Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v.

Franklin Drilon
GR No. L-81958 (30 June 1988)
Reyes J. kmd
SUBJECT MATTER: General provision; preliminary title
CASE SUMMARY:
PASEI is assailing the validity of a department order issued by DOLE which temporarily suspends the deployment of female
domestic and household overseas workers. PASEI claims that it is a discrimination against males or females, it violates the right
to travel, it is an invalid exercise of legislative power, and it violates the constitutional guaranty of workers’ participation in
policy-making affecting their rights and benefits. However, the SC dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of the said
order. The SC ruled that PASEI has not shown satisfactory reason to overturn the presumption of validity of official acts.
DOCTRINES:
Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is
that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.
PARTIES:
Petitioner Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) - a
firm engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female, for overseas placement.
Respondent Hon. Franklin Drilon (Secretary of Labor and Employment)
Tomas D. Achacoso (Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration)

FACTS:
PASEI challenges the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, s.1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), whish temporarily suspends the deployment of Filipina domestic and household workers.
PASEI argues that:
a. the said Order is a discrimination against males or females; it does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills
b. it is violative of the right to travel.
c. It is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.
d. That Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior consultations, violating sec. 3 of Article XIII of the
CONSTI, providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits
as may be provided by law."
e. the said Order is in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury"
that PASEI members face should the Order be further enforced.

ISSUE/S:
1. WON it is valid under the Constitution. (YES)
a. WON there is a valid classification. (YES)
b. WON it impairs the right to travel. (NO)
c. WON it is an invalid exercise of legislative power. (NO)
d. WON it violates the worker’s right to participate "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits". (NO)
HOLDING/RATIO:
1. The assailed Department Order is constitutional.

As a rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the
presumption logically stands. The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified.

a. Although the Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," there is no undue discrimination
between the sexes. The Constitution admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
 substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. Court is well aware of the unhappy plight
that has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions
marked by, in not a few cases, physical and personal abuse. With that, the objective of Department Order No. 1 to
"enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers, making it the classification is germane to the
purpose behind the measure. It is also clear in the Order itself that it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as
those conditions exist. Finally, the Court finds it clear that the guidelines are applicable to all female domestic
overseas worker.

b. The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is
subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." Department
Order No. 1 is a valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to
labor," pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code.

c. DO No. 1 does not constitute an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain of
the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself
vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.

d. The petitioner's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in poliey and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits" is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must
submit to the demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation. "Protection to labor" does not signify
the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an
employment be above all, decent, just, and humane.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.