeze order be served personally, in the same
manner provided for the service of the asset preservation
order in Section 14 of this Rule, upon the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf and such covered institution or
government agency. The court shall notify also such party in
interest as may have appeared before the court. (Emphasis
supplied)
We relate this Section 54 to the already cited Rule 10.d of
the IRR
Rule 10.d. Upon receipt of the freeze order issued by the
Court of Appeals and upon verification by the covered
institution that the related accounts originated from and/or
are materially linked to the monetary instrument or property
subject of the freeze order, the covered institution shall
freeze these related accounts wherever these may be found.
The return of the covered institution as required under Rule
10.c.3 shall include the fact of such freezing and an
explanation as to the grounds for the identification of the
related accounts.
If the related accounts cannot be determined within twenty-
-four (24) hours from receipt of the freeze order due to the
volume and/or complexity of the transactions or any other
justifiable factor(s), the covered institution shall effect the
freezing of the related accounts, monetary instruments and
properties as soon as practicable and shall submit a
supplemental return thereof to the Court of Appeals and the
AMLC within twenty-four (24) hours from the freezing of said
related accounts, monetary instruments and properties.
(Emphasis supplied)
demonstrating that the return of the Freeze Order must
provide an explanation as to the grounds for the
identification of the related accounts, or the requirement of
notice to a party in interest affected thereby whose bank
accounts were examined. This necessarily contemplates the
procedure for a prior bank inquiry order which we ought to
provide for.
For exact reference, we cite A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, Title VIII
on Petitions for Freeze Order in the CA which certain
pertinent provisions we adopt and apply suppletorily as a
separate Title on Petitions for Bank Inquiry Order:
TITLE VIII
PETITIONS FOR FREEZE ORDER IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEC. 43. Applicability. - This Rule shall apply to petitions for
freeze order in the Court of Appeals. The 2002 Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals, as amended, shall apply suppletorily
in all other aspects.
68

xxxx
SEC. 46. Contents of the petition. - The petition shall contain
the following allegations:
(a)
The name and address of the respondent;
(b)
A specific description with particularity of the monetary
instrument, property or proceeds, their location, the name
of the owner, holder, lienholder or possessor, if known;
(c)
The grounds relied upon for the issuance of a freeze order;
and
(d)
The supporting evidence showing that the subject monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way related to
or involved in an unlawful activity as defined under Section
3(i) of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9194.
The petition shall be filed in seven clearly legible copies and
shall be accompanied by clearly legible copies of supporting
documents duly subscribed under oath.
xxxx
SEC. 49. Confidentiality; prohibited disclosure. - The logbook
and the entries therein shall be kept strictly confidential and
maintained under the responsibility of the Presiding Justice
or the Executive Justices, as the case may be. No person,
including Court personnel, shall disclose, divulge or
communicate to anyone directly or indirectly, in any manner
or by any means, the fact of the filing of the petition for
freeze order, its contents and its entry in the logbook except
to those authorized by the Court. Violation shall constitute
contempt of court.
xxxx
SEC. 51. Action by the Court of Appeals.- All members of the
Division of the Court to which the assigned justice belongs
shall act on the petition within twenty-four hours after its
filing. However, if one member of the Division is not
available, the assigned justice and the other justice present
shall act on the petition. If only the assigned justice is
present, he shall act alone. The action of the two justices or
of the assigned justice alone, as the case may be, shall be
forthwith promulgated and thereafter submitted on the next
working day to the absent member or members of the
Division for ratification, modification or recall.
If the Court is satisfied from the verified allegations of the
petition that there exists probable cause that the monetary
instrument, property, or proceeds are in any way related to
or involved in any unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i)
of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended by Republic Act No.
9194, it shall issue ex parte a freeze order as hereinafter
provided.
If the Court finds no substantial merit in the petition, it shall
dismiss the petition outright, stating the specific reasons for
such dismissal.
When the unanimous vote of the three justices of the
Division cannot be obtained, the Presiding Justice or the
Executive Justice shall designate two justices by raffle from
among the other justices of the first three divisions to sit
temporarily with them forming a special division of five
justices. The concurrence of a majority of such special
division shall be required for the pronouncement of a
judgment or resolution.
SEC. 52. Issuance, form and contents of the freeze order -
The freeze order shall:
(a)
issue in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Anti-Money Laundering Council;
(b)
describe with particularity the monetary instrument,
property or proceeds frozen, as well as the names of their
owner or owners; and
(c)
direct the person or covered institution to immediately
freeze the subject monetary instrument, property or
proceeds or its related web of accounts.
SEC. 53. Freeze order.
(a)
Effectivity; post issuance hearing. - The freeze order shall be
effective immediately for a period of twenty days. Within
the twenty-day period, the court shall conduct a summary
hearing, with notice to the parties, to determine whether or
not to modify or lift the freeze order, or extend its
effectivity as hereinafter provided.
(b)
Extension. - On motion of the petitioner filed before the
expiration of twenty days from issuance of a freeze order,
the court may for good cause extend its effectivity for a
period not exceeding six months.
SEC. 54. Notice of freeze order.- The Court shall order that
notice of the freeze order be served personally, in the same
69
manner provided for the service of the asset preservation
order in Section 14 of this Rule, upon the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf and such covered institution or
government agency. The court shall notify also such party in
interest as may have appeared before the court.
SEC. 55. Duty of respondent, covered institution or
government agency upon receipt of freeze order. - Upon
receipt of a copy of the freeze order, the respondent,
covered institution or government agency shall immediately
desist from and not allow any transaction, withdrawal,
deposit, transfer, removal, conversion, other movement or
concealment the account representing, involving or relating
to the subject monetary instrument, property, proceeds or
its related web of accounts.
SEC. 56. Consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture
proceedings - After the post-issuance hearing required in
Section 53, the Court shall forthwith remand the case and
transmit the records to the regional trial court for
consolidation with the pending civil forfeiture proceeding.
SEC. 57. Appeal.- Any party aggrieved by the decision or
ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the
subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court
directs otherwise.
A reverse situation affords us a clearer picture of the
arbitrary and total preclusion of SPCMB to question the bank
inquiry order of the appellate court. In particular, in an
occasion where the appellate court denies the AMLC's ex-
parte application for a bank inquiry order under Section 11,
the AMLC can question this denial and assail such an order by
the appellate court before us on grave abuse of discretion.
Among others, the AMLC can demonstrate that it has
established probable cause for its issuance, or if the situation
contemplates a denial of an application for a bank inquiry
order into a related account, the AMLC can establish that the
account targeted is indeed a related account. The resolution
on these factual and legal issues ought to be reviewable,
albeit post issuance of the Freeze Order, akin to the
provision of an Appeal to the Supreme Court under Section
57 of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC.
Palpably, the requirement to establish probable cause is not
a useless supposition. To establish and demonstrate the
required probable cause before issuance of the bank inquiry
and the freeze orders is a screw on which the AMLC's
intrusive functions turns. We are hard pressed to justify a
disallowance to an aggrieved owner of a bank account to
avail of remedies.
That there are no specific rules governing the bank inquiry
order does not signify that the CA cannot confirm to the
actual owner of the bank account reportedly being
investigated whether it had in fact issued a bank inquiry
order for covering its accounts, of course after the issuance
of the Freeze Order. Even in Ligot,43 we held that by
implication, where the law did not specify, the owner of the
"frozen" property may move to lift the freeze order issued
under Section 10 of the AMLA if he can show that no probable
cause exists or the 20-day period of the freeze order has
already lapsed without any extension being requested from
and granted by the CA. Drawing a parallel, such a showing of
the absence of probable cause ought to be afforded SPCMB.
Ligot clarifies that "probable cause refers to the sufficiency
of the relation between an unlawful activity and the
property or monetary instrument which is the focal point of
Section 10 of the AMLA, as amended." This same probable
cause is likewise the focal point in a bank inquiry order to
further determine whether the account under investigation is
linked to unlawful activities and/or money laundering
offense. Thus, the specific applicability of Sections 52, 53,
54 and 57 Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC covering the
following: (1) Issuance, Form and Content of the Freeze
Order; (2) Effectivity of the Freeze Order and Post Issuance
Hearing thereon; (3) Notice of the Freeze Order; and (4)
Appeal from the Freeze Order as separate Rules for Petitions
to Question the Bank Inquiry Order. And as held in Eugenio
which now applies to the present Section 11 of the AMLA:
Although oriented towards different purposes, the freeze
order under Section 10 and the bank inquiry order under
Section 11 are similar in that they are extraordinary
provisional reliefs which the AMLC may avail of to effectively
combat and prosecute money laundering offenses. Crucially,
Section 10 uses specific language to authorize an ex parte
application for the provisional relief therein, a circumstance
absent in Section 11. xxx.44
The cited rules cover and approximate the distinction made
by Eugenio in declaring that the bank inquiry order is not a
search warrant, and yet there are instituted requirements for
the issuance of these orders given that such is now allowed
ex-parte:
The Constitution and the Rules of Court prescribe particular
requirements attaching to search warrants that are not
imposed by the AMLA with respect to bank inquiry orders. A
constitutional warrant requires that the judge personally
examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, such examination being in the
form of searching questions and answers. Those are
impositions which the legislative did not specifically
prescribe as to the bank inquiry order under the AMLA and
we cannot find sufficient legal basis to apply them to Section
11 of the AMLA. Simply put, a bank inquiry order is not a
search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates a
direct object but not the seizure of persons or property.
Even as the Constitution and the Rules of Court impose a high
procedural standard for the determination of probable cause
70
for the issuance of search warrants which Congress chose not
to prescribe for the bank inquiry order under the AMLA,
Congress nonetheless disallowed ex parte applications for the
inquiry order. We can discern that in exchange for these
procedural standards normally applied to search warrants,
Congress chose instead to legislate a right to notice and a
right to be heard — characteristics of judicial proceedings
which are not ex parte. Absent any demonstrable
constitutional infirmity, there is no reason for us to dispute
such legislative policy choices.45
Thus, as an ex-parte bank inquiry order which Congress has
now specifically allowed, the owner of a bank account post
issuance of the freeze order has an opportunity under the
Rules to contest the establishment of probable cause.
Again, we cannot avoid the requirement-limitation nexus in
Section 11. As it affords the government authority to pursue
a legitimate state interest to investigate money laundering
offenses, such likewise provides the limits for the authority
given. Moreover, allowance to the owner of the bank
account, post issuance of the bank inquiry order and the
corresponding freeze order, of remedies to question the
order, will not forestall and waylay the government's pursuit
of money launderers. That the bank inquiry order is a
separate from the freeze order does not denote that it
cannot be questioned. The opportunity is still rife for the
owner of a bank account to question the basis for its very
inclusion into the investigation and the corresponding
freezing of its account in the process.
As noted in Eugenio, such an allowance accorded the account
holder who wants to contest the issuance of the order and
the actual investigation by the AMLC, does not cast an
unreasonable burden since the bank inquiry order has already
been issued. Further, allowing for notice to the account
holder should not, in any way, compromise the integrity of
the bank records subject of the inquiry which remain in the
possession and control of the bank. The account holder so
notified remains unable to do anything to conceal or cleanse
his bank account records of suspicious or anomalous
transactions, at least not without the whole hearted
cooperation of the bank, which inherently has no vested
interest to aid the account holder in such manner. Rule
10.c.46 of the IRR provides for Duty of the Covered
Institution receiving the Freeze Order. Such can likewise be
made applicable to covered institutions notified of a bank
inquiry order.
On the other hand, a scenario where SPCMB or any account
holder under examination later shows that the bank inquiry
order was without the required probable cause, the
information obtained through the account reverts to, and
maintains, its confidentiality. In short, any and all
information obtained therein by the AMLC remains
confidential, as if no examination or inquiry on the bank
account or investments was undertaken. The foregoing
consequence can be added as a Section in the Rules entitled
"Effect of absence of probable cause."
All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the
AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for
authority to inquire into, and examine, certain bank deposits
and investments.
Section 11 of the AMLA providing for the ex-parte bank
deposit inquiry is constitutionally firm for the reasons
already discussed. The ex--parte inquiry shall be upon
probable cause that the deposits or investments are related
to an unlawful activity as defined in Section 3(i) of the law or
a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the same law.
To effect the limit on the ex-parte inquiry, the petition
under oath for authority to inquire, must, akin to the
requirement of a petition for freeze order enumerated in
Title VIII of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, contain the name and
address of the respondent; the grounds relied upon for the
issuance of the order of inquiry; and the supporting evidence
that the subject bank deposit are in any way related to or
involved in an unlawful activity.
If the CA finds no substantial merit in the petition, it shall
dismiss the petition outright stating the specific reasons for
such denial. If found meritorious and there is a subsequent
petition for freeze order, the proceedings shall be governed
by the existing Rules on Petitions for Freeze Order in the CA.
From the issuance of a freeze order, the party aggrieved by
the ruling of the court may appeal to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising all pertinent questions of law and issues,
including the propriety of the issuance of a bank inquiry
order. The appeal shall not stay the enforcement of the
subject decision or final order unless the Supreme Court
directs otherwise. The CA is directed to draft rules based on
the foregoing discussions to complement the existing A.M.
No. 05-11-04-SC Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture, Asset Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary
Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or
Relating to an Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense
under Republic Act No. 9160, as Amended for submission to
the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court and
eventual approval and promulgation of the Court en banc.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 9160, as amended, is declared VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL.
SO ORDERED.
D. Applicability of Electronic Evidence
G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
NOEL ENOJAS y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ y FABREGAS,
71
FERNANDO SANTOS y DELANTAR, and ROGER JALANDONI y
ARI, Appellants.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
On September 4, 2006 the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas
charged appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit (Enojas), Arnold
Gomez y Fabregas (Gomez), Fernando Santos y Delantar
(Santos), and Roger Jalandoni y Ari (Jalandoni) with murder
before the Las Pifias Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal
Case 06-0854.1
PO2 Eduardo Gregorio, Jr. (P02 Gregorio) testified that at
around 10:30 in the evening of August 29, 2006, he and P02
Francisco Pangilinan (PO2 Pangilinan) were patrolling the
vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they
spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in front of the
Aguila Auto Glass shop near the intersection of BF Almanza
and Alabang-Zapote Roads. The officers approached the taxi
and asked the driver, later identified as accused Enojas, for
his documents. The latter complied but, having entertained
doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them,
they asked him to come with them to the police station in
their mobile car for further questioning.2
Accused Enojas voluntarily went with the police officers and
left his taxi behind. On reaching the 7-11 convenience store
on the Zapote-Alabang Road, however, they stopped and PO2
Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two
suspected robbers and shot it out with them. PO2 Pangilinan
shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to
escape. But someone fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his
death.
On hearing the shots, PO2 Gregorio came around and fired at
an armed man whom he saw running towards Pilar Village.
He saw another man, who came from the Jollibbee outlet,
run towards Alabang-Zapote Road while firing his gun at PO2
Gregorio. The latter returned fire but the men were able to
take a taxi and escape. PO2 Gregorio radioed for help and for
an ambulance. On returning to his mobile car, he realized
that accused Enojas, the taxi driver they had with them had
fled.
P/Insp. Ferjen Torred (Torred), the Chief of Investigation
Division of the Las Piñas Police, testified that he and PO2
Teoson Rosarito (PO2 Rosarito) immediately responded to
PO2 Gregorio’s urgent call. Suspecting that accused Enojas,
the taxi driver who fled, was involved in the attempted
robbery, they searched the abandoned taxi and found a
mobile phone that Enojas apparently left behind. P/Ins.
Torred instructed PO3 Joel Cambi (PO3 Cambi) to monitor its
incoming messages.3
The police later ascertained that the suspect whom PO2
Pangilinan had killed was someone named Reynaldo Mendoza
who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver. The police found
spent 9 mm and M-16 rifle shells at the crime scene. Follow-
up operations at nearby provinces resulted in finding the
dead body of one of the suspects, Alex Angeles, at the Metro
South Medical Center along Molino, Bacoor, Cavite.4
PO3 Cambi and PO2 Rosarito testified that they monitored
the messages in accused Enojas’ mobile phone and, posing as
Enojas, communicated with the other accused. The police
then conducted an entrapment operation that resulted in the
arrest of accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the
police were also able to capture accused Enojas and Gomez.
The prosecution presented the transcripts of the mobile
phone text messages between Enojas and some of his co-
accused.5
The victim’s father, Ricardo Pangilinan, testified that his son
was at the time of his death 28 years old, unmarried, and
was receiving police pay of ₱8,000.00 to ₱10,000.00 per
month. Ricardo spent ₱99,999 for burial expense, ₱16,000.00
for the interment services, and ₱50,000.00 for purchase of
the cemetery lot.6
Manifesting in open court that they did not want to adduce
any evidence or testify in the case,7 the accused opted to
instead file a trial memorandum on March 10, 2008 for their
defense. They pointed out that they were entitled to an
acquittal since they were all illegally arrested and since the
evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having
been properly identified.
On June 2, 2008 the RTC rendered judgment,8 finding all the
accused guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation
and use of armed men with the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearms. It thus sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without the
possibility of parole and to indemnify the heirs of PO2
Pangilinan with ₱165,999.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
₱2,080,000.00 as compensation for loss of earning capacity.
Upon review in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 03377, on June 14, 2012 the
Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the conviction of the accused.9 The CA, however, found
the absence of evident premeditation since the prosecution
failed to prove that the several accused planned the crime
before committing it. The accused appealed from the CA to
this Court.10
The defense points out that the prosecution failed to present
direct evidence that the accused Enojas, Gomez, Santos, or
Jalandoni took part in shooting PO2 Pangilinan dead.11 This
may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by
circumstantial evidence that meets the evidentiary standard
of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1)
there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.12
Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the
prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused. Thus:
1. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Enojas
as the driver of the taxicab suspiciously parked in
front of the Aguila Auto Glass shop. The officers
were bringing him with them to the police station
because of the questionable documents he showed
upon query. Subsequent inspection of the taxicab
yielded Enojas’ mobile phone that contained
messages which led to the entrapment and capture
of the other accused who were also taxicab drivers.
72
 2. Enojas fled during the commotion rather than
remain in the cab to go to the police station where
he was about to be taken for questioning, tending to
show that he had something to hide. He certainly did
not go to the police afterwards to clear up the
matter and claim his taxi.
3. PO2 Gregorio positively identified accused Gomez
as one of the men he saw running away from the
scene of the shooting.
4. The text messages identified "Kua Justin" as one
of those who engaged PO2 Pangilinan in the
shootout; the messages also referred to "Kua Justin"
as the one who was hit in such shootout and later
died in a hospital in Bacoor, Cavite. These messages
linked the other accused.
5. During the follow-up operations, the police
investigators succeeded in entrapping accused
Santos, Jalandoni, Enojas, and Gomez, who were all
named in the text messages.
6. The text messages sent to the phone recovered
from the taxi driven by Enojas clearly made
references to the 7-11 shootout and to the wounding
of "Kua Justin," one of the gunmen, and his
subsequent death.
7. The context of the messages showed that the
accused were members of an organized group of
taxicab drivers engaged in illegal activities.
8. Upon the arrest of the accused, they were found
in possession of mobile phones with call numbers
that corresponded to the senders of the messages
received on the mobile phone that accused Enojas
left in his taxicab.13
The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that
the aggravating circumstances of a) aid of armed men and b)
use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2
Pangilinan to murder. In "aid of armed men," the men act as
accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission
of the crime under the same purpose as the principal
accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals
or co-conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the
other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is not
among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder.14 Consequently, the accused in this case may be held
liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of unlicensed
firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.
As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC
admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions.15 Text messages are to be proved by the
testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has
personal knowledge of them.16 Here, PO3 Cambi, posing as
the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other
accused in order to identify and entrap them. As the
recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile
phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi had personal knowledge
of such messages and was competent to testify on them.
The accused lament that they were arrested without a valid
warrant of arrest.1âwphi1 But, assuming that this was so, it
cannot be a ground for acquitting them of the crime charged
but for rejecting any evidence that may have been taken
from them after an unauthorized search as an incident of an
unlawful arrest, a point that is not in issue here. At any rate,
a crime had been committed—the killing of PO2 Pangilinan—
and the investigating police officers had personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest had
committed it.17 The text messages to and from the mobile
phone left at the scene by accused Enojas provided strong
leads on the participation and identities of the accused.
Indeed, the police caught them in an entrapment using this
knowledge.
The award of damages by the courts below has to be
modified to conform to current jurisprudence.18
WHEREFORE, the Court MODIFIES the Court of Appeals
Decision of June 14, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC 03377. The Court
instead FINDS accused-appellants Noel Enojas y Hingpit,
Arnold Gomez y Fabregas, Fernando Santos y Delantar, and
Roger Jalandoni y Ari GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE
with the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the Court SENTENCES each of them to 12 years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The Court also MODIFIES the award
of exemplary damages by increasing it to ₱30,000.00, with
an additional ₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of
violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the
girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face
on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang
(Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria
Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and
reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service
(SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one
Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face
of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of
another woman making it to appear that it was said Irish
Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic
picture thereby causing substantial emotional anguish,
73
psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish
Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant
Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish
and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken
a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with
Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that
he did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish
rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed
to get hold of it and sent her text messages. Rustan used two
cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-
4769301 and 0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages
but it was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through
multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed
on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number,
stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the
numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in
Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for
him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the
internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in
text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my
chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng
chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who
referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan
to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria
Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After parking
it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers
intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and seized
his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While
Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he
shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of
Technology, testified as an expert in information technology
and computer graphics. He said that it was very much
possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture
and superimpose it on the body of another woman in another
picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by
computer to make it appear that the face and the body
belonged to just one person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had
two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to
the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the
picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the
picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how
this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to
a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began
visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation
lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after
their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in
December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at
that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked
out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking
him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help
in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two
police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the
contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police
station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because
Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s
number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.
Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the
prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone.
This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared
to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims
that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit
A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was
sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she
received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8)
that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She
did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman
in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear
naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in
Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she
was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and
7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The
RTC observed that she wept while recounting her
experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears
were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of
violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart.
The crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of
the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of
human nature and experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated
August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation
of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter
rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the
RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for
reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus,
Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused
Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish,
psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.
74
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed
between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in
R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like
the sending of the nude picture in this case, already
constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict
Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in
evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman
with whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute
violence against women and these include any form
of harassment that causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. – The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the
following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms
or causes substantial emotional or psychological
distress to the woman or her child. This shall
include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the
elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating
relationship" includes a situation where the parties are
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis
during the course of the relationship. Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two
individuals in a business or social context is not a dating
relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved,"
implies that the offender and the offended woman have or
had sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a
sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal
meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make
love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions
the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did
not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended
woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women
x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship.
Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while
Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child." The dating relationship that the law
contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish
and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time
and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from
October to December of 2003. That would be time enough
for nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is
a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that
the romantic relation between the two should be deemed
broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining
what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when
she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry
75
at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-
month romantic relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive
picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He
claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a
very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object
of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated
ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to
obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial
emotional or psychological distress. He claims having
previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that
she was already desensitized by them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife
give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim
that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself
(Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was
Irish since her face did not clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several
other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know
that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted the
pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time
to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted all
the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason
at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would have
been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures
remained in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it
for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous
to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the RTC
was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish
experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged
moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and
injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here,
the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and
bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture
and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any
woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would
be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a
picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish
testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in
the internet for all to see. That must have given her a
nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain
items were seized from him without any warrant, the
evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards
that the police officers seized from him at the time of his
arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to prove its
case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph
depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used,
which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial
conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him
consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene
picture and malicious text messages that the sender’s
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had
been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police
used such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess
Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not
have to present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to
prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text
messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was
harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her,
using his cellphone. But Rustan never presented the
cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the
messages to him to authenticate the same. The RTC did not
give credence to such version and neither will this Court.
Besides, it was most unlikely for Irish to pin the things on
Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish
through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic
signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he
should have objected to the admission of the picture on such
ground at the time it was offered in evidence. He should be
deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies
only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has
proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated
January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 172532 172544-45 November 20, 2013
PRIMO C. MIRO, in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas, Petitioner,
vs.
MARILYN MENDOZA VDA. DE EREDEROS, CATALINA
ALINGASA and PORFERIO I. MENDOZA,Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
decision2 dated November 22 2005 and the resolution3dated
April 21 2006 of the Court of Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. SP Nos.
83149 83150 and 83576.
76
The CA decision reversed and set aside the joint
decision4 dated January 9 2004 of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Visayas (Deputy Ombudsman), Primo C. Miro in OMB-V-A-
02-0414-H finding respondents Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de
Erederos Catalina Alingasa and Porferio I Mendoza guilty of
the administrative charge of Grave Misconduct. The Deputy
Ombudsman also found Oscar Peque guilty of Simple
Misconduct.
The Factual Antecedents
As culled from the records, the antecedents of the present
case are as follows:
Mendoza, Director of the Regional Office VII of the Land
Transportation Office, Cebu City (LTO Cebu), Erederos,
Mendoza's niece and secretary, Alingasa, LTO clerk, and
Peque, Officer-in-Charge, Operation Division of LTO Cebu,
were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct before
the Deputy Ombudsman by private complainants, namely:
Maricar G Huete (Liaison Officer of GCY Parts), Ernesto R
Cantillas (Liaison Officer of Isuzu Cebu, Inc.), Leonardo
Villaraso (General Manager of TBS Trading), and Romeo C.
Climaco (Corporate Secretary of Penta Star).5 They were
likewise charged with criminal complaints for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."
The administrative and criminal charges arose from the
alleged anomalies in the distribution at the LTO Cebu of
confirmation certificates, an indispensable requirement in
the processing of documents for the registration of motor
vehicle with the LTO.
Specifically, the private complainants accused Alingasa of
selling the confirmation certificates, supposed to be issued
by the LTO free of charge. This scheme allegedly existed
upon Mendoza's assumption in office as Regional Director of
LTO Cebu. They observed that:
(1) Confirmation certificates were sold for the
amount of ₱2,500.00 per pad without official
receipt;
(2) Alingasa would usually remit the collections to
Erederos who would, in turn, remit all the
collections to Mendoza;6
(3) The official receipt for the processing of the
confirmation certificates issued to the private
complainants acknowledged only the amount of
₱40.00 which they paid for each engine, chassis or
new vehicle, as MR. (Miscellaneous Receipt-LTO
Form 67);
(4) Said amount was separate and distinct from the
₱2,500.00 required to be paid for each pad;
(5) The official receipt also served as the basis for
the individual stock/sales reports evaluation of
Erederos;7and
(6) The confirmation certificates processed during
the previous administration were no longer honored;
thus, the private complainants were constrained to
reprocess the same by purchasing new ones.
The NBI/Progress report submitted to the LTO Manila also
revealed that the confirmation certificates were given to the
representatives of car dealers, who were authorized to
supply the needed data therein. In the Requisition and Issue
Voucher, it was Roque who received the forms. On August
19, 2002, Cantillas executed an Affidavit of Desi stance on
the ground that he was no longer interested in prosecuting
the case.
On September 25, 2002, the Deputy Ombudsman ordered the
respondents to file their respective counter-affidavits. The
respondents complied with the order and made the required
submission.
On December 12, 2002, the case was called for preliminary
conference. At the conference, the respondents, thru their
counsels, manifested their intention to submit the case for
decision on the basis of the evidence on record after the
submission of their memoranda/position papers.
In the interim, additional administrative and criminal
complaints for the same charges were filed by Rova
Carmelotes (Liaison Officer of ZC Trading Center), Mildred
Regidor (Liaison Officer of Grand Ace Commercial), Estrella
dela Cerna (Liaison Officer of JRK Automotive Supply), and
Vevencia Pedroza (Liaison Officer of Winstar Motor Sales)
against the respondents. These new complaints were
consolidated with the complaints already then pending.
In their complaints, the new complainants commonly alleged
that they had to pay ₱2,500.00 per pad to Alingasa before
they could be issued confirmation certificates by the LTO
Cebu. Alingasa would give her collections to Erederos and to
Mendoza. When they protested, Erederos and Alingasa
pointed to Mendoza as the source of the instructions. They
were also told that the confirmation certificates processed
during the previous administration would no longer be
honored under Mendoza s administration; hence, they had to
buy new sets of confirmation certificates to process the
registration of their motor vehicles with the LTO.
In his counter-affidavit, Mendoza vehemently denied the
accusations. He alleged that the confirmation certificates
actual distribution and processing were assigned to Alingasa;
the processing entails the payment of ₱40.00 per
confirmation certificate, as administrative fee; payment is
only made when the confirmation certificates are filled up
and submitted for processing with the LTO, not upon
issuance; and he did not give any instructions to impose
additional fees for their distribution.
He also alleged that the case against him was instigated by
Assistant Secretary Roberto T. Lastimosa of the LTO Head
Office so that a certain Atty. Manuel I way could replace him
as Regional Director of the L TO Cebu.8
Mendoza additionally submitted the affidavits of desistance
of Carmelotes and Dela Cerna. Carmelotes testified that she
has no evidence to support her allegations against Mendoza.
Dela Cerna, on the other hand, stated that she was merely
told to sign a document which turned out to be an affidavit-
complaint against the respondents. Subsequently, however,
Dela Cerna executed a second affidavit, retracting her
previous statements and narrating how she was threatened
by Peque to sign an affidavit of desistance (1st affidavit).
77
Erederos and Alingasa commonly contended that they did not
collect, demand and receive any money from the
complainants as payment for the confirmation certificates.
Erederos stated that the case against her was initiated by
Huete because she found several discrepancies in the
documents she had processed. According to her, the present
case was Huete s ploy to avoid any liability.
For their part, Alingasa stressed that her act of maintaining a
control book for the releases of the confirmation certificate
pads negates her liability, while Peque denied any
participation in the distribution and sale of the confirmation
certificates.
On January 9, 2004, the Deputy Ombudsman rendered a joint
decision on the administrative aspect of the cases filed
against the respondents, and a joint resolution on the
criminal aspect of the cases.
The Deputy Ombudsman s Ruling
In its joint decision, the Deputy Ombudsman found Mendoza,
Erederos and Alingasa guilty of grave misconduct and
imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. Peque, on
the other hand, was only found guilty of simple misconduct
and was meted the penalty of reprimand.
The Deputy Ombudsman believed the complainants
allegations that Alingasa collected ₱2,500.00 for the issuance
of confirmation certificates and, thereafter, remitted the
collections to Erederos and to Mendoza. He relied largely on
the affidavits supporting the respondents guilt. He found the
affidavits and the NBI/Progress report strong enough to
establish the respondents guilt. The Deputy Ombudsman also
explained that while the distribution of confirmation
certificates to authorized car dealers is not prohibited, the
demand and the collection of payment during their
distribution are anomalous.
The respondents separately moved for reconsideration, but
the Deputy Ombudsman denied their motions on March 5,
2004.9
The respondents separately appealed to the CA to challenge
the rulings against them.
The CA’s Ruling
On November 22, 2005, the CA granted the respondents
petition and reversed the Deputy Ombudsman s joint decision
in the administrative aspect. The CA ruled that the Deputy
Ombudsman s finding of grave misconduct was not supported
by substantial evidence because the affidavits, on which the
decision was mainly anchored, were not corroborated by any
other documentary evidence. Additionally, the affiants did
not appear during the scheduled hearings. The CA also found
that the affiants failed to categorically specify that the
respondents personally demanded from them the payment of
₱2,500.00 -an allegation that the appellate court deemed
material in establishing their personal knowledge. Without
this allegation of personal knowledge, the CA held that the
statements in the affidavits were hearsay and, thus, should
not be given any evidentiary weight. The dispositive portion
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the
consolidated petitions are GRANTED and accordingly the
assailed Joint Decision dated January 9, 2004 (administrative
aspect of the cases filed by the private respondents) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the administrative charges against petitioners
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
With respect to the assailed Joint Resolution also dated
January 9, 2004 (criminal aspect) issued by the public
respondent, this Court has no jurisdiction to review the
same.10
The Deputy Ombudsman moved for the reconsideration of
the decision, but the CA denied the motion in its resolution
of April 21, 2006. The denial led to the filing of the present
petition.
The Petitioner’s Arguments
The Deputy Ombudsman posits that the evidence adduced by
the complainants satisfied the requisite quantum of proof.
He argues that the complainants personal knowledge can be
gleaned from the preface of their narration; hence, their
affidavits could not have been hearsay. Their affidavits read:
3. That in doing my job, I have noticed and witnessed the
following anomalies concerning the processing of vehicle
registration, x x x, as follows:
a. That in order to secure the forms of Confirmation
of Certificates, you have to buy the same at the
present price of ₱2,500.00 per pad from Catalina
Alingasa, an L TO personnel, who will remit her
collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza Vda. de
Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional
Director, Porferio Mendoza;
b. That Confirmation Certificates processed during
previous administration would not be honored and
under such situations, they would require that the
same be reprocessed which means that we have to
buy and use the new forms supplied by the present
administration.11
The Deputy Ombudsman also argues that his joint decision
was not solely based on the complainants affidavits since he
also took into account the NBI/Progress report, which
uncovered the alleged anomalies. He posits that these pieces
of evidence, taken together, more than satisfy the required
quantum of proof to hold the respondents administratively
liable for grave misconduct.
The Case for the Respondents
In their respective comments, the respondents separately
argue that the complainants statements in their affidavits
lack material details and particulars, particularly on the
time, the date, and the specific transactions.
They commonly alleged that the affidavits, which contained
general averments, and the NBI/Progress report that was
based on the same affidavits, failed to meet the quantum of
proof required to hold them administratively liable.
For his part, Mendoza argues that since the affidavits failed
to categorically state that the complainants personally
78
witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos
and eventually to him, his participation in the anomalous
scheme has not been sufficiently shown; hence, he should
not have been found liable.
The Issue
The case presents to us the issue of whether the CA
committed a reversible error in dismissing the administrative
charge against the respondents.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition. The CA committed no reversible error
in setting aside the findings and conclusions of the Deputy
Ombudsman on the ground that they were not supported by
substantial evidence.
Doctrine of conclusiveness of administrative findings of fact
is not absolute
It is well settled that findings of fact by the Office of the
Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by substantial
evidence.12 Their factual findings are generally accorded
with great weight and respect, if not finality by the courts,
by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction.
This rule was reiterated in Cabalit v. Commission on Audit-
Region VII,13 where we held that: When the findings of fact
of the Ombudsman are supported by substantial evidence, it
should be considered as conclusive. This Court recognizes the
expertise and independence of the Ombudsman and will
avoid interfering with its findings absent a finding of grave
abuse of discretion. Hence, being supported by substantial
evidence, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of
the Ombudsman which are affirmed by the CA.
This rule on conclusiveness of factual findings, however, is
not an absolute one. Despite the respect given to
administrative findings of fact, the CA may resolve factual
issues, review and re-evaluate the evidence on record and
reverse the administrative agency s findings if not supported
by substantial evidence. Thus, when the findings of fact by
the administrative or quasi-judicial agencies (like the Office
of the Ombudsman/Deputy Ombudsman) are not adequately
supported by substantial evidence, they shall not be binding
upon the courts.14
In the present case, the CA found no substantial evidence to
support the conclusion that the respondents are guilty of the
administrative charges against them. Mere allegation and
speculation is not evidence, and is not equivalent to
proof.15 Since the Deputy Ombudsman’s findings were found
wanting by the CA of substantial evidence, the same shall
not bind this Court.
Parameters of a judicial review under a Rule 45 petition
a. Rule 45 petition is limited to questions of law
Before proceeding to the merits of the case, this Court
deems it necessary to emphasize that a petition for review
under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law. Factual
questions are not the proper subject of an appeal by
certiorari. This Court will not review facts, as it is not our
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already
considered in the proceedings below. As held in Diokno v.
Hon. Cacdac,16 a re-examination of factual findings is outside
the province of a petition for review on certiorari to wit:
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings
cannot be done through a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because as earlier stated,
this Court is not a trier of facts. xxx The Supreme Court is
not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence
considered in the proceedings below. This is already outside
the province of the instant Petition for Certiorari.
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference
arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts; a
question of fact, on the other hand, exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of the alleged
facts.17 Unless the case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions, we are limited solely to the review of legal
questions.18
b. Rule 45 petition is limited to errors of the appellate court
Furthermore, the "errors" which we may review in a petition
for review on certiorari are those of the CA, and not directly
those of the trial court or the quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
or officer which rendered the decision in the first
instance.19 It is imperative that we refrain from conducting
further scrutiny of the findings of fact made by trial courts,
lest we convert this Court into a trier of facts. As held in
Reman Recio v. Heirs of the Spouses Agueda and Maria
Altamirano etc. et al.20 our review is limited only to the
errors of law committed by the appellate court, to wit:
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, jurisdiction is generally
limited to the review of errors of law committed by the
appellate court. The Supreme Court is not obliged to review
all over again the evidence which the parties adduced in the
court a quo. Of course, the general rule admits of
exceptions, such as where the factual findings of the CA and
the trial court are conflicting or contradictory.
In Montemayor v. Bundalian,21 this Court laid down the
guidelines for the judicial review of decisions rendered by
administrative agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial
powers, as follows:
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by
substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise. Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of
the executive branch of the government, the findings of facts
made therein are to be respected so long as they are
supported by substantial evidence. Hence, it is not for the
reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine
the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise substitute its
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect
to the sufficiency of evidence.
Third, administrative decisions in matters within the
executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles
negate the power of the reviewing court to re-examine the
sufficiency of the evidence in an administrative case as if
originally instituted therein, and do not authorize the court
79
to receive additional evidence that was not submitted to the
administrative agency concerned. [emphases ours]
The present petition directly raises, as issue, the propriety of
the CA s reversal of the Deputy Ombudsman s decision that
found the respondents guilty of grave misconduct. While this
issue may be one of law, its resolution also requires us to
resolve the underlying issue of whether or not substantial
evidence exists to hold the respondents liable for the charge
of grave misconduct. The latter question is one of fact, but a
review is warranted considering the conflicting findings of
fact of the Deputy Ombudsman and of the CA. Accordingly,
we now focus on and assess the findings of fact of the Deputy
Ombudsman and of the CA for their merits.
The Deputy Ombudsman’s appreciation of evidence
The Deputy Ombudsman found the respondents guilty of
grave misconduct based on the affidavits submitted by the
complainants and the NBI/Progress report. In giving credence
to the affidavits, the Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the
complainants have amply established their accusations by
substantial evidence.
The CA’s appreciation of evidence
The CA, on the other hand, reversed the Deputy Ombudsman
s findings and ruled that no substantial evidence exists to
support the latter’s decision as the affidavits upon which said
decision was based are hearsay evidence. It found that the
affidavits lack the important element of personal knowledge
and were not supported by corroborating evidence.
We agree with the CA. The findings of fact of the Deputy
Ombudsman are not supported by substantial evidence on
record.
Substantial evidence, quantum of proof in administrative
cases
Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence.22 The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied
when there is reasonable ground to believe, based on the
evidence submitted, that the respondent is responsible for
the misconduct complained of. It need not be overwhelming
or preponderant, as is required in an ordinary civil case,23 or
evidence beyond reasonable doubt, as is required in criminal
cases, but the evidence must be enough for a reasonable
mind to support a conclusion.
Section 27 of The Ombudsman Act of 198924 provides that:
Findings of fact by the Officer of the Ombudsman when
supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure
or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's
salary shall be final and unappealable. [emphasis ours]
The only pieces of evidence presented by the complainants
to establish the respondents' guilt of the act charged are: (1)
their complaint-affidavits and the (2) NBl/Progress report. As
correctly found by the CA, these pieces of evidence do not
meet the quantum of proof required in administrative cases.
The Evidence Against Mendoza, Erederos and Alingasa
i. Private complainants affidavits
The affidavits show that the complainants lack personal
knowledge of the participation of Mendoza and Erederos in
the allegedly anomalous act. These affidavits indicate that
the complainants have commonly noticed and witnessed the
anomalous sale transaction concerning the confirmation
certificates. Without going into details, they uniformly allege
that to secure the confirmation certificates, an amount of
₱2,500.00 would be paid to Alingasa, an L TO personnel,
"who will remit her collections to a certain Marilyn Mendoza
vda. Erederos, a niece and the Secretary of the Regional
Director, Porferio Mendoza."25 While the payment to Alingasa
might be considered based on personal knowledge, the
alleged remittance to Erederos and Mendoza -on its face - is
hearsay.
Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of he
witness
It is a basic rule in evidence that a witness can testify only
on the facts that he knows of his own Rersonal knowledge,
i.e. those which are derived from his own perception.26 A
witness may not testify on what he merely learned, read or
heard from others because such testimony is considered
hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of
what he has learned, read or heard.27 Hearsay evidence is
evidence, not of what the witness knows himself but, of
what he has heard from others; it is not only limited to oral
testimony or statements but likewise applies to written
statements, such as affidavits.28
The records show that not one of the complainants actually
witnessed the transfer of money from Alingasa to Erederos
and Mendoza. Nowhere in their affidavits did they
specifically allege that they saw Alingasa remit the
collections to Erederos. In fact, there is no specific
allegation that they saw or witnessed Erederos or Mendoza
receive money. That the complainants alleged in the preface
of their affidavits that they "noticed and witnessed" the
anomalous act complained of does not take their statements
out of the coverage of the hearsay evidence rule. Their
testimonies are still "evidence not of what the witness knows
himself but of what he has heard from others."29 Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute
substantial evidence.30
The affidavits also show that the complainants did not allege
any specific act of the respondents. All that the affidavits
allege is a description of the allegedly anomalous scheme
and the arrangement whereby payments were to be made to
Alingasa. There is no averment relating to any "personal
demand" for the amount of ₱2,500.00.
Based on these considerations, we cannot conclude that the
complainants have personal knowledge of Erederos' and
Mendoza's participation in the anomalous act. At most, their
personal knowledge only extends to the acts of Alingasa who
is the recipient of all payments for the processing of
confirmation certificates. This situation, however, is
affected by the complainants' failure to specify Alingasa's act
of personally demanding ₱2,500.00 -a crucial element in
determining her guilt or innocence of the grave misconduct
charged.
80
With respect to Pedroza's allegation in her affidavit31 that
Alingasa and Erederos categorically told them that it was
Mendoza who instructed them to collect the ₱2,500.00 for
the confirmation certificates, we once again draw a
distinction between utterances or testimonies that are
merely hearsay in character or "non-hearsay," and those that
are considered as legal hearsay.
Non-hearsay v. legal hearsay, distinction
To the former belongs the fact that utterances or statements
were made; this class of extrajudicial utterances or
statements is offered not s an assertion to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, but only as to the fact of the utterance
made. The latter class, on the other hand, consists of the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement; this kind
pertains to extrajudicial utterances and statements that are
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted.
The difference between these two classes of utterances lies
in the applicability of the rule on exclusion of hearsay
evidence. The first class, i.e. the fact that the statement
was made, is not covered by the hearsay rule, while the
second class, i.e. the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, is covered by the hearsay rule. Pedroza's
allegation belongs to the first class; hence, it is inadmissible
to prove the truth of the facts asserted in the statement.
The following discussion, made m Patula v. People of the
Philippines32 is particularly instructive:
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a
human utterance is offered as evidence of the truth of the
fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes the basis of
inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received s
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to
the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial
utterance is offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter
asserted but without reference to the truth of the matter
asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a
slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard
the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this
testimony is admissible not to prove that the complainant
was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused
uttered those words. This kind of utterance is hearsay in
character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction is,
therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was
made, to which the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the
truth of the facts asserted in the statement, to which the
hearsay rule applies. [citations omitted]
Failure to identify the affidavits renders them inadmissible
under the hearsay evidence rule
We additionally note that the affidavits were never
identified by the complainants. All the allegations contained
therein were likewise uncorroborated by evidence, other
than the NBI/Progress report.
In Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,33 we had the
occasion to rule on the implications of the affiants' failure to
appear during the preliminary investigation and to identify
their respective sworn statements, to wit:
Notably, the instant administrative complaint was resolved
by the Ombudsman merely on the basis of the evidence
extant in the record of OMB-ADM-0-94-0983. The preliminary
conference required under Republic Act No. 6770 was
dispensed with after the nominal complainant, then BID
Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma, manifested on
July 29, 1996 that he was submitting the case for resolution
on the basis of the documents on record while the petitioner
agreed to simply file his memorandum. Consequently, the
only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman
dismissing the petitioner from the government service was
the unverified complaint-affidavit of Walter H. Beck and that
of his alleged witness, Purisima Terencio.
A thorough review of the records, however, showed that the
subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were not even
identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding
investigation conducted by the BID Resident Ombudsman at
the BID office in Manila. Neither did they appear during the
preliminary investigation to identify their respective sworn
statements despite prior notice before the investigating
officer who subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of
the case upon finding that the charge against the petitioner
"was not supported by any evidence." Hence, Beck's affidavit
is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis alone,
the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the
Ombudsman should have dismissed the administrative
complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.
(emphasis supplied)
For the affiants' failure to identify their sworn statements,
and considering the seriousness of the charges filed, their
affidavits must not be accepted at face value and should be
treated as inadmissible under the hearsay evidence rule.
ii. NBI/Progress report
With regard to the NBI/Progress report submitted by the
complainants as corroborating evidence, the same should not
be given any weight. Contrary to the Ombudsman's
assertions, the report cannot help its case under the
circumstances of this case as it is insufficient to serve as
substantial basis. The pertinent portion of this report reads:
04. P/Sinsp. JESUS KABIGTING and Senior TRO ALFONSO
ALIANZA visited JAGNA District Office at Jagna, Bohol
wherein they were able to conduct interview with MR.
RODOLFO SANTOS, Officer-In-Charge who has assumed his
new post only in February 2002. During the conduct of the
interview, Mr. SANTOS revealed that the anomalous Dos-por-
Dos transactions have been prevented and eliminated when
the previous District Manager in the person of Mr. LEONARDO
G. OLAIVAR, who was transferred to Tagbilaran District
Office allegedly on a floating status and under the direct
control and supervision of its District Manager, Mr. GA VINO
PADEN, Mr. SANTOS allegations of the existence of "Dos-por-
Dos" transactions were supported by the records/documents
gathered of which the signatures of Mr. OLAIVAR affixed
thereof. Copies are hereto attached marked as Annexes D-D-
6.
xxxx
06. Submitted Affidavits of Ms. MARICAR G. HUETE, a
resident of Lahug, Cebu City and liaison Officer of GCY Parts,
Kabancalan Mandaue City and Mr. ERNESTO R. CARTILLAS a
resident of Basak, Mandaue City and liaison Officer of Isuzu
Cebu, Inc. in Jagobiao, Mandaue City stated among others
and both attested that: Annexes "E-E-1."
In order to secure the forms of Confirmation of Certificates,
you have to buy the same at the present cost of ₱2,500.00
81
per pad from CATALINA ALINGASA, an LTO Personnel, who
will remit her collections to a certain MARILYN MENDOZA V
da De EREDEROS, a niece and secretary of the Regional
Director, PORFERIO MENDOZA.34
This quoted portion shows that it was based on complainant
Huete's and Cantillas' affidavits. It constitutes double hearsay
because the material facts recited were not within the
personal knowledge of the officers who conducted the
investigation. As held in Africa, et al. v. Caltex Phil.) Inc., et
al.,35 reports of investigations made by law enforcement
officers or other public officials are hearsay unless they fall
within the scope of Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, to wit: The first question before Us refers to the
admissibility of certain reports on the fire prepared by the
Manila Police and Fire Departments and by a certain Captain
Tinio of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. xxx.
xxxx
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule
just mentioned: (a) that the entry was made by a public
officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the
performance of his duties, or by such other person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and (c) that
the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge
of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired
by him personally or through official information. (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1957] p. 383.)
Of the three requisites just stated, only the last need be
considered here. Obviously the material facts recited in the
reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were
not within the personal knowledge of the officers who
conducted the investigation. Was knowledge of such facts,
however, acquired by them through official information? xxx.
The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the
hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by
the reporting officers through official information, not having
been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so.
[emphases ours]
The NBI/Progress report, having been submitted by the
officials in the performance of their duties not on the basis
of their own personal observation of the facts reported but
merely on the basis of the complainants affidavits, is
hearsay. Thus, the Deputy Ombudsman cannot rely on it.
Non-applicability of strict technical rules of procedure in
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies is not a license to
disregard certain fundamental evidentiary rules
While administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, such as the
Office of the Ombudsman, are not bound by the technical
rules of procedure, this rule cannot be taken as a license to
disregard fundamental evidentiary rules; the decision of the
administrative agencies and the evidence it relies upon must,
at the very least, be substantial. that:
In Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company v. Dumapis,36 we
ruled that:
While it is true that administrative or quasi-judicial bodies
like the NLRC are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure in the adjudication of cases, this procedural rule
should not be construed as a license to disregard certain
fundamental evidentiary rules. The evidence presented must
at least have a modicum of admissibility for it to have
probative value. Not only must there be some evidence to
support a finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
substantial. Substantial evidence is more than a mere
scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Conclusion
With a portion of the complainants affidavits and the
NBI/Progress report being hearsay evidence, the only
question that remains is whether the respondents conduct,
based on the evidence on record, amounted to grave
misconduct, warranting their dismissal in office.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer.37 The misconduct is
considered as grave if it involves additional elements such as
corruption or willful intent to violate the law or to disregard
established rules, which must be proven by substantial
evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.
Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in
the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and
wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some
benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty
and the rights of others.38
Based on these rulings, the Deputy Ombudsman failed to
establish the elements of grave misconduct.1âwphi1 To
reiterate, no substantial evidence exists to show that
Erederos and Mendoza received collected payments from
Alingasa Their involvement or complicity in the allegedly
anomalous scheme cannot be justified under the affidavits of
the complainants and the NBI/Progress report, which are
both hearsay.
With respect to Alingasa, in view of the lack of substantial
evidence showing that she personally demanded the payment
of ₱2,500.00 – a crucial factor in the wrongdoing alleged –
we find that the elements of misconduct, simple or grave, to
be wanting and unproven.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the
assailed decision dated November 22, 2005 and the
resolution dated April 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP Nos. 83149, 83150 and 83576.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 204894, March 10, 2014 -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NOEL
ENOJAS Y HINGPIT, ARNOLD GOMEZ Y
FABREGAS, FERNANDO SANTOS Y
DELANTAR, AND ROGER JALANDONI Y ARI
 Ferrer vs. Carganillo, G.R. No. 170956,
May 12, 2010
 Reyes vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 207264,
October 22, 2013

E. Classification of Evidence
F. Admissibility of Evidence
82
 Requisites of Admissibility
Types of Admissibility
G. Exclusionary Rules
 Tan v. Hosana, 3 February 2016, Brion,
J.
[A.C. No. 5151. October 19, 2004] PEDRO G. TOLENTINO,
ROMEO M. LAYGO, SOLOMON M. LUMALANG, SR., MELITON
D. EVANGELISTA, SR., and NELSON B.
MELGAR, complainants, vs. ATTY. NORBERTO M.
MENDOZA, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino,
Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M. Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D.
Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto
M. Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross
Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that
respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court Judge, abandoned
his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour,
Marilyn dela Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G.
Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente have been
cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy.
Estrella, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered
two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente; respondent
and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of
their two daughters that they were married on May 12, 1986,
making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while
in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the
COMELEC during the 1995 elections, respondent declared that
his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of
candidacy for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status
as separated; such declarations in the birth certificates of his
children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts
constituting falsification of public documents; and
respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and
constitute grounds for his removal as a member of the bar.
Respondent filed his Comment wherein he states that
complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro, are merely filing this case to exact revenge
on him for his filing of criminal charges against them;
complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates
of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such
documents are inadmissible in evidence; respondent did not
participate in the preparation and submission with the local
civil registry of subject birth certificates; respondent never
declared that he had two wives, as he has always declared
that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia;
and complainants have used this issue against him during
elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still
elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the
publics sense of morality.
The administrative case was referred to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. Thereafter, the Commission on
Bar Discipline of the IBP conducted hearings.
Witnesses for complainants, Nelson B. Melgar and Romeo
M. Laygo, submitted their affidavits as their direct testimony
and were subjected to cross-examination by respondents
counsel.
Witness Nelson B. Melgar declares in his affidavit as
follows: He knows respondent for they both reside in Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro. Respondent is known as a practicing lawyer
and a former Municipal Trial Court Judge. Respondent has
been cohabiting openly and publicly with Marilyn dela Fuente,
representing themselves to be husband and wife, and from
their cohabitation, they produced two children, namely, Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza. Sometime in 1995, he (witness
Melgar) received a letter from a concerned citizen, informing
him that respondent was married to Felicitas Valderia of San
Rafael, Bulacan, on January 16, 1980, but respondent
abandoned his wife to cohabit with Marilyn dela Fuente.
Attached to the letter was a photocopy of a Certification
issued by the Civil Register attesting to the marriage between
respondent and Felicitas Valderia. He also received
information from concerned citizens that Marilyn dela Fuente
is also legally married to one Ramon G. Marcos, as evidenced
by a Certification from the Office of the Civil Register.
Respondent stated in his Certificate of Candidacy filed with
the COMELEC in 1995 that he is still legally married to Felicitas
Valderia. In respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with
the COMELEC in 1998, he declared his civil status as separated.
Respondent has represented to all that he is married to Marilyn
dela Fuente. In the Naujanews, a local newspaper where
respondent holds the position of Chairman of the Board of the
Editorial Staff, respondent was reported by said newspaper as
husband to Marilyn dela Fuente and the father of Mara Khrisna
Charmina and Myrra Khrisna Normina.
On cross-examination, witness Melgar testified as
follows: He was the former mayor of Naujan and he and
respondent belong to warring political parties. It was not
respondent who told him about the alleged immoral conduct
subject of the present case. Although he received the letter
of a concerned citizen regarding the immoral conduct of
respondent as far back as 1995, he did not immediately file a
case for disbarment against respondent. It was only after
respondent filed a criminal case for falsification against him
that he decided to file an administrative case against
respondent.[1]
On re-direct examination, witness Melgar testified that
there were people who were against the open relationship
between respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente as respondent
had been publicly introducing the latter as his wife despite the
fact that they are both still legally married to other persons,
and so someone unknown to him just handed to their maid
copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina and
Myrra Khrisna Normina.[2]
The affidavit of Mr. Romeo M. Laygo, which was adopted
as his direct testimony, is practically identical to that of
witness Melgar. On cross-examination, witness Laygo testified
that he was not the one who procured the certified true copies
of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente
Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, as
somebody just gave said documents to Nelson Melgar. He was
a municipal councilor in 1995 when the letter of a concerned
citizen regarding respondents immorality was sent to Melgar,
but he did not take any action against respondent at that
time.[3]
Complainants then formally offered documentary
evidence consisting of photocopies which were admitted by
respondents counsel to be faithful reproductions of the
originals or certified true copies thereof, to wit: a letter of
one Luis Bermudez informing Nelson Melgar of respondents
83
immoral acts,[4] the Certification of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Rafael, Bulacan, attesting to the celebration of the
marriage between respondent and one Felicitas
Valderia,[5] the Birth Certificate of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza,[6] the Birth Certificate of Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza,[7] the Certificate of Candidacy
of respondent dated March 9, 1995,[8] the Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent dated March 25, 1998,[9] Certification
issued by the Civil Registrar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro dated
October 27, 1998, attesting to the marriage celebrated
between Marilyn dela Fuente and Ramon Marcos,[10] and the
editorial page of the Naujanews (February-March 1999
issue),[11] wherein it was stated that respondent has two
daughters with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.
Respondent, on the other hand, opted not to present any
evidence and merely submitted a memorandum expounding on
his arguments that the testimonies of complainants witnesses
are mere hearsay, thus, said testimonies and their
documentary evidence have no probative weight.
On February 27, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP
passed Resolution No. XVI-2004-123, reading as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case,
herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding
the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering
respondents violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice of law
until he submits satisfactory proof that he is no longer
cohabiting with a woman who is not his wife and has
abandoned such immoral course of conduct.
Portions of the report and recommendation of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, upon which the above-quoted
Resolution was based, read as follows:
FINDINGS:
The evidence of complainants to support their charge of
immorality consists in a) the testimonies of Nelson Melgar
and Romeo Laygo given by way of affidavits executed under
oath and affirmed before the Commission and b) their
documentary evidence consisting of their Exhibits A to H.
Respondent filed his comment through counsel and did not
formally present or offer any evidence. Respondent opted
not to present his evidence anymore because according to
him there is none to rebut vis--vis the evidence presented by
the private complainants. Respondent instead submitted a
memorandum through counsel to argue his position. As can
be seen from the comment and memorandum submitted,
respondents counsel argues that the complaint is politically
motivated since complainants are political rivals of
respondent and that the birth certificates Exhibits D and D-1
which were offered to show that respondent sired the
children namely Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza
and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza out of his
cohabitation with Marilyn dela Fuente are inadmissible
because they were allegedly secured in violation of
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993. The rest of the
exhibits are either hearsay or self-serving according to
respondent.
The witnesses who are also two of the complainants herein,
on the other hand, categorically state in their affidavits
[Exhibits A and B] particularly in paragraph 2 that
Respondent has been cohabiting openly and publicly with
Marilyn de la Fuente, representing themselves to be husband
and wife. In paragraph 10 of said affidavits the witnesses also
categorically state that respondent has even represented to
all and sundry that Marilyn de la Fuente is his wife. These
categorical statements made under oath by complainants are
not hearsay and remain un-rebutted. Respondent chose not
to rebut them.
Exhibit E, the Certificate of Candidacy executed by
respondent shows that respondent is married to one,
Felicitas V. Valderia. As shown by Exhibit H, a marriage
certificate, Marilyn de la Fuente is married to one, Ramon G.
Marcos. Duly certified true copies of said exhibits have been
presented by complainants.
With respect to Exhibits D and D-1, we believe that they are
competent and relevant evidence and admissible in this
proceedings. The exclusionary rule which bars admission of
illegally obtained evidence applies more appropriately to
evidence obtained as a result of illegal searches and
seizures. The instant case cannot be analogous to an illegal
search or seizure. A person who violates Rule 24 of
Administrative Order No. 1 Series of 1993 as cited by
respondent risks the penalty of imprisonment or payment of
a fine but it does not make the document so issued
inadmissible as evidence specially in proceedings like the
present case. Exhibits D and D-1 which are duly certified
birth certificates are therefore competent evidence to show
paternity of said children by respondent in the absence of
any evidence to the contrary.
By and large the evidence of complainants consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses Nelson Melgar and Romeo Laygo,
and corroborated by the documentary exhibits will show that
indeed respondent has been cohabiting publicly with a
certain Marilyn de la Fuente who is not his wife and that out
of said cohabitation respondent sired two children. These
facts we repeat have not been denied by respondent under
oath since he chose to just argue on the basis of the
improper motivations and the inadmissibility, hearsay and
self-serving nature of the documents presented.
Complainants have presented evidence sufficient enough to
convince us that indeed respondent has been cohabiting
publicly with a person who is not his wife. The evidence
taken together will support the fact that respondent is not of
good moral character. That respondent chose not to deny
under oath the grave and serious allegations made against
him is to our mind his undoing and his silence has not helped
his position before the Commission. As between the
documents and positive statements of complainants, made
under oath and the arguments and comments of respondent
submitted through his lawyers, which were not verified under
oath by respondent himself, we are inclined and so give
weight to the evidence of complainants. The direct and
forthright testimonies and statements of Nelson Melgar and
Romeo Laygo that respondent was openly cohabiting with
Marilyn de la Fuente is not hearsay. The witnesses may have
admitted that respondent Mendoza did not tell them that a
certain Marilyn de la Fuente was his paramour (for why
would respondent admit that to complainants) but the
witnesses did state clearly in their affidavits under oath that
respondent was cohabiting with Marilyn de la Fuente who is
not respondents wife. Again their categorical statements
taken together with the other documents, are enough to
convince us and conclude that respondent is not of good
moral character.
84
Members of the Bar have been repeatedly reminded that
possession of good moral character is a continuing condition
for membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued
possession of good moral character is a requisite condition
for remaining in the practice of law [Mortel vs. Aspiras 100
Phil. 586 (1956); Cordova vs. Cordova 179 SCRA 680
(1989); People vs. Tuanda 181 SCRA 682 (1990)]. The moral
delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar
to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the
generally accepted moral standards of the community,
conduct for instance, which makes mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage [Mijares vs. Villaluz 274 SCRA 1
(1997)].
In the instant case respondent has disregarded and made a
mockery of the fundamental institution of marriage.
Respondent in fact even so stated in Exhibit F that he is
separated from his wife. This fact and statement without any
further explanation from respondent only contributes to the
blot in his moral character which good moral character we
repeat is a continuing condition for a member to remain in
good standing. Under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Respondent has
violated this rule against engaging in immoral conduct.
We agree, as cited by the respondent, with the
pronouncement made in Santos vs. Dischoso, 84 SCRA 622
(1978) that courts should not be used by private persons
particularly disgruntled opponents to vent their rancor on
members of the Bar through unjust and unfounded
accusations. However, in the instant case the charges can
hardly be considered as unfounded or unjust based on the
evidence presented. The evidence presented shows that
respondent no longer possess (sic) that good moral character
necessary as a condition for him to remain a member of the
Bar in good standing. He is therefore not entitled to continue
to engage in the practice of law.
We find such report and recommendation of the IBP to be
fully supported by the pleadings and evidence on record, and,
hence, approve and adopt the same.
The evidence presented by complainants reach that
quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings
which is only substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conviction.[12]
Witness Melgars testimony that respondent had been
publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is
corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews,
introducing respondent as one of Naujans public servants, and
stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two
beautiful children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente.[13] It
should be noted that said publication is under the control of
respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof.
Thus, it could be reasonably concluded that if he contested
the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews,
or if he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as
his wife, he could have easily ordered that the damning
portions of said article to be edited out.
With regard to respondents argument that the credibility
of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that
they are motivated by revenge for respondents filing of
criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses
Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their
testimonies cannot be discounted as they are fully supported
and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for
themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina
dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente
Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990,
respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela
Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records
of an entry of a marriage between respondent and one
Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts
contained therein, as provided for under Article 410[14] of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent mistakenly argues that the birth certificates
of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988
and May 22, 1990, respectively, to Norberto M. Mendoza and
Marilyn Dela Fuente, are inadmissible in evidence for having
been obtained in violation of Rule 24, Administrative Order
No. 1, series of 1993, which provides as follows:
Rule 24. Non-Disclosure of Birth Records.
(1) The records of a persons birth shall be kept
strictly confidential and no information relating
thereto shall be issued except on the request of
any of the following:
a. the concerned person himself, or any person
authorized by him;
b. the court or proper public official whenever
absolutely necessary in administrative, judicial
or other official proceedings to determine the
identity of the childs parents or other
circumstances surrounding his birth; and
c. in case of the persons death, the nearest of kin.
(2) Any person violating the prohibition shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of at least two
months or a fine in an amount not exceeding five
hundred pesos, or both in the discretion of the
court. (Article 7, P.D. 603)
Section 3, Rule 128 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides that evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the
issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. There could
be no dispute that the subject birth certificates are relevant
to the issue. The only question, therefore, is whether the law
or the rules provide for the inadmissibility of said birth
certificates allegedly for having been obtained in violation of
Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993.
Note that Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993 only provides for sanctions against persons violating the
rule on confidentiality of birth records, but nowhere does it
state that procurement of birth records in violation of said rule
would render said records inadmissible in evidence. On the
other hand, the Revised Rules of Evidence only provides for
the exclusion of evidence if it is obtained as a result of illegal
searches and seizures. It should be emphasized, however, that
said rule against unreasonable searches and seizures is meant
only to protect a person from interference by the government
or the state.[15] In People vs. Hipol,[16] we explained that:
The Constitutional proscription enshrined in the Bill of Rights
does not concern itself with the relation between a private
individual and another individual. It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State and its agents. The Bill
of Rights only tempers governmental power and protects the
individual against any aggression and unwarranted
85
interference by any department of government and its
agencies. Accordingly, it cannot be extended to the acts
complained of in this case. The alleged warrantless search
made by Roque, a co-employee of appellant at the treasurers
office, can hardly fall within the ambit of the constitutional
proscription on unwarranted searches and seizures.
Consequently, in this case where complainants, as
private individuals, obtained the subject birth records as
evidence against respondent, the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply.
Since both Rule 24, Administrative Order No. 1, series of
1993 and the Revised Rules on Evidence do not provide for the
exclusion from evidence of the birth certificates in question,
said public documents are, therefore, admissible and should
be properly taken into consideration in the resolution of this
administrative case against respondent.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara
Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna
Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of
Candidacy dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself
declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia, were never
denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public
documents sufficiently prove that he fathered two children by
Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally
married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
In Bar Matter No. 1154,[17] good moral character was
defined thus:
. . . good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion
generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is
held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds
to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law.
In Zaguirre vs. Castillo,[18] we reiterated the definition of
immoral conduct, to wit:
. . . that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless
as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. Furthermore, such
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That
is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency.
In the above-quoted case, we pointed out that a member
of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of
mistresses but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards and, thus, ruled that siring a
child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below
the standards of morality required of every lawyer.[19]
We must rule in the same wise in this case before us. The
fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit
with a woman who is not his legal wife, thus, siring children
by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent
should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain
ones good standing in the legal profession.[20] In Aldovino vs.
Pujalte, Jr.,[21] we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and
good moral character of members of the Bar. They are
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the
public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal
profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege.
And whenever it is made to appear that an attorney is no
longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it
becomes not only the right but also the duty of this Court,
which made him one of its officers and gave him the
privilege of ministering within its Bar, to withdraw the
privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Norberto M. Mendoza is
hereby found GUILTY of immorality, in violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED
INDEFINITELY from the practice of law until he submits
satisfactory proof that he has abandoned his immoral course
of conduct.
Let a copy of this resolution be served personally on
respondent at his last known address and entered in his record
as attorney. Let the IBP, the Bar Confidant, and the Court
Administrator be furnished also a copy of this resolution for
their information and guidance as well as for circularization to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
H. Relevancy of Evidence
I. Collateral Matters/Circumstantial Evidence
III. What Need Not Be Proved (Rule 129)
A. Introduction
Reyes vs. Glaucoma Research Foundation, Inc.,
G.R. No. 189255, June 17, 2015.
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated April 20,
2009 and August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
104261. The assailed CA Decision annulled the Decision of
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR
Case No. 05-0441-05 and reinstated the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter (LA) in the same case, while the CA Resolution denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The instant petition arose from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by petitioner against respondents with the
NLRC, National Capital Region, Quezon City. Petitioner
alleged that: on August 1, 2003, he was hired by respondent
corporation as administrator of the latter's Eye Referral
Center (ERC); he performed his duties as administrator and
continuously received his monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 until
the end of January 2005; beginning February 2005,
respondent withheld petitioner's salary without notice but he
still continued to report for work; on April 11, 2005,
petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Manuel Agulto
(Agulto), who is the Executive Director of respondent
corporation, informing the latter that he has not been
receiving his salaries since February 2005 as well as his 14th
month pay for 2004; petitioner did not receive any response
86
from Agulto; on April 21, 2005, petitioner was informed by
the Assistant to the Executive Director as well as the
Assistant Administrative Officer, that he is no longer the
Administrator of the ERC; subsequently, petitioner’s office
was padlocked and closed without notice; he still continued
to report for work but on April 29, 2005 he was no longer
allowed by the security guard on duty to enter the premises
of the ERC.
On their part, respondents contended that: upon petitioner's
representation that he is an expert incorporate
organizational structure and management affairs, they
engaged his services as a consultant or adviser in the
formulation of an updated organizational set-up and
employees' manual which is compatible with their present
condition; based on his claim that there is a need for an
administrator for the ERC, he later designated himself as
such on a trial basis; there is no employer-employee
relationship between them because respondents had no
control over petitioner in terms of working hours as he
reports for work at anytime of the day and leaves as he
pleases; respondents also had no control as to the manner in
which he performs his alleged duties as consultant; he
became overbearing and his relationship with the employees
and officers of the company soured leading to the filing of
three complaints against him; petitioner was not dismissed as
he was the one who voluntarily severed his relations with
respondents. On January 20, 2006, the LA assigned to the
case rendered a Decision3 dismissing petitioner's complaint.
The LA held, among others, that petitioner failed to establish
that the elements of an employer-employee relationship
existed between him and respondents because he was unable
to show that he was, in fact, appointed as administrator of
the ERC and received salaries as such; he also failed to deny
that during his stint with respondents, he was, at the same
time, a consultant of various government agencies such as
the Manila International Airport Authority, Manila
Intercontinental Port Authority, Anti-Terrorist Task Force for
Aviation and Air Transportation Sector; his actions were
neither supervised nor controlled by the management of the
ERC; petitioner, likewise, did not observe working hours by
reporting for work and leaving therefrom as he pleased; and,
he was receiving allowances, not salaries, as a consultant.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed and set aside the Decision of
the LA. The NLRC declared petitioner as respondents'
employee, that he was illegally dismissed and ordered
respondents to reinstate him to his former position without
loss of seniority rights and privileges with full backwages.
The NLRC held that the basis upon which the conclusion of
the LA was drawn lacked support; that it was incumbent for
respondents to discharge the burden of proving that
petitioner's dismissal was for cause and effected after due
process was observed; and, that respondents failed to
discharge this burden.4
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the NLRC in its Resolution5 dated May 30, 2008.
Respondents then filed a Petition for Certiorari6 with the CA.
In its assailed Decision, the CA annulled and set aside the
judgment of the NLRC and reinstated the Decision of the LA.
The CA held that the LA was correct in ruling that, under the
control test and the economic reality test, no employer-
employee relationship existed between respondents and
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA
denied it in its Resolution dated August 25, 2009.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari based on
the following grounds:
I Also, Section 2(b), Rule IV of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT RESPONDENTS SUBMITTED
A VERIFICATION THATFAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE 2004 RULES
ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN RULING THATNO EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
RELATIONSHIP EXISTS BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND
PETITIONER.7
As to the first ground, petitioner contends that respondents'
petition for certiorari filed with the CA should have been
dismissed on the ground that it was improperly verified
because the jurat portion of the verification states only the
community tax certificate number of the affiant as evidence
of her identity. Petitioner argues that under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, as amended by a Resolution8 of this
Court, dated February 19, 2008, a community tax certificate
is not among those considered as competent evidence of
identity.
The Court does not agree.
This Court has already ruled that competent evidence of
identity is not required in cases where the affiant is
personally known to the notary public.9
Thus, in Jandoquile v. Revilla, Jr.,10 this Court held that:
If the notary public knows the affiants personally, he need
not require them to show their valid identification
cards.1âwphi1 This rule is supported by the definition of a
"jurat" under Section 6, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. A "jurat" refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion: (a) appears in person before the notary
public and presents an instrument or document; (b) is
personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity; (c)
signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and (d) takes an oath or affirmation before the
notary public as to such instrument or document.11
Practice provides as follows:
SEC. 2. Prohibitions –
(a) x x x
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person
involved as signatory to the instrument or document –
(1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of
the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise
identified by the notary public through competent evidence
of identity as defined by these Rules.
Moreover, Rule II, Section 6 of the same Rules states that:
87
SEC 6. Jurat. – "Jurat" refers to an act in which an individual
on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents
an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by
the notary public through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the
notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as
to such instrument or document.
In legal hermeneutics, "or" is a disjunctive that expresses an
alternative or gives a choice of one among two or more
things.12 The word signifies disassociation and independence
of one thing from another thing in an enumeration.13
Thus, as earlier stated, if the affiant is personally known to
the notary public, the latter need not require the former to
show evidence of identity as required under the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, as amended.
Applying the above rule to the instant case, it is undisputed
that the attorney-in-fact of respondents who executed the
verification and certificate against forum shopping, which
was attached to respondents' petition filed with the CA, is
personally known to the notary public before whom the
documents were acknowledged. Both attorney-in-fact and
the notary public hold office at respondents' place of
business and the latter is also the legal counsel of
respondents.
In any event, this Court's disquisition in the fairly recent case
of Heirs of Amada Zaulda v. Isaac Zaulda14 regarding the
import of procedural rules vis-à-vis the substantive rights of
the parties, is instructive, to wit:
[G]ranting, arguendo, that there was non-compliance with
the verification requirement, the rule is that courts should
not be so strict about procedural lapses which do not really
impair the proper administration of justice. After all, the
higher objective of procedural rule is to ensure that the
substantive rights of the parties are protected. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and
not on technicalities. Every party-litigant must be afforded
ample opportunity for the proper and just determination of
his case, free from the unacceptable plea of technicalities.
In Coca-Cola Bottlers v. De la Cruz, where the verification
was marred only by a glitch in the evidence of the identity of
the affiant, the Court was of the considered view that, in the
interest of justice, the minor defect can be overlooked and
should not defeat the petition.
The reduction in the number of pending cases is laudable,
but if it would be attained by precipitate, if not
preposterous, application of technicalities, justice would not
be served. The law abhors technicalities that impede the
cause of justice. The court's primary duty is to render or
dispense justice. "It is a more prudent course of action for
the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a
review of the case on appeal rather than dispose of the case
on technicality and cause a grave injustice to the parties,
giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not miscarriage of
justice."
What should guide judicial action is the principle that a
party-litigant should be given the fullest opportunity to
establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than
for him to lose life, liberty, honor, or property on
technicalities. The rules of procedure should be viewed as
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. At this
juncture, the Court reminds all members of the bench and
bar of the admonition in the often-cited case of Alonso v.
Villamor:
Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust.
Technicality, when it deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts. There should be no
vested rights in technicalities.15
Anent the second ground, petitioner insists that, based on
evidence on record, an employer-employee relationship
exists between him and respondents.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is a basic rule of evidence that each party must prove his
affirmative allegation.16 If he claims a right granted by law,
he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on
the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness
of that of his opponent.17 The test for determining on whom
the burden of proof lies is found in the result of an inquiry as
to which party would be successful if no evidence of such
matters were given.18 In an illegal dismissal case, the onus
probandi rests on the employer to prove that its dismissal of
an employee was for a valid cause.19 However, before a case
for illegal dismissal can prosper, an employer-employee
relationship must first be established.20 Thus, in filing a
complaint before the LA for illegal dismissal, based on the
premise that he was an employee of respondents, it is
incumbent upon petitioner to prove the employer-employee
relationship by substantial evidence.21
In regard to the above discussion, the issue of whether or not
an employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioner and respondents is essentially a question of
fact.22 The factors that determine the issue include who has
the power to select the employee, who pays the employee’s
wages, who has the power to dismiss the employee, and who
exercises control of the methods and results by which the
work of the employee is accomplished.23 Although no
particular form of evidence is required to prove the
existence of the relationship, and any competent and
relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be
admitted, a finding that the relationship exists must
nonetheless rest on substantial evidence, which is that
amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.24
Generally, the Court does not review factual questions,
primarily because the Court is not a trier of facts.25
However, where, like here, there is a conflict between the
factual findings of the LA and the CA, on one hand, and those
of the NLRC, on the other, it becomes proper for the Court,
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, to review and re-
evaluate the factual issues and to look into the records of
the case and re-examine the questioned findings.26
Etched in an unending stream of cases are four standards in
determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, namely: (a) the manner of selection and
88
engagement of the putative employee; (b) the mode of
payment of wages; (c) the presence or absence of power of
dismissal; and, (d) the presence or absence of control of the
putative employee’s conduct. Most determinative among
these factors is the so-called "control test."27
Indeed, the power of the employer to control the work of the
employee is considered the most significant determinant of
the existence of an employer-employee relationship.28 This
test is premised on whether the person for whom the
services are performed reserves the right to control both the
end achieved and the manner and means used to achieve
that end.29
In the present case, petitioner contends that, as evidence of
respondents' supposed control over him, the organizational
plans he has drawn were subject to the approval of
respondent corporation's Board of Trustees. However, the
Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA on this matter,
to wit:
[Respondents'] power to approve or reject the organizational
plans drawn by [petitioner] cannot be the control
contemplated in the "control test." It is but logical that one
who commissions another to do a piece of work should have
the right to accept or reject the product. The important
factor to consider in the "control test" is still the element of
control over how the work itself is done, not just the end
result thereof.
Well settled is the rule that where a person who works for
another performs his job more or less at his own pleasure, in
the manner he sees fit, not subject to definite hours or
conditions of work, and is compensated according to the
result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, no
employer-employee relationship exists.30
What was glaring in the present case is the undisputed fact
that petitioner was never subject to definite working hours.
He never denied that he goes to work and leaves therefrom
as he pleases.31 In fact, on December 1-31, 2004, he went
on leave without seeking approval from the officers of
respondent company. On the contrary, his letter32 simply
informed respondents that he will be away for a month and
even advised them that they have the option of appointing
his replacement during his absence. This Court has held that
there is no employer-employee relationship where the
supposed employee is not subject to a set of rules and
regulations governing the performance of his duties under
the agreement with the company and is not required to
report for work at any time, nor to devote his time
exclusively to working for the company.33
In this regard, this Court also agrees with the ruling of the CA
that:
Aside from the control test, the Supreme Court has also used
the economic reality test in determining whether an
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties.
Under this test, the economic realities prevailing within the
activity or between the parties are examined, taking into
consideration the totality of circumstances surrounding the
true nature of the relationship between the parties. This is
especially appropriate when, as in this case, there is no
written agreement or contract on which to base the
relationship. In our jurisdiction, the benchmark of economic
reality in analyzing possible employment relationships for
purposes of applying the Labor Code ought to be the
economic dependence of the worker on his employer. In the
instant case, as shown by the resume of [petitioner], he
concurrently held consultancy positions with the Manila
International Airport Authority (from 04 March 2001 to
September 2003 and from 01 November 2004 up to the
present) and the Anti-Terrorist Task Force for Aviation and
Air Transportation Sector (from 16 April 2004 to 30 June
2004) during his stint with the Eye Referral Center (from 01
August 2003 to 29 April 2005). Accordingly, it cannot be said
that the [petitioner] was wholly dependent on [respondent]
company.34
In bolstering his contention that there was an employer-
employee relationship, petitioner draws attention to the pay
slips he supposedly received from respondent corporation.
However, he does not dispute the findings of the CA that
there are no deductions for SSS and withholding tax from his
compensation, which are the usual deductions from
employees' salaries. Thus, the alleged pay slips may not be
treated as competent evidence of petitioner's claim that he
is respondents' employee.
In addition, the designation of the payments to petitioner as
salaries, is not determinative of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship.35 Salary is a general term
defined as a remuneration for services given.36 Evidence of
this fact, in the instant case, was the cash voucher issued in
favor of petitioner where it was stated therein that the
amount of ₱20,000.00 was given as petitioner's allowance for
the month of December 2004, although it appears from the
pay slip that the said amount was his salary for the same
period.
Additional evidence of the fact that petitioner was hired as a
consultant and not as an employee of respondent corporation
are affidavits to this effect which were executed by Roy
Oliveres37 and Aurea Luz Esteva,38 who are Medical Records
Custodian and Administrative Officer, respectively, of
respondent corporation. Petitioner insists in its objection of
the use of these affidavits on the ground that they are,
essentially, hearsay. However, this Court has ruled that
although the affiants had not been presented to affirm the
contents of their affidavits and be cross-examined, their
affidavits may be given evidentiary value; the argument that
such affidavits were hearsay was not persuasive.39 Likewise,
this Court ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants to
appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the
adverse party.40 To require otherwise would be to negate
the rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the
proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory
the application of the technical rules of evidence.41
These affidavits are corroborated by evidence, as discussed
above, showing that petitioner has no definite working hours
and is not subject to the control of respondents.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with petitioner's insistence
that his being hired as respondent corporation's administrator
and his designation as such in intra-company correspondence
proves that he is an employee of the corporation. The fact
alone that petitioner was designated as an administrator
does not necessarily mean that he is an employee of
respondents. Mere title or designation in a corporation will
not, by itself, determine the existence of an employer-
employee relationship.42 In this regard, even the
identification card which was issued to petitioner is not an
adequate proof of petitioner's claim that he is respondents'
employee. In addition, petitioner’s designation as an
administrator neither disproves respondents' contention that
he was engaged only as a consultant.
As a final point, it bears to reiterate that while the
Constitution is committed to the policy of social justice and
89
the protection of the working class, it should not be
supposed that every labor dispute will be automatically
decided in favor of labor.43 Management also has its rights
which are entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of simple fair play.44 Out of its concern for the less
privileged in life, the Court has inclined, more often than
not, toward the worker and upheld his cause in his conflicts
with the employer.45 Such favoritism, however, has not
blinded the Court to the rule that justice is in every case for
the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the established
facts and the applicable law and doctrine.46
leave pay, separation pay and 13th month pay. They also prayed for computation of the foregoing monetary awards
damages and attorneys fees. are as follows:
Respondents denied petitioners allegations. As regards Abueva, I - 13th Month Pay: (For Each Complainant)
respondents averred that he is not an employee but a mere 1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 12 months @ 6 months
contractor in the hacienda. According to respondents, Abueva hired per year of service
other men to perform weeding jobs and even entered into contract
with neighboring haciendas for similar jobs. Respondents alleged P145.00/day x 26 days = P3,770.00/mo.
that Abuevas name does not appear in the payroll, thus indicating P3,770.00/mo. x 12 mos.
that he is not an employee. As such, there can be no dismissal to = P45,240.00= P7,540.00
speak of, much less an illegal dismissal. 6

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and With regard to petitioners Literal and Basay, respondents admitted II Salary Differential:
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated April 20, 2009 and that both are regular employees, each receiving P130.00 per days
August 25, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104261, are work as evidenced by a Master Voucher.[5]However, respondents (a) Romeo Basay:
AFFIRMED. denied having illegally dismissed them and asserted that they Basic Pay = P145.00/day
abandoned their jobs. Salary Received = P122.00/day
SO ORDERED. Salary Differential = P 23.00/day
Respondents alleged that Literal was facing charges of
Basay vs. Hacienda Consolacion, G.R. No. misconduct, insubordination, damaging and taking advantage of 1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 312 days
175532, April 19, 2010 hacienda property, and unauthorized cultivation of a portion of the
hacienda. Literal was ordered to explain; instead of complying, P23.00/day x 312 days = P7,176.00
Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employers are burdened to Literal did not anymore report for work. Instead, he filed a
prove that they did not commit illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon complaint for illegal dismissal. (b) Julian Literal:
the employee to first establish the fact of his or her dismissal. Basic Pay = P145.00/day
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the Decision[2] dated Respondents asserted that they sent a representative to Salary Received = P 91.00/day
June 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00313, convince petitioners to return but to no avail. Respondents Salary Differential = P 54.00/day
which affirmed the March 22, 2004 Decision[3] of the National Labor maintained that they have been religiously giving 13th month pay to
Relations Commission (NLRC), dismissing the illegal dismissal case their employees as evidenced by a voucher[6] corresponding to year 1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 312 days
filed by petitioners against respondents. 2000.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter P54.00/day x 312 days = P16,848.00
Factual Antecedents
On December 19, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a (c) Julian Abueva:
Respondents hired petitioners Romeo Basay (Basay) in 1967 and Decision[7] exonerating respondents from the charge of illegal Basic Pay = P145.00/day
Julian Literal (Literal) in 1984, as tractor operators, and petitioner dismissal as petitioners were the ones who did not report for work Salary Received = P 91.50/day
Julian Abueva (Abueva) in 1989, as laborer, in the hacienda devoted despite respondents call. The Labor Arbiter, however, awarded Salary Differential = P 53.50/day
for sugar cane plantation. petitioners claim of 13th month pay and salary differentials. The
dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiters Decision reads: 1998 & 1999 = 2 years or 312 days
On August 29, 2001, petitioners filed a complaint[4] for
illegal dismissal with monetary claims against respondents. They WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises being P53.50/day x 312 days = P16, 692.00
alleged that sometime in July 2001, respondents verbally informed considered, judgment is hereby rendered
them to stop working. Thereafter, they were not given work declaring the Respondent not guilty of Illegal SUMMARY
assignments despite their status as regular employees. They alleged Dismissal but is however directed to pay the
that their termination was done in violation of their right to complainants their 13th Month Pay covering the 1. ROMEO BASAY:
substantive and procedural due process. Petitioners also claimed years 1998 and 1999, and their Salary Differentials a) 13th Month Pay = P7,540.00
violation of Minimum Wage Law and non-payment of overtime pay, for 2 years at 6 months per year of service. The b) Salary Differential = P7,176.00
premium pay for holiday and rest day, five days service incentive Total P14,716.00
90

2. JULIAN LITERAL
a) 13th Month Pay = P 7,540.00
b) Salary Differential = P16,848.00
Total P24,388.00
3. JULIAN ABUEVA
a) 13th Month Pay = P 7,540.00
b) Salary Differential = P16,692.00
Total P24,232.00
GRAND TOTAL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. P63,336.00
Ten Percent (10%) Attorneys Fees is also
adjudicated from the total monetary award.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission
Both parties sought recourse to the NLRC. Petitioners filed a Partial
Appeal[9] to the Decision declaring respondents not guilty of illegal
dismissal. They argued that there was no proof of clear and
deliberate intent to abandon their work. On the contrary, their filing
of an illegal dismissal case negates the intention to
abandon. Petitioners likewise alleged that respondents failed to
observe procedural due process.
Respondents, for their part, filed a Memorandum on Appeal[10] with
respect to the award of salary differentials and 13th month pay to
petitioners. Respondents averred that the Labor Arbiter erred in
finding that petitioners are entitled to receive a minimum wage
of P145.00/day instead of P130.00/day which is the minimum wage
rate for sugarcane workers in Negros Oriental per Wage Order No.
ROVII-07.[11] Respondents likewise presented vouchers[12] to prove
payment of 13th month pay for the years 1998 and 1999.
The NLRC, in its Decision[13] dated March 22, 2004, found merit in
respondents appeal. It ruled that respondents have satisfactorily
proven payment of the correct amount of wages and 13th month pay
for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, as shown in the Master Voucher
indicating the workers payroll and the various vouchers for
13th month pay. The NLRC further ruled that Abueva is not an
employee of the hacienda but a mere contractor; thus, he is not
entitled to any of his claims. The NLRC thus affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding complainants not illegally
dismissed, judgment is hereby
rendered AFFIRMING the Decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated December 13, 2001, with
the MODIFICATIONthat complainants Julian
Literal and Romeo Basay are not entitled to their
claims for salary differentials and 13th month pay
for lack of legal basis. However, respondents are
ordered to pay complainants Julian Literal and
Romeo Basay proportionate 13th month pay
computed from January 1, 2001 to August 29,
2001.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.[14]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration[15] which was denied by
the NLRC in a Resolution[16] dated September 3, 2004.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Aggrieved, petitioners filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari. On June 7, 2006, however, the CA dismissed the
petition and affirmed the findings of the NLRC. It opined that
respondents have manifested their willingness to retain petitioners
but the latter intentionally abandoned their work. The CA also struck
down petitioners contention that abandonment is inconsistent with
the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal as this rule applies only
when a complainant seeks reinstatement and not when separation
pay is instead prayed for, as in the case of petitioners. As to the issue
posed by petitioners assailing the admissibility of the Master Voucher
due to lack of petitioners authentic signatures, the CA refrained from
resolving the matter since the issue was only raised for the first time
on appeal.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but to no avail.
Issue
Hence, this petition raising the issue of whether petitioners were
illegally dismissed and are entitled to their money claims.
Petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of the
labor tribunals that they deliberately abandoned their work on the
basis of respondents self-serving allegation that they sent emissaries
to persuade them to return to work. They maintain that in the
absence of competent evidence to show clear intention to sever the
employment relationship and compliance with the two-notice rule,
no abandonment can exist. Moreover, the theory that abandonment
of work is inconsistent with the filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal is applicable in the present case since what was prayed for
in the complaint was reinstatement, contrary to the CAs finding that
they were asking for separation pay. Petitioners likewise insist that
the CA gravely erred in holding that they assailed the admissibility of
the Master Voucher for the first time only during appeal. They claim
that such issue was raised in their motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC Decision. Finally, petitioners allege that the fact that they
were staying inside the premises of the hacienda and had been
working therein for more than a year is an indication that they are
regular employees entitled to their monetary claims, as correctly
found by the Labor Arbiter.
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
There was no illegal dismissal.
We are not unmindful of the rule in labor cases that the employer
has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause; however, it is likewise incumbent upon the
employees that they should first establish by competent evidence
the fact of their dismissal from employment.[17] The one who alleges
a fact has the burden of proving it and the proof should be clear,
positive and convincing.[18] In this case, aside from mere allegations,
no evidence was proffered by the petitioners that they were
dismissed from employment. The records are bereft of any
indication that petitioners were prevented from returning to work or
otherwise deprived of any work assignment by respondents.
The CA, in sustaining the Labor Arbiter and NLRCs finding that there
was no illegal dismissal, ruled that respondents have manifested
their willingness to retain petitioners in their employ. Petitioners,
however, complained that this finding is anchored on mere
allegations of respondents.
We do not agree. Respondents presented a declaration[19] made
under oath by Leopoldo Utlang, Jr., assistant supervisor of the
hacienda, attesting that petitioners were asked to return to do some
work for the hacienda but refused to do so upon the advice of their
lawyer. Interestingly too, as late as November of 2001 or even after
almost three months from the filing of the illegal dismissal case, the
91
names of Literal and Basay were still listed and included in
respondents payroll as can be gleaned in the Master Voucher
covering the employees payroll of November 12 to 16, 2001. While a
voucher does not necessarily prove payment, it is an acceptable
documentary record of a business transaction.[20] As such, entries
made therein, being entered in the ordinary or regular course of
business, enjoy the presumption of regularity.[21] Hence, on the basis
of this material proof evincing respondents intention to retain
petitioners as employees, we are not convinced that petitioners
were told to stop working or were prevented from working in the
hacienda. This may well be an indication of respondents lack of
intention to dismiss petitioners from employment since they were
still considered employees as of that time. Records are likewise
bereft of any showing that to date, respondents had already
terminated petitioners from employment.
We are not persuaded by petitioners contention that nothing was
presented to establish their intention of abandoning their work, or
that the fact that they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal negates
the theory of abandonment.
It bears emphasizing that this case does not involve
termination of employment on the ground of abandonment. As
earlier discussed, there is no evidence showing that petitioners were
actually dismissed. Petitioners filing of a complaint for illegal
dismissal, irrespective of whether reinstatement or separation pay
was prayed for, could not by itself be the sole consideration in
determining whether they have been illegally dismissed. All
circumstances surrounding the alleged termination should also be
taken into account.
In Abad v. Roselle Cinema,[22] we ruled that the substantial
evidence proffered by the employer that it had not terminated the
employee should not be ignored on the pretext that the employee
would not have filed the complaint for illegal dismissal if he had not
really been dismissed. We held that such non sequitur reasoning
cannot take the place of the evidence of both the employer and the
employee.
Given that there was no dismissal to speak of, there can be no
question as to the legality or illegality thereof.
Basay and Literal are
entitled to salary
differentials for two
years and
proportionate
13th month pay from
January 1-29, 2001.
Abueva is not an
employee, thus not
entitled to his claims.
We agree with the petitioners that the issue on the admissibility of
the Master Voucher, which does not show that they actually received
the amount of salary indicated therein, was raised in their motion
for reconsideration of the NLRC Decision dated March 22, 2004 where
the labor tribunal ruled that petitioners were duly compensated for
their work on the basis of such voucher. At any rate, even if its
admission as evidence is not put into issue, still, the Master Voucher
did not prove that petitioners were indeed paid the correct amount
of wages.
A perusal of the Master Voucher shows that it covers the
employees payroll for the period of November 12-16,
2001 only. Clearly, the Master Voucher cannot constitute as proof
that petitioners were duly paid for other periods not covered by such
voucher. No other pertinent vouchers, payrolls, records or other
similar documents have been presented as proof of payment of the
correct amount of salaries paid, particularly, for the years 1998 and
1999. As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it.[23] Consequently, respondents failed to discharge
the burden of proving payment thereby making them liable for
petitioners claim for salary differentials. We thus reinstate the Labor
Arbiters award of salary differentials for 1998 and 1999, computed
at 6 months per year of service. However, the Labor Arbiters
computation must be modified pursuant to Wage Order No. ROVII-
07.Under this wage order, the minimum wage rate of sugarcane
plantation workers is at P130.00/day. The correct computation for
the salary differentials due to Basay and Literal, who claimed to have
received only P122.00 and P91.00 per day, respectively, should be
as follows:
For ROMEO BASAY:
Basic Pay = P130.00/day
Salary Received = P122.00/day
Salary Differential = P 8.00/day
P8.00/day x 312 days (for 1998 & 1999) = P2,496.00
For JULIAN LITERAL:
Basic Pay = P130.00/day
Salary Received = P 91.00/day
Salary Differential = P 39.00/day
P39.00/day x 312 days (for 1998 & 1999) = P12,168.00
As regards the 13th month pay, respondents were able to
adduce evidence that the benefit was given to the employees for the
years 1998, 1999, and 2000. However, for an employee who has
been separated from service before the time for payment of the
13th month pay, he is entitled to this monetary benefit in proportion
to the length of time he worked during the year, reckoned from the
time he started working during the calendar year up to the time of
his separation.[24] The NLRCs award of proportionate 13th month pay
computed from January 1, 2001 to August 29, 2001 in favor of Basay
and Literal, is therefore proper.
As for petitioner Abueva, he is not entitled to his
claims. The NLRC excluded Abueva in its judgment award, ruling
that he is not an employee but a mere contractor. The existence of
an employer-employee relationship is ultimately a question of
fact.[25] Settled is the rule that only errors of law are generally
reviewed by this Court.[26] Factual findings of administrative and
quasi-judicial agencies specializing in their respective fields,
especially when affirmed by the CA, must be accorded high respect,
if not finality.[27]
The elements to determine the existence of an employment
relationship are: (1) selection and engagement of the employee; (2)
the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
employers power to control the employees conduct.[28] In filing a
complaint for illegal dismissal, it is incumbent upon Abueva to prove
the relationship by substantial evidence.
In this regard, petitioners claim that Abueva has worked with
respondents for more than a year already and was allowed to stay
inside the hacienda. As such, he is a regular employee entitled to
monetary claims. However, petitioners have not presented
competent proof that respondents engaged the services of Abueva;
that respondents paid his wages or that respondents could dictate
what his conduct should be while at work. In other words, Abuevas
allegations did not establish that his relationship with respondents
has the attributes of employer-employee on the basis of the above-
mentioned four-fold test. Therefore, Abueva was not able to
discharge the burden of proving the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. Moreover, Abueva was not able to refute
respondents assertions that he hires other men to perform weeding
job in the hacienda and that he is not exclusively working for
respondents.
92
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00313 dated June 7, 2006, finding Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
petitioners Romeo Basay, Julian Literal and Julian Abueva not Atienza.
illegally dismissed and awarding petitioners Romeo Basay and Julian
Literal their proportionate 13th month pay computed from January It was alleged in the complaint that the gross
1, 2001 to August 29, 2001, negligence and/or incompetence committed
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the petitioners Romeo Basay by the said doctors, including petitioner,
and Julian Literal are entitled to receive the amounts of P2,496.00 consists of the removal of private
and P12,168.00 as salary differentials, respectively. respondents fully functional right kidney,
instead of the left non-functioning and non-
SO ORDERED. visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After
Atienza vs. Board of Medicine, G.R. No. complainant Romeo Sioson presented his
177407, February 9, 2011 evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson,
also named as complainant there, filed her
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 formal offer of documentary evidence.
of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated Attached to the formal offer of documentary
September 22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP evidence are her Exhibits A to D, which she
No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed offered for the purpose of proving that her
by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
assailed the Orders[2] issued by public respondent Board of locations at the time she was operated. She
Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882. described her exhibits, as follows:
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow. EXHIBIT A the certified
photocopy of the X-ray
Request form dated
December 12, 1996, which is
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent also marked as Annex 2 as it
Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center was actually originally the
(RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit
she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of filed with the City
RMC who, accordingly, ordered several Prosecutor of Pasig City in
diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests connection with the
revealed that her right kidney is normal. It criminal complaint filed by
was ascertained, however, that her left [Romeo Sioson] with the
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. said office, on which are
Thus, she underwent kidney operation in handwritten entries which
September, 1999. are the interpretation of the
results of the ultrasound
On February 18, 2000, private respondents examination. Incidentally,
husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), this exhibit happens to be
filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or the same as or identical to
incompetence before the [BOM] against the the certified photocopy of
doctors who allegedly participated in the the document marked as
fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd Annex 2 to the Counter-
Affidavit dated March 15,
2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000,
with this Honorable Board in
answer to this complaint;
EXHIBIT B the certified
photo copy of the X-ray
request form dated January
30, 1997, which is also
marked as Annex 3 as it was
actually likewise originally
an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro
Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit
filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City
in connection with the
criminal complaint filed by
the herein complainant with
the said office, on which are
handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit
happens to be also the same
as or identical to the
certified photo copy of the
document marked as Annex
3 which is likewise dated
January 30, 1997, which is
appended as such Annex 3 to
the counter-affidavit dated
March 15, 2000, filed by x x
x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May
4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this
complaint.
EXHIBIT C the certified
photocopy of the X-ray
request form dated March
16, 1996, which is also
marked as Annex 4, on
which are handwritten
entries which are the
interpretation of the results
of the examination.
93

EXHIBIT D the certified
photocopy of the X-ray
request form dated May 20,
1999, which is also marked
as Annex 16, on which are
handwritten entries which
are the interpretation of the
results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit
appears to be the draft of
the typewritten final report
of the same examination
which is the document
appended as Annexes 4 and
1 respectively to the
counter-affidavits filed by x
x x Dr. Judd dela Vega and
Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in
answer to the complaint. In
the case of Dr. dela Vega
however, the document
which is marked as Annex 4
is not a certified photocopy,
while in the case of Dr.
Lantin, the document
marked as Annex 1 is a
certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same
date and typewritten
contents are the same as
that which are written on
Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to
private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal
offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits
are inadmissible because the same are mere
photocopies, not properly identified and
authenticated, and intended to establish
matters which are hearsay. He added that
the exhibits are incompetent to prove the
purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the
private respondent [Editha Sioson] was petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated
May 26, 2004. It reads: Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
The Formal Offer of I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
Documentary Evidence of
[Romeo Sioson], the WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF
Comments/Objections of THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE
[herein petitioner] Atienza, FILED THE PETITION
[therein respondents] De la FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06
Vega and Lantin, and the DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT
Manifestation of [therein] OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
respondent Florendo are RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE
hereby ADMITTED by the ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08
[BOM] for whatever purpose OCTOBER 2004 OF RESPONDENT
they may serve in the BOARD.
resolution of this case.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
Let the hearing be set on
July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS
p.m. for the reception of COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE
the evidence of the ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
respondents. SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE
SO ORDERED. APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF
abovementioned Order basically on the same INCOMPETENT AND INADMISSIBLE
reasons stated in his comment/objections to EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD,
the formal offer of exhibits. WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE
DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL
The [BOM] denied the motion for LICENSE A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONES
reconsideration of petitioner in its Order LIVELIHOOD.[4]
dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it
should first admit the evidence being offered
so that it can determine its probative value We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
when it decides the case. According to the
Board, it can determine whether the Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition
evidence is relevant or not if it will take a for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the
look at it through the process of admission. x BOM, admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the
x x.[3] assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the
subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted completely or finally disposes of the case. [5] At that stage,
to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
the BOMs Orders which admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining
remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule
94
65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent
a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in
the CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or
act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the
exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in
evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have
not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are
completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their
purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are
inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of
evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM.[6] Although trial courts
are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of
evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may appear to
be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we
have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical
grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for
the reason that their rejection places them
beyond the consideration of the court, if they
are thereafter found relevant or competent;
on the other hand, their admission, if they
turn out later to be irrelevant or
incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring
them.[8]
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the
admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be
accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOCShipping and
Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals[9] teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the
question of whether or not the circumstance
(or evidence) is to be considered at all. On
the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or
not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of
Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the
loss of his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly
relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative
investigation shall be conducted in
accordance with these Rules. The Rules of
Court shall only apply in these proceedings by
analogy or on a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.
Technical errors in the admission of evidence
which do not prejudice the substantive rights
of either party shall not vitiate the
proceedings.[10]
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the
exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby,
that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The
following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to
the ordinary course of nature and the
ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray
Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997,
March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with
Edithas medical case. The documents contain handwritten
entries interpreting the results of the examination. These
exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin
IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal
complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of
Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical
procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered
the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both
in their proper anatomical locations at the time of her
operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of
Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time of her operation, need not
be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.[11]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the
means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of
fact.[12] Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are
established and need not be proved, such as those covered by
judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary.[13] Laws of
nature involving the physical sciences, specifically
biology,[14] include the structural make-up and composition of
living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take
judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of,
her operation, as with most human beings, were in their
proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best
evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced;
exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or
under the control of the party against whom
95
 the evidence is offered, and the latter fails
to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous
accounts or other documents which cannot
be examined in court without great loss of
time and the fact sought to be established
from them is only the general result of the
whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the
custody of a public officer or is recorded in a
public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent
doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in
removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the
left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical
locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the
proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of
her operation at the RMC may be established not only through
the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay
evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To
further drive home the point, the anatomical positions,
whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of
one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies
of the exhibits, is allowed.[15] Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino
testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the
originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the
previous building, x x x to the new building.[16] Ultimately,
since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly
admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the
BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it
decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755
is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines vs. De Guzman, G.R. No.
175021, June 15, 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by
Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Chief of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), of the September 27,
2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80623, which affirmed with modification the September 8,
2003 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 222,
of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q99-37717.
Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General
Merchandise (MGM),[4] a contractor accredited by the PNP for
the supply of office and construction materials and
equipment, and for the delivery of various services such as
printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and
renovation of buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare
parts.[5]
On December 8, 1995, the PNP Engineering Services
(PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher [6] for the
acquisition of various building materials amounting to Two
Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred
Sixty-Two Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P2,288,562.60) for the
construction of a four-storey condominium building with roof
deck at Camp Crame, Quezon City.[7]
Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM
and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief,
executed a Contract of Agreement[8] (the Contract) wherein
MGM, for the price of P2,288,562.60, undertook to procure
and deliver to the PNP the construction materials itemized in
the purchase order[9] attached to the Contract. Respondent
claimed that after the PNP Chief approved the Contract and
purchase order,[10] MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with the
delivery of the construction materials, as evidenced by
Delivery Receipt Nos. 151-153,[11] Sales Invoice Nos. 038 and
041,[12] and the Report of Public Property Purchase[13] issued
by the PNPs Receiving and Accounting Officers to their Internal
Auditor Chief. Respondent asseverated that following the
PNPs inspection of the delivered materials on March 4,
1996,[14] the PNP issued two Disbursement Vouchers; one in
the amount of P2,226,147.26 in favor of MGM,[15] and the
other, [16] in the amount of P62,415.34, representing the three
percent (3%) withholding tax, in favor of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR).[17]
On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through
counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 1997[18] to the PNP,
demanding the payment of P2,288,562.60 for the construction
materials MGM procured for the PNP under their December
1995 Contract.
On November 17, 1997, the PNP, through its Officer-
in-Charge, replied[19] to respondents counsel, informing her of
the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines
(LBP) Check No. 0000530631, [20] as evidenced by Receipt No.
001, [21] issued by the respondent to the PNP on April 23,
1996.[22]
On November 26, 1997, respondent, through counsel,
responded by reiterating her demand[23] and denying having
ever received the LBP check, personally or through an
authorized person. She also claimed that Receipt No. 001, a
copy of which was attached to the PNPs November 17, 1997
letter, could not support the PNPs claim of payment as the
aforesaid receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders, her other
company, which was also doing business with the PNP, and not
to MGM, with which the contract was made.
On May 5, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum
of Money against the petitioner, represented by the Chief of
the PNP, before the RTC, Branch 222 of Quezon City. [24] This
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q99-37717.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss[25] on July 5,
1999, on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in
respondents complaint had already been paid or
extinguished,[26] as evidenced by LBP Check No. 0000530631
dated April 18, 1996, issued by the PNP to MGM, and Receipt
No. 001, which the respondent correspondingly issued to the
PNP. The petitioner also argued that aside from the fact that
the respondent, in her October 20, 1997 letter, demanded the
incorrect amount since it included the withholding tax paid to
the BIR, her delay in making such demand [did] not speak well
of the worthiness of the cause she espouse[d].[27]
Respondent opposed petitioners motion to dismiss in
her July 12, 1999 Opposition[28]and September 10, 1999
Supplemental Opposition to Motion to
Dismiss.[29]Respondent posited that Receipt No. 001, which the
96
petitioner claimed was issued by MGM upon respondents
receipt of the LBP check, was, first, under the business name
Montaguz Builders, an entity separate from MGM. Next,
petitioners allegation that she received the LBP check on April
19, 1996 was belied by the fact that Receipt No. 001, which
was supposedly issued for the check, was dated four days
later, or April 23, 1996. Moreover, respondent averred, the
PNPs own Checking Account Section Logbook or the Warrant
Register, showed that it was one Edgardo Cruz (Cruz) who
signed for the check due to MGM, [30] contrary to her usual
practice of personally receiving and signing for checks payable
to her companies.
After conducting hearings on the Motion to Dismiss,
the RTC issued an Order[31] on May 4, 2001, denying the
petitioners motion for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter
filed its Answer,[32] wherein it restated the same allegations in
its Motion to Dismiss.
Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial conference,
which was terminated on June 25, 2002 when the parties
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.[33]
On September 3, 2002, shortly after respondent was
sworn in as a witness, and after her counsel formally offered
her testimony in evidence, Atty. Norman Bueno, petitioners
counsel at that time, made the following stipulations in open
court:
Atty. Bueno (To Court)
Your Honor, in order to expedite the trial, we
will admit that this witness
was contracted to deliver
the construction supplies or
materials. We will admit
that she complied, that she
actually delivered the
materials. We will admit
that Land Bank Corporation
check was issued although
we will not admit that the
check was not released to
her, as [a] matter of fact,
we have the copy of the
check. We will admit that
Warrant Register indicated
that the check was released
although we will not admit III
that the check was not
received by the ADMISSIONS
[respondent].
3.1. Facts and/or documents admitted
For brevity, [petitioner] admit[s] only the
Court (To Atty. Albano) allegations in [respondents] Complaint and
the annexes thereto that were admitted in
So, the issues here are whether or not the the Answer.[38] (Emphases ours.)
[respondent] received the
check for the payment of
the construction materials With the issue then confined to whether respondent
or supplies and who was paid or not, the RTC proceeded with the trial.
received the same. That is
all. Respondent, in her testimony, narrated that on April
18, 1996, she went to the PNP Finance Center to claim a check
Atty. Albano (To Court) due to one of her companies, Montaguz Builders. As the PNP
required the issuance of an official receipt upon claiming its
Yes, your Honor. checks, respondent, in preparation for the PNP check she
expected, already signed Montaguz Builders Official Receipt
Court (To Atty. Albano) No. 001, albeit the details were still blank. However, upon
arriving at the PNP Finance Center, respondent was told that
I think we have an abbreviated testimony the check was still with the LBP, which could not yet release
here. Proceed.[34] (Emphasis it. Respondent then left for the Engineering Services Office to
ours.) see Captain Rama, along with Receipt No. 001, which she had
not yet issued.[39] Respondent claimed that after some time,
she left her belongings, including her receipt booklet, at a
The stipulations made by the petitioner through Atty. bench in Captain Ramas office when she went around the
Bueno were in consonance with the admissions it had Engineering Office to talk to some other people.[40] She
previously made, also through Atty. Bueno, in its reasoned that since she was already familiar and comfortable
Answer,[35] and pre-trial brief[36]: with the people in the PNPES Office, she felt no need to ask
anyone to look after her belongings, as it was her normal
Answer: practice[41] to leave her belongings in one of the offices
IX there. The next day, respondent alleged that when she
It ADMITS the allegation in returned for the check due to Montaguz Builders that she was
paragraph 9 of the Complaint that not able to claim the day before, she discovered for the first
[respondent] delivered to the PNP time that Receipt No. 001, which was meant for that check,
Engineering Service the construction was missing. Since she would not be able to claim her check
materials. It also ADMITS the existence of without issuing a receipt, she just informed the releaser of the
Receipt Nos. 151, 152 and 153 alleged in the missing receipt and issued Receipt No. 002 in its
same paragraph, copies of which are place.[42] After a few months, respondent inquired with the
attached to the Complaint as Annexes G, G-1 PNP Finance Center about the payment due to MGM under the
and G-2.[37] (Emphasis ours.) Contract of December 1995 and was surprised to find out that
the check payable to MGM had already been released. Upon
making some inquiries, respondent learned that the check,
Pre-trial Brief: payable to MGM, in the amount of P2,226,147.26, was
received by Cruz, who signed the PNPs Warrant
97
Register. Respondent admitted to knowing Cruz, as he was
connected with Highland Enterprises, a fellow PNP-accredited
contractor. However, she denied ever having authorized Cruz
or Highland Enterprises to receive or claim any of the checks
due to MGM or Montaguz Builders.[43] When asked why she had
not filed a case against Cruz or Herminio Reyes, the owner of
Highland Enterprises, considering the admitted fact that Cruz
claimed the check due to her, respondent declared that there
was no reason for her to confront them as it was the PNPs fault
that the check was released to the wrong person. Thus, it was
the PNPs problem to find out where the money had gone, while
her course of action was to go after the PNP, as the party
involved in the Contract.[44]
On April 29, 2003, petitioner presented Ms. Jesusa
Magtira, who was then the check releaser[45] of the PNP, to
prove that the respondent received the LBP check due to MGM,
and that respondent herself gave the check to Cruz. [46] Ms.
Magtira testified that on April 23, 1996, she released the LBP
check payable to the order of MGM, in the amount
of P2,226,147.26, to the respondent herein, whom she
identified in open court. She claimed that when she released
the check to respondent, she also handed her a voucher, and
a logbook also known as the Warrant Register, for
signing.[47] When asked why Cruz was allowed to sign for the
check, Ms. Magtira explained that this was allowed since the
respondent already gave her the official receipt for the check,
and it was respondent herself who gave the logbook to Cruz
for signing.[48]
The petitioner next presented Edgardo Cruz for the
purpose of proving that the payment respondent was claiming
rightfully belonged to Highland Enterprises. Cruz testified that
Highland Enterprises had been an accredited contractor of the
PNP since 1975. In 1995, Cruz claimed that the PNPES was
tasked to construct by administration a condominium
building. This meant that the PNPES had to do all the work,
from the canvassing of the materials to the construction of the
building. The PNPES allegedly lacked the funds to do this and
so asked for Highland Enterprisess help.[49] In a meeting with
its accredited contractors, the PNPES asked if the other
contractors would agree to the use of their business
name[50] for a two percent (2%) commission of the purchase
order price to avoid the impression that Highland Enterprises
was monopolizing the supply of labor and materials to the
PNP.[51] Cruz alleged that on April 23, 1996, he and the
respondent went to the PNP Finance Center to claim the LBP
check due to MGM. Cruz said that the respondent handed him
the already signed Receipt No. 001, which he filled up. He
claimed that the respondent knew that the LBP check was
really meant for Highland Enterprises as she had already been
paid her 2% commission for the use of her business name in
the concerned transaction.[52]
On September 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,
the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent]
and against [petitioner] ordering the latter to
pay [respondent] the following sums:
(1) P2,226,147.26 representing the
principal sum plus interest at
14% per annum from April 18,
1996 until the same shall have
been fully paid;
(2) 20% of the sum to be collected
as attorneys fees; and,
(3) Costs of suit.[53]
The RTC declared that while Cruzs testimony seemed
to offer a plausible explanation on how and why the LBP check
ended up with him, the petitioner, already admitted in its
Answer, and Pre-trial Brief, that MGM, did in fact deliver the
construction materials worth P2,288,562.60 to the PNP. The
RTC also pointed out the fact that the petitioner made the
same admissions in open court to expedite the trial, leaving
only one issue to be resolved: whether the respondent had
been paid or not. Since this was the only issue, the RTC said
that it had no choice but to go back to the documents and the
documentary evidence clearly indicates that the check subject
of this case was never received by [respondent].[54] In
addition, the PNPs own Warrant Register showed that it was
Edgardo Cruz who received the LBP check, and Receipt No.
001 submitted by the petitioner to support its claim was not
issued by MGM, but by Montaguz Builders, a different
entity. Finally, the RTC held that Cruzs testimony, which
appeared to be an afterthought to cover up the PNPs blunder,
were irreconcilable with the petitioners earlier declarations
and admissions, hence, not credit-worthy.
The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the RTCs ruling on
September 27, 2006:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the 14% interest per
annum imposed on the principal amount is
ordered reduced to 12%, computed from
November 16, 1997 until fully paid. The order
for the payment of attorneys fees and costs
of the suit is DELETED.[55]
The Court of Appeals, in deciding against the
petitioner, held that the petitioners admissions and
declarations, made in various stages of the proceedings are
express admissions, which cannot be overcome by allegations
of respondents implied admissions. Moreover, petitioner
cannot controvert its own admissions and it is estopped from
denying that it had a contract with MGM, which MGM duly
complied with. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that
the real issue for determination was whether the petitioner
was able to discharge its contractual obligation with the
respondent. The Court of Appeals held that while the PNPs
own Warrant Register disclosed that the payment due to MGM
was received by Cruz, on behalf of Highland Enterprises, the
PNPs contract was clearly with MGM, and not with Highland
Enterprises.Thus, in order to extinguish its obligation, the
petitioner should have directed its payment to MGM unless
MGM authorized a third person to accept payment on its
behalf.
The petitioner is now before this Court, praying for
the reversal of the lower courts decisions on the ground that
the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law by
affirming the decision of the trial court.[56]
THE COURTS RULING:
This case stemmed from a contract executed between
the respondent and the petitioner. While the petitioner, in
proclaiming that the respondents claim had already been
extinguished, initially insisted on having fulfilled its
98
contractual obligation, it now contends that the contract it
executed with the respondent is actually a fictitious contract
to conceal the fact that only one contractor will be supplying
all the materials and labor for the PNP condominium project.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of the contract between the petitioner and the
respondent on the strength of the documentary evidence
presented and offered in Court and on petitioners own
stipulations and admissions during various stages of the
proceedings.
It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the assertions and
arguments advanced herein are those that will necessarily
require this Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review
under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by this Court.[57]
This Court has, on many occasions, distinguished
between a question of law and a question of fact. We held that
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, then it is a question of law; but when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a
question of fact.[58] Simply put, when there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.[59] To elucidate
further, this Court, in Hko Ah Pao v. Ting[60] said:
One test to determine if there exists a
question of fact or law in a given case is
whether the Court can resolve the issue that
was raised without having to review or
evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not
involve the calibration of the probative
value of the evidence presented. In
addition, the facts of the case must be
undisputed, and the only issue that should be
left for the Court to decide is whether or not
the conclusion drawn by the CA from a
certain set of facts was
appropriate.[61] (Emphases ours.)
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the
controversial LBP check are central to the issue before us, the
resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire records
of the case including the transcribed testimonies of the
witnesses. Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of
fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive[62] and this Court will
only review them under the following recognized exceptions:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.[63]
Although petitioners sole ground to support this
petition was stated in such a manner as to impress upon this
Court that the Court of Appeals committed an error in law,
what the petitioner actually wants us to do is to review and
re-examine the factual findings of both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this
case falls under any of the enumerated exceptions to the rule,
we are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the
conclusions reached in the appealed decision.
Nonetheless, even if we were to exercise utmost
liberality and veer away from the rule, the records will show
that the petitioner had failed to establish its case by a
preponderance of evidence.[64] Section 1, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining
preponderance of evidence:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of
evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
Expounding on the concept of preponderance of
evidence, this Court in Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc.,[65] held:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of
the evidence or greater weight of the
credible evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.[66]
The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals should
not have relied heavily, if not solely[67] on the admissions made
by petitioners former counsel, thereby losing sight of the
secret agreement between the respondent and Highland
Enterprises, which explains why all the documentary evidence
were in respondents name.[68]
99
 The petitioner relies mainly on Cruzs testimony to
support its allegations. Not only did it not present any other
witness to corroborate Cruz, but it also failed to present any
documentation to confirm its story. It is doubtful that the
petitioner or the contractors would enter into any secret
agreement involving millions of pesos based purely on verbal
affirmations. Meanwhile, the respondent not only presented
all the documentary evidence to prove her claims, even the
petitioner repeatedly admitted that respondent had fully
complied with her contractual obligations.
The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals
should have appreciated the clear and adequate testimony of
Cruz, and should have given it utmost weight and credit
especially since his testimony was a judicial admission against
interest a primary evidence which should have been accorded
full evidentiary value.[69]
The trial courts appreciation of the witnesses
testimonies is entitled to the highest respect since it was in a
better position to assess their credibility.[70] The RTC held
Cruzs testimony to be not credit worthy[71] for being
irreconcilable with petitioners earlier admissions. Contrary to
petitioners contentions, Cruzs testimony cannot be considered
as a judicial admission against his interest as he is neither a
party to the case nor was his admission against his own
interest, but actually against either the petitioners or the
respondents interest. Petitioners statements on the other
hand, were deliberate, clear, and unequivocal and were made
in the course of judicial proceedings; thus, they qualify as
judicial admissions.[72] In Alfelor v. Halasan,[73] this Court held
that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot
later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production
of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy. Consequently,
an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party
or not. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary
of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.[74]
The petitioner admitted to the existence and validity
of the Contract of Agreement executed between the PNP and
MGM, as represented by the respondent, on December 11,
1995. It likewise admitted that respondent delivered the
construction materials subject of the Contract, not once, but
several times during the course of the proceedings. The only
matter petitioner assailed was respondents allegation that she
had not yet been paid. If Cruzs testimony were true, the
petitioner should have put respondent in her place the
moment she sent a letter to the PNP, demanding payment for
the construction materials she had allegedly
delivered. Instead, the petitioner replied that it had already
paid respondent as evidenced by the LBP check and the
receipt she supposedly issued. This line of defense continued
on, with the petitioner assailing only the respondents claim of
nonpayment, and not the rest of respondents claims, in its
motion to dismiss, its answer, its pre-trial brief, and even in
open court during the respondents testimony. Section 4, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions.An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.
Petitioners admissions were proven to have been
made in various stages of the proceedings, and since the
petitioner has not shown us that they were made through
palpable mistake, they are conclusive as to the
petitioner. Hence, the only question to be resolved is whether
the respondent was paid under the December 1995 Contract
of Agreement.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the petitioners obligation has not been extinguished. The
petitioners obligation consists of payment of a sum of
money. In order for petitioners payment to be effective in
extinguishing its obligation, it must be made to the proper
person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to
the person in whose favor the obligation has
been constituted, or his successor in interest,
or any person authorized to receive it.
In Cembrano v. City of Butuan,[75] this Court
elucidated on how payment will effectively extinguish an
obligation, to wit:
Payment made by the debtor to the
person of the creditor or to one authorized
by him or by the law to receive it extinguishes
the obligation. When payment is made to the
wrong party, however, the obligation is not
extinguished as to the creditor who is without
fault or negligence even if the debtor acted
in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the
person of the creditor or through error
induced by fraud of a third person.
In general, a payment in order to be
effective to discharge an obligation, must be
made to the proper person. Thus, payment
must be made to the obligee himself or to an
agent having authority, express or implied, to
receive the particular payment. Payment
made to one having apparent authority to
receive the money will, as a rule, be treated
as though actual authority had been given for
its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to
one who by law is authorized to act for the
creditor, it will work a discharge. The receipt
of money due on a judgment by an officer
authorized by law to accept it will,
therefore, satisfy the debt.[76]
The respondent was able to establish that the LBP
check was not received by her or by her authorized
personnel. The PNPs own records show that it was claimed and
signed for by Cruz, who is openly known as being connected to
Highland Enterprises, another contractor. Hence, absent any
showing that the respondent agreed to the payment of the
100
contract price to another person, or that she authorized Cruz
to claim the check on her behalf, the payment, to be effective
must be made to her.[77]
The petitioner also challenged the RTCs findings, on
the ground that it overlooked material fact and circumstance
of significant weight and substance.[78] Invoking the doctrine
of adoptive admission, the petitioner pointed out that the
respondents inaction towards Cruz, whom she has known to
have claimed her check as early as 1996, should be taken
against her. Finally, the petitioner contends that Cruzs
testimony should be taken against respondent as well, under
Rule 130, Sec. 32 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since she
has not presented any controverting evidence x x x
notwithstanding that she personally heard it.[79]
The respondent has explained her inaction towards
Cruz and Highland Enterprises. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals have found her explanation sufficient and this Court
finds no cogent reason to overturn the assessment by the trial
court and the Court of Appeals of the respondents
testimony. It may be recalled that the respondent argued that
since it was the PNP who owed her money, her actions should
be directed towards the PNP and not Cruz or Highland
Enterprises, against whom she has no adequate
proof.[80] Respondent has also adequately explained her delay
in filing an action against the petitioner, particularly that she
did not want to prejudice her other pending transactions with
the PNP.[81]
The petitioner claims that the RTC overlooked
material fact and circumstance of significant weight and
substance,[82] but it ignores all the documentary evidence, and
even its own admissions, which are evidence of the greater
weight and substance, that support the conclusions reached
by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC
erred in the interest rate and other monetary sums awarded
to respondent as baseless. However, we must further modify
the interest rate imposed by the Court of Appeals pursuant to
the rule laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[83]:
I. When an obligation, regardless of
its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable
for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII
on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
II. With regard particularly to an
award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
1. When the obligation is breached,
and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
12%per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions
of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the courtat the rate of
6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable
certainty.Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially
(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established
at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time
the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph
2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[84]
Since the obligation herein is for the payment of a
sum of money, the legal interest rate to be imposed, under
Article 2209 of the Civil Code is six percent (6%) per annum:
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists
in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six
per cent per annum.
Following the guidelines above, the legal interest of
6% per annum is to be imposed from November 16, 1997, the
date of the last demand, and 12% in lieu of 6% from the date
this decision becomes final until fully paid.
Petitioners allegations of sham dealings involving our
own government agencies are potentially disturbing and
alarming. If Cruzs testimony were true, this should be a lesson
to the PNP not to dabble in spurious transactions. Obviously,
if it can afford to give a 2% commission to other contractors
for the mere use of their business names, then the petitioner
is disbursing more money than it normally would in a
legitimate transaction. It is recommended that the proper
agency investigate this matter and hold the involved personnel
accountable to avoid any similar occurrence in the future.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 80623
dated September 27, 2006 is AFFIRMED with the
101
MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX
PERCENT (6%) per annum on the amount acquisition of various building materials amounting to Two materials MGM procured for the PNP under their December
of P2,226,147.26, computed from the date of the last demand Million Two Hundred Eighty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred 1995 Contract.
or on November 16, 1997. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per
annum interest in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%) shall be imposed Sixty-Two Pesos and Sixty Centavos (P2,288,562.60) for the
on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment
construction of a four-storey condominium building with roof On November 17, 1997, the PNP, through its Officer-
thereof.
deck at Camp Crame, Quezon City.[7] in-Charge, replied[19] to respondents counsel, informing her of
SO ORDERED. the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of the Philippines
Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM (LBP) Check No. 0000530631, [20] as evidenced by Receipt No.
Republic of the Philippines vs. De Guzman,
G.R. No. 175021, June 15, 2011 and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief, 001, [21] issued by the respondent to the PNP on April 23,
executed a Contract of Agreement[8] (the Contract) wherein 1996.[22]
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: MGM, for the price of P2,288,562.60, undertook to procure
and deliver to the PNP the construction materials itemized in On November 26, 1997, respondent, through counsel,
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the purchase order[9] attached to the Contract. Respondent responded by reiterating her demand[23] and denying having
Republic of the Philippines, as represented by the Chief of the claimed that after the PNP Chief approved the Contract and ever received the LBP check, personally or through an
Philippine National Police (PNP), of the September 27, purchase order,[10] MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with the authorized person. She also claimed that Receipt No. 001, a
2006 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. delivery of the construction materials, as evidenced by copy of which was attached to the PNPs November 17, 1997
80623, which affirmed with modification the September 8, Delivery Receipt Nos. 151-153,[11] Sales Invoice Nos. 038 and letter, could not support the PNPs claim of payment as the
2003 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 222, 041,[12] and the Report of Public Property Purchase[13] issued aforesaid receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders, her other
of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q99-37717. by the PNPs Receiving and Accounting Officers to their Internal company, which was also doing business with the PNP, and not
Auditor Chief. Respondent asseverated that following the to MGM, with which the contract was made.
Respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General PNPs inspection of the delivered materials on March 4,
Merchandise (MGM),[4] a contractor accredited by the PNP for 1996,[14] the PNP issued two Disbursement Vouchers; one in On May 5, 1999, respondent filed a Complaint for Sum
the supply of office and construction materials and the amount of P2,226,147.26 in favor of MGM,[15] and the of Money against the petitioner, represented by the Chief of
equipment, and for the delivery of various services such as other, [16] in the amount of P62,415.34, representing the three the PNP, before the RTC, Branch 222 of Quezon City. [24] This
printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and percent (3%) withholding tax, in favor of the Bureau of Internal was docketed as Civil Case No. Q99-37717.
renovation of buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare Revenue (BIR).[17]
parts.[5] The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss[25] on July 5,
On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through 1999, on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in
On December 8, 1995, the PNP Engineering Services counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 1997[18] to the PNP, respondents complaint had already been paid or
(PNPES), released a Requisition and Issue Voucher [6] for the demanding the payment of P2,288,562.60 for the construction extinguished,[26] as evidenced by LBP Check No. 0000530631
102
dated April 18, 1996, issued by the PNP to MGM, and Receipt filed its Answer,[32] wherein it restated the same allegations in Atty. Albano (To Court)
No. 001, which the respondent correspondingly issued to the its Motion to Dismiss.
Yes, your Honor.
PNP. The petitioner also argued that aside from the fact that
Court (To Atty. Albano)
the respondent, in her October 20, 1997 letter, demanded the Trial on the merits followed the pre-trial conference,
incorrect amount since it included the withholding tax paid to which was terminated on June 25, 2002 when the parties I think we have an abbreviated testimony
here. Proceed.[34] (Emphasis
the BIR, her delay in making such demand [did] not speak well failed to arrive at an amicable settlement.[33] ours.)
of the worthiness of the cause she espouse[d].[27]
On September 3, 2002, shortly after respondent was
The stipulations made by the petitioner through Atty.
Respondent opposed petitioners motion to dismiss in sworn in as a witness, and after her counsel formally offered
Bueno were in consonance with the admissions it had
her July 12, 1999 Opposition[28]and September 10, 1999 her testimony in evidence, Atty. Norman Bueno, petitioners
previously made, also through Atty. Bueno, in its
Supplemental Opposition to Motion to counsel at that time, made the following stipulations in open
Answer,[35] and pre-trial brief[36]:
Dismiss.[29]Respondent posited that Receipt No. 001, which the court:
petitioner claimed was issued by MGM upon respondents
Atty. Bueno (To Court) Answer:
receipt of the LBP check, was, first, under the business name Your Honor, in order to expedite the trial, we IX
Montaguz Builders, an entity separate from MGM. Next, will admit that this witness was contracted It ADMITS the allegation in
to deliver the construction supplies or paragraph 9 of the Complaint that
petitioners allegation that she received the LBP check on April materials. We will admit that she [respondent] delivered to the PNP
complied, that she actually delivered the Engineering Service the construction
19, 1996 was belied by the fact that Receipt No. 001, which
materials. We will admit that Land Bank materials. It also ADMITS the existence of
was supposedly issued for the check, was dated four days Corporation check was issued although we Receipt Nos. 151, 152 and 153 alleged in the
will not admit that the check was not same paragraph, copies of which are
later, or April 23, 1996. Moreover, respondent averred, the released to her, as [a] matter of fact, we attached to the Complaint as Annexes G, G-1
have the copy of the check. We will admit and G-2.[37] (Emphasis ours.)
PNPs own Checking Account Section Logbook or the Warrant
that Warrant Register indicated that the
Register, showed that it was one Edgardo Cruz (Cruz) who check was released although we will not
admit that the check was not received by
signed for the check due to MGM, [30] contrary to her usual the [respondent]. Pre-trial Brief:
practice of personally receiving and signing for checks payable
III
to her companies. Court (To Atty. Albano)
ADMISSIONS
So, the issues here are whether or not the
After conducting hearings on the Motion to Dismiss, [respondent] received the 3.1. Facts and/or documents admitted
check for the payment of For brevity, [petitioner] admit[s] only the
the RTC issued an Order[31] on May 4, 2001, denying the the construction materials allegations in [respondents] Complaint and
or supplies and who the annexes thereto that were admitted in
petitioners motion for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter the Answer.[38] (Emphases ours.)
received the same. That is
all.
103
 missing receipt and issued Receipt No. 002 in its identified in open court. She claimed that when she released
With the issue then confined to whether respondent
place.[42] After a few months, respondent inquired with the the check to respondent, she also handed her a voucher, and
was paid or not, the RTC proceeded with the trial.
PNP Finance Center about the payment due to MGM under the a logbook also known as the Warrant Register, for
Contract of December 1995 and was surprised to find out that signing.[47] When asked why Cruz was allowed to sign for the
Respondent, in her testimony, narrated that on April
the check payable to MGM had already been released. Upon check, Ms. Magtira explained that this was allowed since the
18, 1996, she went to the PNP Finance Center to claim a check
making some inquiries, respondent learned that the check, respondent already gave her the official receipt for the check,
due to one of her companies, Montaguz Builders. As the PNP
payable to MGM, in the amount of P2,226,147.26, was and it was respondent herself who gave the logbook to Cruz
required the issuance of an official receipt upon claiming its
received by Cruz, who signed the PNPs Warrant for signing.[48]
checks, respondent, in preparation for the PNP check she
Register. Respondent admitted to knowing Cruz, as he was
expected, already signed Montaguz Builders Official Receipt
connected with Highland Enterprises, a fellow PNP-accredited The petitioner next presented Edgardo Cruz for the
No. 001, albeit the details were still blank. However, upon
contractor. However, she denied ever having authorized Cruz purpose of proving that the payment respondent was claiming
arriving at the PNP Finance Center, respondent was told that
or Highland Enterprises to receive or claim any of the checks rightfully belonged to Highland Enterprises. Cruz testified that
the check was still with the LBP, which could not yet release
due to MGM or Montaguz Builders.[43] When asked why she had Highland Enterprises had been an accredited contractor of the
it. Respondent then left for the Engineering Services Office to
not filed a case against Cruz or Herminio Reyes, the owner of PNP since 1975. In 1995, Cruz claimed that the PNPES was
see Captain Rama, along with Receipt No. 001, which she had
Highland Enterprises, considering the admitted fact that Cruz tasked to construct by administration a condominium
not yet issued.[39] Respondent claimed that after some time,
claimed the check due to her, respondent declared that there building. This meant that the PNPES had to do all the work,
she left her belongings, including her receipt booklet, at a
was no reason for her to confront them as it was the PNPs fault from the canvassing of the materials to the construction of the
bench in Captain Ramas office when she went around the
that the check was released to the wrong person. Thus, it was building. The PNPES allegedly lacked the funds to do this and
Engineering Office to talk to some other people.[40] She
the PNPs problem to find out where the money had gone, while so asked for Highland Enterprisess help.[49] In a meeting with
reasoned that since she was already familiar and comfortable
her course of action was to go after the PNP, as the party its accredited contractors, the PNPES asked if the other
with the people in the PNPES Office, she felt no need to ask
involved in the Contract.[44] contractors would agree to the use of their business
anyone to look after her belongings, as it was her normal
name[50] for a two percent (2%) commission of the purchase
practice[41] to leave her belongings in one of the offices
On April 29, 2003, petitioner presented Ms. Jesusa order price to avoid the impression that Highland Enterprises
there. The next day, respondent alleged that when she
Magtira, who was then the check releaser[45] of the PNP, to was monopolizing the supply of labor and materials to the
returned for the check due to Montaguz Builders that she was
prove that the respondent received the LBP check due to MGM, PNP.[51] Cruz alleged that on April 23, 1996, he and the
not able to claim the day before, she discovered for the first
and that respondent herself gave the check to Cruz. [46] Ms. respondent went to the PNP Finance Center to claim the LBP
time that Receipt No. 001, which was meant for that check,
Magtira testified that on April 23, 1996, she released the LBP check due to MGM. Cruz said that the respondent handed him
was missing. Since she would not be able to claim her check
check payable to the order of MGM, in the amount the already signed Receipt No. 001, which he filled up. He
without issuing a receipt, she just informed the releaser of the
of P2,226,147.26, to the respondent herein, whom she claimed that the respondent knew that the LBP check was
104
really meant for Highland Enterprises as she had already been
paid her 2% commission for the use of her business name in
the concerned transaction.[52]
On September 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,
the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of [respondent]
and against [petitioner] ordering the latter to
pay [respondent] the following sums:
(1) P2,226,147.26 representing the
principal sum plus interest at
14% per annum from April 18,
1996 until the same shall have
been fully paid;
(2) 20% of the sum to be collected
as attorneys fees; and,
(3) Costs of suit.[53]
The RTC declared that while Cruzs testimony seemed
to offer a plausible explanation on how and why the LBP check
ended up with him, the petitioner, already admitted in its
Answer, and Pre-trial Brief, that MGM, did in fact deliver the
construction materials worth P2,288,562.60 to the PNP. The
RTC also pointed out the fact that the petitioner made the
same admissions in open court to expedite the trial, leaving
only one issue to be resolved: whether the respondent had
been paid or not. Since this was the only issue, the RTC said
that it had no choice but to go back to the documents and the
documentary evidence clearly indicates that the check subject
of this case was never received by [respondent].[54] In
addition, the PNPs own Warrant Register showed that it was
Edgardo Cruz who received the LBP check, and Receipt No.
001 submitted by the petitioner to support its claim was not
issued by MGM, but by Montaguz Builders, a different
entity. Finally, the RTC held that Cruzs testimony, which
appeared to be an afterthought to cover up the PNPs blunder,
were irreconcilable with the petitioners earlier declarations
and admissions, hence, not credit-worthy.
The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the RTCs ruling on
September 27, 2006:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the 14% interest per
annum imposed on the principal amount is
ordered reduced to 12%, computed from
November 16, 1997 until fully paid. The order
for the payment of attorneys fees and costs
of the suit is DELETED.[55]
The Court of Appeals, in deciding against the
petitioner, held that the petitioners admissions and
declarations, made in various stages of the proceedings are
express admissions, which cannot be overcome by allegations
of respondents implied admissions. Moreover, petitioner
cannot controvert its own admissions and it is estopped from
denying that it had a contract with MGM, which MGM duly
complied with. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC that
the real issue for determination was whether the petitioner
was able to discharge its contractual obligation with the
respondent. The Court of Appeals held that while the PNPs
own Warrant Register disclosed that the payment due to MGM
was received by Cruz, on behalf of Highland Enterprises, the
PNPs contract was clearly with MGM, and not with Highland
Enterprises.Thus, in order to extinguish its obligation, the
petitioner should have directed its payment to MGM unless
MGM authorized a third person to accept payment on its
behalf.
The petitioner is now before this Court, praying for
the reversal of the lower courts decisions on the ground that
the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law by
affirming the decision of the trial court.[56]
THE COURTS RULING:
This case stemmed from a contract executed between
the respondent and the petitioner. While the petitioner, in
proclaiming that the respondents claim had already been
extinguished, initially insisted on having fulfilled its
contractual obligation, it now contends that the contract it
executed with the respondent is actually a fictitious contract
to conceal the fact that only one contractor will be supplying
all the materials and labor for the PNP condominium project.
105

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals upheld the
validity of the contract between the petitioner and the
respondent on the strength of the documentary evidence
presented and offered in Court and on petitioners own
stipulations and admissions during various stages of the
proceedings.
It is worthy to note that while this petition was filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the assertions and
arguments advanced herein are those that will necessarily
require this Court to re-evaluate the evidence on record.
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review
under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised by the
parties and passed upon by this Court.[57]
This Court has, on many occasions, distinguished
between a question of law and a question of fact. We held that
when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, then it is a question of law; but when the doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a
question of fact.[58] Simply put, when there is no dispute as to
fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn
therefrom is correct, is a question of law.[59] To elucidate
further, this Court, in Hko Ah Pao v. Ting[60] said:
One test to determine if there exists a
question of fact or law in a given case is
whether the Court can resolve the issue that
was raised without having to review or
evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a
question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not
involve the calibration of the probative
value of the evidence presented. In
addition, the facts of the case must be
undisputed, and the only issue that should be
left for the Court to decide is whether or not
the conclusion drawn by the CA from a
certain set of facts was
appropriate.[61] (Emphases ours.)
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the
controversial LBP check are central to the issue before us, the
resolution of which, will require a perusal of the entire records
of the case including the transcribed testimonies of the
witnesses. Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of
fact are not reviewable. As a rule, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are final and conclusive[62] and this Court will
only review them under the following recognized exceptions:
(1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals,
in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record.[63]
Although petitioners sole ground to support this
petition was stated in such a manner as to impress upon this
Court that the Court of Appeals committed an error in law,
what the petitioner actually wants us to do is to review and
re-examine the factual findings of both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this
case falls under any of the enumerated exceptions to the rule,
we are constrained to uphold the facts as established by both
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the
conclusions reached in the appealed decision.
Nonetheless, even if we were to exercise utmost
liberality and veer away from the rule, the records will show
that the petitioner had failed to establish its case by a
preponderance of evidence.[64] Section 1, Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides the guidelines in determining
preponderance of evidence:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of
evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the
party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the
court may consider all the facts and
106
 circumstances of the case, the witnesses
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their
means and opportunity of knowing the facts
to which they are testifying, the nature of
the facts to which they testify, the
probability or improbability of their
testimony, their interest or want of interest,
and also their personal credibility so far as
the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
Expounding on the concept of preponderance of
evidence, this Court in Encinas v. National Bookstore,
Inc.,[65] held:
Preponderance of evidence is the weight,
credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term greater weight of
the evidence or greater weight of the
credible evidence. Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last
analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.[66]
The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals should
not have relied heavily, if not solely[67] on the admissions made
by petitioners former counsel, thereby losing sight of the
secret agreement between the respondent and Highland
Enterprises, which explains why all the documentary evidence
were in respondents name.[68]
The petitioner relies mainly on Cruzs testimony to
support its allegations. Not only did it not present any other
witness to corroborate Cruz, but it also failed to present any
documentation to confirm its story. It is doubtful that the
petitioner or the contractors would enter into any secret
agreement involving millions of pesos based purely on verbal
affirmations. Meanwhile, the respondent not only presented
all the documentary evidence to prove her claims, even the
petitioner repeatedly admitted that respondent had fully
complied with her contractual obligations.
The petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals
should have appreciated the clear and adequate testimony of
Cruz, and should have given it utmost weight and credit
especially since his testimony was a judicial admission against
interest a primary evidence which should have been accorded
full evidentiary value.[69]
The trial courts appreciation of the witnesses
testimonies is entitled to the highest respect since it was in a
better position to assess their credibility.[70] The RTC held
Cruzs testimony to be not credit worthy[71] for being
irreconcilable with petitioners earlier admissions. Contrary to
petitioners contentions, Cruzs testimony cannot be considered
as a judicial admission against his interest as he is neither a
party to the case nor was his admission against his own
interest, but actually against either the petitioners or the
respondents interest. Petitioners statements on the other
hand, were deliberate, clear, and unequivocal and were made
in the course of judicial proceedings; thus, they qualify as
judicial admissions.[72] In Alfelor v. Halasan,[73] this Court held
that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot
later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof; production
of evidence is dispensed with. A judicial
admission also removes an admitted fact
from the field of controversy. Consequently,
an admission made in the pleadings cannot be
controverted by the party making such
admission and are conclusive as to such
party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party
or not. The allegations, statements or
admissions contained in a pleading are
conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contrary
of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.[74]
The petitioner admitted to the existence and validity
of the Contract of Agreement executed between the PNP and
MGM, as represented by the respondent, on December 11,
1995. It likewise admitted that respondent delivered the
construction materials subject of the Contract, not once, but
several times during the course of the proceedings. The only
matter petitioner assailed was respondents allegation that she
had not yet been paid. If Cruzs testimony were true, the
petitioner should have put respondent in her place the
moment she sent a letter to the PNP, demanding payment for
the construction materials she had allegedly
delivered. Instead, the petitioner replied that it had already
paid respondent as evidenced by the LBP check and the
107

receipt she supposedly issued. This line of defense continued
on, with the petitioner assailing only the respondents claim of
nonpayment, and not the rest of respondents claims, in its
motion to dismiss, its answer, its pre-trial brief, and even in
open court during the respondents testimony. Section 4, Rule
129 of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 4. Judicial Admissions.An
admission, verbal or written, made by a party
in the course of the proceedings in the same
case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made.
Petitioners admissions were proven to have been
made in various stages of the proceedings, and since the
petitioner has not shown us that they were made through
palpable mistake, they are conclusive as to the
petitioner. Hence, the only question to be resolved is whether
the respondent was paid under the December 1995 Contract
of Agreement.
The RTC and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the petitioners obligation has not been extinguished. The
petitioners obligation consists of payment of a sum of
money. In order for petitioners payment to be effective in
extinguishing its obligation, it must be made to the proper
person. Article 1240 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1240. Payment shall be made to
the person in whose favor the obligation has
been constituted, or his successor in interest,
or any person authorized to receive it. showing that the respondent agreed to the payment of the
contract price to another person, or that she authorized Cruz
to claim the check on her behalf, the payment, to be effective
In Cembrano v. City of Butuan,[75] this Court
must be made to her.[77]
elucidated on how payment will effectively extinguish an
obligation, to wit:
The petitioner also challenged the RTCs findings, on
Payment made by the debtor to the the ground that it overlooked material fact and circumstance
person of the creditor or to one authorized
of significant weight and substance.[78] Invoking the doctrine
by him or by the law to receive it extinguishes
the obligation. When payment is made to the of adoptive admission, the petitioner pointed out that the
wrong party, however, the obligation is not
extinguished as to the creditor who is without respondents inaction towards Cruz, whom she has known to
fault or negligence even if the debtor acted
have claimed her check as early as 1996, should be taken
in utmost good faith and by mistake as to the
person of the creditor or through error against her. Finally, the petitioner contends that Cruzs
induced by fraud of a third person.
testimony should be taken against respondent as well, under
In general, a payment in order to be Rule 130, Sec. 32 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, since she
effective to discharge an obligation, must be
made to the proper person. Thus, payment has not presented any controverting evidence x x x
must be made to the obligee himself or to an
agent having authority, express or implied, to notwithstanding that she personally heard it.[79]
receive the particular payment. Payment
made to one having apparent authority to
receive the money will, as a rule, be treated The respondent has explained her inaction towards
as though actual authority had been given for
Cruz and Highland Enterprises. Both the RTC and the Court of
its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to
one who by law is authorized to act for the Appeals have found her explanation sufficient and this Court
creditor, it will work a discharge. The receipt
of money due on a judgment by an officer finds no cogent reason to overturn the assessment by the trial
authorized by law to accept it will, court and the Court of Appeals of the respondents
therefore, satisfy the debt.[76]
testimony. It may be recalled that the respondent argued that
since it was the PNP who owed her money, her actions should
The respondent was able to establish that the LBP
be directed towards the PNP and not Cruz or Highland
check was not received by her or by her authorized
Enterprises, against whom she has no adequate
personnel. The PNPs own records show that it was claimed and
proof.[80] Respondent has also adequately explained her delay
signed for by Cruz, who is openly known as being connected to
in filing an action against the petitioner, particularly that she
Highland Enterprises, another contractor. Hence, absent any
108

did not want to prejudice her other pending transactions with
the PNP.[81]
The petitioner claims that the RTC overlooked
material fact and circumstance of significant weight and
substance,[82] but it ignores all the documentary evidence, and
even its own admissions, which are evidence of the greater
weight and substance, that support the conclusions reached
by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the RTC
erred in the interest rate and other monetary sums awarded
to respondent as baseless. However, we must further modify
the interest rate imposed by the Court of Appeals pursuant to
the rule laid down in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals[83]:
I. When an obligation, regardless of
its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-
contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable
for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII
on "Damages" of the Civil Code govern in
determining the measure of recoverable
damages.
II. With regard particularly to an
award of interest in the concept of actual and
compensatory damages, the rate of interest,
as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as
follows:
1. When the obligation is breached,
and it consists in the payment of a sum of
money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money,
the interest due should be that which may
have been stipulated in
writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall
itself earn legal interest from the time it is
judicially demanded. In the absence of
stipulation, the rate of interest shall be
12%per annum to be computed from
default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial
demand under and subject to the provisions
of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money,
is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at
the discretion of the courtat the rate of
6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be
adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages
except when or until the demand can be
established with reasonable
certainty.Accordingly, where the demand is
established with reasonable certainty, the
interest shall begin to run from the time the
claim is made judicially or extrajudicially
(Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established
at the time the demand is made, the interest
shall begin to run only from the date the
judgment of the court is made (at which time
the quantification of damages may be
deemed to have been reasonably
ascertained). The actual base for the
computation of legal interest shall, in any
case, be on the amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court
awarding a sum of money becomes final and
executory, the rate of legal interest, whether
the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph
2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such
finality until its satisfaction, this interim
period being deemed to be by then an
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[84]
Since the obligation herein is for the payment of a
sum of money, the legal interest rate to be imposed, under
Article 2209 of the Civil Code is six percent (6%) per annum:
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists
in the payment of a sum of money, and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for
damages, there being no stipulation to the
contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of
stipulation, the legal interest, which is six
per cent per annum.
Following the guidelines above, the legal interest of
6% per annum is to be imposed from November 16, 1997, the
date of the last demand, and 12% in lieu of 6% from the date
this decision becomes final until fully paid.
Petitioners allegations of sham dealings
involving our own government agencies are
potentially disturbing and alarming. If Cruzs
testimony were true, this should be a lesson
to the PNP not to dabble in spurious
transactions. Obviously, if it can afford to
give a 2% commission to other contractors for
the mere use of their business names, then
the petitioner is disbursing more money than
it normally would in a legitimate
transaction. It is recommended that the
proper agency investigate this matter and
hold the involved personnel accountable to
avoid any similar occurrence in the future.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 80623
dated September 27, 2006 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the legal interest to be paid is SIX
109

PERCENT (6%) per annum on the amount
of P2,226,147.26, computed from the date of the last demand
or on November 16, 1997. A TWELVE PERCENT (12%) per
annum interest in lieu of SIX PERCENT (6%) shall be imposed
on such amount upon finality of this decision until the payment
thereof. SO ORDERED.
Fairland Knitcraft Corporation vs. Po,
G.R. No. 217694, January 27, 2016
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to
reverse and set aside the October 31, 2014
Decision2 and the March 6, 2015 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 134701 which
affirmed the September 16, 2013 Decision4 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67 (RTC) in
SCA Case No. 3831. The RTC decision, in turn,
sustained the March 21, 2013 Decision5 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig
City (MeTC), which dismissed the unlawful detainer
case filed by petitioner Fairland Knitcraft
Corporation (Fairland) against respondent Arturo Loo
Po (Po) for failure to prove its case by preponderance
of evidence.
The Antecedents
In a complaint6 for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil
Case No. 19429, filed before the MeTC, Fairland
alleged that it was the owner of Condominium Unit No.
205 in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig
City. The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by
verbal agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a
month, to be paid by Po at the beginning of each
month. From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to
pay rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew
the lease agreement anymore.
On January 30, 2012, Fairland sent a formal letter7 to
Po demanding that he pay the amount of P220,000.00,
representing the rental arrears, and that he vacate the
leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the letter. Despite receipt of the demand
letter and the lapse of the said 15-day period to
comply, Po neither tendered payment for the unpaid
rent nor vacated the premises. Thus, on December 12,
2012, Fairland was constrained to file the complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po had until
January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed to do
so. Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion
to render judgment.8
In its February 21, 2013 Order,9 the MeTC considered
the case submitted for decision.
On March 1, 2013, Po’s counsel filed his Entry of
Appearance with Motion for Leave of Court to file
Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render
Judgment.10 In the attached Comment/Opposition, Po
denied the allegations against him and commented that
there was no supporting document that would show
that Fairland owned the property; that there was no
lease contract between them; that there were no
documents attached to the complaint which would
show that previous demands had been made and
received by him; that the alleged unpaid rental was
P220,000.00, but the amount of damages being prayed
for was P440,000.00; that the issue in the case was one
of ownership; and that it was the RTC which had
jurisdiction over the case.
The MeTC treated the comment/opposition as Po’s
answer to the complaint. Considering, however, that
the case fell under the Rules of Summary Procedure,
the same was deemed filed out of time. Hence, the
motion was denied.11
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its March 21, 2013 Decision, the MeTC dismissed the
complaint for lack of merit due to Fairland’s failure to
prove its claim by preponderance of evidence. The
MeTC explained that although the complaint
sufficiently alleged a cause of action, Fairland failed to
prove that it was entitled to the possession of the
subject property. There was no evidence presented to
support its claim against Po either.
Aggrieved, Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before
the RTC under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. Being an
appealed case, the RTC required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
In its memorandum,12 Fairland argued that an unlawful
detainer case was a special civil action governed by
summary procedure. In cases where a defendant failed
to file his answer, there was no need for a declaration
of default. Fairland claimed that the Rules stated that
in such cases, judgment should be based on the “facts
alleged in the complaint,”13 and that there was no
requirement that judgment must be based on facts
proved by preponderance of evidence. Considering that
the presentation of evidence was not required when a
defendant in an ejectment case failed to appear in a
preliminary conference, the same should be applied
when no answer had been filed.
Fairland continued that the failure to file an answer in
an ejectment case was tantamount to an admission by
the defendant of all the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint. There was no more need for evidence in
such a situation as every allegation of ultimate facts in
the complaint was deemed established by the
defendant’s acquiescence.
On July 18, 2013, Po filed his memorandum14 and
countered that there was no merit in Fairland’s
insistence that evidence was unnecessary when no
answer had been filed. The facts stated in the
110
complaint did not warrant a rendition of judgment in
the plaintiff’s favor. The court had the discretion to
rule on the pleadings based on its evaluation of the
allegation of facts.
Further, all the statements in the complaint were mere
allegations which were not substantiated by any
competent evidence. Po asserted that there was no
proof presented to show that the subject property was
indeed owned by Fairland; that there was no lease
contract between the parties; that he never received
the demand letter, dated January 30, 2012; and that
the amount stated in the prayer of the complaint did
not coincide with the amount of unpaid rent. Po also
reiterated that the case involved an issue of ownership
over the condominium unit he was occupying.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On September 16, 2013, the RTC affirmed the MeTC
ruling and agreed that Fairland failed to establish its
case by preponderance of evidence. There was nothing
on record that would establish Fairland’s right over the
property subject of the complaint. Though it had been
consistently ruled that the only issue for resolution in
an ejectment case was the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of
any claim of ownership by any of the party-litigants,
the court may go beyond the question of physical
possession provisionally. The RTC concluded that even
assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his actual
physical possession of the subject property created the
presumption that he was entitled to its possession
thereof.
Fairland filed a motion for reconsideration15 attaching
its condominium certificate of title16 over the subject
property, but it was denied by the RTC in its
Order,17 dated February 24, 2014.
Undaunted, Fairland filed a petition for review18 under
Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In the assailed Decision, dated October 31, 2014, the
CA dismissed the petition and ruled that an action for
unlawful detainer would not lie against Po.
Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding it
ordained and the limited pleadings it allowed, the
Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on
evidence. In order for an action for recovery of
possession to prosper, it was indispensable that he who
brought the action should prove not only his ownership
but also the identity of the property claimed. The CA
concluded, however, that Fairland failed to discharge
such bounden duty.
Fairland filed its motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied by the CA in its assailed Resolution, dated
March 6, 2015.
Hence, this petition.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS
I
IN AN EJECTMENT CASE WHEREIN NO ANSWER WAS
SEASONABLY FILED, IT IS AN ERROR OF LAW TO BASE
JUDGMENT ON PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
II
HOLDING THAT EVIDENCE IN AN EJECTMENT CASE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ATTACHED TO THE COMPLAINT
IS AN ERROR OF LAW.19
Fairland argues that in ejectment cases, presentation
of evidence was undertaken through the submission of
position papers but the same was dispensed with when
the defendant failed to file an answer or when either
party failed to appear during the preliminary
conference. In an ejectment case, the scope of inquiry
should be limited to the sufficiency of the cause of
action stated in the complaint when no seasonable
answer was filed. The attachment of documentary
evidence to the Complaint was not a requirement and
was even proscribed by law.
In his Comment,20 Po countered that the present
petition raised a question of fact. Although couched in
different words, the issues raised here were
substantially the same as the issues raised before the
CA. There was no legal basis in Fairland’s assertion that
evidence was dispensed with when no answer to the
complaint had been filed. Such argument would
undermine the inherent authority of the courts to
resolve legal issues based on the facts of the case and
on the rules on evidence. Contrary to Fairland’s
position, the court decided the case on the basis of the
complaint which was found wanting in preponderance
of evidence.
In its Reply,21 Fairland posited that the petition did not
raise mere questions of fact but one of law as what was
being sought for review was the erroneous dismissal of
the ejectment case for lack of preponderance of
evidence. Since no answer was filed and the complaint
sufficiently alleged a cause of action for unlawful
detainer, it became the duty of the MeTC to decide the
case in its favor.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Complaint has a valid cause of action for Unlawful
Detainer
Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court lays down the
requirements for filing a complaint for unlawful
detainer, to wit:
111
 Section 1. – Who may institute proceedings,
and when. – Subject to the provision of the next
succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against
whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such
lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may,
at any time within one (1) year after such
unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, bring an action in the proper
Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming
under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
1âwphi1
Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary
action for the recovery of possession of real property.
This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person from whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant was originally legal, as his possession was
permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or
implied contract between them. The defendant’s
possession, however, became illegal when the plaintiff
demanded that the defendant vacate the subject
property due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess under the contract, and the defendant
refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful
detainer must be instituted one year from the unlawful
withholding of possession.22
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following: (1)
initially, possession of the property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
termination of the latter’s right of possession; (3)
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property, and deprived the plaintiff of the
enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one (1) year from
the last demand on defendant to vacate the property,
the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.23
There is no question that the complaint filed by
Fairland adequately alleged a cause of action for
unlawful detainer. The pertinent portion of the said
complaint reads:
xxx
3. Plaintiff is the owner of, and had been
leasing to the defendant, the premises
mentioned above as the residence of the latter;
4. There is no current written lease contract
between plaintiff and the defendant, but the
latter agreed to pay the former the amount of
Php20,000.00 as rent at the beginning of each
month. Thus, the term of the lease agreement
is renewable on a month-to-month basis;
5. Since March 2011, defendant has not been
paying the aforesaid rent despite plaintiff’s
repeated demands;
6. Due to defendant’s continuous failure to pay
rent, plaintiff reached a decision not to renew
the lease agreement. It sent a formal letter, x x
x demanding defendant to pay the amount of
Php220,000.00, representing defendant’s
twelve month rental arrears beginning January
2011, and to vacate the leased premises, both
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of said
letter;
7. Despite receipt of the aforesaid demand
letter and lapse of the fifteen day period given
to comply with plaintiff’s demand, defendant
neither tendered payment for the unpaid rent
nor vacated the leased premises. Worse,
defendant has not been paying rent up to now;
x x x24
The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently
alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject
property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral
agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to
pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful
detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably
filed within the one-year period prescribed by law.
With all the elements present, there was clearly a
cause of action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.
Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of
evidence is not considered when a judgment is
rendered based on the complaint
The question now is whether the MeTC correctly
dismissed the case for lack of preponderance of
evidence. Fairland posits that judgment should have
been rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint
itself and not on its failure to adduce proof of
ownership over the subject property.
The Court agrees with Fairland’s position.
The summons, together with the complaint and its
annexes, was served upon Po on December 28, 2012.
This presupposes that the MeTC found no ground to
dismiss the action for unlawful detainer.25 Nevertheless,
Po failed to file his answer on time and the MeTC had
the option to render judgment motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff. In relation thereto, Sections 5
and 6 of the Rules on Summary Procedure provide:
112
Sec. 5. Answer. – Within ten (10) days from service of
summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.
Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein
shall be deemed waived, except for lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory
counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall be
considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or
cross-claims shall be filed and served within ten (10)
days from service of the answer in which they are
pleaded.
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to answer. – Should the
defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio or on
motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint
and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court
may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages
and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or
otherwise unconscionable, without prejudice to the
applicability of Section 4, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court, if there are two or more defendants.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Section 6 is clear that in case the defendant failed to
file his answer, the court shall render judgment,
either motu proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based
solely on the facts alleged in the complaint and
limited to what is prayed for. The failure of the
defendant to timely file his answer and to controvert
the claim against him constitutes his acquiescence to
every allegation stated in the complaint. Logically,
there is nothing to be done in this situation26except to
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint.27
Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, which governs the rules for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the
complaint within the period provided, the court has no
authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead,
the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by
the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what
is prayed for.28
This has been enunciated in the case of Don Tino
Realty and Development Corporation v.
Florentino,29 citing Bayog v. Natino,30 where the Court
held that there was no provision for an entry of default
under the Rules of Summary Procedure if the
defendant failed to file his answer.
In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the
complaint despite proper service of summons. He also
failed to provide a sufficient justification to excuse his
lapses. Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must
1âwphi1
be rendered by the court as may be warranted by the
facts alleged in the complaint.
Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint
alleges a sufficient cause of action; evidence need not
be attached to the complaint
The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint
of Fairland simply on the ground that it failed to
establish by preponderance of evidence its ownership
over the subject property. As can be gleaned above,
the rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach his
evidence to the complaint because, at this inception
stage, he only has to file his complaint to establish his
cause of action. Here, the court was only tasked to
determine whether the complaint of Fairland alleged a
sufficient cause of action and to render judgment
thereon.
Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in
the complaint because the allegations therein
constituted a sufficient cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint
are insufficient to form a cause of action shall the
attachment become material in the determination
thereof. Even under Section 4 of the Rules of Summary
Procedure,31 it is not mandatory to attach annexes to
the complaint.
In the case of Lazaro v. Brewmaster32 (Lazaro), where
judgment was rendered based on the complaint due to
the failure of the defendant to file an answer under
the Rules of Summary Procedure, it was written that:
xxx To determine whether the complaint states a cause
of action, all documents attached thereto may, in fact,
be considered, particularly when referred to in the
complaint. We emphasize, however, that the inquiry
is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations in the complaint. Thus,
consideration of the annexed documents should only
be taken in the context of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint.
[Emphasis Supplied]
In Lazaro, the assailed invalid invoices attached to the
complaint were not considered because the complaint
already alleged a sufficient cause of action for
collection of sum of money. Those assailed documents
were not the bases of the plaintiff’s action for sum of
money, but were only attached to the complaint to
provide evidentiary details on the alleged transactions.
Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for
documentary attachments to prove Fairland’s
ownership over the subject property. First, the present
action is an action for unlawful detainer wherein
only de facto or material possession is required to be
alleged. Evidently, the attachment of any deed of
ownership to the complaint is not indispensable
because an action for unlawful detainer does not
entirely depend on ownership.
Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and
superior right of possession over the subject property.
113
These allegations were evidently manifest in the
complaint as Fairland claimed to have orally agreed to
lease the property to Po. The Court is of the view that
these allegations were clear and unequivocal and did
not need supporting attachments to be considered as
having sufficiently established its cause of action. Even
the MeTC conceded that the complaint of Fairland
stated a valid cause of action for unlawful detainer.33 It
must be stressed that inquiry into the attached
documents in the complaint is for the sufficiency, not
the veracity, of the material allegations in the
complaint.
Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer
within the prescribed period, he was deemed to have
admitted all the allegations in the complaint including
Fairland’s claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure
of the defendant to timely file his answer and
controvert the claim against him constituted his
acquiescence to every allegation stated in the
complaint.
In the Entry of Appearance with Motion for Leave of
Court to file Comment/Opposition to Motion to Render
Judgment, which was belatedly filed and so was denied
by the MeTC, Po merely denied the allegations against
him without even bothering to aver why he claimed to
have a superior right of possession of the subject
property.34
Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary
procedure when the affidavits of witnesses and other
evidence on factual issues shall be presented before
the court. Sections 8 and 9 of the Rules on Summary
Procedure state:
Sec. 8. Record of preliminary conference. – Within five
(5) days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the
matters taken up therein, x x x
Sec. 9. Submission of affidavits and position papers. –
Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order
mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties
shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and
other evidence on the factual issues defined in the
order, together with their position papers setting forth
the law and the facts relied upon by them.
[Emphasis Supplied]
Again, it is worth stressing that these provisions are
exactly Sections 9 and 10 under Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court.
Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings
that the parties will be required to present and offer
their evidence before the court to establish their
causes and defenses. Before the issuance of the record
of preliminary conference, the parties are not yet
required to present their respective evidence.
These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary
Procedure which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, serve their purpose to immediately
settle ejectment proceedings. “Forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings
designed to provide for an expeditious means of
protecting actual possession or the right to possession
of the property involved. It does not admit of a delay
in the determination thereof. It is a ‘time procedure’
designed to remedy the situation.35 Thus, as a
consequence of the defendant’s failure to file an
answer, the court is simply tasked to render judgment
as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.
As the complaint contains a valid cause of action, a
judgment can already be rendered
In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of unlawful detainer cases, a remand of
this case to the lower courts is no longer necessary and
the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.
To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer on time,
judgment shall be rendered based only on the
complaint of Fairland without the need to consider the
weight of evidence. As discussed above, the complaint
of Fairland had a valid cause of action for unlawful
detainer.
Consequently, there is no more need to present
evidence to establish the allegation of Fairland of its
ownership and superior right of possession over the
subject property. Po’s failure to file an answer
constitutes an admission of his illegal occupation due
to his non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland’s rightful
claim of material possession. Thus, judgment must be
rendered finding that Fairland has the right to eject Po
from the subject property.
The Judicial Affidavit Rule
On a final note, the Court deems it proper to discuss
the relevance of the Judicial Affidavit Rule or A.M. No.
12-8-8-SC, where documentary or object evidence are
required to be attached. To begin with, the rule is not
applicable because such evidence are required to be
attached to a judicial affidavit, not to a complaint.
Moreover, as the rule took effect only on January 1,
2013, it cannot be required in this case because this
was earlier filed on December 12, 2012.
Granting that it can be applied retroactively, the rule
being essentially remedial, still it has no bearing on the
ruling of this Court.
In the Judicial Affidavit Rule, the attachments of
documentary or object evidence to the affidavits is
required when there would be a pre-trial or
preliminary conference or the scheduled hearing. As
stated earlier, where a defendant fails to file an
114
answer, the court shall render judgment, either motu
proprio or upon plaintiff’s motion, based solely on the
facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for. Thus, where there is no answer, there is no
need for a pre-trial, preliminary conference or hearing.
Section 2 of the Judicial Affidavit Rule reads:
Section 2. Submission of Judicial Affidavits and Exhibits
in lieu of direct testimonies. - (a) The parties shall file
with the court and serve on the adverse party,
personally or by licensed courier service, not later than
five days before pre-trial or preliminary conference or
the scheduled hearing with respect to motions and
incidents, the following:
(1) The judicial affidavits of their witnesses,
which shall take the place of such witnesses'
direct testimonies; and
(2) The parties' docun1entary or object
evidence, if any, which shall be attached to the
judicial affidavits and marked as Exhibits A, B,
C, and so on in the case of the complainant or
the plaintiff, and as Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and so on
in the case of the respondent or the defendant.
(b) Should a party or a witness desire to keep the
original document or object evidence in his possession,
he may, after the same has been identified, marked as
exhibit, and authenticated, warrant in his judicial
affidavit that the copy or reproduction attached to
such affidavit is a faithful copy or reproduction of that
original. In addition, the party or witness shall bring
the original document or object evidence for
comparison during the preliminary conference with the
attached copy, reproduction, or pictures, failing which
the latter shall not be admitted.
This is without prejudice to the introduction of
secondary evidence in place of the original when
allowed by existing rules.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The October
31, 2014 Decision and the March 6, 2015 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. SP No. 134701 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Arturo
Loo Po is ORDERED TO VACATE Condominium Unit No.
205 located in Cedar Mansion II on Ma. Escriba Street,
Pasig City.
Respondent Po is further ORDERED TO PAY the rentals-
in-arrears, as well as the rentals accruing in the
interim until he vacates the property. The unpaid
rentals shall incur a legal interest of six percent (6%)
per annum from January 30, 2012, when the demand to
pay and to vacate was made, up to the finality of this
decision. Thereafter, an interest of six percent (6%) per
annum shall be imposed on the total amount due until
full payment is made. SO ORDERED
People of the Philippines vs.
Comesario, G.R. No. 127811, April 29, 1990
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 2 May 1989, at ten in the evening, seven-year old
Reynaldo Fernandez was found dead near the bank of Oraan
Creek in Brgy. Lelemaan, Manaoag, Pangasinan. His neck was
slashed. He drowned. He had been missing as early as twelve
noon that day. At first his parents thought that he was out
playing in his grandmothers house. When dusk came, however,
Reynaldo still could not be found.
Rodolfo and Emilia Fernandez, parents of the victim,
could not think of somebody else other than accused-appellant
Isidro Comesario y Dacasin as the perpetrator of the
crime.Emilia narrated that sometime in February 1989
accused-appellant paid her a nocturnal visit at their house
while her husband was away in the fields. Accused-appellant
allegedly offered to sell rice but when Emilia refused to buy
for lack of money, accused-appellant countered that they
could have sex instead. Accused-appellant then shoved his
hardened penis against Emilia. Scared, Emilia jumped out of
her house.
On 28 April 1989 or three (3) days before Reynaldo was
killed, Rodolfo caught accused-appellant cutting his mongo
plants. An altercation ensued during which accused-appellant
got so angry that he ran after Rodolfo with scythe in
hand. Accused-appellant then threatened to kill Rodolfo or
any member of his family. In the morning of 2 May 1989
Rodolfo saw accused-appellant Isidro Comesario holding a
scythe and walking towards Oraan Creek.
With this backdrop, Emilia and Rodolfo could not help
concluded that it was accused-appellant who killed their son
Reynaldo.
Prosecution witness Napoleon Veloria testified that at
around ten-thirty in the morning of 2 May 1989, while he was
in the vicinity of Oraan Creek, he saw accused-appellant
dragging a boy with his left hand while holding a scythe in his
right. He did not recognized Reynaldo although the boy was
wearing a striped t-shirt and blue short pants. Accused-
appellant appeared to be angry while the boy was
crying. Napoleon thought that the two (2) were just
siblings. He did not see the actual killing as he only learned
about the death of Reynaldo the following day. Nevertheless,
he believe accused-appellant was the killer as he was the last
person seen together with the victim.
On 22 November 1989 accused-appellant was charged
with murder.
On his part, accused-appellant averred that at the time
of the incident, he was helping in the construction of their
house together with his father and brothers. He only left their
house to gather grass for their farm animals. He did not go far
though as there was enough supply nearby.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, the court below
found accused-appellant guilty as charged and sentenced him
to reclusion perpetua. In this appeal accused-appellant
maintains his innocence and asserts that the circumstantial
evidence proffered by the prosecution was too meager to
support his conviction.
Doctrinally, an accused is presumed innocent. This
presumption prevails unless overturned by competent and
credible proof. To sustain a conviction, the guilt of the
accused must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt
must be considered in his favor. Evidence showing a mere
possibility of guilt is insufficient to warrant a conviction.[1]
115
 Accused-appellants conviction by the trial court hinged
on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial
evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one
circumstance and the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[2] The circumstances must constitute an unbroken
chain of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion
pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the
author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is
purely circumstantial that there should be an even greater
need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the
prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense
and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of guilt of the accused.[3] Like a tapestry made of
strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all other, as the guilty
person.[4]
In a nutshell, the evidence for the prosecution is that
accused-appellant had motive to kill Reynaldo; he allegedly
felt bad when his advances were spurned by Emilia; three (3)
days before the killing, accused-appellant had an altercation
with the father of the victim; and, in the morning of 2 May
1989 accused-appellant was seen dragging a boy with his left
hand while holding a scythe in his right towards Oraan
Creek. The lone witness for the prosecution who allegedly saw
the boy dragged could not recognize him. All he could say was
that the boy was wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue
short pants.
We believe that under all these circumstances taken
together accused-appellant should be acquitted.
First. An accused enjoys the presumption of
innocence. He need not proved what is legally presumed. If he
so desires he may present evidence on his behalf, but no
matter how weak it is, he still deserves an acquittal. This is
because the prosecution must not rely on the weakness of the
evidence for the defense but on the strength of its own
evidence.Unless the prosecution has successfully overturned
the presumption of innocence, acquittal is inevitable.
Second. The guilt of the accused must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. There must be moral certainty in our
unprejudiced mind that it was accused-appellant who
committed the crime. Absent this required quantum of
evidence would mean exoneration for accused-appellant. The
conviction of the accused-appellant having been based on very
tenuous grounds, our judicial conscience cannot rest easy if
we sustain his conviction by the court below.
Third. Mere proof of motive, no matter how strong, is not
sufficient to support a conviction, most especially if there is
no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be
deduced that the accused was the malefactor.[5] The elements
constituting the crime must be shown.
Fourth. The invocation of circumstantial evidence is
misplaced. As already adverted to, for circumstantial
evidence to be validly invoked there must be more than one
circumstance. In the instant case, the prosecution only
presented a single circumstance and that was when Napoleon
Veloria supposedly saw accused-appellant dragging a boy
wearing a striped t-shirt and a pair of blue short pants towards
Oraan Creek. From ten in the morning until ten in the evening
of 2 May 1989 when the lifeless body of Reynaldo was found
near Oraan Creek, there was a paucity of evidence. We cannot
decipher a pattern out of this single strand of circumstance as
to support the conclusion that it was accused-appellant who
killed Reynaldo. From this angle alone, it is already clear that
circumstantial evidence cannot be successfully availed of.
Last. We are not implying that accused-appellant did not
commit the crime. All we are saying is that when measured
against the required quantum of evidence in criminal cases,
the case for the prosecution has miserably failed in all
aspects. Simply put, if we are to be guided by the established
rules of evidence, we can safely say that the guilt of accused-
appellant was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. We find
occasion then to reiterate what we have said in People v.
Masalihit:[6]
Before we condemn x x x the crime must first be positively
established and that the accused is guilty sans any scintilla of
doubt. This is elementary and fundamental in our criminal
justice systems. Any suspicion or belief that that accused is
guilty no matter how strong cannot substitute for the
quantum of evidence that is required to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant should not be punished for the failure of
the prosecution to dispose of its burden to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish his
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. This Court has
always stood by the rule that it is better to acquit a guilty
person than to convict an innocent one.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, finding accused-appellant
ISIDRO COMESARIO Y DACASIN guilty murder is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE for gross insufficiency of evidence; consequently,
he is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and is ordered
IMMEDIATELY RELEASED FROM CUSTODY unless lawfully held
for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to
implement this Decisions and to report to this Court the action
taken hereon immediately but not later than five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
Cost de oficio.SO ORDERED.
Mabunga vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 142039, May 27, 2004
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of June 30,
1999,1 affirmed that of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon2
convicting appellant Modesto Mabunga of robbery with force
upon things under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code, he
comes to this Court on a petition for review.
In the morning of October 2, 1994, employees of the
Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) including Davy Villaruel
(Villaruel) discovered that the hasp of the door of the BFP
office in Barangay Capaclan, Romblon, Romblon was
destroyed, and that the only typewriter in their office, a
"Triumph" bearing Serial Number 340118640, was missing.
From the testimonies of prosecution witnesses tricycle
driver Sixto Bernardo (Bernardo), Diana Malay (Diana),
Villaruel, Sylvia Silverio Comienzo (Sylvia), and SPO2 Eleazar
Madali, the prosecution presented its case as follows:
116
 Around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 15,
1994, as Diana was in front of her store in Capaclan,
Romblon, Romblon waiting for a tricycle, she saw appellant,
a dealer of marble slabs, who was carrying a box which bore
the marking "HOPE" and tied with gray straw string, board a
pedicab driven by Bernardo. Having heard from her husband
Rodolfo Malay who works with the BFP that appellant was the
prime suspect of the police for the "robbery" at the BFP,
Diana immediately informed her husband of what she saw.
She was thereupon instructed by her husband to follow
appellant.3
As Diana noticed that the pedicab was heading for the
pier, she proceeded on foot to the house of Villaruel4 whom
she informed of what she had witnessed.
After the lapse of about 5 minutes,5 Villaruel, on board
his scooter, proceeded to the pier. By that time appellant
had reached the pier, alighted from Bernardo’s tricycle, and
unloaded the "HOPE" box.
In the meantime, Diana contacted Chief of Police Major
Ernesto Madrona at his house.6
Appellant, not long after alighting from the tricycle at
the pier, reboarded the same tricycle7 driven by Bernardo,
without the box, and headed for his house at Capaclan.
Diana, in fact, saw him on board the tricycle on his way
home.
Diana later boarded the tricycle of Bernardo after the
latter brought home appellant, and repaired to the pier.
There, by the gate, she saw Villaruel who confirmed to her
that he had verified from Bernardo, whom he earlier saw by
the same gate, that the latter indeed conveyed appellant to
the pier, with a "HOPE" box.
Diana also learned from Villaruel that "he really saw the
box brought by [appellant]." She thus returned on foot to the
house of Major Madrona who instructed SPO2 Eleazar Madali
and PO2 Eustaquio Rogero "to surreptitiously watch a box of
Hope brand cigarettes placed under a bench inside the PPA
passengers terminal owned by [appellant] and wait until
somebody gets said box and load it aboard the vessel M/V
Peñafrancia 8."8
On Villaruel’s entering the terminal9 he was told by
Sylvia, the cashier on duty at the restaurant therein, that a
man, whom she later identified to be appellant through a
photograph shown to her that same day, entrusted the box to
her, he telling her that it contained a damaged electric
fan.10
Villaruel thereupon kept watch over the box, as SPO2
Madali and PO2 Rogero later did discreetly, until M/V
Peñafrancia departed for Batangas at 8:00 p.m., with
appellant on board the same. About an hour later, PPA
officers Reynaldo Dianco and Leo Vedito Fontellera arrived at
the terminal and the box was turned over by them to SPO2
Madali and PO2 Rogero. The box, when opened, contained
the lost BFP typewriter.
On February 7, 1995, appellant was charged with
robbery before the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon
under an information reading:
That on or about the 1st day of October, 1994, at
around 12:00 midnight, in [B]arangay Capaclan, municipality
of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with
intent [to] gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously enter the Office of the Bureau of Fire Protection
by forcibly breaking the door hasp of the main door and upon
having gained entry therein, take, steal and carry away one
(1) typewriter (Triumph brand) with Serial No. 340118640,
valued at P5,894.00, Philippine currency, belonging to and
owned by the government, without its consent, and to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforestated
amount.11
On arraignment on February 21, 1995, appellant, with
the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty."12 Thereafter,
trial ensued.
Appellant interposed alibi with respect to the date and
place of occurrence of the alleged robbery. While he
admitted bringing to the pier on October 15, 1994 a box, he
claimed, however, that it bore the marking "CHAMPION," not
"HOPE." At the witness stand, he gave the following tale:
He left Romblon on September 24, 1994 and arrived in
Manila the next day. After the lapse of 12 hours, he went to
the Cubao station of the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus (BLTB)
Company and boarded a bus bound for Matnog, Sorsogon. He
reached Matnog on the afternoon of September 27, 1994 and
stayed there overnight before proceeding to Allen, Samar
which he reached on September 28, 1994. He then boarded a
jeep bound for San Jose, Northern Samar where he stayed for
one (1) hour, after which he proceeded to Calbayog City
which he reached on September 29, 1994. He transferred to
another jeep bound for Tacloban and arrived there on
September 30, 1994. For a day he stayed in Tacloban to rest,
after which he proceeded to Palo, Leyte to visit his "project."
He arrived in Palo on October 1, 1994. The next day, he went
to Tacloban City and purchased materials for polishing
marble. He returned to Palo and supervised his marble
"project" for a week. When the "project" was finished, he
returned to Cebu on October 6, 1994 and the next day
boarded the ferry "[Backwagon] Bay" for Romblon. He
reached Romblon on October 9, 1994.13
In support of his alibi, he presented bus tickets and
purchase receipts of materials, viz:
Exhibit "1" – BLTB ticket No. 60850, dated September
26, 1994, (Cubao to Matnog, Sorsogon)
Exhibit "2" – Bus ticket dated September 28, 1994 issued
by E. Tabinas Enterprises to Moody Mabunga (Matnog,
Sorsogon, to Allen, Samar).
Exhibit "3" – Invoice No. 18639 issued on October 2, 1993
by Terrazzo Construction and Marble Supply to Moody
Mabunga.14
Appellant further claimed that on the afternoon of
October 15, 1994, he, along with his son, boarded the
pedicab of Bernardo to which they loaded a box marked
"CHAMPION" containing marble novelties to be brought to
Manila via Viva Penafrancia 8; on reaching the pier, he laid
down the box at the gate of the PPA and stood beside it as
he waited for the ship to dock; and when he later boarded
the ship, he placed the box at the back of his cot.15
Finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery, Branch 81 of the RTC Romblon sentenced him to
suffer "an indeterminate penalty of from 4 years and 2
months of prison correccional, as minimum to 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory
penalties of the law, and to pay the costs."16
117

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the
trial court, relied on Section 3(j) Rule 131 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence which reads:
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following
presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx
(j) That a person in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of
the whole act; otherwise, that things which a person
possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by
him;
The appellate court having denied his motion for
reconsideration,17 appellant lodged the present appeal,
ascribing to it the following errors:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
DISREGARDED THE UNIMPUGNED ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION.
2. THE COURT OF APEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
ADMITTED IN EVIDENCE THE TYPEWRITER, WHICH WAS
SEARCHED WITHOUT WARRANT AND IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
ACCUSED.
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
PRESUMED THE ELEMENT OF INTENT TO GAIN, WHEN THE
SUPPOSED ACT OF THE ACCUSED IN LEAVING THE BOX TO A
STRANGER AND NEVER COMING BACK TO CLAIM IT NEGATED
THE NOTION OF ANIMUS LUCRANDI.18 (Underscoring
supplied)
The appeal is impressed with merit.
While courts have consistently looked upon alibi with
suspicion not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable as a defense, but because it can easily be
fabricated,19 the basic rule is for the prosecution, upon
which lies the onus, to establish all the elements of a crime
to thereby hold him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Such
burden does not shift as it remains with the prosecution.
Tasked with the burden of persuasion, the prosecution must
thus rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the
weakness of the defense.20
Admittedly, the evidence for the prosecution is
circumstantial. The alleged robbery was discovered when the
employees of the BFP reported for work on October 2, 1994
and noticed that the hasp of the office door was broken and
the typewriter was missing.
On the sole basis of the presumption laid down under
above-quoted Section 3(j) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence, the appellate court affirmed the conviction of
appellant.
A presumption is an assumption of fact that the law
requires to be made from another fact or group of facts
found or otherwise established in the action.21 It is an
"inference as to the existence of a fact not actually known,
arising from its usual connection with another which is
known, or a conjecture based on past experience as to what
course of human affairs ordinarily take."22
A presumption has the effect of shifting the burden of
proof to the party who would be disadvantaged by a finding
of the presumed fact. The presumption controls decision on
the presumed fact unless there is counterproof that the
presumed fact is not so.23
In criminal cases, however, presumptions should be
taken with caution especially in light of serious concerns that
they might water down the requirement of proof beyond
reasonable doubt. As special considerations must be given to
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent, there
should be limits on the use of presumptions against an
accused.
Although possession of stolen property within a limited
time from the commission of the theft or robbery is not in
itself a crime, it being possible to possess the same and
remain innocent, such possession may be sufficient for the
formation of an inference that the possessor is the thief
unless the evidence satisfactorily proves that the property
was acquired by the accused by legal means.
How the presumption under Section 3(j) Rule 131 is to
be understood, United States v. Catimbang24 explains:
According to the modern view convictions in cases of
this kind are not sustained upon a presumption of law as to
the guilt of the accused. The conviction rests wholly upon an
inference of fact as to the guilt of the accused. If as a matter
of probability and reasoning based on the fact of possession
of the stolen goods, taken in connection with other evidence,
it may fairly be concluded beyond reasonable doubt that the
accused is guilty of the theft, judgment or conviction may
properly be entered. x x x
The inference of guilt is one of fact and rests upon the
common experience of men. But the experience of men has
taught them that an apparently guilty possession may be
explained so as to rebut such an inference and an accused
person may therefore put witness on the stand or go to the
witness stand himself to explain his possession, and any
reasonable explanation of his possession, inconsistent with
his guilty connection with the commission of the crime, will
rebut the inference as to his guilt which the prosecution
seeks to have drawn from his guilty possession of the stolen
goods.
It is in this sense that it is sometimes said that the
unexplained possession of recently stolen goods will sustain a
conviction of the crime of larceny.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Before an inference of guilt arising from possession of
recently stolen goods can be made, however, the following
basic facts need to be proven by the prosecution: (1) that
the crime was committed; (2) that the crime was committed
recently; (3) that the stolen property was found in the
possession of the defendant; and (4) that the defendant is
unable to explain his possession satisfactorily.26
For purposes moreover of conclusively proving
possession, the following considerations have to be
emphasized: (1) the possession must be unexplained by any
innocent origin; (2) the possession must be fairly recent; and
(3) the possession must be exclusive.27
Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate
courts, the People failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant was caught in exclusive possession of the
recently stolen good.
118
 While possession need not mean actual physical control
over the thing for it may include constructive possession, it is
still necessary that for possession to be deemed constructive
the accused knowingly has the power and the intention at a
given time to exercise dominion or control over a thing,
either directly or through another person.28
The case of U.S. v. Simbahan29 cited by the appellate
court has a different factual setting and is, therefore,
inapplicable to the present case. In Simbahan, the accused,
for a consideration of ₱50.00 pesos, disclosed to the owner
of the missing carabao its precise location. There, this Court
held: "The word possession as used above can not be limited
to manual touch or personal custody. One who puts or
deposits the stolen property in a place of concealment may
be deemed to have such property in his possession. x x x All
the facts and circumstances [including the absence of a
satisfactory explanation of his possession] show conclusively
that he had possession of said caraballa and fully justify his
conviction."30
The accused in Simbahan exercised exclusive dominion
and control over the thing lost. Appellant in the present case
did not.
The "HOPE" box was not concealed and anyone entering
and leaving the PPA terminal had access to it, it having been
placed just below one of the benches, around three meters
from the cashier, Sylvia.
To assume that in a busy place, such as the PPA
terminal, the "HOPE" box that was opened by the police
authorities and found to contain the missing typewriter is the
same box allegedly entrusted by appellant to the cashier is
to form an inference which is, however, doubtful, more than
six hours having elapsed from the time the box was allegedly
left at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon until it was
opened by the police authorities at around 9:00 o’clock in
the evening after appellant had already boarded the ship.
A presumption cannot be founded on another
presumption. It cannot thus be concluded that from the time
the box was left under the bench, appellant was still in
constructive possession thereof, the exercise of exclusive
dominion or control being absent.
Adding serious doubt to the prosecution’s claim is that
what was allegedly seen being carried by appellant and
entrusted to the cashier was not the stolen typewriter but
merely a "HOPE" box.
A review of the transcript of stenographic notes in fact
shows that there are flaws in the prosecution’s theory as well
as inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies
that do not warrant appellant’s conviction.
Why appellant was considered a suspect by the police,
no explanation has been proferred. The records, however,
indicate that appellant had previously been indicted before
the Municipal Trial Court for theft.31 On that basis alone, it
is non sequitor to point to him as a suspect.
At all events, apart from appellant’s supposed
possession of the "HOPE" box on October 15, 1994, no other
evidence was adduced by the prosecution linking him to the
robbery. The teaching of Askew v. United States32 must thus
be heeded:
We have heretofore adverted to the possession of the
instruments or of the fruits of a crime as affording ground to
presume the guilt of the possessor; but on this subject no
certain rule can be laid down of universal application; the
presumption being not conclusive but disputable, and
therefore to be dealt with by the jury alone, as a mere
inference of fact. Its force and value will depend on several
considerations. In the first place, if the fact of possession
stands alone, wholly unconnected with any other
circumstances, its value or persuasive power is very slight;
for the real criminal may have artfully placed the article in
the possession or upon the premises of an innocent person,
the better to conceal his own guilt. It will be necessary,
therefore, for the prosecutor to add the proof of other
circumstances indicative of guilt, in order to render the
naked possession of the thing available towards a
conviction.33 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That the fact of possession alone, wholly unconnected
with any other circumstances, cannot be relied with
certititude to convict one with robbery is echoed in People v.
Geron:34
At any rate, the mere possession by the accused of
items allegedly stolen, without more, cannot conduce to a
single conclusion that robbery indeed took place or at least
was the primary motive for the killings. In the absence of
positive and indubitable evidence showing unlawful taking by
the accused by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, the prosecution cannot rely with certitude on the
fact of possession alone. The Court’s application of the
presumption that a person found in possession of the
personal effects belonging to the person robbed and killed is
considered the author of the aggression, the death of the
person, as well as the robbery committed, has been
invariably limited to cases where such possession is either
unexplained or that the proferred explanation is rendered
implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent
thereto.35 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The appellate court ruled that since it was sufficiently
established that appellant was in possession of the
typewriter two weeks after it was stolen, he had the burden
of proving that he was not the one responsible for the
heist.36 While a presumption imposes on a party against
whom it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut such presumption, the burden of producing
evidence of guilt does not extend to the burden of proving
the accused’s innocence of the crime as the burden of
persuasion does not shift and remains throughout the trial
upon the prosecution.
Compounding doubts on the case for the prosecution is
its witnesses’ differing versions on how and where the box
was opened, a fact necessarily important in determining
whether its content was indeed the stolen typewriter.
On one hand, a member of the PNP, SPO2 Eleazar
Madali, testified during the direct examination by Prosecutor
Sy that the box was opened at the police station:
Q – And what time did the M/V P[e]ñafrancia 8 le[ave]?
A – About 8:00 o’clock in the evening.
Q – And what time was that when you entered the PPA
terminal to see the carton?
A – May be 3:30 o’clock, more or less, the vessel has not
arrive[d] yet.
119
 Q – And also because the vessel has left and the carton
[w]as not brought out, what did you do?
A – We coordinate[d] with the PPA about the box that
was not taken and it was turned over to us and we brought it
to the police station.
Q – Who was your companion in bringing the box to the
police station?
A – SPO1 Rogero, our investigator Victor Miñano,
Fireman Sim, Dave Villaruel then we proceeded to the guard
of the Romblon Police Station.
Q – And what was done with the box in the police
station?
A – When we arrived in the PNP Police Station we have
the box opened before the guard and the content of the box
was a typewriter.37 (Underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, the cashier, Sylvia Silverio
Comienzo, testified that the police authorities opened the
box inside her small room in the terminal.
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY PROSECUTOR SY:
Q – The day in which you have identified him as Modesto
Mabunga, [did he] retrieved (sic) that carton from you that
same day or afternoon?
A – No, sir.
Q – Who got the carton?
A – The policemen, sir.
Q – And what did the policemen do when they got the
carton?
A – They opened it, sir.
Q – If you could remember, who were those policemen
who got and opened the carton?
A – Madrona, Eustaqio and Mike Villaruel.
Q – Where did they open that carton?
A – Inside the terminal because I have a small room
there.38 (Underscoring supplied)
On additional direct examination, Sylvia remained
adamant in saying that the box was opened in her small room
inside the terminal.
ADDITIONAL DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY PROSECUTOR SY:
Q – When the policemen as you said got this carton and
opened it, where did the policemen precisely get the carton,
from what place precisely?
A – Taken from under the bench.
COURT:
Q – Where this Moody placed it?
A – Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR SY CONTINUING:
Q – Were you personally present when the policemen
got the carton from under the bench where Moody placed it?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – And where did the policemen open the carton?
A – In our small room.
Q – Where you personally present when the policemen
go the carton and opened it on that room?
A – Yes, sir.
Q – Were you personally present when the straw that
was used in tying the carton was cut or untie or loosen by the
policemen?
A – I was there.
COURT:
Q – Why were you there present?
A – Because I saw to it what was the content of that box
and if it was really an electric fan.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Without doubt, the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses firsthand and observe their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination.
An examination of the records shows, however, that, as
indicated by the trial judge’s following comments on
prosecution witness Villaruel’s answers to the questions
posed to him during his direct examination, the prosecution
evidence leaves much to be desired.
COURT: Very familiar. This witness is a very typical
witness. You are just waiting for Atty. Sy to finish his
question for you to say what you have been in your mind
regardless of the question but you will just continue what
you have already in your mind without thinking about the
question. But remember his question, when the question is
asked it will appear in your mind, it should be the other way
around, do you understand? You forget what is in your mind,
concentrate on the question. You listen to the question. You
are like a tape recorder. You just switch on and then you
continue, no you wait for the question.40
Then again, during the cross examination of the same
witness, the trial court gave the following observation on his
demeanor:
COURT: The statement of the Court that you are like a
fish in outer space is more applicable to you. You are like a
fish in outer space, meaning, you are a police science
graduate, meaning, that your career is to be a policeman and
a police officer, an officer of the law. You are now in the
court of law, you should then feel comfortable in a court of
law like a fish in the water you should be comfortable in a
court of law because that is part of your career but the way
we look at it you are like a lawyer who just graduated, took
the bar and then become an office employee not practicing
law in the courtroom so that when the lawyer comes to
Court, he will not come to Court, he is afraid of the
courtroom although he is a lawyer he is afraid of the
courtroom.41 (Underscoring supplied)
120
 Finally, logic, common knowledge and human
experience teach that it is unlikely that a robber would
represent himself to be the owner of a stuff which he knows
contains stolen property and seek the help of a third person
to look after it.
In fine, the life, liberty and property of a citizen may
not be taken away on possibilities, conjectures or even,
generally speaking, a bare probability.42
At all events, appellant’s alibi, for which he submitted
documentary evidence, has not been discredited by the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the decision on review is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and appellant, Modesto "Moody" Mabunga, is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of robbery. SO ORDERED.
People of the Philippines vs. Mingoa, G.R.
No. L-5371, March 26, 1953
REYES, J.:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the
office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon,
and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to
P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, the
defendant Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of
malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance
of Romblon, and having been found guilty as charged and
sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to
the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case
here on the ground that it involved a constitutional
question.
The evidence shows that it is not disputed that upon
examination of his books and accounts on September 1,
1949, defendants, as accountable officer, was found short
in the sum above-named and that, required to produce the
missing fund, he was not able to do so. He explained to
the examining officer that some days before he had, by
mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took
with him to show and that he forgot it on his seat and it
was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not
testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor.
We agree with the trial judge that defendant's
explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot
overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his
inability to produce the fund which was found missing. As
His Honor observes, if the money was really lost without
defendant's fault, the most natural thing for him to do
would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release
from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to
borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse
that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not
report the loss to the police. Considering further as the
prosecution points out in its brief, that defendant had at
first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to
examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the
alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the
town had not been paid their salaries, there is good
ground to believe that defendant had really malversed the
fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure
invention.
It is now contended, however, that lacking direct
evidence of actual misappropriation the trial court
convicted defendant on mere presumptions, that is,
presumptions of criminal intent in losing the money under
the circumstances alleged and presumptions of guilt from
the mere fact that he failed, upon demand to produce the
sum lacking. The criticism as to the first presumption is
irrelevant, for the fact is that trial court did not believe
defendant's explanation that the money was lost,
considering it mere cloak to cover actual
misappropriation. That is why the court said that "whether
or not he (defendant) is guilty of malversation for
negligence is of no moment . . . " And as to the other
presumption, the same is authorized by article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
The failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal use.
The contention that this legal provision violates the
constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.
The question of the constitutionality of the statute not
having been raised in the court below, it may not be
considered for the first time on appeal. (Robb vs. People,
68 Phil., 320.)
In many event, the validity of statutes establishing
presumptions in criminal cases is now settled matter,
Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations, 8th ed.,
Vo. I, pp. 639-641says that "there is no constitutional
objection to the passage of law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human
conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with
this view, it is generally held in the United States that the
legislature may enact that when certain facts have been
proven they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence
of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof
provided there be rational connection between that facts
proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the
inference of the one from proof of the others is not
unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection
between the two in common experience. (See annotation
on constitutionality of statutes or ordinances making one
fact presumptive or prima facie evidence of another, 162
A.L.R. 495-535; also, State vs. Brown, 182 S.E., 838, with
reference to embezzlement.) The same view has been
adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of this
court in the U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil., 303; U.S. vs. Luling, 34
Phil., 725; and People vs. Merilo, G.R. No. L-3489,
promulgated June 28, 1951.
The statute in the present case creates a presumption
of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure
of public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper
demaand, any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate
fact presumed is that officer has malversed the funds or
property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is
made to arise from proof that he has received them and
yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper
demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural
inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said
that there is no rational connection between the two.
Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie
presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to
present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is
121
reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in
the above citations.
There being no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Sandiganbayan are:
Wa-Acon vs. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 164575, December 6, 2006
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, seeks the reversal of the April 22, 2004
Decision[1] of the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioner Robert
P. Wa-acon of Malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code for misappropriating PhP 92,199.20, which forms
part of his accountabilities as Special Collecting Officer of the
National Food Authority (NFA); and the July 23, 2004
Resolution[2] of said graft court denying Wa-acons plea for
reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 14375.
The Facts
The information against the accused Wa-acon reads
as follows:
That on about the period from July
19, 1979 to September 28, 1981, in the City
of Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Robert P. Wa-acon, a public officer, being a
Special Collecting Officer, National Food
Authority (NFA) and stationed at Canonigo,
Paco, Manila and as such was accountable
and responsible of rice stocks and empty
sacks for which he received and entrusted to
him, by reason of his official position, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and
convert to his own personal use and benefit
the aforesaid stocks of rice and empty sacks
with a total aggregate money value of
P114,303.00, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The facts of the case as found by the
On the period from July 19,
1979 to September 28, 1981, accused Robert
P. Wa-acon was a Special Collecting Officer
of the National Food Authority (NFA) and was
assigned at the Kadiwa Center at Moriones,
Tondo, Manila. One of his duties was to
receive grains, consisting of rice and mongo,
which shall then be sold to the public on
retail. The proceeds of the sale of the grains
shall then be collected by the same accused.
On September 28, 1981, by virtue of
a Travel Order, a team of Auditors from the
Commission of Audit, composed of Dionisio A.
Nillo, as team leader, Mercedes Punzalan,
Audit Examiner II, Herminia Gonzales, Audit
Examiner II and Raquel Cruz, Clerk II, as
members, conducted an examination of the
accountabilities of various Special Collecting
Officers of the NFA, one of whom was
accused Robert P. Wa-acon. The said
examination was conducted at the Office of
the Regional Auditor, NFA Metro Manila
Office at Paco, Manila. In that office, the
audit team asked the presence of accused
Robert P. Wa-acon by virtue of a demand
letter dated September 1981, demanding the
latter to produce cash, cash items, stocks and
empty sacks and other pertinent papers. As
testified by Prosecution witness Dionisio A.
Nillo, accused Robert P. Wa-acon told the
audit team that he has no cash on hand at the
time pertaining to his accountability as
Special Collecting Officer. Hence, it was
indicated in the Cash Count Sheet that there
was no cash counted during the cash
examination.
Based on the examination conducted on the
various Warehouse Stock Issues, Empty Sacks
Receipts, Official Receipts submitted and the
Certificate of Inventory of Stocks and Empty
Sacks dated September 18, 1981, containing
the signature of accused Robert P. Wa-acon
and witnessed by Virgilio Cacanendin, Special
Investigator, Manolito Diaz, Bookkeeper,
Louie Pastofide, Proceso A. Saavedra, Audit
Examiner II and Gloria T. Reyes, Audit
Examiner I, the audit team rendered a Report
of Examination, Form 74-A of the Cash and
Accounts of accused Robert P. Wa-acon. All
of the aforementioned documents were
submitted by Proceso Saavedra, a resident
Audit Examiner of the NFA Metro Manila
Office, Paco, Manila, to the Audit team
headed by Dionisio A. Nillo. In connection
with the Audit conducted, the Audit Team
prepared the following Schedules: Schedule
1: Statement of Rice received by Robert A.
Wa-acon, Schedule 1-A: Statement of
Rice/mongo Received by Robert P. Wa-acon,
Schedules 2: Statement of Remittances of
Proceeds from Sales of Robert P. Wa-acon,
Schedule 3: Statement of Refunds made by
Robert P. Wa-acon, Schedule I: Statement of
Empty Sacks Returned by Robert P. Wa-acon,
and Summary of Empty Sacks Accountability
of Robert P. Wa-acon and the Revised
Summary of Cash Examination of Robert P.
Wa-acon.
The Report of the Examination of the Cash
and Accountabilities of accused Robert P.
Wa-acon shows that the latter incurred a
cash shortage of One Hundred Fourteen
Thousand Three Hundred Three Pesos
(P114,303.00). In the Revised Summary of the
Cash Examination of accused Robert P. Wa-
acon, the cash shortage was changed to One
Hundred Two Thousand and One Hundred
Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty Centavos
(P102,199.20) after deducting the cost of
sixty (60) bags of regular milled rice value of
Six Thousand Nine Hundred (P6,900.00) and
the monetary value of the empty sacks
122
 returned by accused Robert P. Wa-acon,
which is Five Thousand Two Hundred Three
Pesos and Eighty Centavos (P5,203.80).
However, accused Robert P. Wa-acon made a
refund of the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00). Therefore, the total shortage
amount[ed] to Ninety Two Thousand One
Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty
Centavos (P92,199.20).[4]
During the trial before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
denied that he misapplied and converted for his personal use
the stocks of rice and empty sacks as he had been faithfully
remitting all the proceeds of the rice he sold to consumers.[5]
Petitioner also contended that the shortage
discovered by the Audit Team may be attributed to the
discrepancy in the actual weight of the rice actually delivered
to him and that of the weight reflected in the receipts. In
other words, he claimed that the rice delivered to him
weighed less than that for which he signed. He alleged that he
discovered the shortage of five (5) to ten (10) kilos per sack
only upon delivery of the rice to the station/outlet. Petitioner
explained that he could not check the weight of the sacks
delivered to him as the weighing scale in their office had a
maximum capacity of only twelve (12) kilograms. Petitioner
claimed that he informed his superiors of such shortage
verbally, but was unheeded.[6]
Petitioner further claimed that the only reason he
signed for the sacks of rice, despite the shortage, was because
he was told that he would not be paid his salary if he would
not sign, added to the fact that he was then hungryall of which
prompted Wa-acon to sign the audit report of the Audit
Team.[7] As to the missing empty sacks, petitioner argued that
those were in the custody of the delivery man who had a
logbook where Special Collecting Officers sign as proof that
the delivery man had taken the sacks.[8]
The Sandiganbayan Ruling
Citing the presumption under the last paragraph of
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code that the failure of the
public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds which
he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized officer,
shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing
funds or property to personal use and the inability of accused
Wa-acon to rebut the presumption that he had put the rice
stocks and the empty sacks to personal use, the Sandiganbayan
found him guilty of malversation of public funds under the
Revised Penal Code. In the graft courts April 22, 2004
Decision, the dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered finding the accused Robert P. Wa-
acon, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as
defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no
modifying circumstance, is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from
TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal minimum, as the
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal maximum, as the maximum and to
suffer perpetual special disqualification. The
accused Robert P. Wa-acon is likewise
ordered to pay a FINE equal to the amount of
the funds malversed, which is Ninety Two
Thousand One Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and
Twenty Centavos (P 92,199.20) and to
indemnify the National Food Authority (NFA)
the amount of Ninety Two Thousand One
Hundred Ninety Nine Pesos and Twenty
Centavos (P92,199.20) with interest thereon.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Correspondingly, petitioner filed his May 20,
2004 Motion for Reconsideration[10] of the Decision, reiterating
his defenses raised during the trial.
On July 23, 2004, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration on
the ground that accused Wa-acon raised no new substantial
issues and cogent reasons to justify the reversal of the April
22, 2004 Decision.
Thus, Wa-acon filed the instant petition.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner Wa-acon presented a lone issue to be
resolved: his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt;
thus, the assailed Decision and Resolution convicting him of
malversation must be reversed.
In seeking the recall of his conviction, accused petitioner
asserts that the unremitted amounts for the rice stocks and
the money allegedly gained from the empty sacks were not
used for his personal use and therefore, the fourth element of
malversationthat the accused appropriated, took, or
misappropriated public funds or property for which he was
accountablewas not proven. According to petitioner, while he
might have violated certain auditing rules and regulations, this
violation is not tantamount to malversation. He leans on the
rulings in Madarang v. Sandiganbayan,[11] and Agullo v.
Sandiganbayan[12] that it is essential to prove that there had
been a conversion of public fund to personal use and that
conversion must be affirmatively proved; otherwise, the
presumption is deemed never to have existed at all.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code whereas
provides:
Malversation of public funds or
property. Presumption of malversation. Any
public officer who, by reason of the duties of
his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, or
through abandonment or negligence, shall
permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation
or malversation of such funds or property x x
x
xxxx
The failure of a public officer to
have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal
uses (emphasis supplied).
123
The elements to constitute malversation under Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
The elements common to all acts of
malversation under Article 217 are: (a) that
the offender be a public officer; (b) that he
had custody or control of funds or property
by reason of the duties of his office; (c) these
funds were public funds or property for which
he was accountable; and (d) that he
appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented or through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take
them.[13]
Accused petitioner has conceded that the first three
(3) elements of the crime of malversation exist but
asseverates that the fourth elementthat he appropriated,
took, or misappropriated the public funds for which he was
made accountable by the Commission on Audit (COA) to his
own personal usewas not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Unfortunately, petitioners postulation has no legal
mooring. Article 217, as amended by Republic Act 1060, no
longer requires proof by the State that the accused actually
appropriated, took, or misappropriated public funds or
property. Instead, a presumption, though disputable and
rebuttable, was installed that upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly
forthcoming any public funds or property with which said
officer is accountableshould be prima facieevidence that he
had put such missing funds or properties to personal use. When
these circumstances are present, a presumption of law arises
that there was malversation of public funds or properties as
decreed by Article 217. A presumption of law is sanctioned by
a statute prescribing that a certain inference must be made
whenever facts appear which furnish the basis of the
interference. This is to be set apart from a presumption of fact
which is a [conclusion] drawn from particular circumstances,
the connection between them and the sought for fact having
received such a sanction in experience as to have become
recognized as justifying the assumption.[14] When there is a
presumption of law, the onus probandi (burden of proof),
generally imposed upon the State, is now shifted to the party
against whom the interference is made to adduce satisfactory
evidence to rebut the presumption and hence, to demolish
the prima facie case.
After the government auditors discovered the
shortage and demanded an explanation, petitioner Wa-acon
was not able to make money readily available,[15]immediately
refund the shortage,[16] or explain satisfactorily the cash
deficit.[17] These facts or circumstances constitute prima
facie evidence that he converted such funds to his personal
use.
Prima facie evidence is defined as:
Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such
evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is
sufficient to establish a given fact, or the
group or chain of facts constituting the partys
claim or defense, and which if not rebutted
or contradicted, will remain
sufficient. Evidence which, if unexplained
or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain a
judgment in favor of the issue it supports,
but which may be contradicted by other
evidence (emphasis supplied).[18]
Neither can accused petitioner claim that such presumption
under Article 217 violates the constitutional guarantee of
presumption of innocence for the establishment of a prima
facie case does not take away the presumption of innocence
which may x x x be such as to rebut and control
it.[19] Such prima facie evidence, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, can counterbalance the presumption of
innocence to warrant a conviction.[20]
Since the facts adduced by the State brought about
a prima facie evidence which is considered sufficient to
sustain petitioners conviction under Article 217, it is
incumbent upon petitioner Wa-acon to destroy the
presumption of law.
In his quest to exculpate himself from the legal
assumption of criminal liability for the missing funds, he
insisted that: 1) the sacks of rice were less than that declared
in the receipts when they were delivered to him; 2) he sold
the rice at the older and lower prices, as he was not informed
of changes in the prices of the rice; and 3) the empty sacks of
rice were in the possession of the delivery men. However,
petitioner merely settled for his bare uncorroborated
testimony during the trial before the Sandiganbayan. He never
bothered to adduce other pieces of evidence to fortify his
defenses. Petitioner did not produce the delivery men whom
he claims had in their possession the empty sacks or any
acknowledgement receipt for said bags. Moreover, petitioner
did not bring forward his co-workers to attest to and confirm
the practice of, and substantiate petitioners story of receiving
sacks of rice without weighing them and that the bags received
weighed less than that reflected in the receipt. The
established rule is that [d]enials, if unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence, are deemed negative and self-
serving evidence unworthy of credence.[21] The court a quo is
correct in holding that as compared to credible witnesses like
the COA auditors who testified on affirmative matters, the
self-serving negative testimony of accused petitioner Wa-acon
has no substantial weight or credit.[22]
Negative testimony is made clear as
testimony that a fact did not exist, that a
thing was not done, that no one did not hearis
admissible and, in the absence of opposing
testimony, is usually regarded as of sufficient
probative force to sustain a verdict. It is
however, a long recognized general rule of
evidence that all other things being equal,
positive evidence is stronger than negative
evidence. [23]
Since Wa-acon lamentably fell short of adducing the desired
quantum of evidence, his weak and unconvincing testimony
standing alone did not overthrow the presumption that he
misappropriated public funds.
As a last ditch effort to exonerate himself, petitioner
anchored his defense on Madarang[24] and Agullo,[25] where
public employees charged of malversation were cleared of
criminal liability.
In these two (2) cases cited by petitioner, we elucidated the
legal presumption of assumed criminal liability for
accountable funds under the last paragraph of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code. In Madarang, we explained:
Concededly, the first three elements
are present in the case at bar. Lacking any
evidence, however, of shortage, or taking,
appropriation, or conversion by petitioner or
124
 loss of public funds, there is no malversation
(Narciso vs. Sandiganbayan, 229 SCRA 229
[1994]). True, the law creates a presumption
that the mere failure of an accountable
officer to produce public funds which have
come into his hand on demand by an officer
duly authorized to examine his accounts
is prima facie evidence of conversion. The
presumption is, of course, rebuttable.
Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present
adequate evidence that can nullify any
likelihood that he had put the funds or
property to personal use, then that
presumption would be at an end and
the prima facie case is effectively
negated.[26]
In Agullo, we amplified that:
Thus, in a string of categorical
pronouncements, this Court has consistently
and emphatically ruled that the presumption
of conversion incarnated in Article 217,
paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code is by
its very nature rebuttable. To put it
differently, the presumption under the law is
not conclusive but disputable by satisfactory
evidence to the effect that the accused did
not utilize the public funds or property for his
personal use, gain or benefit.
Accordingly, if the accused is able to
present adequate evidence that can nullify
any likelihood that he had put the funds or
property to personal use, then that
presumption would be at an end and
the prima facie case is effectively
negated. This Court has repeatedly said that
when the absence of funds is not due to the
personal use thereof by the accused, the
presumption is completely destroyed; in fact,
the presumption is never deemed to have
existed at all.[27]
Unfortunately, petitioners vaunted reliance
on Madarang and Agullo does not provide legal relief as the
facts in these cases are not on all fours with his case. The
accused parties in said cases were able to produce satisfactory
evidence ample enough to prove that the missing funds were
not converted to their personal uses and thus, the legal
presumption was effectively negated.
In Madarang, the accused, based on the COA audit report, was
charged with malversation of PhP 20,700.00 representing
advance rental payments for the lease of real property owned
by the City of Cebu for which he was responsible as a barangay
captain. When the accused was asked to account for such
missing funds, he introduced convincing evidence that the
funds were utilized by the barangay for its projects and for
the benefit of his constituents, namely: for materials for the
water system of the barangay hall, barangay police uniforms,
and payment for medicine. Therefore, the legal presumption
was successfully overturned.
Likewise, in Agullo, the accused, who was the
disbursing officer of then Ministry of Public Works and
Highways, Regional Office No. VIII, Candahug, Palo, Leyte,was
charged based on audit, with malversation of PhP 26,404.26
representing the salaries of the personnel in her office. The
accused admitted that the funds were lost; however, she was
able to prove that she suffered a stroke while going to her
office. This was corroborated by the barangay captain of the
place where she suffered a stroke, as well as medical
certificates to prove the illness. She was acquitted because
the loss of funds was not due to malversation.
In contrast, petitioner anchored his defenses solely on
his own bare testimony unsubstantiated by other parol,
documentary, or object evidence to prop up such self-serving
allegations. Without doubt, the rulings
in Madarang and Agullo cannot be considered precedents to
the case at bar because the facts in said cases are not the
same or substantially similar to petitioner Wa-acons situation.
Without any strong and convincing proof to bring
down the disputable presumption of law, the Court is left with
no other option but to sustain petitioners conviction.
WHEREFORE, We DENY the petition and the
assailed April 22, 2004 Decision and the July 23, 2004
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14375
are AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
B. Kinds of Judicial Notice
C. Mandatory Judicial Notice
 Rico Rommel Atienza v. Board of Medicine
and Editha Sioson, G.R. No. 177407,
February 9, 2011;
Sulpico v. NEDA et. Al., G.R. No. 178830, July
14, 2008;
REYES, R.T., J.:
Under consideration is the Manifestation and
Motion[1] dated October 26, 2007 of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) which states:
The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) respectfully avers that in an
Indorsement dated October 24, 2007, the
Legal Service of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
has informed it of the Philippine
Governments decision not to continue with
the ZTE National Broadband Network Project
(see attachment[2]). That said, there is no
more justiciable controversy for this
Honorable Court to resolve. WHEREFORE,
public respondents respectfully pray that the
present petitions be DISMISSED.
On November 13, 2007, the Court noted the OSGs
manifestation and motion and required petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 178830, 179317, and 179613 to comment.
On December 6, 2007, Rolex Suplico, petitioner in
G.R. No. 178830, filed his Consolidated Reply and
Opposition,[3] opposing the aforequoted OSG Manifestation
and Motion, arguing that:
66. Aside from the fact that
the Notes of the Meeting Between President
125
 Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese
President Hu Jintao held 2 October 2007
were not attached to the 26 October 2007
Manifestation and Motion thus depriving
petitioners of the opportunity to comment
thereon a mere verbally
requested 1st Indorsement is not sufficient
basis for the conclusion that the ZTE-DOTC
NBN deal has been permanently scrapped.
67. Suffice to state,
said 1st Indorsement is glaringly self-serving,
especially without the Notes of the Meeting
Between President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
and Chinese President Hu Jintao to support
its allegations or other proof of the supposed
decision to cancel the ZTE-DOTC NBN
deal. Public respondents can certainly do
better than that.[4]
Petitioner Suplico further argues that:
79. Assuming arguendo that some aspects of
the present Petition have been rendered
moot (which is vehemently denied), this
Honorable Court, consistent with well-
entrenched jurisprudence, may still take
cognizance thereof.[5]
Petitioner Suplico cites this Courts rulings in Gonzales v.
Chavez,[6] Rufino v. Endriga,[7] and Alunan III v. Mirasol[8] that
despite their mootness, the Court nevertheless took
cognizance of these cases and ruled on the merits due to the
Courts symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar
by formulating guiding and controlling principles, precepts,
doctrines, and rules.
On January 31, 2008, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. (AHI)
and Nathaniel Sauz, petitioners in G.R. No. 179317, also filed
their comment expressing their sentiments, thus:
3. First of all, the
present administration has never been known
for candor. The present administration has a
very nasty habit of not keeping its word. It
says one thing, but does another.
4. This being the case, herein
petitioners are unable to bring themselves to
feel even a bit reassured that the
government, in the event that the above-
captioned cases are dismissed, will not
backtrack, re-transact, or even resurrect the
now infamous NBN-ZTE transaction. This is
especially relevant since what was attached
to the OSGs Manifestation and Motion was a
mere one (1) page written communication
sent by the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) to the OSG,
allegedly relaying that the Philippine
Government has decided not to continue with
the NBN project x x x due to several reasons
and constraints.
Petitioners AHI and Sauz further contend that
because of the transcendental importance of the issues raised
in the petition, which among others, included the Presidents
use of the power to borrow, i.e., to enter into foreign loan
agreements, this Court should take cognizance of this case
despite its apparent mootness.
On January 15, 2008, the Court required the OSG to
file respondents reply to petitioners comments on its
manifestation and motion.
On April 18, 2008, the OSG filed respondents reply,
reiterating their position that for a court to exercise its power
of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy
one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution; the
case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-legal or
other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice.[9]
Respondents also insist that there is no perfected
contract in this case that would prejudice the government or
public interest. Explaining the nature of the NBN Project as an
executive agreement, respondents stress that it remained in
the negotiation stage. The conditions precedent[10] for the
agreement to become effective have not yet been complied
with.
Respondents further oppose petitioners claim of the
right to information, which they contend is not an absolute
right. They contend that the matters raised concern executive
policy, a political question which the judicial branch of
government would generally hesitate to pass upon.
On July 2, 2008, the OSG filed a Supplemental
Manifestation and Motion. Appended to it is the Highlights
from the Notes of Meeting between President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and Chinese President Hu Jintao, held in XI
Jiao Guesthouse, Shanghai, China, on October 2, 2007. In the
Notes of Meeting, the Philippine Government conveyed its
decision not to continue with the ZTE National Broadband
Network Project due to several constraints. The same Notes
likewise contained President Hu Jintaos expression of
understanding of the Philippine Government decision.
We resolve to grant the motion.
Firstly, the Court notes the triple petitions to be
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for
the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Preliminary Injunction. The individual prayers in each of the
three (3) consolidated petitions are:
G.R. No. 178830
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court:
1. Upon the filing of this Petition,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Rule 58,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court,
issue forthwith an ex parte temporary
restraining order enjoining respondents,
their subordinates, agents, representatives
and any and all persons acting on their
behalf from pursuing, entering into
indebtedness, disbursing funds, and
implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband
Deal;
2. Compel respondents, upon Writ
of Mandamus, to forthwith produce and
furnish petitioner or his undersigned
counsel a certified true copy of the contract
or agreement covering the NBN project as
agreed upon with ZTE Corporation;
126
 3. Schedule Oral Arguments in the individuals with regard to the National
present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation Broadband Network Project.[12] (Emphasis G.R. No. 178830 (Rolex Suplico vs. National
to Section 2, Rule 56 of the revised Rules of supplied) Economic and Development Authority,
Court; and, represented by NEDA Secretary Romulo L.
Neri, and the NEDA Investment
4. Annul and set aside the award of G.R. No. 179613 Coordination Committee, Department of
the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal, and compel Transportation and Communications
public respondents to forthwith comply with WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed (DOTC), represented by DOTC Secretary
pertinent provisions of law regarding of this Honorable Court to: Leandro Mendoza, including the
procurement of government ICT contracts Commission on Information and
and public bidding for the NBN 1. Compel respondents, upon Writ of Communications Technology, headed by its
contract.[11] (Emphasis supplied) Mandamus, to forthwith produce and Chairman, Ramon P. Sales, The
furnish petitioner or his undersigned Telecommunications Office, Bids and
G.R. No. 179317 counsel a certified true copy of the contract Awards for Information and
or agreement covering the NBN project as Communications Technology Committee
WHEREFORE, petitioners Amsterdam agreed upon with ZTE Corporation; (ICT), headed by DOTC Assistant Secretary
Holdings, Inc., and Nathaniel Sauz Elmer A. Soneja as Chairman, and The
respectfully pray as follows: 2. Schedule Oral Arguments in the Technical Working Group for ICT, and DOTC
present case pursuant to Rule 49 in relation Assistant Secretary Lorenzo Formoso, and
A. upon the filing of this Petition for Mandamus and to Section 2, Rule 56 of the Revised Rules of All Other Operating Units of the DOTC for
conditioned upon the posting of a bond in Court; Information and Communications
such amount as the Honorable Court may fix, Technology, and ZTE Corporation,
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of 3. Annul and set aside the award of Amsterdam Holdings, Inc., and ARESCOM,
preliminary injunction be issued directing the contract for the national broadband Inc.Acting on the instant petition with
the Department of Transportation and network to respondent ZTE Corporation, prayer for temporary restraining order
Communication, the Commission on upon the ground that said contract, as well as and/or writ of preliminary injunction, the
Information and Communications Technology, the procedures resorted to preparatory to the Court Resolved, without giving due course
all other government agencies and execution thereof, is contrary to the to the petition, to
instrumentalities, their officers, employees, Constitution, to law and to public policy;
and/or other persons acting for and on their xxxx
behalf to desistduring the pendency of the 4. Compel public respondent
instant Petition for Mandamus from entering to forthwith comply with pertinent (d) Issue a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
into any other agreements and from provisions of law regarding procurement of ORDER, effective immediately and
commencing with any kind, sort, or specie government infrastructure projects, continuing until further orders from this
of activity in connection with the National including public bidding for said contract to Court, enjoining the (i) National
Broadband Network Project; undertake the construction of the national Economic and Development Authority,
broadband network.[13] (Emphasis supplied) (ii) NEDA-Investment Coordination
B. the instant Petition for Committee, (iii) Department of
Mandamus be given due course; and, On September 11, 2007, the Court issued a TRO[14] in Transportation and Communications,
G.R. No. 178830, enjoining the parties from pursuing, entering Commission on Information and
C. after due consideration of all into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and implementing the Communications Technology, (iv)
relevant issues, judgment be rendered ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and Project as prayed Telecommunications Office, Bids and
directing respondents to allow herein for. Pertinent parts of the said Order read: Awards for Information and
petitioners access to all agreements entered Communications Technology Committee
into with the Government of China, the ZTE WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, on 11 (ICT), (v) Technical Working Group for
Corporation, and/or other entities, September 2007, adopted a resolution in the ICT, and all other Operating Units of the
government instrumentalities, and/or above-entitled case, to wit: DOTC for Information and
127
 Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings,
Inc., and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any
and all persons acting on their behalf
from pursuing, entering into
indebtedness, disbursing funds, and
implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband
Deal and Project as prayed for.
NOW THEREFORE, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this
Court, You, Respondents (i) National
Economic and Development Authority, (ii)
NEDA-Investment Coordination Committee,
(iii) Department of Transportation and
Communications, Commission on Information
and Communications Technology, (iv)
Telecommunications Office, Bids and Awards
for Information and Communications
Technology Committee (ICT), (v) Technical
Working Group for ICT, and all other
Operating Units of the DOTC for Information
and Communications Technology, (vi) ZTE
Corporation; (vii) Amsterdam Holdings, Inc.,
and (viii) ARESCOM, Inc., and any and all
persons acting on their behalf are
hereby ENJOINED from pursuing, entering
into indebtedness, disbursing funds, and
implementing the ZTE-DOTC Broadband
Deal and Project as prayed for.[15](Emphasis
supplied.)
Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 pray that they be
furnished certified true copies of the contract or agreement
covering the NBN project as agreed upon with ZTE
Corporation. It appears that during one of the Senate hearings
on the NBN project, copies of the supply contract[16] were
readily made available to petitioners.[17]Evidently, the said
prayer has been complied with and is, thus, mooted.
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, acting in her official
capacity during the meeting held on October 2, 2007 in China,
informed Chinas President Hu Jintao that the Philippine
Government had decided not to continue with the ZTE-
National Broadband Network (ZTE-NBN) Project due to several
reasons and constraints, there is no doubt that all the other
principal prayers in the three petitions (to annul, set aside,
and enjoin the implementation of the ZTE-NBN Project) had
also become moot.
Contrary to petitioners contentions that these declarations
made by officials belonging to the executive branch on the
Philippine Governments decision not to continue with the ZTE-
NBN Project are self-serving, hence, inadmissible, the Court
has no alternative but to take judicial notice of this official
act of the President of the Philippines.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when
mandatory. A court shall take judicial
notice, without introduction of evidence,
of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the
Philippines, the official acts of
the legislative, executive and
judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the rules, it is mandatory and the Court has no
alternative but to take judicial notice of the official acts of
the President of the Philippines, who heads the executive
branch of our government. It is further provided in the above-
quoted rule that the court shall take judicial notice of the
foregoing facts without introduction of evidence. Since we
consider the act of cancellation by President Macapagal-
Arroyo of the proposed ZTE-NBN Project during the meeting
of October 2, 2007 with the Chinese President in China as
an official act of the executive department, the Court must
take judicial notice of such official act without need of
evidence.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[18] We took judicial
notice of the announcement by the Office of the President
banning all rallies and canceling all permits for public
assemblies following the issuance of Presidential Proclamation
No. 1017 and General Order No. 5.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[19] the Court also resorted to
judicial notice in resolving the factual ingredient of the
petition.
Moreover, under Section 2, paragraph (m) of Rule 131
of the Rules of Court, the official duty of the executive
officials[20] of informing this Court of the governments decision
not to continue with the ZTE-NBN Project is also presumed
to have been regularly performed, absent proof to the
contrary. Other than petitioner AHIs unsavory insinuation in
its comment, the Court finds no factual or legal basis to
disregard this disputable presumption in the present instance.
Concomitant to its fundamental task as the ultimate
citadel of justice and legitimacy is the judiciarys role of
strengthening political stability indispensable to progress and
national development. Pontificating on issues which no longer
legitimately constitute an actual case or controversy will do
more harm than good to the nation as a whole. Wise exercise
of judicial discretion militates against resolving the academic
issues, as petitioners want this Court to do. This is especially
true where, as will be further discussed, the legal issues raised
cannot be resolved without previously establishing the factual
basis or antecedents.
Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very
antithesis of mootness. In the absence of actual justiciable
controversies or disputes, the Court generally opts to refrain
from deciding moot issues. Where there is no more live
subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to
render any ruling or make any pronouncement.
Kapag wala nang buhay na kaso, wala nang dahilan para
magdesisyon ang Husgado.
In Republic Telecommunications Holdings, Inc. v.
Santiago,[21] the lone issue tackled by the Court of Appeals
(CA) was whether the Securities Investigation and Clearing
Department (SICD) and Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) en banc committed reversible error in issuing and
upholding, respectively, the writ of preliminary injunction.
The writ enjoined the execution of the questioned agreements
between Qualcomm, Inc. and Republic Telecommunications
Holdings, Inc. (RETELCOM). The implementation of the
agreements was restrained through the assailed orders of the
SICD and the SEC en banc which, however, were nullified by
the CA decision. Thus, RETELCOM elevated the matter to this
128
Court praying for the reinstatement of the writ of preliminary
injunction of the SICD and the SEC en banc. However, before
the matter was finally resolved, Qualcomm, Inc. withdrew
from the negotiating table. Its withdrawal had thwarted the
execution and enforcement of the contracts. Thus, the
resolution of whether the implementation of said agreements
should be enjoined became no longer necessary.
Equally applicable to the present case is the Court
ruling in the above-cited Republic Telecommunications. There
We held, thus:
Indeed, the instant petition, insofar
as it assails the Court of Appeals Decision
nullifying the orders of the SEC en banc and
the SICD, has been rendered moot and
academic. To rule, one way or the other, on
the correctness of the questioned orders of
the SEC en banc and the SICD will be
indulging in a theoretical exercise that has no
practical worth in view of the supervening
event.
The rule is well-settled that for a
court to exercise its power of adjudication,
there must be an actual case or controversy
one which involves a conflict of legal rights,
an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case
must not be moot or academic or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations
not cognizable by a court of justice. Where
the issue has become moot and academic,
there is no justiciable controversy, and an
adjudication thereon would be of no
practical use or value as courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to
satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging.
In the ultimate analysis, petitioners
are seeking the reinstatement of the writ of
injunction to prevent the concerned parties
from pushing through with transactions with
Qualcomm, Inc. Given that Qualcomm, Inc. is
no longer interested in pursuing the
contracts, there is no actual substantial relief
to which petitioners would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of
the petition.
The Court likewise finds it
unnecessary to rule whether the assailed
Court of Appeals Decision had the effect of
overruling the Courts Resolution dated 29
January 1999, which set aside the TRO issued
by the appellate court.
A ruling on the matter practically
partakes of a mere advisory opinion, which
falls beyond the realm of judicial review. The
exercise of the power of judicial review is
limited to actual cases and controversies.
Courts have no authority to pass upon issues
through advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems.
While there were occasions when the
Court passed upon issues although
supervening events had rendered those
petitions moot and academic, the instant
case does not fall under the exceptional
cases. In those cases, the Court was
persuaded to resolve moot and academic
issues to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines
or rules for future guidance of both bench
and bar.
In the case at bar, the resolution of
whether a writ of preliminary injunction may
be issued to prevent the implementation of
the assailed contracts calls for an appraisal
of factual considerations which are peculiar
only to the transactions and parties involved
in this controversy. Except for the
determination of whether petitioners are
entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction
which is now moot, the issues raised in this
petition do not call for a clarification of any
constitutional principle or the interpretation
of any statutory provision.[22]
Secondly, even assuming that the Court will choose
to disregard the foregoing considerations and brush aside
mootness, the Court cannot completely rule on the merits of
the case because the resolution of the three petitions
involves settling factual issues which definitely requires
reception of evidence. There is not an iota of doubt that this
may not be done by this Court in the first instance because,
as has been stated often enough, this Court is not a trier of
facts.
Ang pagpapasiya sa tatlong petisyon ay nangangailangan
ng paglilitis na hindi gawain ng Hukumang ito.
Respondent ZTE, in its Comment in G.R. No.
178830,[23] correctly pointed out that since petitioner Suplico
filed his petition directly with this Court, without prior factual
findings made by any lower court, a determination of
pertinent and relevant facts is needed. ZTE enumerated some
of these factual issues, to wit:
(1) Whether an executive
agreement has been reached
between the Philippine and Chinese
governments over the NBN Project;
(2) Whether the ZTE Supply
Contract was entered into by the
Republic of the Philippines, through
the DOTC, and ZTE International
pursuant to, and as an integral part
of, the executive agreement;
(3) Whether a loan agreement for
the NBN Project has actually been
executed;
(4) Whether the Philippine
government required that the NBN
Project be completed under a Build-
Operate-and-Transfer Scheme;
(5) Whether the AHI proposal
complied with the requirements for
an unsolicited proposal under the
BOT Law;
(6) Whether the Philippine
government has actually earmarked
129
 public finds for disbursement under
the ZTE Supply Contract; and
(7) Whether the coverage of the
NBN Project to be supplied under the
ZTE Supply Contract is more
extensive than that under
the AHI proposal or such other
proposal submitted therefor.[24]
Definitely, some very specific reliefs prayed for in
both G.R. Nos. 178830 and 179613 require prior determination
of facts before pertinent legal issues could be resolved and
specific reliefs granted.
In G.R. No. 178830, petitioner seeks to annul and
set aside the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal and
compel public respondents to forthwith comply with
pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN
contract.
In G.R. No. 179613, petitioners also pray that the
Court annul and set aside the award of the contract for the
national broadband network to respondent ZTE Corporation,
upon the ground that said contract, as well as the procedures
resorted to preparatory to the execution thereof, is contrary
to the Constitution, to law and to public policy. They also ask
the Court to compel public respondent to forthwith comply
with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government infrastructure projects, including public bidding
for said contract to undertake the construction of the national
broadband network.
It is simply impossible for this Court to annul and set aside
the award of the ZTE-DOTC Broadband Deal without any
evidence to support a prior factual finding pointing to any
violation of law that could lead to such annulment order. For
sure, the Supreme Court is not the proper venue for this
factual matter to be threshed out.
Thirdly, petitioner Suplico in G.R. No. 178830 prayed that this
Court order public respondents to forthwith comply with
pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government ICT contracts and public bidding for the NBN
contract.[25] It would be too presumptuous on the part of the
Court to summarily compel public respondents to comply
with pertinent provisions of law regarding procurement of
government infrastructure projects without any factual
basis or prior determination of very particular violations
committed by specific government officials of the executive
branch. For the Court to do so would amount to a breach of
the norms of comity among co-equal branches of
government. A perceived error cannot be corrected by
committing another error. Without proper evidence, the Court
cannot just presume that the executive did not comply with
procurement laws. Should the Court allow itself to fall into
this trap, it would plainly commit grave error itself.
Magiging kapangahasan sa Hukumang ito na pilitin ang mga
pinipetisyon na tumalima sa batas sa pangongontrata ng
pamahalaan kung wala pang pagtitiyak o angkop na
ebidensiya ng nagawang paglabag dito.
Let it be clarified that the Senate investigation in aid of
legislation cannot be the basis of Our decision which requires
a judicial finding of facts.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio takes the view that the National
Broadband Network Project should be declared null and
void. The foregoing threefold reasons would suffice to address
the concern of Our esteemed colleague.
The Court is, therefore, constrained to dismiss the
petitions and deny them due course because of mootness and
because their resolution requires reception of evidence which
cannot be done in an original petition brought before the
Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary
Restraining Order issued on September 11,
2007 is DISSOLVED. SO ORDERED.
Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No. 142295, May 31,
2001;
PARDO, J.:
Petitioner Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas
appeals via certiorari from a decision of the
Court of Appeals[1] affirming with modification
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan,
Branch 20, Malolos, and finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P. D. No.
1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294
(illegal possession of firearms), sentencing him
to four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six
(6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine
of P30,000.00.
On June 17, 1996, Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Eufracio S. Marquez of Bulacan filed
with the Regional Trial Court, Bulacan, Malolos
an Information charging petitioner Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas with violation of P. D. No.
1866, as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in
the municipality of Norzagaray, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession under his
custody and control, the following, to wit:
a) One (1) pc. Pistol Cal. 45 SN:70G23792 (w/o
license)
b) One (1) pc. Revolver Cal. 22 SN:48673 (w/o
license)
130
c) Twenty Seven (27) rds live ammos. For cal.
.45
d) Five (5) pcs. Magazines for cal. .45
e) Eight (8) rds live ammunitions for cal. 22
f) Five (5) pcs. Magazines short for cal. 5.56
(M16)
g) Twenty (20) rds live ammunitions for cal
5.56
without first having obtained a proper license
therefor.
Contrary to law.[2]
On June 25, 1996, the trial court arraigned the
petitioner. He pleaded not guilty.[3] Trial ensued.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a
report that accused-appellant Vicente del
Rosario was in possession of certain firearms
without the necessary licenses. Acting upon the
report, P/Sr. Insp. Jerito Adique of the PNP
Criminal Investigation Group at Camp Olivas,
Pampanga inquired from the PNP Firearms and
Explosive Division whether or not the report
was true. On May 10, 1996, P/Sr. Insp. Edwin
C. Roque of the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Division issued a certification (Exhibit L)
stating that per records in his office, the
appellant is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber. Armed with the
said certification, P/Sr. Insp. Adique applied for
a search warrant to enable his team to search the
house of appellant.
On June 13, 1996, a search warrant (Exhibit A)
was issued by Judge Gil Fernandez, Sr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
217, authorizing the search of the residence of
appellant at Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray,
Bulacan.[4] On June 15, 1996, at about 7:00
oclock in the morning, a team led by P/Sr. Insp.
Adique went to Norzagaray to serve the warrant.
Before proceeding to the residence of the
appellant, the police officers requested Barangay
Chairman Rogelio de Silva and Barangay
Councilman Aurelio Panteleon to accompany
them in the implementation of the warrant.
Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police
officers introduced themselves to the wife of
appellant. When the appellant came out, P/Sr.
Insp. Adique informed him that they had a
search warrant and that they were authorized to
search his house. After appellant gave his
permission, the police officers conducted a
search of the house. The search yielded the
following items: (a) a caliber .45 pistol with
Serial No. 703792 with five magazines of
caliber .45 (Exhibits B and H) found at the
masters bedroom; (b) five magazines of 5.56 M-
16 rifle and two radios (Exhibits C to C-4)
found in the room of appellants daughter; and
(c) a caliber .22 revolver with Serial No. 48673
(Exhibit F) containing 8 pieces of live
ammunition (Exhibit M) found in the kitchen of
the house. When asked about his license to
possess the firearms, the appellant failed to
produce any. This prompted the police officers
to seize the subject firearms.
SPO2 Marion Montezon, one of the searching
officers, prepared three separate inventories of
the seized items (Exhibits H, M and N). The
inventories were signed by P/Sr. Insp. Adique,
the appellant and the barangay officials who
witnessed the search. Thereafter SPO2
Montezon prepared a certification of orderly
search (Exhibit I) which was signed by the
appellant and the barangay officials attesting to
the orderly conduct of the search.
For his defense, appellant contends that he had a
license for the caliber .45 pistol recovered in his
bedroom and that the other items seized during
the search including the caliber .22 revolver,
were merely planted by the police
officers. Appellant likewise assails the manner
in which the search was carried out, claiming
that the police officers just barged into his house
without asking permission. Furthermore, he
claimed that the barangay officials arrived only
after the police already had finished the search.
131
After trial and on July 2, 1998, the trial court
rendered a judgment of conviction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court
finds the accused VICENTE DEL ROSARIO y
NICOLAS guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of P. D. No. 1866 as charged under the
Information dated June 17, 1996.
Conformably with the provisions of said law, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8294, and
pursuant to the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6)
years of prision correctional, as maximum, and
to pay a fine of Fifteen Thousand Pesos
(P15,000.00).[5]
On July 20, 1998, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, assailing the decision for being
contrary to facts and the law.[6]
On July 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court as set
out in the opening paragraph of this decision.[7]
On August 10, 1999, petitioner filed with the
Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration
and/or new trial.[8] He contended that the
certification issued by the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, Philippine National Police
stating that the person named therein had not
been issued a firearm license referred to a certain
Vicente Vic del Rosario of barangay Bigte,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, not to him. He comes from
barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan, and that
he has a valid firearm license.
On February 22, 2000, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.[9]
Hence, this appeal.[10]
Petitioner submits that the search conducted
at his residence was illegal as the search warrant
was issued in violation of the Constitution[11] and
consequently, the evidence seized was
inadmissible. He also submits that he had a
license for the .45 caliber firearm and
ammunition seized in his bedroom. The other
firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer
at the kitchen of his house, a magazine for 5.56
mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios
found in his daughters bedroom, were either
planted by the police or illegally seized, as they
were not mentioned in the search warrant.
We find the petition impressed with merit.
We define the issues as follows:
First: whether petitioner had a license for the
.45 caliber Colt pistol and ammunition seized in
his bedroom; and
Second: whether the .22 caliber revolver
seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his house, a
magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle and
two 2-way radios found in his daughters
bedroom, were planted by the police or were
illegally seized.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First: The .45 cal. Colt pistol in question was
duly licensed.
Normally, we do not review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial
courts.[12] However, this case comes within the
exceptions.[13] The findings of fact by the Court of
Appeals will not be disturbed by the Court unless
these findings are not supported by
evidence.[14] In this case, the findings of the lower
courts even directly contradict the evidence.
Hence, we review the evidence. The trial court
held that the copy of the license presented was
blurred, and that in any event, the court could rely
on the certification dated May 10, 1996, of P/Sr.
Inspector Edwin C. Roque, Chief, Records
Branch, Firearms and Explosives Division,
Philippine National Police stating that Vicente
Vic del Rosario of Barangay Bigte, Norzagaray,
Bulacan is not a licensed/registered firearm
holder of any kind and caliber.[15] As against this,
petitioner submitted that he was not the person
referred to in the said certification because he is
Vicente del Rosario y Nicolas from
Barangay Tigbe,Norzagaray, Bulacan. The
Court takes judicial notice of the existence of
both barangay Tigbe and barangay Bigte, in
Norzagaray, Bulacan.[16] In fact, the trial court
erred grievously in not taking judicial notice of
132
the barangays within its territorial jurisdiction,
believing the prosecutions submission that there
was only barangay Tigbe, and that barangay
Bigte in the certification was a typographical
error.[17] Petitioner presented to the head of the
raiding team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A.
Adique, Chief, Operations Branch, PNP Criminal
Investigation Command, a valid firearm license.
The court is duty bound to examine the evidence
assiduously to determine the guilt or innocence
of the accused. It is true that the court may rely
on the certification of the Chief, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP on the absence of a
firearm license.[18] However, such certification
referred to another individual and thus, cannot
prevail over a valid firearm license duly issued to
petitioner. In this case, petitioner presented the
printed computerized copy of License No. RCL
1614021915 issued to him on July 13, 1993,
expiring in January 1995, by the Chief, Firearms
and Explosives Division, PNP under the
signature of Reynaldo V. Velasco, Sr.
Supt. (GSC) PNP, Chief, FEO.[19] On the dorsal
side of the printed computerized license, there is
stamped the words Validity of computerized
license is extended until renewed license is
printed dated January 17, 1995, signed by Police
Chief Inspector Franklin S. Alfabeto, Chief,
Licence Branch, FEO.[20] Coupled with this
indefinite extension, petitioner paid the license
fees for the extension of the license for the next
two-year period.[21]
Consequently, we find that petitioner was the was unlawful took effect only on July 7,
holder of a valid firearm license for the .45 1997.[24] It could not be given retroactive effect.[25]
caliber Colt pistol seized in the bedroom of his
According to firearm licensing regulations,
house on June 15, 1996.[22] As required, petitioner
the renewal of a firearm license was
presented the license to the head of the raiding
automatically applied for upon payment of the
team, Police Senior Inspector Jerito A. Adique
license fees for the renewal period. The expired
of the Criminal Investigation Division Group,
license was not cancelled or revoked. It served as
PNP.[23] As a senior police officer, Senior
temporary authority to possess the firearm until
Inspector Adique could easily determine the
the renewed license was issued. Meantime, the
genuineness and authenticity of the computerized
applicant may keep the gun at home pending
printed license presented. He must know the
renewal of the firearm license and issuance of a
computerized license printed form. The stamp is
printed computerized license. He was not obliged
clearly visible. He could decipher the words and
to surrender the weapon. Printed at the dorsal
the signature of the authorized signing official of
side of the computerized license is a notice
the Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP. He
reading:
belonged to the same national police
organization. IMPORTANT
Nevertheless, Senior Insp. Adique rejected
1. This firearm license is valid for two (2)
the license presented because, according to him,
years. Exhibit this license whenever demanded
it was expired. However, assuming that the by proper authority.
license presented was expired during the period
2. Surrender your firearm/s to the nearest PNP
January 1995 to January 1997, still, possession of Unit upon revocation or termination of this
the firearm in question, a .45 caliber Colt pistol license. Under any of the following instances,
with serial No. 70G23792, during that period was your license shall be revoked for which reason
your firearm/s is/are subject to confiscation and
not illegal. The firearm was kept at home, not
its/their forfeiture in favor of the government.
carried outside residence. On June 15, 1996, at
the time of the seizure of the firearm in
a. Failure to notify the Chief of PNP in
question, possession of firearm with an expired
writing of your change of address,
license was not considered unlawful, provided
and/or qualification.
that the license had not been cancelled or
revoked. Republic Act No. 8294, providing that b. Failure to renew this license by
possession of a firearm with an expired license paying annual license, fees, within
133
 six (6) months from your birth
month. Renewal of your license can
be made within your birth month or
month preceding your birth month.
Late renewal shall be penalized with
50% surcharge for the first month
(from the first day to the last day of
this month) followed by an additional
25% surcharge for all of the
succeeding five (5) months
compounded monthly.
c. Loss of firearm/s through negligence.
d. Carrying of firearm/s outside of
residence without appropriate permit
and/or carrying firearm/s in prohibited
places.
e. Conviction by competent court for a
crime involving moral turpitude or for
any offense where the penalty carries
an imprisonment of more than six (6)
months or fine of at least P1,000.00.
f. Dismissal for cause from the service.
g. Failure to sign license, or sign ID
picture or affix right thumbmark.
3. Unauthorized loan of firearm/s to another
person is punishable by permanent
disqualification and forfeiture of the firearm in
favor of the government.
4. If termination is due to death, your next of kin
should surrender your firearm/s to the nearest
PNP Unit. For those within Metro Manila,
surrender should be made with FEO, Camp
Crame.
5. When firearms become permanently
unserviceable, they should be deposited with
the nearest PNP Unit and ownership should be
relinquished in writing so that firearms may be
disposed of in accordance with law.
6. Application for the purchase of ammunition
should be made in case of a resident of Metro
Manila direct to the Chief, FEO and for
residents of a Province to secure
recommendation letter to the nearest PNP
Provincial Command who will thereafter
endorse same to CHIEF, FEO for issuance of
the permit. License must be presented before
an authority to purchase ammo could be
obtained.[26]
Indeed, as heretofore stated, petitioner duly
paid the license fees for the automatic renewal of
the firearm license for the next two years upon
expiration of the license in January 1995, as
evidenced by official receipt No. 7615186, dated
January 17, 1995.[27] The license would be
renewed, as it was, because petitioner still
possessed the required qualifications. Meantime,
the validity of the license was extended until the
renewed computerized license was printed. In
fact, a renewed license was issued on January 17,
1997, for the succeeding two-year period.[28]
Aside from the clearly valid and subsisting
license issued to petitioner, on January 25, 1995,
the Chief, Philippine National Police issued to
him a permit to carry firearm outside residence
valid until January 25, 1996, for the firearm in
question.[29] The Chief, Philippine National Police
would not issue a permit to carry firearm outside
residence unless petitioner had a valid and
subsisting firearm license. Although the permit to
carry firearm outside residence was valid for only
one year, and expired on January 25, 1996, such
permit is proof that the regular firearm license
was renewed and subsisting within the two-year
term up to January 1997. A Permit to Carry
Firearm Outside Residence presupposes that the
party to whom it is issued is duly licensed to
possess the firearm in
question. Unquestionably, on January 17,
[30]
1997, the Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP renewed petitioners license for the
.45 cal. Colt pistol in question.[31]
Clearly then, petitioner had a valid firearm
license during the interregnum between January
17, 1995, to the issuance of his renewed license
on January 17, 1997.
Finally, there is no rhyme or reason why the
Court of Appeals and the trial court did not accept
with alacrity the certification dated June 25,
1996, of P/Sr. Inspector Edwin C.
Roque,[32] Chief, Records Branch, Firearms and
Explosives Division, PNP that Vicente N. del
Rosario of Barangay Tigbe, Norzagaray, Bulacan
is a licensed/registered holder of Pistol, Colt
caliber .45 with serial number 70G23792,
covered by computerized license issued dated
134
June 15, 1995, with an expiry date January
1997.[33] Reinforcing the aforementioned
certification, petitioner submitted another
certification dated August 27, 1999, stating that
Vicente N. del Rosario of Barangay Tigbe,
Norzagaray, Bulacan, was issued firearm license
No. RL-C1614021915, for caliber .45 Pistol with
Serial Number 70G23792, for the years covering
the period from July 13, 1993 to January 1995,
and the extension appearing at the back thereof
for the years 1995 to 1997.[34] Had the lower
courts given full probative value to these official
issuances, petitioner would have been correctly
acquitted, thus sparing this Court of valuable
time and effort.
In crimes involving illegal possession of
firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, viz.: (a) the
existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact
that the accused who owned or possessed it does
not have the license or permit to possess the
same.[35] The essence of the crime of illegal
possession is the possession, whether actual or
constructive, of the subject firearm, without
which there can be no conviction for illegal
possession. After possession is established by the
prosecution, it would only be a matter of course
to determine whether the accused has a license to
possess the firearm.[36] Possession of any firearm
becomes unlawful only if the necessary permit or
license therefor is not first obtained. The absence
of license and legal authority constitutes an
essential ingredient of the offense of illegal
possession of firearm and every ingredient or coupled with intent to possess (animus
essential element of an offense must be shown by possidendi) the firearm.[40]
the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable
In upholding the prosecution and giving
doubt. Stated otherwise, the negative fact of lack
credence to the testimony of police officer Jerito
or absence of license constitutes an essential
A. Adigue, the trial court relied on the
ingredient of the offense which the prosecution
presumption of regularity in the performance of
has the duty not only to allege but also to prove
official duties by the police officers.[41] This is a
beyond reasonable doubt.[37] To convict an
flagrant error because his testimony is directly
accused for illegal possession of firearms and
contradictory to the official records of the
explosives under P. D. 1866, as amended, two (2)
Firearms and Explosives Division, PNP, which
essential elements must be indubitably
must prevail. Morever, the presumption of
established, viz.: (a) the existence of the
regularity can not prevail over the Constitutional
subject firearm or explosive which may be
presumption of innocence.[42] Right from the start,
proved by the presentation of the subject firearm
P/Sr. Insp. Jerito A. Adigue was aware that
or explosive or by the testimony of witnesses who
petitioner possessed a valid license for the caliber
saw accused in possession of the same, and
.45 Colt pistol in question. Despite this fact, P/Sr.
(b) the negative fact that the accused had no
Insp. Adigue proceeded to detain petitioner and
license or permit to own or possess the firearm
charged him with illegal possession of firearms.
or explosive which fact may be established by the
We quote pertinent portions of the testimony of
testimony or certification of a representative of
petitioner:
the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the
Q: What else did Adigue tell you after showing to him
accused has no license or permit to possess the
the license of your cal. .45 pistol and the alleged cal.
subject firearm or explosive. x x x We stress that
.22 found in a drawer in your kitchen?
the essence of the crime penalized under P. D.
A: He told me that since my firearm is licensed, he will
1866 is primarily the accuseds lack of license or
return my firearm, give him ten thousand
permit to carry or possess the firearm, pesos (P10,000.00) and for me to tell who among
ammunition or explosive as possession by itself the people in our barangay have unlicensed firearm,
is not prohibited by law.[38] Illegal possession of sir.
firearm is a crime punished by special law, Q: How did he say about the ten thousand pesos?
a malum prohibitum, and no malice or intent to
A: He said palit kalabaw na lang tayo sir.
commit a crime need be proved.[39] To support a
Q: And what did you answer him?
conviction, however, there must be possession
135
 A: I told him my firearm is licensed and I do not have
money, if I have, I will not give him, sir, because he
was just trying to squeeze something from me.
Q: How about the unlicensed firearms in your barangay
which he asked from you?
A: I said I do not know any unlicensed firearm in our
barangay, sir.
Q: About the .22 cal. pistol, what was your answer to
him?
A: I told him that it was not mine, they planted it, sir.
Q: What did he say next?
A: He said that it is your word against mine, the Court
will believe me because I am a police officer, sir.
Q: What was your comment to what he said?
A: I said my firearm is licensed and we have Courts of
law who do not conform with officials like you and
then he laughed and laughed, sir.[43]
The trial court was obviously misguided
when it held that it is a matter of judicial notice
that a caliber .45 firearm can not be licensed to a
private individual.[44] This ruling has no basis
either in law or in jurisprudence.[45]
Second issue. The seizure of items not
mentioned in the search warrant was illegal.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver with
Serial No. 48673, that the police raiding team
found in a drawer at the kitchen of petitioners
house, suffice it to say that the firearm was not
mentioned in the search warrant applied for and
issued for the search of petitioners house. Section
2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the
general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial
warrant, absent which such search and seizure
becomes unreasonable within the meaning of
said constitutional provision.[46] Supporting
jurisprudence thus outlined the following
requisites for a search warrants validity, the
absence of even one will cause its downright
nullification: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined
by the judge himself and not by the applicant or
any other person; (3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under
oath or affirmation, the complainant and such
witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the
warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized.[47] Seizure is limited to those items
particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion
regarding what articles they shall
seize. Evidence seized on the occasion of such
[48]
an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a
poisonous tree. In the language of the
fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.[49]
In this case, the firearm was not found
inadvertently and in plain view. It was found as a
result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of
petitioners house. This firearm, to emphasize,
was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence,
the seizure was illegal.[50] The seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in plain violation of
the law and the Constitution.[51] True that as an
exception, the police may seize without warrant
illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for
that matter, inadvertently found in plain
view. However, [t]he seizure of evidence in plain
view applies only where the police officer is not
searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object.[52] Specifically, seizure of evidence in
plain view is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who had the right to be where they
are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent,
and
(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search.[53]
Hence, the petitioner rightly rejected the
firearm as planted and not belonging to him. The
prosecution was not able to prove that the firearm
was in the effective possession or control of the
petitioner without a license. In illegal possession
of firearms, the possessor must know of the
existence of the subject firearm in his possession
or control. In People v. de Gracia,[54] we clarified
the meaning of possession for the purpose of
convicting a person under P. D. No. 1866, thus: x
x x In the present case, a distinction should be
136
made between criminal intent and intent to
possess. While mere possession without criminal
intent is sufficient to convict a person for illegal
possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that
there was animus possidendi or an intent to
possess on the part of the accused. x x x x Hence,
the kind of possession punishable under P. D. No.
1866 is one where the accused possessed a
firearm either physically or constructively
with animus possidendi or intention to possess
the same.[55] That is the meaning of animus
possidendi. In the absence of animus
possidendi, the possessor of a firearm incurs no
criminal liability.
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal.
magazine found in the bedroom of petitioners
daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized
items were inadmissible in evidence. As
explained in People v. Doria,[56] the plain view
doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a
position where he has a clear view of a particular
area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2)
said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees
in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence;
and (3) it is immediately apparent to such officer
that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime
or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure.
With particular reference to the two 2-way
radios that the raiding policemen also seized in
the bedroom of petitioners daughter, there was
absolutely no reason for the seizure. The radios
were not contraband per se. The National
Telecommunications Commission may license
two-way radios at its discretion.[57] The burden is
on the prosecution to show that the two-way
radios were not licensed. The National
Telecommunication Commission is the sole
agency authorized to seize unlicensed two-way
radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-
way radios were not mentioned in the search
warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a
plain violation of a citizens right. Worse, the
petitioner was not charged with illegal possession
of the two-way radios.
Consequently, the confiscation of the two 2-
way radios was clearly illegal. The possession of
such radios is not even included in the charge of
illegal possession of firearms (violation of P. D.
No. 1866, as amended) alleged in the
Information.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby
REVERSES the decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. CR No. 22255, promulgated on July
09, 1999.
The Court ACQUITS petitioner Vicente del
Rosario y Nicolas of the charge of violation of P.
D. No. 1866, as amended by R. A. No. 8294
(illegal possession of firearms and ammunition),
in Criminal Case No. 800-M-96, Regional Trial
Court, Bulacan, Branch 20, Malolos.
Costs de oficio.
The Chief, Firearms and Explosives
Division, PNP shall return to petitioner his
caliber .45 Colt pistol, with Serial Number No.
70G23792, the five (5) extra magazines and
twenty seven (27) rounds of live ammunition,
and the two 2-way radios confiscated from
him. The Chief, Philippine National Police, or his
duly authorized representative shall show to this
Court proof of compliance herewith within
fifteen (15) days from notice. The .22 caliber
revolver with Serial No. 48673, and eight (8) live
ammunition and the magazine for 5.56 mm.
caliber Armalite rifle are confiscated in favor of
the government. SO ORDERED.
Vergara v. People, G.R. No. 128720, January
23, 2002;
QUISUMBING, J.:
Petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’
decision dated October 31, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. CR
18318, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in Criminal Case No.
86163, convicting him of robbery, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara GUILTY beyond
peradventure of doubt of the crime of Robbery defined
and penalized under Art. 294, No. (5), in relation to Art.
295, of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years
of prision correcional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years
and Twenty-One (21) days of prision mayor, as
137
maximum; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of
P106,000.00; to suffer all the accessory penalties
appurtenant thereto; and, to pay the Costs.
SO ORDERED.1
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 19, 1991, an information charging S/Sgt.
Elmer Vergara, PC, C1C Nicasio Custodio y Abrera, PC
and Leonido Losanes y Vasquez of robbery in band was
filed by the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor’s Office with the
RTC of Pasig, Metro Manila. The information reads:
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1990, in the
Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines,
a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with John Doe, whose true
identity and present whereabout is still unknown, and
mutually helping and aiding one another, armed with
high powered handguns, with intent of gain, by means of
violence and intimidation employed upon the person of
one Catherine F. Manalo, an employee of J & E Manalo
Construction Co., Inc., who was then aboard a private
car, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and divest from Catherine F. Manalo the
payroll money amounting to ₱89,000.00 belonging to J &
E Manalo Construction Company, Inc. and a gold
necklace with two (2) pendants, 18K valued at ₱17,000
belonging to Catherine F. Manalo, to the damage and
prejudice of J & E Manalo Construction Company, Inc.
and Catherine F. Manalo in the aforementioned amounts
of ₱89,000.00 and ₱17, 000.00 respectively.
Contrary to law.2
Although all the suspects were brought into police
custody, petitioner’s co-accused managed to extricate
themselves from police control and remain at large. Only
petitioner was left to face the charges. On May 21, 1993,
he was arraigned. With the assistance of counsel de
oficio, he pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. Following
the pre-trial conference on August 20, 1993, trial on the
merits ensued.
The prosecution relied on the positive identification
made by private complainant who testified in court. As
found by the court a quo:
xxx
On October 27, 1990, during the police line-up at the
San Juan Police Station…she positively identified herein
accused Elmer Vergara as the armed man who pointed
the gun at her after he approached the left side of the
car and wearing an army fatigue uniform with black hat
and who got her car keys, thereafter, she executed
another statement implicating accused Elmer Vergara as
one of the four armed men who robbe[d] her.
On March 16, 1994, during the hearing of the case, she
(Catherine F. Manalo) again pointed to accused Elmer
Vergara to be one of the robbery/hold-up gang members
(HULIDAP), who took the payroll money of the J & E
Manalo Construction Co., Inc., and her gold necklace,
his participation being that of the person who pointed the
gun at her and got the keys to her car; she remembered
him to be about 5’6" to 5’7" in height, with dark features,
chubby and heavily built.3
Petitioner claimed an alibi, while denying any
participation in the offense. The trial court summed up
his defense as follows:
Accused Elmer Vergara lays a serious doubt on his
identity as one of the perpetrators of the robbery ‘hold-
up’ in question…Claiming innocence, he presented
evidence showing that he was at some other place
during the occurrence of the robbery. His alleged
presence at the Pacita Complex at San Pedro, Laguna,
being a member of the narcotic operatives engaged in a
surveillance of a suspected drug pusher, was
corroborated by no less than the team leader Captain,
now Major Christopher Laxa. Major Christopher Laxa
was definite in declaring that S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara was
physically present inside the Pizza Hut restaurant at
Pacita Complex, San Pedro Laguna, at about 3:00
o’clock in the afternoon of October 19, 1990 and, that he
did not leave the area from the time of their arrival at
around 1:00 o’clock in the morning until 11:30 o’clock in
the evening.…4
The trial court chose to believe the prosecution and
disregarded petitioner’s alibi. On March 29, 1995, it
convicted Vergara not of robbery in band as charged in
the information, however, but of robbery as defined and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.
As explained by the trial court:
Under Art. 295 of the Revised Penal Code a robbery
shall be deemed to have been committed by a
band when more than three armed
malefactors (underline supplied) take part in its
commission. The prosecution’s evidence demonstrates
that only three (3) in the group were armed, although
there was another member inside the car at the time of
the commission. However, there is no indication that the
person inside the car was armed. Conceding in gratia
argumenti, therefore, that the group of the accused
Elmer Vergara was composed of more than three (3)
malefactors, the evidence disclosed that only three (3)
were armed, and hence, the crime cannot be considered
to have been committed by a band and does not come
within the purview of Article 296 of the Revised Penal
Code, which requires more than three (3) armed
malefactors to constitute the crime of robbery committed
by a band.5
In convicting petitioner for robbery, the trial court stated:
Both the defenses of negative identification and alibi are
unavailing. Contrary to these protestations, complainant
Catherine Manalo had a vivid recollection of the identity
of S/Sgt. Elmer Vergara as the person who accosted her
on the left side of the car or at the driver’s seat and who
138
poked a gun at her neck and was also the one who took
the key from the ignition. It was a clear day, 3:00 o’clock
in the afternoon, and the probability of a poor
recollection is nil. Catherine Manalo was able to see Sgt.
Elmer Vergara while on board the Gallant (sic) Sigma
Car when it was trailing her car and also at the time it
was passing her car until her path was blocked and the
three (3) armed malefactors disembarked. She had
sufficient time to recollect the faces of the persons who
approached the car and their respective positions. There
is no reason to doubt her unerring testimony that she
was able to positively remember and then later on
identified the robbers. Between the positive declaration
of Catherine Manalo and the denial of accused Elmer
Vergara, the former deserves more credence,
notwithstanding minor inaccuracies as to the height and
weight and styling of the hair of accused Elmer Vergara.
xxx
Conceding the fact that accused Elmer Vergara was in
San Pedro, Laguna, it is not physically impossible for
him to have gone to Pasig, Metro Manila, considering
that he had an available means of transportation. The
distance between San Pedro, Laguna where the
accused claimed he was at the time the robbery took
place, and Pasig, Metro Manila, where the crime was
committed, is less than an hour drive by car and can
easily be reached by one who, like the accused Elmer
Vergara, had a car available to him.6
Aggrieved by his conviction, Vergara elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No.
18318, on the sole issue of whether or not petitioner
committed the crime charged against him. The appeal
was anchored on two grounds: (1) the alleged dubious
identification of Vergara by the private complainant, and
(2) failure of the trial court to appreciate Vergara’s alibi
that he was on an intelligence mission in San Pedro,
Laguna at the time the alleged robbery, specially in view
of the corroboration of his alibi by his commanding
officer.
Finding no reversible error in the findings and
conclusions of the trial court, the Court of Appeals
affirmed Vergara’s conviction. The appellate court said:
In the case at bench (sic), the prosecution had proven
the identity of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt through the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
Villanueva and Manalo. Appellant failed to controvert the
testimony of prosecution witness Villanueva that
accused-appellant was pointed to by witness Manalo out
of nine (9) persons. Thus, the trial court had no reason
to consider the identification made by witness Manalo in
the police station as one that stemmed from a
suggestive identification procedure used by the police.
The trial court was correct in regarding the difference in
height as a minor matter. What is vital is that the witness
recognized accused in the line-up and reiterated her
identification of accused-appellant in open court. In the
absence of ill-motive on her part to testify falsely against
accused-appellant, the trial court is correct in giving full
faith and credence to the testimony of witness Manalo.7
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it
was denied by the appellate court in its resolution of
March 26, 1997.
Insisting on his innocence, petitioner now submits to this
Court the following sole assignment of error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING MORE CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINANT CATHERINE
MANALO THAN THE TESTIMONIES OF THE
ACCUSED AND HIS WITNESS AND CONSEQUENTLY
FURTHER ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED
GUILTY OF THE CRIME BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.8
The issue of whether or not the guilt of the accused had
been proven beyond reasonable doubt hinges, in our
view, on the credibility of witnesses presented by the
prosecution and the defense. Crucial in this regard is the
identification made by the complaining witness,
Catherine Manalo, of the petitioner, Sgt. Elmer T.
Vergara, as one of the malefactors.
Petitioner vehemently insists that the contradictions in
Catherine Manalo’s testimony are not mere minor
inconsistencies. According to petitioner, while private
complainant below described him as around 5’6"-5’7"
tall, weighing about 160-165 lbs., and sporting a military
haircut; in truth, he is only 5’3-1/2" tall, tips the scale at
less than 150 lbs., and had long hair at the time of the
incident. Given these discrepancies, petitioner insists
that private complainant below must have been referring
to another person and not to him.
Basically, petitioner’s contention raises questions of
facts, which traditionally fall within the province of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals. After reviewing the
records of this case, we find no reason to disturb the
assessment of the trial court of all the pieces of evidence
submitted before it, particularly as its findings and
conclusions had been affirmed by the appellate court.
In this case, petitioner has been convicted on the basis
of the positive identification made by private complainant
below. As the Court of Appeals stressed, petitioner was
categorically identified by the private complainant not
just once, but twice, as one of the armed men who
robbed her. The first time was during the police line-up
of nine (9) persons on October 27, 1990 and the second
time was during her testimony in open court. The
records show that private complainant had no motive to
falsely testify against petitioner. We agree with the lower
courts that the discrepancies in the private complainant’s
description are not decisive. Her description was based
on visual estimates, which cannot be expected to be
perfect. What is decisive is that petitioner was positively
and categorically identified as one of the robbers, not
just once but twice, by private complainant, Catherine
Manalo. Her recollection of his description might suffer
from imperfection regarding his height, weight and
139
personal appearance. But we note less. Jurisprudence
recognizes that victims of crime have a penchant for
seeing the faces and features of their attackers, and
remembering them.9 That some variance as to
petitioner’s height and weight might exist in her
recollection, in comparison to his statistical
measurement does not destroy her credibility. That the
trial court found this variance inconsequential does not
render its findings on the credibility of witnesses
erroneous. Such findings are accorded great respect
and will be sustained by the appellate courts unless the
trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which could alter the decision or affect the result of the
case.10 Here, the important thing is that complaining
witness Catherine Manalo identified the petitioner as one
of the perpetrators of the robbery twice, without any
presumptions or suggestion from the police at the line-
up or the court at the trial.
Petitioner also argues that the prosecution failed to
contradict his alibi. He submits that the prosecution
failed to prove that he had a car available to him, or that
he drove one from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig, Metro
Manila. Petitioner further insists that the trial court’s
finding that the place where the crime was committed is
less than an hour’s drive by car and can easily be
reached by one who, like petitioner, had a car available
to him, is erroneous and unsupported by the evidence
on record.
Judicial notice could be taken of the travel time by car
from San Pedro, Laguna to Pasig City, Metro Manila,
because it is capable of unquestionable demonstration,
and nowadays is already of public knowledge, especially
to commuters.11 We find no error in the trial court’s
finding that it was not impossible for petitioner to be at
the scene of the crime, despite his alibi that he was
engaged in intelligence work in San Pablo Laguna that
same afternoon of October 19, 1990.
For alibi to prosper, it would not be enough for the
accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime
was committed. He must further demonstrate that it
would have been physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.12 It is essential that credible and tangible
proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at
the scene of the crime be presented to establish an
acceptable alibi.13Petitioner failed to meet this test. While
petitioner could have been working as intelligence agent
in San Pedro, Laguna from October 19 –21, 1990,
contrary to his claim, it was not physically impossible for
him to have been in Pasig City, Metro Manila on the day
of the commission of the crime.
Petitioner’s insistence that he had no vehicle available to
him is not supported by the testimony of his own
commanding officer who testified in petitioner’s defense,
to wit:
FISCAL: CROSS EXAMINATION:
Q: Mr. Witness, what mode of transportation did you
take in going to Laguna in (sic) October 19, 1990.
A: We used cars.
Q: What vehicle?
A: Toyota Corona ’78 model and a Galant, old model.
Q: And in what particular vehicle did you yourself used?
A: Toyota Corona and another car as a back-up vehicle.
xxx
Q: Who arrived ahead, your car or the car of the
accused?
A: We arrived together because we traveled not far with
each other, we maintained the distance of three to five
meters, ma’m.
Q: How many were you?
A: Normally, up to nine members of the team, but in that
operation I think, seven or six members, ma’m.
xxx
Q: Who were the companions of Vergara where he was
riding?
A: It was Sgt. San Jose who was driving the car,
together with Sgt. Magno and Sgt. Rubi.
Q: How about you, who were your companions?
A: I was with the other car, with a civilian driver, and I
cannot recall anymore whom I was with at the time.14
Nor was his commanding officer’s corroborative
testimony of much help in sustaining petitioner’s alibi, as
shown by the following:
FISCAL:
What is your basis that Vergara was with you at about
3:00 in the afternoon of October 19, 1990?
A: What do you mean basis? His physical presence in
the area is my basis, ma’m, that he was there.
Q: Do you keep an attendance record or attendance
book of the members of the team?
A: We do not normally do it once we left for an
operation, we believe it is not necessary to account
every minute every hour of the operation, so long as we
are in the area, target area and every body (sic) is
140
posted on our designated position, as soon as the signal
is already given then that’s the time we will respond or
arrest the guy, but I can say that Sgt. Vergara never left
the place until the 21st of October, he was there in
Pacita Complex, ma’m.
Q: In other cases where you conducted surveillance do
you maintain a logbook?
A: The log book is filled up only, I mean we do the
logging prior and after the operation, that’s the time we
placed the preparations or extent of our operation, that’s
the time we entered this in the log book and when we
returned from the operation, we also registered about
the result of the operation.
xxx
Q: You do not likewise keep a call or make a roll call or
keep attendance record?
A: It is automatic ma’m, everytime, during the operation
we see to it that all the persons were in the area at the
time we registered ourselves in the logbook.
Q: In your team, who in particular is assigned to keep
track of the attendance?
A: Being the team leader, I am the one in charge to keep
the movements of every members (sic) of the team, but
when I left on 19th October proceeding to Makati, I
specifically gave instructions to maintain the operation
and see to it that they have new informations (sic) or
new development of the case they have to call me by
radio so that I can come back in the area, that was the
instruction to the assistant team leader whenever I left
the area.
Q: So I understand that you do not go with the members
of the team during the whole period or duration of the
surveillance.
A: Sometimes, ma’m, there are instances. In that
particular instance I left my men at about 1130 in the
evening of 19th October, I left my team and back again
in the early morning of 20 October.15
There were far too many glaring lapses in the testimony
of petitioner’s corroborative witness for petitioner’s alibi
to be given much weight, thus:
Q: And what was that particular mission in San Pedro,
Laguna on October 19, 1990?
A: We were supposed to conduct a buy-bust operation
with the aid of our informant, an errand boy of the
subject pusher.
Q: Do you know the name of that informant?
A: I cannot recall.
xxx
Q: And in what particular place in Laguna was this
suppose(d) surveillance that you will conduct?
A: I cannot recall the name of the street but I know the
place, but the street name and the exact number I
cannot recall.
xxx
Q: What place?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: What is the number?
A: I cannot recall.
Q: Who was the subject?
A: It was a certain alias German, ma’m.
xxx
COURT:
Is a certain Nicasio Custodio y Abrera a member of your
team?
A: I think during that time.
xxx
COURT:
On October 19, 1990, will you recall if he was with you?
A: I cannot recall, your honor.16
In the case of alibi, it is elementary that the requirements
of time and place be strictly complied with by the
defense, meaning that the accused must not only show
that he was somewhere else but that it was also
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time it was committed.17
1âwphi1
In the light of private complainant’s positive identification
of petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime, the latter’s
defense of bare denial and alibi must necessarily fail, as
her positive testimony overrides his negative
testimony.18Alibi is a weak defense that becomes even
weaker in the face of positive identification of the
accused.19 Further, an alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the petitioner by a credible
witness who has no motive to testify falsely.20
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR
18318 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.
141
SO ORDERED.
Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
161602, July 13, 2010;
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the Ombudsmans
authority to conduct preliminary investigation
in a forfeiture case where the petitioner
allegedly amassed ill-gotten wealth before
February 25, 1986.
The Facts and the Case
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic
of the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for
the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired
property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case
0167 against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez
and his wife Agnes Sison Romualdez as well as
against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport,
Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island
Resort, Inc. (collectively, the Romualdezes)
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.[1]
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes
filed a motion to dismiss the action on grounds
of a) violation of their right to a speedy
disposition of their case; b) lack of jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c)
prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis
pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also
denied on March 10, 2003 their subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes
next filed a motion for preliminary
investigation and to suspend
proceedings.[2] They claim that since Civil Case
0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under
R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first
conducted a previous inquiry similar to
preliminary investigations in criminal cases
before the filing of the case pursuant to Section
2 of the law.[3]
In its Comment[4] on the motion, the
Republic pointed out that the Office of the
Ombudsman in fact conducted such a
preliminary investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-
91-0820[5] and issued on January 22, 1992 a
resolution, recommending the endorsement of
the matter to the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.
On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution,[6] denying the Romualdezes
March 31, 2003 motion. It also denied by
resolution on December 3, 2003their
subsequent motion for reconsideration.[7] Thus,
the Romualdezes filed the present petition
for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul
the Sandiganbayans rulings and prevent it from
further proceeding with Civil Case 0167 until
another preliminary investigation is conducted
in their case.
The Question Presented
The sole question presented in this case
is whether or not the preliminary investigation
that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-
0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the
law in forfeiture cases.
The Ruling of the Court
The Romualdezes point out that the
Office of the Ombudsman should not have
conducted an investigation of their case, since
its authority to investigate ill-gotten or
unexplained wealth cases pertained only to
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and
not before that date.[8] Since the Romualdezes
142
acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth
involved in their case as early as 1970, then the
Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the
investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In
the absence of a prior valid preliminary
investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in
Civil Case 0167 cannot continue.
In addition, the Romualdezes insist that
it was improper for the Ombudsman to have
conducted its investigation in their
absence. The spouses Alfredo and Agnes
Romualdez were in the United States when that
investigation took place. They were thus denied
their right to be heard in that investigation.
But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly
pointed out, quoting Republic v.
Sandiganbayan,[9] the Ombudsman has under
its general investigatory powers the authority to
investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged
ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before
February 25, 1986. Thus:
Nonetheless, while we do
not discount the authority of the
Ombudsman, we believe and so
hold that the exercise of his
correlative powers to both
investigate and initiate the proper
action for the recovery of ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth
is restricted only to cases for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or
unexplained wealth which were
amassed after February 25,
1986. Prior to said date, the
Ombudsman is without authority
to initiate such forfeiture
proceedings. We, however,
uphold his authority
to investigate cases for the
forfeiture or recovery of such ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed even before the
aforementioned date, pursuant to
his general investigatory power
under Section 15(1) of Republic
Act No. 6770.[10] (Emphasis
supplied)
And, although it was the Ombudsman
who conducted the preliminary investigation, it
was the OSG that instituted the action in Civil
Case 0167 in line with the Courts ruling in the
above-cited Republic and other cases that
followed.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the
Romualdezes claim that they are entitled to a
new preliminary investigation since they had no
opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991,
in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the
subpoena for that investigation had been sent to
their last known residence at the time it was
conducted.[11]The Republic categorically insists
that the appropriate subpoena had been served
on the Romualdezes.[12]
Actually, the lament of the spouses was
that they left the Philippines because of danger
to their lives after the EDSA revolution of
February 1986 and so could not take part in the
proceedings against them. While it is true that
the Court characterized the departure of the
Romualdezes as forced upon them by the
uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also said
that such was the case only until things shall
have stabilized.[13] The Court will take judicial
notice of the fact that the peoples ratification of
the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987
signaled the return to normalcy of the political
situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the
Romualdezes had no valid excuse for not
responding to the subpoena served on them at
their last known address in 1991, which they do
not deny having received.
143

The Ombudsman could not be faulted for
proceeding with the investigation of the
Romualdezes cases when they did not show up
despite notice being sent to them at their last
known residence. As the Court held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not require as a
condition sine qua non to the
validity of the proceedings [in the
preliminary investigation] the
presence of the accused for as
long as efforts to reach him were
made, and an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of the
complainant is accorded him.
The obvious purpose of the rule is
to block attempts of
unscrupulous respondents to
thwart the prosecution of offenses
by hiding themselves or by
employing dilatory tactics.[14]
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or
interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the
Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
CLT Dev’t Corp. v. Hi-Grade Feeds
Corp., G.R. No. 160684, September 02, 2015
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious
Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo Tuason, the vastness of which
measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City,
Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or
Original Certificate of Title (OCT). One of the mother titles is
OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on, smaller
lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different
persons. Several subsequent subdivisions, consolidations, and
one expropriation of the Estate, spawned numerous legal
disputes, living-up to the name "Land of Caveat
Emptor."1 One of these disputed lots was Lot 26, the
property subject of this litigation.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the
Decision2 and Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 53770 dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003,
respectively, which annulled petitioner CLT Realty
Development Corporation's (CLT) TCT No. T-177013 and
affirmed Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation's (Hi-Grade) TCTs No.
237450 and No. T-146941.
The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of
CLT and Hi-Grade, which prompted CLT to file a case for
Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of
Possession, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121, docketed as Civil Case
No. C-15463 against Hi-Grade.
Version of Hi-Grade
Respondent Hi-Grade is the registered owner of two (2)
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 237450 and T-146941,
derived from TCT No. 4211 of the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Rizal, registered under the names of Alejandro
Ruiz (Ruiz) and Mariano Leuterio (Leuterio), which is a
derivative title of OCT No. 994, the mother title.4
Tracing the line of transfer that preceded the title of Hi-
Grade, it is averred that TCT No. 4211 was registered under
the names of Ruiz and Leuterio on 9 September 1918. Later,
Lot 26 was sold to Francisco Gonzalez (Gonzalez), which
resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 4211 and its
replacement by TCT No. 5261, registered under the name of
Gonzalez.5
Upon Gonzalez's death, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled and
replaced by TCT No. 35486, registered under the name of his
surviving spouse Rufina Narciso Vda. De Gonzalez. The land
covered by TCT No. 35486 was subdivided into seven (7) lots
under subdivision plan Psd-21154. By virtue of Psd-21154,
TCT No. 35486 was cancelled and seven (7) new titles were
issued, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, registered under the
children of Gonzalez.
In 1947, the Government expropriated the seven lots.6 By
virtue of the expropriation, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 were
cancelled and replaced by TCTs No. 12836 to No. 12842.
Afterwards, by virtue of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Psd
(LRC) Pcd-1828, the Government consolidated the titles and
then further subdivided the property into 77 lots.
One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito
Villanueva under TCTs No. 23027 to No. 23028, which was
further subdivided into Lot-A and 17-B, pursuant to
subdivision plan Psd-276839. One of the properties in dispute
is Lot 17-B, which was later on registered in the name of
Jose Madulid, Sr. (Madulid, Sr.), under TCT No. C-32979,
which was later on sold to Hi-Grade.
Another lot resulting from the Government's consolidation
and subdivision of the Maysilo Estate into 77 lots, is Lot No.
52, which was registered in the name of Inocencio Alvarez
(Alvarez) under TCT No. 7363. Soon after, Alvarez sold Lot
No. 52 to Madulid, Sr. TCT No. 7363 was cancelled and TCT
No. 7364 was issued to Madulid, Sr. Afterwards, Madulid, Sr.
sold the lot to Hi-Grade. This is another one of the properties
in dispute.
As a review, first, Hi-Grade traces its title to TCTs No. 7364
and No. C-32979, which were registered in the name
144
Madulid, Sr., which in turn stemmed from TCT Nos. 36557-
63/T-460.
TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460 were derived from TCTs No. 1368
to No. 1374.
TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 stemmed from TCT No. 35486,
which was subdivided into smaller lots.
TCT No. 35486 was derived from TCT No. 5261. TCT No. 5261
stemmed from TCT No. 4211.
Finally, TCT No. 4211 was derived from OCT No. 994, the
mother title.
Version of CLT
CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue of
a Deed of Absolute Sale with Real Estate Mortgage dated 10
December 1988, executed by the former registered owner,
Estelita I. Hipolito.
CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being
fake and spurious based on the following:
1. As shown in the face of TCT No. 4211, it purports to
have been derived from OCT No.
994;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. The original copy of OCT No. 994, which is existing
and in due form, on file with the Registry of Deeds
of Caloocan City, contains dilapidated pages and no
longer contains the pages where Lot No. 26 and
some other lots are supposedly inscribed.
3. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT No.
994, it can be seen that the technical descriptions of
the lots and the certificate itself are entirely written
in the English language. On the other hand, the
technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs No. 4211,
No. 5261, and No. 35486 are still inscribed in the
Spanish language.
4. The dates of the original survey of OCT No. 994, the
mother title of TCT No. 4211, i.e., 8-27 September,
4-21 October and 17-18 November 1911, are not
indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No.
35486. Rather, an entirely different date, 22
December 1917, is indicated at the end of the
Spanish technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs
No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486.
5. The parcel of land covered successively by TCTs No.
4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 is not identified by a
lot number and there is no reference or mention of
Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate in the technical
description of said titles.
6. There is no subdivision survey plan number indicated
on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 covering
the subdivision of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.
7. The plan Psd-21154 which subdivided the lot covered
by TCT No. 35486 (formerly covered by TCT No.
4211, then TCT No. 5261), could not be traced at the
official depository of plans, which is the Lands
Management Bureau (LMB). According to the EDPS
Listings of the Records Management Division of the
LMB, there is no record of Plan Psd-21154. Said EDPS
listings indicate those records which were surveyed
after the Second World War. It appears, from TCTs
No. 1368 to No. 1374, plan PSD-21154 was done after
the war on 15, 21, 29 September and 5-6 October
1946.
8. The technical descriptions inscribed on TCTs No.
1368 to No. 1374 show that the tie points deviated
from the mother lot's tie point, which is the Bureau
of Lands Location Monument ("BLLM") No. 1,
Caloocan. Instead, different location monuments of
the adjoining Piedad Estate were used. The tie point
used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M. 10, Piedad Estate;
while TCTs No. 1369 and No. 1470 used B.M. No. 8,
Piedad Estate; and TCTs No. 1371, No. 1372, No.
1373, and No. 1374 used B.M. No. 7, Piedad Estate.
The changing tie points resulted in the shifting of
the position of the seven lots in relation to the
mother lot, using their technical descriptions
inscribed on the face of the titles. Thus, when
plotted, the seven lots do not fall exactly inside the
boundary of the mother lot. The same is true when
the lots described on the titles of Hi-Grade are
plotted on the basis of their technical descriptions
inscribed on the titles.
9. TCT No. 4211 contains patent infirmities,
inconsistencies, and irregularities indicating that it is
a falsified document representing a fictitious title
and is, therefore, null and void. The fact was
confirmed by an examination by the Forensic
Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation, which concluded that TCT No. 4211
was prepared only sometime in the 1940s and not in
1918, as it is made to appear on the face of the
document. Thus, the series of titles from where Hi-
Grade's titles were derived, starting from TCTs No.
4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486, and up to and
including the titles of Hi-Grade, are also necessarily
null and void.
During trial, CLT presented the following witnesses: (1)
Ramon Velazquez (Velazquez), Officer-in-Charge of the
Survey Records Section, Records Management Division of the
LMB, who testified that the LMB does not have a copy of Psd
21154; (2) Norberto Vasquez, Jr. (Vasquez), Deputy Register
of Deeds of Caloocan City, who identified the various titles
relevant to the case; (3) Juanito Bustalino (Bustalino), a
licensed Geodetic Engineer, who testified that CLT engaged
his services to survey the subject property and discovered
that there was an overlap between CLT's and Hi-Grade's
titles; (4) Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos, one of the counsel
of CLT; and (5) Aida R. Villora-Magsipoc, a Forensic Chemist
of the Forensic Division, National Bureau of Investigation,
who examined the titles as an expert witness.
On the other hand, Hi-Grade presented its sole witness, Atty.
Jose Madulid, counsel for and stockholder of Hi-Grade, and
son of Hi-Grade's predecessor, Jose Madulid, Sr., who
testified that his family has been occupying the subject
properties under the concept of an owner for more than
twenty-seven (27) years, until the properties were
transferred to Hi-Grade.
The Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC7 ruled in favor of CLT. According to the
RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older title, cannot prevail over
CLT's title because it suffers from patent defects and
145
infirmities. Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the
subject properties, it is not considered as a conclusive proof
of ownership. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the
RTC dated 27 December 1995 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of
evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. and against
defendants HI-GRADE FEEDS CORP. et. al., ordering
1. TCT Nos. 237450 and 146941 in the name of
the defendant null and void and accordingly
ordering their
cancellation;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
2. defendant to vacate the portion of Lot No.
26 presently occupied by it and turn over
possession of the same to the plaintiff; and
3. defendant to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
and serious and patent errors in the court's appreciation of
evidence and factual findings based on the decision of the
court in Civil Case No. C-15491, entitled "CLT v. Sto. Niño
Kapithahayan Association." The RTC denied the motion for
utter lack of merit. According to the RTC, the ruling in favor
of Hi-Grade in Sto. Niño is not a newly-discovered evidence,
as Hi-Grade could not have failed to produce such evidence if
it exercised reasonable diligence. Hi-Grade's reliance in the
aforesaid case is already moot and academic as the court
in Sto. Niño already reconsidered its decision and upheld the
validity of CLT's title.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Impelled by the adverse ruling of the RTC, Hi-Grade elevated
the case to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the
appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take Judicial
Notice of Committee Report on Senate Inquiry into Maysilo
Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human
Rights and on Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement
(Senate Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of Appeals granted
the motion in a Resolution9 dated 31 August 1998. Included in
the Resolution, however, is a statement that although the
Court of Appeals takes judicial notice of the Senate Report,
the Court of Appeals is not bound by the findings and
conclusions therein.10
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
on behalf of the Republic and in representation of the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, filed a
Petition for Intervention dated 25 August 1998. The OSG
averred that its intervention is indispensable as it is pursuant
to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of
registration and to protect the Assurance Fund, in connection
with which it can initiate necessary actions for the
annulment of titles irregularly and fraudulently issued. The
Court of Appeals granted the OSG motion. The Court of
Appeals resolved the issue on intervention in the appealed
Decision dated 18 June 2003. According to the Court of
Appeals, due to the magnitude and significance that will
affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens system, the
State has sufficient interest in the case.
Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of
Appeals ruled as baseless the trial court's reliance on the
testimonies of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalmo, on the
alleged patent infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211.
According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez and Bustalino
never testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to
conform to the registration procedures in 1917, the year it
was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are incompetent to
testify on the customary practices in land registration at that
time. Reversing the Decision of the RTC, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING CLT's
complaint a quo and upholding the validity of TCT Nos.
237450 and T-146941 of appellant Hi-Grade Feeds
Corporation.
Appellant CLT is further ordered to surrender its owner's
duplicate copy of TCT No. T-177013 to the Registrar of Deeds
of Caloocan City who is hereby directed to effect its
cancellation.
The other incidents are resolved as above indicated. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. In
addition to the factual issues raised in the trial court, the
Petition raised the following arguments:
I. The Court of Appeals went beyond the issues
resolved by the trial court and formulated its own
issue regarding the date when OCT No. 994 was
originally registered which it resolved on the basis of
extraneous purported evidence not presented before
the trial court in the instant case, in violation of
petitioner CLT Realty's rights to due process of law.
II. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily, arbitrarily and
blindly disregarded the findings of fact and
conclusions of the trial court arrived at after a
careful evaluation of the evidence presented by the
parties and established on record and substituted
and supplanted the same with its own conclusions
based on extraneous evidence not presented and
admitted in evidence before the trial court.
III. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court despite the fact that respondent Hi-Grade
has failed to present evidence to refute the
established fact that the alleged titles from where
its alleged titles are derived from, i.e., the alleged
TCT Nos. 4211, 5261, 35486 and 1368 to 1374,
contain patent and inherent technical defects and
infirmities which render them spurious, void and
ineffective.
IV. The Court of Appeals unjustly made a wholesale
rendition in its questioned decision despite the
pendency of important prejudicial motions or
incidents which it thereby either peremptorily
resolved or rendered moot and academic, thus,
violating petitioner CLT Realty's right to due process
of law.
V. The Court of Appeals totally disregarded the rules on
evidence and surrendered the independence of the
judiciary by giving full faith and credence to the
findings and conclusions contained in the Senate
Committee Report No. 1031 by taking judicial notice
of the same, which report was rendered pursuant to
proceedings initiated and conducted without notice
146
 to petitioner CLT Realty and thus in gross violation
of its right to due process, and was based on
documents that were never authenticated.
VI. The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the
allegation raised in the Republic's petitioner for
intervention although the State has no legal interest
in the subject matter of the litigation of the instant
case and may not validly intervene in the instant
case since the matter in litigation are admittedly
privately owned lands which will not revert to the
Republic.
VII. The Court of Appeals blindly ignored the fact and
worse, failed and refused to rule on the issue that
respondent Hi-Grade is guilty of forum-shopping for
which reason the latter's appeal before the Court of
Appeals should have been dismissed.12
Issues
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error when it admitted the Office of the Solicitor General's
Petition for Intervention
III.
Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that
dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?
Our Ruling
First, the incidental matters.
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it took judicial notice of the Senate
Report
CLT avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is
a violation of the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due
process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and should
not be given any probative value because it was obtained in
violation of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, considering that
the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed
hearsay evidence. Contrary to the mandatory procedure
under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires
examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the
Senate Report was not put to proof and CLT was deprived of
the opportunity to conduct a cross-examination on the
Senate Report. And it is also contended that the right of CLT
to due process was violated because the proceedings in the
Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the
admission in evidence of the Senate Report violated the
time-honored principle of separation of powers as it is an
encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.
CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the
Senate is well within the ambit of the law. Section 1 of Rule
129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. — A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions,
(1a) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges
may properly take and act on without proof because these
facts are already known to them;13 it is the duty of the court
to assume something as a matter of fact without need of
further evidentiary support.14 Otherwise stated, by the taking
of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional
form of presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of
evidence and court proceedings such as cross-examination.15
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative
department, may be taken judicial notice of.
CLT posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-
honored principle of separation of powers when it took
judicial notice of the Senate Report. This contention is
baseless. We adopt the pronouncements of this Court
in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice:16
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and
Senate reports regarding OCT No. 994. In the
2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division
of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
declaring as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared
to adopt the findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or
even consider whether these are admissible as evidence,
though such questions may be considered by the Court of
Appeals upon the initiative of the parties, x x x The reports
cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial
decisions, but if admissible they may be taken into
account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces
of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they
were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in
itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry.
The facts and arguments presented in the reports must
still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly
the courts will have the discretion to accept or reject
them.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the
courts, but will be examined and evaluated based on its
probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite
pointedly why the taking of judicial notice of the Senate
Report does not violate the republican principle. Thus:
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report
upon this Court is altogether a different matter. Certainly, a
determination by any branch of government on a justiciable
matter which is properly before this Court for adjudication
does not bind the latter. The finding of the Senate
committees may be the appropriate basis for remedial
legislation but when the issue of the validity of a Torrens
title is submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter
has the competence to make such a determination and once
final, the same binds not only the parties but all agencies of
government.18
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all
that was conceded by the Court of Appeals. It did not allow
the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.
II.
147
 Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it admitted the Office of the
Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention
The Republic maintains that the proliferation of spurious or
fake titles covering the infamous Maysilo Estate poses a
serious threat to the integrity of the Torrens system and the
Assurance Fund. The Republic asserts that because it is
bound to safeguard and protect the integrity of the Torrens
system and Assurance Fund, it is duty-bound to intervene in
the present case. In granting the intervention, the Court of
Appeals ruled that considering the magnitude and
significance of the issues spawned by the Maysilo Estate,
enough to affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens
system, the Republic is allowed to intervene.
CLT, on the other hand, contends that the Republic's
intervention is baseless. According to CLT, the Republic has
no legal interest in the properties as the subject properties
are not public lands and as such, will not revert to the
Republic. Further, there is no threat or claim against the
Assurance Fund. Anchoring on Presidential Decree No. 478
and Administrative Code of 1987, CLT claims that the only
action which the Office of the Solicitor General may file on
behalf of the Republic in connection with registered lands is
an action for the reversion to the Government of lands of the
public domain and improvements thereon, as well as lands
held in violation of the Constitution.19
This time, we agree with CLT.
Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps.
Oliva v. CA,20 CLT argues that the Petition for Intervention
was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, i.e.,
before rendition of judgment. In Oliva, the Court clarified
that intervention is unallowable when the case has already
been submitted for decision, when judgment has been
rendered, or when judgment has already became final and
executory. And, intervention is only allowed when the
intervenors are indispensable parties.
Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court
may wield its power to suspend its own rules and procedure
in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons,21 the
attendant circumstances are not availing in the present case.
The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant
litigation. An indispensable party is a party-in-interest
without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or
defendants.22 Here, even without the Republic as
participant, a final determination of the issues can be
attained.
Anent the opportuness of intervention, the Court held
in Cariño v. Ofilada23 that it may be allowed only before or
during trial. The term trial is used in its restricted
sense, i.e., the period for the introduction of evidence by
both parties. The period of trial terminates when the
judgment begins. As this case was already in its appeal stage
when intervention was sought, it could no longer be allowed.
CLT further avers that because there was no claim against
the Assurance Fund, intervention is improper. Section 95 of
P.D. 1529 provides for the grounds when a party can claim
against the Assurance Fund:
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person
who, without negligence on his part, sustains loss or damage,
or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in
consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation
of the Torrens system of arising after original registration of
land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission,
mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any
entry or memorandum in the registration book, and who by
the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded
under the provision of any law from bringing an action for
the recovery of such land or the estate or interest therein,
may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction
for the recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance
Fund.
Indeed, whatever party is favored in this case, the losing
party may file a claim against the Assurance Fund as the
present case involves the operation of the Torrens system.
However, the action to claim against the Assurance Fund may
be dealt with in a separate proceeding.
Now, the merits of this case.
Parenthetically, although the general rule is that the factual
findings of the trial court are accorded respect and are not
generally disturbed on appeal, the aforesaid rule does not
apply in the case at bar, as the findings of the trial court and
the appellate court are contradictory.24
We shall now discuss the bottom issues.
III.
Which off the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that
dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?
The mother title, OCT 994
The arguments of the parties come from apparently the same
document. Notably, however, the parties' OCTs No. 994
contain different dates of registration,
namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917
Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can
only be one title covering the same property. The date of
registration is reckoned from the time of the title's
transcription in the record book of the Registry of
Deeds.25 Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title
refers to the date of issuance of the decree of registration,
as provided in Sections 41 and 42 of the Land Registration
Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529:
Section 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of
registration the clerk shall send a certified copy thereof,
under the seal of the court to the register of deeds for the
province, or provinces or city in which the land lies, and
the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in a book
to be called the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or
leaves, in consecutive order, shall be devoted exclusively
to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in
this book in each case shall be the original certificate of
title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with the seal
of the court. x x x
Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of
the decree of registration in regard to any parcel of land
shall be entitled in the registration book, "original certificate
of title, entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land
Registration, dated at" (stating the time and place of entry
of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall
take effect upon the date of the transcription of the
148
decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land
shall be in like form, but shall be entitled "Transfer from
number" (the number of the next previous certificate relating
to the same land), and also the words "Originally registered"
(date, volume, and page of registration). (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No.
4429, the decree registering OCT No. 994, the date of the
issuance is 19 April 1917 while on the other hand, OCT No.
994 was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds
on 3 May 1917. In this case, the date which should be
reckoned as the date of registration of the title is the date
when the mother title was received for transcription, 3 May
1917. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:
For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by
Appellee CLT no less and marked as its Exhibit "D", shows on
its face that the date April 19, 1917 refers to the issuance of
the decree of registration by the Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, while May 3, 1917 pertains to the date when the
same decree was Received for transcription in the Office of
the Register of Deeds.26
Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of
the Registry of Deeds is 3 May 1917, we rule that the genuine
title is the title of Hi-Grade.
The derivative title, TCT No. 4211
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, CLT failed to
prove by preponderance of evidence, the alleged defects and
infirmities in TCT No. 4211, the title from whence Hi-Grade's
titles were derived.
CLT failed to prove that TCT No. 4211 did not conform to the
registration procedures at the time it was prepared. Contrary
to the findings of the trial court, the Court cannot give
credence to the testimony of CLT's witnesses, Vasquez27 and
Bustalino.28 Vasquez is the Deputy Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City, while Bustalino is a Geodetic Engineer. For
their testimonies to matter, CLT must first establish their
competence as regards the registration rules in land
registration in 1918, at the time TCT No. 4211 was prepared.
CLT failed to discharge such burden.
On CLT's allegation that the Lands Management Bureau (LMB)
has no records of Psd 21154, we note that CLT did not prove
that the LMB indeed has no such records. CLT's witness,
Velasquez, merely testified that he cannot ascertain whether
or not Psd 21154 was burned or lost during the world
war.29 Just as important, while Psd 21154 could not be
located, it was not only testified to that it may have been
lost or burned during the world war; a blue print copy of the
same is being kept in the vault of the Register of Deeds of
Pasig City.
As regards the findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist on the
age of TCT No. 4211, the Court of Appeals correctly found
that such findings are inconclusive because the Chemist did
not conclusively state that TCT No. 4211 could not have been
prepared in 1918.30 Also, the Chemist, in her cross-
examination, admitted that she did not know who supplied
her copies of the TCTs and that she has not seen any
standard document dated 1918.31
On the matter regarding the discrepancy between the dates
of survey and issuance, tie points, and language used in TCT
No. 4211 and OCT No. 994, CLT's contention must fail for the
obvious reason that the basis of CLT's allegation is the non-
existent mother title, OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917. Thus,
as OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 has been established as
null and void, it cannot serve as precedent for ascertaining
the genuineness of TCT No. 4211.
What matters most in this case is that CLT questioned the
title of Hi-Grade for the purpose of having CLT's own title
upheld. Instead of establishing the genuineness of its own
title, CLT attacked Hi-Grade's titles. However, CLT failed to
establish the chain of titles linking its TCT No. T-177013 to
the mother title, OCT No. 994. It failed to prove the
"circumstances under which its predecessor-in-interest
acquired the whole of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. Ironically,
it is even by CLT's presentation of OCT No. 994 and of the
succession of titles previous to those held by appellant Hi-
Grade that the latter's titles [was] established as genuine
derivative titles of OCT No. 994."32
Indeed, CLT's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the alleged
weakness of the evidence of Hi-Grade. As already shown,
such allegation was proven wrong by documents on records.
As opposed to CLT's evidence on the alleged infirmities in Hi-
Grade's titles, Hi-Grade presented muniments of title, tax
declarations or realty tax payments, on the subject
properties.33 While tax declarations and receipts are
inconclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land, they are prima facie proof of ownership or possession
and may become the basis of a claim for ownership when it is
coupled with proof of actual possession of the property.34 In
the case at bar, Hi-Grade is the actual possessor of the
subject property.35
To sum up, Hi-Grade was able to establish the chain of titles
linking its titles, TCTs No. 237450 and T-14691, to the
derivative title, TCT No. 4211, to the mother title, OCT No.
994.36 As borne by the records, TCT No. 4211 was registered
as a derivative title of OCT No. 994 on 9 September
1918.37 On the other hand, CLT's title, TCT No. R-
17994,38 was registered also as a derivative title of OCT No.
994 only on 12 September 1978. Thus, the reference of both
parties is OCT No. 994, but with different dates: CLT's OCT
No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917, while Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994
is dated 3 May 1917.
This factual issue of which OCT No. 994 is genuine is not a
novel matter. This Court, in Angeles v. The Secretary of
Justice,39 citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation,40exhaustively passed upon and
ruled that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was dated 3 May
1917, not 19 April 1917.
In the recent case of Syjuco v. Republic of the
Philippines,41 this Court, reiterated the rulings in Angeles v.
The Secretary of Justice42and Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT
Realty Development Corporation, that the true and valid
OCT No. 994 was registered on 3 May 1917, not on 19 April
1917, and that any title that traces its source from OCT No.
994 dated 19 April 1917, is deemed void and inexistent.43
As we have priorly pronounced, any title that traces its
source to a void title, is also void. The spring cannot rise
higher than its source. Nemo potest plus juris ad alium
transferre quam ipse habet. All titles that trace its source to
OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, are therefore void, for such
mother title is inexistent.44 CLT so traces its title to OCT No.
994 dated 19 April 1917, the title of CLT is
void.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-
149
Grade Feeds Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila,
District III," dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
PCIB v. Escolin, G.R. 27936, 29 March 1974
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were
originally from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they had
acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties
in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They
both lived, worked and were domiciled in Iloilo City for
around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a
will leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses,
to her husband Charles. Should Charles die, the will provided
that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and
sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and
sisters die before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of
the said sibling be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s
place.
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and
was appointed Executor, then later, Special Administrator.
He moved to be allowed to continue administering the family
business, as per Linnie Jane’s wishes, and to engage in sales,
conveyances, leases, mortgages and other necessary
transactions. He also filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records, and income tax returns
for the estate. Charles named seven brothers and sisters of
Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma, Leonard, Aline, David,
Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy
(Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a verified motion to have
Roy’s name included.
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate
he was administering under American law. He did file such as
estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In Schedule "M" of such
return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he
was contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as
to what property interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, he answered:
“None, except for purposes of administering the
Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal charges. It
is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased
to distribute the remaining property and interests of
the deceased in their Community estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when the
debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid.”
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having
liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes her share in the
conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges,
Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnie’s
estate) and a Special Administratrix (for Charles’). Magno was
appointed, but later Harold Davies (representative of Charles’
heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator, who
was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One
Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator, and an
order of probate and letters of administration were issued to
Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused about
the gaps in the facts, convinced that the parties representing
both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to settle money
matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)—
which, however, went awry, with more and more heirs from
the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and lawyers (Ozaetas!
Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for
retainer fees. Much much later, PCIB became the
administrator of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his
estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him
upon Linnie Jane’s death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as
Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS) would be prejudiced,
so she continued acting in her capacity as administrator
(entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these
acts, the PCIB dismissed her as an employee of Charles’
estate, to which she responded by locking up the premises
being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estate’s
properties.
PCIB’s Claims
Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law, with
respect to the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions.
 Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.
 Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may
be found", shall prevail. However, the Conflict of
Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the
testatrix, Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the
domiciliary law (Philippine law) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights
over movables, and the law of the situs of the
property (also Philippine law as to properties located
in the Philippines) as regards immovables.
 Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and
applied in the Christensen case (1963), Philippine
law should apply.
 Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses shall, upon dissolution,
be divided equally between them. Thus, upon
Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of the assets of the
Hodges spouses constituting their conjugal estate
pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of
inheritance, but in his own right as partner in the
conjugal partnership.
 The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of
Linnie’s estate, cannot, under a clear and specific
provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by
income, earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing
after her death. “All rents, emoluments and income
from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges)
and he is further authorized to use any part of the
principal of said estate as he may need or desire."
 Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving
spouse of a deceased leaving no ascendants or
descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by
way of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half
(1/2) of the estate of the deceased, and no
testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally
and validly affect this right of the surviving spouse.
In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2)
portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article
886)
 Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of
Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the owner of
150
 at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of the conjugal
assets of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal
partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way of
inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments
and income" accruing to said conjugal estate from
the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
 In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnie’s
estate, Charles appropriated to himself the entirety
of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in
business and performed all acts in connection with
the entirety of the conjugal estate, in his own name
alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and
doing while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still
alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole
possession and control, and registered in his name
alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all
said assets.
 As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need
to liquidate the estate. Neither was there any asset
left to Linnie’s estate at the time of Charles’ death,
though Linnie’s estate may have referred to “all of
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate” which
would go to her siblings in the event of Charles
death. The provision is thus void and invalid at least
as to Philippine assets.
 There are generally only two kinds of substitution
provided for and authorized by our Civil Code
(Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or
common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2)
fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other
substitutions are merely variations of these. The
substitution provided for by paragraph four of the
Will of Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary
substitution, because there is clearly no obligation
on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir
designated, to preserve the properties for the
substitute heirs. At most, it is
a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in order
that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid,
three alternative conditions must be present,
namely, that the first designated heir (1) should die
before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept
the inheritance; or (3) should be incapacitated to do
so. None of these conditions apply to C. N. Hodges,
and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the
above-quoted provision of the Will is not authorized
by the Code, and, therefore, it is void. Manresa even
said, “when another heir is designated to inherit
upon the death of a first heir, the second
designation can have effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or
not that was the true intention of said testator.”
 The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming
dubious rights to ¼ of the conjugal estate of the
Hodges, is to file a claim against the estate of
Charles.
 It also follows that the conveyances executed by
Avelina, claiming to be merely in continuation of the
Hodges’ businesses, and which corresponding deeds
of sale were confirmed by the probate court, are
null and void and should be subject to reconveyance.
Avelina’s Claims
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina
removed from her capacity as administrator, but the lower
court reversed its earlier grant of the motion, on account of
a previous injunction it issued.)
 Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a
usufruct over all her estate, and gave a vested
remainder-estate or the naked title over the same
estate, to her relatives.
 After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator and
executor of the will, unequivocably and clearly
through oral and written declarations and sworn
public statements, renounced, disclaimed and
repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.
 Since there was no separation or segregation of the
interests of Linnie and Charles in the combined
conjugal estate, as there has been no such
separation or segregation, and because of Charles’
repudiation, both interests have continually earned
exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments and
income.
Issue:
1. Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings void? – NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? –
REMAND!
Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s
testamentary substitution, when viewed as a substitution,
may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking,
Linnie’s will provides neither for a simple or vulgar
substitution under Article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a
fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof.
There is no vulgar substitution because there is no provision
for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated
heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept
the inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is
there a fideicommissary substitution therein because no
obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the
estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these
premises, it is not correct to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB
does, that the testamentary dispositions in question are
therefore inoperative and invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it
views the said disposition exclusively in the light of
substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that
subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is
obvious that substitution occurs only when another heir is
appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in
default of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in
the present case, no such possible default is contemplated.
The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes
for Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit
what Hodges cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what
he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather,
therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with
Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions, partially
resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers
and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory, since it
bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned
and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means
that while he could completely and absolutely dispose of any
portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he
was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what
might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the
occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his
brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although
vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges, would
automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the
death of Hodges in the event of actual existence of any
remainder of her estate then.
151

Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the usufruct
alone of Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in Article 869, that
she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the full
ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during
his lifetime only, even as there was no restriction whatsoever
against his disposing or conveying the whole or any portion
thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no
legal impediment to this kind of institution, except that it
cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that
Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts.
872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly
negate PCIB’s claims that he had adjudicated to himself all
of Linnie’s estate. While he may have used language like
“herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the
deceased, in accordance with the last will and testament
already probated… there is no other person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein
account to be given notice,” he would’ve known that doing
so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very
motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnie’s named heirs.
He even moved to include Roy’s name included in the
probate court’s order, lest Roy’s heirs think that they had
been omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of
his wife’s estate from his own share of the conjugal
partnership up to the time of his death, more than 5 years
after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate
as a single one belonging exclusively to himself. The only
conclusion one can gather from this is that he could have
been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his
wife's estate, or, at least, so much thereof as he would not
have been able to dispose of during his lifetime, to her
brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire,
as intimated in his tax return in the US. And assuming that he
did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance taxes in the
Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment
is not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the
rights of his co-heirs. The Court thus viewed that under the
peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the
applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered
as her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the
remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon the
eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be
warranted should there be any such remainder then is a
matter that could well be taken care of by the internal
revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as
basis of Charles’ intentions several questionnaires in solemn
forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though they have not
been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to several
times by the parties.
It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in settling
Linnie’s estate, and his sole administration of it, commingled
his and his co-heirs interests, making it difficult to properly
make an accounting of their shares. PCIB, then, cannot
administer the properties on its own. What would be just and
proper is for both administrators of the two estates to act
conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from
each other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of
the Civil Code should be applied. On the one hand, PCIB
claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16,
construed in relation to the pertinent laws of Texas and the
principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should be
the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore,
her estate could consist of no more than one-fourth of the
said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as already
explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she
could not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition
(Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie
died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never
changed nor intended to change her original residence of
birth in Texas, United States of America, and contends that,
anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she
being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of
the Civil Code, the distribution of her estate is subject to the
laws of said State which, according to her, do not provide for
any legitime, hence, Linnie’s brothers and sisters are
entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of the
conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-half
thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in any event,
Charles had renounced his rights under the will in favor of his
co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents touching on
the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and
legal significance of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither
the evidence submitted by the parties appeared to be
adequate enough for it to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable
proof of what in fact the possibly applicable laws of Texas
are, was presented (Remember judicial notice in case of
foreign laws?). Then also, the genuineness of documents
relied upon by Avelina is disputed. In Justice, therefore, to
all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant
matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in
the proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of
ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate
of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly
probated will.
Linnie’s estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal
partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did not
maintain that the application of the laws of Texas would
result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting
anything under her will. And since PCIB's representations in
regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of
fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to
rely and act upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them
or subsequently take a position contradictory to or
inconsistent with them.
The only question that remains to be settled in the remand
to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in
effect for more, such as, when there is no legitime provided
therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole
inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by
some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least,
minimize further protracted legal controversies between the
respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to
elucidate on the possible consequences of dispositions made
by Charles after Linnie’s death, from the mass of the
unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the
pertinent documents as to whether his intention is to dispose
of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his own
share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB
after the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third
parties, whether these be individuals, corporations or
152
foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of
properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his
wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of May 27
and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general authority
to make sales or other disposals of properties under the
jurisdiction of the court, which include his own share of the
conjugal estate, he was not invoking particularly his right
over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part
of his inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife;
(2) as regards sales, exchanges or
other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such sales or
the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be
considered as merely the products of "physical changes" of
the properties of her estate which the will expressly
authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said
products should remain with the estate at the time of the
death of Hodges should go to her brothers and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges
must naturally be deemed as covering only the properties
belonging to his estate considering that being only the
administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have
disposed of properties belonging to the estate of his wife.
Neither could such dispositions be considered as involving
conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal
partnership automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by
the peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the
remainder of her share descended also automatically upon
the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside
of the scope of PCIB's administration. Accordingly, these
constructions of Linnie’s will should be adhered to by the
trial court in its final order of adjudication and distribution
and/or partition of the two estates in question.
Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16,
CC (renvoi), and of Charles’ alleged renunciation of his
ineritance under Linnie’s will. Avelina remains to be the
administrator of Linnie’s estate. The said estate consists of
¼ of the community properties of the said spouses, as of the
time of Linnie’s death on May 23, 1957, minus whatever the
husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third
persons from said date until his death, provided, first, that
with respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the
husband, and second, that should the purported renunciation
be declared legally effective, no deductions whatsoever are
to be made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act
thenceforth always conjointly, never independently from
each other, as administrators.
Sps. Latip v. Chua, 16 October 2009
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:[1]
(1) reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;[2] and
(2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city
in Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3]
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different
lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie
Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a
commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue
corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque
City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and
Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the
complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane
Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as
lessees thereof.
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with
office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy.
Baclaran, Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the
LESSOR,
- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both
Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV
Homes Paraaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the
LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building
erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc.
situated at 158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road,
Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the
1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square
meters under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS,
SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00), Philippine Currency.
However, due to unstable power of the peso LESSEES agrees
to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly
rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the
expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric
consumptions in the said premises;
153
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration
in the cubicles without a written permission from the
LESSOR. Provided, however, that at the termination of the
Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its
original conditions at their expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and
sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of
flammable or combustible materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental
every time it falls due or violate any of the above conditions
shall be enough ground to terminate this Contract of Lease.
Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this
Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or
period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting
from December _____, 1999 or up to December ______,
2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed
their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of
Manila, Philippines.
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSORLESSEE
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
Republic of the Philippines)
C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila
personally appeared the following persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on
2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque
City on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653
Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who
executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly
signed by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and
acknowledged to me that the same is their free and
voluntarily acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed
my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999
at the City of Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member[4]
A year after the commencement of the lease and with
Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie,
through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding
payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to
vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed
Rosalies demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They
averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already
been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment
to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three
(3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million
pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment
of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND[5]
Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
154
 the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to
______(sgd.)______ finish construction of the building giving them first priority in
the occupation of the finished cubicles.
Ferdinand Chua
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles
2. Received cash were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting
for the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip
P500,000.00 averred that the contract of lease they signed had been
novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject
From Moshiera Latip cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand
letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a
complaint against them.
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
Received by
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and
all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to
3. Received cash VACATE the property subject of this case located at the 1st
and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158
P70,000.00 from Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay
Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also
Moshiera Latip ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages
12-11-99 for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and
thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from January 2001
to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each
____(sgd.)___ and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in
paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the
Received by:[6] [Spouses Latip] have completely vacated the leased premises
subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are
hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in
Court as appearance fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999,
Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during
the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to [Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still merit.
under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip,
SO ORDERED.[7]
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in
favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the
contract of lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all
other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point,
the RTC noted that the contract of lease lacked: (1) the
signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the
signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the
specific dates for the term of the contract which only stated
that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from
December 1999 or up to December 2005; (4) the exact date
of execution of the document, albeit the month of December
and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for
payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly
uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the
contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the
entire lease rentals for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years
had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of
P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt of
P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective
lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of
lease rights, the RTC shot this down and pointed out that,
apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce
evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC
declared an existent lease between the parties for a period
of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip.
Thus, Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased
premises until expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
155
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed
decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as
judgment is hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and
against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court
appearance as and for attorneys fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously
mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of
the MeTC. The CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit
lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized,
remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had,
the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the
contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On
the issue of whether the amount of P2,570,000.00 merely
constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial
notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran,
especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the
appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the
Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane
Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior
to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling on Rosalies
appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for
Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC
Paraaque City Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004
decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip
should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and
upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial
notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the
Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare
when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of
the existence and territorial extent of states, their political
history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the
law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the
world and their seals, the political constitution and history of
the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may
take judicial notice of matters which are of public
knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration
or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and
discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is
to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable
doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3)
it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is
merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence
will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be
otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that
the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But
judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal
knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the
court, and he is not authorized to make his individual
knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known,
the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
those matters which are commonly known.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that
they may be regarded as forming part of the common
knowledge of every person.[11]
156
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of
judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals,[12] which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three
material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common
and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3)
it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may
be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject
to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or
they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and
which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such
of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they
may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge
of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far
and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been
judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge.
But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in
part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings
thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate
court took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of
notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of
this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in
the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the
former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the
practice was of common knowledge or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart
from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her
claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted
the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie
attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA,
containing a joint declaration under oath by other
stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize
that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for
matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically
on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual
form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it
will not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by
the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before
the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven
by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had
knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the
Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and
judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take
judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every
reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for
the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the
negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be
ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence
is the documentary evidence signed by both parties the
contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of
P2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which
documents were executed first or if there was a novation of
the contract of lease. As had been found by the RTC, the
lease contract and the receipts for the amount of
P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC
declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over
two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane
(Roferland) Building, a commercial building located at 158
Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran,
Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease
agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in
December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was
embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms of this
lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by
another agreement between the parties executed and or
entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease
contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is
unclear.[13]
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There
exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in
the contract of lease which is a complete document. It need
not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign
the other two receipts for P500,000.00 and P70,000.00,
respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie.
Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the
stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for
her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower courts
concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years
commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed
by Spouses Latips admission that they occupied the property
forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales
during the holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the
receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the
practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area
157
is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was
Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that, apart from
the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of
Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment
of goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by
Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the
Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting
parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be
principally considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be,
they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are
distinct and cases that are different from those which the
parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that
import which is most adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that
the receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the
contract of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it
ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2)
cubicles for the entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe
to this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the
contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again
reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million
pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment
of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner
Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND
Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______ payment of rentals for the whole period of the lease. All
three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua amounts. The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state
payment for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full
FAR EAST BANK payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there
are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were
subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the
P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since
______(sgd.)______ the contract of lease remained operative, we find that
Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as
Ferdinand Chua advanced rentals on the leased cubicles. This conclusion is
bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the
lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the
commencement of the lease.
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently,
From Moshiera Latip Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They
are liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the
two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on
rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the amount of
(sgd.) P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted
from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
Received by GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and
Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for
unpaid rentals minus the amount of P2,570,000.00 already
3. Received cash received by her as advance rentals. No costs.
P70,000.00 from
SO ORDERED.
Moshiera Latip
New Sun Valley Homeowners’ Assoc. v.
12-11-99 Sangguniang Bgy. of Sun Valley, 27 July 2011
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
___(sgd.) ____
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
Received by:[14]
45 of the Rules of Court against the Decision[1] dated October
16, 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 and theResolution[2] dated
January 17, 2003, both of the Court of Appeals.
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the
payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full
158
 The facts are as follows:
The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley
(the BSV Sangguniang Barangay) issued BSV Resolution No.
98-096[3] on October 13, 1998, entitled Directing the New Sun
Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster
Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic, the pertinent
portions of which read as follows:
NOW, THEREFORE, be it resolved as
it is hereby resolved by the Sangguniang
Barangay in session assembled that
1. Pursuant to its power
and authority under the Local Government
Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), the New
Sun Valley Homeowners Association (NSVHA)
is hereby directed to open Rosemallow and
Aster Sts. to vehicular (private cars only) and
pedestrian traffic at all hours daily except
from 11 p.m. to 5 a.m. at which time the said
streets may be closed for the sake of the
security of the residents therein.
2. The Barangay
government take steps to address the
security concerns of the residents of the area
concerned, including the possible assignment
of a barangay tanod or traffic enforcer
therein, within the limits of the authority and
financial capability of the Barangay.
3. This Resolution shall
become executory within 72 hours upon
receipt hereof by the Association or any of its
members.[4]
The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc.
(NSVHAI), represented by its President, Marita Cortez, filed
a Petition[5] for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent
Injunction with prayer for issuance of TRO with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City. This was docketed as Civil
Case No. 98-0420.NSVHAI claimed therein that the
implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-096 would cause
grave injustice and irreparable injury as [the] affected
homeowners acquired their properties for strictly residential
purposes;[6] that the subdivision is a place that the
homeowners envisioned would provide them privacy and a
peaceful neighborhood, free from the hassles of public
places;[7] and that the passage of the Resolution would destroy
the character of the subdivision. NSVHAI averred that contrary
to what was stated in the BSV Resolution, the opening of the
gates of the subdivision would not in any manner ease the
traffic congestion in the area, and that there were alternative
routes available. According to NSVHAI, the opening of the
proposed route to all kinds of vehicles would result in
contributing to the traffic build-up on Doa Soledad Avenue,
and that instead of easing the traffic flow, it would generate
a heavier volume of vehicles in an already congested choke
point. NSVHAI went on to state that a deterioration of the
peace and order condition inside the subdivision would be
inevitable; that the maintenance of peace and order in the
residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit to
the subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the
passing through of vehicles was controlled and limited; and
that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening
to public use of the roads in question.[8]
NSVHAI further contested the BSV Resolution by
submitting the following arguments to the RTC:
12. The road network inside the
subdivision and drainage system is not
designed to withstand the entry of a heavy
volume of vehicles especially delivery vans
and trucks. Thus, destruction of the roads
and drainage system will result. The safety,
health and well-being of the residents will
face continuous danger to their detriment
and prejudice;
13. When the residents bought their
residential properties, they also paid
proportionately for the roads and the park in
then subdivision. They have therefore an
existing equity on these roads. To open the
roads to public use is a violation of the rights
and interests to a secure, peaceful and
healthful environment;
14. Aside from the availability of a
better route to be opened, there are other
ways to ease traffic flow. The continuous
presence of traffic enforcers on all identified
traffic choke points will prevent snarls which
impede smooth travel. The strict
enforcement of traffic rules and regulations
should be done;
15. There are a lot of undisciplined
drivers of tricycles, jeepneys, trucks and
delivery [vans], which contribute to the
traffic congestion. The barangay should
require these drivers to observe road
courtesy and obedience to traffic rules[.][9]
Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the
RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[10] (TRO) in Civil
Case No. 98-0420 on October 30, 1998. Said Order provides:
Acting on the Application for Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/ Permanent
Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order, filed by
plaintiff and considering that there is
extreme urgency, such that unless the same
is issued, plaintiff would suffer grave
injustice and/or irreparable injury, let a
Temporary Restraining Order issue directing
the Sangguniang Barangay as represented by
Punong Barangay Roberto Guevarra to cease
and desist from the implementation of
Resolution No. 98-096 or otherwise maintain
the status quo until further Orders of this
Court.
This Temporary Restraining Order
shall be effective for seventy two (72) hours
from issuance hereof, unless extended by
another Order of this Court.
Let this case be set for special raffle
and conference on November 3, 1998 at
10:30 in the morning.
On November 3, 1998, the RTC issued
another Order[11] stating that, by agreement of the parties,
the status quo shall be maintained for seventeen (17) more
days, and that the case was set for hearing on the prayer for
159
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on November
20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m.
NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition[12] on
November 13, 1998, at about 11:10 a.m., wherein it claimed
that the BSV Sangguniang Barangay had no jurisdiction over
the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the subject
roads). NSVHAI likewise attached to its Amended Petition its
Position Paper[13] dated July 21, 1998, which set forth its
objection to the opening of the subject roads for public use
and argued that a Barangay Resolution cannot validly cause
the opening of the subject roads because under the law,
an ordinance is required to effect such an act.[14]
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed its Motion to
Dismiss[15] likewise on November 13, 1998. The copy provided
by petitioner to the Court indicates the time of receipt by
NSVHAI as 11:00 a.m.[16]
The RTC heard the case on November 20, 1998, as
scheduled, and thereafter submitted the matter for
decision.[17] On the same date, the RTC issued the
following Order[18]:
Acting on the prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by
petitioner, it appearing that petitioner may
suffer grave injustice or irreparable injury,
let a writ of preliminary injunction issue
prohibiting the Sangguniang Barangay
represented by Punong Barangay Roberto
Guevarra from implementing Resolution no.
98-096 until further orders from this Court.
Petitioner is directed to file a bond
in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS (sic) to answer for
damages to defendants in the event the Court
finds petitioner is not entitled to said
injunction.
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay filed on December 4,
1998 a Motion for Reconsideration and to Dissolve
Preliminary Injunction (with Memorandum of
Authorities).[19]
NSVHAI then filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Expunge on December 10, 1998, moving to declare the above
motion of the BSV Sangguniang Barangay as a mere scrap of
paper for being filed out of time and for failure to serve a copy
thereof to the counsel of petitioner.
The RTC subsequently dismissed the case in
an Order[20] dated August 17, 1999, stating as follows:
Defendant Barangay Sun Valley
moves to dismiss the instant case on the
grounds that the complaint states no cause of
action and the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter. In summary, defendant
alleges that the subject streets Aster and
Rosemallow inside Sun Valley Subdivision are
owned by the local government. Such streets
have long been part of the public domain and
beyond the commerce of man. In support of
this, defendant cited the case of White Plains
Association, Inc. vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765
wherein it was held that road lots of
subdivisions constitute a part of the
mandatory open space reserved for public
use; ownership of which is automatically
vested in the Republic of the Philippines
although it is still registered in the name of
the developer/owner, its donation to the
government is a mere formality. The power
or authority to close or open the said streets
is vested in the local government units and
not on homeowners associations, pursuant to
Section 21 of the local Government Code (RA
7160) quoted as follows: Section 21. Closure
and Opening of Roads. (a) A local government
unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any
local road, alley, park, or square falling
within its jurisdiction x x x. In view thereof,
Resolution No. 98-096 was passed by the
Sangguniang Barangay. Hence there is no
right whatsoever on the part of Plaintiff
NSVHA entitled to the protection of the law.
Further, defendant contends that petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies as
ordained in Sections 32 and 57 of the Local
Government Code giving the city mayor the
supervisory power, and the power of review
by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively.
No opposition to the motion to
dismiss was filed by the Plaintiff.
Same defendant seeks to reconsider
the order granting the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction alleging that there is a
pending motion to dismiss and Plaintiff has
not been able to establish an actually existing
right.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition
thereto, instead it filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to expunge the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that its
counsel has not been furnished with a copy of
the motion for reconsideration, but the
record shows that Maria Cortez (plaintiffs
representative) has received a copy of said
motion.
After considering the arguments of
the parties in their respective pleadings, this
court hereby resolves as follows:
1. The Motion for
Reconsideration and the Urgent
Ex-parte Motion to Expunge
(motion for reconsideration) are
Denied being devoid of merit;
and
2. The Motion to Dismiss is
hereby Granted for failure of the
plaintiff to exhaust the
administrative remedies under
Sections 32 and 57 of the Local
Government Code.
WHEREFORE, let this case be as it is hereby
ordered Dismissed. The writ of preliminary
injunction is hereby lifted.[21]
160
 NSVHAI filed a Motion for Reconsideration[22] of the
above-quoted Order but this was denied by the RTC for lack of
merit in an Order[23] dated September 21, 1999.
NSVHAI raised the matter to the Court of Appeals and
the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 65559. NSVHAI
alleged that despite the lack of the required hearing [24] and
without any order requiring it to submit its
Comment/Opposition to the BSV Sangguniang Barangays
Motion to Dismiss or that of submitting said Motion for
resolution, Judge Bautista-Ricafort issued an Order which, to
NSVHAIs complete surprise, granted the Motion. NSVHAI
argued that the RTC gravely erred in taking cognizance of, and
thereafter ruling on, said Motion and refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 98-
0420. Petitioner likewise argued that the RTC committed
serious errors which, if not corrected, would cause grave or
irreparable injury to petitioner and cause a violation of law.[25]
The BSV Sangguniang Barangay, Roberto Guevarra in
his capacity as Punong Barangay, and members of
the Sangguniang Barangay (hereinafter, respondents), in their
Appellees Brief, argued as follows:
I cognizance, and constitutional law doctrine provides that the
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES MOTION TO DISMISS
DUE TO LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
AND APPELLANTS FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. AS NOTED BY THE
COURT, NO OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION TO
DISMISS WAS EVER FILED BY APPELLANT.
II
THE TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION
ASSAILING ITS SUBJECT-MATTER, BARANGAY
RESOLUTION NO. 98-096, CONSISTING OF A
DIRECTIVE OF AN LGU TO A DEFIANT PRIVATE
ORGANIZATION WITHIN ITS JURISDICTION, IS
JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF THE SOLE
COMPETENCE AND WISE DISCRETION OF THE
BARANGAY OVER A LOCAL TRAFFIC PROBLEM.
III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ANY
SERIOUS ERROR, PROCEDURAL OR
SUBSTANTIVE, AS FOUND BY THE COURT A
QUO. IT IS APPELLANT THAT HAS COMMITTED
THE ERROR OF NOT EXHAUSTING
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES. HENCE, NO
GRAVE OR IRREPARABLE INJURY CAN BE
CAUSED TO APPELLANT FOR IT HAS NO RIGHT
TO PROTECT.[26]
Respondents claimed that Barangay Resolution No.
98-096 was simply a directive to petitioner, a private
aggrupation of some self-seeking homeowners,[27] and was just
a measure of internal policy among residents; that the opening
of roads for traffic reasons was within the sole competence of
the barangay to determine;[28] and the Mayor could have
chosen, as it was within his power to do so, to cause the
demolition of the gates, which were illegally built by
petitioner and therefore were obstructions on the road, even
without a Barangay resolution. Respondents likewise claimed
that the BSVs action could be considered a political question,
which should be essentially withdrawn from judicial
courts would not interfere with political issues unless grave
abuse of discretion is shown, of which there was none on the
part of the Barangay. Respondents argued that petitioner did
not have any actual legal right entitled to the protection of
the law.[29]
Respondents attached to their Appellees Brief six
documents, labeled as Annexes 2 to 7, all stamped Certified
True Copy by a certain Roman E. Loreto, Legal Officer II of
Legal Department.[30] The detailed information contained in
each of the documents that comprise respondents Annexes 2
to 7 is copied below:
1. 1st Indorsement[31] from the Office of the Mayor
of Paraaque dated May 20, 1988, signed by
Luzviminda A. Concepcion, Administrative Officer
II, stating as follows:
Respectfully indorsed to Atty.
Antonio G. Cruz, Municipal Attorney, of this
municipality the herein attached Original
Copies of Transfer Certificate of Title for Sun
Valley Open Space and Road Lots with TCT
Nos. 133552, 119836, and 122443 for your
appropriate actions.
2. Letter[32] dated December 27, 1990 from
Francisco B. Jose, Jr., Municipal Attorney of
Paraaque, addressed to the Municipal Council
Secretary, which reads:
This has reference to your request
dated December 18, 1990 relative to the
letter of inquiry of the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Sun Valley dated December 13,
1990.
We wish to inform you that based on
the available records of our office the open
space and road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision
is already owned by the Municipal
Government of Paraaque as evidenced by
TCT NOS. 133552, 119836, and 122443.
Copies of which are hereto attached for your
ready reference.
Considering that the Municipality of
Paraaque is the registered owner of the road
lots of Sun Valley Subdivision, we are of the
opinion that the roads become public in use
and ownership, and therefore, use of the
roads by persons other than residents of the
Subdivision can no longer be curtailed.
However, should the Municipal Government
decides to delegate its right to regulate the
use of the said roads to the Sun Valley
Homeowners Association or Sun Valley
Barangay Council, such right may be
exercise[d] by said association or council.
3. Certification[33] dated October 8, 1990 issued by
Francisco B. Jose, Jr. under the letterhead of the
Office of the Municipal Attorney of Paraaque, which
reads:
This is to certify that based on the available
records of this Office, the open space and
road lots of Sun Valley Subdivision has been
donated and now owned by the Municipality
of Paranaque, as evidenced by TCT Nos.
161
 133552, 119836, and 122443 copies of which
are hereto attached.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of Mr. Mario Cortez, President of Sun
Valley Homeowners Association.
4. Certification[34] dated June 13, 1994, again
signed by Francisco B. Jose, Jr., of the Office of the
Municipal Attorney, providing as follows:
This is to certify that based on the available
records of this Office, the only road lots in
Sun Valley Subdivision titled in the name of
the Municipality of Paraaque are those
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos.
133552 and 122443.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of Coun. Manuel T. De Guia.
5. Certification[35] dated March 2, 1995 issued by
Rodolfo O. Alora, OIC, Asst. Municipal Legal Officer,
which reads:
This is to certify that based on the available
records of this Office, the open space within
Sun Valley Subdivision has already been
donated to the Municipality as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 119836, copy
of which is hereto attached.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of Atty. Rex G. Rico.
6. Certification[36] dated October 26, 1998 issued
by Ma. Riza Pureza Manalese, Legal Researcher,
Office of the Municipal Attorney, Paraaque City,
which reads:
This is to certify that based on the available
records of this Office, road lots of Sun Valley
Subdivision have already been donated to the
Municipality of Paranaque as evidenced by
TCT NO. 133552, 119836, and 122443.
This certification is being issued upon the
request of MR. WILLIAM UY.
The Court of Appeals issued a Decision dated October
16, 2002 denying the appeal and affirming the Orders of the
RTC dated August 17, 1999 and September 21, 1999. The Court
of Appeals likewise denied NSVHAIs Motion for Partial
Reconsideration in its Resolution promulgated on January 17,
2003, stating that after a thorough study of the Motion for
Reconsideration, it found no sufficient reason to deviate from
its findings and conclusion reached in its decision.
Thus, NSVHAI (hereinafter, petitioner) went to this
Court.
Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner alleges that the decision of the Court of
Appeals was based on facts that [were] outside of the original
Petition and Amended Petition and on supposed findings of
facts that are not even evidence offered before the court a
quo.[37] Petitioner likewise alleges that the facts used by the
Court of Appeals in dismissing the case were contrary to the
records of Civil Case No. 98-0420.
Petitioner lists the following as its Questions of Law:
A
In sustaining the dismissal of Civil Case No.
98-0420, the Honorable Court of Appeals
sanctioned the departure of the Regional
Trial Court from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings
B the amended complaint, I guess it is a matter
Whether or not the issuance of the Resolution
promulgated January 17, 2003 and the
Decision promulgated October 16, 2002 by
the Former 4th Division and the 4th Division of
the Court of Appeals sustaining the validity of
dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420 is not in
accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court
C
Whether or not the Honorable Court of
Appeals, with due respect, departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings by making findings of fact not
supported by evidence of record[38]
Petitioner avers that the hearing for the respondents
Motion to Dismiss was set on November 20, 1998, without
indication as to time and that during the hearing on such date,
counsel for respondents moved that their Motion to Dismiss be
heard over the objection of counsel for petitioner, who
explained that there was an urgency in ruling on the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in view of
the expiration of the temporary restraining order (TRO).[39]
Petitioner quotes the transcript of stenographic notes
(TSN) from the November 20, 1998 hearing before the RTC in
the following manner:
Atty. Herrera:
Then, Your Honor, I files [sic] a
motion petitioning to dismiss this instant
case, which should be resolved first before
hearing this case.
Atty. Nuez:
Your Honor, please, with due respect
to the opposing counsel, the hearing today is
supposed to be on the presentation of
petitioners evidence in support of its prayer
for preliminary injunction. In connection with
of right to amend its pleading. What
happened here, the amended petition was
filed before this Honorable Court on
November 13 at 11:10 a.m. but I think the
motion to dismiss was filed by the
respondent on November 13 at 11:20 a.m..
Therefore, it is the right of the petitioner
insofar as the case is concerned.
162
 And therefore, this Court should
proceed with the hearing on the
preliminary injunction instead of
entertaining this matter. The temporary
restraining order will expire today and we
have the right to be heard.
Court:
We will proceed first with the
hearing (referring to the scheduled hearing
of the prayer for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction). (Transcript of
Stenographic Notes, November 20,
1998) (Underscoring and explanation
petitioners.)[40]
Petitioner claims that the RTC proceeded to hear the
prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and no
hearing was conducted on the Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner
reiterates its earlier claim that it did not receive an order
requiring it to submit its Comment/Opposition to the Motion
to Dismiss or informing it that said Motion had been submitted
for resolution.[41]
Petitioner alleges that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-0420
arose from the grant of respondents Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner claims that it filed its Amended Petition on
November 13, 1998 at 11:10 a.m., or before respondents
served any responsive pleading, or before they had filed their
Motion to Dismiss on the same date at about 11:20
a.m.[42] Petitioner avers that the filing of said Amended
Petition was a matter of right under Section 2, Rule 10 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and had the effect of
superseding the original petition dated October 28,
1998. Petitioner concludes that the Motion to Dismiss was
therefore directed against a non-existing Petition.[43]
Petitioner argues that the RTCs ruling on the Motion to Dismiss
is contrary to procedural law because no hearing was
conducted on said Motion to Dismiss; that said motion violated
Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for
failing to set the time of hearing thereof; and that instead of
being resolved, said motion should have been declared as a
mere scrap of worthless paper.[44]
Petitioner claims that during the proceedings before
the RTC on November 20, 1998, both parties manifested that
the Motion to Dismiss was never set for hearing, and that when
Judge Bautista-Ricafort said, We will proceed first with the
hearing,[45] she was referring to the scheduled hearing of the
prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioner claims that it is crystal clear that it was
deprived due process when a ruling was had on the Motion to
Dismiss despite the clear absence of a hearing. Petitioner
concludes that the Court of Appeals was manifestly mistaken
when it ruled that due process was observed in the issuance
of the assailed Orders of Judge Bautista-Ricafort, despite the
lack of opportunity to submit a comment or opposition to the
Motion to Dismiss and the lack of issuance of an order
submitting said motion for resolution. Petitioner alleges that
the Court of Appeals sanctioned the ruling of the RTC that
violated both substantial and procedural law. [46]
Moreover, petitioner avers that contrary to the ruling of the
Court of Appeals, the RTC had jurisdiction to hear and decide
the Amended Petition, and the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies was not applicable. This is because,
according to petitioner, such doctrine requires that were a
remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief
must first be sought from the administrative agencies prior to
bringing an action before courts of justice.[47] Petitioner
claims that when it filed Civil Case No. 98-08420, it did not
have the luxury of time to elevate the matter to the higher
authorities under Sections 32 and 57 of the Local Government
Code.Petitioner alleges that the tenor of BSV Resolution No.
98-096 necessitated the immediate filing of the injunction
case on October 29, 1998, to forestall the prejudicial effect of
said resolution that was to take effect two days later. Thus,
petitioner claims that it had no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy except to file the case.[48]
Anent the question of whether the Sangguniang
Barangay should have passed an ordinance instead of a
resolution to open the subject roads, petitioner alleges that
the Court of Appeals should not have relied on respondents
claim of ownership, as this led to the erroneous conclusion
that there was no need to pass an ordinance.Petitioner insists
that the supposed titles to the subject roads were never
submitted to the RTC, and the respondents merely attached
certifications that the ownership of the subject roads was
already vested in the City Government of Paraaque City as
Annexes to their Appellees Brief before the Court of
Appeals. Those annexes, according to petitioner, were not
formally offered as evidence.[49]
Petitioner avers that the records of Civil Case No. 98-
0420 clearly show that there was no proof or evidence on
record to support the findings of the Court of Appeals. This is
because, allegedly, the dismissal of said case was due to the
grant of a motion to dismiss, and the case did not go to trial
to receive evidence.[50]Petitioner avers that a motion to
dismiss hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint.[51] In adopting the annexes as basis for its
findings of fact, the Court of Appeals allegedly disregarded the
rules on Evidence.
Petitioner raises the following grounds for the
issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction:
Sangguniang Barangay Resolution
No. 98-096 is repugnant to the proprietary
rights of the affected homeowners who are
members of petitioner NSVHAI, such rights
undoubtedly protected by the Constitution.
As there is no proof otherwise
(except the baseless findings of fact by the
Honorable Court of Appeals) that the streets
encompassed by the concerned subdivision,
Sun Valley Subdivision, are all private
properties. As such, the residents of Sun
Valley Subdivision have all the right to
regulate the roads and open spaces within
their territorial jurisdiction.
This Honorable Supreme Court can
take judicial knowledge that criminal
activities such as robbery and kidnappings
are becoming daily fares in Philippine
society. Residents have invested their
lifetimes savings in private subdivision since
subdivision living afford them privacy,
exclusivity and foremost of all, safety. Living
in a subdivision has a premium and such
premium translates into a comparatively
more expensive lot because of the safety,
among others, that subdivision lifestyle
offers.
163

But, with the enactment and
intended implementation of Sangguniang
Barangay Resolution No. 98-096 to open
Rosemallow and Aster Streets for public
use, it is indubitable that, instead of
promoting the safety of resident of Sun Valley
Subdivision, respondents are endangering the
life and property of the residents of the said
subdivision as they will now be exposed to
criminal and lawless elements.
It is respectfully submitted that
Sangguniang Barangay Resolution No. 98-096
has a place only in an authoritarian
government where proprietary rights and
privacy are alien concepts. Lest it be
forgotten, ours is a democratic society and
therefore, it should not be ruled in a manner
befitting of a despotic government.
2.
Petitioner NSVHAI, in protection of
the rights and interest of the residents of Sun
Valley Subdivision and in order to ensure that
public officials will not abuse governmental
powers and use them in an oppressive and
arbitrary manner, invokes the judicial power
of this Honorable Supreme Court and pray
that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued and, after hearing, be declared
permanent. [52]
A perusal of the documents attached by petitioner as
Annexes revealed to the Court the following, which were not
discussed in the body of the petition:
1. A letter[53] dated January 25, 2003
signed by Sonia G. Sison, President of NSVHAI, to Mayor Joey
P. Marquez, the pertinent portions of which provide:
We admit that we erred in not going to you
directly because at that time, the NSVHA
received the letter-order of Brgy. Capt.
Guevara two days before the effectivity of
the order.Aside from this, there was a long
holiday (long weekend prior to November 1).
Thus, the Board of Governors had no other
recourse but to seek a TRO and thereafter a
permanent injunction.
We now would like to seek your assistance
concerning this urgent problem. For your
information there are already two (2) gates
in and out of Sun Valley Subdivision.
Under P.D. 957, the Homeowners Association
is mandated to protect the interest of the
homeowners and residents especially in so far
as it affects the security, comfort and the
general welfare of the homeowners.
Thank you and because of the urgency of the
matter, we anticipate your prompt and
favorable action. (Emphasis ours.)
A letter[54] signed by Paraaque City Mayor Joey
Marquez dated January 27, 2003, addressed to Mr.
Roberto Guevara, Office of the Barangay Captain,
Barangay Sun Valley, which reads in part:
This refers to your intended implementation
of Barangay Sun Valley Resolution No. 98-096
entitled, A RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE NEW
SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION TO
OPEN ROSEMALLOW AND ASTER STREETS TO
VEHICULAR AND PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC.
In this regard and pursuant to the provisions
of Sec. 32 of the Local Government Code of
1991 which vests upon the city mayor the
right to exercise general supervision over
component barangays, to ensure that said
barangays act within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions, you are
hereby directed to defer your
implementation of the subject ordinance
based on the following grounds:
1. The roads subject of your
resolution is a municipal road and
not a barangay road;
2. The opening or closure of any
local road may be undertaken by a
local government unit pursuant to an
ordinance and not through a mere
resolution as provided under Sec. 21
of the Local Government Code of
1991;
3. There is no more need to order
the opening of the aforementioned
roads in view of the fact that Gelia
and State Ave., have already been
opened by the subdivision to the
general public to accommodate
vehicular and pedestrian traffic in
the area;
4. There is a need to conduct
public hearings, as in fact we shall
be conducting public hearings, on
the matter to enable us to arrive at
an intelligent resolution of the issues
involved.
3. A letter[55] dated January 31, 2003 addressed to
Mayor Joey Marquez, signed by counsel for
respondents, wherein the latter wrote:
We regret to observe that all the
reasons that you have cited in your letter as
grounds for your order of non-
implementation of the Barangay Resolution
have been passed upon and decided by the
Court of Appeals, which lately denied the
NSVHA Motion for Reconsideration x x x.
xxxx
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is now the subject of an appeal taken by the
NSVHA to the Supreme Court. In deference to
the high Court, you would do well to
reconsider your order to the Barangay and
not pre-empt the high Court on its decision.
x x x.
164
Arguments of Respondents
Respondents filed their Comment[56] on July 17,
2003. They manifest that the petition is substantially a
reproduction of petitioners brief filed with the Court of
Appeals, and consists of almost identical issues which have
already been ventilated and decided upon by the said court.
Respondents claim that the hearing held on November
20, 1998, as found by the Court of Appeals, covered both the
injunction and dismissal incidents, and that the motion to
dismiss on issues of jurisdiction was a prejudicial
matter. Respondents confirm that the RTC said it will proceed
first with the hearing, but the lower court did not specify if
the hearing was going to take up the prayer for the issuance
of preliminary injunction or the motion to
dismiss. Respondents further claim that by the end of the
hearing, after Atty. Florencio R. Herreras manifestation on the
donated public roads, counsels for both parties were asked by
the court if they were submitting, and both of them answered
in the affirmative. [57] Respondents aver that petitioners reply
to its charge of misleading the Court was an admission that
counsel had tampered without authority with the TSN, and
that the phrase referring to the scheduled hearing of the
prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction[58] was said counsels own mere footnote.
Respondents allege that the issuance of the titles in
favor of Paraaque over all the roads in Sun Valley Subdivision
was an official act by the land registration office of the City
of Paraaque, and was perfectly within the judicial notice of
the Courts, pursuant to Rule 129, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court.[59] Respondents likewise allege that the gates were
earlier built illegally on the roads by the Association, and while
petitioner may lend a helping hand to the barangay, it cannot
control the latters discretion as to the wisdom of its traffic
policies within the barangay. They maintain that petitioner
had no business putting up road blocks in the first place; that
this matter is purely a local government determination; and
that it is even doubtful if courts would encroach upon this
autonomous determination for local constituents of
the Barangay in deference to the doctrine of separation of
powers.
Respondents claim that since the subject matter of
the case is a directive of the Barangay to the petitioner, the
requirement for an ordinance would not be necessary, as there
was no legislative determination in the Barangay resolution
regarding what class of roads to open or what to close by way
of general policy. [60]
Respondents contend that the Barangay Resolution
was internal and temporary, passed to solve a traffic
problem. They propose a reason why petitioner allegedly
wants to control the subject roads, as follows:
The directive of the Barangay is
certainly a declaration of an intention
expressed by resolution on complaints of
residents for a convenient outlet of cars and
pedestrians during certain hours of the [day]
or night. This need not be the subject of an
ordinance. It is addressed to a special group
of residents, and not to the general
community. It refers to particular roads and
at certain hours only, not to all the roads and
at all hours.
Hence, the Barangay Resolutions
(sic) is but temporary in character, being a
solution to a momentary traffic problem then
visualized by the Barangay and encouraged
by the MMDA. There is no legal question
involved that is of any concern to the NSVHA.
The prevailing reason why the NSVHA desires
to control the roads is the monetary
consideration it gains by its unilateral
requirement of car stickers and of substantial
fees exacted from delivery vans and trucks
for bringing in cargo into the subdivision. And
yet, the residents who, never gave their
consent to this activities (sic), are busy
people and have merely tolerated this for a
long time now. This tolerance did not of
course give legality to the illegal act. x x x.[61]
As regards petitioners argument that the
BSV Sangguniang Barangay should have passed an ordinance
instead of a resolution, respondents present their counter-
argument as follows:
Hence, even assuming for the sake of
argument that a legal question exists on
whether it be a resolution or ordinance that
should contain the Barangay directive, such
an issue is of no moment as plaintiff-
appellant failed to exhaust the necessary
administrative remedies before resorting to
court action, as found by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals. Section 32, R.A. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991) provides
for a remedy from Barangay actions to the
Mayor under the latters power of general
supervision.[62]
With regard to the Mayors involvement in this case,
respondents have this to say:
The Mayors act of interfering in Barangay Sun
Valley affairs stemmed out of a long-standing
political feud of the Mayor with the Punong
Barangay. Its general supervision did not
extend to pure Barangay matters, which the
Barangay would be x x x in a better position
to determine.
Furthermore, the general
supervision of the Mayor is limited to the
overseeing authority that the Barangays act
within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions. Sadly, there is nothing in this
Mayors letter x x x that would as much as
show a deviation by the Barangay Sun Valley
from any prescribed powers or function. The
Mayors directive to the Barangay is of
doubtful legality.
It was mainly the mounting traffic
problem progressively experienced through
the years that prompted the Barangay to
resolve to open Rosemallow and Aster Streets
in accordance with its power under Section
21 of R.A. 7160 to temporarily open or close
any local road falling within its jurisdiction.
This Resolution x x x was decided upon after
the Barangay Council made the necessary
investigation and conducted hearings in
consultation with affected residents. In order
to maintain some kind of cordial relationship
165
 with the NSVHA, the Barangay by its
resolution, opted to give the NSVHA the
chance to open the roads, which it earlier
closed by means of arbitrarily putting up
steel gates without any apparent
authority.[63]
Furthermore, respondents aver that the trial court
and the appellate court have ruled that only a local
government unit (LGU), in this case the Barangay, can open or
close roads, whether they be public or private, in accordance
with Section 21 of the Local Government Code. Respondents
contend that Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,[64] wherein the Court
discussed the power of LGUs to open and close roads, is
substantially in point.[65]
After the submission of the parties respective
memoranda,[66] this case was submitted for decision.
The issues before us are:
1. Whether or not petitioner has a right to
the protection of the law that would entitle
it to injunctive relief against the
implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-
096; and
2. Whether or not petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court of Appeals passed upon petitioners claims
as to the validity of the dismissal in this wise:
We do not agree. Although the
Motion to Dismiss was filed on the same day,
but after, the Amended Petition was filed,
the same cannot be considered as directed
merely against the original petition which
Appellant already considers as non-existing.
The records will show that Appellants
Amended Petition contained no material
amendments to the original petition. Both
allege the same factual circumstances or
events that constitute the Appellants cause
of action anent the Appellees alleged
violation of Appellants propriety rights over
the subdivision roads in question. Corollarily,
the allegations in Appellees Motion to
Dismiss, as well as the grounds therefore
predicated on lack of cause of action and
jurisdiction, could very well be considered as
likewise addressed to Appellants Amended
Petition.
xxxx
It bears stressing that due process
simply means giving every contending party
the opportunity to be heard and the court to
consider every piece of evidence presented
in their favor (Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company versus Benjamin Bitanga, G.R. Nos.
137934 & 137936[)]. In the instant case,
Appellant cannot be said to have been denied
of due process. As borne by the records,
while Appellees Motion to Dismiss did not set
the time for the hearing of the motion, the
day set therefore was the same date set for
the hearing of Appellants prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
that is, November 20, 1998, with the precise
purpose of presenting evidence in support of
the motion to dismiss on the same said
scheduled hearing date and time when
Appellant and its counsel would be present.
Moreover, Appellants predication of lack of
due hearing is belied by the fact that the
hearing held on November 20, 1999 took up
not only the matter of whether or not to
grant the injunction, but also tackled the
jurisdictional issue raised in Appellees Motion
to Dismiss, which issues were intertwined in
both incidents. [67]
We see no reason to depart from these findings by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners recourse in questioning BSV
Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of
Paraaque City, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local
Government Code, which provides:
Section 32. City and Municipal
Supervision over Their Respective
Barangays. - The city or municipality,
through the city or municipal mayor
concerned, shall exercise general supervision
over component barangays to ensure that
said barangays act within the scope of their
prescribed powers and functions.
We do not see how petitioners act could qualify as an
exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying
this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:
The doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is a cornerstone
of our judicial system. The thrust of the
rule is that courts must allow administrative
agencies to carry out their functions and
discharge their responsibilities within the
specialized areas of their respective
competence. The rationale for this doctrine
is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and
provides for the speedier resolution of
controversies. Comity and convenience also
impel courts of justice to shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed.[68]
It is the Mayor who can best review the Sangguniang
Barangays actions to see if it acted within the scope of its
prescribed powers and functions. Indeed, this is a local
problem to be resolved within the local government. Thus, the
Court of Appeals correctly found that the trial court
committed no reversible error in dismissing the case for
petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies, as the
requirement under the Local Government Code that the
closure and opening of roads be made pursuant to an
ordinance, instead of a resolution, is not applicable in this
case because the subject roads belong to the City Government
of Paraaque.
Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief,
the burden of proof was on petitioner to show ownership over
the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do.
166

In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making
allegations has the burden of proving them by a
preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the strength
of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defense offered by their opponent.[69]
Petitioner dared to question the barangays ownership
over the subject roads when it should have been the one to
adduce evidence to support its broad claims of exclusivity and
privacy. Petitioner did not submit an iota of proof to support
its acts of ownership, which, as pointed out by respondents,
consisted of closing the subject roads that belonged to the
then Municipality of Paraaque and were already being used by
the public, limiting their use exclusively to the subdivisions
homeowners, and collecting fees from delivery vans that
would pass through the gates that they themselves had
built. It is petitioners authority to put up the road blocks in
the first place that becomes highly questionable absent any
proof of ownership.
On the other hand, the local government units power
to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under
the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides:
Section 21. Closure and Opening of
Roads. (a) A local government unit
may, pursuant to an
ordinance, permanently or temporarily close
or open any local road, alley, park, or square
falling within its jurisdiction: Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure,
such ordinance must be approved by at least
two-thirds (2/3) of all the members of the
sanggunian, and when necessary, an
adequate substitute for the public facility
that is subject to closure is provided.
We quote with approval the ruling of the Court of
Appeals in this regard, as follows:
Contrary, however, to Appellants
position, the above-quoted provision, which
requires the passage of an ordinance by a
local government unit to effect the opening
of a local road, can have no applicability to
the instant case since the subdivision road
lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic
in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster
Streets have already been donated by the Sun
Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto
already issued in the name of, the City
Government of Paraaque since the year 1964
(Annexes 2 to 7 of Appellees Brief). This fact
has not even been denied by the Appellant in
the proceedings below nor in the present
recourse. Having been already donated or
turned over to the City Government of
Paraaque, the road lots in question have
since then taken the nature of public roads
which are withdrawn from the commerce of
man, and hence placed beyond the private
rights or claims of herein Appellant.
Accordingly, the Appellant was not in the
lawful exercise of its predicated rights when
it built obstructing structures closing the
road lots in question to vehicular traffic for
the use of the general Public. Consequently,
Appellees act of passing the disputed
barangay resolution, the implementation of
which is sought to be restrained by Appellant,
had for its purpose not the opening of a
private road but may be considered merely as
a directive or reminder to the Appellant to
cause the opening of a public road which
should rightfully be open for use to the
general public.[70]
Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and
interests of the residents of Sun Valley Subdivision but it
miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its
ownership of the subject roads, which entitles petitioner to
the remedy prayed for. It even wants this Court to take
judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and
kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine
society.[71] This is absurd. The Rules of Court provide which
matters constitute judicial notice, to wit:
Rule 129
WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when
mandatory.A court shall take judicial notice,
without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states,
their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of
the world and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines,
the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines,
the laws of nature, the measure of time, and
the geographical divisions.(1a)
The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of
judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and
do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.
As petitioner has failed to establish that it has any
right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed
to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive
relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local
Government Code, the petition must be denied.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals DECISION dated
October 16, 2002 and its RESOLUTION dated January 17, 2003
in CA-G.R. CV No. 65559 are both AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
F. Doctrine of Presumed-Identity Approach or
Processual Presumption
ATCI Overseas Corporation, Amalia G. Ikdal
and Ministry of Public Health-Kuwait v. Ma.
Josefa Echin, G.R. No. 178551, October 11,
2010;
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
167
Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI
Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner,
the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (the Ministry), for the
position of medical technologist under a two-year contract,
denominated as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), with a
monthly salary of US$1,200.00.
Under the MOA,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a
probationary period of one (1) year and are covered by
Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was
terminated from employment on February 11, 2001, she not
having allegedly passed the probationary period.
As the Ministry denied respondent’s request for
reconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March 17,
2001, shouldering her own air fare.
On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal
dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment
agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and
the Ministry, as the foreign principal.
By Decision3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter, finding
that petitioners neither showed that there was just cause to
warrant respondent’s dismissal nor that she failed to qualify
as a regular employee, held that respondent was illegally
dismissed and accordingly ordered petitioners to pay her
US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months
unexpired portion of her contract.
On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s decision by Resolution4 of January 26,
2004. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been
denied by Resolution5 of April 22, 2004, they appealed to the
Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the
Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from
suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required
under Kuwait’s Civil Service Laws. Petitioners further
contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer of
petitioner ATCI.
By Decision6 of March 30, 2007, the appellate court affirmed
the NLRC Resolution.
In brushing aside petitioners’ contention that they only acted
as agent of the Ministry and that they cannot be held jointly
and solidarily liable with it, the appellate court noted that
under the law, a private employment agency shall assume all
responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of
employment of an overseas worker, hence, it can be sued
jointly and severally with the foreign principal for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or contract of
employment.
As to Ikdal’s liability, the appellate court held that under
Sec. 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, the "Migrant and Overseas
Filipinos’ Act of 1995," corporate officers, directors and
partners of a recruitment agency may themselves be jointly
and solidarily liable with the recruitment agency for money
claims and damages awarded to overseas workers.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the appellate court by Resolution7 of June 27, 2007, the
present petition for review on certiorari was filed.
Petitioners maintain that they should not be held liable
because respondent’s employment contract specifically
stipulates that her employment shall be governed by the Civil
Service Law and Regulations of Kuwait. They thus conclude
that it was patent error for the labor tribunals and the
appellate court to apply the Labor Code provisions governing
probationary employment in deciding the present case.
Further, petitioners argue that even the Philippine Overseas
Employment Act (POEA) Rules relative to master employment
contracts (Part III, Sec. 2 of the POEA Rules and Regulations)
accord respect to the "customs, practices, company policies
and labor laws and legislation of the host country."
Finally, petitioners posit that assuming arguendo that
Philippine labor laws are applicable, given that the foreign
principal is a government agency which is immune from suit,
as in fact it did not sign any document agreeing to be held
jointly and solidarily liable, petitioner ATCI cannot likewise
be held liable, more so since the Ministry’s liability had not
been judicially determined as jurisdiction was not acquired
over it.
The petition fails.
Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot
evade responsibility for the money claims of Overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by the mere
expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is a
government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that
such foreign principal’s liability must first be established
before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily liable.
In providing for the joint and solidary liability of private
recruitment agencies with their foreign principals, Republic
Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a recourse and
assures them of immediate and sufficient payment of what is
due them. Skippers United Pacific v. Maguad8 explains:
. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local agent
and its foreign principal are not coterminous with the term
of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties
decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such
parties towards the contracted employees under the
agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and
until the expiration of the employment contracts of the
employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render
nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the
employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted. (emphasis supplied)
The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with
the policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight of
the working class.9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simply
invoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to
wait for the judicial determination of the foreign principal’s
liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law
on joint and solidary liability inutile.
As to petitioners’ contentions that Philippine labor laws on
probationary employment are not applicable since it was
expressly provided in respondent’s employment contract,
which she voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her
168
engagement shall be governed by prevailing Kuwaiti Civil
Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord
respect to such rules, customs and practices of the host
country, the same was not substantiated.
Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered the law
between the parties who can establish stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
including the laws which they wish to govern their respective
obligations, as long as they are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the
application of a foreign law has the burden of proving the
law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in
this case, petitioners failed to discharge. The Court’s ruling
in EDI-Staffbuilders Int’l., v. NLRC10 illuminates:
In the present case, the employment contract signed by Gran
specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws will govern matters
not provided for in the contract (e.g. specific causes for
termination, termination procedures, etc.). Being the law
intended by the parties (lex loci intentiones) to apply to the
contract, Saudi Labor Laws should govern all matters relating
to the termination of the employment of Gran.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign
law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of proving
the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as a question of
fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge or labor
arbiter cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. He is
presumed to know only domestic or forum law.
Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinent
Saudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual
presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not
pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption
is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply
Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented
before us. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws,
hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the
certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.
(emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a
copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of
the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that
the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under
the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if
he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of
such court.
To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted the
following: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, as
represented by ATCI, which provides that the employee is
subject to a probationary period of one (1) year and that the
host country’s Civil Service Laws and Regulations apply; a
translated copy11 (Arabic to English) of the termination letter
to respondent stating that she did not pass the probation
terms, without specifying the grounds therefor, and a
translated copy of the certificate of termination,12 both of
which documents were certified by Mr. Mustapha Alawi,
Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs-Office of Consular
Affairs Inslamic Certification and Translation Unit; and
respondent’s letter13 of reconsideration to the Ministry,
wherein she noted that in her first eight (8) months of
employment, she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it
changed due to changes in her shift of work schedule.
These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole, do not
sufficiently prove that respondent was validly terminated as
a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service
laws. Instead of submitting a copy of the pertinent Kuwaiti
labor laws duly authenticated and translated by Embassy
officials thereat, as required under the Rules, what
petitioners submitted were mere certifications attesting
only to the correctness of the translations of the MOA and
the termination letter which does not prove at all that
Kuwaiti civil service laws differ from Philippine laws and
that under such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly
terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:
xxxx
This is to certify that the herein attached translation/s from
Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versa was/were
presented to this Office for review and certification and the
same was/were found to be in order. This Office, however,
assumes no responsibility as to the contents of the
document/s.
This certification is being issued upon request of the
interested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
(emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate
officer, the same is in order too following the express
provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:
SEC. 10. Money Claims.—Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the claims
arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue
of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual moral, exemplary and
other forms of damages.
The liability of the principal/employer and the
recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under
this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and
shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement
agency, as provided by law, shall be answerable for all
169
money claims or damages that may be awarded to the
workers. If the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical
being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as
the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily
liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid
claims and damages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.
Merope Enriquez Vda. De Catalan v. Louella
A. Catalan-Lee, G.R. No. 183622, Feb. 8,
2012.
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the
issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American
citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a
second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the
Philippines.
Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment
as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case
was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was
pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar
petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No.
232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec.
Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner
was not considered an interested person qualified to file a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the
estate of Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent
alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against
petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos,
Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for
bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage
to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol
on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner
of bigamy.[3] The trial court ruled that since the deceased was
a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for
declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court
in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased
and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a
prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for
the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place,
petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos,
Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters
of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of
private respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No.
2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner
and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married
Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her
acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause.
Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an interested
party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for
Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Court
of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition
filed by respondent should have been dismissed on the ground
of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for
letters of administration may have been filed by an
uninterested person, the defect was cured by the appearance
of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to
determine who has a better right to administer the decedents
properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to
present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
170

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed
Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook the wrong
remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review
rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the
Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec.
4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to
decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we
find it not applicable in the case. For litis
pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of
an action, there must be: (a) identity of the
parties or at least such as to represent the
same interest in both actions; (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts, and
(c) the identity in the two cases should be
such that the judgment which may be
rendered in one would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other. A petition for letters of
administration is a special proceeding. A
special proceeding is an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of
a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast
to an ordinary civil action, a special
proceeding involves no defendant or
respondent. The only party in this kind of
proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.
Considering its nature, a subsequent petition
for letters of administration can hardly be
barred by a similar pending petition involving
the estate of the same decedent unless both
petitions are filed by the same person. In the
case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to
the petition filed by the private respondent,
in the same manner that the latter was not
made a party to the petition filed by the
former. The first element of litis
pendentia is wanting. The contention of the
petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention dismissal of her petition for letters of
of the petitioner would render nugatory the administration by the trial court is in place.
provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner
for letters of administration to be an xxx xxx xxx
interested party, inasmuch as any person, for
that matter, regardless of whether he has WHEREFORE, premises considered,
valid interest in the estate sought to be the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
administered, could be appointed as
administrator for as long as he files his
petition ahead of any other person, in SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)
derogation of the rights of those specifically
mentioned in the order of preference in the
appointment of administrator under Rule 78, Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.[6] She
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides: alleged that the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating,
on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on
xxx xxx xxx
the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando
The petitioner, armed with a
was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
marriage certificate, filed her petition for
letters of administration. As a spouse, the bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
petitioner would have been preferred to
administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
However, a marriage certificate, like any
other public document, is only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated Hence, this Petition.
therein. The fact that the petitioner had
been charged with bigamy and was At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special
acquitted has not been disputed by the
petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the RTC in
committed by contracting a second or Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to
subsequent marriage before the first
marriage has been dissolved or before the Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because
absent spouse has been declared petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered
in a proper proceedings. The deduction of marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to
the trial court that the acquittal of the take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the
petitioner in the said case negates the
validity of her subsequent marriage with marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA
Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate
by her. There was not even an attempt
from the petitioner to deny the findings of of Orlando.
the trial court. There is therefore no basis
for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the
being an interested party and a stranger to
the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had
already ruled that under the principles of comity, our
171

jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7]wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces[,] the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx
We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of
Appeals,[8] to wit:
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held
that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality. In the same case, the
Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according
to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the
Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,
that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained
the divorce from petitioner, the ruling
in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we
recognized the divorce obtained by the
respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that
divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as
respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the
status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines,
the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be
proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of
himself. Before a foreign judgment is given
presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and
admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained
abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a
judgment is the judgment itself. The decree
purports to be a written act or record of an
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign
country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, on the other hand, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either
(1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his
office.
The divorce decree between
respondent and Editha Samson appears to be
an authentic one issued by an Australian
family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause,
when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner
objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the
Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The
trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence,
it was admitted in evidence and accorded
weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's
failure to object properly rendered the
divorce decree admissible as a written act of
the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles
(11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not
necessary; respondent was no longer bound
by Philippine personal laws after he acquired
Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization
is the legal act of adopting an alien and
clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their
former states, don the attires of their
adoptive countries. By becoming an
Australian, respondent severed his allegiance
to the Philippines and the vinculum juris that
had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the
burden to prove Australian divorce law falls
upon petitioner, because she is the party
challenging the validity of a foreign
judgment. He contends that petitioner was
satisfied with the original of the divorce
decree and was cognizant of the marital laws
of Australia, because she had lived and
worked in that country for quite a long time.
Besides, the Australian divorce law is
172
 allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign
laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden
of proof lies with the party who alleges the
existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil
cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving
the material allegations of the complaint
when those are denied by the answer; and
defendants have the burden of proving the
material allegations in their answer when
they introduce new matters. Since the
divorce was a defense raised by
respondent, the burden of proving the
pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction
that our courts cannot take judicial notice
of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they
must be alleged and proved. Australian
marital laws are not among those matters
that judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function. The power of
judicial notice must be exercised with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon
the subject should be resolved in the
negative. (Emphasis supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required
petitioner to prove the validity of Orlandos divorce under the
laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner
and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the
proceedings to the trial court for further reception of
evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and
the subsequent marriage, she has the preferential right to be
issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to
marriage was done in accordance with the
respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of
said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the
the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Revised Rules of Court.
Therefore, this case should be
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce
Luis,[10] in which we said:
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the
Applying the above doctrine in the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
instant case, the divorce decree allegedly (Emphasis supplied)
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first
file the present petition as Felicisimo's
surviving spouse. However, the records determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the rightful
show that there is insufficient evidence to party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate
prove the validity of the divorce obtained
by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of of Orlando B. Catalan.
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws
of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading
and proving foreign law and divorce hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October
judgments. It held that presentation solely of 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of
the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with
foreign country by either (1) an official this Decision.
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the
SO ORDERED.
document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the G. Judicial Admissions
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his Heirs of Antonio Feraren et. Al., v. Court of
office. Appeals & Cecilia Tadiar, G.R. No. 159328,
Oct. 5, 2011;
With regard to respondent's marriage
to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in
California, U.S.A., she submitted
photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and PERALTA, J.:
the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their
173
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting
aside of the May 21, 2003 Decision1 and the July 17, 2003
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
71372. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Fernando
City, La Union, Branch 2 in Civil Case No. 34633 and the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando City, La Union,
Branch 26 in Civil Case No. 6617,4 while the questioned CA
Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
On May 25, 1999, herein private respondent Celia Tadiar
(Celia) filed with the MTC of San Fernando, La Union a
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against herein petitioners
Heirs of Antonio Feraren. In said Complaint, Celia alleged
that she and her three brothers are co-owners of a 1,200
square meter parcel of land located in the poblacion of San
Fernando City in La Union; that on September 21, 1960, the
said lot was sold by their father to the spouses Antonio and
Justina Feraren (Spouses Feraren) on pacto de retro; it was
stipulated that the right to repurchase may be exercised
within ten years; on August 31, 1970, Celia and her co-heirs
re-acquired the subject property; thereafter, the lot was
leased on a month-to-month basis to the Spouses Feraren
who have constructed a residential house thereon; that
sometime in March 1992, Celia and her co-heirs informed the
Spouses Feraren of their intention to terminate their lease
contract; the Spouses Feraren, in turn, offered to sell them
their house or buy the subject lot, which offers were
declined by Celia and her co-heirs and, instead, allowed the
Spouses Feraren to continue renting the property; after the
death of Antonio in 1995, herein petitioners requested Celia
and her co-heirs to extend the lease until June 30, 1997 and
even volunteered to temporarily vacate the said property;
Celia and her co-heirs agreed and they did not even increase
the rentals; nonetheless, petitioners failed to comply with
their commitment to temporarily vacate; they continued to
stay within the premises of the subject property and refused
to vacate the same notwithstanding repeated demands from
Celia and her co-heirs.5
In their Answer, herein petitioners contended that a 128-
square-meter portion of the lot being claimed by private
respondent is their property; even before the Spouses
Feraren entered into a contract of sale with pacto de
retro with the father of Celia, the former were already in
possession of the remaining portion of the subject property
on the strength of a lease contract executed in their favor by
the latter in 1949; their construction of a residential house
on the subject property was by virtue of a right granted
under the said contract of lease; petitioners were very much
willing to vacate the disputed lot but only upon payment of
the value of all the improvements that they have legally
introduced as builders in good faith on the said lot, which
includes the house presently standing thereon as well as the
concrete fence surrounding the said house; in the
alternative, they offered to buy the parcel of land subject of
the complaint.6
For failure of the parties to arrive at an amicable
settlement, the MTC, in its Order7 dated November 3, 2000,
directed them to submit their position papers and other
evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy of the
said Order.
Private respondent did not file a position paper.
On the other hand, petitioners filed their Position Paper 8 on
March 15, 2001. Petitioners alleged therein that their parents
are builders in good faith having built their house on the lot
in question during the time that they were the owners of the
disputed lot.
174

On June 15, 2001, the MTC rendered its Decision dismissing
the complaint for unlawful detainer. The trial court gave
credence to petitioners' contention that their parents built
the house in controversy on the subject lot while they were
the owners of the said lot. As such, the MTC held that as long
as private respondent refuses to reimburse petitioners of the
value of the improvements they have introduced on the lot in
question, they (petitioners) may not be compelled to vacate
the same.
On appeal, the RTC of San Fernando City, La Union, in its
Decision dated January 28, 2002, affirmed in toto the
judgment of the MTC.
Private respondent then filed a petition for review with the
CA.
On May 21, 2003, the CA promulgated its presently assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial
Court of San Fernando City, La Union in Civil
Case No. 3463 and the Decision rendered by
the Regional Trial Court of La Union in the
same case are both REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the
respondents not entitled to
reimbursement for the cost
of their residential house
built on the land owned by
the petitioner; and
2. Directing the
respondents to vacate the
premises and restore
possession thereof to the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.9
The CA based its Decision on its finding that the subject
residential house was built during the time petitioners'
parents were lessees of the lot in question.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the CA via its Resolution dated July 17, 2003.
Hence, the present petition with the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONERS
ADMITTED IN THEIR ANSWER THAT THEIR
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE WAS CONSTRUCTED
DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE LEASE
CONTRACT AND NOT DURING THE 10-YEAR
PERIOD WHEN THE LOT WHERE IT STOOD
WAS SOLD UNDER PACTO DE RETRO TO THE
PETITIONERS' PARENTS AS SHOWN BY
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN
REVERSING THE DECISIONS OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT AND THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL
COURT OF SAN FERNANDO CITY, LA UNION.10
Petitioners allege in the instant petition that the house
presently standing on the subject parcel of land is different
from the house built on the same lot in 1949. Petitioners
insist on their claim that the house built at the time that
their parents were lessees of the subject property in 1949
175

was demolished to give way to the construction of the
present house which was erected sometime in the late 1960's
when the said lot was then owned by their parents by virtue
of the pacto de retro sale executed in the latter's favor on
September 21, 1960.
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the issues raised in the
present petition are essentially questions of fact. It is
fundamental that a petition for review on certiorari filed
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court shall, as a
general rule, raise only questions of law and that this Court
is not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence
introduced in and considered by the tribunals
below.11 However, there are recognized exceptions to this
rule, to wit:
(a) When the findings are grounded entirely
on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures;
(b) When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(c) When there is grave abuse of discretion;
(d) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; standing on the disputed parcel of land was built at the time
that the ownership of the said lot was in the name of
(e) When the findings of facts are
conflicting; petitioners' parents. The CA, on the other hand, ruled that
the abovementioned house was constructed when petitioners'
(f) When in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its parents were in possession of the lot in question as lessees.
findings are contrary to the admissions Thus, this Court's review of such findings is warranted.
of both the appellant and the appellee;
(g) When the CA’s findings are contrary to
those by the trial court;
A careful review of the records and the evidence presented
(h) When the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on in the instant case shows that the CA did not commit error in
which they are based;
finding that the house in question was built at the time
(i) When the facts set forth in the petition petitioners' parents possessed the subject lot as lessees.
as well as in the petitioner’s main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent;
(j) When the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence Firstly, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners'
and contradicted by the evidence on Position Paper and the affidavits of its witnesses should not
record; or
have been considered by the trial courts since these were
(k) When the CA manifestly overlooked filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period required under
certain relevant facts not disputed by
the parties, which, if properly Section 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of the
considered, would justify a different
conclusion.12 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.13 Petitioners do not
dispute the appellate court's finding that they submitted
their position paper and affidavits more than three months
after the deadline set by the abovementioned rules. In this
regard, this Court, in Teraña v. De Sagun,14 held as follows:
In the present case, the findings of the MTC and the RTC are
contrary to those made by the CA. The RTC affirmed the
findings of the MTC that the subject house which is presently x x x By its express terms, the purpose of
the RSP [Revised Rule on Summary
176
 Procedure] is to “achieve an expeditious and
inexpensive determination” of the cases
they cover, among them, forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases. To achieve this
objective, the RSP expressly prohibit[s]
certain motions and pleadings that could
cause delay, among them, a motion for
extension of time to file pleadings,
affidavits or any other paper. If the
extension for the filing of these submissions
cannot be allowed, we believe it illogical
and incongruous to admit a pleading that is
already filed late. Effectively, we would
then allow indirectly what we prohibit to be
done directly. It is for this reason that
in Don Tino Realty Development Corporation
v. Florentino [G.R. No. 134222, September
10, 1999, 314 SCRA 197], albeit on the issue
of late filing of an answer in a summary
proceeding, we stated that “[t]o admit a
late answer is to put a premium on dilatory
measures, the very mischief that the rules
seek to redress.”
The strict adherence to the reglementary
period prescribed by the RSP is due to the
essence and purpose of these rules. The law
looks with compassion upon a party who has
been illegally dispossessed of his property.
Due to the urgency presented by this
situation, the RSP provides for an
expeditious and inexpensive means of
reinstating the rightful possessor to the
enjoyment of the subject property. This
fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment
case quickly. x x x15
As noted by the CA, petitioners did not even bother to file a
motion asking the trial court to admit their position paper
which was belatedly filed. Indeed, the record is barren of
any evidence to show that petitioners, at least, tried to offer
any explanation or justification for such delay. They simply
ignored the Rules. This Court has previously held that
technical rules may be relaxed only for the furtherance of
justice and to benefit the deserving.16 Moreover, rules of
procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants.17These rules are established to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system.18 They are not
to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere
expedience of invoking "substantial justice."19 In a long line
of decisions, this Court has repeatedly held that, while the
rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on
reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as
they are to the prevention of needless delays, and are
necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business.20 In the instant case, petitioners' complete
disregard of the Rules of Court and of the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure only shows that they are not deserving
of their relaxation. Hence, the MTC erred in admitting
petitioners' position paper and taking the same into
consideration in rendering its judgment.
In any case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA
that petitioners' statement in their Answer, that their
parents built the subject residential house as lessees under
the authority given to them by private respondent's father in
their contract of lease executed in 1949, is a judicial
admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court,21petitioners may not contradict this judicial admission
unless they are able to show that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. In the
instant case, petitioners' subsequent claim in their Position
Paper that their house was built during the time that their
parents were the owners of the disputed lot is a direct
contradiction of their judicial admission in their Answer.
However, petitioners failed to prove that such admission was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission
was made. Hence, they may not contradict the same.
Aside from the abovementioned admission made by
petitioners in their Answer, there is nothing in the said
Answer which claims that the subject house was constructed
when petitioners' parents were the owners of the disputed
lot. Neither was there any allegation nor even a hint that a
house was first built on the lot in question in 1949 and that
the same was demolished in the late 1960s to give way to the
construction of the house which is presently standing on the
disputed lot.
Thus, it appears from all indications that petitioners' claims
and allegations in their Position Paper contradicting their
177
admission in their Answer are mere afterthought subsequent
to realizing that they could not recover the full value of the
house based on their acknowledgment that the same was
erected at the time that their parents were lessees of the
disputed parcel of land.
At this juncture, it would not be amiss to reiterate that the
rights of a lessee, like petitioners in the present case, are
governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in
good faith, useful improvements which are
suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased, the lessor
upon the termination of the lease shall pay
the lessee one-half of the value of the
improvements at that time. Should the
lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the
lessee may remove the improvements, even
though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the
property leased than is necessary.
With regard to ornamental
expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to
any reimbursement, but he may remove the
ornamental objects, provided no damage is
caused to the principal thing, and the lessor
does not choose to retain them by paying
their value at the time the lease is
extinguished.
Hence, under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of
paying one-half of the value of the improvements that the
lessee made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for
which the lease is intended, and which have not altered the
form and substance of the land. On the other hand, the
lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor
refuse to reimburse.22
It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private
respondent prayed for the demolition of petitioners'
residential house constructed on the subject lot. It is, thus,
clear that private respondent does not want to appropriate
the improvements. As such, petitioners cannot compel her to
reimburse to them one-half of the value of their house. The
sole right of petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove
the improvements without causing any more damage upon
the property leased than is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines v. Estate of Hans
Menzi, G.R. No. 183446, November 13, 2012.
FACTS
1. Subject of this case are three “blocks” of shares of the
Bulleting Publishiong Corp., as follows:
a. 154 block – 154, 472 shares
b. 198 block – 198, 052.5 shares
c. 214 block – 214, 424.5 shares
2) In an action for reconveyance earlier decided by the
Sandiganbayan, said tribunal decided that:
a. Ff. shares were ill-gotten:
i. 46,000 shares (belonging to the 214 block),
under the name of Danding Cojuangco, and
the
ii. entire 198 block, which were originally
under the names of Campos, Cojuangco
and Zalamea then subsequently sold to
HMHMI (Hans Menzu Holdings and Mgt. Inc)
b. The 154 block was not ill-gotten
c. The estate of Hans Menzi must thus surrender for
cancellation the certificates of stock in its
possession
3) This present appeal pertains to the propriety of declaring
the 154 block, on the one hand, as not ill-gotten, and
the 198 and 214 blocks as ill-gotten.
G.R. 152578 – Re 154 block
(This is the more relevant half)
FACTS
a. In 1957, Menzi purchased the entire interest in
Bulletin Publishing
b. In 1961, US Automotive purchased Bulletin shares
from Menzi
c. In 1968, a stock option was executed between Menzi
and US Automotive giving each other preferential
rights in the purchase of each other’s Bulleting
shares
d. Later in the same year, Bulletin’s articles of
incorporation were amended to place restrictions
on the transfer of Bulletin shares to non-
178
 stockholders where by stockholders seeking to sell
must first make an offer to Bulleting itself.
e. In 1984, Menzi sold the 154 block to US automotive.
US Automotive’s VP executed a promissory note in
favor of Menzi
f. Days later, Menzi dies and a petition for the
probate of his will was filed. In said proceedings,
the executor moved for the confirmation of the
sale of the 154 block; which motion the probate
court granted.
g. Subsequently, the executor received 2 checks
representing full payment; he in turn, issues a
receipt.
ISSUE
Is the sale of the 154 block from Menzi to US Automotive
valid. YES.
HELD / RATIO:
1. Requisites for a valid transfer per Sec. 63:
a. Between the parties:
i. Delivery
ii. Indorsement
b. To be valid as to third persons:
i. Recorded in the books of the corporation
2. Per the above requisites, a deed of sale, as insisted by
the Republic, is not required. In fact, per Rural Bank of
Lipa v. CA, the execurtion of a deed of sale does not
necessarily make the transfer effective as it is the
delivery of the stock certificate duly indorsed by the
owner which is the oprative act that transfers the
shares.
3. Here, there is no dispute, that delivery and indorsement
in favor of US Automotive were made.
4. Moreover, the executor’s authority to negotiate the
transfer is found in the general power of attorney
executed by Menzi. Also, the former’s authority to
accept payment springs from Menzi’s will and the order
of the probate court confirming the sale.
 Section 7, 8, 10, and 11 of Rule 8
5. As found by the Sandiganbayan, it was Menzi himself who (Actionable Document and General Denial)
sold to US Automotive, hencem the non-inclusion of the
 Section 8, Rule 10 (Admissions in
subject shares in MEnzi’s will an din the inventory of his
estate is attributable to the fact that at the time the
Superseded Pleadings)
aforesaid were taken, they already belonged to US  Section 2 and 3 Rule 26 (Failure to answer
Automotive. request for admission)
 Section 2, Rule 118 (Factual stipulations in
G.R. 154487 and 154518 – Re 198 and 214 blocks criminal pre-trial)
(Relevant) ISSUE
Were the covered shares validly ceded by Camps and
Zalamea to the government? YES.
HELD / RATIO:
1. The fact that the stock certificates covering the shares
ceded to the Republic (ie, Campos and Zalamea’s
portions in the 214 block), and which were under the
names of Campos, Zalamea and Cojuangco (Cojuangco
did not cede his 46,000 shares) were found in Menzi’s
possession does not prove that Menzi owned the shares.
2. A stock certificate is merely a tangible evidence of
ownership of shares of stock. Its presence or absence
does not affect the right of the registered owner to
dispose of the shares. Accordingly, Campo and
Zalamea, as registered owners, validly ceded their
shares in favor of the Government.
Doctrine:
Requisites for a valid transfer per Sec. 63:
a. Between the parties:
i. Delivery
ii. Indorsement
b. To be valid as to third persons:
i. Recorded in the books of the corporation
* All other formalities are mere superfluities that do not
add to nor detract from the validity of a transfer.
ATCI Overseas Corp. v. Echin, 11 October
2010).
179
180