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Bureaucratization and administrative development in Africa: A reading of

Riggs' theory of prismatic society

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DOI: 10.1002/pad.1816

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RESEARCH ARTICLE

Bureaucratization and administrative development in Africa: A

reading of Riggs' theory of prismatic society
Okechukwu M. Ikeanyibe

University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria

Correspondence
Okechukwu M. Ikeanyibe, Department of
Public Administration and Local Government,
University of Nigeria Nsukka, Nigeria.
Email: okey.ikeanyibe@unn.edu.ng
Funding information
Open Society Foundation and Central Euro-
pean University Budapest Hungary
Summary
Poor bureaucratization in prismatic (transitional) societies is attributed to malintegration of the
ideal bureaucratic principles with subsisting traditional sociocultural features by Fred Riggs. Riggs
has been severely criticized on many fronts, yet aspects of his theory remain relevant towards
explaining persistent poor administrative behaviour in most African countries. This article applies
Riggs' notion of poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism to explain the contribution of low state
identity to persistent poor administrative behaviour in Africa. Historical institutionalism theory is
also used to attempt at resolving the challenge of equilibrium for which Riggs' theory is commonly
criticized. The author avers that communalism, a value that supports group interest in a traditional
society, subsists in most poly‐communal transitional African countries, leading to distortions in
administrative behaviour. A good number of African countries were mobilized through colonial-
ism but poorly assimilated, thus lacking strong common state identity, which leads to ineffective
public administration. The article suggests that resolving the trapping of the administrative sys-
tem in Africa requires resolving the challenge of poly‐communalism and lack of common identity
among a state population.

KEY W ORDS

bureaucratization, common state identity, historical institutionalism, poly‐communalism, poly‐

normativism, public administration in Africa, theory of the prismatic society, traditional cultures

1 | I N T RO D U CT I O N Fred W. Riggs' prismatic theory and aspects of new institutional-

The literature on African public administration acknowledges wide-
spread ineffectiveness and poor administrative behaviour of public
officials, which largely affect the entire development superstructure
(Ayee, 2005; Hyden, 1983; Joseph, 1997; World Bank, 1993). Scholars
have paid attention to various obstacles to administrative and general
development in Africa. Studies in these directions are usually classified
into three broad categories, namely, the sociocultural, historical, and
psychological frameworks (Zoogah, Peng, & Woldu, 2015). Despite
the usefulness of these frameworks and the vast literature they have
inspired, the explanations offered remain in most cases exclusive and
inadequate and, in some cases, appear to be diametrically opposed to
each other (Chapman, 2008). Yet each of the framework has some
important facts and together could provide a more holistic understand-
ing of the nature of challenges to proper bureaucratization in most
Africa. In furthering the quest for more holistic explanation, this essay
tries to extract and integrate aspects of the three frameworks.
ism provide a nexus for this inquiry. The prismatic theory avers that
administrative ineffectiveness in prismatic societies emanate from
incongruence of traditional cultures and modern bureaucratic features.
Although Riggs' theory has been widely criticized and probably seen as
outdated in the current debates in public administration and develop-
ment, it still provides relevant theoretical anchor for analysis of histor-
ical, cultural, and psychological influences on administrative behaviour
especially among the vanguard states. Peng (2008, p. 214) observes
that “those who study comparative public administration will inevitably
find reason to critique Fred W. Riggs' ‘fused‐prismatic‐diffracted
model’, but in conducting research, no one is free of Riggs' influence.”
In relation to Riggs' prismatic theory, the questions that continue to
be relevant concerning the relationship of traditional cultures and for-
mal bureaucracy are (a) whether common traditional cultural features,
which can negatively influence administrative behaviour and inhibit
proper bureaucratization, could be identified for such a wide social
milieu like all the developing countries for Riggs and Africa in the

Public Admin Dev. 2017;37:307–318. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/pad Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 307
308
context of this investigation? (b) How does the impact of the tradi-
tional or cultural attribute, if any, lead to persistent poor administrative
behaviour in the manner to be seen as trapped or persistent as Riggs'
theory portrayed? (c) Can this notion of trapping be resolved?
These questions underline the research problem. The objective is
to offer a reading or reinterpretation of Fred Riggs' prismatic theory
in relation to why bureaucracy in Africa has been framed a failure
based on the argument of influence or overlap of traditional culture
on or with ideal bureaucratic features. The argument of the paper as
different from Riggs' is in finding communalism, a value that accommo-
dates group interest in a traditional society as subsisting and overlap-
ping with bureaucratic values in a poly‐communal environment. The
paper argues that resulting from the formation of modern states
through colonialism in Africa, various communities and kingdoms that
were brought together as countries have not properly assimilated
towards a common state consciousness and identity that could over-
ride the traditional communal attachment to primordial and atomistic
group interests in administrative behaviour. The consequence of this
is what Riggs describes as poly‐communalism (the existence of com-
munities of sorts—ethnic, religious, and so on—side by side but which
are antagonistic to each other) and poly‐normativism (existence of var-
ious sets of norms and values—traditional and modern as well as those
of various unassimilated groups). The lack of strong assimilation among
the population leads to poor common state identity that gives more
support to communalism than bureaucracy as the institution or value
for responding to group interest.
On the other hand, the theory of historical institutionalism, which
sees institutions as “sticky,” reflecting past choices as opposed to cur-
rent political, social, and economic conditions (Pollack, 1996)
problematizes the controlling power of actors over institutions
(Awesti, 2007). This theory is employed here not only to explain how
poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism have contributed to the
sticky poor administrative behaviour in most sub‐Saharan Africa but
also to offer a way out of the dilemma of change in Riggs' theory.
2 | MODERNIZATION, BUREAUCRATIZA-
T I O N , A N D L O C A L CU L T U R E S
Some scholars contend that bureaucratization is necessary for mod-
ernization and development (Hyden, Court, & Mease, 2003; Parsons,
1964; World Bank, 1993). Modernization is conceptualized as the tran-
sition and positive transformation that a traditional society has to
undergo in order to become developed (Matunhu, 2011). The term
gained popularity in relation to discussions about the various transfor-
mations of social, economic, political, administrative, and industrial sys-
tems in Western Europe and North America from the 17th to the 19th
century (Eisenstadt, 1966; Tipps, 2012). Understood as such, the
claims of the modernization theory include (a) Westerners possess a
high need for rationality and achievement; (b) a traditional society's
chance of development at least partly depends on the psychological
culture of its members; and (c) contact with modern institutions pro-
duces the “modern” man (Yeh, 1989, p. 3).
A critical path to replicating this Western experience is believed to
be through proper bureaucratization itself. Parsons (1964) conceives
IKEANYIBE
societies as self‐regulated, structural–functional wholes in which the
main processes of change are social differentiation and the discovery
(or acquisition through diffusion) of certain evolutionary universals
such as bureaucratic organizations and money markets. Evans and
Rauch (1999) posit that replacing patronage systems for state officials
by a professional bureaucracy is a necessary condition for a state to
be developmental. Similarly, the World Bank (1993) observes that evi-
dence from the “miracle” era in East Asia highlights meritocratic recruit-
ment and deep bureaucratic traditions as crucial to their developmental
success. Furthermore, bureaucratization is not only perceived as impor-
tant for socio‐economic development but also conceived as the pivot of
administrative development by some scholars. For instance, Armer and
Katsillis (2001) argue that its principles increase the adaptive capacity
of a society by providing more efficient social arrangements that lead
to a system of universalistic norms. DiMaggio and Powell (1983,
p. 156) remark that “Despite the findings of organizational research,
the image of society as consisting of tightly and rationally coupled insti-
tutions persists throughout much of modern social theory. Rational
administration pushes out non‐bureaucratic forms.”
There is of course no consensus on the central role of bureaucra-
tization in administrative and organization development in the litera-
ture. However, Riggs started with the assumption that proper
bureaucratization could lead to administrative development; thus, his
postulation that the overlapping of traditional sociocultural features
with bureaucratic features inhibits administrative development in pris-
matic society. This assumption is also maintained in this essay in the
belief that acting in the public interest is the most important goal of
the bureaucratic behaviour. Bureaucrats follow rules and orders volun-
tarily as trustees of a legitimate and impersonal rational–legal order.
They cannot appropriate their positions (Rosenbloom & Kravchuk,
2002). The role, not the person, is the basic unit (Olsen, 2007).
Amtstreue, the German term used by Weber, refers to specific duty
and loyalty to the purpose of the office (Olsen, 2007). Unfortunately,
respect for bureaucratic principles such as impersonality, universality,
rule compliance, discipline, merit, and loyalty to the common state
interests are important features that are significantly lacking in most
African public administrations.
It is necessary to remark that in practice, the ideal bureaucratic
features are never realized in full. Even Weber himself had argued that
bureaucracy is an “iron cage” that affords a level of efficiency that
modern society cannot do without, but it achieves this efficiency only
at the terrible price of alienation (Adler, 2012). Gouldner (1954)
describes bureaucracy as Janus‐faced, looking two ways at once. Thus,
this paper recognizes the stand‐off between those who celebrate
bureaucracy's technical advantages and those who critique its human
consequences—embodying the enduring split between rational and
natural system views in organizational theory (Scott & Davis, 2007).
However, the concern is with the relationship between integration or
effective functionality of bureaucratic principles and the degree of
assimilation or sense of a common identity willingly shared by the pop-
ulation of a country. This assimilation or sense of common identity
affords the operators of bureaucratic institutions to more easily apply
the bureaucratic principles, such as impersonality, loyalty, and merit,
universally to the population rather than those they share some com-
munal links with.
IKEANYIBE
3 | THE PRISMATIC MODEL, HISTORICAL
I N S T I T U TI O N A L I S M , A N D A D M I N I S T R A T I V E
D E V E L O P M E NT
In his theory, Riggs used the term prismatic in referring to developing
countries rather than the popular term transitional used by Parsons
(1964) and other classical modernists. Because of space, we cannot
provide all the various reformulations Riggs has made to his prismatic
theory so as to overcome the deficiencies constantly pointed out by
critics. Suffice to say that he employed two approaches to illustrate
his theory of the prismatic society, latter fused–prismatic–diffracted
model. In the first approach, he used a metaphor borrowed from phys-
ics about how a prism refracts a beam of light to illustrate how admin-
istrative functions are differentiated in three hypothetical societal
types, namely, the traditional, the prismatic, and the diffracted socie-
ties. Administration in a traditional society is likened to a beam of light
that contains some colour components that are fused and undifferen-
tiated. Here, administrative functions are described in terms of ascrip-
tion, particularism, and functional diffusion (Riggs, 1964). In a developed
society, administrative functions are assumed to be fully refracted
having passed through the prism and manifests “achievement,” “uni-
versalism,” and “functional specificity.” In the prismatic or transitional
society, which is the focus of Riggs' theory, administrative functions
manifest a mixture of the features of the traditional and the developed
or refracted societies that translate to a depraved administrative situa-
tion characterized by features of “attainment,” “selectivism,” and “poly‐
functionalism.” The notion of prismatic is to graphically present a
situation where like light “imprismed” in the course of refraction
through the prism, administration in prismatic societies is destined to
be trapped (Okoli, 1980). Riggs' theory therefore fails to explain how
a traditional society could become a developed one. Portrays the key
features of each of Riggs' societal types depicting a disparate rather
than a linear societal progression from traditional through transitional
to the developed society as the modernization theorists would
conceive.
Riggs' second (Figure 1) approach identified what he called the
“earmarks of transition” in a prismatic society, namely, heterogeneity,
overlapping, and formalism. Heterogeneity refers to a mixture of old
and new values, norms, and institutions, which derive from the com-
bined “traditional” and modern status of prismatic societies. This
causes overlapping of the contradictory traditional and modern admin-
istrative features and consequently leads to formalism or incongruence
between the prescribed and practised. In relation to bureaucratization,
FIGURE 1 Riggs' three societal types and their features
309
Riggs (1964, p. 15) postulates that “the new formal apparatus, like the
administrative bureau … is deeply enmeshed in, and cross‐influenced
by remnants of older traditional, social, economic, religious, and politi-
cal systems.” The result is a perverted form of bureaucracy—the “sala”
bureaucratic model. The features of the sala bureaucracy (administra-
tive system of a prismatic society), which is distinct from the bureau
(administrative system of a diffracted society), are
• Poly‐communalism: Diverse religio‐ethnic groups live side by side,
yet they are not friendly to one another. High‐ranking officers in
the bureaucracy favour members of their community thereby
affecting social relations. Thus, different communities pull society
in different directions, and there is no consensus on what is to
be done.
• Poly‐normativism: There are two different sets of norms—one for
public appearance and another for use in real practice. Traditional
and modern ideas are in conflict; people subscribe to different
values and norms.
• Nepotism: Relatives (kith and kin) are given favourable treatments
in recruitments to government jobs; they enjoy privileges because
of their links to the officials.
• Bazaar–canteen model: This is the economic subsystem of pris-
matic society, where prices are not decided on the basis of
demands and supply. Bargaining is an important feature. There-
fore, prices change from one customer to the other leading to
goods being sold at lower prices to some customers.
• Authority versus control: Authority is highly centralized, whereas
control is dispersed; authority and control reside in different
administrative structures or actors (Abeyrathne, 2017).
The implication of these products of overlap on the administrative
effectiveness is that family connections lead to sinecures, people with-
out pull find themselves assigned low positions, fringe benefits
abound, corruption is institutionalized, and rule is selectively applied;
citizens have to offer bribes, and budget allocation would be based
not on the requirements of bureaus but on the power relations with
the political authorities. Some departments may have extra money;
some will lack resources to implement public policies; the formalism
and separation of authority will lead to unduly heavyweight bureau-
cracy, and so forth (Abeyrathne, 2017).
The two approaches explain administrative challenge in prismatic
societies as a problem of transition itself. However, the latter better
310
provides us with some important features arising from the structure of
transitioning societies especially in Africa that could better explain key
features that constrain bureaucratization. The features of poly‐com-
munalism and poly‐normativism provide a more fundamental causal
link between the structure of these societies and administrative
behaviour, hence my focus on them to further inquiry in this path. It
is important to note that Riggs' notion of heterogeneity, overlap, and
formalism largely underscores mixture of traditionalism (culture) and
modernity (bureaucracy). But I consider an inquiry necessary regarding
the mixture and interactions of the values of “poly‐communal” and
“poly‐normative” groups that compete in prismatic states and not just
between traditional cultures and bureaucratic features.
Critics see Riggs' model as value laden and western biased
because it emphasizes the negative characteristics of the prismatic
society (Okoli, 1980; Arora and Monroe cited in Peng, 2008). It is
described as an equilibrium model, which offers no option for change
in prismatic society. Okoli (1980) describes it as having imprismed
the public administration system. Yet it apparently depicts the prevail-
ing situation in most sub‐Saharan Africa where various efforts to
reform the public administration system have produced limited results.
Invariably, the key challenge of why some vanguard countries have
manifested persistent slowness in advancement as a result of vestiges
of traditional cultures remains unresolved. What aspect of traditional
cultures that is largely responsible for poor integration of bureaucratic
principles remains hazy.
The dilemma of explaining social change in the face of persis-
tence of old institutions (culture) or their incongruence to bureau-
cratic principles by the Riggsian theory moves us to turn to the
theory of new institutionalism for respite. New institutionalism eluci-
dates the role that institutions play in the determination of social and
political outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996). The central questions to any
institutional analysis are how do actors behave? What do institutions
do? And why do institutions persist over time or change? Traditions
and cultures are no doubt institutions, institution being defined as
the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political
economy (Hall & Taylor, 1996), a process or set of processes that
shape behaviour (Bell, 2002). The role of traditional cultural elements
as institutions can be brought to bear on the administrative behaviour
of many Africans. In other words, the relevant question to this paper
could be framed thus: which traditional cultural element persists and
influences negative administrative behaviour in prismatic society,
nay Africa despite the introduction of modern administrative features
of bureaucracy?
The historical institutionalism perspective like Riggs' prismatic the-
ory acknowledges that institutional effects can persist. But better than
Riggs' theory, it provides a “developmental” angle that can deal with
the issue of change. Historical institutionalists advance
an image of social causation that is ‘path dependent’ in
the sense that it rejects the traditional postulate that
the same operative forces will generate the same results
everywhere in favor of the view that the effect of such
forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a
given situation. (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 944)
IKEANYIBE
Thus despite the fact that “the individual is seen as an entity
deeply imbricated in a world of institutions, composed of symbols,
scripts and routines, which provide the filters for interpretation, of
both the situation and oneself, out of which a course of action is con-
structed” (Hall and Talylor, 1996, p. 943), individuals also make and
modify institutions. Two fundamental aspects of the perspective
therefore is that institutions shape sociopolitical outcomes and institu-
tions are shaped by history (Putnam, 1993). These two aspects of the
theory are described by Hall and Taylor (1996) as the “calculus
approach” and the “cultural approach.” The calculus approach views
the individual's behaviour as strategic. Hence,
Individuals seek to maximize the attainment of a set of
goals given by a specific preference function and, in
doing so, behave strategically, which is to say that they
canvass all possible options to select those conferring
maximum benefit. In general, the actor's goals or
preferences are given exogenously to the institutional
analysis. (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 944)
The implication of this is that individuals can eschew the dictates of an
institution when doing so will maximize the value of their preferences.
Compliance with institutional rules, norms, or operating procedures
might be voluntary, especially where monitoring and enforcement
mechanisms required to sustain or underpin them are weak (Bell,
2002). In this case, institution does not really constrain change because
it can “affect individual action by altering the expectations an actor has
about the actions that others are likely to take in response to or simul-
taneously with his own action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 7). The
cultural aspect of the theory explains the persistence of institutions
by noting that many of the conventions associated with social institu-
tions cannot readily be the explicit objects of individual choice. Behav-
iour is not fully strategic but bounded by an individual's worldview,
emphasizing the extent to which individuals turn to established
routines or familiar patterns of behaviour to attain their purposes
(Hall & Taylor, 1996).
In the final analysis, historical institutionalism admits change or
development, whether it is political, economic, social, or administra-
tive. This is explained as “critical junctures,” that is, moments when
substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a
“branching point” from which historical development moves onto a
new path (Cohen, 2016; Gourevitch, 1986; Hall & Taylor, 1996).
Cohen (2016) suggests two approaches through which historical insti-
tutionalism can be used to analyse the processes of institutional
change: the first relies on a path‐dependent analysis that explains
how significant institutional changes happen when historical processes
reach a critical juncture; the second approach focuses on incremental
transformative changes, which may be minor ones that adapt or
reshape an existing institution or major ones that completely revamp
the institution and are therefore transformative (Thelen, 2010). What
makes a critical juncture possible depends on a number of factors that
are found within the purview of four core features of historical institu-
tionalism profiled by Hall and Taylor (1996). These are
• Relationships between institutions and individual behaviour. Both
can influence and shape the other.
IKEANYIBE
• Asymmetries of power among individuals, groups, and so forth
associated with the operation and development of institutions; in
our context, this manifests in the asymmetrical power between
various poly‐communal groups, the African elite, and the popula-
tion at large.
• The impact of path dependencies and unintended consequences.
• The impact of other factors, such as ideas, exogenous influences
such as globalization, and history.
The antithesis to the main one pursued in this paper is that the dif-
ferences found in the integration of bureaucratic principles in various
countries of Africa may be explained within these core features. Some
countries may have clearly shown better administrative advancement
due to historical and other factors that might have aided population
assimilation. But generally, the slowness of this development relatively
applies to a good number of the countries.
4 | T R A D I T I O N A L SO C I E T A L F E A T U R E S I N
A PRISMATIC ADMINISTRATIVE SETTING
Riggs (1964) identifies ascription, particularism, and functional diffu-
sion as key features of a traditional society, which overlap with bureau-
cratic principles of achievement, functional specificity, and universalism
to give rise to attainment, selectivism, and poly‐functionalism. How-
ever, I argue that these Riggsian features cannot be the basis for distor-
tion of bureaucratization in prismatic society. First, ascription of roles
cannot be extended to every traditional society. In some parts of tradi-
tional Africa, merit and excellence were recognized in the assignment
of duties often through communal or popular choice, depending on
local cultures. War commanders were men of valour. For instance,
Okonkwor (the main character in Chinua Achebe's (1959) Things Fall
Apart) would be given difficult assignments that a warrior of his calibre
could perform and was compensated with a chieftaincy title in recogni-
tion for his achievements in the town of Umuofia. Uzoigwe (2017)
underscores the warrior credential as a merit factor in choosing a chief
in several African precolonial state systems such as the Zulu Kingdom
(South Africa), the Bunyoro Kitra and Buganda (Uganda), Oyo and the
Yoruba States, in parts of the present day Nigeria and West Africa,
and the Kikuyu (Kenya). He reveals that in most of these kingdoms, “a
chief was usually a great warrior, and his officials were appointed, in
large measure as a result of their military valour” (Uzoigwe, 2017, p.
24). Ascription does not therefore constitute a universally applicable
traditional politico‐administrative practice that could subsist to cause
bureaucratic malintegration in every transiting society.
Second, the feature of functional diffusion also cannot be so gen-
eralized. Even in the smallest social unit—the family—the role of the
father differs from that of the mother and both from those of the chil-
dren. Hence, no traditional society could exist without some level of
functional specification. Multiplication and specialization of adminis-
trative structures apparently should be in proportion to the available
tasks to be performed, and these are by and large fewer in a simple tra-
ditional social setting. In some African traditional setting, not everyone
could perform the role of the physician, and not everyone was a war-
rior, a priest, or a seer. Uzoigwe (2017, p. 23) recognizes that in
311
precolonial African states, the state and the military were relatively
fused that “the study of the warrior is, in essence, the study of the
state. But yet not everyone, strictly speaking was a warrior.” Functional
diffusion therefore bespeaks fewness of political and administrative
roles. The concept does not really contradict the principle of specializa-
tion and functional specificity. More importantly, it does not tanta-
mount to ineffectiveness of the structure and cannot therefore be
held accountable for malintegration of ideal bureaucratic principles in
a prismatic or transitional society.
On the other hand, Riggs' particularism underscores a feature that
could widely apply to every traditional society. Particularism refers to
when rules are varied to fit the person or group in contrast to universal-
ism (where rules apply equally to everyone; Riggs, 1964). When it
overlaps with universal principle of the bureaucracy, it leads
to selectivism—the situation when a norm is applied “particularistically
to discriminate against all members of a community, but
universalistically insofar as it makes no discrimination of persons within
this community” (Riggs, 1964, p. 168). The feature of particularism is
here equated with the concept of “communalism” that generally relates
to a traditional community.
The relational models theory, developed by Fiske (1992), shows
that the sense of community is the relational pivot used by humans
to structure and coordinate their social interactions in the traditional
society. Social relations are largely founded on communal sharing or
what people have in common. Fiske (1992, pp. 690–691) asserts, “peo-
ple in a CS relationship often think themselves as sharing some com-
mon substance (e.g. ‘blood’) and hence think that it is natural to be
relatively kind and altruistic to people of their own kind.” Riggs
(1959, 1964) also anchors his prismatic model on a hypothetical notion
of a simplicity–complexity matrix of social structure and functions.
Simple society refers to the traditional society that is based on natural
structures of the family and kinship, whereas the complex refers to
society where social relations are largely based on formal organiza-
tional structures or the bureau. On the basis of this simplicity–com-
plexity matrix, communalism could be universalized as a primary
societal norm of a traditional society. This conclusion derives essen-
tially from the simplicity of the social structure rooted in the natural
social organization of the family, kinship relations, and the community.
A traditional society in Africa or elsewhere manifests the centrality of
natural affiliation and filial and conjugal relationships. Little wonder
most pioneer African nationalist leaders (e.g., Kwame Nkrumah,
Leopold Sedar Senghor, and Julius Nyerere) propagated a philosophy
of African thought and political theory that were rooted on communal
bonding. Communalism accounts for mutual aid function in such soci-
ety and therefore plays some kind of institutional role in the welfare,
control of the individual's social action, and ordering of the society
(Nwala, 1980; Okeibunor, 1995) just like the bureaucracy in a complex
society. For Nwala (1980, p. 297), the
moral values of the traditional society were communal,
that is to say, moral lapses of any member of the
society became the concern of everybody. In fact, the
whole society, through its rituals, taboos, powerful
public opinion and sanctions, tried to exercise strict
control over the moral life of the community.
312 IKEANYIBE

Ofuebe 2007, p.66 posits that communalism as an African cul- describes group separateness resulting from poor assimilation in a
tural value is not a selfish acquisitive character. Using the communal state as atomistic parochialism.
possession of land in some parts of Eastern Nigeria as an example, Poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism, therefore, are aspects
he recollects that “land then was communally owned and everybody of the heterogeneity that characterize a prismatic society and African
had access to it. There was the centrality of affiliational, filial and transitional societies in particular. Riggs glossed over these features
conjugal relationships in the supply of labour. Generally, people were as mere characteristics of the sala bureaucracy while focusing on the
not abrasively acquisitive.” Communalism ensures community inter- heterogeneity between traditional cultural features and bureaucratic
est just like the bureaucracy, which emphasizes impersonality, principles (Riggs, 1964). Yet these features are more fundamental char-
achievement, universality, and other such features that target public acteristics of most African states and not just their bureaucracies. The
interest in advanced modern states. point being stressed is that some level of social blending, rationaliza-
It is perhaps necessary to remark that communalism does not tion, assimilation, organic‐ness of a state, or a sense of national com-
usually guarantee full proof control in the same way that the bureau- munity among a population of the state is necessary for proper
cracy does not eliminate dysfunctional tendencies. As ideal, the integration and functionality of bureaucratic principles. Assimilation
Weberian bureaucratic principles are never fully realized in practice here should not be understood as homogenization or a blending that
(Adler, 2012). Bureaucratic features are not constitutive of develop- precludes some degree of differences. It is in terms of patriotic dispo-
ment per se but are seen as crucial determinants of the degree to sition towards the state and belief in the superiority of the state inter-
which a country makes social and economic progress (Hyden et al., est to that of any individual or subgroup.
2003; World Bank, 1993)—or fails to do so (Blunt, 1983; Hyden,
1983). Indeed, this is where Riggs' theory is fiercely criticized
5 | POOR STATE IDENTITY AND PUBLIC
because there is a striking degree of particularism and selfish tenden-
ADMINISTRATION IN THE AFRICAN
cies in every administrative system, and every bureaucracy in
CONTEXT
practice conforms much less to the Weberian model (La Palombara,
2006). Similarly, communalism does not eliminate selfish tendencies
Most African states are poly‐communal and poly‐normative in their
of individuals in traditional social setting despite its feature of order-
sociopolitical constitution. The state remains a pseudo‐Western
ing social interactions for the benefit of all members of the commu-
facade that disguises the fact that neither politics nor state institu-
nity. The Riggsian feature of particularism like communalism works to
tions have been emancipated from society or rather societies and
maintain the interest of the in‐group. In an autonomous traditional
have therefore never been institutionalized (Chabal & Daloz, 1999;
community, it does not discriminate among the members. It does
Von Holdt, 2010). The consequence is the existence of poor state
not, therefore, contrast with the universalism principle of the bureau-
identity and integration of the population. Identity is here defined
cracy, except that where groups have not been sufficiently assimi-
in terms of the ability of a people to be united by common disposi-
lated (poly‐communal and poly‐normative), and the tendency to
tions, exhibiting continuity in what they share (White, 2012). It
discriminate against “other” groups is high. In other words, it leads
underscores the fact that some kind of mass bond is required for a
to maladjustment of the individual in a poly‐communal population
polity to be unified, strong, and able to provide public goods and that
when it endears him or her to discriminate against other groups than
only where such bond exists will the polity meet the standards of
his own.
legitimacy, coherence, and common purpose, and disposition to
Poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism, which Riggs saw as
solidarity will be forthcoming (White, 2012). Where it is lacking, it will
features of the sala bureaucracy, more fundamentally, are features
be difficult for the bureaucracy to function as a means of social
of a poorly assimilated society constituted by heterogeneous groups.
action.
For Riggs (1964, p. 160), poly‐communalism “implies the presence of
Now in the attempt to explain the source of poly‐communalism
several communities in one society not of several societies”; it is “to
and poly‐normative features of many African states, which are inci-
be distinguished from the ‘pluralism’ of a diffracted society whose
dental to the poor state identity that persists, it is important to point
power is dispersed.” Riggs describes the group differences that exist
to the whole lot of age‐long migrations in and out of the continent.
in a mobilized and assimilated society as “pluralistic”—various groups
However, the colonial enterprise, which revolutionized transition to
exist with a high degree of assimilation of the population—and that
modern states and establishment of modern bureaucratic administra-
of a mobilized but unassimilated society as “plural.” Although a
tive institutions in most African countries, was decisive in bringing
mobilized and assimilated society has formed a “national
separate autonomously developing kingdoms and communities
community,” a population that is mobilized but unassimilated is a
together as countries. Referring to the formation of states in Africa
poly‐communal or plural society (Riggs, 1959, p. 37). Riggs (1964,
through the partitioning of Africa by European countries in the
pp. 159–160) contends that when mobilization and assimilation do
19th century, Meredith (2011, pp. 1–2) remarks that Africa was
not happen at the same time in a society, “its members may form
partitioned into countries without much consideration for cultural
rival communities, each with its own sub‐elites or leaders, its own
affinity. Hence,
language, religion and way of life.” Diamant (1960) sees many of
the non‐Western polities as culturally, racially, and linguistically het- in some cases African societies were rent apart …. In all,
erogeneous as a number of autonomous communities exist within the new boundaries cut through some 190 culture
the political boundaries of the new states. La Palombara (2006) groups. In other cases, Europe's new colonial territories
IKEANYIBE
enclosed hundreds of diverse and independent groups,
with no common history, culture, language or religion.
The consequence of this as observed by Eyerman (1992, p. 38) is
that “the break with tradition and the rural community meant the break
with established identity‐giving authority.” This leads to the enthrone-
ment of ethnicity and other communal or social stereotypes and cleav-
ages, which scholars (Kendhammer, 2014; Mulinge & Lesetedi, 2002;
Opondo, 2014) acknowledge, lead to social polarization and
entrenched interest groups, politics of exclusion, and the reinforce-
ment of ethnic identity that increases the reality of conflicts. Few
examples below portray the effect of this poor state identity and
poly‐communal tendencies on public administration in some African
countries.
In Zambia, for instance, people identify themselves either as mem-
bers of one of the country's 73 tribes or as members of one of its four
principal language groups (Posner, 2015). This multigroup identity
affects the loyalty and commitment with which public officials serve
the state. Similarly, in Kenya, there exists what is referred to as a pas-
toral model of economic management, a divide and rule administrative
technique most popular during the reign of Arap Moi, in which mem-
bers of other ethnic groups were systematically purged from econom-
ically strategic positions and replaced with the predominantly pastoral,
unqualified but politically well‐connected members of Moi's Kalenjin
tribe (Mulinge & Lesetedi, 2002, p. 55).
The most common practice has been one in which an
individual mismanages a particular organization to its
bankruptcy before being transferred to mismanage
another one. This is consistent with pastoral practices in
which an area is grazed to the bare soil before moving
to another area in the hope that the grass in the
overgrazed area will regenerate naturally. The pastoral
model of economic management in Kenya has
catapulted the country into acute poverty, characterized
by rampant unemployment, declining education and
health care services, and recurring food shortages,
among others.
In this vein, poverty, unemployment, and declining public services ulti-
mately derive from poor public management practices as a result of the
use of unqualified hands because of their political and ethnic connec-
tion. Nzambi (2014) observes that in all the different regimes in Kenya,
the ruling groups have sought to use the resources of the state for the
special benefit of their own ethnic community and allies. This of course
leads to unhealthy competition for political and administrative offices
and the use of the same to dispense favours “particularlistically” rather
than universally to the entire population.
Poly‐communal and poly‐normative tendencies had also been
shown to be responsible for the persistent political conflict and war
in the Democratic Republic of Congo and their effect on poor gover-
nance of the country. The country has hundreds of ethnic groups,
which provide impetus for polarized politics of economic survival; eth-
nic, language and regional divide; socialized and insitutionalized cor-
ruption; disenfranchised population; illiteracy; unemployment; self‐
help; and war (Birungi, 2006). Apparently, the “forces publiques” of
313
the colonial times to suppress the natives are maintained by the
governing elite often using sentiments along poly‐communal divides.
Nigeria remains a typical model of illustration of sub‐Saharan
Africa on many issues. Like most of these countries, it constitutes
of various ethnic nationalities that have experienced poor assimila-
tion as a country. The country consists of about 384 ethnic national-
ities and is usually seen as an incompatibility of multidiverse ethnic
configuration (Ojo, 2014). Although the constitution has introduced
inclusive principle in appointment known as the federal character,
which requires that certain positions in government reflect the multi-
plicity of ethnic nationalities that make up the country, more often
than not, leaders deliberately ignore its application to favour their
groups, especially with regard to the so‐called strategic blue chip or
juicy institutions and positions (e.g., oil and gas, defence, power and
energy, works, and aviation). The present administration of
Muhammadu Buhari, for instance, appointed most of the Service
Chiefs and other high‐profile positions from the north and or Muslim
faithful, himself being an Islamic northerner. The head of the Army,
National Security Adviser, Defence, Air Force, Police, Director of
State Services, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nigerian
Security and Civil Defence Corps and National Immigration Service,
Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Director of the
Department of Petroleum Resources, and Independent Electoral
Commission to mention a few are appointed therefrom (Esajere,
2015) and thereby fanning the embers of the present secession agi-
tations from some ethnic nationalities. High office holders often see
their appointment as a privilege and are primarily concerned about
enriching themselves and their people (Ojie & Ewhrudjakpor, 2009).
Invariably, the federal character principle has proved inadequate for
effective state building and efficient public administration system
because of the constant recourse to poly‐communal disposition at
the expense of merit, equity, and fairness in appointments by leaders.
Among the key challenges to administrative and general develop-
ment in Nigeria, which is also discernible from other countries of sub‐
Saharan Africa, is the challenge of dual citizenship. Scholars describe
this challenge as the ethnically based citizenship in which membership
in the state political community is mediated by membership in a pro-
vincially recognized “indigenous” ethnic or racial group (Ejobowah,
2013; Kendhammer, 2014; Osaghae, 1990, 1998). Kendhammer
observes that Nigerian nationals whose ethnic ancestry is not local to
their official province or state of residence face systematic discrimina-
tion that denies them full local and state‐level (provincial) citizenship
and the political rights that come with it. “In many jurisdictions across
Nigeria, it is effectively impossible for ethnic ‘strangers to gain
‘indigene’ status in their state of residence, even if they have lived
there since birth” (sic) (Kendhammer, 2014, p. 397). The consequence
of this is that what conveys citizenship primarily is ethnic relationship
rather than the place of birth. Because citizens do not get equal status
regarding government services outside their ethnic enclaves, they
invariably consider their ethnicity as more important than the country.
Kendhammer (2014:397) discovers that
even where citizenship conflicts have not led directly to
rebellion and war, they have undermined the
consolidation of democracy by entrenching clientele and
314
neo‐patrimonial patterns of authority and reinforcing the
role of ethnic community membership in determining
access to state services and benefits.
This feature also replicates in many other African states such as
Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Mauritania,
and Uganda. Bronwen Manby (2009) avers that a great many political
crises in the aforementioned countries and elsewhere in Africa since
independence are as a result of citizenship conflicts as political leaders
seek to buttress their support among one part of their country's popu-
lation by excluding another from the right to belong to the country at
all. He further remarks that
Hundreds of thousands of people living in Africa find
themselves non‐persons in the only state they have ever
known. They cannot get their children registered at birth
or entered in school or university; they cannot access
state health services; they cannot obtain travel
documents, or employment without a work permit; and
if they leave the country they may not be able to return.
Most of all, they cannot vote, stand for office or work
for state institutions. (Manby, 2009, p. 1)
These discriminatory practices cannot in effect advance the principles
of effective bureaucratic administrative practices that are hinged on
impersonality, universality, equity, and fairness and are sure to hinder
their integration and institutionalization.
In South Africa, citizenship rights based on poly‐communal distinc-
tions take a slightly different twist but certainly have its toll on effec-
tive administration in terms of equalization and redress of
discrimination policy. In his study of the postapartheid bureaucracy
within the state hospitals and provincial health departments, Von
Holdt (2010, p. 11) observes that processes of rapid upward mobility
and Black class formation have come to constitute a core rationale of
bureaucratic functioning, one which competes with the rationale of
public service and health care delivery in numerous ways. For example,
equity indicators become more important than clinical indicators; the
first question asked of any project tends to be about its implications
for employment equity targets, rather than its implications for
improved health care. Von Holdt (2010) also identifies ambivalence
towards skills and those who have them (mostly White, who have high
levels of skill and expertise as a consequence of the policies of apart-
heid) as another key detractor to effective public administration in
South Africa. Like class formation, and very much linked to it, the
ambivalence towards skill finds a voice in ethnic nationalism and works
directly against meritocracy, ensuring that health departments and
hospitals cannot function effectively (Von Holdt, 2010, p. 14). These
cases illustrate the damaging impact of poly‐communal and poly‐nor-
mative tendencies and poor assimilation of the population on adminis-
trative practices, a situation where the Blacks continue to view the
Whites in South Africa as colonialists from within.
The cases described above could be found in any bureaucracy;
however, the degree to which they occur in most African administra-
tive systems is worsened by the divisive and antagonistic groups living
side by side with little sense of unity and common purpose. The expe-
diency of formal bureaucratic organization as the norm for social action
IKEANYIBE
in the poly‐communal and poly‐normative environment of many Afri-
can states can only be perceived as a tool for maximizing individual
and group interests as the countries remain differentiated and unas-
similated. Communal norms remain readily available for politicians
and administrators to prioritize personal and subgroup interests at
the expense of legal rational administration and the universal interest
of the country.
Apart from the effects of the poly‐communal structure of most
African states, it is vital to also mention that historically the colonial
bureaucracy laid a poor foundation for proper bureaucratization in
most African countries. Rodman (1968) observes that many African
countries inherited the idea of the public service as a privileged class,
living ostentatiously and far beyond the means of the individual offi-
cials (Rodman, 1968). Adamolekun (2006, p. 195) describes colonial
bureaucracy in virtually all colonized sub‐Saharan African countries
as imperfect imitations of the Weberian model. Loyalty of public offi-
cials was to the colonial order rather than to the local population.
Whenever expatriate commercial interests clashed with
those of the colonized people, they [colonial public
officials] were usually on the side of the expatriates. And
instances of treating the inhabitants of the colonies with
fairness and impartiality were the exceptions to the
virtual triumph of unequal and discriminatory practices.
Furthermore,
the imperfect imitations of the Weberian model include
the dilution of the merit system by the importance
attached to the racial factor: the top administrative
positions were reserved for citizens of the colonizing
powers until the immediate years preceding
independence.
In replication of this colonial experience, the indigenous political
and administrative elites have maintained selfish, individual, and group
interests when these conflict with the interest of the country at large.
Public administrations in most African countries replicate the “colonial-
ist power relationships” with the colony (Cooke, 2001). The elitist,
privileged, exploitative, and “disloyal” (in relation to the colonized peo-
ple) nature of colonial bureaucracy laid the foundation for the suste-
nance of wrong bureaucratic ideals by African potentates that
replaced colonial expatriates. Political and administrative positions
are seen as privileged positions of those who access it to the exclusion
of others, and the power that the positions afford are employed for
individual or poly‐communal interest, which conflicts with that of the
entire population. The atomistic constitution of many African states
and the low state identity among the population only heighten the ten-
dency towards ethnic and patronage politics. Patronage politics take
different forms that obviously affect effective administration such as
government actors diverting public resources for their own interest
and those of friends and family and financing of local and private
causes (Reinikka & Svensson, 2004).
Poor administrative behaviour and practices as discussed above
are not just historically and culturally influenced; indeed, persistence
is more as a result of the psychological consequences of these. Thus,
the question can be raised as to why Africa has not been able to escape
IKEANYIBE
from traditional cultural and historical influences that are inimical to
administrative practices after years of reforms and counter reforms.
The psychological framework that rather blames traditional or modern
cultural features separately advances a thesis of hybridity. It argues
that there exists a psychological maladjustment of most African public
officials as a result of hybrid effects of mixed cultures (Munene, 1991;
Seriki, Martin, & Parboteeah, 2010). Hybridization takes place in a third
space or in between and does not always conform to a binary distinc-
tion between Western and non‐Western or between the Orient and
the Occident (Bhabha, 1998; Massucco, 2009). The hybridity argument
better explains the nature of influence between traditional norms,
which I have identified as communalism and bureaucratic principles.
The hybridity effect serves as an instrument of empowerment of the
individual in the relationship with his or her transitional society
(Massucco, 2009). It endears the individual to seek uniqueness by uti-
lizing and exploring the “Western” (bureaucratic) elements in a rela-
tionship with and within larger groups and also to avoid being
alienated from his or her own traditional community and culture, thus,
making choices that also express his or her desire to be a significant
part of his or her own community. Franz Fanon's (1967) ambivalent
personality of the African helps to further illustrate this. Interpreting
Fanon on this ambivalent personality, Bhabha (1994, pp. 44–45) avers,
‘Black skin, white masks’ is not a neat division; it is a
doubling, dissembling image of being in at least two
places at once that makes it impossible for the
devalued, insatiable évolué (an abandonment neurotic,
Fanon claims) to accept the colonizer's invitation to
identity: ‘You're a doctor, a writer, a student, you're
different, you're one of us’. It is precisely in that
ambivalent use of ‘different’ – to be different from those
that are different makes you the same – that the
Unconscious speaks of the form of otherness, the
tethered showdown of deferral and displacement. It is
not the colonialist Self or the colonized Other, but the
disturbing distance in‐between that constitutes the
figure of colonial otherness – the white man's artifice
inscribed on the black man's body. It is in relation to this
impossible object that the liminal problem of colonial
identity and its vicissitudes emerges.
The damning consequence of cultural hybridity is similar to what Riggs
describes as formalism. This is the degree of discrepancy or incongru-
ence between the formally prescribed and the effectively practised,
between norms and realities. It is a product of history and mixed
cultures that have been found strategically useful to perform in a
new society where the African is not sure whether he or she belongs
to his or her traditional community or the new poly‐communal state.
Ekeh (1975, p. 92) posits that the experiences of colonialism in Africa
have led to the emergence of two publics instead of one.
At one level is the public realm in which primordial
groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine
the individual's public behavior. I shall call this the
primordial public because it is closely identified with
primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities, which
315
nevertheless impinge on the public interest …. On the
other hand, there is a public realm which is historically
associated with the colonial administration and which
has become identified with popular politics in post‐
colonial Africa. It is based on civil structures: the
military, the civil service, the police, etc.
In the midst of the influences from these parallel institutions, the
African public official is at liberty to reappropriate either of these in
the pursuit of personal or group benefits. The persistence of
communalistic instinct as the norm of group behaviour works against
the state's public interest leading to various challenges of African pub-
lic administration such as nepotism, ethnic rivalry, and the unquench-
able desire to loot public funds for selfish or group interests. The
idea of the “public” in public administration is therefore not monolithic
in most African states.
Despite the argument pursued above, some scholars, for example,
Englebert (2000, p. 10), have queried the emerging “wide variation in
economic performance and state capacity observed across Africa.”
He specifically mentioned Botswana, Mauritius, and Cape Verde as
some African countries that have shown marked difference in adminis-
trative development. On this note, it must be reiterated that the thesis
advanced here does not entirely negate the enormous variations
among African countries. In this vein, the path‐dependent feature of
historical institutionalism rejects the postulate that the same operative
forces will generate the same results everywhere; the effect of such
forces will be mediated by the contextual features (Hall & Taylor,
1996). Historical institutionalism, while agreeing to persistence of
institutions, admits the impact of other factors, which provide grounds
for advancement beyond the constraining power of institutions. It is
vital at this point to aver that in some of the countries used as typical
examples of public administration effectiveness in Africa, assimilation
of ethnic groups has been achieved at some higher degree. In
Botswana, for instance, Mulinge (2008, p. 63), reiterating the mind of
other scholars such as Holm and Molutsi (1992), posits that
Compared to most other African countries, Botswana
presents a rather unique case with respect to ethnic
relations. Like other African countries, the country
comprises multiple ethnic groups. However, unlike most
other African countries, where ethnicity has had
disintegrative tendencies by creating conditions for
competition and animosities between groups ….
Botswana was characterized by integrative ethnicity in
which ethnic groups co‐existed as equals and devoid of
arrogance on the part of any particular group.
Englebert (2000, p. 11) also observes that variations in state legit-
imacy condition the developmental capacity of states by shaping the
strategies of power of domestic elites. Leaders of historically
nonlegitimate, incongruent, or mismatched states are indeed faced
with a peculiar challenge and are limited in the options available to
them to address it. Supporting this antithesis of assimilation and inte-
grative ethnicity, Reinikka and Svensson's (2004) survey to track how
local politicians and administrators divert public resources from the
central government to intended destinations and programmes at the
316
local level in some African countries reveals that “despite similar insti-
tutions, there is still some cross‐country variation in local capture. Spe-
cifically, local capture in Tanzania, a neighboring country with lower per
capita income, is somewhat lower than in Uganda.” Among the key rea-
sons provided for this variation are history and investment in social
capital. Reinikka and Svensson (2004, p. 699) aver that
Both Uganda and Tanzania are ethnically diverse
countries, but while Tanzania has consistently pursued a
policy of nation‐building [understood as state‐building
here], Uganda has, at best, mimicked the policies of
neighboring Kenya. The politics of ethnic diversion was a
cornerstone of the regimes of Milton Obote and Idi
Amin, just as it was for the first two post independent
presidents of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Arap
Moi. Investment in social capital through nation‐building
policies can be an important explanation for the
observed difference in local capture.
As shown by these scholars, what makes a difference in the ten-
dency to divert resources by administrators are history and how a
country has invested in state building. These are of course path depen-
dent as a result of different leadership directions.
In all, the degree of assimilation in different countries cannot be
the same as some countries have achieved some greater assimilation
than others either prior to formation of new states or through the pur-
suit of more effective state‐building policies as revealed by Reinikka
and Svensson (2004) in the case of Tanzania. What is clear from the
analysis above is that some level of assimilation of the population is
necessary for bureaucratic performance and effective public adminis-
tration. This conclusion of course remains only a premise for further
inquiry, especially as regards what determines the degree of assimila-
tion and the corresponding level of variations in administrative effec-
tiveness and development.
6 | C O N CL U S I O N S
This article has investigated Riggs' concept of poly‐communalism
and poly‐normativism as structural features of prismatic societies
and how they result in poor assimilation and lack of strong common
state identity, factors considered critical to ineffective administra-
tive behaviour in most of Africa. Most African countries remain a
political collectivity of poorly blended communities and nations of
varied norms created at the critical juncture of colonialism
(Meredith, 2011). Communalism, which is identified in this paper
as a normative institution of social action in a traditional society,
subsists in great measure in the plural prismatic societies (Riggs,
1961). Administrative ineffectiveness bothering on selfish and sub-
group interests is a reality in most administrative systems, devel-
oped and developing alike. The difference and slowness in
responding to bureaucratization of some African states hinge on
the degree of assimilation and state's common identity shared by
the country's population.
Poly‐communalism and poly‐normativism engender entrenched
patrimonial and communal groups and personal interests, which work
IKEANYIBE
against the interest of the population of a state as a whole. Similar to
what critics see as equilibrium in Riggs' model is what historical institu-
tionalists also perceive as persistence of institutions and their effects
on human behaviour “to the point of creating perhaps excessively
static conception of institutionalism” (Peters, 2000, p. 13). However,
historical institutionalism explains why change and development are
possible despite the constraining influence of institutions. This helps
to explain some positive changes in administrative practices and devel-
opment believed to be taking place in some African countries
(Englebert, 2000), despite the constraining effects of poly‐communal-
ism, experiences of the colonial bureaucratic relations, and psycholog-
ical maladjustments resulting from the historical and cultural
experiences. Variations are possible because integration and assimila-
tion are not at the same level in all the states. Some countries such
as Botswana manifest some clear signs of integrative ethnicity
(Mulinge, 2008), and some like Tanzania has invested more effectively
in social capital. Hence, the extent of clash between postcolonial state
institutions and pre‐existing ones vary. “The greater the incongruence
between pre and post‐colonial institutions, the greater the relative
power payoffs to domestic elites of adopting neo‐patrimonial policies
over developmental ones” (Englebert, 2000).
A critical dilemma from the issues examined in this paper is
whether public administration in Africa should be strengthened along
poly‐communal tendencies or the integrative bureaucratization
option. Resolving this dilemma remains critical to enhancing adminis-
trative development in Africa. I am wont to believe however that
increasing social rationalization and mobilization requires recourse
to a legal‐rational order as means of social action. There is also the
fact that it would be a near impossible task to revert Africa to vari-
ous distinctive poly‐communal groups prior to colonialism in order
to improve and enhance identity consciousness along distinct com-
munal lines because increasingly new approaches to disintegrative
social stereotyping and clientelism are being advanced by the elite
to keep the population subjugated. In this vein, one can only hope
that a more progressive approach will be to continue to encourage
integrative and state‐building policies. Efforts in this direction in the
past through various authoritarian regimes have not yielded much
fruits. It is therefore suggested that a more liberal approach to state
building should continue to be explored. The issues of self‐determi-
nation and political restructuring calls in various parts of the conti-
nent should be genuinely addressed than the current autocratic
approach that arrogates an indivisible “unity” to states that are in
reality mere collectivities held together by mere force majeure of
the state. Perhaps, the time has come for many African countries
to openly address the reality of their existence as one country.
It is recommended that efforts should be directed towards effec-
tive citizenship policies and education aimed at consciously inculcating
the benefits of larger states to smaller ones to citizens and groups.
There should also be genuine political dialogue to improve assimilation
and common identity. Although some countries have operated affirma-
tive, inclusive, and equalization policies such as observed in Nigeria's
federal character principle and South Africa's equalization policy to
redress past discrimination, it is important to underscore that often
the application of these policies in themselves works against the
proper insitutionalization of bureaucratic principles by further
IKEANYIBE
strengthening poly‐communal tendencies. Although such measures
can be undertaken, it should not undermine important features of
bureaucracy such as merit and fairness and universality.
ACKNOWLEDGEMEN TS
This research was done as part of the visiting research fellowship
programme at School of Public Policy, Central European University
Hungary, generously funded by Open Society Foundation and Central
European University. An earlier draft was presented in a seminar to the
Africa Research Group of the School of Public Policy, thanks to
Dan Large.
ORCID
Okechukwu M. Ikeanyibe http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9583-7254
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How to cite this article: Ikeanyibe OM. Bureaucratization and
administrative development in Africa: A reading of Riggs'
theory of prismatic society. Public Admin Dev. 2017;37:307–
318. https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.1816