Cruel and Unusual Punishments after rehearsing various grounds of grievance, and among others, that

"excessive bail hath been required of persons committed in criminal cases, to

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 513 February 25, 1902
BENITO LEGARDA, complainant-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE GARCIA VALDEZ, defendant-appellee.
Felipe Calderon, for appellant.
Montagne and Dominguez, for appellee.
WILLARD, J.:
Article 56 of Act 136 defines the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. Under
clause 6 of this article these courts have jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in
which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding
one hundred dollars may be imposed."
It does not admit of doubt that the court has jurisdiction of an offense if it may
impose a fine of more than $100. The fact that it may under the law impose a
fine of less then $100 does not deprive it of jurisdiction of the offense
prescribed and punished by article 459 of the Penal Code. The fine there may
be no more than $31, but it may, in the discretion of the court, be $310. So if
the Code punished an offense with imprisonment for one year and a fine of
$50 the court would have jurisdiction not only to direct the imprisonment but
also to impose the fine. This would also be true if the fine were $200 and the
imprisonment three months.
The prosecution in this case is based upon article 458, which assigns a
penalty of destierro and a fine of form 625 to 6,250 pesetas. We can not,
therefore, see why it is necessary in this case to decide whether the penalty of
banishment is lighter or heavier than imprisonment for six months. Even
assuming that it is a lighter punishment the court had, as far as this point is
concerned, jurisdiction to try this case because it had power to impose a fine
of nearly $600.
It remains to be considered whether Courts of First Instance have power to
impose the penalty of banishment. We do not agree with the counsel for the
defendant in his claim that the language of article 56 of Act No. 136 prevents
Courts of First Instance from inflicting any punishment except fine or
imprisonment. Such a construction would prohibit the infliction of the death
penalty.
elude the benefit of the laws made for the liberty of the subjects; and
excessive fines have been imposed; and illegal and cruel punishment inflicted"
— it is declared that "excessive bail ought not to be required, not excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." (Stat. 1 W. & M.,
chap. 2.)"
So that, if the punishment prescribed for an offense against the laws of the
State were manifestly cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion,
breaking on the wheel or the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge
such penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition. And we think this
equally true of the Eighth Amendment, in its application to Congress.
In Wilkerson vs. Utah, 99 U.S., 130, 135, Mr. Justice Clifford, in delivering the
opinion of the court, referring to Blackstone, said: "Difficulty would attend the
effort to define with exactness the extent of the constitutional provision, which
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe
to affirm that punishments of torture, such as those mentioned by the
commentator referred to, and all others in the same line of unnecessary
cruelty, are forbidden by that Amendment to the Constitution." Punishments
are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the Constitution.
It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life."
The courts of New York held that the mode adopted in this instance might be
said to be unusual because it was new, but that it could not be assumed to be
cruel in the light of that common knowledge which has stamped certain
punishments as such. (Ex parte Kemmeler, 136 U.S., 436.)
By disposing of this claim on this ground we do not wish to be understood as
giving our assent to the proposition that the said instructions could in any
event have any bearing on this case. It is not necessary to pass upon this
question and we do not do so.
The defendant demurred to the complaint on three grounds: The first attacked
the jurisdiction of the court, the other two were directed to the sufficiency of the
complaint. The court expressly refrain from passing upon these and limited
itself to deciding that the court was without jurisdiction. These objections were
made before the defendant had pleaded to the complaint. Article 9 of General
Orders, No. 58, allows the complaint to be amended before that time in
substance or form without leave of the court. When the case is remanded the
complaining witness will have that right. Article 23 of General Orders, No. 58,
provides also that if the court below sustains a demurrer for defects in the
complaint it has the power to order a new complaint to be filed. The court may
take this course if, upon the remanding the case, the demurrer is renewed and
sustained. For these reasons we decline to consider the other points raised by
the demurrer.

The judgment of dismissal is reversed and the cause remanded with

The penalty of destierro is defined as follows by article 114:
instructions to proceed therein according to law, with costs of this instance de
oficio.
Those sentence to destierro shall be precluded from entering the place or
places designated in the sentence, or within the radius therein designated,
which shall include a distance of 25 kilometers at least, and 250 kilometers at Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Mapa, and Ladd, JJ., concur.
most, from the place designated.
Republic of the Philippines
If in this case the defendant is convicted the sentence might be such as to
enable him to live free from all restraint in any place in the Archipelago that SUPREME COURT
Manila
was more than 25 kilometers from Manila, and to return hither upon the
expiration of the penalty. Groziard (vol. 2, p. 511), in distinguishing this penalty
EN BANC
from that of confinement, says: "The punishment involved is, nevertheless,
much less than that of confinement. For the exile there is only one prohibition
G.R. No. L-5790 April 17, 1953
— that of entering the places designated in the judgment. All other parts of the
territory are free and open to his person. The criminal, sentenced to
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
confinement, is not permitted to depart from the place whither he has been
vs.
transported; the exile may go anywhere with the exception of the places
PABLO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
designated in the judgment."
Claro M. Recto for appellant.
Punishment of this character is not new, for it is found in the Fuero Juzgo (law
Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor Felixberto
12, title 5, book 6; law 13, title 5, book 6). It is not limited to the Spanish law. It
has existed in the French, Austrian, Italian, Portuguese, and other codes. It Milambiling for appellee.
can not be and is not claimed to be a cruel punishment. It is, however, claimed
BENGZON, J.:
to be a punishment unusual in the United States, and therefore prohibited in
these Islands by the instructions of the President to the Commission. Those
Having retailed a can of milk at ten centavos more than the ceiling price, Pablo
instructions use the words "cruel and unusual punishment." They were, of
de la Cruz was sentenced, after trial, in the court of first instance of Manila, to
course, taken from the Constitution of the United States and originally from the
English statute. It is to be observed that the words are "cruel and unusual." To imprisonment for five years, and to pay a fine of five thousand pesos plus
costs. He was also barred from engaging in wholesale and retail business for
be prohibited by this provision the punishment must not only be unusual but it
five years.
must also be cruel. There is no reason why unusual punishments which were
not cruel should have been prohibited. If that had been done it would have
In this appeal he argues that the trial judge erred: (a) in not holding that the
been impossible to change the punishments that existed when the Constitution
charge was fabricated; (b) in imposing a punishment wholly disproportionate to
was adopted. A law which changes a penalty so as to make it less severe
the offense and therefore unconstitutional and (c) in not invalidating Republic
would be unconstitutional if the new penalty were an unusual one. It would
prohibit the introduction in the matter of penalties of new ideas intended to Act No. 509 in so far as it prescribed excessive penalties.
ameliorate the condition of criminals. Such a construction has never been
given to this provision. Speaking of the law of New York providing for The evidence shows that in the morning of October 14, 1950, Eduardo
Bernardo, Jr. went to the defendant's store in Sampaloc, Manila, and
electrocution the Supreme Court of the United Stated said: "The provision in
purchased from him a six-ounce tin of "Carnation" milk for thirty centavos. As
reference to cruel and unusual punishments was taken from the well-known
Act of Parliament of 1688, entitled "An Act for Declaring the Rights and the purchase had been made for Ruperto Austria, who was not in good terms
with Pablo de la Cruz the matter reached the City Fiscal's office and resulted
Liberties of the Subject, and Setting the Succession of the Crown," in which,
in this criminal prosecution, because Executive Order No. 331 (issued by

Page 1 of 129
authority of Republic Act No. 509) fixed 20 centavos as the maximum price for
that kind of commodity.
The record is now before us, and from a reading thereof, we find it difficult to
accept appellants contention that the charge had no foundation in fact. The
People's case has been established beyond reasonable doubt.
And his argument based on the principles of entrapment, may not be upheld,
because he was selling to the public, i.e., to anybody who would come to his
store to buy his commodities, and no special circumstances are shown to
support the claim that he was led or induced to commit the offense.
However, appellant's extensive discussion of his two propositions about the
penalty, deserves serious consideration.
Republic Act No. 509 provides in part as follows:
SEC. 12. Imprisonment for a period of not less two months nor more than
twelve years or a fine of not less than two thousand pesos nor more than ten
thousand pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who sells any
article, goods, or commodity in excess of the maximum selling price fixed by
the president; . . . .
In addition to the penalties prescribed above, the persons, corporations,
partnerships, or associations found guilty of any violation of this Act or of any
rule or regulations issued by the president pursuant to this Act shall be barred
from the wholesome and retail business for a period of five years for a first
offense, and shall be permanently barred for the second or succeeding
offenses.
The constitution directs that "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted." The prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to
punishment which never existed in America of which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance those inflicted
at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the
wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur., supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p.
561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.
However, there are respectable authorities holding that the inhibition applies
as well to punishments that although not cruel and unusual in nature, may be
so severe as to fall within the fundamental restriction. (15 Am. Jur., p. 178.)
These authorities explain, nevertheless, that to justify a court's declaration of
conflict with the Constitution, the prison term must be so disproportionate to
the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of all reasonable men as
to what is right and proper under the circumstances (lb.). And seldom has a
sentence been declared to be cruel and unusual solely on account of its
duration (15 Am. Jur., p. 179).
Because it expressly enjoins the imposition of "excessive fines" the
Constitution might have contemplated the latter school of thought assessing
punishments not only by their character but also by their duration or extent.
And yet, having applied "excessive" to fines, and "cruel and unusual" to
punishment did it not intend to distinguish "excessive" from "cruel" or
"unusual"? And then, it has been heretofore the practice that when a court
finds the penalty to be "clearly excessive" it enforces the law but makes a
recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency (Art. 5 Revised Penal
Code). Did the Constitutional Convention intend to stop that practice? Or is
that article unconstitutional?
So far as the writer of this opinion has been able to ascertain, these questions
have not been definitely passed upon by this court,1 although in U.S. vs.
Borromeo, 23 Phil., 279 it was said that the prohibition of the Philippine Bill on
punishments refer not only to the mode but to the extent thereto.
For the purposes of this decision, we may assume, without actually holding,
that too long a prison term might clash with the Philippine Constitution.
But that brings up again two opposing theories. On one side we are told the
prohibition applies to legislation only, and not to the courts' decision imposing
penalties within the limits of the statute (15 Am. Jur., "Criminal Law" sec. 526).
On the other, authorities are not lacking to the effect that the fundamental
prohibition likewise restricts the judge's power and authority (State vs. Ross 55
Or. 450, 104 Pac. 596; State vs. Whitaker, 48 La. Am. 527, 19 So. 457). (See
also U.S. vs. Borromeo, 23 Phil., 279.)
In other words, and referring to the penalty provided in Republic Act No. 509,
under the first theory the section would violate the Constitution, if the penalty is
excessive under any and all circumstances, the minimum being entirely out of
proportion to the kind of offenses prescribed. If it is not, the imposition by the
judge of a stiff penalty — but within the limits of the section — will not be
deemed unconstitutional.2 The second theory would contrast the penalty
imposed by the court with the gravity of the particular crime or misdemeanor,
and if notable disparity results, it would apply the constitutional brake, even if
the statute would, under other circumstances, be not extreme or oppressive.
Now therefore, if we adopt the first doctrine the present issue would be: Is
imprisonment for two months or fine of two thousand pesos too excessive for a
merchant who sells goods at prices beyond the ceilings established in the
Executive Order? Obviously a negative answer must be returned, because in
overstepping the price barriers he might derive, in some instances, profits
Page 2 of 129
amounting to thousands of pesos. Therefore under that doctrine, the penalty
imposed in this case would not be susceptible of valid attack, it being within
the statutory limits.
Under the second theory the inquiry should be: Is five years and five thousand
pesos, cruel and unusual for a violation that merely netted a ten-centavo profit
to the accused? Many of us do not regard such punishment unusual and cruel,
remembering the national policy against profiteering in the matter of foodstuffs
affecting the people's health, the need of stopping speculation in such
essentials and of safeguarding public welfare in times of food scarcity or
similar stress. In our opinion the damage caused to the State is not measured
exclusively by the gains obtained by the accused, inasmuch as one violation
would mean others, and the consequential breakdown of the beneficial system
of price controls.
Some of us however are deeply moved by the plight of this modest store-
owner with a family to support, who will serve in Muntinglupa a stretch of five
years, for having attempted to earn a few extra centavos.
Fortunately there is an area of compromise, skirting the constitutional issue,
yet executing substantial justice: We may decrease the penalty, exercising
that discretion vested in the courts by the same statutory enactment.
Wherefore, reducing the imprisonment to six months and the fine to two
thousand pesos, we hereby affirm the appealed decision in all other respects.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo and Bautista
Angelo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5793 August 27, 1953
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO ESTOISTA, defendant-appellant.
Ramon Diokno and Jose W. Diokno for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan Jr. and Acting
Solicitor Antonio Consing for appellee.
TUAZON, J.:
Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for homicide through
reckless imprudence and illegal possession of firearm under one information,
the appellant was acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second,
for which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment. This appeal is from
that sentence raising factual legal and constitutional questions. The
constitutional question, set up after the submission of the briefs, has to do with
the objection that the penalty — from 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and fines
— provided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.
As to the facts. The firearms with which the appellant was charged with having
in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father, Bruno Estoista, who
held a legal permit for it. Father and son lived in the same house, a little
distance from a 27-hectare estate belonging to the family which was partly
covered with cogon grass, tall weeds and second growth trees. From a spot in
the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the house, the defendant took a shot at
a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima a laborer of the family who was setting a
trap for wild chicken and whose presence was not perceived by the accused.
The evidence is somewhat conflicting on whether the owner of the rifle was
with the accused at the time of the accidental killing.
Bruno Estoista testified that on the morning of the accident, February 10,
1949, his son told him that there were wild chickens on the plantation
"scratching palay and corn" plants and asked if he might shoot them; that
Bruno told his son to wait, got the rifle from the house or locker, handed it over
to Alberto who is a "sharp-shooter" and "shoots better," and walked about 20
meters behind the young man; that Bruno was that far from Alberto when the
latter fired and accidentally wounded their servant.
The defendant's key testimony is: "When I heard wild rooster crowing I told my
father about the said wild rooster crowing near our house and he told me to
shoot the said wild rooster, so I went to shoot it."
Bruno's testimony at the trial is in direct contradiction to his and his son's
statements at the Constabulary headquarters on the same morning of the
shooting, and sworn to by them before the justice of the peace soon after.
Bruno related on that occasion that Alberto "went to hunt for wild rooster;" that
"later on my son Alberto came to inform me that he had accidentally hit our
laborer;" Queried "who was with Alberto when he went out hunting," Bruno
replied, " He was alone."
On his part, the defendant declared on the same occasion that Diragon Dima,
after being shot, requested to be taken to his (Dima's) house; that as the
accused was able to carry the wounded man only about 50 meters, Dima
asked the defendant to call Bruno "who was in the house" — which Alberto
did. To the question who his companion was when he shot at a rooster,
Alberto said, "I was alone."
There is not the slightest ground to believe that these affidavits contained
anything but the truth, especially that part regarding Bruno's whereabouts
when the defendant used the rifle. Both affiants are very intelligent, the
affidavits were executed immediately upon their arrival at the Constabulary
headquarters, there is no hint of any undue pressure brought to bear upon
either of them, and, above all, they stood to gain nothing from the statement
that the accused was unaccompanied. In contrast, Bruno's testimony in court
was interested, given with his son's acquittal in view. And especially is the
father's veracity in court to be distrusted because by Alberto's unsolicited
admission, he had been in the habit of going out hunting in other places and
for target practices, and because by Bruno's unwitting admission, his son, who
had no gun of his own, is a sharpshooter and shoots better.
It being established that the defendant was alone when he walked to the
plantation with his father's gun, the next question that presents itself is: Does
this evidence support conviction as a matter of law?
In United States vs. Samson (16 Phil., 323), cited by defense counsel, it was
held that carrying a gun by order of the owner does not constitute illegal
possession of firearm. The facts in that case were that a shotgun and nine
cartridges which belonged to one Pablo Padilla, who had a proper permit to
possess them, were seized by the police from Samson while walking in the
town of Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija. Padilla was to use the shotgun in hunting
that day and, as he was coming along on horseback, sent Samson on ahead.
Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised Administrative
Code, in it pertinent provision is directed against any person who possesses
any firearm, ammunition therefor, etc. A point to consider in this connection is
the meaning of the word "possesses."
It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad sense as to
include "carries" and "holds." This has to be to is the manifest intent of the Act
is to be effective. The same evils, the same perils to public security, which the
Act penalizes exist whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be
its owner or a borrower. To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary
concept of the possession can have no bearing whatever. "Ownership of the
weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may tend to establish the
guilt or intention of the accused." It is remarkable that in the United States,
where the right to bear arms for defense is ensured by the federal and many
state constitutions, legislation has been very generally enacted severely
restricting the carrying of deadly weapons, and the power of state legislatures
to do so has been upheld.
In the light of these considerations, it is a mistake to point to United States vs.
Samson, supra, as authority for the appellant's plea for acquittal. The implied
holding in that case that the intention to possess is an essential element of a
violation of the Firearms Law was not intended to imply title or right to the
weapon to the exclusion of everyone else. The court did not mean only
intention to own but also intention to use. From the very nature of the subject
matter of the prohibition control or dominion of the use of the weapon by the
holder regardless of ownership is, of necessity, the essential factor.
The terms "control" and "dominion" themselves are relative terms not
susceptible of exact definition, and opinions on the degree and character of
control or dominion sufficient to constitute a violation vary. The rule laid down
by United States courts — rule which we here adopt — is that temporary,
incidental, casual or harmless possession or control of a firearm is not a
violation of a statute prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of
weapon. A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks up a
weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a moment, or to shoot at
some object." (Sanderson vs. State, 5 S.W., 138; C.J., 22)
Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or carrying of his
father's gun was not incidental, casual, temporary or harmless. Away from his
father's sight and control, he carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as
in fact he did, with fatal consequences.
Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference between the case at bar and
the Samson case. Although Samson had physical control of his employer's
shotgun and cartridges, his possession thereof was undoubtedly harmless and
innocent, as evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore them in full view of
the people he met and of the authorities. Unlike the appellant herein, Samson
carried the gun solely in obedience to its owner's order or request without any
inferable intention to use it as a weapon. It is of interest to note that even in
the United States where, as stated, the right to bear arms as a means of
defense is guaranteed, possession such as that by Samson is by the weight of
authority considered a violation of similar statutes.
Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the penalty and the
duration of imprisonment, it is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years
for possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due regard to
the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to suppress or curb. The
rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even the very security of
the Government, directly traceable in large measure to promiscuous carrying
and use of powerful weapons, justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances might appear excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is
Page 3 of 129
out of proportion to the present case in view of certain circumstances, the law
is not to be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The constitutionality of an
act of the legislature is not to be judged in the light of exceptional cases. Small
transgressors for which the heavy net was not spread are like small fishes,
bound to be caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are
advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for clemency or
reduction of the penalty. (Art. 5, Revised Penal Code; People vs. De la Cruz,
92 Phil., 906.)
The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the penalty
authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is therefore modified so as to
sentence the accused to imprisonment for five years. However, considering
the degree of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full extent
would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that copy of this decision be
furnished to the President, thru the Secretary of Justice, with the
recommendation that the imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six
months. the appellant will pay the costs of both instances.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
RESOLUTION
December 3, 1953
TUASON, J.:
The constitutionality if Republic Act No. 4, with reference to the penalty therein
provided, was carefully considered. In branding imprisonment for five years
too harsh and out of proportion in this case, we had in mind that six months
was commensurate and just for the appellant's offense, taking into
consideration his intention and the degree of his malice, rather than that it
infringes the constitutional prohibition against the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment.
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24
C.J.S., 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive, "
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community." (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a radical
measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that five years'
confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and
similar case, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to
the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that
the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested
neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was
raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of
Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial
reaction to the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some
members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for
executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment
within the prescribed range.
The sufficiency of the evidence for appellant's conviction under Republic Act
No. 4 likewise had received close attention and study. There is no need on our
part to add anything to what has been said, except to point out for clarification
that the references to defendant's previous uses of his father's gun and the
fatal consequences of his last use of it, were made simply to emphasize that
his possession of the prohibited weapon was not casual, incidental, or
harmless. His previous conduct was relevant in determining his motive and
intention, and to disprove the claim that his father followed his son so as not to
lose control of the firearm. It was far from the thought of the court to condemn
the appellant for acts with which he had not been charged or of which he had
been pronounced innocent.
The confiscation of the gun is, in our opinion, in accordance with section 1 of
the Republic Act No. 4, which reads:
SECTION 1. Section twenty-six hundred and ninety-two of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act Numbered fifty-six,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, disposition, or
possession of firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition. — Any person who
manufactures, deals in, acquires, disposes, or possesses, any firearm, parts of
firearms, or ammunition therefor, or instrument or implement used or intended
to be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition in violation of any
provision of sections eight hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and
six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment for a period of not less than a year and one day nor more
than five years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in the discretion of the
court. If the article illegally possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun, bazooka,
machine gun, submachine gun, hand grenade, bomb, artillery of any kind or
ammunition exclusively intended for such weapons, such period of
imprisonment shall not be less than five years nor more than ten years. A
conviction under this section shall carry with it the forfeiture of the prohibited
article or articles to the Philippine Government.

The possession of any instrument or implement which is directly useful in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition on the part of any person whose
business or employment does not deal with such instrument or implement
shall be prima facie proof that such article is intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
This provision does not say that firearms unlawfully possessed or carried are
to be confiscated only if they belong to the defendant, nor is such intention
deducible from the language of the act. We are inclined to, and do, believe
that, except perhaps where the lawful owner was innocent of, or without fault
in, the use of his property by another, confiscation accords with the legislative
intent.
We can foresee the objection that such legislation deprives one of his property
without due process of law. The answer to this is that ownership or possession
of firearms is not a natural right protected by the Constitution. Above the right
to own property is the inherent attribute of sovereignty — the police power of
the state to protect its citizens and to provide for the safety and good order of
society. (16 C.J.S., 539, 540.) pursuant to the exercise of police power, the
right to private property may be limited, restricted and impaired so as to
promote the general welfare, public order and safety. (Id., 611.) The power of
the legislature to prohibit the possession of deadly weapon carries with it the
power to provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of weapons unlawfully used
or allowed by the licensed owner to be used.
The motion for reconsideration is therefore denied.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo, and Labrador, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25513 March 27, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSAURO DIONISIO Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rosauro Dionisio y Cruz for and in his own behalf as defendant-
appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its
Criminal Case No. 65715, convicting appellant Rosauro Dionisio y Cruz of
violating Republic Act, No. 3063, and sentencing him to imprisonment for one
month.
The case and facts are stated in the appellant's, brief (pages 1-2) and
agreed to by the Solicitor General, in this wise:1äwphï1.ñët
ROSAURO DIONISIO, appellant herein, was charged with having
violated Republic Act No. 3063 before the Court of First Instance of Manila in
an information filed by the Assistant City Fiscal in this wise:
That on or about the 19th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, a person who is not duly authorized in any
capacity by the Games and Amusement Board to conduct a horse race, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully offer, arrange and collect bets for the
Special Daily Double Race being then conducted at the Sta. Ana Racing Club
at Makati, Rizal, and for that purpose has in possession the following, to wit:
cash money in the amount of P8.50, one Nueva Era Racing Program, dated
Aug. 19, 1962, one list of bets, one ballpen and one booklet of Daily Double
receipt (Original Record, p. 1).
On being arraigned, accused waived his right to be assisted by counsel,
and pleaded not guilty to the charge. (Id., p.5).
However, when the case was finally called for trial, accused voluntarily
waive his right to be assisted by counsel, withdrew his former plea of not guilty
and pleaded guilty to the information charging him with violation of Rep. Act
No. 3063. The Court a quo found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and,
accordingly, sentenced him "to suffer one month imprisonment." (Id., p. 18).
Having filed an appeal bond duly approved by the court a quo, his
appeal from the decision of said Court was given due course. (Id., p. 19).
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 3063 amends section 2 of R.A. 954 to
read as follows:
SEC. 2. No person shall offer, take or arrange bets on any horse race,
or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or
gamble on any horse race outside the place, enclosure, or track where the
race is held. This prohibition shall not apply to a race-track or racing club
licensed by the Games and Amusements Board to conduct horse race nor to
Page 4 of 129
the duly authorized agents of such race-truck or racing club and its duly
authorized agents are hereby authorized on the days when races are being
held in its premises to offer, take or arrange bets outside the place, enclosure
or track where the races are held, provided such bets are offered, taken or
arranged only in Rizal Province and chartered cities. The sale of such tickets
shall be made only from offices or booths and shall be recorded in the race
track before the start of the races.
Violation of the Act is sanctioned by "a fine of not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than two thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not
less than one month or more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the
Court." (R. A. 954, Sec. 1, as amended by R. A. 3063, sec. 2).
Sole issue posed by appellant is that the penalty as applied to his
offense infringes the constitutional provision that —1äwphï1.ñët
Excessive fines shall not be imposed nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted. (Art. III, Sec. 1, clause 19, of the Constitution of the Philippines).
To bolster his position, appellant argues that the provided penalty is
harsh, the true measure of the gravity of any offense being its effects, if
unchecked, upon the well-being of the people and the body politic. The
premise can be granted, without the conclusion being true or correct.
Neither fines nor imprisonment constitute in themselves cruel and
unusual punishment, for the constitutional stricture has been interpreted as
referring to penalties that are inhuman and barbarous, or shocking to the
conscience (Weems vs. U.S., 217 U. S. 349) and fines or imprisonment are
definitely not in this category.
Nor does mere severity constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In
People vs. Estoista, 93 Phil. 655, this Court ruled:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the
punishment authorized by the statute, is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual." (24 C.J.S. 1187-1188.) Expressed in other terms, it has been held
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock
the moral sense of the community." (Idem.) Having in mind the necessity for a
radical measure and the public interest at stake, we do not believe that: five
years' confinement for possessing firearms, even as applied to appellant's and
similar cases, can be said to be cruel and unusual, barbarous, or excessive to
the extent of being shocking to public conscience. It is of interest to note that
the validity on constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested
neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the appellant; it was
raised for the first time in the course of the oral argument in the Court of
Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as possible gauge of popular and judicial
reaction the duration of the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some
members of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation for
executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he deserved imprisonment
within the prescribed range.
What evils should be corrected as pernicious to the body politic, and
how correction should be done, is a matter primarily addressed to the
discretion of the legislative department, not of the courts; and the view that
unsupervised gambling is definitely detrimental to the nation and its citizens
counts with respectable support. "The hope of large or easy gain, obtained
without special effort, turns the head of the workman, and habitual gambling is
a cause of laziness and ruin." (Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No. 2110). "The
social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling
must be enforced to the limit." (Peo. vs. Gorostiza, 77 Phil. 88).
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against
appellant. So ordered.1äwphï1.ñët
Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and
Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-57601-06 July 30, 1982
LAZARO VENIEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Aniano A. Albon for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Asst. Solicitor General Reynato S.
Puno, Asst. Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Mariano
M. Martinez for respondents.
RESOLUTION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Petitioner in seeking to set aside the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting
him of six (6) counts of malversation and six (6) counts of falsification assails'
the decision as violative of due process and the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. He also contends that P.D. No. 1606, which created the
Sandiganbayan, is an ex-post facto legislation.
The petition must fail on all counts.
It is to be noted that it is the decision, not the statute, which petitioner assails
as having violated the due process and the cruel and unusual punishment
clauses of the Constitution. He claims that he was deprived of due process of
law for having been convicted without evidence of his guilt. This is belied by
the decision of the Sandiganbayan which states and analyzes the evidence
against him. Further on due process, petitioner claims that having been
convicted of malversation, he should not have been convicted anymore of
falsification. But as the Sandiganbayan states in its decision, the public funds
were already in petitioner's possession and he could have misappropriated
them without having to resort to falsification but which he did anyway. His
other claim that he was made to answer several times for a single offense is
baseless for the misappropriations and falsifications were committed by him
separately. Lastly, it is claimed that the decision imposed cruel and unusual
punishment because for the twelve (12) convictions.. he would be made to
serve ninety two (92) years of imprisonment which is "shocking to the moral
sense ... an offense to the constitution." This is nonsense. Obviously,
petitioner's counsel has forgotten the provisions of Art. 70. par. 4 of 'the
Revised Penal Code which mandates:
Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum
duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than threefold the length
of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him.
No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total
of those imposed equals the same maximum period.
As to the claim that P.D. No. 1606 is ex-post facto legisglation, Nuñez vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 50581-5,0617, says it is not so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De
Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Ericta, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-33841 October 31, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLAVIANO PUDA Y GARAPEA alias "FLAVIO PUDA", accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This case is before us for the automatic review of a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch II, sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer
the penalty of death after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder qualified by treachery and premeditation with two aggravating
circumstances. The accused-appellant was also ordered to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the sum of P6,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The original information for murder reads:têñ.£îhqwâ£
That on or about the 19th day of December, 1959, in the municipality of
Parañaque, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack and wound with a dagger one Ching Tian Un while he was sleeping,
thereby upon him two mortal wounds which directly caused his instantaneous
death.
All contrary to law, and with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit:
1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim, Ching
Tian Un, the latter not having given provocation;
2. That the crime was committed in the night time, a circumstance
deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the commission thereof;
3. That the crime was committed after an unlawful entry;and
4. That as a means to the commission of the crime a wall or window
was broken.
Page 5 of 129
At his arraignment, the appellant, with the assistance of his counsel de oficio,
Atty. Norberto Inlayo, voluntary and spontaneously pleaded guilty. In view
however of the gravity of the offense charged and because several
aggravating circumstances were alleged, the lower court required the
prosecution to submit evidence.
From the evidence submitted, the following facts were established and were
made the basis by the court a quo for its decision:têñ.£îhqwâ£
... it appears that in the early morning of December 19, 1959 defendant
Flaviano Puda climbed over the fence of the house of Luis Ching Kiat Biak
located at 557 Tomas Claudia Street, Parañaque, Rizal, then once over the
fence he clambered to the awning (media agua) of the back part of the ground
floor of the house and from there, he went up to the second story, removed the
wooden mouldings which held in place the glass plates of the transom located
over one of the windows,and then removed the glass plates thereby causing
an opening to be made; that thereafter he removed his rubber shoes and went
thru the opening and gained entrance into the bedroom of Ching Tian Un, son
of the owner of the house who was then sleeping alone in said bedroom at the
time; that after having gained entry into the bedroom, defendant stabbed twice
the sleeping Ching Tian Un with a dagger causing the death of the latter
(Confession of defendant marked exhibit H). The method of entry into the
house by the defendant as hereby outlined is corroborated by the testimony of
Purisima de Dumaual, a chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who
examined the rubber shoes used by the defendant, and who testified that she
had examined the same and had found on their soles paints Identical with the
paint of the awning where the defendant walked on in going up towards the
window of the house over which he gained entrance.
Demetrio de Leon, Chief of Police of Parañaque, Rizal, testified that in the
morning of December 19, 1959 he received a report that a Chinese boy was
killed in his bedroom at Tomas Claudio, Baclaran, Parañaque, and so he sent
Lt. Peñafiel, Sgt. Siga, and Pat. Rosendo Cruz of his office to conduct an
investigation. Pat Rosendo Cruz, one of the policemen mentioned by the Chief
of Police, testified that about 3:30 in the morning he went to the house of the
victim Ching Tian Un and found the room where he slept splattered with blood;
that all the windows of the room were closed and barred by iron grills but he
found that the glass plates of the transom over one of the windows had been
removed. According to him he found the pair of rubber shoes ( Exhibit C), the
glass plates of the transom as well as the moulding that had kept them in
place on the awning below the transom. He also found in the yard of the house
the hunting knife, Exhibit B and a handkerchief, Exhibit C; that the
handkerchief, the knife or dagger and the pair of rubber shoes which were
used allegedly by the defendant were all sent to the Bureau of Investigation for
examination.
According to the examination conducted by the chemist of the National Bureau
of Investigation, the aforementioned Purisima Dumaual, the stains which she
found in the handkerchief, Exhibit C and the dagger, Exhibit B, were human
blood.
The evidence further established that after the defendant had been arrested
and after he had made the statement, Exhibit H, he was requested to reenact
his movements and from the reenactment it was shown that defendant may
climbed over the fence and went over the awning of the house wearing the
pair of rubber shoes, Exhibit C-1; that after he had removed the mouldings
around the glass places of the transom he removed his shoes and left them on
the awning and then he entered the room.
Dr. Jesus Crisostomo of the National Bureau of Investigation who performed
the autopsy on the body of the deceased Ching Tian Un testified that he found
two stab wounds on the chest and upper abdomen of the deceased, the one
on the chest having a width of 2-1/2 cm. and a depth of 12 cm. the right
ventricle of the heart having been penetrated down to the left ventricular
chamber. The other wound was a gaping one 3.1 cm. in length and extended
down the upper abdominal cavity to a depth of 13 cm and involved the
supermedial aspect, left lobe of the liver. Dr. Crisostomo gave an opinion that
the stab wound on the chest was fatal and was the one which caused the
death of the deceased. The other testimonies established that the fingerprints
found on the window under the transom and in the room of the victim when
developed were found to be Identical to those of the defendant.
When it came to the turn of the appellant to testify, he at first stated that he
was not guilty. Later on, however, he reverted to his plea of guilty. Contrary to
his previous confession, however, the appellant testified that he gained entry
into the house of the victim at around 3:00 o'clock that morning through the
main door which was open. Thereafter, he directly proceeded upstairs to the
bedroom of the victim the door of which was also open in order to steal some
money although he did not know whose money he, was looking for. According
to the appellant, the victim who was out of the room when he entered,
immediately came and attempted to hit him three times with a piece of wood
about two feet and one and a half inches wide, but he managed to evade the
attack and instead the victim hit the window. He then stabbed the victim twice
with something that he picked up from the drawer even before the victim
attempted to hit him again. After the stabbing, the appellant ran away by
passing through the transom of the window which had no glass or shade.
(T.S.N., pp. 12-19, August 9, 1960). During the cross-examination, the
appellant testified that he found the blade which he used in stabbing the victim
inside the drawer ransacking the same to look for money and he took the
blade because he wanted it. (T.S.N., p. 21, August 9, 1960) Reminded that
when he reenacted the crime, he showed that he reached the bedroom by
passing through the transom of the window, he stated that he made that re-
enactment only because he was beaten on the left part of his face between
the left eye and the left ear. (T.S.N., p. 23, August 9, 1960).
The trial court found the version of the prosecution more credible especially
since it was supported by the accused's confession, Exhibit H, which showed
that the accused had been earlier convicted by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal for having stolen P100.00 from the father of the victim and for which
reason he was dismissed as houseboy and that because of this and of the fact
that he had not been treated well by the deceased he went to the victim's
house in the night of December 19, 1959 with the intention to kill the
deceased; that the court also found that the shoes the accused used were
stolen by him from the said house; that he really passed through the transom
of the window, removing however the said shoes before entering the room;
that once inside the room, he stabbed the deceased twice; that after stabbing
the deceased who was then sleeping, he escaped but left behind him the pair
of shoes and that he also lost on the way of the dagger he used in stabbing
the deceased.
The trial court also found the following aggravating circumstances to be
present, namely-treachery which qualified the killing to murder; evident
premeditation which was off-set by the appellant's plea of guilty; unlawful entry
and dwelling.
Thus, on November 21, 1960, the trial court found the accused guilty of
murder with two aggravating circumstances and sentenced him to the
supreme penalty of death.
Unfortunately because of negligence of some court personnel the records of
the case were not forwarded by the court a quo to this Court for automatic
review.
Eleven years after his conviction, the accused wrote a letter to this Court
inquiring about the status of his case. We inquired through a letter addressed
to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance of Pasig, Rizal, about the
veracity of the allegations of the letter of the accused and received a reply
informing us that due to the inadvertence of the then clerk in charge of criminal
cases of Branch II, the records of this case were placed in the archives
sometime in 1960 instead of being forwarded to us. Hence, it was only then
that the entire records were elevated to this Court. The accused raises the
following alleged errors:
I Similarly, in People v. Nismal, supra, we ruled: têñ.£îhqwâ£
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S PLEA OF GUILTY FOR BEING IMPROVIDENTLY GIVEN.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING AND GIVING CREDENCE
TO ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S ALLEGED CONFESSION STATEMENT (EXH.
H) FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING AND IN GIVING
FULL CREDENCE TO EVIDENCE TAKEN FROM THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ALLEGED RE-ENACTMENT WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION IN GROSS VIOLATION
OF THE ACCUSED' RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AND DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S TESTIMONY INTERPOSING QUASI-SELF
DEFENSE TENDING TO ESTABLISH HOMICIDE.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT GRANTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT FULL OPPORTUNITY TO AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE
TENDING TO ESTABLISH HOMICIDE.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY FOR
BEING VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION (1935
CONSTITUTION) AGAINST THE IMPOSITION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT.
VIII
IN ANY EVENT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD NOT BE METED WITH
THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH BY THIS HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT AS HE HAS FULLY PAID HIS DUE TO SOCIETY FOR HAVING
Page 6 of 129
SUFFERED ENOUGH IN STAYING IN DEATH ROW FOR MORE THAN
TWENTY (20) YEARS.
With respect to the first assignment of error, the accused contends that his
plea of guilty was not voluntarily and spontaneously made but was
improvidently given because neither his counsel nor the respondent judge
informed him of the consequences of his plea.
This contention has no merit. The records show that after entering his plea of
guilty, the accused withdrew the same in open court on April 25, 1960 stating
as the reason that he was not thinking at the time he made the plea.
Subsequently, however, on August 9, 1960, he reiterated his plea of guilty with
the assistance of his counsel who assured the court that the accused
understood the purpose of trial based on the plea of guilty and that they were
only proving mitigating circumstances. Thus, it is clear that aside from having
been assisted by his counsel when he reiterated his plea, the accused also
had sufficient time to think about the consequences of the same. Furthermore,
notwithstanding his plea, the lower court continued with the trial and required
the prosecution to present its evidence and also gave the defense a chance to
present its side. The contention, therefore, of the appellant that the case
should at least be remanded to the lower court for re-arraignment and further
proceedings on the ground that his plea was improvidently given cannot be
sustained.
The ruling in the case of People v. Onavia (120 SCRA 232) is applicable:
têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
... Although it did not explain to the accused the fun import of his plea of guilty,
neither did it automatically accept that plea nor did it render judgment based
exclusively thereon. It accepted evidence for the purpose of determining the
accused's guilt and the degree of his culpability to the end that such evidence
would dispel all doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects
of his plea of guilty. (People v. Daeng, 49 SCRA 222 [1973]. Where the Trial
Court received evidence on the crime, there is no improvident acceptance of a
plea of guilty. (People v. Nismal, 114 SCRA 487, 490 [1982] citing People v.
Apduhan, Jr., 24 SCRA 798 [1968]. The defense contention, therefore, that
the plea of guilty, having been improvidently accepted, the case should be
remanded to the trial court, is bereft of basis. The validity of the judgment
under review is unassailable.
xxx xxx xxx
... When, as in this case, the trial court in obedience to this Court's injunction
in Apduhan (People v. Apduhan, 24 SCRA 798) and similar cases, receives
evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused has erred in
admitting guilt, the manner in which the plea is made loses legal significance,
for the simple reason that the conviction is, as in this case, predicated not on
the plea but on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the
offense charged.
Coming to the second and third assignments of errors, the accused maintains
that the trial court erred in appreciating and giving credence to the accused's
confession and his alleged re-enactment of how he gained entry into the
house of the victim on the ground that both were executed by the accused
without the assistance of his counsel and therefore violated his right against
self-incrimination.
It should be noted that the confession and re- enactment were executed by the
accused long before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. The "Miranda-
type" protection given to the accused during a custodial investigation, cannot
be invoked by herein appellant as said right was incorporated into the Bill of
Rights only in 197,3 and has no retroactive effects. In the case of Magtoto v.
Manguera (63 SCRA 4) we have settled this issue and ruled that. têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
... a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission
of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to
counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the
effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973. Conversely, such
confession is admissible in evidence against the accused if the same had
been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented
after January l7,1973,and even if he had not been informed of his right to
counsel since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that
date.
Hence, the trial court did not err in taking into account the confession and re-
enactment of the accused as part of the evidence against the latter.
With regard to the fourth, fifth and sixth assignments of errors, the accused
contends that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery and evident
premeditation as qualifying circumstances and in not finding that the crime
committed was only homicide.
We are convinced that the crime committed was murder. Treachery and
evident premeditation were both present in the commission of the crime. The
records of the case clearly establish the fact that the accused after having
served for eleven months as a houseboy of the victim's family was dismissed
because he stole money from his employers and for which he was convicted
by the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Because of this and the fact that he was
not treated well by the deceased, he decided to seek revenge and did so in
the early morning of December 19, 1959. While everyone in the house of the
deceased was still asleep, he forcibly removed the glass from the transom of
the window of the room of the deceased after he stealthily climbed up the
same. After he succeeded in entering the room, he stabbed the deceased
twice while the latter was still asleep and thereafter, he hurriedly climbed up
the same window and made his exit through the same opening of the transom
which he had created upon his entry.
We cannot lend credence to the appellant's testimony that he gained entry into
the house through the main door which happened to be open at that time
because aside from the testimony of Luis Ching Kiat Biak the father of the
deceased that he checked the doors of the house and the rooms of his
children and found them locked from the inside, it is also highly improbable
that the main door of a house would be left open at 3:00 o'clock in the morning
while every member of the household was stiff sleeping. Lt. Ismael de Leon
also testified that he did not see any piece of wood in the bedroom of the
deceased which the accused claimed was used by the deceased when the
latter tried to hit him. There were also no signs of a struggle that may have
ensued between the deceased and the accused tending to establish the fact
that the accused was really asleep when the deceased stabbed him
From the necropsy report, it was shown that the deceased weighed 78
kilograms or around 171.6 pounds and had a height of 168 centimeters or
around 5' feet and 6 inches tall. The accused on the contrary weighs only 110
pounds and stood at 5 feet. If there was really a struggle which ensued
between the two and if the deceased really attempted to hit the accused three
times with a piece of wood, the latter could not have stabbed the deceased
twice; once on the chest and the other on the abdomen with a depth of 12 and
13 centimeters respectively and in so short a time. According to the accused,
he was in the room of the deceased at 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of
December 19, 1959 (T.S.N., p. 14, August 9, 1960) while according to
Patrolman Rosendo Cruz, he arrived at the house of the deceased at around
3:30 a.m. on the same day (T.S.N., p. 34, February 17, 1960). By that time,
the accused had already escaped through the transom of the window of the
deceased's room and was outside of the premises of the house. It is,
therefore, highly improbable that between 3:00 o'clock and 3:30 a.m., or a
span of less than 30 minutes, the accused was able to enter the room of the
deceased, evade the piece of wood which the deceased attempted to hit him
with three times, pick up a bladed instrument from the drawer and stab the
latter twice one of which caused the mortal wound and finally escape from the
premises of the house by passing through a high window. The only way he
could have accomplished all of these in less than 30 minutes is if the
deceased were asleep at that time so much so that the accused did not have
to exert extra effort to ensure his victim's death.
The trial court, therefore, correctly ruled that the crime committed was murder
qualified by treachery and that evident premeditation dwelling and unlawful
entry were also present.
The next assignment of error alleges that the death penalty is violative of the
constitutional right against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. In
the case of People v. Camano, (115 SCRA 688), we ruled that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. Citing the case of Harden v. Director
of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741, 747, we further said that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.'
The Court, however, agrees with the accused's contention that the penalty
should not be imposed on him since he has been detained and continues to
be in the death row for about 24 years now since as stated earlier, it took
eleven years after his trial and conviction before the records of this case were
discovered and transmitted to this Court for automatic review. For lack of the
needed votes, the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua. (People
v. Advincula, 96 SCRA 875; People v. Saravia, 127 SCRA 100)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty of death is reduced to reclusion perpetua and
the indemnity for the heirs of the victim increased to THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS.
In view of the long period of time during which the accused-appellant has been
in Death Row this case is referred to the Board of Pardons and Parole for a
thorough study of all aspects of the case, including the accused's conduct
while in prison, with the end in view of recommending executive clemency if
warranted by the facts.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs in the result.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Page 7 of 129
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Provincial Fiscal of
Leyte, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE AUXENCIO C. DACUYCUY, CELESTINO S. MATONDO,
SEGUNDINO A, CAVAL and CIRILO M. ZANORIA, respondents.
The Office of the Solicitor General for petitioner.
Adelino B. Sitoy for private respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
Involved in this special civil action is the unique situation, to use an
euphemistic phrase, of an alternative penal sanction of imprisonment imposed
by law but without a specification as to the term or duration thereof.
As a consequence of such legislative faux pas or oversight, the petition at bar
seeks to set aside the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Leyte,
Branch IV, dated September 8,1976, 1 penned by herein respondent judge
and granting the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction filed by herein private respondents and docketed therein as Civil
Case No. 5428, as well as his resolution of October 19, 1976 2 denying the
motions for reconsideration filed by the parties therein. Subject of said
decision were the issues on jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No.
4670, otherwise known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and
the constitutionality of Section 32 thereof.
In a complaint filed by the Chief of Police of Hindang, Leyte on April 4, 1975,
herein private respondents Celestino S. Matondo, Segundino A. Caval and
Cirilo M. Zanoria, public school officials of Leyte, were charged before the
Municipal Court of Hindang, Leyte in Criminal Case No. 555 thereof for
violation of Republic Act No. 4670. The case was set for arraignment and trial
on May 29, 1975. At the arraignment, the herein private respondents, as the
accused therein, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Immediately thereafter, they
orally moved to quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
allegedly due to the correctional nature of the penalty of imprisonment
prescribed for the offense. The motion to quash was subsequently reduced to
writing on June 13, 1975. 3 On August 21, 1975, the municipal court denied
the motion to quash for lack of merit. 4 On September 2, 1975, private
respondents filed a motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid denial order
on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction, but with the further allegation that
the facts charged do not constitute an offense considering that Section 32 of
Republic Act No. 4670 is null and void for being unconstitutional. In an
undated order received by the counsel for private respondents on October
20,1975, the motion for reconsideration was denied. 5
On October 26, 1975, private respondents filed a petitions 6 for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction before the former Court of First Instance
of Leyte, Branch VIII, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. B-622, to
restrain the Municipal Judge, Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Hindang,
Leyte from proceeding with the trial of said Criminal Case No. 555 upon the
ground that the former Municipal Court of Hindang had no jurisdiction over the
offense charged. Subsequently, an amended petition 7 alleged the additional
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense since the penal
provision, which is Section 32 of said law, is unconstitutional for the following
reasons: (1) It imposes a cruel and unusual punishment, the term of
imprisonment being unfixed and may run to reclusion perpetua; and (2) It also
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power, the duration of the
penalty of imprisonment being solely left to the discretion of the court as if the
latter were the legislative department of the Government.
On March 30, 1976, having been advised that the petition of herein private
respondents was related to Criminal Case No. 1978 for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 442 previously transferred from Branch VIII to Branch
IV of the erstwhile Court of First Instance of Leyte, Judge Fortunate B. Cuna of
the former branch transferred the said petition to the latter branch for further
proceedings and where it was subsequently docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 5428. 8 On March 15, 1976, the petitioner herein filed an opposition to the
admission of the said amended petitions 9 but respondent judge denied the
same in his resolution of April 20, 1976. 10 On August 2, 1976, herein
petitioner filed a supplementary memorandum in answer to the amended
petition. 11
On September 8, 1976, respondent judge rendered the aforecited challenged
decision holding in substance that Republic Act No. 4670 is valid and
constitutional but cases for its violation fall outside of the jurisdiction of
municipal and city courts, and remanding the case to the former Municipal
Court of Hindang, Leyte only for preliminary investigation.
As earlier stated, on September 25, 1976, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration. 12 Likewise, private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration of the lower court's decision but the same was limited only to
the portion thereof which sustains the validity of Section 32 of Republic Act
No. 4670. 13 Respondent judge denied both motions for reconsideration in a
resolution dated October 19, 1976. 14
The instant petition to review the decision of respondent judge poses the
following questions of law: (1) Whether the municipal and city courts have
jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 4670; and (2) Whether Section
32 of said Republic Act No. 4670 is constitutional.
We shall resolve said queries in inverse order, since prior determination of the
constitutionality of the assailed provision of the law involved is necessary for
the adjudication of the jurisdictional issue raised in this petition.
1. The disputed section of Republic Act No. 4670 provides:
Sec. 32. Penal Provision. — A person who shall wilfully interfere with, restrain
or coerce any teacher in the exercise of his rights guaranteed by this Act or
who shall in any other manner commit any act to defeat any of the provisions
of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one
hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment, in the
discretion of the court. (Emphasis supplied).
Two alternative and distinct penalties are consequently imposed, to wit: (a) a
fine ranging from P100.00 to P1,000.00; or (b) imprisonment. It is apparent
that the law has no prescribed period or term for the imposable penalty of
imprisonment. While a minimum and maximum amount for the penalty of fine
is specified, there is no equivalent provision for the penalty of imprisonment,
although both appear to be qualified by the phrase "in the discretion of the
court.
Private respondents contend that a judicial determination of what Congress
intended to be the duration of the penalty of imprisonment would be violative
of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power,
and that the absence of a provision on the specific term of imprisonment
constitutes that penalty into a cruel and unusual form of punishment. Hence, it
is vigorously asserted, said Section 32 is unconstitutional.
The basic principle underlying the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to
the validity of legislation is that in the enactment of legislation a constitutional
measure is thereby created. In every case where a question is raised as to the
constitutionality of an act, the court employs this doctrine in scrutinizing the
terms of the law. In a great volume of cases, the courts have enunciated the
fundamental rule that there is a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
a legislative enactment. 15
It is contended that Republic Act No. 4670 is unconstitutional on the ground
that the imposable but indefinite penalty of imprisonment provided therein
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, in defiance of the express
mandate of the Constitution. This contention is inaccurate and should be
rejected.
We note with approval the holding of respondent judge that —
The rule is established beyond question that a punishment authorized by
statute is not cruel or unusual or disproportionate to the nature of the offense
unless it is a barbarous one unknown to the law or so wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.
Based on the principle, our Supreme Court has consistently overruled
contentions of the defense that the punishment of fine or imprisonment
authorized by the statute involved is cruel and unusual. (Legarda vs. Valdez, 1
Phil. 146; U.S. vs. Pico, 18 Phil. 386; People vs. Garay, 2 ACR 149; People
vs. Estoista 93 Phil. 647; People vs. Tiu Ua. 96 Phil. 738; People vs. Dionisio,
22 SCRA 1299). The language of our Supreme Court in the first of the cases it
decided after the last world war is appropriate here:
The Constitution directs that 'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishment inflicted.' The prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and apply to
punishments which never existed in America, or which public sentiment has
regarded as cruel or obsolete (15 Am. Jur., p. 172), for instance there (sic)
inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, disemboweling, and the like (15 Am. Jur. Supra, Note 35 L.R.A. p.
561). Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.' (People
vs. de la Cruz, 92 Phil. 906). 16
The question that should be asked, further, is whether the constitutional
prohibition looks only to the form or nature of the penalty and not to the
proportion between the penalty and the crime.
The answer thereto may be gathered from the pronouncement in People vs.
Estoista, 17 where an "excessive" penalty was upheld as constitutional and
was imposed but with a recommendation for executive clemency, thus:
... If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the present case in
view of certain circumstances, the law is not to be declared unconstitutional for
this reason. The constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged
in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which the heavy net
was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be caught, and it is to meet
such a situation as this that courts are advised to make a recommendation to
the Chief Executive for clemency or reduction of the penalty...
Page 8 of 129
That the penalty is grossly disproportionate to the crime is an insufficient basis
to declare the law unconstitutional on the ground that it is cruel and unusual.
The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not
make it cruel or unusual. 18 In addition, what degree of disproportion the Court
will consider as obnoxious to the Constitution has still to await appropriate
determination in due time since, to the credit of our legislative bodies, no
decision has as yet struck down a penalty for being "cruel and unusual" or
"excessive."
We turn now to the argument of private respondents that the entire penal
provision in question should be invalidated as an 49 "undue delegation of
legislative power, the duration of penalty of imprisonment being solely left to
the discretion of the court as if the lattter were the legislative department of the
government."
Petitioner counters that the discretion granted therein by the legislature to the
courts to determine the period of imprisonment is a matter of statutory
construction and not an undue delegation of legislative power. It is contended
that the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative power is concerned
only with the delegation of power to make laws and not to interpret the same.
It is also submitted that Republic Act No. 4670 vests in the courts the
discretion, not to fix the period of imprisonment, but to choose which of the
alternative penalties shall be imposed.
Respondent judge sustained these theses of petitioner on his theory that "the
principle of separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion
as to the length of sentence or amount of fine between designated limits in
sentencing persons convicted of crime. In such instance, the exercise of
judicial discretion by the courts is not an attempt to use legislative power or to
prescribe and create a law but is an instance of the administration of justice
and the application of existing laws to the facts of particular cases." 19 What
respondent judge obviously overlooked is his own reference to penalties
"between designated limits."
In his commentary on the Constitution of the United States, Corwin wrote:
.. At least three distinct ideas have contributed to the development of the
principle that legislative power cannot be delegated. One is the doctrine of
separation of powers: Why go to the trouble of separating the three powers of
government if they can straightway remerge on their own motion? The second
is the concept of due process of laws which precludes the transfer of
regulatory functions to private persons. Lastly, there is the maxim of agency
"Delegata potestas non potest delegari." 20
An apparent exception to the general rule forbidding the delegation of
legislative authority to the courts exists in cases where discretion is conferred
upon said courts. It is clear, however, that when the courts are said to exercise
a discretion, it must be a mere legal discretion which is exercised in discerning
the course prescribed by law and which, when discerned, it is the duty of the
court to follow. 21
So it was held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the principle of
separation of powers is not violated by vesting in courts discretion as to the
length of sentence or the amount of fine between designated limits in
sentencing persons convicted of a crime. 22
In the case under consideration, the respondent judge erronneously assumed
that since the penalty of imprisonment has been provided for by the
legislature, the court is endowed with the discretion to ascertain the term or
period of imprisonment. We cannot agree with this postulate. It is not for the
courts to fix the term of imprisonment where no points of reference have been
provided by the legislature. What valid delegation presupposes and sanctions
is an exercise of discretion to fix the length of service of a term of
imprisonment which must be encompassed within specific or designated limits
provided by law, the absence of which designated limits well constitute such
exercise as an undue delegation, if not-an outright intrusion into or
assumption, of legislative power.
Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of
imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been
set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of
discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any
sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of
respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused.
Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty
essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does
violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of
legislative powers. This time, the preumption of constitutionality has to yield.
On the foregoing considerations, and by virtue of the separability clause in
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 4670, the penalty of imprisonment provided in
Section 32 thereof should be, as it is hereby, declared unconstitutional.
It follows, therefore, that a ruling on the proper interpretation of the actual term
of imprisonment, as may have been intended by Congress, would be pointless
and academic. It is, however, worth mentioning that the suggested application
of the so-called rule or principle of parallelism, whereby a fine of P1,000.00
would be equated with one year of imprisonment, does not merit judicial
acceptance. A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty,
should not and cannot be reduced or converted into a prison term; it is to be
considered as a separate and independent penalty consonant with Article 26
of the Revised Penal Code. 23 It is likewise declared a discrete principal
penalty in the graduated scales of penalties in Article 71 of said Code. There is
no rule for transmutation of the amount of a fine into a term of imprisonment.
Neither does the Code contain any provision that a fine when imposed in
conjunction with imprisonment is subordinate to the latter penalty. In sum, a
fine is as much a principal penalty as imprisonment. Neither is subordinate to
the other. 24
2. It has been the consistent rule that the criminal jurisdiction of the
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. 25
With the deletion by invalidation of the provision on imprisonment in Section
32 of Republic Act No. 4670, as earlier discussed, the imposable penalty for
violations of said law should be limited to a fine of not less than P100.00 and
not more than P1,000.00, the same to serve as the basis in determining which
court may properly exercise jurisdiction thereover. When the complaint against
private respondents was filed in 1975, the pertinent law then in force was
Republic Act No. 296, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, under which
crimes punishable by a fine of not more than P 3,000.00 fall under the original
jurisdiction of the former municipal courts. Consequently, Criminal Case No.
555 against herein private respondents falls within the original jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court of Hindang, Leyte.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of respondent judge are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 555 filed against private
respondents herein is hereby ordered to be remanded to the Municipal Trial
Court of Hindang, Leyte for trial on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 95136 October 3, 1991
RAFAEL BAYLOSIS and BENJAMIN DE VERA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. APOLONIO R. CHAVEZ, JR., RIZAL PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR
MAURO CASTRO, COL. VIRGILIO SALDAJENO, HON. FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, JR., HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS and GEN. RENATO DE VILLA,
respondents.
Romeo T. Capulong for Rafael Baylosis.
Arno V. Sanidad for Benjamin de Vera.
Efren H. Mercado for Marco Palo.
NARVASA, J.:
The constitutionality of the third paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866 is put at issue in the special action of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus at bar. That provision punishes with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, 1 any person who unlawfully manufacturers, deals in, acquires,
disposes of, or possesses any firearm, 2 "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion."
This is the second such attack against the provision. The first was launched
sometime in 1988 and eventually repelled in this Court's decision in Misolas
vs. Panga, rendered on January 30, 1990. 3 The Court in that case declined to
hold the provision unconstitutional, overruling such arguments as that —
a) the questioned paragraph is violative of the principle of
"substantive due process against arbitrary law ... because it disregards the
overwhelming weight of national as well as international laws and
jurisprudence behind the Hernandez (99 Phil 615) and Geronimo (100 Phil 90)
rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common crimes in rebellion;"
b) it has given rise to the practice of charging armed rebels or
subversives with "qualified' illegal possession of firearms instead of subversion
or rebellion ... (because) (1) the former is easier to prosecute than the latter,
and (2) the former has a higher penalty ...;"
c) it is a bill of attainder; and
d) it allows a second jeopardy.
This second challenge to the constitutionality of said third paragraph of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 relies on essentially the same
arguments as those put forth in support of the first, petitioners' insistence to
the contrary notwithstanding. Since it does not seem that the passage of time
has infused any validity into those arguments, they shall again be struck down
as specious, and the second constitutional challenge, like the first, repulsed.
Page 9 of 129
The case at bar originated from an information filed in the Regional Trial Court
at Pasig charging petitioners Rafael Baylosis and Benjamin de Vera, together
with one Marco Palo, with a violation of PD 1866, 4 committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of March, 1988 in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines ..., the above named accused, all known high
ranking officers of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and its military arm,
the New Peoples Army, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, did then and there willfully , unlawfully and feloniously
have in their possession, control and custody, in furtherance of, or incident to,
or in connection with the crimes of rebellion/subversion, the following, to wit:
A. Firearms/Ammunition
One (1) AK 47 Automatic Rifle with M22N006726 with magazine and 9 rounds.
B. Explosives
Three (3) pieces fragmentation hand grenades without first securing the
necessary license or permit thereof from a competent government authority.
Baylosis, de Vera, and Palo, filed a motion to quash the information on the
following grounds, viz.:
I. THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
BECAUSE THEY ARE FOUNDED ON AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL/REPEALED
STATUTE.
B. FOR THE SAME REASONS, THIS HONORABLE COURT IS
DEVOID OF JURISDICTION TO TRY THIS CASE.
After receiving the parties' arguments on the matter, the Trial Court denied the
motion to quash, by an extended Resolution dated April 24, 1990. A motion for
reconsideration filed by Baylosis, et al. was also denied in an Order dated July
12, 1990.
Baylosis and de Vera thereupon instituted the present action in this Court.
Here, they plead for the nullification and setting aside of the Trial Judge's
Orders of April 24, 1990 and July 12, 1990; the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
72705 or, alternatively, that the information therein be considered as charging
only simple rebellion; and that the public officials impleaded as respondents —
the Rizal Public Prosecutor, the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of National
Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the
Special Military Prosecutor — be "restrained from further initiating, filing or
prosecuting cases involving common crimes against the petitioners."
What the petitioners advocate at bottom is that a doctrine laid down by
jurisprudence or case law is superior to a statute afterwards enacted by
legislative authority; that decisions construing certain specific provisions of one
law are sufficient basis for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of a
subsequently enacted law. More specifically, they contend that the rulings in
People vs. Amado Hernandez 5 (reiterated in some ten other subsequent
rulings), Enrile vs. Salazar, 6 and Enrile vs. Amin 7 — to the effect that the
felony of rebellion defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code cannot, in
accordance with Article 48 of the same Code, be complexed with the offense
of murder, homicide, arson, or other crimes committed in connection with, or
on the occasion or in furtherance of, rebellion — render invalid, as
unconstitutional, Section 1 (3) of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended.
The petitioners further posit the unconstitutionality of the challenged provision
because "repugnant to the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which
guarantee full respect for human rights, equal protection of the laws, due
process, right to bail, protection against double jeopardy and from cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, and supremacy of civilian authority over
the military."
PD 1866 was enacted on June 29, 1983 8 by the late President Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative powers under the 1973 Constitution, with the
avowed purpose, indicated in its title, to codify "the laws on illegal/unlawful
possession, manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or disposition, of firearms,
ammunition or explosives or instruments used in the manufacture of firearms,
ammunition or explosives; and disposing stiffer penalties for certain violations
thereof and for relevant purposes." The section (numbered 1) containing the
allegedly unconstitutional provision 9 reads as follows:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession
of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess
any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
If the violation of this Section is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in
connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion, the penalty
of death shall be imposed.
The penalty reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua
shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager, director or other
responsible officer of any public or private firm, company, corporation or entity,
who shall wilfully or knowingly allow any of the firearms owned by such firm,
company, corporation or entity to be used by any person found guilty of
violating the provisions of the preceding paragraphs.
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor.
It is worthy of note that under this section —
1) simple possession of firearm without license or lawful authority (or
unlawful manufacture, dealing in, acquisition, or disposal of any firearm, part of
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition), without more, is
punished by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua — a penalty
that, to be sure, is heavier than prision mayor, which is the penalty prescribed
for rebellion or insurrection by Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code;
2) indeed, even if the firearm be licensed but is brought by the
possessor outside of his residence without authority, the penalty imposed for
the act is prision mayor, the same sanction as for rebellion;
3) the penalty is however increased to death (now reclusion
perpetua) 10 if —
a) the unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of murder or homicide, or
b) the unlicensed firearm (or part thereof, or ammunition or machinery, tool or
instrument in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition) is possessed,
dealt in, acquired, disposed of or possessed in furtherance of, or incident to, or
in connection with the crimes of rebellion, insurrection or subversion.
Equally noteworthy is that the same PD 1866, as amended, 11 also defines as
a crime punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua, the act of any person —
... who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal in, acquire, dispose or
possess hand-grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but
not limited to "philbox bombs (sic)," "molotov cocktail bomb," "firebombs," or
other incendiary devices capable of producing destructive effect on contiguous
objects or causing injury or death to any person.
In other words, the mere possession of the weapons (or the unlawful
manufacture or assembly thereof, or dealing in, acquisition or disposal thereof)
is also punished by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, a
penalty higher than that imposed for rebellion or insurrection, prision mayor,
supra.
But the even higher penalty of death (now reclusion perpetua) is imposed if
the aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices —
1) are used in the commission of any of the crimes defined in the
Revised Penal Code, and this results in the death of any person or persons; or
2) are manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired, disposed of or
possessed "in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of
rebellion, insurrection or subversion ..."
It is of no little significance that the petitioners do not condemn these other
provisions of Section 1 and 3 — defining crimes also involving possession or
manufacturing and/or use of firearms, ammunition and explosives, and
penalizing them by reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua, or
even by death — as being unconstitutionally infirm because imposing cruel or
unusual punishment, or violative of due process, or otherwise.
What they say is that "laws and jurisprudence on political crimes are intended,
and should always be interpreted, as favoring the political offender" since
"political crimes are committed by the best of patriots," a theory that, it is said,
runs counter to the Misolas decision 12 and impels re-examination of the
latter. What they condemn is the imposition of such heavy penalties on the
crime of possession, manufacture or use of firearms or explosives if committed
"in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion,
insurrection or subversion," as if by some juridic alchemy, relation to rebellion
or subversion works a transformation in the nature of the crimes in question.
The connection, in other words, as the petitioners unabashedly affirm, is that
the act of illicitly possessing or using a firearm is ennobled and mitigated by its
being connected with an attempt or a publicly asserted intention to overthrow
the Government; that killers, arsonists, terrorists should not be treated as
"common criminals," i.e., condemned and punished as the killers, arsonists or
terrorists that they are, if they commit their acts of violence and destruction in
the name of "the Revolution." This is sophistry, totally unacceptable under the
constitutional scheme of things in this country. It is a theory which has never
been and should never be sanctioned by this Court. It is a proposition that is
not in essence defensible, specially in the context of contemporary events. 13
The petitioners further theorize that Section 1 (3) of PD 1866 is invalid
because it gives the public prosecutor an option not to file a case for rebellion
and instead file as many crimes for murder, frustrated murder, etc. as might
have been perpetrated in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with
Page 10 of 129
rebellion, insurrection or subversion. The argument is not tenable. The fact is
that the Revised Penal Code treats rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct
from murder, homicide, arson, or other felonies that might conceivably be
committed in the course of a rebellion. It is the Code, therefore, in relation to
the evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the latter's whim or
caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows, for example, separate
prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the
indictment alleges that the former has been committed in furtherance of or in
connection with the latter. Surely, whether people are killed or injured in
connection with a rebellion, or not, the deaths or injuries of the victims are no
less real, and the grief of the victims' families no less poignant.
Moreover, it certainly is within the power of the legislature to determine what
acts or omissions other than those set out in the Revised Penal Code or other
existing statutes are to be condemned as separate, individual crimes and what
penalties should be attached thereto. The power is not diluted or improperly
wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an
element or ingredient of another offense, or might usually have been
connected with another crime.
The interdict laid in Hernandez, Enrile and the other cases cited is against
attempts to complex rebellion with the so called "common" crimes committed
in furtherance, or in the course, thereof; this, on the authority alone of the first
sentence of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Stated otherwise, the ratio
of said cases is that Article 48 cannot be invoked as the basis for charging and
prosecuting the complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., for the purpose of
obtaining imposition of the penalty for the more serious offense in its maximum
period (in accordance with said Art. 48). Said cases did not — indeed they
could not and were never meant to — proscribe the legislative authority from
validly enacting statutes that would define and punish, as offenses sui generis
crimes which, in the context of Hernandez, et al. may be viewed as a complex
of rebellion with other offenses. There is no constitutional prohibition against
this, and the Court never said there was. What the Court stated in said cases
about rebellion "absorbing" common crimes committed in its course or
furtherance must be viewed in light of the fact that at the time they were
decided, there were no penal provisions defining and punishing, as specific
offenses, crimes like murder, etc. committed in the course of as part of a
rebellion. This is no longer true, as far as the present case is concerned, and
there being no question that PD 1866 was a valid exercise of the former
President's legislative powers. Thus, Misolas, 14 to the effect that charging the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866 does not
charge the complex crime of subversion with illegal possession of firearms,
and hence does not run counter to Hernandez, et al., is good and correct rule
and is applicable here.
In Enrile vs. Salazar, the Court intimated that the remedy against the
perceived lightness of the penalty for rebellion was not to be sought from the
courts, but by legislation. It may not unreasonably be supposed that the
purpose of PD 1866 appears to be precisely to remedy that perceived lenity of
the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for rebellion or insurrection
and the legal impossibility, pronounced by this Court of complexing that felony
with other crimes punished by higher penalties in accordance with Article 48 of
the same Code.
It is next argued that the proviso in question is unconstitutional because if
inflicts on the convicted felon a cruel or unusual punishment, considering that
the Revised Code penalizes rebellion or subversion only by prision mayor. The
penalty fixed in said challenged section is, it is contended, flagrantly and
plainly oppressive, greatly disproportionate to the offense, and shocking to the
people's sense of justice. The result, it is further argued, is that the right to bail
is denied under PD 1866 when the act thereby punished is only an ingredient
of simple rebellion or subversion (which are bailable offenses) under the
Revised Penal Code.
It is well settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so
much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is,
or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 15 As
pointed out by a brother in the Court, a noted authority on Constitutional Law,
this Court had held (in People vs. Dionisio, 22 SCRA 1299), "that mere
severity does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Reiterating the rule
first announced in People vs. Estoista (93 Phil. 674), it declared that it takes
more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a
penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution ... to come under the ban, the
punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly oppressive' 'wholly disproportionate
to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community.'" 16
The same noted author further points out that "a penalty not normally
proportionate to the offense may be imposed in some instances without
violation of the Constitution. ... (as) for example, where the offense has
become so rampant as to require the adoption of a more effective deterrent,
like the stealing of jeeps or coconuts, which is punished by the Revised Penal
Code as qualified theft" 17 — or, it may be added, like such crimes as
assassinations, bombings and robberies, which are committed nowadays with
frightening frequency and seeming impunity with the use of high-powered
weapons, explosives or similar devices, whether in connection with or in
furtherance or pursuance of, rebellion or subversion, or not.
It bears repeating in this connection that mere possession of a firearm without
license or lawful authority, 18 without more, is punished by reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua; and that the use of an unlicensed firearm in
the commission of murder of homicide is punished by death (now reclusion
perpetua 19 ), yet there is no challenge to these penalties as being cruel or
unusual.
The petitioners next proffer the argument that the Revised Penal Code
punishes the crime of rebellion or insurrection (including the "common crimes"
of murder, homicide, arson, etc. therein absorbed) only with the penalty of
prision mayor. Comparisons, as the saying goes, are odious; and in this case,
the attempt to compare PD 1866 with the Revised Penal Code is unwarranted.
That there is a difference in penalty between the two laws does not
necessarily establish that the heavier penalty imposed by one of said laws is
excessive, disproportionate, or "cruel or unusual." For it might be argued, too,
and certainly not without more than a modicum of validity, that the penalty in
the Penal Code for rebellion may be regarded as unduly light given the
conditions now prevailing in the country. In fact, no lack of commensuration
may be pleaded if the avowed premises of PD 1866 (particularly the first,
second and fifth whereas clauses of the preamble) are taken into account, viz.:
1) there has been an upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order
and safety (including, not to say specially, offenses of rebellion or subversion)
due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms,
ammunition and explosives;
2) these criminal acts have resulted in loss of human lives damage to
property and destruction of valuable resources of the country;
3) there are some provisions in ... (the) and laws and presidential
decrees which must be updated and revised in order to more effectively deter
violators of the law on firearms, ammunition and explosives.
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous
bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be
ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts of destruction and
terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the
best efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be
true that the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer pose a
genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more effective
measures against these nefarious activities, including of course more stringent
laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid.
It is also argued that PD 1866 offends against the equal protection clause of
the Constitution in that government prosecutors may arbitrarily choose those
they want to prosecute under said law and those under Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code (or RA 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act). The argument is
unimpressive. It is not much different from saying that a suspected killer is
denied the equal protection of the laws because the prosecutor charges him
with murder, not homicide, both crimes, though essentially consisting in the
taking of human life, being punished with different penalties under separate
provisions of the penal code. As already stressed, it is the prerogative of the
legislature of the determine what acts or omissions shall be deemed criminal
offenses and what sanctions should attach to them. Certainly, the public
prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which prosecutions should be
initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal act may have
elements common to more than one offense does not rob the prosecutor of
that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge the lesser
offense although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the
more serious one. Now, if government prosecutors make arbitrary choices of
those they would prosecute under a particular law, excluding from the
indictment certain individuals against whom there is the same evidence as
those impleaded, the fault is not in the law but in the prosecutors themselves
whose duty it is to file the corresponding information or complaint against all
persons who appear to be liable for the offense involved, 20 a duty that should
be performed responsibly, without discrimination, arbitrariness or oppression.
If that duty is not performed evenhandedly, the persons aggrieved are not
without remedy. They may avail of the remedy of mandamus of compel
compliance with that duty by the prosecutors concerned. 21
The petitioners' invocation of the doctrine of double jeopardy as an argument
against the constitutionality of PD 1866 is equally futile. They maintain that a
person held liable under PD 1866 can still be made to answer subsequently
for rebellion. The argument is here disposed of by simply adverting to the
resolution of that self-same contention in Misolas:
The right against double jeopardy is a matter which the accused may raise in a
motion to quash (Sec. 3[h], Rule 117). But, precisely, petitioner's motion to
quash filed in the trial court did not raise the issue of double jeopardy because
it had not arisen. The Court cannot anticipated that the opportunity for a
second jeopardy will still arise if he is acquitted or convicted as charged under
P.D. 1866.
Moreover, even if such a subsequent or second jeopardy does arise, P.D. No.
1866 will not be rendered unconstitutional. That an accused will be exposed to
double jeopardy if he is prosecuted under another law is not a ground to nullify
that law. Double jeopardy is merely a defense that an accused may raise to
defeat a subsequent prosecution or conviction for the same offense.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Page 11 of 129
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 117472. February 7, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y
PILO, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, we rendered our decision in the instant case affirming the
conviction of the accused-appellant for the crime of raping his ten-year old
daughter. The crime having been committed sometime in April, 1994, during
which time Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, commonly known as the Death
Penalty Law, was already in effect, accused-appellant was inevitably meted
out the supreme penalty of death.
On July 9, 1996, the accused-appellant timely filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which focused on the sinister motive of the victim's
grandmother that precipitated the filing of the alleged false accusation of rape
against the accused. We find no substantial arguments on the said motion
that can disturb our verdict.
On August 6, 1996, accused-appellant discharged the defense counsel, Atty.
Julian R. Vitug, and retained the services of the Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force of the Free Legal Assistance Group of the Philippines (FLAG).
On August 23, 1996, we received the Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration prepared by the FLAG on behalf of accused-appellant. The
motion raises the following grounds for the reversal of the death sentence:
"[1] Accused-appellant should not have been prosecuted since the pardon
by the offended party and her mother before the filing of the complaint acted
as a bar to his criminal prosecution.
[2] The lack of a definite allegation of the date of the commission of the
offense in the Complaint and throughout trial prevented the accused-appellant
from preparing an adequate defense.
[3] The guilt of the accused was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
[4] The Honorable Court erred in finding that the accused-appellant was the
father or stepfather of the complainant and in affirming the sentence of death
against him on this basis.
[5] The trial court denied the accused-appellant of due process and
manifested bias in the conduct of the trial.
[6] The accused-appellant was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel and to due process, due to the incompetence of
counsel.
[7] R.A. [No.] 7659, reimposing the death penalty is unconstitutional per se:
a. For crimes where no death results from the offense, the death
penalty is a severe and excessive penalty in violation of Article III, Sec. 19 ( I )
of the 1987 Constitution.
b. The death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
Article III, Sec. 11 of the 1987 Constitution."
In sum, the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raises three (3) main
issues: (1) mixed factual and legal matters relating to the trial proceedings and
findings; (2) alleged incompetence of accused-appellant's former counsel; and
(3) purely legal question of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659.
I.
It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings
nor raised during the proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time
on appeal before the Supreme Court. Moreover, as we have stated in our
Resolution in Manila Bay Club Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[1]
"If well-recognized jurisprudence precludes raising an issue only for the first
time on appeal proper, with more reason should such issue be disallowed or
disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court."
It is to be remembered that during the proceedings of the rape case against
the accused-appellant before the sala of then presiding Judge xxx, the
defense attempted to prove that:
a) the rape case was motivated by greed, hence, a mere concoction of the
alleged victim's maternal grandmother;
b) the accused is not the real father of the complainant;
c) the size of the penis of the accused cannot have possibly penetrated the
alleged victim's private part; and
d) the accused was in xxx during the time of the alleged rape.

In his Brief before us when the rape case was elevated for automatic review,
the accused-appellant reiterated as grounds for exculpation:
a) the ill-motive of the victim's maternal grandmother in prompting her
grandchild to file the rape case;
b) the defense of denial relative to the size of his penis which could not
have caused the healed hymenal lacerations of the victim; and
c) the defense of alibi.
Thus, a second hard look at the issues raised by the new counsel of the
accused-appellant reveals that in their messianic appeal for a reversal of our
judgment of conviction, we are asked to consider for the first time, by way of a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, the following matters:
a) the affidavit of desistance written by the victim which acted as a bar to
the criminal prosecution for rape against the accused-appellant;
b) the vagueness attributed to the date of the commission of the offense in
the Complaint which deprived the accused-appellant from adequately
defending himself;
c) the failure of this Court to clearly establish the qualifying circumstance
that placed the accused-appellant within the coverage of the Death Penalty
Law;
d) the denial of due process and the manifest bias exhibited by the trial
court during the trial of the rape case.
Apparently, after a careful scrutiny of the foregoing points for reconsideration,
the only legitimate issue that We can tackle relates to the Affidavit of
Desistance which touches on the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to have
proceeded with the prosecution of the accused-appellant considering that the
issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any time, even
during appeal.[2]
It must be stressed that during the trial proceedings of the rape case against
the accused-appellant, it appeared that despite the admission made by the
victim herself in open court that she had signed an Affidavit of Desistance,
she, nevertheless, "strongly pointed out that she is not withdrawing the charge
against the accused because the latter might do the same sexual assaults to
other women."[3] Thus, this is one occasion where an affidavit of desistance
must be regarded with disfavor inasmuch as the victim, in her tender age,
manifested in court that she was pursuing the rape charges against the
accused-appellant.
We have explained in the case of People v. Gerry Ballabare,[4] that:
"As pointed out in People v. Lim (24 190 SCRA 706 [1990], which is also cited
by the accused-appellant, an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional
ground to buttress the accused's defenses, not the sole consideration that can
result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled
with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony
given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the judge."[5]
In the case at bar, all that the accused-appellant offered as defenses mainly
consisted of denial and alibi which cannot outweigh the positive identification
and convincing testimonies given by the prosecution. Hence, the affidavit of
desistance, which the victim herself intended to disregard as earlier discussed,
must have no bearing on the criminal prosecution against the accused-
appellant, particularly on the trial court's jurisdiction over the case.
II
The settled rule is that the client is bound by the negligence or mistakes of his
counsel.[6] One of the recognized exceptions to this rule is gross
incompetency in a way that the defendant is highly prejudiced and prevented,
in effect, from having his day in court to defend himself.[7]
In the instant case, we believe that the former counsel of the accused-
appellant to whom the FLAG lawyers now impute incompetency had amply
exercised the required ordinary diligence or that reasonable decree of care
and skill expected of him relative to his client's defense. As the rape case was
being tried on the merits, Atty. Vitug, from the time he was assigned to handle
the case, dutifully attended the hearings thereof. Moreover, he had
seasonably submitted the Accused-Appellant's Brief and the Motion for
Reconsideration of our June 25, 1996 Decision with extensive discussion in
support of his line of defense. There is no indication of gross incompetency
that could have resulted from a failure to present any argument or any witness
to defend his client. Neither has he acted haphazardly in the preparation of
his case against the prosecution evidence. The main reason for his failure to
exculpate his client, the accused-appellant, is the overwhelming evidence of
the prosecution. The alleged errors committed by the previous counsel as
enumerated by the new counsel could not have overturned the judgment of
conviction against the accused-appellant.
III
Although its origins seem lost in obscurity, the imposition of death as
punishment for violation of law or custom, religious or secular, is an ancient
Page 12 of 129
practice. We do know that our forefathers killed to avenge themselves and
their kin and that initially, the criminal law was used to compensate for a wrong
done to a private party or his family, not to punish in the name of the state.
The dawning of civilization brought with it both the increasing sensitization
throughout the later generations against past barbarity and the
institutionalization of state power under the rule of law. Today every man or
woman is both an individual person with inherent human rights recognized and
protected by the state and a citizen with the duty to serve the common weal
and defend and preserve society.
One of the indispensable powers of the state is the power to secure society
against threatened and actual evil. Pursuant to this, the legislative arm of
government enacts criminal laws that define and punish illegal acts that may
be committed by its own subjects, the executive agencies enforce these laws,
and the judiciary tries and sentences the criminals in accordance with these
laws.
Although penologists, throughout history, have not stopped debating on the
causes of criminal behavior and the purposes of criminal punishment, our
criminal laws have been perceived as relatively stable and functional since the
enforcement of the Revised Penal Code on January 1, 1932, this
notwithstanding occasional opposition to the death penalty provisions therein.
The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated, provided for the
death penalty in specified crimes under specific circumstances. As early as
1886, though, capital punishment had entered our legal system through the
old Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish Penal Code of
1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form of a constitutional
question of whether or not the death penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or
unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel
and unusual punishments. We unchangingly answered this question in the
negative in the cases of Harden v. Director of Prison,[8] People v. Limaco,[9]
People v. Camano,[10] People v. Puda[11] and People v. Marcos,[12] In
Harden, we ruled:
"The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S., 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
'punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in
the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life.'"[13]
Consequently, we have time and again emphasized that our courts are not the
fora for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the death sentence
where the law itself provides therefor in specific and well-defined criminal acts.
Thus we had ruled in the 1951 case of Limacothat:
"x x x there are quite a number of people who honestly believe that the
supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as
long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal
law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers
to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions,"[14]
and this we have reiterated in the 1995 case of People v. Veneracion.[15]
Under the Revised Penal Code, death is the penalty for the crimes of treason,
correspondence with the enemy during times of war, qualified piracy, parricide,
murder, infanticide, kidnapping, rape with homicide or with the use of deadly
weapon or by two or more persons resulting in insanity, robbery with homicide,
and arson resulting in death. The list of capital offenses lengthened as the
legislature responded to the emergencies of the times. In 1941,
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 616 added espionage to the list. In the 1950s,
at the height of the Huk rebellion, the government enacted Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, which carried the
death penalty for leaders of the rebellion. From 1971 to 1972, more capital
offenses were created by more laws, among them, the Anti-Hijacking Law, the
Dangerous Drugs Act, and the Anti-Carnapping Law. During martial law,
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 was enacted penalizing with death,
among others, crimes involving homicide committed with an unlicensed
firearm.
In the aftermath of the 1986 revolution that dismantled the Marcos regime and
led to the nullification of the 1973 Constitution, a Constitutional Commission
was convened following appointments thereto by Corazon Aquino who was
catapulted to power by the people.
Tasked with formulating a charter that echoes the new found freedom of a
rejuvenated people, the Constitutional Commissioners grouped themselves
into working committees among which is the Bill of Rights Committee with
Jose B. Laurel, Jr. As Chairman and Father Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as Vice-
Chairman.
On July 17, 1986, Father Bernas presented the committee draft of the
proposed bill of rights to the rest of the commission. What is now Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution was first denominated as Section 22
and was originally worded as follows:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment, or the death penalty inflicted. Death penalty already imposed
shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua."

Father Bernas explained that the foregoing provision was the result of a
consensus among the members of the Bill of Rights Committee that the death
penalty should be abolished. Having agreed to abolish the death penalty, they
proceeded to deliberate on how the abolition was to be done -- whether the
abolition should be done by the Constitution or by the legislature -- and the
majority voted for a constitutional abolition of the death penalty. Father
Bernas explained:
"x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not on whether the death
penalty should be abolished or not, but rather on whether the abolition should
be done by the Constitution -- in which case it cannot be restored by the
legislature -- or left to the legislature. The majority voted for the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty. And the reason is that capital punishment is
inhuman for the convict and his family who are traumatized by the waiting,
even if it is never carried out. There is no evidence that the death penalty
deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should not be destroyed just in the hope
that other lives might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of another
man is just too presumptuous for any man. The fact that the death penalty as
an institution has been there from time immemorial should not deter us from
reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than an institution intended precisely
to serve human life. So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which
were presented in support of the constitutional abolition of the death
penalty".[16]
The original wording of Article III, Section 19 (1), however, did not survive the
debate that it instigated. Commissioner Napoleon G. Rama first pointed out
that "never in our history has there been a higher incidence of crime" and that
"criminality was at its zenith during the last decade".[17] Ultimately, the dissent
defined itself to an unwillingness to absolutely excise the death penalty from
our legal system and leave society helpless in the face of a future upsurge of
crimes or other similar emergencies. As Commissioner Rustico F. de los
Reyes, Jr. suggested, "although we abolish the death penalty in the
Constitution, we should afford some amount of flexibility to future
legislation,"[18] and his concern was amplified by the interpellatory remarks of
Commissioner Lugum L. Commissioner and now Associate Justice Florenz
Regalado, Commissioner Crispino M. de Castro, Commissioner Ambrosio B.
Padilla, Commissioner Christian Monsod, Commissioner Francisco A.
Rodrigo, and Commissioner Ricardo Romulo. Commissioner Padilla put it
succinctly in the following exchange with Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani:
"BISHOP BACANI. x x x At present, they explicitly make it clear that the
church has never condemned the right of the state to inflict capital
punishment.
MR. PADILLA. x x x So it is granted that the state is not deprived of the right
even from a moral standpoint of imposing or prescribing capital punishment.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes. What I am saying is that from the Catholic point of
view, that right of the state is not forbidden.
MR. PADILLA. In fact x x x we have to accept that the state has the
delegated authority from the Creator to impose the death penalty under certain
circumstances.
BISHOP BACANI. The state has the delegation from God for it to do what is
needed for the sake of the common good, but the issue at stake is whether or
not under the present circumstances that will be for the common good.
MR. PADILLA. But the delegated power of the state cannot be denied.
BISHOP BACANI. Yes, the state can be delegated by God at a particular
stage in history, but it is not clear whether or not that delegation is forever
under all circumstances
MR. PADILLA. So this matter should be left to the legislature to determine,
under certain specified conditions or circumstances, whether the retention of
the death penalty or its abolition would be for the common good. I do not
believe this Commission can a priori, and as was remarked within a few days
or even a month, determine a positive provision in the Constitution that would
prohibit even the legislature to prescribe the death penalty for the most
heinous crimes, the most grievous offenses attended by many qualifying and
aggravating circumstances."[19]
What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the beleaguered
provision. The move to add the phrase, "unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the national assembly provides for the death
penalty," came from Commissioners Monsod, Jose E. Suarez and de los
Reyes. Commissioner Rodrigo, however, expressed reservations even as
regards the proposed amendment. He said:
"x x x [T]he issue here is whether or not we should provide this matter in the
Constitution or leave it to the discretion of our legislature. Arguments pro and
con have been given x x x. But my stand is, we should leave this to the
discretion of the legislature.
The proposed amendment is halfhearted. It is awkward because we will, in
effect, repeal by our Constitution a piece of legislation and after repealing this
piece of legislation, tell the legislature that we have repealed the law and that
the legislature can go ahead and enact it again. I think this is not worthy of a
constitutional body like ours. If we will leave the matter of the death penalty to
the legislature, let us leave it completely to the discretion of the legislature, but
Page 13 of 129
let us not have this half-baked provision. We have many provisions in the
Revised Penal Code imposing the death penalty. We will now revoke or
repeal these pieces of legislation by means of the Constitution, but at the
same time say that it is up to the legislature to impose this again.
x x x The temper and condition of the times change x x x and so we, I think we
should leave this matter to the legislature to enact statutes depending on the
changing needs of the times. Let us entrust this completely to the legislature
composed of representatives elected by the people.
I do not say that we are not competent. But we have to admit the fact that we
are not elected by the people and if we are going to entrust this to the
legislature, let us not be half-baked nor half-hearted about it. Let us entrust it
to the legislature 100 percent."[20]
Nonetheless, the proposed amendment was approved with twenty-three (23)
commissioners voting in favor of the amendment and twelve (12) voting
against it, followed by more revisions, hence the present wording of Article III,
Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution in the following tenor:
"Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides
for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua."
The implications of the foregoing provision on the effectivity of the death
penalty provisions in the Revised Penal Code and certain special criminal laws
and the state of the scale of penalties thereunder, were tremendous.
The immediate problem pertained to the applicable penalty for what used to be
capital crimes. In People v. Gavarra,[21] we stated that "in view of the
abolition of the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, the penalty that may be imposed for murder isreclusion temporal
in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua"[22] thereby eliminating death as
the original maximum period. The constitutional abolition of the death penalty,
it seemed, limited the penalty for murder to only the remaining periods, to wit,
the minimum and the medium, which we then, in People v. Masangkay,[23]
People v. Atencio[24] and People v. Intino[25] divided into three new periods,
to wit, the lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the
upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as the medium; and reclusion
perpetua as the maximum, in keeping with the three-grade scheme under the
Revised Penal Code. In People v. Munoz,[26] however, we reconsidered
these aforecited cases and after extended discussion, we concluded that the
doctrine announced therein did not reflect the intention of the framers. The
crux of the issue was whether or not Article III, Section 19 (1) absolutely
abolished the death penalty, for if it did, then, the aforementioned new three-
grade penalty should replace the old one where the death penalty constituted
the maximum period. But if no total abolition can be read from said
constitutional provision and the death penalty is only suspended, it cannot as
yet be negated by the institution of a new three-grade penalty premised on the
total inexistence of the death penalty in our statute books. We thus ruled in
Munoz:
"The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished
the death penalty and thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining
periods, to wit, the minimum and the medium. These should now be divided
into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade scheme intended by the
legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19 (1) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it
toreclusion perpetua, also correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties.
These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really
nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.
The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter
provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
The language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough".[27]
Nothing is more defining of the true content of Article III, Section 19 (1) of the
1987 Constitution than the form in which the legislature took the initiative in re-
imposing the death penalty.
The Senate never doubted its power as vested in it by the constitution, to
enact legislation re-imposing the death penalty for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Senate
proceeded to a two-step process consisting of: first, the decision, as a matter
of policy, to re-impose the death penalty or not; and second, the vote to pass
on the third reading the bill re-imposing the death penalty for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes.
On February 15, 1993, after a fierce and fiery exchange of arguments for and
against capital punishment, the Members of the Senate voted on the policy
issue of death penalty. The vote was explained, thus:
"SUSPENSION OF THE RULES
Upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the Body
suspended the Rules of the Senate.
Thereafter, upon motion of Senator Romulo, there being no objection, the
Chair directed that a nominal voting be conducted on the policy issue of death
penalty.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Asked by Senator Tolentino on how the Members of the Senate would vote on
this policy question, Senator Romulo stated that a vote of Yes would mean a
vote in favor of death as a penalty to be reincorporated in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code, and a vote of No would be a
vote against the reincorporation of death penalty in the scale of penalties in
the Revised Penal Code.
INQUIRY OF SENATOR ALVAREZ
xxx
The Chair explained that it was agreed upon that the Body would first decide
the question whether or not death penalty should be reimposed, and
thereafter, a seven-man committee would be formed to draft the compromise
bill in accordance with the result of the voting. If the Body decides in favor of
the death penalty, the Chair said that the committee would specify the crimes
on which death penalty would be imposed. It affirmed that a vote of Yes in the
nominal voting would mean a vote in favor of death penalty on at least one
crime, and that certain refinements on how the penalty would be imposed
would be left to the discretion of the seven-man committee.
xxx
INQUIRY OF SENATOR TAADA
In reply to Senator Taada's query, the Chair affirmed that even if a senator
would vote 'yes' on the basic policy issue, he could still vote 'no' on the
imposition of the death penalty on a particular crime.
REMARKS OF SENATOR TOLENTINO
Senator Tolentino observed that the Body would be voting on the basic policy
issue of whether or not the death penalty would be included in the scale of
penalties found in Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, so that if it is voted
down, the Body would discontinue discussing Senate Bill No. 891 pursuant to
the Rules, but if approved, a special committee, as agreed upon in the caucus,
is going to be appointed and whatever course it will take will depend upon the
mandate given to it by the Body later on.
The Chair affirmed Senator Tolentino's observations.
REMARKS OF SENATOR ROCO
Senator Roco stated that the Body would vote whether or not death as a
penalty will be reincorporated in the scale of penalties provided by the Revised
Penal Code. However, he pointed out that if the Body decides in favor of
death penalty, the Body would still have to address two issues: 1) Is the crime
for which the death penalty is supposed to be imposed heinous pursuant to
the constitutional mandate? 2) And, if so, is there a compelling reason to
impose the death penalty for it? The death penalty, he stressed, cannot be
imposed simply because the crime is heinous."[28]
With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative votes and no
abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate has voted to re-incorporate
death as a penalty in the scale of penalties as provided in the Revised Penal
Code. A nine-person committee was subsequently created to draft the
compromise bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the committee was to
retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the committee would be the
determination of the crimes to be considered heinous.
On March 17, 1993, Senator Arturo Tolentino, Chairman of the Special
Committee on the Death Penalty, delivered his Sponsorship Speech. He
began with an explanation as to why the Senate Bill No. 891 re-imposes the
death penalty by amending the Revised Penal Code and other special penal
laws and includes provisions that do not define or punish crimes but serve
purposes allied to the reimposition of the death penalty. Senator Tolentino
stated:
x x x [W]hen the Senate approved the policy of reimposing the death penalty
on heinous crimes and delegated to the Special Committee the work of
drafting a bill, a compromise bill that would be the subject for future
deliberations of this Body, the Committee had to consider that the death
penalty was imposed originally in the Revised Penal Code.
So, when the Constitution was approved in order to do away with the death
penalty, unless Congress should, for compelling reasons reimpose that
penalty on heinous crimes, it was obvious that it was the Revised Penal Code
that was affected by that provision of the Constitution. The death penalty, as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, would be considered as having been
repealed -- all provisions on the death penalty would be considered as having
been repealed by the Constitution, until Congress should, for compelling
reasons, reimpose such penalty on heinous crimes. Therefore, it was not only
one article but many articles of the Revised Penal Code that were actually
affected by the Constitution.
Page 14 of 129
And it is in consideration of this consequence of the constitutional provision
that our Special Committee had to consider the Revised Penal Code itself in
making this compromise bill or text of the bill. That is why, in the proposed
draft now under consideration which we are sponsoring, the specific provisions
of the Revised Penal Code are actually either reenacted or amended or both.
Because by the effect of the Constitution, some provisions were totally
repealed, and they had to be reenacted so that the provisions could be
retained. And some of them had to be amended because the Committee
thought that amendments were proper."[29]
In response to a query by Senator Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as to whether or
not it would have been better if the Senate were to enact a special law which
merely defined and imposed the death penalty for heinous crimes, Senator
Tolentino explicated, thus:
"x x x [T]hat may be a way presenting the bill. But we must bear in mind that
the death penalty is imposed in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the Revised
Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution provides that where the
death penalty has already been imposed but not yet carried out, then the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, restoring the death penalty for some crimes that may be
considered as heinous. That is why the bill is in this form amending the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Of course, if some people want to present a special bill . . . the whole trouble
is, when a special bill is presented and we want to punish in the special bill the
case of murder, for instance, we will have to reproduce the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on murder in order to define the crime for which the
death penalty shall be imposed. Or if we want to impose the death penalty in
the case of kidnapping which is punished in the Revised Penal Code, we will
do the same -- merely reproduce. Why will we do that? So we just followed
the simpler method of keeping the definition of the crime as the same and
merely adding some aggravating circumstances and reimposing the death
penalty in these offenses originally punished in the Revised Penal Code."[30]
From March 17, 1993, when the death penalty bill was presented for
discussion until August 16, 1993, the Members of the Senate debated on its
provisions.
The stiffest opposition thereto was bannered by Senator Lina who kept
prodding the sponsors of the bill to state the compelling reason for each and
every crime for which the supreme penalty of death was sought. Zeroing in on
the statement in the preamble of the death penalty bill that the same is
warranted in the face of "the alarming upsurge of [heinous] crimes", Senator
Lina demanded for solid statistics showing that in the case of each and every
crime in the death penalty bill, there was a significantly higher incidence of
each crime after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2, 1987
when the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the majority of the Filipino people,
than before such ratification.[31]Inasmuch as the re-impositionists could not
satisfy the abolitionists with sufficient statistical data for the latter to accept the
alarming upsurge of heinous crimes as a compelling reason justifying the
reimposition of the death penalty, Senator Lina concluded that there were, in
fact, no compelling reasons therefor. In the alternative, Senator Lina argued
that the compelling reason required by the constitution was that "the State has
done everything in its command so that it can be justified to use an inhuman
punishment called death penalty".[32] The problem, Senator Lina emphasized,
was that even the re-impositionists admit that there were still numerous
reforms in the criminal justice system that may and must be put in place, and
so clearly, the recourse to the enactment of a death penalty bill was not in the
nature of a last resort, hence, unconstitutional in the absence of compelling
reasons. As an initial reaction to Senator Lina's contentions, Senator
Tolentino explained that the statement in the preamble is a general one and
refers to all the crimes covered by the bill and not to specific crimes. He
added that one crime may not have the same degree of increase in incidence
as the other crimes and that the public demand to impose the death penalty is
enough compelling reason.[33]
Equally fit to the task was Senator Wigberto Taada to whom the battle lines
were clearly drawn. He put to issue two things: first, the definition of "heinous
crimes" as provided for in the death penalty bill; and second, the statement of
compelling reasons for each and every capital crime. His interpellation of
Senator Tolentino clearly showed his objections to the bill:
"Senator Taada. x x x But what would make crimes heinous, Mr. President?
Are crimes heinous by their nature or elements as they are described in the bill
or are crimes heinous because they are punished by death, as bribery and
malversation are proposed to be punished in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. They are heinous by their nature, Mr. President, but that is
not supposed to be the exclusive criterion. The nature of the offense is the
most important element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we
should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to have a
complete idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these offenses by
themselves connected with the effect upon society and the government have
made them fall under the classification of heinous crimes. The compelling
reason for imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of malversation
and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as indicated in the substitute bill
itself, then there is a compelling reason for the death penalty.

Senator Taada. With respect to the compelling reasons, Mr. President, does
the Gentleman believe that these compelling reasons, which would call for the
reimposition of the death penalty, should be separately, distinctly and clearly
stated for each crime so that it will be very clear to one and all that not only are
these crimes heinous but also one can see the compelling reasons for the
reimposition of the death penalty therefor?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that matter was actually considered by the
Committee. But the decision of the Committee was to avoid stating the
compelling reason for each and every offense that is included in the substitute
measure. That is why in the preamble, general statements were made to
show these compelling reasons. And that, we believe, included in the bill,
when converted into law, would be sufficient notice as to what were
considered compelling reasons by the Congress, in providing the death
penalty for these different offenses.
If a matter like this is questioned before the Supreme Court, I would suppose
that with the preamble already in general terms, the Supreme Court would feel
that it was the sense of Congress that this preamble would be applicable to
each and every offense described or punishable in the measure.
So we felt that it was not necessary to repeat these compelling reasons for
each and every offense.
Senator Taada. Mr. President, I am thinking about the constitutional
limitations upon the power of Congress to enact criminal legislation, especially
the provisions on the Bill of Rights, particularly the one which says that no
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of
law.
Can we not say that under this provision, it is required that the compelling
reasons be so stated in the bill so that the bill, when it becomes a law, will
clearly define the acts and the omissions punished as crimes?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I believe that in itself, as substantive law,
this is sufficient. The question of whether there is due process will more or
less be a matter of procedure in the compliance with the requirements of the
Constitution with respect to due process itself which is a separate matter from
the substantive law as to the definition and penalty for crimes.
Senator Taada. Under the Constitution, Mr. President, it appears that the
reimposition of the death penalty is subject to three conditions and these are:
1. Congress should so provide such reimposition of the death penalty;
2. There are compelling reasons; and
3. These involve heinous crimes.
Under these provision of the Constitution, paragraph 1, Section 13, does the
distinguished Gentleman not feel that Congress is bound to state clearly the
compelling reasons for the reimposition of the death penalty for each crime, as
well as the elements that make each of the crimes heinous included in the bill?
Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, that is a matter of opinion already. I believe
that whether we state the compelling reasons or not, whether we state why a
certain offense is heinous, is not very important. If the question is raised in the
Supreme Court, it is not what we say in the bill that will be controlling but what
the Supreme Court will fell as a sufficient compelling reason or as to the
heinous nature whether the crime is heinous or not. The accused can
certainly raise the matter of constitutionality but it will not go into the matter of
due process. It will go into the very power of Congress to enact a bill imposing
the death penalty. So that would be entirely separate from the matter of due
process." [34]
Senator Francisco Tatad, on his part, pointed out that the death penalty bill
violated our international commitment in support of the worldwide abolition of
capital punishment, the Philippines being a signatory to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its Second Optional Protocol.
Senator Ernesto Herrera clarified, however, that in the United Nations, subject
matters are submitted to the different committees which vote on them for
consideration in the plenary session. He stressed that unless approved in the
plenary session, a declaration would have no binding effect on signatory
countries. In this respect, the Philippines cannot be deemed irrevocably
bound by said covenant and protocol considering that these agreements have
reached only the committee level.[35]
After the protracted debate, the Members of the Senate voted on Senate Bill
No. 891 on third reading. With seventeen (17) affirmative votes, four (4)
negative votes, and one abstention, the death penalty bill was approved on
third reading on August 16, 1993.
The Senate's vote to pass Senate Bill No. 891 on third reading on August 16,
1993 was a vindication of, the House of Representatives. The House had, in
the Eight Congress, earlier approved on third reading House Bill No. 295 on
the restoration of the death penalty for certain heinous crimes. The House
was in effect rebuffed by the Senate when the Senate killed House Bill No.
295 along with other bills coming from the House. House Bill No. 295 was
resurrected during the Ninth Congress in the form of House Bill No. 62 which
was introduced by twenty one (21) Members of the House of Representatives
on October 27, 1992. House Bill No. 62 was a merger of House Bill Nos. 125,
Page 15 of 129
187, 411, 764, 506, 781, 955, 1565, 1586, 2206, 3238, 3576 and 3632
authored by various Members of the Lower House.
In his Sponsorship Speech, Representative Manuel R. Sanchez of Rizal ably
essayed the constitutional vesting in Congress of the power to re-impose the
death penalty for compelling reasons invoking heinous crimes as well as the
nature of this constitutional pre-requisite to the exercise of such power.
"Mr. Speaker, in Article III, Section 19(1) of Constitution reads, a I quote:
'Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress shall thereafter provide for it . . .'
The phrase 'unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress shall thereafter provide for it was introduced as an amendment by
then Comm. Christian Monsod.
The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this amendment, the death
penalty was not completely abolished by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it
merely suspended the death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to
review it at the propitious time.
Arguing for the inclusion of said amendment in the fine provision, Comm.
Ricardo Romulo said, and I quote:
"'The people should have the final say on the subject, because, at some future
time, the people might want to restore death penalty through initiative and
referendum.
Commissioner Monsod further argued, and I quote:
We cannot presume to have the wisdom of the ages. Therefore, it is entirely
possible in the future that circumstances may arise which we should not
preclude today.
xxx xxx
xxx
I believe that [there] are enough compelling reasons that merit the reimposition
of the capital punishment. The violent manner and the viciousness in which
crimes are now committed with alarming regularity, show very clearly a patent
disregard of the law and a mockery of public peace and order.
In the public gallery section today are the relatives of the victims of heinous
crimes the Hultmans, the Maguans, the Vizcondes, the Castanoses, and many
more, and they are all crying for justice. We ought to listen to them because
their lives, their hopes, their dreams, their future have fallen asunder by the
cruel and vicious criminality of a few who put their selfish interest above that of
society.
Heinous crime is an act or series of acts which, by the flagrantly violent
manner in which the same was committed or by the reason of its inherent
viciousness, shows a patent disregard and mockery of the law, public peace
and order, or public morals. It is an offense whose essential and inherent
viciousness and atrocity are repugnant and outrageous to a civilized society
and hence, shock the moral self of a people.
Of late, we are witness to such kind of barbaric crimes.
The Vizconde massacre that took the lives of a mother and her two lovely
daughters, will stand in the people's memory for many long years as the
epitome of viciousness and atrocity that are repugnant to civilized society.
The senseless murder of Eldon Maguan, and up-and-coming young business
executive, was and still is an outrage that shocks the moral self of our people.
The mind-boggling death of Maureen Hultmann, a comely 16 year-old high
school student who dreamt of becoming a commercial model someday, at the
hands of a crazed man was so repulsive, so brutal that it offends the
sensibilities of Christians and non-Christians alike
The cold-blooded double murder of Cochise Bernabe and Beebom Castanos,
the lovely and promising couple from the University of the Philippines, is
eternally lodged in the recesses of our minds and still makes our stomach turn
in utter disgust.
xxx xxx
xxx
The seriousness of the situation is such that if no radical action is taken by this
body in restoring death penalty as a positive response to the overwhelming
clamor of the people, then, as Professor Esteban Bautista of the Philippine
Law Center said, and I quote:
'When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to
impose upon criminal offenders the punishment they deserve, there are sown
the seeds of anarchy of self-help, of vigilante justice and lynch law. The
people will take the law upon their hands and exact vengeance in the nature of
personal vendetta.'
It is for this reason, Mr. Speaker, that I stand here and support House Bill No.
62.
As duly elected Representatives of our people, collectively, we ought to listen
to our constituents and heed their plea a plea for life, liberty and pursuit of their
happiness under a regime of justice and democracy, and without threat that
their loves ones will be kidnapped, raped or butchered.
But if such a misfortune befalls them, there is the law they could rely on for
justice. A law that will exact retribution for the victims. A law that will deter
future animalistic behavior of the criminal who take their selfish interest over
and above that of society. A law that will deal a deathblow upon all heinous
crimes.
Mr. Speaker, my distinguished colleagues, for the preservation of all that we
hold dear and sacred, let us restore the death penalty."[36]
A studious comparison of the legislative proceedings in the Senate and in the
House of Representatives reveals that, while both Chambers were not wanting
of oppositors to the death penalty, the Lower House seemed less quarrelsome
about the form of the death penalty bill as a special law specifying certain
heinous crimes without regard to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
and more unified in the perception of what crimes are heinous and that the fact
of their very heinousness involves the compulsion and the imperative to
suppress, if not completely eradicate, their occurrence. Be it the foregoing
general statement of Representative Sanchez or the following details of the
nature of the heinous crimes enumerated in House Bill No. 62 by
Representative Miguel L. Romero of Negros Oriental, there was clearly,
among the hundred or so re-impositionists in the Lower House, no doubt as to
their cause:
"My friends, this bill provides for the imposition of the death penalty not only
for the importation, manufacture and sale of dangerous drugs, but also for
other heinous crimes such as reason; parricide; murder; kidnapping; robbery;
rape as defined by the Revised Penal Code with or without additionally defined
circumstances; plunder, as defined in R.A. 7080; piracy, as defined under
Section 2 of PD 532; carnapping, as defined in Section 2 of RA 6539, when
the owner, driver or occupant is killed; hijacking, as defined in xxx RA 6235;
and arson resulting in the death of any occupants.
All these crimes have a common denominator which qualifies them to the level
of heinous crimes. A heinous crime is one which, by reason of its inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity or perversity, is repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards of decency and morality in a just and
civilized society.
For instance, the crime of treason is defined as a breach of allegiance to a
government, committed by a person who owes allegiance to it (U.S. v. Abad 1
Phil. 437). By the 'allegiance' is meant the obligation of fidelity and obedience
which individuals owe to the government under which they live or to their
sovereign in return for the protection which they receive (52 Am Jur 797).
In kidnapping, the though alone of one's loved one being held against his or
her own will in some unidentified xxx house by a group of scoundrels who are
strangers is enough terrify and send shivers of fear through the spine of any
person, even scoundrels themselves.
In robbery accompanied by rape, intentional mutilation or arson, what is being
punished by death is the fact that the perpetrator, at the time of the
commission of the crime, thinks nothing of the other crime he commits and
sees it merely as a form of self-amusement. When a homicide is committed
by reason of the robbery, the culprits are perceived as willing to take human
life in exchange for money or other personal property.
In the crime of rape, not only do we speak of the pain and agony of the
parents over the personal shock and suffering of their child but the stigma of
the traumatic and degrading incident which has shattered the victim's life and
permanently destroyed her reputation, not to mention the ordeal of having to
undergo the shameful experience of police interrogation and court hearings.
Piracy, which is merely a higher form of robbery, is punished for the universal
hostility of the perpetrators against their victims who are passengers and
complement of the vessel, and because of the fact that, in the high seas, no
one may be expected to be able to come to the rescue of the helpless victims.
For the same reason, Mr. Speaker, the crime of air piracy is punished due to
the evil motive of the hijackers in making unreasonable demands upon the
sovereignty of an entire nation or nations, coupled with the attendant
circumstance of subjecting the passengers to terrorism." [37]
The debate on House Bill No. 62 lasted from October 27, 1992 to February 11,
1993. On February 11, 1993, the Members of the House of Representatives
overwhelmingly approved the death penalty bill on second reading.
On February 23, 1993, after explaining their votes, the Members of the House
of Representatives cast their vote on House Bill No. 62 when it was up for
consideration on third reading. [38] The results were 123 votes in favor, 26
votes against, and 2 abstentions
After the approval on third reading of House Bill No. 62 on February 23, 1993
and of Senate Bill No. 891 on August 16, 1993, the Bicameral Conference
Committee convened to incorporate and consolidate them.
Page 16 of 129
On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, entitled, "An Act to
Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending for that
Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws,
and for Other Purposes," took effect.[39]
Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took effect, and the
present time, criminal offenders have been prosecuted under said law, and
one of them, herein accused-appellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted
out the supreme penalty of death for raping his ten-year old daughter. Upon
his conviction, his case was elevated to us on automatic review. On June 25,
1996, we affirmed his conviction and the death sentence.
Now, accused-appellant comes to us in the heels of this court's affirmation of
his death sentence and raises for the first time the issue of the constitutionality
of R.A. 7659. His thesis is two-fold: (1) that the death penalty law is
unconstitutional per se for having been enacted in the absence of compelling
reasons therefor; and (2) that the death penalty for rape is a cruel, excessive
and inhuman punishment in violation of the constitutional proscription against
punishment of such nature.
We reject accused-appellant's proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with accused-
appellant's view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659 without complying with
the twin requirements of compelling reasons and heinous crimes.
At this juncture, the detailed events leading to the enactment of R.A. No. 7659
as unfurled in the beginning of this disquisition, necessarily provide the context
for the following analysis.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution plainly vests in Congress the
power to re-impose the death penalty "for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes". This power is not subsumed in the plenary legislative power
of Congress, for it is subject to a clear showing of "compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes."
The constitutional exercise of this limited power to re-impose the death penalty
entails (1) that Congress define or describe what is meant by heinous crimes;
(2) that Congress specify and penalize by death, only crimes that qualify as
heinous in accordance with the definition or description set in the death
penalty bill and/or designate crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
in which latter case, death can only be imposed upon the attendance of
circumstances duly proven in court that characterize the crime to be heinous in
accordance with the definition or description set in the death penalty bill; and
(3) that Congress, in enacting this death penalty bill be singularly motivated by
"compelling reasons involving heinous crimes."
In the second whereas clause of the preamble of R.A. No. 7659, we find the
definition or description of heinous crimes. Said clause provides that
"x x x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or
manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
just, civilized and ordered society."
Justice Santiago Kapunan, in his dissenting opinion in People v. Alicando, [40]
traced the etymological root of the word "heinous" to the Early Spartans' word,
"haineus", meaning, hateful and abominable, which, in turn, was from the
Greek prefix "haton", denoting acts so hatefully or shockingly evil.
We find the foregoing definition or description to be a sufficient criterion of
what is to be considered a heinous crime. This criterion is deliberately
undetailed as to the circumstances of the victim, the accused, place, time, the
manner of commission of crime, its proximate consequences and effects on
the victim as well as on society, to afford the sentencing authority sufficient
leeway to exercise his discretion in imposing the appropriate penalty in cases
where R.A. No. 7659 imposes not a mandatory penalty of death but the more
flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
During the debates on the proposed death penalty bill, Senators Lina and
Taada grilled the sponsors of the bill as regards what they perceived as a
mere enumeration of capital crimes without a specification of the elements that
make them heinous. They were oblivious to the fact that there were two types
of crimes in the death penalty bill: first, there were crimes penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death; and second, there were crimes penalized by
mandatory capital punishment upon the attendance of certain specified
qualifying circumstances.
Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by reclusion perpetua
to death:
(1) Treason (Sec. 2);
(2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
(3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
(4) Murder (Sec. 6);
(5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
(6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if attended by any of the
following four circumstances: (a) the victim was detained for more than three
days; (b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c) serious physical
injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made; and (d) if
the victim is a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer (Sec. 8);
(7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional mutilation (Sec. 9);
(8) Destructive arson if what is burned is (a) one or more buildings or
edifice; (b) a building where people usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane
for public use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public utilities; (e) a
building for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence Or a crime; (f) an
arsenal, fireworks factory, or government museum; and (g) a storehouse or
factory of explosive materials located in an inhabited place; or regardless of
what is burned, if the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec. 10);
(9) Rape attended by any of the following circumstances: (a) the rape is
committed with a deadly weapon; (b) the rape is committed by two or more
persons; and (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed with
homicide (Sec. 11);
(10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
(11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
(12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of
prohibited drugs (id.);
(13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of prohibited drugs (id.);
(14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
(15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in certain specified amounts (id.);
(16) Cultivation of plants which are sources of prohibited drugs (id.)
(17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
(18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
(19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, transportation, and
distribution of regulated drugs (id.);
(20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs (Sec.
15);
(21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified amounts (Sec. 16);
(22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to account dangerous drugs
confiscated by the arresting officer (Sec. 17);
(23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person or immediate vicinity of
another to implicate the latter (Sec. 19); and
(24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor
vehicle is killed or raped (Sec. 20).
All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the uniform penalty for
all of them being not mandatory death but the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. In other words, it is premature to demand for a specification
of the heinous elements in each of foregoing crimes because they are not
anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The elements that call for the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death in these crimes, would only be
relevant when the trial court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion
perpetua, instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in
appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the attendance of certain
circumstances in the manner by which the crime was committed, or in the
person of the accused on his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other
matter of significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the
victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the criminal acts as
grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or manifestly wicked, vicious,
atrocious or perverse as to be repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.
On the other hand, under R.A. No. 7659, the mandatory penalty of death is
imposed in the following crimes:
(1) Qualified bribery
"If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by
reclusion perpetua and/or death in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not prosecuted.
If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall
suffer the penalty of death." (Sec. 4)
(2) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the
death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured or subjected to
dehumanizing acts
Page 17 of 129
"The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of
the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
or is subject to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty [of death]
shall be imposed." (Sec. 8)
(3) Destructive arson resulting in death
"If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this
Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed." (Sec.
10)
(4) Rape with the victim becoming insane, rape with homicide and qualified
"When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become
insane, the penalty shall be death.
xxx xxx xxx
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the
penalty shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent or the
victim.
2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the
children or other relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old
5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) disease.
6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
the Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered
permanent physical mutilation." (Sec. 11 )
(5) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of
prohibited drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed."
(Sec. 13)
(6) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of prohibited drugs where the
victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the
maximum of the penalty [of death] shall be imposed in every case where a
prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to
use the same in such place.
Should a prohibited drug be the proximate case of the death of a person using
the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section
20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 13)
(7) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of regulated drugs where the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any
offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed."
(Sec. 14)
(8) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of regulated drugs where
the victim is a minor or the victim dies
"Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the
maximum penalty [of death] herein provided shall be imposed in every case
where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.
Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of death of a person using
the same in such den, dive or resort, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of Section
20 of this Act to the contrary." (Sec. 15)
(9) Drug offenses if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers including members of police agencies and armed forces
"The maximum penalties [of death] provided for in Section 3, 4 (1), 5(1), 6, 7,
8, 9, 11,12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 14(1), 15A (1), 16, and
19 of Article III [of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972] shall be imposed, if those
found guilty or any of the same offenses are government officials, employees
or officers including members of police agencies and the armed forces." (Sec.
19)
(10) Planting of dangerous drugs as evidence in drug offenses with the
mandatory death penalty if convicted are government officials, employees or
officers
"Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty
of 'planting' any dangerous drugs punished in Section s 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15, and 16 of Article III (of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972) in the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as
evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty as therein
provided." (Sec. 19)
(11) In all the crimes in RA. No. 7659 in their qualified form
"When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender
of his public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum [of
death] regardless of mitigating circumstances.
The maximum penalty [of death] shall be imposed if the offense was
committed by any person who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime
group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of
gain in the commission of any crime." (Sec. 23)
It is specifically against the foregoing capital crimes that the test of
heinousness must be squarely applied.
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their
very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is
treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the
normal course of his or her growth as a human being. The right of a person is
not only to live but to live a quality life, and this means that the rest of society
is obligated to respect his or her individual personality, the integrity and the
sanctity of his or her own physical body, and the value he or she puts in his or
her own spiritual, psychological, material and social preferences and needs.
Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured,
or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death, and
drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping
and serious illegal detention where the victim is detained for more than three
days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill
him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner,
driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are
penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance
and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-
political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to
develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and
impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the
political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and psyche of the populace. Terribly lacking the money to provide
even the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very
existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of the people it governs
over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and
repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers,
that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and
damage to society.
We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of heinousness is
concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly identified crimes warranting the
mandatory penalty of death. As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished
by reclusion perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable than
those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time to determine their
heinousness in contemplation of law, is when on automatic review, we are
called to pass on a death sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the
death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to say, however,
that the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code need be
additionally alleged as establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial
Page 18 of 129
court to validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No. 7659
which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or repeal the provisions
of the Revised Penal Code relating to aggravating circumstances. Secondly,
R.A. No. 7659, while it specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime
provided therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death, neither
amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal
Code. Thus, construing R.A. No. 7659 in parimateria with the Revised Penal
Code, death may be imposed when (1) aggravating circumstances attend the
commission of the crime as to make operative the provision of the Revised
Penal Code regarding the imposition of the maximum penalty; and (2) other
circumstances attend the commission of the crime which indubitably
characterize the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that
justify the imposition of the death, albeit the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand the rationale for the
guided discretion granted in the trial court to cognize circumstances that
characterize the commission of the crime as heinous. Certainly there is an
infinity of circumstances that may attend the commission of a crime to the
same extent that there is no telling the evil that man is capable of. The
legislature cannot and need not foresee and inscribe in law each and every
loathsome act man is capable of. It is sufficient thus that R.A. 7659 provides
the test and yardstick for the determination of the legal situation warranting the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death. Needless to say, we are not
unaware of the ever existing danger of abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in meting out the death sentence. Precisely to reduce to nil the
possibility of executing an innocent man or one criminal but not heinously
criminal, R.A. 7659 is replete with both procedural and substantive safeguards
that ensure only the correct application of the mandate of R.A. No. 7659.
In the course of the congressional debates on the constitutional requirement
that the death penalty be re-imposed for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, we note that the main objection to the death penalty bill revolved
around the persistent demand of the abolitionists for a statement of the reason
in each and every heinous crime and statistical proof the such compelling
reason actually exists.
We believe, however, that the elements of heinousness and compulsion are
inseparable and are, in fact, interspersed with each other. Because the subject
crimes are either so revolting and debasing as to violate the most minimum of
the human standards of decency or its effects, repercussions, implications and
consequences so destructive, destabilizing, debilitating, or aggravating in the
context of our socio-political and economic agenda as a developing nation,
these crimes must be frustrated, curtailed and altogether eradicated. There
can be no ifs or buts in the face of evil, and we cannot afford to wait until we
rub elbows with it before grasping it by the ears and thrashing it to its
demission.
The abolitionists in congress insisted that all criminal reforms first be pursued
and implemented before the death penalty be re-imposed in case such
reforms prove unsuccessful. They claimed that the only compelling reason
contemplated of by the constitution is that nothing else but the death penalty is
left for the government to resort to that could check the chaos and the
destruction that is being caused by unbridled criminality. Three of our
colleagues, are of the opinion that the compelling reason required by the
constitution is that there occurred a dramatic and significant change in the
socio-cultural milieu after the suspension of the death penalty on February 2,
1987 such as an unprecedented rise in the incidence of criminality. Such are,
however, interpretations only of the phrase "compelling reasons" but not of the
conjunctive phrase "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes". The
imposition of the requirement that there be a rise in the incidence of criminality
because of the suspension of the death penalty, moreover, is an unfair and
misplaced demand, for what it amounts to, in fact, is a requirement that the
death penalty first proves itself to be a truly deterrent factor in criminal
behavior. If there was a dramatically higher incidence of criminality during the
time that the death penalty was suspended, that would have proven that the
death penalty was indeed a deterrent during the years before its suspension.
Suffice it to say that the constitution in the first place did not require that the
death penalty be first proven to be a deterrent; what it requires is that there be
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution simply states that congress,
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, may re-impose the death
penalty. Nothing in the said provision imposes a requirement that for a death
penalty bill to be valid, a positive manifestation in the form of a higher
incidence of crime should first be perceived and statistically proven following
the suspension of the death penalty. Neither does the said provision require
that the death penalty be resorted to as a last recourse when all other criminal
reforms have failed to abate criminality in society. It is immaterial and
irrelevant that R.A. No. 7659 cites that there has been an "alarming upsurge of
such crimes", for the same was never intended by said law to be the yardstick
to determine the existence of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
Fittingly, thus, what R.A. No. 7659 states is that "the Congress, in the interest
of justice, public order and rule of law, and the need to rationalize and
harmonize the penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to
impose the death penalty for said crimes."
We now proceed to answer accused-appellant's other ground for attacking the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, i.e., that the death penalty imposed in rape
is violative of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.
Accused-appellant first claims that the death penalty is per se a cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment as ruled by the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia.[41] To state, however, that the U.S.
Supreme Court, in Furman, categorically ruled that the death penalty is a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, is misleading and inaccurate.
The issue in Furman was not so much death penalty itself but the arbitrariness
pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed on the
accused by the sentencing jury. Thus, the defense theory in Furman centered
not so much on the nature of the death penalty as a criminal sanction but on
the discrimination against the black accused who is meted out the death
penalty by a white jury that is given the unconditional discretion to determine
whether or not to impose the death penalty. In fact, the long road of the
American abolitionist movement leading to the landmark case of Furman was
trekked by American civil rights advocates zealously fighting against racial
discrimination. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Furman:
"We cannot say from facts disclosed in these records that these defendants
were sentenced to death because they were black. Yet our task is not
restricted to an effort to divine what motives impelled these death penalties.
Rather, we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the
uncontrolled discretion of judges or juries the determination whether
defendants committing these crimes should die x x x.
xxx
In a Nation committed to equal protection of the laws there is no permissible
'caste' aspect of law enforcement. Yet we know that the discretion of judges
and juries in imposing the death penalty enables the penalty to be selectively
applied, feeding prejudices against the accused if he is poor and despised x x
x.
xxx
Thus, these discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit in the
ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishments."
Furman, thus, did not outlaw the death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. While the U.S. Supreme Court nullified all discretionary death
penalty statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these
statutes vested in the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or standards intended to lessen, if not
altogether eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and
discriminatory acts on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries.
Consequently, in the aftermath of Furman, when most of the states re-enacted
their death penalty statutes now bearing the procedural checks that were
required by the U.S. Supreme Court, said court affirmed the constitutionality of
the new death penalty statutes in the cases of Gregg v. Georgia,[42] Jurek v.
Texas,[43] and Profitt v. Florida.[44]
Next, accused-appellant asseverates that the death penalty is a cruel,
inhuman or degrading punishment for the crime of rape mainly because the
latter, unlike murder, does not involve the taking of life. In support of his
contention, accused-appellant largely relies on the ruling of the U.S. Supreme
Court in Coker v. Georgia.[45]
In Coker, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled as follows:
"x x x It is now settled that the death penalty is not invariably cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment; it is not
inherently barbaric or an unacceptable mode of punishment for crime; neither
is it always disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. It is also
established that imposing capital punishment, at least for murder, in
accordance with the procedures provided under the Georgia statutes saves
the sentence from the infirmities which led the Court to invalidate the prior
Georgia capital punishment statute in Furman v. Georgia x x x.
xxx
In Gregg [v. Georgia] x x x the Court's judgment was that the death penalty for
deliberate murder was neither the purposeless imposition of severe
punishment nor a punishment grossly disproportionate to the crime. But the
Court reserved the question of the constitutionality of the death penalty when
imposed for other crimes. x x x
That question, with respect to rape of an adult woman, is now before us.
xxx
x x x [T]he public judgment with respect to rape, as reflected in the statutes
providing the punishment for that crime, has been dramatically different. In
reviving death penalty laws to satisfy Furman's mandate, none of the States
that had not previously authorized death for rape chose to include rape among
capital felonies. Of the 16 States in which rape had been a capital offense,
only three provided the death penalty for rape of an adult woman in their
revised statutes -- Georgia, North Carolina. and Louisiana. In the latter two
States, the death penalty was mandatory for those found guilty, and those
laws were invalidated by Woodson and Roberts. When Louisiana and North
Carolina, respondent to those decisions, again revised their capital
Page 19 of 129
punishment laws, they reenacted the death penalty for murder but not for rape;
none of the seven other legislatures that to our knowledge have amended or
replaced their death penalty statutes since July 2, 1976, including four States
(in addition to Louisiana and North Carolina) that had authorized the death
sentence for rape prior to 1972 and had reacted to Furman with mandatory
statutes, included rape among the crimes for which death was an authorized
punishment.
xxx
It should be noted that Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee also authorized the
death penalty in some rape cases, but only where the victim was a child, and
the rapist an adult, the Tennessee statute has since been invalidated because
the death sentence was mandatory. x x x The upshot is that Georgia is the
sole jurisdiction in the United States at the present time that authorizes a
sentence of death when the rape victim is an adult woman, and only two other
jurisdictions provide capital punishment when the victim is a child
The current judgment with respect to the death penalty for rape is not wholly
unanimous among state legislatures, but it obviously weighs very heavily on
the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an
adult woman.
x x x [T]he legislative rejection of capital punishment for rape strongly
confirms our own judgment, which is that death is indeed a disproportionate
penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman.
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime. It is highly
reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the
personal integrity and autonomy of the female victim and for the latter's
privilege of choosing those with whom intimate relationships are to be
established. Short of homicide, it is the 'ultimate violation of self.' It is also a
violent crime because it normally involves force, or the threat of force or
intimidation, to over come the will and the capacity of the victim to resist.
Rape is very often accompanied by physical injury to the female and can also
inflict mental and psychological damage. Because it undermines the
community's sense of security, there is public injury as well.
Rape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral
depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public, it does not compare
with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life. Although
it may be accompanied by another crime, rape by definition does not include
the death of or even the serious injury to another person. The murderer kills;
the rapist, if no more than that, does not. Life is over for the victim of the
murderer; for the rape victim, life may not be nearly so happy as it was, but it
is not over and normally is not beyond repair. We have the abiding conviction
that the death penalty, which 'is unique in its severity and irrevocability' x x x
is an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life."
The U.S. Supreme Court based its foregoing ruling on two grounds: first, that
the public has manifested its rejection of the death penalty as a proper
punishment for the crime of rape through the willful omission by the state
legislatures to include rape in their new death penalty statutes in the aftermath
of Furman; and second, that rape, while concededly a dastardly contemptuous
violation of a woman's spiritual integrity, physical privacy, and psychological
balance, does not involve the taking of life.
Anent the first ground, we fail to see how this could have any bearing on the
Philippine experience and in the context of our own culture.
Anent the second ground, we disagree with the court's predicate that the
gauge of whether or not a crime warrants the death penalty or not, is the
attendance of the circumstance of death on the part of the victim. Such a
premise is in fact an ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an
eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth". We have already demonstrated earlier in
our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of life simply because life
was taken, never was a defining essence of the death penalty in the context of
our legal history and cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed
in heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply dehumanized a person or
criminal acts with severely destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the
masses from abject poverty through organized governmental strategies based
on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they have so caused
irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim and the society and a
repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety of individuals and
the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented from doing
so. At any rate, this court has no doubts as to the innate heinousness of the
crime of rape, as we have held in the case of People v. Cristobal: [46]
"Rape is the forcible violation of the sexual intimacy of another person. It does
injury to justice and charity. Rape deeply wounds the respect, freedom, and
physical and moral integrity to which every person has a right. It causes grave
damage that can mark the victim for life. It is always an intrinsically evil act xxx
an outrage upon decency and dignity that hurts not only the victim but the
society itself."
We are not unaware that for all the legal posturings we have so essayed here,
at the heart of the issue of capital punishment is the wistful, sentimental life-
and-death question to which all of us, without thinking, would answer, "life, of
course, over death". But dealing with the fundamental question of death
provides a context for struggling with even more basic questions, for to
grapple with the meaning of death is, in an indirect way, to ask the meaning of
life. Otherwise put, to ask what the rights are of the dying is to ask what the
rights are of the living.
"Capital punishment ought not to be abolished solely because it is
substantially repulsive, if infinitely less repulsive than the acts which invoke it.
Yet the mounting zeal for its abolition seems to arise from a sentimentalized
hyperfastidiousness that seeks to expunge from the society all that appears
harsh and suppressive. If we are to preserve the humane society we will have
to retain sufficient strength of character and will to do the unpleasant in order
that tranquillity and civility may rule comprehensively. It seems very likely that
capital punishment is a x x x necessary, if limited factor in that maintenance of
social tranquillity and ought to be retained on this ground. To do otherwise is
to indulge in the luxury of permitting a sense of false delicacy to reign over the
necessity of social survival." [47]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration and
the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED[48] for
LACK OF MERIT.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and
Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998]
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
and THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, THE
EXECUTIVE JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY
AND THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY, BRANCH 104, respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On June 25, 1996, this Court affirmed[1] the conviction of petitioner Leo
Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of the 10 year-old daughter of his
common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the death penalty for the
said crime.
Petitioner duly filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues,
and on its heels, a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the
first time the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659[2] (the
death penalty law) and the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
rape.
On February 7, 1998, this Court denied[3] petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with a finding
that Congress duly complied with the requirements for the reimposition of the
death penalty and therefore the death penalty law is not unconstitutional.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of
the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection,[4] and passed Republic
Act No. 8177, AN ACT DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS
THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.[5] Pursuant to
the provisions of said law, the Secretary of Justice promulgated the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 ("implementing rules")[6] and
directed the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal
Injection Manual.[7]
On March 2, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition[8] for Prohibition, Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin respondents Secretary of Justice and
Director of the Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the execution by lethal
injection of petitioner under R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules as these
are unconstitutional and void for being: (a) cruel, degrading and inhuman
punishment per se as well as by reason of its being (b) arbitrary, unreasonable
and a violation of due process, (c) a violation of the Philippines' obligations
under international covenants, (d) an undue delegation of legislative power by
Congress, (e) an unlawful exercise by respondent Secretary of the power to
legislate, and (f) an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the Secretary
of Justice to respondent Director.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion for Leave of
Court[9] to Amend and Supplement Petition with the Amended and
Supplemental Petition[10] attached thereto, invoking the additional ground of
violation of equal protection, and impleading the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 104, in order to enjoin said public respondents from acting
under the questioned rules by setting a date for petitioner's execution.
On March 3, 1998, the Court resolved, without giving due course to the
petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from notice, and directed the parties "to
MAINTAIN the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of this petition."
Page 20 of 129
On March 10, 1998, the Court granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Amend
and Supplement Petition, and required respondents to COMMENT thereon
within ten (10) days from notice.
On March 16, 1998, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion (1) To clarify Status
Quo Order, and (2) For the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
expressly enjoining public respondents from taking any action to carry out
petitioner's execution until the petition is resolved.
On March 16, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General[11] filed a Comment
(On the Petition and the Amended Supplemental Petition)[12] stating that (1)
this Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law,
and has repeatedly declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust,
excessive or unusual punishment; (2) execution by lethal injection, as
authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,
lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer
and easier to apply (than electrocution or the gas chamber); (3) the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights does not expressly or
impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; (4) R.A. No. 8177
properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that (5) R.A.
No. 8177 confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the
Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
On March 17, 1998, the Court required the petitioner to file a REPLY thereto
within a non-extendible period of ten days from notice.
On March 25, 1998, the Commission on Human Rights[13] filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[14] with the
attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus Curiae[15] alleging
that the death penalty imposed under R.A. No. 7659 which is to be
implemented by R.A. No. 8177 is cruel, degrading and outside the limits of civil
society standards, and further invoking (a) Article II, Section 11 of the
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights."; (b) Article III of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which states that "Everyone has the
right to life, liberty and security of person," and Article V thereof, which states
that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."; (c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, in particular, Article 6 thereof, and the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming At The Abolition of
the Death Penalty; (d) Amnesty International statistics showing that as of
October 1996, 58 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, 15
countries have abolished the death penalty for ordinary crimes, and 26
countries are abolitionists de facto, which means that they have retained the
death penalty for ordinary crimes but are considered abolitionists in practice
that they have not executed anyone during the past ten (10) years or more, or
in that they have made an international commitment not to carry out
executions, for a total of 99 countries which are total abolitionists in law or
practice, and 95 countries as retentionists;[16] and (e) Pope John Paul II's
encyclical, "Evangelium Vitae." In a Resolution dated April 3, 1998, the Court
duly noted the motion.
On March 27, 1998, petitioner filed a Reply[17] stating that (1) this Court is not
barred from exercising judicial review over the death penalty per se, the death
penalty for rape and lethal injection as a mode of carrying out the death
penalty; (2) capital punishment is a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment;
(3) lethal injection is cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment, and that being
the "most modern" does not make it less cruel or more humane, and that the
Solicitor General's "aesthetic" criteria is short-sighted, and that the lethal
injection is not risk free nor is it easier to implement; and (4) the death penalty
violates the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights considering
that the Philippines participated in the deliberations of and voted for the
Second Optional Protocol.
After deliberating on the pleadings, the Court gave due course to the petition,
which it now resolves on the merits.
In the Amended and Supplemental Petition, petitioner assails the
constitutionality of the mode of carrying out his death sentence by lethal
injection on the following grounds:[18]
I.
DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A
CRUEL, DEGRADING AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
II.
THE DEATH PENALTY VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, WHICH IS PART OF THE LAW OF THE
LAND.
III.
LETHAL INJECTION, AS AUTHORIZED UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177
AND THE QUESTIONED RULES, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS
AN UNNECESSARY AND WANTON INFLICTION OF PAIN ON A PERSON
AND IS, THUS, A CRUEL, DEGRADING, AND INHUMAN PUNISHMENT.
IV.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 UNDULY DELEGATES LEGISLATIVE POWER
TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
V.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY UNLAWFULLY DELEGATED THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS DELEGATED TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO.
8177 TO RESPONDENT DIRECTOR.
VI.
RESPONDENT SECRETARY EXCEEDED THE AUTHORITY DELEGATED
TO HIM UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8177 AND UNLAWFULLY USURPED
THE POWER TO LEGISLATE IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTIONED
RULES.
VII.
SECTION 17 OF THE QUESTIONED RULES IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR
BEING DISCRIMINATORY AS WELL AS FOR BEING AN INVALID
EXERCISE BY RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF THE POWER TO
LEGISLATE.
VIII.
INJUCTION MUST ISSUE TO PREVENT IRREPARABLE DAMAGE AND
INJURY TO PETITIONER'S RIGHTS BY REASON OF THE EXISTENCE,
OPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
STATUTE AND EQUALLY INVALID AND IMPLEMENTING RULES.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules
do not pass constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of
our international treaty obligations, (c) being an undue delegation of legislative
power, and (d) being discriminatory.
The Court shall now proceed to discuss these issues in seriatim.
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR INHUMAN
PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
The main challenge to R.A. 8177 and its implementing rules is anchored on
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the
imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman" punishment. "The prohibition in the
Philippine Bill against cruel and unusual punishments is an Anglo-Saxon
safeguard against governmental oppression of the subject, which made its first
appearance in the reign of William and Mary of England in 'An Act declaring
the rights and liberties of the subject, and settling the succession of the crown,'
passed in the year 1689. It has been incorporated into the Constitution of the
United States (of America) and into most constitutions of the various States in
substantially the same language as that used in the original statute. The exact
language of the Constitution of the United States is used in the Philippine
Bill."[19] "The counterpart of Section 19 (1) in the 1935 Constitution reads:
'Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and inhuman punishment
inflicted.' xxx In the 1973 Constitution the phrase became 'cruel or unusual
punishment.' The Bill of Rights Committee of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission read the 1973 modification as prohibiting 'unusual' punishment
even if not 'cruel.' It was thus seen as an obstacle to experimentation in
penology. Consequently, the Committee reported out the present text which
prohibits 'cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment' as more consonant with
the meaning desired and with jurisprudence on the subject."[20]
Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading
and inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for
the drugs to be used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug
to be administered, and the procedure in administering said drug/s into the
accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules are uncertain as to the
date of the execution, time of notification, the court which will fix the date of
execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and suffering for the
convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Before the Court proceeds any further, a brief explanation of the process of
administering lethal injection is in order.
In lethal injection, the condemned inmate is strapped on a hospital gurney and
wheeled into the execution room. A trained technician inserts a needle into a
vein in the inmate's arm and begins an intravenous flow of saline solution. At
the warden's signal, a lethal combination of drugs is injected into the
intravenous line. The deadly concoction typically includes three drugs: (1) a
nonlethal dose of sodium thiopenthotal, a sleep inducing barbiturate; (2) lethal
doses of pancuronium bromide, a drug that paralyzes the muscles; and (3)
potassium chloride, which stops the heart within seconds. The first two drugs
are commonly used during surgery to put the patient to sleep and relax
muscles; the third is used in heart bypass surgery.[21]
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.[22] In the oft-cited case of Harden v.
Director of Prisons,[23] this Court held that "[p]unishments are cruel when they
involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel,
within the meaning of that word as used in the constitution. It implies there
Page 21 of 129
something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the details
involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading
or inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons hereafter discussed, the
implementing details of R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to
the competence and expertise of administrative officials.[24]
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16[25] of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which
"court" will fix the time and date of execution, and the date of execution and
time of notification of the death convict. As petitioner already knows, the
"court" which designates the date of execution is the trial court which
convicted the accused, that is, after this Court has reviewed the entire records
of the case[26] and has affirmed the judgment of the lower court. Thereupon,
the procedure is that the "judgment is entered fifteen (15) days after its
promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to the court
below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution.[27] Neither is
there any uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As
to the date of execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in
conjunction with the last sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which
provides that the death sentence shall be carried out "not earlier than one (1)
year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment imposing
the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to the
exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times."
Hence, the death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the
time the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory[28]
wherein he can seek executive clemency[29] and attend to all his temporal
and spiritual affairs.[30]
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of
possible complications in the intravenous injection, considering and as
petitioner claims, that respondent Director is an untrained and untested person
insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Such
supposition is highly speculative and unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection
required the expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and
that the drugs to be administered are unsafe or ineffective.[31] Petitioner
simply cites situations in the United States wherein execution by lethal
injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for the
convict,[32] without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177
which requires that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should
be trained prior to the performance of such task. We must presume that the
public officials entrusted with the implementation of the death penalty (by
lethal injection) will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.[33]
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out
the execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited
sense, anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and since
punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may be said that all
punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does not mean that
crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished."[34] The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of
punishment, not the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.[35] Numerous federal and state courts of the United
States have been asked to review whether lethal injections constitute cruel
and unusual punishment. No court has found lethal injections to implicate
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights. In fact, most courts that have addressed
the issue state in one or two sentences that lethal injection clearly is a
constitutional form of execution.[36] A few jurisdictions, however, have
addressed the merits of the Eighth Amendment claims. Without exception,
these courts have found that lethal injection does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. After reviewing the medical evidence that indicates that
improper doses or improper administration of the drugs causes severe pain
and that prison officials tend to have little training in the administration of the
drugs, the courts have found that the few minutes of pain does not rise to a
constitutional violation.[37]
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and
"must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society."[38] Indeed, "[o]ther (U.S.) courts have
focused on 'standards of decency' finding that the widespread use of lethal
injections indicates that it comports with contemporary norms."[39] the primary
indicator of society's standard of decency with regard to capital punishment is
the response of the country's legislatures to the sanction.[40] Hence, for as
long as the death penalty remains in our statute books and meets the most
stringent requirements provided by the Constitution, we must confine our
inquiry to the legality of R.A. No. 8177, whose constitutionality we duly sustain
in the face of petitioner's challenge. We find that the legislature's substitution
of the mode of carrying out the death penalty from electrocution to lethal
injection infringes no constitutional rights of petitioner herein.
II. REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner assiduously argues that the reimposition of the death penalty law
violates our international obligations, in particular, the International Covenant
on Civil And Political Rights, which was adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the
Philippines on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,[41] respectively.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:
"1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death
may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in
force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the
provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried
out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court." (emphasis
supplied)
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood
that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present
Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the
provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or
commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, pardon or commutation of the
sentence of death may be granted in all-cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons
below eighteen years of age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of
capital punishment by any State. Party to the present Covenant."
Indisputably, Article 6 of the Covenant enshrines the individual's right to life.
Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) of the Covenant explicitly recognizes that capital
punishment is an allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the
limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes". Pursuant to Article
28 of the Covenant, a Human Rights Committee was established and under
Article 40 of the Covenant, State parties to the Covenant are required to
submit an initial report to the Committee on the measures they have adopted
which give effect to the rights recognized within the Covenant and on the
progress made on the enjoyment of those rights one year of its entry into force
for the State Party concerned and thereafter, after five years. On July 27,
1982, the Human Rights Committee issued General Comment No. 6
interpreting Article 6 of the Covenant stating that "(while) it follows from Article
6 (2) to (6) that State parties are not obliged to abolish the death penalty
totally, they are obliged to limit its use and, in particular, to abolish it for other
than the 'most serious crimes.' Accordingly, they ought to consider reviewing
their criminal laws in this light and, in any event, are obliged to restrict the
application of the death penalty to the most serious crimes.' The article
strongly suggests (pars. 2 (2) and (6) that abolition is desirable. xxx The
Committee is of the opinion that the expression 'most serious crimes' must be
read restrictively to mean that the death penalty should be a quite exceptional
measure." Further, the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of Those Facing
the Death Penalty[42] adopted by the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations declare that the ambit of the term 'most serious crimes' should
not go beyond intentional crimes, with lethal or other extremely grave
consequences.
The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on
December 16, 1966, and signed and ratified by the Philippines on December
19, 1966 and August 22, 1989,[43] respectively. The Optional Protocol
provides that the Human Rights Committee shall receive and consider
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of
the rights set forth in the Covenant.
On the other hand, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines
neither signed nor ratified said document.[44] Evidently, petitioner's assertion
of our obligation under the Second Optional Protocol is misplaced.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A.
NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND
REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of
government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual division in
the framing of our Constitution. Each department of the government has
exclusive cognizance of matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme
within its own sphere.[45] Corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is
the principle of non-delegation of powers. "The rule is that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim: potestas
delegata non delegari potest."[46] The recognized exceptions to the rule are
as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28 (2) of Article
VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23 (2) of
Article VI of the Constitution;
Page 22 of 129
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.[47]
Empowering the Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of
Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to promulgate rules and
regulations on the subject of lethal injection is a form of delegation of
legislative authority to administrative bodies.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the
increasing complexity of the task of government requiring expertise as well as
the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected to attend to by itself. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. On many problems involving day-to-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the needed competence to provide the required
direct and efficacious, not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may,
however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in
the particular fields assigned to them.[48]
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the
power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a
law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself - it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate[49] - and (b)
fix a standard - the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.[50]
Considering the scope and the definiteness of R.A. No. 8177, which changed
the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court finds that the law
sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.[51]
R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative
policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies
which will apply it. it indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
purpose may be carried out.[52] R.A. No. 8177 specifically requires that "[t]he
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to mitigate the
sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well
as during the proceedings prior to the execution."[53] Further, "[t]he Director of
the Bureau of Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to
be administered is sufficient to cause the instantaneous death of the
convict."[54] The legislature also mandated that "all personnel involved in the
administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the performance of
such task."[55] The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served
by requiring greater detail.[56] The question raised is not the definition of what
constitutes a criminal offense,[57] but the mode of carrying out the penalty
already imposed by the Courts. In this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently
definite and the exercise of discretion by the administrative officials concerned
is, to use the words of Justice Benjamin Cardozo, canalized within banks that
keep it from overflowing.
Thus, the Court finds that the existence of an area for exercise of discretion by
the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections under
delegated legislative power is proper where standards are formulated for the
guidance and the exercise of limited discretion, which though general, are
capable of reasonable application.[58]
It is also noteworthy that Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code which originally
provided for the death penalty by electrocution was not subjected to attack on
the ground that it failed to provide for details such as the kind of chair to be
used, the amount of voltage, volume of amperage or place of attachment of
electrodes on the death convict. Hence, petitioner's analogous argument with
respect to lethal injection must fail.
A careful reading of R.A. No. 8177 would show that there is no undue
delegation of legislative power from the Secretary of Justice to the Director of
the Bureau of Corrections for the simple reason that under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the Bureau of Corrections is a mere constituent unit of the
Department of Justice.[59] Further, the Department of Justice is tasked,
among others, to take charge of the "administration of the correctional
system."[60] Hence, the import of the phraseology of the law is that the
Secretary of Justice should supervise the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
in promulgating the Lethal Injection Manual, in consultation with the
Department of Health.[61]
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
suffer serious flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something
basic appears missing in Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides:
"SEC. 19. EXECUTION PROCEDURE. - Details of the procedure prior to,
during and after administering the lethal injection shall be set forth in a manual
to be prepared by the Director. The manual shall contain details of, among
others, the sequence of events before and after execution; procedures in
setting up the intravenous line; the administration of the lethal drugs; the
pronouncement of death; and the removal of the intravenous system.
Said manual shall be confidential and its distribution shall be limited to
authorized prison personnel."
Thus, the Courts finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing
rules a veritable vacuum. The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated
the power to promulgate the manual on the execution procedure to the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a mode of review
and approval thereof. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of
Justice, the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would
not bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice
as the rule-making authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of
departmental responsibility renders the said paragraph invalid.
As to the second paragraph of section 19, the Court finds the requirement of
confidentiality of the contents of the manual even with respect to the convict
unduly suppressive. It sees no legal impediment for the convict, should he so
desire, to obtain a copy of the manual. The contents of the manual are matters
of public concern "which the public may want to know, either because these
directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the
interest of an ordinary citizen."[62] Section 7 of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
"SEC. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transaction, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as a basis for policy development, shall be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitation as may be provided by law."
The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of
public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and
information in a democracy.[63] In the same way that free discussion enables
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time,[64] access to
information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-
making[65] by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting
the nation.[66]
D. SECTION 17 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A.
NO. 8177 IS INVALID FOR BEING DISCRIMINATORY AND CONTRARY TO
LAW.
Even more seriously flawed than Section 19 is Section of the implementing
rules which provides:
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH
SENTENCE. Execution by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman
within the three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70) years of age. In this latter
case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised
Penal Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory
as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent
Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
Article 83 f the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No.
7659 now reads as follows:
"ART. 83, Suspension of the execution of the death sentence.- The death
sentence shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is pregnant or within
one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age. In
this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided in Article 40. x x x".
On this point, the Courts finds petitioner's contention impressed with merit.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of
Republic Act No. 7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty
while a woman is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of
the implementing rules omits the one (1) year period following delivery as an
instance when the death sentence is suspended, and adds a ground for
suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is
sentenced. This addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based
discrimination sans statutory basis, while the omission is an impermissible
contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override,
but instead remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply
and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to carry out,
neither to supplant nor to modify, the law."[67] An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Congress.[68] In case of discrepancy between a
provision of statute and a rule or regulation issued to implement said statute,
the statutory provision prevails. Since the cited clause in Section 17 which
suspends the execution of a woman within the three (3) years next following
the date of sentence finds no supports in Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, perforce Section 17 must be declared invalid.
One member of the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as
unconstitutional insofar as it delegates the power to make rules over the same
subject matter to two persons (the Secretary of Justice and the Director of the
Page 23 of 129
Bureau of Corrections) and constitutes a violation of the international norm
towards the abolition of the death penalty. One member of the Court,
consistent with his view in People v. Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682, 734-758
(1997) that the death penalty law (Republic Act. No. 7659) is itself
unconstitutional, believes that Republic Act No. 8177 which provides for the
means of carrying out the death sentence, is likewise unconstitutional. Two
other members of the court concurred in the aforesaid Separate Opinions in
that the death penalty law (Republic Act No. 7659) together with the assailed
statute (Republic Act No. 8177) are unconstitutional. In sum, four members of
the Court voted to declare Republic Act. No. 8177 as unconstitutional. These
Separate Opinions are hereto annexed, infra.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of the Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)
Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection
Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual
confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the
accused/convict and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from
enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections
17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177
are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this
Decision.
NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., On official leave
Pardo, J., No part.
See Per Curiams Dissenting Opinion A and B
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of
the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990 temporarily restraining the
execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration. It is the submission of public respondents that:
The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution
enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority. The issuance
of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive
authority;
The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . . creates dangerous
precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a
possibility that Congress may repeal a law.
Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill. To be
certain, whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law
before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this
Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon . . .
Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks
forward while the judge looks at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing
the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.
At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the
effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has
become nil, to wit:
The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal
of the law;
The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public
respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which
provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the
Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of the House of
Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means
under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The
Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.

In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay order. . . is
within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive
powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the exercise by this Court of its
power to stay execution was reasonable; (3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction
to address incidental matters involved or arising from the petition; (4) public
respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5)
there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or
modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions
and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern
matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty
was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court.
The instant motions were filed in this case, G.R. No. 132601, where the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal Injection Law) and its implementing
rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in
its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of
Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of
Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal
standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of
the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.
I functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence
can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public
respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered
in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a
place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the
Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to
examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that
became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in the Entry of
Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the above-
entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare
the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but
GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to
Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared
INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section
19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by
the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and
counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing
Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended,
revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and executory and
is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
Clerk of Court
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of
Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21,
1998 a Compliance where he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations
implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with our Decision. On October 28,
1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he
has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision of this
Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that R.A. No. 8177 is
not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations
to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be
enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear
that this Decision was not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the
submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot
divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
Page 24 of 129
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers
nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has
become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. 3 There
is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and
its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even
after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. 4 . . . For
after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire
which can render the execution unjust or impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this
Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has
unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First
Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which
constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the
sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot
change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in
cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution,
in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty
in issuing the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of
the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not
always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are
absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no
power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the
penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this
point. It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution
and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date
therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common
law this postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It
is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that
assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail
the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the
need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is
acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however
a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement.
Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the
execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under
investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of
jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our
Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. To be sure, the important
part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law
and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by
law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed
by such court or officer and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of
such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the
Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it
reasonable time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in
Congress as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by
Congress.1âwphi1.nêt
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents
that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioner is that it
can diminish the independence of the judiciary. Since the implant of
republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdiction to
enforce their final decisions. In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this
Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which,
among others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules
are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessary
and incidental power to control and supervise the process of execution of their
decisions. Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in
civil cases. Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases. It should be
stressed that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure was granted by our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its
independence, for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence
and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance
of their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions continuously
vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence. Under the
1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure was granted but it appeared to be co-
existent with legislative power for it was subject to the power of Congress to
repeal, alter or supplement. Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The
existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as
statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the
Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress have the power to
repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may appear on
its surface. In In re Cunanan 10 Congress in the exercise of its power to
amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law,
enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which considered as a passing
grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down
the law as unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . .
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any
attempt on the part of these department would be a clear usurpation of its
function, as is the case with the law in question." 12 The venerable jurist
further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license
for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the 1973
Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of this Court "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, . . .
which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa . . . ." More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar,
which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang
Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened the
independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power to promulgate
rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more independent
judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making power of this Court. Its
Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first
time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also granted for the first
time the power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-
judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the
power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public
respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of
Page 25 of 129
execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised
since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the
jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation of its
decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became final and
executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that after November 6,
1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the Secretary of Justice
recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a Manifestation and Urgent
Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC,
Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of
Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the
contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the
public when requested." The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent
Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice beseeching this Court "to provide the
appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation
however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion
(a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution
deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of
his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee
that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern, and (b) to
ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of
supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39,
Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III,
Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the enforcement of Republic
Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic
Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it
that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully
observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information
about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President of
executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII (Executive
Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article 81 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out "without prejudice to the exercise by the President of his executive
powers at all times." (Emphasis supplied) For instance, the President cannot
grant reprieve, i.e., postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain
(People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to
reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might even
work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of the Constitution
and the applicable statute as when the date at execution set by the President
would be earlier than that designated by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the
date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section 7,
Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of Principles
and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development shall, be afforded the
citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies
"the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley,
A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by guaranteeing the
right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information.
Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the
people upon the ratification of the Constitution without need for any ancillary
act of the Legislature (Id., at p. 165) What may be provided for by the
Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be
afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy
of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that
whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the
duty under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of
the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme Court En Banc in
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of execution
of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty. Theodore Te, on
December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to due process and the
public's right to information. The Solicitor General, as counsel for public
respondents, did not oppose petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court
has no more jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This
Court granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998. There was
not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and they are now
estopped from contending that this Court has lost its jurisdiction to grant said
relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not depend on the convenience of
litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters
the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive department . . .. By granting
the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an
executive function." 14 Public respondents cite as their authority for this
proposition, Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. He shall also have the
power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members
of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation suggested
by the public respondents. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and
forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. It also provides the authority for
the President to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as
denying the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after
their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final judgment
still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be claimed in the
appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who become insane after his
final conviction cannot be executed while in a state of insanity. 15 As observed
by Antieau, "today, it is generally assumed that due process of law will prevent
the government from executing the death sentence upon a person who is
insane at the time of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence
is undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the temporary
suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the same vein, it cannot
be denied that Congress can at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by reducing
the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such an amendment is
like that of commutation of sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can
the exercise by Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered
as a violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to
save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other for the simple
reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. Indeed, in various
States in the United States, laws have even been enacted expressly granting
courts the power to suspend execution of convicts and their constitutionality
has been upheld over arguments that they infringe upon the power of the
President to grant reprieves. For the public respondents therefore to contend
that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the
three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner
must be put in its proper perspective as it has been grievously distorted
especially by those who make a living by vilifying courts. Petitioner filed his
Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on December 28, 1998 at about
11:30 p.m. He invoked several grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been
set on January 4, the first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress
had either sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's
resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that capital
punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13) other senators;
(b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator Miriam S. Defensor have
publicly declared they would seek a review of the death penalty law; (b.3)
Senator Paul Roco has also sought the repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4)
Congressman Salacrib Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen
are demanding review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its traditional
recess and would only resume session on January 18, 1999. Even then, Chief
Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a Special Session on January 4,
1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court
hardly had five (5) hours to resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be
executed at 3 p.m. Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving
whether petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or
amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the Court's
majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not immediately
dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and surmises. They
noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a pleading under oath and
were widely publicized in the print and broadcast media. It was also of judicial
notice that the 11th Congress is a new Congress and has no less than one
hundred thirty (130) new members whose views on capital punishment are still
unexpressed. The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress
that enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal Injection
Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that petitioner's
allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a time to verify
petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3 p.m. And verification from
Congress was impossible as Congress was not in session. Given these
constraints, the Court's majority did not rush to judgment but took an
extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of
Page 26 of 129
petitioner. The suspension was temporary — "until June 15, 1999, coeval with
the constitutional duration of the present regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be
made." The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among
others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution of
the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard.
As life was at, stake, the Court refused to constitutionalize haste and the
hysteria of some partisans. The Court's majority felt it needed the certainty
that the legislature will not petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed
that law and equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the
State to take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired result,
i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is disposed to review
capital punishment. The public respondents, thru the Solicitor General, cite
posterior events that negate beyond doubt the possibility that Congress will
repeal or amend the death penalty law. He names these supervening events
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law
imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.
The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal
of the law;
The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his
signature and that of Senator Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, the
Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman
Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659 which provided
for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and
the Executive Department of the position of the House of Representative on
this matter and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to
immediately implement the death penalty law." The Golez resolution was
signed by 113 congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor
amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an overwhelming vote.
House Resolution No. 25 expressed the sentiment that the House ". . . does
not desire at this time to review Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President
has stated that he will not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in
review of the prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served its legal
and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . . the
question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless discussion and
will probably never be settled so long as men believe in punishment." 19 In our
clime and time when heinous crimes continue to be unchecked, the debate on
the legal and moral predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably
blurred by emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-
death partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be sure,
any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is healthy in a
democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord due to the overuse of
words that wound, when anger threatens to turn the majority rule to tyranny, it
is the especial duty of this Court to assure that the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights to the minority fully hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the
very purpose of the Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to
declare certain values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than the
courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can prevent the
roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage. The flame of the rule of
law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the rage of the mob which is the
mother of unfairness. The business of courts in rendering justice is to be fair
and they can pass their litmus test only when they can be fair to him who is
momentarily the most hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order issued in its
Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set anew the
date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance with applicable
provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Martinez,
Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT.
GARY ALEJANO, PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO,
Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES,
and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 seeks to nullify the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 17 September 2003 and Resolution dated 13 November 2003 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 78545. The Court of Appeals’ Decision and Resolution dismissed
the petition for habeas corpus filed by lawyers Homobono Adaza and Roberto
Rafael Pulido ("petitioners") on behalf of their detained clients Capt. Gary
Alejano (PN-Marines), Capt. Nicanor Faeldon (PN-Marines), Capt. Gerardo
Gambala (PA), Lt. SG James Layug (PN), Capt. Milo Maestrecampo (PA), and
Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (PN) ("detainees").
Petitioners named as respondent Gen. Pedro Cabuay ("Gen. Cabuay"), Chief
of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("ISAFP"),
who has custody of the detainees. Petitioners impleaded Gen. Narciso Abaya
("Gen. Abaya"), Sec. Angelo Reyes and Roilo Golez, who are respectively the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP"), Secretary of
National Defense and National Security Adviser, because they have command
responsibility over Gen. Cabuay.
Antecedent Facts
Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now
detained junior officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood Premier
Luxury Apartments ("Oakwood"), an upscale apartment complex, located in
the business district of Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security officers
of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in its immediate surroundings. The
junior officers publicly renounced their support for the administration and
called for the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several
cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with government emissaries. The soldiers
later defused the explosive devices they had earlier planted. The soldiers then
returned to their barracks.
On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a
directive to all the Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of ten
junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were investigating the soldiers’ involvement in
the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an Information for coup d’etat
with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers
involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident. The government prosecutors
accused the soldiers of coup d’etat as defined and penalized under Article
134-A of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended. The case
was docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes
IV ("Trillanes") and Capt. Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of
ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the military personnel under their command
who took part in the Oakwood incident except the detained junior officers who
were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
Supreme Court. On 12 August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which
resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b) require respondents to make
a RETURN of the writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m. before the
Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE
among the Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings and decision
thereon, after which a REPORT shall be made to this Court within ten (10)
days from promulgation of the decision.3
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated 12 August 2003
directing respondents to make a return of the writ and to appear and produce
the persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals on the scheduled
date for hearing and further proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-accused filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation,
which the trial court granted.
Page 27 of 129
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the Court, respondents
submitted their Return of the Writ and Answer to the petition and produced the
detainees before the Court of Appeals during the scheduled hearing. After the
parties filed their memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court
considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision dismissing
the petition. Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen. Cabuay, who was
in charge of implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to
uphold faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance with Standing
Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay
to adhere to his commitment made in court regarding visiting hours and the
detainees’ right to exercise for two hours a day.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found the petition bereft of merit. The appellate court
pointed out that the detainees are already charged of coup d’etat before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is unavailing in this case as the
detainees’ confinement is under a valid indictment, the legality of which the
detainees and petitioners do not even question.
The Court of Appeals recognized that habeas corpus may also be the
appropriate remedy to assail the legality of detention if there is a deprivation of
a constitutional right. However, the appellate court held that the constitutional
rights alleged to have been violated in this case do not directly affect the
detainees’ liberty. The appellate court ruled that the regulation of the
detainees’ right to confer with their counsels is reasonable under the
circumstances.
The appellate court declared that while the opening and reading of Trillanes’
letter is an abhorrent violation of his right to privacy of communication, this
does not justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The violation does not
amount to illegal restraint, which is the proper subject of habeas corpus
proceedings.
The Court of Appeals thus dismissed the petition and ordered Gen. Cabuay to
fulfill the promise he made in open court to uphold the visiting hours and the
right of the detainees to exercise for two hours a day. The dispositive portion
of the appellate court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent Cabuay is hereby ORDERED to faithfully adhere to
his commitment to uphold the constitutional rights of the detainees in
accordance with the Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04 regarding
visiting hours and the right of the detainees to exercise for two (2) hours a day.
SO ORDERED.4
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING AND REVERSING A
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT;
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACKNOWLEDGING THE
APPROPRIATENESS OF THE REMEDY PETITIONERS SEEK; and
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ASSERTING THE LEGALITY OF
THE CONDITIONS OF THE DETAINED JUNIOR OFFICERS’ DETENTION.5
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the Court’s 12 August 2003 Order granted the petition
and the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals only for a factual
hearing. Petitioners thus argue that the Court’s Order had already foreclosed
any question on the propriety and merits of their petition.
Petitioners’ claim is baseless. A plain reading of the 12 August 2003 Order
shows that the Court referred to the Court of Appeals the duty to inquire into
the cause of the junior officers’ detention. Had the Court ruled for the
detainees’ release, the Court would not have referred the hearing of the
petition to the Court of Appeals. The Court would have forthwith released the
detainees had the Court upheld petitioners’ cause.
In a habeas corpus petition, the order to present an individual before the court
is a preliminary step in the hearing of the petition.6 The respondent must
produce the person and explain the cause of his detention.7 However, this
order is not a ruling on the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive
matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Court’s order to the Court of
Appeals to conduct a factual hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of
the remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of the propriety of the remedy. If a court
finds the alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it should issue the writ
and release the detainees. In the present case, after hearing the case, the
Court of Appeals found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After actively
participating in the hearing before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are
estopped from claiming that the appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire
into the merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas corpus is not
the proper remedy to address the detainees’ complaint against the regulations
and conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy of habeas corpus
has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person.8 The
purpose of the writ is to determine whether a person is being illegally deprived
of his liberty.9 If the inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal, the court orders
the release of the person. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the
habeas corpus proceedings terminate. The use of habeas corpus is thus very
limited. It is not a writ of error.10 Neither can it substitute for an appeal.11
Nonetheless, case law has expanded the writ’s application to circumstances
where there is deprivation of a person’s constitutional rights. The writ is
available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of
his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the
restraints are not merely involuntary but are also unnecessary, and where a
deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.12
However, a mere allegation of a violation of one’s constitutional right is not
sufficient. The courts will extend the scope of the writ only if any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) there is a deprivation of a constitutional
right resulting in the unlawful restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty is imposed and
such sentence is void as to the excess.13 Whatever situation the petitioner
invokes, the threshold remains high. The violation of constitutional right must
be sufficient to void the entire proceedings.14
Petitioners admit that they do not question the legality of the detention of the
detainees. Neither do they dispute the lawful indictment of the detainees for
criminal and military offenses. What petitioners bewail is the regulation
adopted by Gen. Cabuay in the ISAFP Detention Center preventing petitioners
as lawyers from seeing the detainees – their clients – any time of the day or
night. The regulation allegedly curtails the detainees’ right to counsel and
violates Republic Act No. 7438 ("RA 7438").15 Petitioners claim that the
regulated visits made it difficult for them to prepare for the important hearings
before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission.
Petitioners also point out that the officials of the ISAFP Detention Center
violated the detainees’ right to privacy of communication when the ISAFP
officials opened and read the personal letters of Trillanes and Capt. Milo
Maestrecampo ("Maestrecampo"). Petitioners further claim that the ISAFP
officials violated the detainees’ right against cruel and unusual punishment
when the ISAFP officials prevented the detainees from having contact with
their visitors. Moreover, the ISAFP officials boarded up with iron bars and
plywood slabs the iron grills of the detention cells, limiting the already poor
light and ventilation in the detainees’ cells.
Pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their constitutional rights upon confinement.16
However, the fact that the detainees are confined makes their rights more
limited than those of the public.17 RA 7438, which specifies the rights of
detainees and the duties of detention officers, expressly recognizes the power
of the detention officer to adopt and implement reasonable measures to
secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. Section 4(b) of RA
7438 provides:
Section 4. Penalty Clause. – a) x x x
b) Any person who obstructs, prevents or prohibits any lawyer, any member of
the immediate family of a person arrested, detained or under custodial
investigation, or any medical doctor or priest or religious minister or by his
counsel, from visiting and conferring privately chosen by him or by any
member of his immediate family with him, or from examining and treating him,
or from ministering to his spiritual needs, at any hour of the day or, in urgent
cases, of the night shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than
four (4) years nor more than six (6) years, and a fine of four thousand pesos
(₱4,000.00).
The provisions of the above Section notwithstanding, any security officer with
custodial responsibility over any detainee or prisoner may undertake such
reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure his safety and prevent
his escape. (Emphasis supplied)
True, Section 4(b) of RA 7438 makes it an offense to prohibit a lawyer from
visiting a detainee client "at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the
night." However, the last paragraph of the same Section 4(b) makes the
express qualification that "notwithstanding" the provisions of Section 4(b), the
detention officer has the power to undertake such reasonable measures as
may be necessary to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his
escape.
The last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 prescribes a clear standard.
The regulations governing a detainee’s confinement must be "reasonable
measures x x x to secure his safety and prevent his escape." Thus, the
regulations must be reasonably connected to the government’s objective of
securing the safety and preventing the escape of the detainee. The law grants
the detention officer the authority to "undertake such reasonable measures" or
regulations.
Page 28 of 129
Petitioners contend that there was an actual prohibition of the detainees’ right
to effective representation when petitioners’ visits were limited by the schedule
of visiting hours. Petitioners assert that the violation of the detainees’ rights
entitle them to be released from detention.
Petitioners’ contention does not persuade us. The schedule of visiting hours
does not render void the detainees’ indictment for criminal and military
offenses to warrant the detainees’ release from detention. The ISAFP officials
did not deny, but merely regulated, the detainees’ right to counsel. The
purpose of the regulation is not to render ineffective the right to counsel, but to
secure the safety and security of all detainees. American cases are instructive
on the standards to determine whether regulations on pre-trial confinement are
permissible.
In Bell v. Wolfish,18 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court held that
regulations must be reasonably related to maintaining security and must not
be excessive in achieving that purpose. Courts will strike down a restriction
that is arbitrary and purposeless.19 However, Bell v. Wolfish expressly
discouraged courts from skeptically questioning challenged restrictions in
detention and prison facilities.20 The U.S. Supreme Court commanded the
courts to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" in implementing
policies to maintain institutional security.21
In our jurisdiction, the last paragraph of Section 4(b) of RA 7438 provides the
standard to make regulations in detention centers allowable: "such reasonable
measures as may be necessary to secure the detainee’s safety and prevent
his escape." In the present case, the visiting hours accorded to the lawyers of
the detainees are reasonably connected to the legitimate purpose of securing
the safety and preventing the escape of all detainees.
While petitioners may not visit the detainees any time they want, the fact that
the detainees still have face-to-face meetings with their lawyers on a daily
basis clearly shows that there is no impairment of detainees’ right to counsel.
Petitioners as counsels could visit their clients between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00
p.m. with a lunch break at 12:00 p.m. The visiting hours are regular business
hours, the same hours when lawyers normally entertain clients in their law
offices. Clearly, the visiting hours pass the standard of reasonableness.
Moreover, in urgent cases, petitioners could always seek permission from the
ISAFP officials to confer with their clients beyond the visiting hours.
The scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable access to the detainees,
giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the detainees. The detainees’
right to counsel is not undermined by the scheduled visits. Even in the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano Commission,22 petitioners were
given time to confer with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves
admit.23 Thus, at no point were the detainees denied their right to counsel.
Petitioners further argue that the bars separating the detainees from their
visitors and the boarding of the iron grills in their cells with plywood amount to
unusual and excessive punishment. This argument fails to impress us. Bell v.
Wolfish pointed out that while a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law, detention
inevitably interferes with a detainee’s desire to live comfortably.24 The fact
that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude into the detainees’ desire to
live comfortably does not convert those restrictions into punishment.25 It is
when the restrictions are arbitrary and purposeless that courts will infer intent
to punish.26 Courts will also infer intent to punish even if the restriction seems
to be related rationally to the alternative purpose if the restriction appears
excessive in relation to that purpose.27 Jail officials are thus not required to
use the least restrictive security measure.28 They must only refrain from
implementing a restriction that appears excessive to the purpose it serves.29
We quote Bell v. Wolfish:
One further point requires discussion. The petitioners assert, and respondents
concede, that the "essential objective of pretrial confinement is to insure the
detainees’ presence at trial." While this interest undoubtedly justifies the
original decision to confine an individual in some manner, we do not accept
respondents’ argument that the Government’s interest in ensuring a detainee’s
presence at trial is the only objective that may justify restraints and conditions
once the decision is lawfully made to confine a person. "If the government
could confine or otherwise infringe the liberty of detainees only to the extent
necessary to ensure their presence at trial, house arrest would in the end be
the only constitutionally justified form of detention." The Government also has
legitimate interests that stem from its need to manage the facility in which the
individual is detained. These legitimate operational concerns may require
administrative measures that go beyond those that are, strictly speaking,
necessary to ensure that the detainee shows up at trial. For example, the
Government must be able to take steps to maintain security and order at the
institution and make certain no weapons or illicit drugs reach detainees.
Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining
jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even
if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have
experienced had he been released while awaiting trial. We need not here
attempt to detail the precise extent of the legitimate governmental interests
that may justify conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention. It is enough
simply to recognize that in addition to ensuring the detainees’ presence at trial,
the effective management of the detention facility once the individual is
confined is a valid objective that may justify imposition of conditions and
restrictions of pretrial detention and dispel any inference that such restrictions
are intended as punishment.30

An action constitutes a punishment when (1) that action causes the inmate to
suffer some harm or "disability," and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish
the inmate.31 Punishment also requires that the harm or disability be
significantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of
confinement.32
Block v. Rutherford,33 which reiterated Bell v. Wolfish, upheld the blanket
restriction on contact visits as this practice was reasonably related to
maintaining security. The safety of innocent individuals will be jeopardized if
they are exposed to detainees who while not yet convicted are awaiting trial
for serious, violent offenses and may have prior criminal conviction.34 Contact
visits make it possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to
effect escapes.35 Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors
smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other contraband.36 The restriction on
contact visits was imposed even on low-risk detainees as they could also
potentially be enlisted to help obtain contraband and weapons.37 The security
consideration in the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled
to outweigh the sentiments of the detainees.38
Block v. Rutherford held that the prohibition of contact visits bore a rational
connection to the legitimate goal of internal security.39 This case reaffirmed
the "hands-off" doctrine enunciated in Bell v. Wolfish, a form of judicial self-
restraint, based on the premise that courts should decline jurisdiction over
prison matters in deference to administrative expertise.40
In the present case, we cannot infer punishment from the separation of the
detainees from their visitors by iron bars, which is merely a limitation on
contact visits. The iron bars separating the detainees from their visitors
prevent direct physical contact but still allow the detainees to have visual,
verbal, non-verbal and limited physical contact with their visitors. The
arrangement is not unduly restrictive. In fact, it is not even a strict non-contact
visitation regulation like in Block v. Rutherford. The limitation on the detainees’
physical contacts with visitors is a reasonable, non-punitive response to valid
security concerns.
The boarding of the iron grills is for the furtherance of security within the
ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to fortify the individual cells
and to prevent the detainees from passing on contraband and weapons from
one cell to another. The boarded grills ensure security and prevent disorder
and crime within the facility. The diminished illumination and ventilation are but
discomforts inherent in the fact of detention, and do not constitute
punishments on the detainees.
We accord respect to the finding of the Court of Appeals that the conditions in
the ISAFP Detention Center are not inhuman, degrading and cruel. Each
detainee, except for Capt. Nicanor Faeldon and Capt. Gerardo Gambala, is
confined in separate cells, unlike ordinary cramped detention cells. The
detainees are treated well and given regular meals. The Court of Appeals
noted that the cells are relatively clean and livable compared to the conditions
now prevailing in the city and provincial jails, which are congested with
detainees. The Court of Appeals found the assailed measures to be
reasonable considering that the ISAFP Detention Center is a high-risk
detention facility. Apart from the soldiers, a suspected New People’s Army
("NPA") member and two suspected Abu Sayyaf members are detained in the
ISAFP Detention Center.
We now pass upon petitioners’ argument that the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center violated the detainees’ right to privacy when the ISAFP
officials opened and read the letters handed by detainees Trillanes and
Maestrecampo to one of the petitioners for mailing. Petitioners point out that
the letters were not in a sealed envelope but simply folded because there were
no envelopes in the ISAFP Detention Center. Petitioners contend that the
Constitution prohibits the infringement of a citizen’s privacy rights unless
authorized by law. The Solicitor General does not deny that the ISAFP officials
opened the letters.
Courts in the U.S. have generally permitted prison officials to open and read
all incoming and outgoing mail of convicted prisoners to prevent the smuggling
of contraband into the prison facility and to avert coordinated escapes.41 Even
in the absence of statutes specifically allowing prison authorities from opening
and inspecting mail, such practice was upheld based on the principle of "civil
deaths."42 Inmates were deemed to have no right to correspond confidentially
with anyone. The only restriction placed upon prison authorities was that the
right of inspection should not be used to delay unreasonably the
communications between the inmate and his lawyer.43
Eventually, the inmates’ outgoing mail to licensed attorneys, courts, and court
officials received respect.44 The confidential correspondences could not be
censored.45 The infringement of such privileged communication was held to
be a violation of the inmates’ First Amendment rights.46 A prisoner has a right
to consult with his attorney in absolute privacy, which right is not abrogated by
the legitimate interests of prison authorities in the administration of the
institution.47 Moreover, the risk is small that attorneys will conspire in plots
that threaten prison security.48
American jurisprudence initially made a distinction between the privacy rights
enjoyed by convicted inmates and pre-trial detainees. The case of Palmigiano
v. Travisono49 recognized that pre-trial detainees, unlike convicted prisoners,
enjoy a limited right of privacy in communication. Censorship of pre-trial
detainees’ mail addressed to public officials, courts and counsel was held
impermissible. While incoming mail may be inspected for contraband and read
Page 29 of 129
in certain instances, outgoing mail of pre-trial detainees could not be inspected
or read at all.
In the subsequent case of Wolff v. McDonnell,50 involving convicted prisoners,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that prison officials could open in the presence of
the inmates incoming mail from attorneys to inmates. However, prison officials
could not read such mail from attorneys. Explained the U.S. Supreme Court:
The issue of the extent to which prison authorities can open and inspect
incoming mail from attorneys to inmates, has been considerably narrowed in
the course of this litigation. The prison regulation under challenge provided
that ‘(a)ll incoming and outgoing mail will be read and inspected,’ and no
exception was made for attorney-prisoner mail. x x x
Petitioners now concede that they cannot open and read mail from attorneys
to inmates, but contend that they may open all letters from attorneys as long
as it is done in the presence of the prisoners. The narrow issue thus presented
is whether letters determined or found to be from attorneys may be opened by
prison authorities in the presence of the inmate or whether such mail must be
delivered unopened if normal detection techniques fail to indicate contraband.
xxx
x x x If prison officials had to check in each case whether a communication
was from an attorney before opening it for inspection, a near impossible task
of administration would be imposed. We think it entirely appropriate that the
State require any such communications to be specially marked as originating
from an attorney, with his name and address being given, if they are to receive
special treatment. It would also certainly be permissible that prison authorities
require that a lawyer desiring to correspond with a prisoner, first identify
himself and his client to the prison officials, to assure that the letters marked
privileged are actually from members of the bar. As to the ability to open the
mail in the presence of inmates, this could in no way constitute censorship,
since the mail would not be read. Neither could it chill such communications,
since the inmate’s presence insures that prison officials will not read the mail.
The possibility that contraband will be enclosed in letters, even those from
apparent attorneys, surely warrants prison officials’ opening the letters. We
disagree with the Court of Appeals that this should only be done in
‘appropriate circumstances.’ Since a flexible test, besides being unworkable,
serves no arguable purpose in protecting any of the possible constitutional
rights enumerated by respondent, we think that petitioners, by acceding to a
rule whereby the inmate is present when mail from attorneys is inspected,
have done all, and perhaps even more, than the Constitution requires.51
In Hudson v. Palmer,52 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an inmate has no
reasonable expectation of privacy inside his cell. The U.S. Supreme Court
explained that prisoners necessarily lose many protections of the Constitution,
thus:
However, while persons imprisoned for crime enjoy many protections of the
Constitution, it is also clear that imprisonment carries with it the
circumscription or loss of many significant rights. These constraints on
inmates, and in some cases the complete withdrawal of certain rights, are
"justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." The curtailment
of certain rights is necessary, as a practical matter, to accommodate a myriad
of "institutional needs and objectives" of prison facilities, chief among which is
internal security. Of course, these restrictions or retractions also serve,
incidentally, as reminders that, under our system of justice, deterrence and
retribution are factors in addition to correction.53
The later case of State v. Dunn,54 citing Hudson v. Palmer, abandoned
Palmigiano v. Travisono and made no distinction as to the detainees’ limited
right to privacy. State v. Dunn noted the considerable jurisprudence in the
United States holding that inmate mail may be censored for the furtherance of
a substantial government interest such as security or discipline. State v. Dunn
declared that if complete censorship is permissible, then the lesser act of
opening the mail and reading it is also permissible. We quote State v. Dunn:
[A] right of privacy in traditional Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally
incompatible with the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their
cells required to ensure institutional security and internal order. We are
satisfied that society would insist that the prisoner’s expectation of privacy
always yield to what must be considered a paramount interest in institutional
security. We believe that it is accepted by our society that "[l]oss of freedom of
choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement."
The distinction between the limited privacy rights of a pre-trial detainee and a
convicted inmate has been blurred as courts in the U.S. ruled that pre-trial
detainees might occasionally pose an even greater security risk than convicted
inmates. Bell v. Wolfish reasoned that those who are detained prior to trial
may in many cases be individuals who are charged with serious crimes or who
have prior records and may therefore pose a greater risk of escape than
convicted inmates.55 Valencia v. Wiggins56 further held that "it is impractical
to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the
purpose of maintaining jail security."
American cases recognize that the unmonitored use of pre-trial detainees’
non-privileged mail poses a genuine threat to jail security.57 Hence, when a
detainee places his letter in an envelope for non-privileged mail, the detainee
knowingly exposes his letter to possible inspection by jail officials.58 A pre-trial
detainee has no reasonable expectation of privacy for his incoming mail.59
However, incoming mail from lawyers of inmates enjoys limited protection
such that prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but
could not read the contents without violating the inmates’ right to correspond
with his lawyer.60 The inspection of privileged mail is limited to physical
contraband and not to verbal contraband.61
Thus, we do not agree with the Court of Appeals that the opening and reading
of the detainees’ letters in the present case violated the detainees’ right to
privacy of communication. The letters were not in a sealed envelope. The
inspection of the folded letters is a valid measure as it serves the same
purpose as the opening of sealed letters for the inspection of contraband.
The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP authorities were not
confidential letters between the detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner
who received the letters from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was
merely acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their counsel when
he received the letters for mailing. In the present case, since the letters were
not confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters. If the letters are
marked confidential communication between the detainees and their lawyers,
the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes
for inspection in the presence of the detainees.
That a law is required before an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s
privacy rights62 is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but
not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to privacy of those
detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438, as well as to the limitations
inherent in lawful detention or imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention,
pre-trial detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished expectation of
privacy rights.
In assessing the regulations imposed in detention and prison facilities that are
alleged to infringe on the constitutional rights of the detainees and convicted
prisoners, U.S. courts "balance the guarantees of the Constitution with the
legitimate concerns of prison administrators."63 The deferential review of such
regulations stems from the principle that:
[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict
scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security
problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration.64
The detainees in the present case are junior officers accused of leading 300
soldiers in committing coup d’etat, a crime punishable with reclusion
perpetua.65 The junior officers are not ordinary detainees but visible leaders
of the Oakwood incident involving an armed takeover of a civilian building in
the heart of the financial district of the country. As members of the military
armed forces, the detainees are subject to the Articles of War.66
Moreover, the junior officers are detained with other high-risk persons from the
Abu Sayyaf and the NPA. Thus, we must give the military custodian a wider
range of deference in implementing the regulations in the ISAFP Detention
Center. The military custodian is in a better position to know the security risks
involved in detaining the junior officers, together with the suspected Abu
Sayyaf and NPA members. Since the appropriate regulations depend largely
on the security risks involved, we should defer to the regulations adopted by
the military custodian in the absence of patent arbitrariness.
The ruling in this case, however, does not foreclose the right of detainees and
convicted prisoners from petitioning the courts for the redress of grievances.
Regulations and conditions in detention and prison facilities that violate the
Constitutional rights of the detainees and prisoners will be reviewed by the
courts on a case-by-case basis. The courts could afford injunctive relief or
damages to the detainees and prisoners subjected to arbitrary and inhumane
conditions. However, habeas corpus is not the proper mode to question
conditions of confinement.67 The writ of habeas corpus will only lie if what is
challenged is the fact or duration of confinement.68
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78545.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164763 February 12, 2008
ZENON R. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
Page 30 of 129
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review1 of his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan2 for malversation of public funds3 under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code.
This is not a big case but its implications are wide-ranging and the issues We
resolve include the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of a criminal
case, the balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.
The Facts
On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin,
Provincial Auditor’s Office, Bohol,4 conducted a cash examination on the
account of petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon,
Bohol.
Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office on December
28, 1988. A radio message was sent to Loon, the town where he resided, to
apprise him of the on-going audit. The following day, the audit team counted
the cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of
the audit, the amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner.
The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination,5
which also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit,
petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36,
instead of the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.6
The report also contained the Cash Production Notice7 dated January 4,
1989, where petitioner was informed and required to produce the amount of
P72,784.57, and the cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by petitioner
indicating the correctness of the amount of P21,331.79 found in his safe and
counted in his presence. A separate demand letter8 dated January 4, 1989
requiring the production of the missing funds was sent and received by
petitioner on January 5, 1989.
When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds,
petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the
loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family,
and the rest for his medicine.9
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum10 dated
January 13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending
the filing of the appropriate criminal case against petitioner.
On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Bohol the amounts of P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively.
On February 14, 1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial Treasurer an
additional amount of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on February
16, 1989 in the amounts of P2,000.00 and P2,784.00.
An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989. He
filed an Answer11 dated February 22, 1989 reiterating his earlier verbal
admission before the audit team.
On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the
Provincial Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner had then fully restituted his shortage
in the amount of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing money was
confirmed and shown by the following receipts:12
Official Receipt No. Date Issued and Received Amount
8266659 January 16, 1989 P10,000.00
8266660 January 16, 1989 P15,000.00
8266662 February 14, 1989 P35,000.00
8266667 February 16, 1989 P 2,000.00
8266668 February 16, 1989 P 2,784.00
8266675 April 17, 1989 P 8,000.00
TOTAL - P72,784.57
Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of
public funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
in an Information that read:
That on or about the period covering from December 28, 1988 to January 5,
1989, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Tubigon, Province
of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused Zenon R. Perez, a public officer being then Acting
Municipal Treasury of the said Municipality, by reason of the duties of his
official position was accountable for the public funds collected and received by
him, with grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take away from the said
funds the total amount of SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS and 57/100 (P72,784.57), which said fund was
appropriated and converted by the said accused to his own personal use and
benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforementioned
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.13 (Underscoring supplied)

On March 1, 1990, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a
plea of "not guilty."14
Pre-trial was initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioner’s counsel moved for
postponement. The Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on
June 5, 1990, as previously scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution
witness Arlene R. Mandin, who came all the way from Bohol.
On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the
prosecution to present its witness. Arlene R. Mandin testified as narrated
above.
The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself.
He denied the contents of his first Answer15 to the administrative case filed
against him by the audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the
assistance of counsel and that at the time of its preparation and submission,
he was not in peak mental and physical condition, having been stricken with
diabetes mellitus.16
He then revoked his Answer dated February 22, 1989 and filed his second
Answer dated March 2, 1989.17 In the latter, he vehemently denied that he
incurred a cash shortage P72,784.57.
According to petitioner, the alleged shortage was in the possession and
custody of his accountable personnel at the time of the audit examination.
Several amounts totalling P64,784.00 were remitted to him on separate dates
by his accountable officer, starting January 16, 1989 to February 16, 1989.
The same were turned over by him to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer,
leaving an unremitted sum of P8,000.00 as of February 16, 1989.18 He
remitted the P8,000.00 on April 17, 1989 to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol,
fully restoring the cash shortage.
Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he submitted his Position
Paper19 before the Office of the Ombudsman, Cebu City and maintained that
the alleged cash shortage was only due to oversight. Petitioner argued that the
government did not suffer any damage or prejudice since the alleged cash
shortage was actually deposited with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer as
evidenced by official receipts.20
Petitioner completed his testimony on September 20, 1990. He rested his case
on October 20, 1990.21
Sandiganbayan Disposition
On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of
conviction with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ZENON R.
PEREZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code and, there being one mitigating circumstance without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS
of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual special
disqualification. The accused Zenon R. Perez is likewise ordered to pay a
FINE equal to the total amount of the funds malversed, which is Seventy-Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P72,
784.57).
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On January 13, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration23 which the
prosecution opposed on January 28, 2004.24 Petitioner replied25 to the
opposition. On August 6, 2004, petitioner’s motion was denied with finality.
On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to the instant appeal26 raising the
following issues, to wit:
I. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN BY UNDULY AND UNREASONABLY
DELAYING THE DECISION OF THE CASE FOR OVER THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS VIOLATED THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION
OF HIS CASE AND DUE PROCESS.
II. THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION
19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE CONSTITUTION.27
(Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Before addressing petitioner’s twin assignment of errors, We first tackle the
propriety of petitioner’s conviction for malversation of public funds.
I. Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation.
Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or
property, (2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public
Page 31 of 129
funds or property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.28
There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found
guilty of the crime. They are:
(a) That the offender be a public officer;
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office;
(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and
(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.29
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of
the commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being
then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public
office, he was accountable for the public funds under his custody or control.
The question then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, took or
misappropriated, or consented or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted another person to take such funds.
We rule in the affirmative.
In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in
his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not
have them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse
for its disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of
malversation even if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the
only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has not been able to
explain satisfactorily.30
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even
if there is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a
presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds
which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to
examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion.31
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence
is shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or
property under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he
has appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to
do so, the accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The
accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If
he adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or
property to personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie
case is destroyed.32
In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to
rebut the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or
control. What is extant in the records is that the prosecution, through witness
Arlene R. Mandin, was able to prove that petitioner malversed the funds under
his custody and control. As testified by Mandin:
Atty. Caballero:
Q: Was Mr. Zenon Perez actually and physically present during the time of
your cash examination?
Witness:
A. Yes, Sir.
Q: From December 28, to January 5, 1989?
A: He was present on December 28, 1988 and January 4 and 5, 1989, Sir.
Q: Did he not make any verbal explanation as the reason why he was short
of about P72,000.00, after you conducted the cash count on January 5, 1989?
A: Yes, Sir, he did.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told us that he used some of the money to pay for the loan of his
brother and the other portion was spent for food of his family; and the rest for
his medicine.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Bohol in the administrative case filed against him.
In that Answer, petitioner narrated how he disposed of the missing funds
under his custody and control, to wit: (1) about P30,000.00 was used to pay
the commercial loan of his late brother; (2) he spent P10,000.00 for the
treatment of his toxic goiter; and (3) about P32,000.00 was spent for food and
clothing of his family, and the education of his children. He there stated:
1. That the circumstances surrounding the cash shortage in the total amount
of P72,784.57 during the examination of the respondent’s cash accounts by
the Commission on Audit on December 28-29, 1988 and January 4-5, 1989
are as follows, to wit:
(a) That respondent paid the amount of about P30,000.00 to the Philippine
National Bank, Tagbilaran Branch as interests of the commercial loan of his
late brother Carino R. Perez using respondent’s house and lot as collateral
thereof. If the interests would not be paid, the loan would be foreclosed to
respondent’s great prejudice and disadvantage considering that he and his
family are residing in said house used as collateral;
(b) That respondent spent the amount of P10,000.00 in connection with the
treatment of his toxic goiter;
(c) That the rest of the amount amounting to about P32,000.00 was spent by
him for his family’s foods, clothings (sic), and education of his children
because his monthly salary is not enough for the needs of his family.34
By the explicit admission of petitioner, coupled with the testimony of Arlene R.
Mandin, the fourth element of the crime of malversation was duly established.
His conviction thus stands in terra firma.
True it is that petitioner filed another Answer on March 2, 1989 with the Office
of the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, substantially changing the contents of his
earlier answer of February 22, 1989. His second Answer averred:
3. That the truth of the matter is that the alleged total cash shortage of
P72,784.57 were still in the possession and custody of his accountable
personnel at the time of the examination held by the auditor of the
Commission on Audit;
4. That out of the alleged cash shortage of P72,784.57, almost all of said
amount were already remitted to him by his accountable personnel after
January 5, 1989, and only the remaining amount of P8,000.00 remains to be
remitted to him by his accountable personnel.35
The sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind,
petitioner only changed his story to exonerate himself, after realizing that his
first Answer put him in a hole, so to speak.
It is contended that petitioner’s first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not
have been given probative weight because it was executed without the
assistance of counsel.36
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee
should be assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary,
jurisprudence is in unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not
indispensable in administrative proceedings.
Walang batas, hurisprudensiya, o tuntunin na nagsasabi na ang isang kawani
ay dapat may tulong ng abogado sa isang kasong administratibo. Sa
katunayan, ang hurisprudensiya ay iisa ang sinasabi na ang pagtulong ng
isang abogado ay hindi kailangang-kailangan sa kasong administratibo.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing
and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during
custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or
rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative
inquiry.37
Ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado, na hindi maaaring talikdan malibang
ang waiver ay nakasulat at sa harap ng abogado, ay karapatang ibinibigay sa
suspek o nasasakdal sa isang custodial investigation. Ito ay hindi lubos na
karapatan at maaring hingin o tanggihan sa isang prosesong kriminal, at lalo
na sa isang administratibong pagsisiyasat.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin
to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in
an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective
of the nature of the charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself,
and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with
counsel.38
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations
because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are
facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and
employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.39
Kung gayon, ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado ay hindi sapilitan sa
isang administratibong imbestigasyon sapagkat ito ay ginagawa lamang
upang malaman kung may sapat na batayan na patawan ng disiplina ang
nagkasalang opisyal o empleyado, para mapanatili ang dignidad ng
paglilingkod sa pamahalaan.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
Page 32 of 129
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is
not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at
his side.40
More than that, petitioner’s first Answer may be taken against him, as he
executed it in the course of the administrative proceedings below. This is
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court which provides that the
"act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given
against him." In People v. Lising,41 the Court held:
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective
declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party
as to a relevant fact may be given against him. This is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
declarations were true. A man’s act, conduct and declarations wherever made,
provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is
fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are
not.
There is also no merit in the contention that petitioner’s sickness affected the
preparation of his first Answer. He presented no convincing evidence that his
disease at the time he formulated that answer diminished his capacity to
formulate a true, clear and coherent response to any query. In fact, its
contents merely reiterated his verbal explanation to the auditing team on
January 5, 1989 on how he disposed of the missing funds.
II. There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the case and to
due process of law.
We now discuss the right to a speedy trial and disposition, the balancing test,
due process, and cruel and unusual punishment.
Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition
of his case was violated because the decision of the Sandiganbayan was
handed down after the lapse of more than twelve years. The years that he had
to wait for the outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo, pain and
agony.42
We are not persuaded.
Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to
mean "a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and
renders judgment only after trial."43 Petitioner cannot complain that his right to
due process has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to
present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after
considering all the pieces of evidence presented before it.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case
must also fail.
The 1987 Constitution44 guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial.
Both the 1973 Constitution in Section 16 of Article IV and the 1987
Constitution in Section 16 of Article III, Bill of Rights, are also explicit in
granting to the accused the right to speedy disposition of his case.45
In Barker v. Wingo,46 the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the
first time with two "rigid approaches" on speedy trial as "ways of eliminating
some of the uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right."47
The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the
Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a
specified time period."48 The second approach is the "demand-waiver rule"
which provides that "a defendant waives any consideration of his right to
speedy trial for any period prior to which he has not demanded trial. Under this
rigid approach, a prior demand is a necessary condition to the consideration of
the speedy trial right."49
The fixed-time period was rejected because there is "no constitutional basis
for holding that the speedy trial can be quantified into a specific number of
days or months."50 The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because
aside from the fact that it is "inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on
waiver of constitutional rights,"51 "it is insensitive to a right which we have
deemed fundamental."52
The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which
"the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed."53 Mr.
Justice Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on
an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the factors which
courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has been
deprived of his right. Though some might express them in different ways, we
identify four such factors: Length of delay, the reason for the delay, the
defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there is
some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry
into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the
imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke
such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of
the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex
conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns to
justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to different
reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason
such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but
nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify
appropriate delay. We have already discussed the third factor, the defendant’s
responsibility to assert his right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his
right is closely related to the other factors we have mentioned. The strength of
his efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the
reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is
not always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the
deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s
assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight
in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right. We
emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course, should be
assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right
was designed to protect. This Court has identified three such interests: (i) to
prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern
of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired.
Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant
adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. If
witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is
also prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of
the distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the
record because what has been forgotten can rarely be shown.54 (Emphasis
supplied)
Philippine jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted the balancing
test.
In 1991, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,55 this Court ruled:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause
or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or
a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the
prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such factors as length of the
delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion or non-assertion of his
right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, are considered.
(Underscoring supplied)
Subsequently, in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,56 this Court again
enumerated the factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: (1)
length of delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) assertion or failure to assert such
right by the accused; and (4) prejudice caused by the delay.57
Once more, in Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,58 this Court reiterated that
the right to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.59 In the determination of whether said right has been
violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances
peculiar to each case.60 The conduct of both the prosecution and defendant,
the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay are the
factors to consider and balance.61
Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is
relative and cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time.62
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, We rule that petitioner was not deprived
of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did
not want a speedy disposition of his case.63 Petitioner was duly represented
by counsel de parte in all stages of the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. From the moment his case was deemed submitted for
decision up to the time he was found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, however,
petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation which could be
construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to be
dispatched without delay.
Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of
asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some
overt acts, like filing a motion for early resolution, to show that he was not
waiving that right.64
Page 33 of 129
Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the
slothful and those who neglect their rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa
mga tamad at pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus
jura in re subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber in
their rights. Ang batas ay tumutulong sa mga mapagbantay at hindi sa mga
humihimbing sa kanilang karapatan.
Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived
in suspicion and anxiety for over twelve years. However, any prejudice that
may have been caused to him in all those years was only minimal. The
supposed gravity of agony experienced by petitioner is more imagined than
real.
This case is analogous to Guerrero v. Court of Appeals.65 There, the Court
ruled that there was no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial and
disposition of his case inasmuch as he failed seasonably to assert his rights:
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation
against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial
judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just
continued to sleep on his right – a situation amounting to laches – had the
respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-completion of
the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could dispose of the
case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those ten
years between 1979 when accused filed his memorandum and 1989 when the
case was re-raffled, the accused showed signs of asserting his right which
was granted him in 1987 when the new Constitution took effect, or at least
made some overt act (like a motion for early disposition or a motion to compel
the stenographer to transcribe stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it.
As it is, his silence would have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly from
the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously
espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to
the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights
should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash of
the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in the
disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as well.
Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably and
inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of the case
on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper and
equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to
dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
III. The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does
not violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights.
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly
defined.66 The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution,67 the
source of Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights68 of our own Constitution,
has yet to be put to the test to finally determine what constitutes cruel and
inhuman punishment.69
Cases that have been decided described, rather than defined, what is meant
by cruel and unusual punishment. This is explained by the pronouncement of
the United States Supreme Court that "[t]he clause of the Constitution, in the
opinion of the learned commentators, may be therefore progressive, and is not
fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by a humane justice."70
In Wilkerson v. Utah,71 Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme
Court opined that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness
the extent of the constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual
punishments shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of
torture, x x x and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden by that amendment to the constitution."72
In In Re: Kemmler,73 Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of that same Court stated that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and barbarous,
something more than the mere extinguishment of life."74
Again, in Weems v. U.S.,75 Mr. Justice McKenna held for the Court that
cadena temporal and its accessory penalties "has no fellow in American
legislation. Let us remember that it has come to us from a government of a
different form and genus from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment
and that which accompanies and follows imprisonment. It is unusual in
character. Its punishments come under the condemnation of the Bill of Rights,
both on account of their degree and kind. And they would have those bad
attributes even if they were found in a Federal enactment, and not taken from
an alien source."
In Echegaray v. Executive Secretary,76 this Court in a per curiam Decision
held that Republic Act No. 8177,77 even if it does not provide in particular the
details involved in the execution by lethal injection, is not cruel, degrading or
inhuman, and is thus constitutional. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
merely incidental in carrying out the execution of the death penalty and does
not fall within the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment.78
The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not
fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.79
In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty
meted for the crime of malversation of public funds "that ha[ve] been
replenished, remitted and/or returned" to the government is cruel and
therefore unconstitutional, "as government has not suffered any damage."80
The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public
officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate
or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall permit any other
person to take such public funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall
otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.81
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it
may only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because
damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible
in harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution.82 The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law.83 It is presumed that the legislature has acted
within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that every
statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed to be
valid and constitutional.84
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show
why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its
presumption of constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or
inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
IV. On the penalty
The Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In imposing
the penalty, it found that petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of payment which is akin to voluntary surrender.
Article 217 penalizes malversation in the following tenor:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of
malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall
take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property,
wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved is more than 12,000 but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the
amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses. (Underscoring supplied)
The amount malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, which has a
range of seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40)
years.
However, the commission of the crime was attended by the mitigating
circumstance akin to voluntary surrender. As correctly observed by the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner restituted the full amount even before the
prosecution could present its evidence. That is borne by the records.
It bears stressing that the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in
any way exonerate an accused, as payment is not one of the elements of
extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum
misappropriated, even before the commencement of the criminal prosecution,
does not exempt the guilty person from liability for the crime.85 At most, then,
payment of the amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating
circumstance86 akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of
Page 34 of 129
Article 1387 in relation to paragraph 1088 of the same Article of the Revised
Penal Code.
But the Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a
wrong,89 again in relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13.90
The records bear out that petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under
his custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine love for his
brother and his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to
pay off a debt owed by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated
funds went to his medications for his debilitating diabetes.
Further, as shown earlier, petitioner restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000.00) of the funds in less than one month and a half and said small
balance in three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5,
1999. Evidently, there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Of course, the end does not justify the means. To condone what petitioner has
done because of the nobility of his purpose or financial emergencies will
become a potent excuse for malefactors and open the floodgates for more
corruption in the government, even from "small fry" like him.
The bottom line is a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant
circumstances and commensurate with the gravity of the offense committed.
Thus, a reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is in order. Article
64 of the Revised Penal Code is explicit:
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. – In
cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contains three periods, whether
it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three difference penalties, each
one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of Articles 76
and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty, the following
rules, according to whether there are no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances:
xxxx
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by law, in the period that it may deem applicable, according to
the number and nature of such circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, the prescribed
penalty is reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its medium period, to be imposed in any of its periods. The new
penalty has a range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,91 the
maximum term could be ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
maximum, while the minimum term is again one degree lower92 and could be
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional
maximum.
In the 1910 case of U.S. v. Reyes,93 the trial judge entered a judgment of
conviction against the accused and meted to him the penalty of "three years’
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he failed to
pay, which subsidiary imprisonment, however, should not exceed one third of
the principal penalty" and to be "perpetually disqualified for public office and to
pay the costs." This was well within the imposable penalty then under Section
1 of Act No. 1740,94 which is "imprisonment for not less than two months nor
more than ten years and, in the discretion of the court, by a fine of not more
than the amount of such funds and the value of such property."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused’s conviction was affirmed but
his sentence was modified and reduced to six months. The court, per Mr.
Justice Torres, reasoned thus:
For the foregoing reasons the several unfounded errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been fully refuted, since in conclusion it is fully
shown that the accused unlawfully disposed of a portion of the municipal
funds, putting the same to his own use, and to that of other persons in
violation of Act. No. 1740, and consequently he has incurred the penalty
therein established as principal of the crime of misappropriation; and even
though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the rules of the Penal
Code, the court in using its discretional powers as authorized by law, believes
that the circumstances present in the commission of crimes should be taken
into consideration, and in the present case the amount misappropriated was
refunded at the time the funds were counted.95 (Underscoring supplied)
We opt to exercise an analogous discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification.
He is likewise ORDERED to pay a fine of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the
funds malversed.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner),
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
(1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale
Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then
engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered to sell the
said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and
as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k
diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced
by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the
proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a
period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds
of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was
able to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value
of the said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which
reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1)
men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's
bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth
₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of
said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the
same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items, with
intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far
from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the
sale thereof, and despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused
to return the said items or to remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand
Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said
Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a
plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone
testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the
lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia,
who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base
employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner
denied having transacted any business with private complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for
which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt
was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the
supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he did not
even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
Page 35 of 129
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1),
subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS
AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS
MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of
petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated
July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as
maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of 7 years.
The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this
Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE
ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE
MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR
ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID
NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD,
OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE
INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT
FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH
WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT
[PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF
SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE
LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF
THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE
STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN
EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO
THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to
their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the
designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry
even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent
any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or
that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of
discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in affirming the
factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both
procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court,
admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and
its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating
the best evidence rule. However, the records show that petitioner never
objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was identified,
marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA also
correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his
Comment to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party
failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered
in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally
defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does
not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be
returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one
testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable. The CA did not
err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and in reiterating
that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the
crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is
the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice
of the owner6 and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of
the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter
fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory
designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or
information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was
committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows
compliance with the foregoing rule. That the time of the commission of the
offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991" is not
likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the
same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a
material ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of
the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof
is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the
prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso
facto defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said
[pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient
compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot now be
allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred
against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or
denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by
the offended party on the offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the
offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his
testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner
after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and
asked petitioner about the same items with the latter promising to pay them.
Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
Page 36 of 129
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction
could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic)
when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you find him?
a No, sir.
q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
a I talked to him, sir.
q How many times?
a Two times, sir.
q What did you talk (sic) to him?
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him
where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially
or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10
Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word
"demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon
the person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the
money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.12 As
expounded in Asejo v. People:13
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand
under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court
observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa
under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word
"demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a
written demand as evidence is not fatal.
In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the
money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a
demand, thus:
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the
existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to
account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by
other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to
prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave
petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in
the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same
within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was misappropriation when petitioner
failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took
place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed
period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the
latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by
petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the
trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied
the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The
assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their
testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on
this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on persons
convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature apparently
pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it
enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached
no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first impression, they
decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to
give their academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously
complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria,
Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments
before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de
oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this
Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said
range of penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation. What the
legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the
said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would
be encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This,
however, does not render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be
appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed
but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. -
Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to
repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision,
and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the
reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the
subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without
suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused
by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne
out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to
repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and thereafter, report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the
same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a
deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any penal legislation, thus,
the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act
punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the
first except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but
the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy
therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court
considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act committed.
Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need
for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B.
Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the
Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena
sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except those
previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem
it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice
will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of
a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in
such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions
which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-
Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited
commentary, thus:
Page 37 of 129
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle
that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing
to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or
not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular
statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which
commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to
enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a
given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and
unusual punishment." A petition for clemency should be addressed to the
Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property
be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to
₱100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be
remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the
penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to
change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the
RPC intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it
included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume
why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject
penalties in order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the
legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further
commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that
it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime
of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered,
the legislature lowered it to ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature
lowered the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may
apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present
penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of
their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the
penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph,
and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases,
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if
the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed
6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed
200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions
shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos,
when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall
have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-
provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the
proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the penalty is
imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem
that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the
penalty proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one
degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to
maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender
qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum period and may
even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty
after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months)
is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would
seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive.
The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing
stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the
gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of
determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the
penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the act committed
and the value of the thing stolen or the damage caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be
modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00,
punished by prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1
day to 10 years).
2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,
punished by prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum
(2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck
down as unconstitutional because it is absurd.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual
punishment.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is
more than Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:

3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental
by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by
1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Congress.

4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by JUSTICE PERALTA:

arresto mayor medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day
to 2 years and 4 months). But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred
Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...
5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). DEAN DIOKNO:

6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
arresto mayor medium.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
x x x x.
For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty
modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows: of one (1) year, did I get you right?

1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, DEAN DIOKNO:

punishable by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4
years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).25 Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory
interpretation.
2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 JUSTICE PERALTA:
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).26
Ah ...
3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 DEAN DIOKNO:
months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum
(4 months and 1 day to 6 months). JUSTICE PERALTA:

An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed But if we de ... (interrupted)
amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the
RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause. DEAN DIOKNO:

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is ....then....
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness,27 which has four JUSTICE PERALTA:
requisites:
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; court cannot fix the amount ...

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; DEAN DIOKNO:

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and No, Your Honor.

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 JUSTICE PERALTA:

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest ... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-
on substantial distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR was
devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would DEAN DIOKNO:
receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved, because a
person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as someone No, Your Honor.
who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the
IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing JUSTICE PERALTA:
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist
today. The Court cannot do that.

Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and DEAN DIOKNO:
declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in Could not be.
case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00?
It seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers, which leads JUSTICE PERALTA:
us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to refer these matters
to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws. The only remedy is to go to Congress...

Page 38 of 129
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and determine the value or the amount.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of
Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Thank you.
x x x x29
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean
Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the
application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual
punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its form. The court
therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence is
proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the
offense, and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious
crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3)
Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case,
because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty
imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the
latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a "no account"
check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime would have been five
years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent was
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South
Dakota’s recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely,
the factual antecedents of Solem are different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the
imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the
imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and
confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After accepting and allowing
the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon such person
the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a
subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of
imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are
dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the
proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money
malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed
two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos
but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
Page 39 of 129
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if
the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than
twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses
money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if
the amount malversed is ₱200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now
becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may
not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 compared to
the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e.,
Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically
Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally
defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15
years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be
the case, because in the crime of malversation, the public official takes
advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the
government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon
things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken
and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also,
in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent
on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase
the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole
basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no
longer the element of force employed in entering the premises. It may likewise
cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under
Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is punishable by
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months
and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if
the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or
intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime
of Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision
mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the
penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the
basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest
penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum
periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the damage caused
exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto mayor (1 month
and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the
value of the damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount
involved does not exceed ₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the
proposal, ₱200.00 will now become ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the
fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now become ₱20,000.00. The
amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in
nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony
penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also
amend Article 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of
Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or
impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may
also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment
and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to wit:
Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National
Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights
in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other
forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other
deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331
(Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). Other
crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213
(Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215
(Prohibited Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218
(Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a
responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also
affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal
Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing
timber or other forest products without license as an offense as grave as and
equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the
Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense
is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products involved in the
offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this
particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is
concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the
RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular
law is not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal
Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by
the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and
necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the intentions of the
framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study of the
applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within
the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to
conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after
due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the
questioned law or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt
to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the
Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate
informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the
Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code,37 each one proposing
much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were promulgated
decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far
different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way
that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the
course of such application or construction, it should not make or supervise
legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort,
remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant
to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner that would give
effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent
and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching
upon the primary function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise,
this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers by means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a
Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict
shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of
Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance
by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the
death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of
monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction
that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the
civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the
accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as restitution.
Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is
the basis in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the
reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense
cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the
suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only
imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00.
The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for
the award cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil
indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222039 of
the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded.
It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award
of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense
committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are
generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or
amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers. It is
Page 40 of 129
the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear
and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s
opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be declared
unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount
involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the law
is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be
punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of
criminal justice would occur when every accused convicted of the crime of
estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that should be
imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and
directly runs counter to what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation
of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No.
765940 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before this
Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet
still, from the time the death penalty was re-imposed until its lifting in June
2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede the imposition of
the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the
purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was
through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty
that led to its non-imposition and not via the intervention of the Court.
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot
declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates
unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the
opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that the
constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more
so in the present controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment
rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for
instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the
stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual.
Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the
punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive," "wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of
the community."45
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the
law and adapt it to our modern time.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely
adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money
based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and variables
that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon
before the said values could be accurately and properly adjusted. The effects
on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic impact, and
the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive
at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law.
Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient
personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to
validly effect these changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly
and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to
this conclusion, to wit:
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the
value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Per capita income.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Per capita income.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Consumer price index.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yes.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be
determined utilizing all of those economic terms.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, but ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and
peg the value to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
That is legislative in nature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to
make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno
echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but
also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in
the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty
pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as
simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken
into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
circumstances" in its decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the
validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s
adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the Court had
previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v.
Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice
and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial
legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is
truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power
belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear-cut
divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers to civil
liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution. It is truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said
on penalties because, as earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the
value of money, but on several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as
to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum
sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus,
it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Page 41 of 129
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified
the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium period, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year
for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme,
Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive, thus:
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of
the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor
in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding
one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or
reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three,
periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the
time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in the
penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying
the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and minimum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three
equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form one
period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In the present case, the
amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the
maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years,
8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that
a period of one year shall be added to the penalty for every additional
₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total
penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the
₱22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each additional
₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years. Taking the
maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7
years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law
for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then be prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere
from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and
usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous
proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007
of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated
March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315,
paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be
furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Department of Justice.
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
Double jeopardy
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3580 March 22, 1950
CONRADO CARMELO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, respondent-appellees.
Jose A. Fojas for petitioner.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor
Martiniano P. Vivo for respondents.
MORAN, C.J.:
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted
upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several
serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for
a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his
habitual labor for the same period of time. On December 29, 1949, at eight
o'clock in the morning, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged,
and at 10:15 in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his
wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on January
3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an amended information
was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused
filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy,
motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the
amended information.
Brushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into the substance of the
issues raised, it may readily be stated that amended information was rightly
allowed to stand. Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, is as follows:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or
information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and
may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information
and order the filing of a new one for the treason that the proper offense was
not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second
jeopardy for the same or identical offense.
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,"
according to article III, section 1 (20) of our constitution. The rule of double
jeopardy had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution
was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and
the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner
without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with
the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason,
justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in
idem, in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every system of
jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. It
found expression in the Spanish Law and in the Constitution of the United
States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one of the
fundamental rights of the citizen.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a
second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in
the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense, under the general
rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense charged
is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the
two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when
the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. This so called "same-evidence test" which
was found to be vague and deficient, was restated by the Rules of Court in a
clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between
two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first,
but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim
Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In
this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
Page 42 of 129
included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of
the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who
has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or
identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. "As the
Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down step to step,
bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither
can it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same
result." (People vs. Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Lim
Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs.
Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)
This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not
in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution,
to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the
accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put
him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S. 442, followed
by this Court in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and these
two cases are similar to the instant case. Stating it in another form, the rule is
that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and,
together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second
jeopardy if indicated for the new offense.
This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our constitution for
was the one prevailing in jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was
promulgated, and no other meaning could have been intended by our Rules of
Court.
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be
necessarily included in another offense, for the purpose of determining the
existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in existence during the
pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then
inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and
consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second
jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under
such circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize
the existence of a condition where such condition in reality does not exist.
General terms of a statute or regulation should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.
It will always, therefore, be presumed that exceptions have been intended to
their language which would avoid results of this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil.,
641.)
When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no intention of
abandoning the ruling laid down in the Diaz case, and the proof of this is that
although the said Rules were approved on December 1939, yet on January
30, 1940, this Court decided the Espino case reiterating therein the Diaz
doctrine. Had that doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the Rules of Court
as being unwise, unjust or obnoxious, logically it would have likewise been
repudiated in the Espino case by reason if consistency and as a matter of
justice to the accused, who should in consequence have been acquitted
instead of being sentenced to a heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine
that had already been found to be wrong. There was absolutely no reason to
preclude this Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino case, for as a
mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in the decision of any case
where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the mind of the Court, even after the
approval of the Rules, was not against but in favor of said doctrine.
For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People vs.
Tarok, 73 Phil., 260, as followed in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to
No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is not only contrary to the real meaning of "double
jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of Court but is also
obnoxious to the administration of justice. If, in obedience to the mandate of
the law, the prosecuting officer files an information within six hours after the
accused is arrested, and the accused claiming his constitutional right to a
speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on new fact supervenes which,
together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense,
under the Tarok ruling, no way is open by which the accused may be
penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt. Furthermore, such a ruling
may open the way to suspicions or charges of conclusion between the
prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave detriment of public interest
and confidence in the administration of justice, which cannot happen under the
Diaz ruling.
Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already
suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new and greater offense
under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty may be credited to him
in case of conviction for the second offense.
For all the foregoing, the petition is denied, and the respondent court may
proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the amended information.
Without costs.
Ozaeta, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24447 June 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLY OBSANIA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, on appeal by the People of the Philippines, is an order,
dated January 8, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
dismissing, upon motion of the defense, an indictment for rape against Willy
Obsania.
On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime,
Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and
Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a
complaint for rape with robbery, 1 alleging
That on or about the 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the
afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan, municipality of
Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by
means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then
and there have carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against
her will and on the roadside in the ricefields at the above-mentioned place
while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for
further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape
against the accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with
an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel
moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally
defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent
information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the
jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted the motion and ordered
dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the
offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with
'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this
order, the fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Two issues are tendered for resolution, namely: first, are "lewd designs" an
indispensable element which should be alleged in the complaint?, and,
second, does the present appeal place the accused in double jeopardy?
Both must be answered in the negative.
The accused, in his motion to dismiss, as well as the trial judge, in his order of
dismissal, rely basically on the ruling in People vs. Gilo (L-18202, April 30,
1964). In the case which involved a prosecution for acts of lasciviousness this
Court, in passing, opined that "lewd design" is
... an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as abduction,
seduction and rape, including acts of lasciviousness ... an element that
characterizes all crimes against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal
intent of the offender, and such element must be always present in order that
they may be considered in contemplation of law.
Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably interpreted as requiring
an explicit allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for rape. We hold in no
uncertain terms that in a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd
design" or "unchaste motive", for to require such averment is to demand a
patent superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape and the unchaste design is
manifest in the very act itself — the carnal knowledge of a woman through
force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age. 2
It is clear that the complaint here satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency
of an indictment for rape as it unmistakably alleges that the accused had
carnal knowledge of the complainant by means of violence and intimidation.
We therefore hold that the trial judge erred in dismissing the case on the
proffered grounds that the complaint was defective for failure to allege "lewd
design" and, as a consequence of such infirmity, that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case. The error of the trial judge was in confusing
the concept of jurisdiction with that of insufficiency in substance of an
indictment.
We come now to the more important issue of double jeopardy. The accused
maintains that "assuming, arguendo, that the argument is right that the court a
quo has jurisdiction, the appeal of the Government constitutes double
jeopardy."
Page 43 of 129
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the
defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. 3 Correlatively, section
9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against
him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction
or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the
same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an
accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the
court a quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the
record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence,
the only remaining and decisive question is whether the dismissal of the case
was without the express consent of the accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial
judge upon his motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that
under the prevailing jurisprudence, citing People vs. Bangalao, et al. (94 Phil.
354, February 17, 1954), People vs. Labatete (L-12917, April 27, 1960),
People vs. Villarin (L-19795, July 31, 1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L-20314,
August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal of a criminal action, even upon the
instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss, does not bar him
from pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal by the
Government or in a new prosecution for the same offense. The accused
suggests that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the previous
ruling of this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other than on
the merits, upon motion of the accused personally or through counsel, such
dismissal is to be regarded as with the express consent of the accused and
consequently he is deemed to have waived 4 his right to plead double
jeopardy and/or he is estopped 5 from claiming such defense on appeal by the
Government or in another indictment for the same offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy — dismissal or termination of the
original case without the express consent of the defendant — has evoked
varied and apparently conflicting rulings from this Court. We must untangle
this jurisprudential maze and fashion out in bold relief a ruling not susceptible
of equivocation. Hence, a searching extended review of the pertinent cases is
imperative.
The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was enunciated and formally
labelled as such for the first time in 1949 in People vs. Salico, supra, with
three justices dissenting. 6 In that case, the provincial fiscal appealed from the
order of the trial court dismissing, upon motion of the defendant made
immediately after the prosecution had rested its case, an indictment for
homicide, on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the crime
was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or, more
specifically, that the municipality of Victorias in which the crime was allegedly
committed was compromised within the province of Negros Occidental.
Rejecting the claim of the accused that the appeal placed him in double
jeopardy, this Court held that the dismissal was erroneous because the
evidence on record showed that the crime was committed in the town of
Victorias and the trial judge should have taken judicial notice that the said
municipality was included within the province of Negros Occidental and
therefore the offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the
court of first instance of the said province. In ruling that the appeal by the
Government did not put the accused in peril of a second jeopardy, this Court
stressed that with "the dismissal of the case by the court below upon motion of
the defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy," and "assuming, arguendo,
that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and would
be placed in double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his
constitutional right not to be put in danger of being convicted twice for the
same offense." Mr. Justice Felicisimo Feria, speaking for the majority,
reasoned that
... when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the
dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense;
because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85
Phil. 832, March 30, 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil. 299, March 5,
1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil. 53, March 28, 1952), Co Te Hue vs.
Encarnacion (94 Phil. 258, January 26, 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (L-
15516, December 17, 1966).
In Marapao, the defendant was indicted for slight physical injuries in the
municipal court of Sibonga, Cebu. After the prosecution had rested its case, a
continuance was had, and when trial was resumed, the court, upon motion of
the defense, ordered the case dismissed for failure of the prosecution to
appear. However, the court reconsidered this order upon representation of the
fiscal who appeared moments later, and ordered the defense to present its
evidence. The accused moved to get aside the latter order on the ground that
it placed him in double jeopardy. Acceding to this motion, the court dismissed
the case. Subsequently, the accused was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu with the offense of assault upon a person in authority, based
on the same facts alleged in the former complaint for slight physical injuries.
Again, upon motion of the accused, the trial court dismissed the new
indictment on the ground of double jeopardy. From this order, the prosecution
appealed. In upholding the appeal of the Government, this Court observed that
although the information for assault necessarily embraced the crime of slight
physical injuries for which the accused was indicted in the justice of the peace
court,
... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor acquitted of the
previous charge against him for slight physical injuries, for that case was
dismissed upon his own request before trial could be finished. Having himself
asked for such dismissal, before a judgment of conviction or acquittal could
have been rendered, the appellee is not entitled to invoke the defense of
double jeopardy...
In Gandicela, this Court had occasion to reiterate the Salico ruling:
But where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving for, the dismissal of
the case against him, as in the present case, even if the court or judge states
in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is
without prejudice on the part of the fiscal to file another information, the
dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for
the same offense. (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Salico, 84 Phil.
722.).
And in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in that
case, this Court held:
According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise
than upon the merits at any stage before judgment, without the express
consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid
complaint or information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge,
the dismissal of the case shall be definite or a bar to another prosecution for
the same offense; but if it is dismissed upon the petition or with the express
consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without prejudice or not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the
defendant's action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his
constitutional right not to be prosecuted again for the same offense.
In Pinuela, as in Salico, the prosecution had presented its evidence against
the defendant, and the trial court, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the
criminal action for lack of evidence showing that the crime charged was
committed within its territorial jurisdiction. On appeal by the Government, this
Court found that the evidence showed otherwise and, like in Salico, the
majority rejected the plea of double jeopardy interposed by the accused on the
ground that his virtual instigation of the erroneous dismissal amounted to a
waiver of his right against a second jeopardy.
In Co Te Hue, it was the theory of the petitioner that the charge of estafa filed
against him having been dismissed, albeit provisionally, without his express
consent, its revival constituted double jeopardy which bars a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense. This claim was traversed by the Solicitor
General who contended that considering what had transpired in the
conference between the parties, the provisional dismissal was no bar to the
subsequent prosecution for the reason that the dismissal was made with the
defendant's express consent. This Court sustained the view of the Solicitor
General, thus:
We are inclined to uphold the view of the Solicitor General. From the transcript
of the notes taken at the hearing in connection with the motion for dismissal, it
appears that a conference was held between petitioner and the offended party
in the office of the fiscal concerning the case and that as a result of that
conference the offended party filed the motion to dismiss. It also appears that
as no action has been taken on said motion, counsel for petitioner invited the
attention of the court to the matter who acted thereon only after certain
explanation was given by said counsel. And when the order came the court
made it plain that the dismissal was merely provisional in character. It can be
plainly seen that the dismissal was effected not only with the express consent
of the petitioner but even upon the urging of his counsel. This attitude of
petitioner, or his counsel, takes this case out of the operation of the rule.
In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed
provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon
the urging of his counsel, there can be no double jeopardy under section 9,
Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. This decision
subscribes substantially to the doctrine on waiver established in Salico.
The validity and currency of the Salico doctrine were intimated in the recent
case of People vs. Fajardo (L-18257, June 29, 1966), and six months later
were reaffirmed in People vs. Desalisa, supra.
In Fajardo, this Court, through Mr. Justice Querube Makalintal, observed:
Page 44 of 129
The record does not reveal that appellees expressly agreed to the dismissal of
the information as ordered by the trial Judge or that they performed any act
which could be considered as express consent within the meaning of the rule.
While they did file a motion asking that the case be quashed or that a
reinvestigation thereof be ordered, the court granted neither alternative. What
it did was to order the prosecution to amend the complaint. This order was in
effect a denial of the motion to quash, and it was only after the prosecution
failed to amend that the court dismissed the case on that ground.
Consequently, even under the theory enunciated in some decisions of this
Court (People vs. Salico, etc.) that if a valid and sufficient information is
erroneously dismissed upon motion of the defendant he is deemed to have
waived the plea of double jeopardy in connection with an appeal from the
order of dismissal, appellees here are not precluded from making such plea.
To paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion to dismiss, the
defendants would not have been entitled to protection against double
jeopardy.
Then in Desalisa, this Court, in a unanimous decision penned by Mr. Justice
Jesus Barrera, held that
... The ruling in the case of Salico, that the act of the defendant in moving for
the dismissal of the case constitutes a waiver of the right to avail of the
defense of double jeopardy, insofar as it applies to dismissals which do not
amount to acquittal or dismissal of the case on the merits, cannot be
considered to have been abandoned by the subsequent decisions on the
matter. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
... an appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal
complaint) by the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant,
and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon
by the appellate court is purely legal; so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (Emphasis
supplied)
The doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first
enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on
a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is
estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support
of his plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the
same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other
than on the merits, sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to
be with his express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing the
defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same
offense.
In Acierto, the defendant was charged before a United States court-martial
with having defrauded the Government of the United States, through
falsification of documents, within a military base of the United States in the
Philippines. The challenge by the accused against the jurisdiction of the
military tribunal was brushed aside, and he was convicted. On review, the
verdict was reversed by the Commanding General who sustained Acierto's
position on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, he was convicted
of estafa and falsification based on the same facts by the Court of first
Instance of Rizal. On appeal to this Court, he claimed former jeopardy in the
court-martial proceedings, asserting that the military court actually had
jurisdiction. In a unanimous 7 decision, this Court, through Mr. Justice Pedro
Tuason, ruled:
This is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military trial. As
stated, he there attacked the court-martial's jurisdiction with the same vigor
that he now says the court-martial did have jurisdiction; and thanks to his
objections, so we incline to believe, the Commanding General, upon
consultation with, and the recommendation of, the Judge Advocate General in
Washington, disapproved the court-martial proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military authorities, the
defendant was estopped from demurring to the Philippine court's jurisdiction
and pleading double jeopardy on the strength of his trial by the court-martial, A
party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent
positions which if allowed would result in brazen deception. It is trifling with the
courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith, for
an accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him and, after he has
succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned over that
the first has committed error in yielding to his plea. (Emphasis supplied)
The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al. (96 Phil.
827, April 30, 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al. (98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956);
People vs. Casiano (L-15309, February 16, 1961), and People vs. Archilla (L-
15632, February 28, 1961).
The defendants in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., were charged as
accessories to the crime of theft committed by their brother, Anselmo, the
principal accused. The latter pleaded guilty to simple theft and was sentenced
accordingly. The former pleaded not guilty and subsequently filed a motion to
quash on the ground that being brothers and sisters of the principal accused,
they were exempt from criminal responsibility for the acts charged against
them in the information. Thereupon, the prosecution moved to amend the
information so as to allege that the defendants profited from the effects of the
crime. In view of this development, counsel for the defendants moved to
withdraw their motion to quash, and objected to the proposed amendment
which sought to change materially the information after plea without the
consent of the accused. Without acting on the petition to withdraw the motion
to quash, the trial court denied the motion of the prosecution on the ground
that the proposed amendment would substantially affect the fundamental
rights of the accused who were exempt from liability under the information
because of their relation to the principal culprit. Then the prosecution moved
for the dismissal of the case against the alleged accessories with reservation
to file a new information. The court ordered the dismissal without ruling on the
reservation. Subsequently, a new information was filed virtually reproducing
the previous one except that now there was an added allegation of intent to
gain. The lower court quashed the new information upon motion of the
accused on the ground of double jeopardy. On appeal by the prosecution, this
Court, thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that the plea of double jeopardy
was erroneously sustained because
In the first place, the accused-appellees herein filed a motion to quash on the
ground that they incurred no criminal liability under the facts alleged in the
information in the preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial court instead of
allowing the withdrawal of the motion to quash, virtually sustained the same
when it denied the fiscal's motion to amend, thereby forcing the latter to
dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that the former case was
terminated without the express consent of the accused. Secondly, the
defendants themselves showed that the information in the previous case was
insufficient to charge them with any criminal offense, in view of their
relationship with the principal accused; and it is well established doctrine that
for jeopardy to attach, there must be an information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction. Lastly, the herein accused having
successfully contended that the information in the former case was insufficient
to sustain a conviction, they cannot turn around now and claim that such
information was after all, sufficient and did place them in danger of jeopardy of
being convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no conviction
could be had in the previous case, they are in estoppel to contend now that
the information in the second case places them in jeopardy for the second
time. Their case comes within the spirit of the rule laid down in People vs.
Acierto.
Again, in People vs. Reyes, et al., supra, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief
Justice Paras, reiterated the Acierto ruling thus:
Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case
is dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint
or information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another
prosecution for the same offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging
in the second information that the former dismissal was wrong because the
complaint or information was valid.
In this particular case, upon motion of the defendants, the trial court dismissed
the information because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding
the fact that the offense charged was coercion under article 287 of the
Revised Penal Code. On appeal, however, this Court ruled that the dismissal
was erroneous because "although the offense named in the information is
coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the applicable provision is the first
paragraph, since the second paragraph also speaks of 'coercions'. Inasmuch
as the recitals in the information do not include violence, the inevitable
conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that described and penalized in
the second paragraph."
We come now to the case of People vs. Casiano. In this case the accused
was charged with estafa in a complaint filed with the justice of the peace court
of Rosales, Pangasinan. The accused waived her right to preliminary
investigation and the record was accordingly forwarded to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal filed an information for
"illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes." Upon arraignment
the defendant pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the defense filed a motion to
dismiss on the thesis that there had been no preliminary investigation of the
charge of illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes, and that
the absence of such preliminary investigation affected the jurisdiction of the
trial court. The motion was granted on the ground that the waiver made by the
defendant in the justice of the peace court did not deprive her of the right to a
preliminary investigation of an entirely different crime. On appeal to this Court,
it was held that the dismissal was erroneous because the allegations of the
information filed in the Court of First Instance were included in those of the
complaint filed in the justice of the peace court where the defendant had
already waived her right to a preliminary investigation. On the question of
whether the appeal placed the defendant in double jeopardy, this Court, thru
Mr. Chief Justice (then Associate Justice) Concepcion, observed that the
situation of Casiano was identical to that of the accused in Acierto
... were she to plead double jeopardy in this case, for such plea would require
the assertion of jurisdiction of the court of first instance to try her and that the
same erred in yielding to her plea therein for lack of authority therefor. In the
language of our decision in the Acierto case, it is immaterial whether or not the
court a quo had said authority. It, likewise, makes no difference whether or not
the issue raised by defendant in the lower court affected its jurisdiction. The
fact is that she contested its jurisdiction and that, although such pretense was
erroneous, she led the court to believe that it was correct and to act in
Page 45 of 129
accordance with such belief. The elementary principles of fair dealing and
good faith demand, accordingly, that she be estopped now from taking the
opposite stand in order to pave the way for a plea of double jeopardy, unless
the rule of estoppel laid down in the Acierto case is revoked. As a matter of
fact, said rule applies with greater force to the case at bar than to the Acierto
case, because the same involved two (2) separate proceedings before courts
deriving their authority from different sovereignties, whereas the appeal in the
case at bar is a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court, which like
this Supreme Court, is a creature of the same sovereignty. In short the
inconsistency and impropriety would be more patent and glaring in this case
than in that of Acierto, if appellant herein pleaded double jeopardy in this
instance.
This Court then forthnightly stated that "the rule of estoppel applied in the
Acierto case should be maintained, because:
1. It is basically and fundamentally sound and just.
2. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethics, which demand good
faith of the higher order in the practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal,
adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it
had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it
had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be
conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5 C.J.S. 861-863).
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position — that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon.
Twelve days after Casiano, this Court, in People vs. Archilla, supra, invoked
anew the doctrine of estoppel. In this case Alfreda Roberts, together with Jose
Archilla, was charged with bigamy. After pleading not guilty, Roberts, through
his counsel, filed a motion praying that the complaint be quashed with regard
to her on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute the
offense charged for failure to aver that "insofar as Alfreda Roberts is
concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla was her second marriage ..." On
appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial court erred in granting the
motion to quash, because the complaint was sufficient and at least charged
the accused as an accomplice. The defendant maintained that even if that
were true, the quashing of the information amounted to her acquittal which
prevented the prosecution from taking the said appeal as it would place her in
double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Felix Bautista Angelo, writing for the majority,
ruled that the trial court erred, and proceeded to emphasize that the accused
... cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing
the trial court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed.
In other words, appellee can not adopt a posture of double dealing without
running afoul with the doctrine of estoppel. It is well-settled that the parties to a
justiciable proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with
that which they sustained in the lower court (Williams v. McMicking, 17 Phil.
408; Molina v. Somes, etc.). Consequently, appellee is now estopped from
invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that she would still be
convicted under an information which she branded to be insufficient in the
lower court.
The accused in this case now before us nevertheless insists that the Salico
doctrine and "necessarily analogous doctrines" were abandoned by this Court
in Bangalao, Labatete, Villarin and Cloribel.
In Bangalao, the complaint filed by the victim's mother alleged that the rape
was committed "by means of force and intimidation" while the information filed
by the fiscal alleged that the offended party was a "minor and demented girl"
and that the defendants "successively had sexual intercourse with her by
means of force and against the will of Rosita Palban." After the accused had
pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the case on
the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the offense of rape
charged by the fiscal since it was distinct from the one alleged in the complaint
which did not aver that the victim was a demented girl". The lower court
sustained the motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal
by the prosecution, this Court held that the trial judge erred in dismissing the
case for lack of jurisdiction, but ruled, however, that the appeal could not
prosper because it placed the accused in double jeopardy.
As the court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon the filing of the
complaint by the mother of the offended party, the defendants-appellees would
be placed in double jeopardy if the appeal is allowed.
After mature analysis, we cannot agree that this Court in Bangalao impliedly
abandoned the Salico doctrine on waiver. Bangalao was decided solely on the
question of jurisdiction. This Court, however, after holding that the lower
tribunal had jurisdiction, decided outright to repress the appeal by the
Government on the ground of double jeopardy without considering whether the
appealed order of dismissal was issued with or without the express consent of
the accused (this aspect of double jeopardy not being in issue). Hence, the
ruling in Salico — that the dismissal was with the express consent of the
accused because it was granted upon his instigation thru a motion to dismiss
— was not passed upon in Bangalao.
A case of striking factual resemblance with Salico is People vs. Ferrer (100
Phil. 124, October 23, 1956). In this case, after the prosecution had rested, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction
of the trial court had not been published. Acting on this motion, the lower court
dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed. This Court found that the
evidence on record, contrary to the finding of the trial court, amply proved the
jurisdiction of the lower tribunal. However, without the defendant interposing
the plea of double jeopardy, this Court held that "the Government however
meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without violating the
right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy." Again, like in
Bangalao, this Court did not consider the nature of dismissal — whether it was
with or without the express consent of the defendant.
The accused in the case at bar avers that the Salico doctrine was formally and
expressly abandoned in People vs. Labatete, supra. In the latter case, the trial
court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the original information for
estafa on the ground that it did not allege facts constituting the offense
charged. The information recited that the accused had contracted a loan from
the complainant, giving as security the improvements and products of his
property (a piece of land), without averring that the said property, which was
allegedly mortgaged by the accused to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
formed part of the security. Consequently, the fiscal filed an amended
complaint alleging that the accused also gave as security the land in question,
which he later mortgaged to the damage and prejudice of the complaining
creditor. This amended information was also dismissed upon motion of the
defendant on the ground of double jeopardy. This Court, in sustaining the
appealed order of dismissal, held:
If the amended information were to be admitted, the accused will be deprived
of his defense of double jeopardy because by the amended information he is
sought to be made responsible for the same act of borrowing on a mortgage
for which he had already begun to be tried and acquitted by the dismissal of
the original information.
xxx xxx xxx
... the trial court found that the accused could not be found guilty of any
offense under the information. The judgment entered was not one of dismissal
but of acquittal, and whether the judgment is correct or incorrect, the same
constitutes a bar to the presentation of the amended information sought to be
introduced by the fiscal. (Emphasis supplied)
In not applying the Salico doctrine, this Court, through Mr. Justice Alejo
Labrador, expounded:
... The judgment of the trial court (in People vs. Salico) was in fact an acquittal
because of the failure on the part of the fiscal to prove that the crime was
committed within the jurisdiction of the court. The judgment was in fact a final
judgment of acquittal. The mere fact that the accused asked for his acquittal
after trial on the merits (after the prosecution had rested its case) is no reason
for saying that the case was "dismissed" with his express consent and he may
again be subjected to another prosecution.
From the above named statement, it is clear that what in Salico was
repudiated in Labatete was the premise that the dismissal therein was not on
the merits and not the conclusion that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
sought by the accused, is deemed to be with his express consent and
therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead double jeopardy in the event
of an appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for the same offense.
This Court, in Labatete, merely pointed out that the controverted dismissal in
Salico was in fact an acquittal." Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not
amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have applied and
prevailed. As a matter of fact we believe with the majority in Salico that the
dismissal therein was not on the merits and therefore did not amount to an
acquittal:
If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is
not an acquittal, inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again
prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction; and
it is elemental that in such case the defendant may again be prosecuted for
the same offense before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Granting, however, that the Salico doctrine was abandoned in Labatete, it was
resurrected in Desalisa. Moreover, Labatete never mentioned the doctrine of
estoppel enunciated in Acierto which had been repeatedly reaffirmed.
To bolster his contention that the Salico doctrine has been dropped from the
corpus of our jurisprudence, the accused cites People vs. Villarin, supra. Here
the accused appealed to the Court of First instance his conviction in the
inferior court for acts of lasciviousness with consent. After conducting the
preliminary investigation, the fiscal charged the accused with corruption of
minors. Villarin pleaded not guilty, and before the case could be heard, his
counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information did not
allege facts constituting the crime charged. Acting on this motion, the trial
Page 46 of 129
court dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court thru Mr.
Justice Felix Angelo Bautista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that
this error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order dismissal of the court a
quo and by remanding the case to it for further proceedings as now suggested
by the prosecution considering that the case was dismissed without the
express consent of the accused even if it was upon the motion of his counsel,
for to do so would place the accused in double jeopardy. The only exception to
the rule on the matter is when the dismissal is with the consent of the accused,
and here this consent has not been obtained. (Emphasis supplied)
Villarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above statement, that this
Court therein sustained the plea of double jeopardy on the ground that
dismissal was without the express consent of the defendant as it was ordered
"upon the motion of his counsel" and not upon motion of the defendant
himself. This conclusion is rather unfortunate and must be rectified, for the
settled rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution bind his client.
Thus, in People vs. Romero (89 Phil. 672, July 31, 1951), this Court held
categorically that
The fact that the counsel for the defendant, and not the defendant himself
personally moved for the dismissal of the case against him, had the same
effect as if the defendant had personally moved for such dismissal, inasmuch
as the act of the counsel in the prosecution of the defendant's cases was the
act of the defendant himself , for the only case in which the defendant cannot
be represented by his counsel is in pleading guilty according to Section 3,
Rule 114, of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
On this consideration alone, we cannot agree with the accused in the case at
bar that this Court in Villarin intended to abandon the Salico ruling. Had the
motion to dismiss filed by Villarin's counsel been considered as one made by
the defendant himself, as should have been done, the Villarin case should
have been resolved consistent with the doctrine of waiver in Salico and/or that
of estoppel in Acierto.
As a final citation in support of his theory, the accused in the case at bar
invokes People vs. Clolibel, supra, where this Court, in sustaining the plea of
double jeopardy interposed by the defendants, stated inter alia:
In asserting that Criminal Case No. 45717 may still be reinstated, the
petitioner adopts the ruling once followed by the Court to the effect that a
dismissal upon the defendant's own motion is a dismissal consented to by him
and, consequently, will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense, because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver
of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents
the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 772) But, this authority
has long been abandoned and the ruling therein expressly repudiated.
Thus, in the case of People v. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761, June 29, 1959, citing
People v. Bangalao, L-5610, February 17, 1954; People v. Diaz, L-6518,
March 30, 1954; People v. Abano, L-7862, May 17, 1955; and People v.
Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956, We said:
... In reaching the above conclusion, this Court has not overlooked the ruling in
People vs. Salico, 47 O.G. 4765, to the effect that a dismissal upon
defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense as said dismissal was not without the express consent of the
defendant, which ruling the prosecution now invokes in support of its appeal;
but said ruling is not now controlling, having been modified or abandoned in
subsequent cases wherein this Court sustained the theory of double jeopardy
despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied)
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the
express consent of the defendant, has no application to a case where the
dismissal, as here, is predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial.
(People vs. Tacneng, et al., G.R. No. L-12082, April 30, 1959). (emphasis
supplied)
The above statements must be taken in the proper context and perspective.
As previously explained, Bangalao, Ferrer, and even Labatete, did not actually
abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases even
implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in
Acierto). In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng and Robles which are cited above, like in
Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants, were considered
acquittals because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a
speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute. Therefore,
even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a
dismissal not amounting to an acquittal.
This Court, through Mr. Justice Marceliano Montemayor, held in People vs.
Diaz (94 Phil. 714, March 30, 1954):
Here the prosecution was not even present on the day of trial so as to be in a
position to proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused. The case was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without
asking for postponement or giving any explanation, just failed to appear. So
the dismissal of the case, though at the instance of defendant Diaz may,
according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be regarded as an acquittal.
(emphasis supplied)
A similar result was reached by this Court thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, in
People vs. Abano (97 Phil. 28, May 27, 1955), in this wise:
After a perusal of the documents attached to the petition for a writ of certiorari,
we fail to find an abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge. He
took pains to inquire about the nature of the ailment from which the
complaining witness claimed she was suffering. He continued the trial three
times, to wit: on 27 May, 1 and 12 June. The defendant was entitled to a
speedy trial. When on 15 June, the last day set for the resumption of the trial,
the prosecution failed to secure the continuance thereof and could not produce
further evidence because of the absence of the complaining witness, the
respondent judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the
defense ... The defendant was placed in jeopardy for the offense charged in
the information and the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal
would place him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
(emphasis supplied)
Then in People vs. Tacneng (L-12082, April 30, 1959), Mr. Justice Pastor
Endencia, speaking for a unanimous Court, stressed that
... when criminal case No. 1793 was called for hearing for the third time and
the fiscal was not ready to enter into trial due to the absence of his witnesses,
the herein appellees had the right to object to any further postponement and to
ask for the dismissal of the case by reason of their constitutional right to a
speedy trial; and if pursuant to that objection and petition for dismissal the
case was dismissed, such dismissal ammounted to an acquittal of the herein
appellees which can be invoked, as they did, in a second prosecution for the
same offense. (emphasis supplied)
And this Court proceeded to distinguish the case from People vs. Salico, thus:
We are fully aware that pursuant to our ruling in the case of Peo. v. Salico, 45
O.G. No. 4, 1765-1776, and later reiterated in Peo vs. Romero, L-4517-20,
July 31, 1951, a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not without the
express consent of the defendant. This ruling, however, has no application to
the instant case, since the dismissal in those cases was not predicated, as in
the case at bar, on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial, but on different
grounds. In the Salico case, the dismissal was based on the ground that the
evidence for the prosecution did not show that the crime was committed within
the territorial jurisdiction of the court which, on appeal, we found that it was, so
the case was remanded for further proceedings; and in the Romero case the
dismissal was due to the non-production of other important witnesses by the
prosecution on a date fixed by the court and under the understanding that no
further postponement at the instance of the government would be entertained.
In both cases, the right of a defendant to a speedy trial was never put in issue.
(emphasis supplied)
The gravamen of the foregoing decisions was reiterated in People vs. Robles
(L-12761, June 29, 1959) where the trial court, upon motion of the defendant,
dismissed the case on the ground that the failure of the prosecution to present
its evidence despite several postponements granted at its instance, denied the
accused a speedy trial. In rejecting the appeal of the Government, this Court
held:
In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 11065 is not provisional in character but one which is
tantamount to acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for
the same offense.
In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from
September 27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when
it was called for trial, after numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of
the prosecution. On the latter date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial,
and upon motion of defendants, the case was dismissed. This Court held "that
the dismissal here complained of was not truly a 'dismissal' but an acquittal.
For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right
to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on the date
of trial." (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no
parallelism between Cloribel and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and
the instant case, on the other. Here the controverted dismissal was predicated
on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective
and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the court a quo, and not on the
right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to
prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under
consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel
and in the other related cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because
the failure to prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case
against the accused, who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine
qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the
defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must
not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal.
Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the periphery of the said
doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our
jurisprudence.
Page 47 of 129
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case is hereby
remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law.
No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29270 November 23, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
RODRIGO YORAC, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor
General
Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for plaintiff-
appellant.
Vicente F. Delfin for defendant-appellee.
FERNANDO, J.:
The constitutional right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense1
was the basis for a motion to quash filed by the accused, now appellee,
Rodrigo Yorac. He was prosecuted for frustrated murder arising allegedly from
having assaulted, attacked, and hit with a piece of wood the offended party, for
which he had been previously tried and sentenced for slight physical injuries,
his plea being one of guilt. The later information for frustrated murder was
based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the
former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much
more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater
injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by the
Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no,
supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained
the motion to quash in an order of June 21, 1968. The People appealed. As
the order complained of is, fully supported by the latest authoritative ruling of
this Tribunal, People v. Buling,2 we have to affirm.
In the brief for the People of the Philippines, it was shown that the accused
Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of
Bacolod, the offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the
medical certificate issued in April 10, 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident
physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since
April 8, 1968 up to the present time for head injury."3 Then came a plea of
guilty by the accused on April 16, 1968 resulting in his being penalized to
suffer ten days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On
April 18, 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging the same defendant with
frustrated murder arising from the same act against the aforesaid victim Lam
Hock upon another medical certificate dated April 17, 1968 issued by the
same Dr. Zulueta. In the medical certificate of April 17, 1968, it was made to
appear that the confinement of the offended party in the hospital was the result
of: "1. Contusion with lacerated wound 4 inches parieto-occipital region scalp
mid portion. 2. Cerebral concussion, moderately severe, secondary."4
Moreover, it further contained a statement that the X-ray finding did not yield
any "radiographic evidence of fracture." The healing period barring
complications, was declared to be from eighteen to twenty-one days.5
Afterwards, a motion to quash was filed by the accused on June 10, 1968 on
the ground that, having been previously convicted of slight physical injuries by
the City Court of Bacolod and having already served the penalty imposed on
him for the very same offense, the prosecution for frustrated murder arising
out of the same act committed against the same offended party, the crime of
slight physical injuries necessarily being included in that of frustrated murder,
he would be placed in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.6 In its
well-reasoned resolution of June 21, 1968 granting the motion to quash and
ordering the dismissal of a criminal case for frustrated murder against the
accused, Judge Alampay relied on People v. Buling which, in his opinion, was
squarely applicable as "nothing in the later medical certificate [indicated] that a
new or supervening fact had developed or arisen since the time of the filing of
the original action" against the accused. A motion for reconsideration being
unavailing, an appeal was elevated to us.
As succinctly set forth in the brief of the People of the Philippines: "The sole
issue in this case is whether the defendant, who had already been convicted
of slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod for injuries inflicted
upon Lam Hock, and had served sentence therefore, may be prosecuted anew
for frustrated murder for the same act committed against the same person."7
The position taken by the appellant is in the affirmative but, as indicated at the
outset, the controlling force of People v. Buling would preclude us from
reversing the resolution of Judge Alampay.
1. The Constitution, to repeat, is quite explicit: "No person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. As Justice Laurel
made clear in an address as delegate before the Constitutional Convention,
such a provision finds its origin" from the days when sanguinary punishments
were frequently resorted to by despots."9 A defendant in a criminal case
should therefore, according to him, be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and
thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from
taking an appeal. 10 It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in
jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule
of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is
closed, enabling him to plan his, future accordingly, protecting him from
continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the state from the
expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation
that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities
of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly
in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit.
Then, as a member of the Supreme Court, Justice Laurel had the first
opportunity to give meaning to what, under the Constitution, should be
considered "the same offense." In the case of People v. Tarok, decided in
1941, 11 the then comparatively new Rules of Court in its Section 9 of Rule
113 speaks of a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged after a
defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, "or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or for, any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information." 12
In the Tarok case, the conviction for parricide of the accused was sought to be
set aside, as previously he had been indicted for the crime of serious physical
injuries, to which he had pleaded guilty. He was sentenced and was actually
incarcerated by virtue of such penalty imposed. The offended party was his
wife whom he hacked with bolo, his ire being aroused by certain, remarks
made her. While he was thus serving sentence, the victim died resulting in the
new prosecution for parricide of which he was convicted. On appeal to this
Court, it was decided over the dissents of the then Justice Moran and Justice
Diaz that the offense of serious physical injury of which he was found guilty
being included in parricide his previous conviction was a bar to such
subsequent prosecution for the more serious crime. The lower court
judgement of conviction was thus reversed. According to Justice Laurel who
spoke for the Court: "To our mind, the principle embodied in the New Rules of
Court is a clear expression of selection of rule amidst conflicting theories. We
take the position that when we amended section 26 of General Orders No. 58
by providing that the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense not only
necessarily therein included but which necessarily includes the offense
charged in the former complaint or information, we meant what we have, in
plain language, stated. We certainly did not mean to engage in the simple,
play of words." 13
2. Such a ruling was however re-examined and set aside in Melo v.
People, 14 where it was held that an accused who pleaded guilty to the
offense of frustrated homicide, the offended party thereafter dying in the
evening of the same day, could not rely on a plea of double jeopardy if, as a
result thereof, the information was amended to charge him with homicide. 15
As was clarified in the opinion of this Court through the then Chief Justice
Moran, one of the dissenters in the Tarok case: "This rule of identity does not
apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy." 16
Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime
and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to
be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." 17 It is noteworthy,
however, that in the Melo ruling, there was a reiteration of what was so
emphatically asserted by Justice Laurel in the Tarok case in these words: "As
the Government cannot begin with the highest, and then down step by step,
bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither
can it begin the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same
result." 18
3. There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a
new fact [which] supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing
the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing
previously constituting a new and distinct offense. The conclusion reached in
People v. Buling, 19 the latest case in point relied upon by Judge Alampay in
the resolution no appeal, was thus, predictable. As set forth in the opinion of
Justice Labrador in the case, there was a medical certification that the wounds
for which the accused Buenaventura as first prosecuted for less serious
physical injuries would require medical attendance from a period of from ten
days to fifteen days. He pleaded guilty and on December 8, 1956, sentenced
by the Justice of the Peace of Cabalian Leyte, to one month and one day of
arresto mayor. He started serving his sentence on the same day. On January
18, 1957, however, another physician examined the offended party and with
the use of an X-ray apparatus, certified that he did suffer a fracture requiring a
treatment of from one and one-half months to two and one half months,
barring complications. As a result, on February 20, 1957, an information was
filed against the same accused, this time before the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, charging him with serious physical injuries. He stood trial and was
Page 48 of 129
found guilty of such an offense and sentenced to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor as minimum to one year of prision correccional as maximum.
On appeal to this Court, his invocation of the defense of double jeopardy
struck a responsive chord, and he was acquitted.
4. The opinion of Justice Labrador explained with clarity why the
constitutional right against being put twice in jeopardy was a bar to the second
prosecution. Thus: "If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a
fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first
examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is therefore, no view or
supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing
of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling
enunciated by us in the cases if Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong ... .
We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period
of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination
made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the
time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the
delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination,
but said delay was, caused by the very superficial examination then made. As
we have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which
justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People
vs. Manolong for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of
double jeopardy." 20 It is quite apparent, in the light of the foregoing, why the
lower court, submitting to the compulsion of the Buling decision, had to sustain
the motion to quash and to dismiss the information against appellee Yorac. No
error could therefore be rightfully imputed to it.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of June 21, 1968 of Judge Nestor B. Alampay
granting the motion to quash, ordering the dismissal of the case and the
immediate release of the appellee Rodrigo Yorac, is affirmed. Without costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38440 July 20, 1982
ATTY. DOMINGO V. FLORES, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, HON. MILITARY COMMISSION, NO. 13, and
Military Trial Counsel Capt. SOTERO SORIANO and Prosecuting Fiscal
LILIA LOPEZ, respondents.
Lumen Policarpio for petitioner.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Asst. Solicitor General Vicente V.
Mendoza and Trial Atty. Edgar Y. Chua for respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order, to annul and set aside the order of the respondent Military Commission
No. 13 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Criminal Case MC No.
13-2, entitled: "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Capt. Rodolfo
Magpantay, et al., accused", and to restrain the said respondents from further
proceeding with the case.
The record shows that on October 19, 1973, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay alias
"Honorato D. Castro", alias "Rolando Moreno", alias "Norberto de Ramos";
Corazon R. Serrano, and the herein petitioner, Domingo V. Flores, Jr., and two
other "John Does" were charged before the respondent Military Commission
No. 13 with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and
falsification of commercial documents. The case was docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. MC 13-2. 1
The petitioner and his co-accused were arraigned on October 25, 1973 and all
pleaded not guilty. The case was thereafter set for trial.
The presentation of evidence for the prosecution which started on October 25,
1973 was concluded on January 24, 1974, and the reception of the evidence
for the defendants was set for March 26 and 27, 1974. On March 25, 1974,
however, the respondent Secretary of National Defense, in a memorandum to
the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed
the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Rodolfo V. Magpantay, et al., from
Military Commission No. 13, thusly —
The withdrawal from Military Commission No. 13 of the charges against
accused Capt. Rodolfo V. Magpantay O-97692, PAF (NAC), et all in line with
paragraph 4 (3) of Presidential Decree No. 39, dated 7 November 1972 is
hereby directed for immediate implementation.
Please submit to this Office your corresponding early report implementing
action taken hereon.

It would appear that early in the day, Mrs. Milagros Magpantay, wife of one of
the accused therein, saw the Secretary of National Defense about the petition
for withdrawal of charges which her husband had earlier filed, 2 and to enable
himself to go over the petition for withdrawal of charges and avoid the
possibility of unjustly putting the accused on trial the said Secretary of National
Defense ordered the withdrawal of the case from the respondent Commission.
3 The order was implemented by the Judge Advocate General on that same
day. 4
The next day, March 26, 1974, the day scheduled for the reception of the
evidence for the defendants, counsel for the accused Magpantay handed to
the respondent Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of National
Defense and the letter of the Judge Advocate General, directing the
withdrawal of the case from the Commission. The prosecution deplored the
withdrawal of the case, claiming that they have proved the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but the respondent Military Commission held itself
to be without discretion on the matter. For her part, counsel for the herein
petitioner manifested that —
... this representation prepared her objections in writing to the written offer of
evidence of the state prosecutor in this case. When the prosecution has
submitted a formal written offer of evidence, we also prepared and submitted a
written objection to the said formal written offer of evidence. Considering the
fact that the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense has quoted
par. 3 of Presidential Decree 39 where at any stage the case can be
withdrawn from the commission, it does not however show that there was
already a promulgation of the findings and sentence by your Honors. In that
light, if your Honors please, it will not prevent the filing a case before the civil
courts in order to go back from the beginning of the hearing of this case. In this
connection, if Your Honors please, this representation has already submitted
my written objection to the formal offer of evidence of the prosecution for and
in behalf of my client Domingo Flores, Jr. and we do not know at that time
when this written objection to the formal offer of evidence of the Prosecution is
supposed to be presented and the said memorandum was relayed only this
morning and I think it is within the competency of this commission to resolve
my motion for a finding of Not Guilty of my client Domingo Flores, Jr. based on
the reasons and objections stated in our written objection to the formal offer of
the evidence of the prosecution. So, in that light, we appeal to your sense of
judgment and indulgence to at least consider our prayer, so if ever the case
will have to be terminated, I want to get a ruling from your Honors that the
case is ended and the case is closed in connection with the offer of evidence
and also the written objection to the said formal offer of evidence.
The Law Member of the Commission replied: "This Commission understands
the prayer in your motion, Atty. Policarpio. However, for the moment, all that
this Commission will say is, 'We would if we could but we can't.' " Thereafter,
the hearing was adjourned. 5
On March 28, 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, after a full
consideration of all the aspects of the case, withdrew his previous order and
directed the respondent Commission forthwith to proceed with the trial of the
accused. 6 Pursuant thereto, the respondent Military Commission scheduled
the continuation of the trial and reception of the evidence for the defendants to
April 1, 1974.
Pleading double jeopardy, in that the "Withdrawal Order of the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of National Defense dated March 25, 1974
operates as an acquittal of the accused Flores and a revocation and
reinstatement of the case against the accused Domingo V. Flores, Jr.
constitutes 'DOUBLE JEOPARDY'," the herein petitioner moved to quash the
case against him, 7 but the respondent Military Commission denied his petition
to quash. Hence, the present recourse.
The other accused, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay, upon the other hand, started
presenting his evidence on April 2, 1974, But, the proceedings were
suspended upon the filing of the instant petition for certiorari with this Court. 8
The petitioner maintains that the withdrawal of the charges against Capt.
Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused, including petitioner, on March 26,
1974, after the prosecution had rested its case, amounted to a dismissal or
termination of the case, and its referral anew to the respondent Military
Commission No. 13 violates the constitutional right of the petitioner not to be
twice placed in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The rule on double jeopardy is contained in Article IV, Section 22 of the 1973
Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense." It is restated in Article 39 of the Articles of
War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as follows:
ART. 39. As to number. — No person shalt without his consent, be tried a
second time for the same offense; but no proceeding in which an accused has
been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification shall be
held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and, if there be
one, the confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case. ...
and in Section 70-C of the Manual on Courts Martial which reads, as follows:
Section 70-C — One who in a competent court has been convicted, acquitted
or put in jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime, cannot be further or
again pursued for it, unless he waives his right to rely on this immunity. 9
Page 49 of 129
For double jeopardy to exist, it is essential that the first judgment of conviction
or acquittal or dismissal is final; otherwise, there is no judgment of conviction
or acquittal to speak of, and, therefore, the accused can not claim double
jeopardy.
In the instant case, the petitioner cannot invoke double jeopardy because the
order of the respondent Military Commission No. 13, terminating the hearing
on March 26, 1974 pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National
Defense to the Judge Advocate General and of the letter of the latter to the
respondent Commission, is not a final order of acquittal or dismissal. Under
military law, a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or
dismissal, is merely recommendatory and subject to review by the convening
authority, the review boards, and the reviewing authority. Thus, Presidential
Decree No. 39 and Implementing Rules, issued on November 7,1972,
provides:
4. Procedure for Military Commission. —
a. Before trial. —
xxx xxx xxx
b. During trial. —
xxx xxx xxx
c. After trial. —
(1) Action by Convening Authority. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Execution of Sentence. — Except as otherwise herein provided, no
sentence of a military commission shall be executed unless the same is
approved and ordered executed by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines. Where the sentence imposed by a Military Commission is death or
if the Chief of Staff recommends that a penalty of death should be imposed, in
a case where the sentence imposed by a military commission is less than
death, the record of trial shall be forwarded to the President through the
Secretary of National Defense, for confirmation or approval. No sentence of
death shall be executed unless ordered executed by the President. In any
case, the President shall have the power to reverse, confirm increase the
penalty imposed, or otherwise modify any decision of the military commission.
(Emphasis supplied for emphasis)
It is apparent therefrom that in the administration of justice by the military, a
military commission acts merely as a commissioner who takes the evidence
and reports thereon to the convening and reviewing authorities with his
recommendation. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, this system of
administration of justice is similar to the system of review under the Spanish
regime where the cases have to be passed upon by the Audiencia and then by
the Supreme Court of Spain in Madrid before the sentence becomes final.
Under that system the lower courts were regarded as examining courts,
having preliminary jurisdiction, and the accused was not fully convicted or
acquitted until the case has been passed upon by the Audiencia, or supreme
court, whose judgment was subject to review in the supreme court in Madrid
for errors of law, with power to order a new trial. The trial was regarded as one
continuous proceeding, and the protection given was against a second
conviction after this final trial had been concluded in due form of law. ... 10
While the respondent Military Commission No. 13 nmay have ordered the
termination of the hearing of Criminal Case No. MC 13-2, pursuant to the
Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate
General, and the letter of the latter to the respondent Military Commission No.
13, directing the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay
and his co-accused, the order has none of the attributes of a final judgment
since it was not passed upon by the convening and reviewing authorities and
confirmed by the President. Although jeopardy had attached, it has not yet
terminated. Being so, the constitutional mandate against putting a person
twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was not violated when
the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and
directed that further proceedings be had in the case, as the action of the
Secretary of National Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. The
constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through
a trial a second time. But, since the first proceedings has not yet been
terminated, there is no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no
double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Escolin Vasquez, Relova
and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, JJ., concur in the result.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Fernando, Makasiar, CJ., reserves his vote.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32144-45 July 30, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NAÑO MILFLORES y LAKSA, defendant-appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza for plaintiff-appellee.
Arsenio Fer. Cabanting for defendant-appellant.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
(Branch XI) in its Criminal Cases Nos. 88173 and 88174 convicting and
sentencing herein accused-appellant Naño Milflores y Laksa: to Four (4)
Years, Two (2) Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) Years
of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law for the
crime of multiple attempted murder; and to reclusion perpetua and to pay the
heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, for the crime of murder.
The incidents that gave rise to the filing of the above-mentioned criminal cases
against herein accused-appellant in the court a quo may be briefly narrated as
follows:
Early in the morning of November 27, 1967, about the hour of 7:45, an old
man approached the house on 2233 Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, calling
out the name of one of the occupants—Mrs. Javier. Heeding such call,
Florencia Tactay Javier came out of the door and met the caller. The old man
handed to her a paper bag containing some vegetables—pechay, upo and
sigarillas—and then left the place. Mrs. Florencia Javier brought the bag into
the house and proceeded to empty the same of its contents. As she did so,
however, something inside the paper bag began emitting smoke and whistling
sound, followed moments later by a deafening bomb explosion which caused
death of one, and multiple injuries and wounds to seven (7) other occupants of
the house. Investigations thereafter conducted by various police agencies led
to the arrest of herein accused-appellant, Naño Milflores y Laksa.
On December 6, 1967, he was charged with multiple frustrated murder
(Criminal Case No. 88173) before the Court of First Instance of Manila, in an
information reading as follows:
That on or about the 27th of November, 1967 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon Abelardo Mique Olivar, Romana Mique, Isabelo
Lapitan, Benedicto Mique, Florencia Javier, Anaflor Javier, and Ariel Javier, by
then and there delivering a bomb inside a bag containing vegetables at the
address of the latter at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, causing the same to explode
when opened, thereby inflicting upon the seen persons mentioned above
mortal wounds on the different parts of their bodies, thus performing all of the
acts of execution which would have produced the crime of multiple murder as
a consequence but which nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of said accused, that is, the timely medical assistance
rendered to said Abelardo Mique Olivar, Romana Mique, Isabelo Lapitan,
Benedicto Mique, Florencia Javier, Anaflor Javier and Ariel Javier, which
prevented their death. (Pp. 21-22, Record)
In a separate information filed with the same court on even date, he was
likewise charged for murder (Criminal Case No. 88174). The body of said
separate information reads:
That on or about the 27th of November, 1967 in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use
personal violence upon Felicidad Mique, by then and there delivering a bomb
inside a bag containing vegetables at the address of the latte of 2233 Garrido,
Sta. Ana, causing the same to explode when opened, thereby inflicting upon
her mortal wounds on the different parts of her body, which were the direct
and immediate cause of her death.
Accused-appellant was arraigned on said two informations on December 14,
1967 and January 23, 1968, respectively, and entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to
the charges. Later, he moved to quash the information for murder but the
same was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, the two cases were tried jointly,
at the conclusion of which the court a quo rendered the decision of conviction
and the corresponding sentences first above mentioned.
The factual findings of the court below, upon which it based its sentence of
conviction, are not seriously disputed by herein appellant 1 . Indeed, the
record which We have carefully reviewed reveals that said findings are
supported by the evidence which His Honor summarized as follows:
Page 50 of 129
From the evidence of the prosecution it appears that Victoria Remolar Javier,
a public school teacher, married Antonio Javier on April 28, 1964 at
Guiniañgan, Quezon Province. This wedlock, however, is Antonio Javier's
second since he was previously married to Florencia Tactay-Javier, then living
and with whom he had children. Sometime after the marriage of Victoria to
Antonio, she discovered this previously existing marriage to Florencia. Victoria
continued her marital relations with Antonio. This anomalous situation — i.e., a
'Love triangle' or the double marriage of Antonio Javier — naturally resulted in
animosity between the two wives. The first wife, Florencia Tactay, filed a
charge of bigamy against her husband, Antonio Javier, in Baguio City, and an
administrative charge against Victoria Remolar, Florencia, however, later
desisted when Victoria promised that she would cease to live with Antonio;
and the administrative charge was dropped upon a finding that Victoria
married Antonio without prior knowledge that he was previously married.
Sometime in March, 1967, Victoria consulted with the accused, Naño Milflores
— who advertised his services as a palmist and fortune teller at Magsaysay
Avenue, Baguio City. Victoria wanted to know what her future would be and
sought Milflores' help. She asked Milflores if she still had a chance to live
again with Antonio. Milflores told her that she had a 100% chance to live with
Antonio on condition that she pays him P375.00 as fee for the temple. He
assured her that the result would be favorable and Antonio would voluntary
come back to her. Milflores told her he would use his spiritual power in making
Antonio come back to her voluntarily.
Since March, 1967, Victoria consulted with Milflores at least once a month.
She paid him P5.00 for the initial consultation. Sometime later, she paid him
the P375.00. Milflores asked for and Victoria gave him the address of
Antonio's other wife at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, manila. Milflores told Victoria
he will work in about 7 to 9 weeks, and, within that period he assured Victoria
that Antonio will go back to her. Milflores in a couple of weeks. This time
Milflores demanded another sum of P375.00 for things he needed in the
temple. Victoria gave him the amount the following day. Then, again, Milflores
asked Victoria the sums of P200.00 and P175.00, so that by June, 1967,
Victoria had given Milflores the sum of P1,130.00 in all.
After June, 1967, Antonio Javier still did not return Victoria. Victoria then
demanded of Milflores the return of her money. She saw Milflores at least two
times in July and August and demanded the return of the sums she had paid
him. Milflores told her to be patient as Antonio would, for sure, return to her. In
September and the last week of October, 1967, Milflores got mad at Victoria
because of the latter's insistence that he (Milflores) return her (Victoria's)
money (Exh. A).
Florencia Tactay really resided at 2233 Garrido, Sta. Ana, Manila. She and her
family shared an apartment door with the Mique family — Romana, Felicidad,
Isabelo Lapitan and Abelardo Mique.
On November 27, 1967, somebody called at the 2233 Garrido apartment door
where Florencia and the Miques resided for 'Mrs. Javier'. Florencia, who was
carrying her child, peeped at the window and saw an old man. the man called
for 'Mrs. Javier' twice. Florencia then went downstairs. The man gave her a big
paper bag containing vegetables. Florencia inquired as to who sent the same,
but the man did not answer. Instead, he hurriedly went away. As Florencia
received the bag, she saw the address on it — i.e., 'Mrs. Javier; 2233 Makati'.
The bag contained pechay, upo and sigarillas. She then brought the same
inside the house and placed it on a chair in a room where Ana, Letty, Abe,
Felicidad and Florencia's two children were.
Florencia the proceeded to empty the bag of its contents. As she did so, she
noticed that it emitted smoke and heard a whistling sound. Alarmed, she
withdrew away from the bag. Felicidad Mique, however, went near the same
and looked into the bag. Suddenly, a deafening explosion ensued. The
explosion caused a hole through the table and on the cement floor 7 inches
wide by 4 inches deep. Fragments of utensils and furniture were thrown and
scattered around and the splattered room was in complete disarray (Exhs. II &
I).
All of the persons then in that room, where the bomb exploded, sustained
injuries and wounds as a result of the explosion. Felicidad Mique y Olivar, 21
years, student; Abelardo Mique y Olivar, 22 years married, goldsmith; Romana
Mique y Olivar, 21 years, married, housewife; Isabelo Lapitan y Mique, 25
years, laborer; Benedicto Mique y Olivar, 15 years, student; Florencia Tactay-
Javier, wife of Antonio Javier; Anaflor Javier, 2 years, and Ariel Javier 9
months, Florencia's children — were brought to the St. Anne's Hospital for
emergency treatment. Florencia Javier (sic) 2 sustained 23 different,
penetrating, explosive blast wounds from metallic objects and wire coil
fragments in different parts of her body — i.e., on her face or both upper right
and left extremities and both thighs. Her right anterior VIII rib was fractured
and the right lobe or her liver, right diaphram and right lung, were pierced with
metallic fragment. Two (2) coiled wire loop metals were embedded on her right
forehead and another in the anterior aspect of her right arm. She suffered
hemorrhage of about 700 cc of blood in her respiratory system, exanguination
collapse from bleeding, vena cavae, in her cardiovascular system. She died
within 15 minutes of arrival at the St. Anne's Hospital from profuse
exanguinating hemorrhage, colapsing the vena cavae, and shock due to the
23 different penetrating blast wounds. The rest of the victims were forwarded
to the Philippine General Hospital for further treatment (Exhs. B, C, D, E & F).
Meanwhile, Alexis Nazario, a student and Desiderio Juvida — who is known
as 'Pops' in the vicinity — were conversing at the corner of Cagayan and
Mabuhay Streets, a block from Garrido Street. They heard the explosion; they
saw a person walking hurriedly from Garrido to Mabuhay. The person's face
was painted black; he was wearing a checkered polo shirt with black pants
and black shoes. Nazario — who was 8 to 10 meters only away when he saw
the person walking at a fast gait towards them (Exh. 1) — pointed to the
person, at the same time calling Juvida's attention to him, thinking that he was
a thief. When the blast was heard, the person began to run. Juvida asked
Nazario to chase the person, but he (Nazario) did not overtake him (the
person) as he was running fast (mabilis). The person ran towards Tejeron
Street, where he was able to make good his escape.
The explosion, which rocked the neighborhood that early morning, brought
many persons to the scene, mostly curious onlookers. The police chief, Gen.
Ricardo Papa, also arrived at the scene of the explosion. He took immediate
steps to investigate the incident. He made requests for homicide operatives.
Sgt. B. Brown, Det. N. Bonifacio and Pat. Alejandro Yatco, MPD, responded.
Alex Tumale y Palma, 31 years old, and a security guard of the United Equity
Agency assigned to the RCPI, alleged that he was the intended victim of the
bomb explosion. He implicated a certain Theodore Laudet (See Exhs. M & M-
1), a striker of the RCPI, as the person whom he saw carrying a paper bag
with three other companions in front of his house before the explosion
occurred. Tumale informed the police that Laudet resented his escorting the
manager of the RCPI.
Further investigation also revealed that Antonio Javier, husband of Florencio
Tactay-Javier, had contracted another marriage with one Victoria Remolar with
whom he has two children; that Victoria, who resides and teaches in Baguio
City, occasionally comes to Manila to see Antonio Javier; that Florencia and
Victoria had quarreled for the sole possession of Antonio and that charges and
countercharges had been filed between them. The site of the explosion was
also searched for evidence, which were then submitted to the Criminal
Investigation Division, MPD (Exhs. U & V).
On November 28, 1967, at 4:30 a.m., Theodore Laudet y Gabriola was
investigated. He was brought before Florencia Javier, Isabelo Lapitan and
Alex Tumale. The three failed to Identify him. Mrs. Javier and Lapitan averred
that the suspect was older, stouter, and his face was painted black. Laudet, on
the other hand, accounted for his whereabouts the day previous. Laudet was
released. Laudet, who was subjected to a polygraph, cleared himself (Exh. J).
On November 30, 1967, at or about 10:00 a.m., Sgt. P. Briones Det. Dionisia
Nena Tuason and Pat. Alejandro Yatco left for Baguio to investigate Mrs.
Victoria Remolar-Javier, the second wife of Antonio Javier. They were referred
to Pat. Pedro Remolar of the Baguio Police Department, Victoria's father, from
whom they learned that Victoria had left for an unknown destination. A
background investigation of Victoria revealed that she took her BSEE degree
at the Baguio Colleges, where she met Antonio Javier whom she later married
in 1963. In 1965, Florencia filed an immorality charge against Victoria.
Florencia later desisted, when Antonio promised to leave Victoria and live with
her. The immortality charge was dropped, on the ground that Victoria married
Antonio in good faith.
Meantime, in Baguio, Victoria Remolar-Javier, who was then teaching at the
Ambuklao Elementary School, heard over her transistor radio, on November
29, 1967 — a Wednesday — that her name was being implicated in
connection with the bomb explosion. She became apprehensive. She went
home to her residence at Baguio City, to seek the advice of her parents. She
was shown a newspaper account where her name was implicated, and
advised to see their family lawyer, a certain Atty. de Guzman.
Victoria decided to see the family lawyer. The next day — November 30, a
Thursday — she was on her way to see him at about 7:00 A.M., but before
she could leave the house, a phone call was received by Victoria. The person
on the other side of the line Identified himself as Naño Milflores. Milflores told
Victoria to go to his office at Magsaysay Avenue and bring with her P1,000.00
so that he could help her exricate herself from suspicion in connection with the
bomb slaying incident. ten proceeded to the office of the accused with her
sister, Gertrudis.
When she arrived there, Milflores expressed his surprise why she was
accompanied by her sister, saying, 'Why did you come with a companion?' I
told you to come alone.' Victoria told Milflores there was nothing to hide.
Touching her head Milflores said, 'Loko loko ka ba? Ang hirap hirap ng kaso
mo. Now you need money so that you will not be involved in this case
anymore.' He asked Victoria and her sister to produce P1,000.00, because he
knew somebody at the Manila Police Department who could help Victoria.
Victoria's sister left to secure money while Victoria was left ion the office of the
accused. Gertrudis, Victoria's sister, later returned with P200.00. When
Milflores saw the amount he said, 'Bakit iyan lang" O, sigue, tama na.'
The three then proceeded to the Dangwa Bus Station. Milflores secured two
tickets without Victoria and her sister's knowledge. Milflores then hurriedly
urged Victoria to board the bus for Manila, leaving Gertrudis behind. The two
arrived at Angeles City and proceeded to the office of Milflores there, where
Victoria passed the night.
Early the next morning — December 1, Friday — at or about 4:00 A.M.,
Milflores and Victoria proceeded to Manila in his jeep. They arrived in Manila
at or about 6:00 o'clock the same morning. In Manila she was introduced to
one Atty. Ben Dimaunahan, who tried to gather the facts from Victoria about
the bomb-killing. Victoria had no information go give. In the afternoon, at or
about 3:00 o'clock, Atty. Dimaunahan informed the Manila Police Department,
Page 51 of 129
thru Lt. A. Lim, that he had with him Victoria Remolar-Javier, the person
sought in the bomb-slaying probe, and that they were going to the police
headquarters with Milflores, a magician, illutionist, and a marriage counselor of
423 Angeles City, Pampanga, and one Oscar Alayon, their driver. Victoria was
interviewed at the headquarters. She was allowed to go home, but was
advised to return for confrontation.
After Victoria was interviewed, she noticed that Atty. Dimaunahan and
Milflores were nowhere around. Since she was left alone and did not know
anybody in Manila, she looked for them, until she saw Atty. Dimaunahan, who
was about to leave. She requested him to look for the accused. During the
interview, Victoria told Capt. Lim that aside from the P200.00 Milflores
received from her sister in Baguio, he also received P210.00 from her in
Angeles City; that Milflores told her these amounts will be given to the lawyer
who will help her with respect to her involvement in the case. Victoria gave
these amounts to Milflores in her desire to clear her name. Capt. Lim told her
that she was swindled. From then on, Victoria began to suspect Milflores.
After Victoria was interviewed, the suspicion of the investigating authorities
focused on Milflores. On December 2 (Saturday) — after Victoria had been
interrogated extensively — Florencia Tactay was invited to the Manila Police
Department. Her husband, Antonio Javier, accompanied her to the said office.
A police line-up was conducted. Florencia requested that the face of Milflores
be painted black. Whereupon, she pointed to him as the very person who
handed to her the paper bag containing the vegetables and the fatal bomb.
Florencia also stated that the accused had the same tone of voice as the
person who handed her the bag. The police line-up was conducted in the
presence of police authorities and other persons, including newspaper
reporters — i.e., Tony Alba of ABS, Channel 5; Alfredo Santiago of the
Evening News; Fred Cruz of the Manila Times. Pictures were taken during the
confrontation (Exh. 3, The Sunday Times, page 1).
Alexis Nazario and Desiderio Juvida were recalled to the office. Both fingered
Milflores as the person they saw running away from the house of Mrs. Javier.
Their statements were reduced into writing.
The accused was investigated. He denied any criminal participation in the fatal
explosion incident. He admitted he came to know Victoria Remolar-Javier
sometime in June 1967, when she came to his booth in Baguio City to seek
his advice concerning her marital problems with Antonio Javier; that he had
asked Victoria to pay him some amounts for his spiritual advice and that all in
all he had received from her more or less P800.00. He stood pat on his claim
of innocence and that he had merely given her spiritual advice as a minister of
the Will of Christ Chapel.
The statement of Victoria Remolar-Javier was taken (Exh. A) on December 3,
1967 (Sunday). The investigation of Milflores proceeded. He continued to deny
any participation in the incident. At 11:00 A.M., the police authorities searched
his Willy's Mitsubishi jeep, with Plate No. 1678-67 Manila, which was parked in
front of the headquarters. The following articles were found in the glove
compartment: (1) one (1) piece of cotton, blackened with dye; (2) one (1) strip
of cotton, wrapped in paper; (3) one (1) plastic bottle, pitcher type; (4) one (1)
pallet of black dye powder; (5) a receipt from the Talayan Quezon Blvd., gas
station for the purchase of one liter oil, dated November 25, 1967. A further
search of the jeep yielded a small box containing: (1) one brown ladies' clutch
bag; (2) one white ladies' plastic bag; (3) one forcep; (4) speculum; (5) one
plastic bag with 15 rounds of .22 cal. bullets, short; (6) 3 rounds of .22 cal.
bullets, short; (7) one TVR issued by the TRAFCON in his name; (8) one piece
of candle (9) one set of keys; (10) four envelopes addressed to him; (11) one
crucifix; (12) one envelope containing 40 units of sweepstakes tickets for the
December 17, 1967 draw. Confronted with these articles, Milflores denied the
presence of these articles in his jeep and claimed the same must be that of his
sons (Exh. K).
At 12:00 o'clock, December 3 — a Sunday — 1967, Milflores was taken to the
crime scene. Nazario and Juvida pointed to the front of House No. 2463
Cagayan Street as the place where they saw Milflores, whose appearance
attracted them, because his face was painted black. Milflores was then placed
under arrest and booked for murder and frustrated murder on 7 counts.
Charges were preferred (sic) against him with the Fiscal's Office. (Pp. 3-8,
Decision pp. 256-261, CFI Record.)
To reiterate, the above summation of the evidence by the trial court is fully
supported by the evidence on record. Just the same, counsel for appellant has
made the following assignment of error in his brief:
I. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT-
APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS CRIMINAL CASE NO. 88174 ON
GROUNDS OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
II. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CREDITING THE
ALLEGED PREVIOUS MISDEEDS OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS A
BASIS FOR AN INFERENCE OF MOTIVE IN THE DELIVERY OF
EXPLOSIVE THAT CAUSED THE DEATH OF FELICIDAD MIQUE AND THE
INJURIES OF SEVEN OTHERS.
III. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF AN EVIDENCE THAT FAILED TO PROVE
THE GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
It is the position of appellant, under the first assigned error, that after he had
pleaded to the charge of multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case No.
88173 on December 17, 1967, the trial court gravely erred in not hearkening to
his plea of double jeopardy when he was subsequently arraigned on the
separate charge of murder in Criminal Case NO. 88174 on January 23, 1968,
considering that the charge in the separate information for murder is based on
facts that are the very same facts alleged in the other information for multiple
frustrated murder. Thus, appellant argues in his brief:
A conscientious study of the allegations in both criminal cases (shows), that in
the multiple frustrated murder case and the murder case, the elements of
murder were alleged. The facts in both cases are synonymous insofar as the
following are concerned:
a) That offense charged in both cases were committed, in one single
act, on November 27, 1967;
b) That the accused delivered a bomb inside a bag containing
vegetables, causing the same to explode and which single act of the accused
(herein appellant) resulted in the:
—1— injuries of seven persons (those named in Crim. Case No. 88173),
and
—2— death to Felicidad Mique and independently treated in Crim. Case
No. 88174.
xxx xxx xxx
It is very evident that the single act of delivering a big bag containing a bomb
caused the injuries of seven persons and the death of one, but the fact of
death of one must not be the reason to make the same an object of a distinct
and separate information.
That matter of charging the accused, herein defendant-appellant, or murder in
a separate information based on facts that are the very same facts obtaining in
another case of frustrated murder, is a wanton violation of Section 2(h), Rule
117 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 2—Motion to Quash—Grounds—
(h) That the defendant has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
in relation to Section 1, paragraph 20, Article III of the Constitution which
likewise provides that:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
It is obvious that the information charging herein appellant with the crime of
MURDER in Criminal Case No. 88174 placed him in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense treated in Criminal Case No. 88173. Giving effect to the
above-quoted provisions of our laws, our Supreme Court, in the case of Yap
vs. Lutero, G.R. No. L-1266, promulgated on April 30, 1959, resolved as
follows:
If the two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal
under either the law or ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the
plea of double jeopardy or punishment for the same offense. So long as
jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense,
the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction or acquital in either case. (Pp. 6-8,
Appellant's Brief; pp. 77-79, Record)
Before tackling counsel's pose, one important point has to be made clear. And
it is that the first information for frustrated murder, Criminal Case No. 88173,
does not include among the victims or offense parties Felicidad Mique, the
woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased in the murder case,
Criminal Case No. 88174. In the sence, therefore, that appellant was ever in
jeopardy in that first case, it is plain to see that such was impossible or could
not have happened. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double jeopardy.
To be accurate, the legal error of the prosecution here consists of having filed
two separate informations for a single offense. For there can be no doubt
about the fact that since the injuries suffered by the offended parties in
Criminal Case No. 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the accused
that caused the death of Felicidad Mique, the victim in Criminal Case No.
88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb which according to the prosecution
was handed by appellant to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for which
appellant could be made to answer is the virtually single complex offense of
murder pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Penalty for complex crimes. — When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.
Page 52 of 129
There is in law only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be
imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise
separate or distinct offenses.
And so, the legal problem before Us is not really whether or not the filing of
Criminal Case No. 88174 placed appellant under risk of double jeopardy. What
has to be resolved here is the question of whether or not the error of the fiscal
of filing two separate informations for the same offense, albeit with different
offended parties in each of them, in reversible error, having in view the
peculiar milieu of the cases.
On this point, the Solicitor General submits that:
We submit that Criminal Cases Nos. 88173 and 88174 were the results of
appellant's single act (pp. i and 1, Informations, rec.), and should have been
incorporated in one criminal information in accordance with the provision of
Article 48 of the REvised Penal Code, the same being a complex crime. The
reason behind the legal doctrine of discouraging the splitting of cause of action
in complex crimes was enunciated by this Honorable Supreme Court in the
case of People vs. Cano, G.R. No. L-19660, May 24, 1966; when it ruled that:
From the viewpoint both of trial and practice, it is doubtful whether the
prosecution should split the action against the defendant ... . Such splitting of
action would work unnecessary inconvenience to the administration of justice
in general and to the accused in particular, for it would require the presentation
of substantially the same evidence in different courts ... .
Significantly, the cases at bar were filed at the same time and there was a joint
hearing in both cases (pp. 1-2, t.s.n., Magalit, March 21, 1968). Definitely then,
joint hearing conducted by the trial court in the cases at bar cured the
technical defect of splitting the cause of action, for the inconvenience sought
to be prevented was avoided.
Moreover, the cases cited by the appellant in support for its defense of double
jeopardy cannot be applied in this case (pp. 8, 9, Appellant's Brief). Firstly,
because there was only one injured party in the cited cases, while there were
several injured parties in the case at bar; secondly, the filing of the information
and the hearings on the former cases were made one after the other, while the
information in the cases at bar were filed on the same date (pp. 1 and 1,
Informations, rec.); Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 769). (Emphasis Ours), (Pp. 4-5,
Solicitor General's Brief)
There is, to Our mind, some degree of plausibility in such posture of the
People. Indeed, it is obvious that the technical error of the fiscal in filing two
separate informations did not cause appellant any substantial prejudice at all.
In effect, as the proceedings were actually conducted, it is as if appellant had
been prosecuted and tried under a single information. It would be giving
premium to technicality and sacrificing substantial justice to yield to counsel's
contention. Besides, to do so would result in duplicating what had already
been done, the full-dressed trial of the case, with both prosecution and
defense presenting all their respective evidence.
But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that when he
invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first
jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled jurisprudence
in this Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the
same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to
complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the
simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that
the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that
the same has been terminated without his consent. (Bulaong vs. People, L-
19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746; Silvestre vs. Military Commission No. 21,
No. L-46366, March 8, 1978; 3 Buscayno vs. Military Commissions Nos. 1, 2,
6 and 25, No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273)
Accordingly, We overrule appellant's first assignment of error.
Under his second assignment of error, appellant submits that the lower court
erred in giving full weight and credit to the evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove certain alleged previous misdeeds of his as basis for an
inference of motive which must have induced him to commit the crimes
imputed to him in these cases. He places reliance on Section 46 of Rule 130
of the Rules of Court which provides in part that unless in rebuttal, the
prosecution cannot prove the bad moral character of the accused. More
specifically, he bewails the finding of the court a quo from the testimony of
Victoria Remolar to the effect that appellant, having extorted the sum of
P1,130.00 from said Victoria with the promise that with his spiritual powers he
would make her erstwhile husband Antonio Javier come back to her, failing in
which Victoria had demanded from him the return of her money, appellant
resorted to the nefarious scheme of delivering a bomb to said Antonio's other
wife (Florencia Tactay- Javier) to do away with her. And on this particular
point, on the other hand, counsel for the People counters that what was
considered by the lower court in the determination of appellant's motive were
evidence of series of events and acts indicating his specific intent, system,
scheme and plan to commit the crimes for which he had been indicted, which
kind of evidence is admissible under Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
It would appear Idle, however, to discuss at length such opposing views of the
parties. Suffice it to say that what happened between Victoria Remolar and
appellant as related above, furnishes a well- founded clue to what could have
been the reason for appellant's act of delivering the fatal bag of vegetables
containing also a deadly bomb, to Florencia Tactay-Javier. But even this
observation seems superfluous, for the determination of motive becomes COURT: (To witness [Desiderio Juvida]
relevant only where there is doubt as to whether or not an accused is the one
who committed the crime charged. Withal, lack of motive does not preclude Q— You say that the man you saw that morning is painted?
conviction of the offense when the crime and participation of the accused are
definitely proved, as in these cases. (People vs. Lumantas, L-28355, July 17, A— Yes, Your Honor.
1969, 28 SCRA 764, 769, and cases therein cited; People vs. Dorico, L-
31568, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 172, 186; People vs. Herila, L-32785, May Q— On his face and on his hands?
21, 1973, 51 SCRA 31, 38, and cases therein cited.) There is thus no merit in
appellant's second assignment of error. A— Yes, Your Honor.

Appellant's third and and last assignment of error is directed against the Q— How are you certain now that this man, the accused, was the man
finding of his guilt by the trial court beyond reasonable doubt. He complains whom you saw that morning, because, as you said, he was painted black?
that the testimonies of the witnesses and the circumstantial evidence against
him were excessively overweighed while the evidence on his behalf was A— I noticed his face when he passed by because he was only around
hardly paid credit by His Honor. Accordingly, We have taken pains to reread two meters away from me.....
the transcript of the stenographic notes taken at the trial in order to find out by
Ourselves where the trial court might have erred in the appreciation of all the xxx xxx xxx
oral and real evidence presented by both parties. Our conclusion after such
review is that appellant's plaintiff has no merit. xxx xxx xxx

1. As to what We might refer to as the prelude to the fatal events Q— Will you please indicate on this diagram, Exhibit 1, where your
which constituted the graver offenses committed by appellant, he more or less, position was, and where the accused came nearest to you at the point of 2
admits either expressly or impliedly in his testimony and in his brief his meters?
meetings and conversations with Victoria Remolar whom he made to believe
he had spiritual powers to help her solve her triangular marriage affair A— This is the store.
involving her bona-fide marriage with Antonio Javier who, turned out to have
been previously legally married to Florencia Tactay. He has not denied he Q— Where were you?
received money from her several times in consideration of his promise that for
sure soon enough Antonio would be Victoria's alone. A— A I was at the comer of the store. .....

As he in truth did not possess a bit of the spiritual means he pretended to have xxx xxx xxx
and was in fact deceiving Victoria to be able to fleece money from her, it is
inescapable to believe that upon being finally cornered by Victoria, he xxx xxx xxx
concocted the diabolical Idea that he could make true his word to her by
making Antonio a widower freed from the marriage with Florencia. In a word, Q— And where was the accused when you saw him?
he must have found no other way out of his problem with Victoria than to snap
out the life of Florencia. A— He was here already in this place-corner of Cagayan and Mabuhay
Streets. I was sitting at the comer indicated by a blue dot. Alexis, who was
2. Appellant's contention that Florencia did not have sufficient basis standing near me, facing Cagayan Street, told me that there was a man with
for Identifying him as the man who delivered the bag with the fatal bomb to her painted face who might be a robber.
that unhappy morning of November 27, 1967 is utterly untenable. Florencia
had immediately described his general build and appearance to the
investigators and readily Identified him in the police lineup in the presence of Q— What did you do them?
pressmen after he was made to paint his face black the same way he did that
morning of the event in question. And although he did not answer her when A— I stood up and then I looked at the man who was passing and it
she asked from where the bag came and did not hear his voice then, it should was then that [he] passed in front of me.
be recalled that when he knocked at the door and Florencia or Mrs. Javier
looked out from the window upstairs, he said that he was looking for "Mrs. Q— And then?
Javier". Thus, that Florencia could Identify him thru his voice cannot be
surprising. A— And I suspected, because he was painted, that he might be a
criminal or something like that. So I followed him with my face up to 15 meters.
Florencia's testimony on this point reads: He was not running but he was rushing. When we heard an explosion, and he
ran, I suspected he might be connected with the explosion, so I requested
Q— At 7:45 o'clock in the morning, do you remember anything unusual Alexis Nazario to run after him. (t.s.n., Hearing of June 4, 1968, pp. 11, 21-23.)
that happened in your house at 2233 Garrido Street? (Words in brackets supplied)

A— Yes, sir. COURT: [To witness Alexis Nazario]

COURT: (to witness) xxx xxx xxx

Q— What was that? xxx xxx xxx

A— Somebody called me, 'Mrs. Javier! Q— You said as soon as you heard the explosion you saw the accused
walk at a fast clip. Will you indicate the route the accused took when you first
ASST. FISCAL: (to witness) saw him? (The witness indicates it with an arrow.)

Q— Upon hearing such call what did you do? Q— You also said you heard an explosion. From what portion of this
sketch did you hear the explosion come from?
A— I peeped out of the window.
A— It came from Garrido Street the third house from the corner.
Q— And what did you see after peeping out of the window?
ATTY. GENSON:
A— I saw an old man.
Q— Was the explosion, from the place where you were standing, loud,
Q— And what happened? or soft?

A— He called me twice, so I went downstairs. (t.s.n., Hearing of July A— It was loud.

11, 1968, p. 2. Emphasis supplied.)
Q— How many explosions did you hear?
And as to the fact that this witness first failed to Identify appellant as the
person who handed to her the bag containing the bomb, the fact still remains A— Just one.
that she later readily pointed to him after appellant's face was painted with
black dye, let alone the circumstance that black dyeing materials were also COURT:
found in the glove compartment of his jeep used by appellant in coming to the
police headquarters. Q— You also said that the accused was walking at a fast clip and after
he passed you, he ran faster. Will you indicate the route the accused took from
As to the Identification of appellant by prosecution witnesses Desiderio Juvida the place where you were? (Witness indicating.)
and Alexis Nazario, it is not accurate to say, as suggested by appellant, that
said witnesses had only a passing glimpse of the person they saw running fast ATTY. GENSON:
from the scene of the crime and could not have seen his face, much less
recognized him. On this point, the following is revealing:

Page 53 of 129
Q— After you heard the explosion, where did you see the accused for
the first time, in this sketch?
A— Here, sir.
ATTY. GENSON:
Please mark it with X.
WITNESS:
The first time we saw the accused he was walking in Cagayan Street, but
when we heard the explosion he was in Mabuhay and running already. (t.s.n.,
Hearing of May 2, 1968, p. 9; Words in brackets supplied.)
ATTY. CABANTING: [Cross-examining witness Alexis Nazario]
Q— I suppose Milflores just passed on November 27 when you saw
him that morning. Am I right?
A— Yes, sir.
Q— When you saw him, he was already running fast. Is that correct?
A— When he passed us, he ran fast.
Q— He was already far away, when you saw him, or noticed him
running. Is that correct?
A— It is quite far.
COURT:
Q— Will you indicate, more or less, how far?
A— From this place to that place.
COURT:
Make a record that the witness indicates a distance of eight (8) to ten (1 0)
meters.
ATTY. CABANTING:
Q— That was the first time you saw him in your lifetime. Is that correct?
A— Yes, sir.
Q— Q You saw him in a split second that morning before giving chase.
Is that correct?
A— Not only seconds. He was walking towards us, facing us.
Q— He was not running, but walking?
A— A He was walking at a fast clip. (t.s.n., Hearing of May 2, 1968, pp.
5-6; Words in brackets supplied.)
From the above-quoted portions of the testimonies of witnesses Juvida and
Nazario, it can be readily seen that they came face to face with appellant.
They saw him walking at a fast clip from Cagayan Street to Mabuhay Street,
and because they also noticed that his face was painted black, their suspicion
was readily aroused that he must be a robber or something when he passed
by them at a distance of only about two (2) meters. And so, after appellant had
passed in front of them, when they heard the explosion and saw appellant
start running, the old man Juvida instructed the younger Nazario to try to catch
him, albeit in such attempt Nazario failed because appellant was able to make
good his escape after Nazario lost sight of him amongst the many people
passing by Tejeron Street. It cannot be said then that said witnesses had only
a glimpse of appellant at the time. Then too, it is not at all out of the ordinary,
as testified to by said witnesses, that they saw appellant first merely walking at
a fast clip after having delivered the fatal bomb to the intended victim, for the
stubborn fact is, as explained by said witnesses, appellant started to run soon
after the explosion of said bomb, apparently in an attempt to get away from the
scene of the crime of which he was the author as fast as he could upon
realization that the said bomb he planted had exploded. Surely, such behavior
of appellant, as described by the two witnesses referred to, is not in conflict
with the experience of common fife and the ordinary instincts and promptings
of human nature as insisted by appellant.
Our review of the evidence leads Us to no other conclusion that appellant has
been definitely and indubitably Identified as the man who handed the bag with
the fatal bomb to Florencia Tactay-Javier.
As to appellant's lament about the finding of the trial court vis-a-vis the black
dyeing materials found in his jeep, it is very safe to say that those materials
constituted the strongest mute evidence of his having been indeed the black-
painted man whom Florencia and the other two eye witnesses Juvida and
Nazario saw that morning. Said materials, albeit circumstantial, pointed to him
conclusively as the culprit. There were very credible oral evidence on top of
the dyeing materials. The accurate summation by the lower court of the
evidence in support of the case for the People reads as follows:
Page 54 of 129
Having been Identified; having thus been shown to have a motive for
committing the offense; and having had in his possession blackening materials
the evidence thus conclusively point to him as the person guilty as charged in
the information.
It may not be a miss to close this discussion with the following words in People
vs. Gonzaga, L-34418, May 26, 1977, 77 SCRA 140, 144-145, to dispose of
his defense of alibi.
It is easily understandable why the Identification of an accused as a participant
in the commission of an offense by evidence that is worthy of credence and
belief negates the claim of alibi. The falsity of an assertion that he was
elsewhere and therefore could not have been guilty of the crime imputed to
him becomes apparent. Where the proof of his presence then is clear and
positive, such a defense in unavailing. In the language of Justice Laurel in
People v. Caroz (68 Phil. 521 [1939]: 'Alibis cannot stand and prevail over
clear and convincing affirmation of credible witnesses (Ibid., 526). Such a
doctrine is of respectable lineage. It was first announced by Justice Torres in
United States v. Roque (1 I Phil. 422), a 1908 decision, where the accused
'was recognized with rare unanimity by five eye witnesses to the sequestration
as being one of the four armed individuals who in the early morning of the 23rd
of June, 1904, abducted the deceased, ... ... (Ibid., 426). Since then, as
pointed out by Justice Trent in United States v. Lasada (18 Phil. 90 [1910],
promulgated two years later, alibi cannot avail as against 'the positive and
direct testimony' (lbid., 100) of the witnesses for the prosecution. ... ...
Unquestionably, the crimes proven, as found above to have been committed
by appellant in these cases, constitute the complex crime of murder with
multiple frustrated murder, the same being the result of a single act that of
delivering the bomb which actually exploded as he had intended causing the
death and grave injuries already referred to earlier. The qualifying
circumstance is use of explosive. Based on the facts proven, We also find that
the commission of the offense was attended by evident premeditation, craft
and dwelling. His guilt having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, We have
no alternative than to find him guilty of said complex offense, with the
aggravating circumstances just mentioned, and he deserves no less than the
extreme penalty of death.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appellant Naño Milflores y Laksa is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex offense of
murder with frustrated murder with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, craft and dwelling and he is hereby sentenced to death. It
appearing from the records, however, that he is presently more than 70 years
old, pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, We have no alternative
but to affirm the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial court, with
an the concomitant accessories thereof. Costs against appellant.
Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27935 August 16, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUAN L. BOCAR, Presiding Judge of Branch XVI, Court of
First Instance of Manila, and CESAR URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and
SERAPION CLAUDIO, respondents.
Juanito M. Romano for Complainant Juan B. Bañez, Jr.
Leonardo R. Lucena for respondents.
MAKASIAR, C.J.:
Before Us is a special civil action seeking the annulment of the respondent
Court of First Instance of Manila (now the Regional Trial Court) dated July 7,
1967 in Criminal Case No. 85798 for theft entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio" dismissing said
case, thus:
Upon a summary investigation of this case the Court is of the opinion that the
same is more civil than criminal. The issue is who is the owner of the logs.
Both parties claim ownership and both claim that they can prove ownership.
During the summary investigation the accused acknowledged to have taken
the logs from the compound in the pier in good faith, without any intention to
steal them from anybody.
In view thereof, the Court orders the case dismissed, cost de oficio and the
cancellation of the bond filed by the accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 18, rec.).
On March 28, 1967, the assistant fiscal for Manila filed before the respondent
Court the following information:
The undersigned accuses CESAR S. URBINO, JOSE GIGANTE and
SERAPION CLAUDIO of the crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true
names, Identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal
and carry away the following property, to wit.
Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at -
P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAÑEZ, JR. to
the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of
P7,104.62, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.
CARLOS GALMAN CRUZ
Assistant Fiscal
(p.,10, rec.).
On May 3, 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty" (p.
2. rec).
Proceedings were had on July 7, 1967. On said date, the respondent Judge
conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as
well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation," the respondent Judge
issued the order under review.
On July 12, 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower court's
order dated July 7, 1967.
On July 18. 1967, the private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for
reconsideration" (pp. 3 & 19-27, rec.); and on August 8, 1967, the city Fiscal's
Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration (pp. 3
& 28, rec.).
On August 9, 1967, respondent Court issued an order denying the motion for
reconsideration (pp. 29-30, rec.). A copy of said order was received by the City
Fiscal's Office on August 11, 1967
The question is: Whether or not respondent Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated July 7,
1967.
WE find for petitioner.
It is not disputed that the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila had conducted a
preliminary investigation on the complaint of Juan B. Bañez, Jr., and that as a
result thereof an information was filed before respondent Court for theft
against the three accused. On May 3, 1967, the three accused were
arraigned, and all three pleaded "not guilty" of the charge. The propriety and
validity of both the information and the arraignment are not contested. The
issues having been joined, the case was ready for trial on the merits.
The subsequent proceedings. however, was marred with irregularities.
It is evident from the brief transcript of the proceedings held on July 7, 1967
that the parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries
of the respondent Judge (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, no evidence in law had as
yet been entered into the records of the case before respondent Court.
respondent Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary,
whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which this Court
cannot permit.
Moreover, it is clear from the same transcript that the prosecution never had a
chance to introduce and offer its evidence formally in accordance with the
Rules of Court (pp. 11-17, rec.). Verily, the prosecution was denied due
process.
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case, its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs. Genato, L-37399,
57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zosa, L-33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug.
31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345, 20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People
vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17 SCRA 11 19 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which
cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard
of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L- 30370, [May
25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L- 30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb.
27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation
may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and
slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores,
supra).
Page 55 of 129
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for
lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
The constitutional guarantee is that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense" (Sec. 22, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court (substantially reproduced as Section
7, Rule 117 in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, made effective on
January 1, 1985) clarifies the guarantee as follows:
Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy.-When a defendant shall
have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was
not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
In People vs. Gomez, et al., supra, We said:
. . . The dismissal was therefore purely capricious. It amounted to grave of
discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction. Such a dismissal order, made
sua sponte, for no proper reason at all, is void for being issued without
authority. And being void, it cannot terminate the proceedings. The same
jeopardy that attached continues, the cause not having been terminated,
thereby rendering the defense of double jeopardy without merit (People vs.
Cabero, 61 Phil. 121, 125).
A purely capricious dismissal of an information, as herein involved, moveover,
deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. It denies the
prosecution its day in court. Accordingly, it is a dismissal without due process
and, therefore, null and void. A dismissal invalid for lack of a fundamental
prerequisite, such as due process, will not constitute a proper basis for the
claim of double jeopardy" (People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, August 31, 1966,
Tilghman vs. Mago [Fla.] 82 So. 2d 136; McCleary vs. Hudspeth, 124 F. 2d.
445).
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 7,
1967 IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 85798 DISMISSING SAID CASE IS HEREBY
SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 85798 IS
REMANDED TO THE COURT A QUO FOR TRIAL ON THE MERITS. NO
COST.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 72670 September 12, 1986
SATURNINA GALMAN, REYNALDO GALMAN and JOSE P. BENGZON,
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, JOAQUIN G. BERNAS; S.J., M.
BELLARMINE BERNAS, O.S.B., FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, SOLITA
COLLAS-MONSOD, SANTIAGO DUMLAO, JR., MARIA FERIA, MARCELO
B. FERNAN, FRANCISCO GARCHITORENA, * ANDREW GONZALEZ,
JOSE C. LAURETA, SALVADOR P. LOPEZ, FELIX K. MARAMBA, JR.,
CECILIA MUÑOZ PALMA. JAIME V. ONGPIN, FELIX PEREZ, JOSE B.L.
REYES, JOSE E. ROMERO, JR., RAMON DEL ROSARIO, JR., RICARDO J.
ROMULO, AUGUSTO SANCHEZ, EMMANUEL V. SORIANO, DAVID
SYCIP, ENRIQUE SYQUIA, CRISTINA TAN, JESUS VARGAS, BERNARDO
M. VILLEGAS, VICENTE JAYME, **, petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION (represented by Justice Manuel
Pamaran, Chairman, and Justices Augusto Amores and Bienvenido Vera
Cruz, Members), JUSTICE BERNARDO FERNANDEZ (Ombudsman) and
GEN. FABIAN C. VER, MAJ. GEN. PROSPERO A. OLIVAS, BRIG. GEN.
LUFHER A. CUSTODIO, COL. ARTURO G. CUSTODIO, COL. VICENTE B.
TIGAS, JR., CAPT. FELIPE VALERIO, CAPT. LLEWELYN KAVINTA,
CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS CASTRO, SGT. PABLO
MARTINEZ, SGT. ARNULFO DE MESA, SGT. TOMAS FERNANDEZ, SGT.
CLARO LAT, SGT. FILOMENO MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE
GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG,
SGT. LEONARDO MOJICA, SGT. PEPITO TORIO, SGT. ARMANDO DELA
CRUZ, SGT. PROSPERO A. BONA, CIC ROGELIO MORENO, CIC MARIO
LAZAGA, AIC CORDOVA G. ESTELO, AIC ANICETO ACUPIDO and
HERMILO GOSUICO, *** , respondents.
Lupino Lazaro and Arturo M. de Castro for petitioners.
Antonio R. Coronel for respondents Gen. Ver and Col. Tigas, Jr.
Rodolfo U. Jimenez for respondent Brig. Gen. Custodio.
Ramon M. Bernaldo for respondent H. Gosuico.
Romulo Quimbo for respondent B. Vera Cruz.
Norberto J. Quisumbing for respondent P. Olivas.
Felix Solomon for respondent Col. A. Custodio.
Alfonso S. Cruz for B. Fernandez.
Edgardo B. Gayos for M. Pamaran.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
Last August 21st, our nation marked with solemnity and for the first time in
freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of foremost
opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for
almost eight years since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was sentenced to death by firing
squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been
committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction
over him as a civilian entitled to trial by judicial process by civil courts he
repudiated. Ninoy pleaded in vain that the military tribunals are admittedly not
courts but mere instruments and subject to the control of the President as
created by him under the General Orders issued by him as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and that he had already been
publicly indicted and adjudged guilty by the President of the charges in a
nationwide press conference held on August 24, 1971 when he declared the
evidence against Ninoy "not only strong but overwhelming ." 1 This followed
the Plaza Miranda bombing of August 21, 1971 of the proclamation rally of the
opposition Liberal Party candidates for the November, 1971 elections (when
eight persons were killed and practically all of the opposition candidates
headed by Senator Jovito Salonga and many more were seriously injured),
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under
Proclamation No. 889 on August 23, 1971. The massacre was instantly
attributed to the communists but the truth has never been known. But the then
President never filed the said charges against Ninoy in the civil courts.
Ninoy Aquino was nevertheless thereafter allowed in May, 1980 to leave the
country to undergo successful heart surgery. After three years of exile and
despite the regime's refusal to give him a passport, he sought to return home
"to strive for a genuine national reconciliation founded on justice." He was to
be cold-bloodedly killed while under escort away by soldiers from his plane
that had just landed at the Manila International Airport on that fateful day at
past 1 p.m. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the back of
his head by a murderous assassin, notwithstanding that the airport was ringed
by airtight security of close to 2,000 soldiers and "from a military viewpoint, it
(was) technically impossible to get inside (such) a cordon." 2 The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot
Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed
only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of
accused Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on August
17, 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts
gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing
scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV
channels as if it were taken live on the spot. The then President instantly
accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press
conference that he gave late in the evening of August 22, 1983, wherein he
said, in order to induce disbelief that the military had a hand in the killing, that
"if the purpose was to eliminate Aquino, this was not the way to do it."
The national tragedy shocked the conscience of the entire nation and outraged
the free world. The large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of
national mourning and came out in millions in the largest and most orderly
public turnout for Ninoy's funeral reflected their grief for his martyrdom and
their yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
Page 56 of 129
The then President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board 3 to
investigate "the treacherous and vicious assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983 [which] has to all Filipinos become
a national tragedy and national shame specially because of the early
distortions and exaggerations in both foreign and local media 4 so that all right
thinking and honest men desire to ventilate the truth through fare, independent
and dispassionate investigation by prestigious and free investigators." After
two false starts, 5 he finally constituted the Board 6 on October 22, 1983 which
held 125 hearing days commencing November 3, 1983 (including 3 hearings
in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies
of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission
of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24,
1984. This was to mark another first anywhere in the world wherein the
minority report was submitted one day ahead by the ponente thereof, the
chairman, who was received congenially and cordially by the then President
who treated the report as if it were the majority report instead of a minority
report of one and forthwith referred it to respondent Tanodbayan "for final
resolution through the legal system" and for trial in the Sandiganbayan which
was better known as a graft court; and the majority report of the four other
members was submitted on the following day to the then President who coldly
received them and could scarcely conceal his instant rejection of their report
with the grim statement that "I hope you can live with your conscience with
what you have done."
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the
military version as propounded by the chief investigator, respondent Gen.
Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin, stating that "the
evidence shows [to the contrary] that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations." They were in agreement that "only the soldiers in the staircase
with Sen. Aquino could have shot him;" that Galman, the military's "fall guy"
was "not the assassin of Sen. Aquino and that "the SWAT troopers who
gunned down Galman and the soldiers who escorted Sen. Aquino down the
service stairs, deliberately and in conspiracy with one another, gave a perjured
story to us regarding the alleged shooting by Galman of Sen. Aquino and the
mowing down, in turn, of Galman himself;" in short, that Ninoy's assassination
was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot The only
difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the
twenty-six private respondents abovenamed in the title of the case headed by
then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and
therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino,
Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's
minority report would exclude nineteen of them and limit as plotters "the six
persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was
descending" and "General Luther Custodio . . . because the criminal plot could
not have been planned and implemented without his intervention."
The chairman wrote in her minority report (somewhat prophetically) that "The
epilogue to our work lies in what will transpire in accordance with the action
that the Office of the President may thereafter direct to be taken. "The four-
member majority report (also prophetically) wrote in the epilogue (after
warning the forces who adhere to an alien and intolerable political ideology
against unscrupulously using the report "to discredit our traditionally revered
institutions"), that "the tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed
our worst fears of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing." They
wrote:
The task of the Board was clear and unequivocal. This task was not only to
determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of the late
former Senator. Of greater significance is the awesome responsibility of the
Board to uphold righteousness over evil, justice over injustice, rationality over
irrationality, humaneness over inhumanity. The task was indeed a painful test,
the inevitable result of which will restore our country's honored place among
the sovereign nations of the free world where peace, law and order, freedom,
and justice are a way of life.
More than any other event in contemporary Philippine history, the killing of the
late former Senator Aquino has brought into sharper focus, the ills pervading
Philippine society. It was the concretization of the horror that has been
haunting this country for decades, routinely manifested by the breakdown of
peace and order, economic instability, subversion, graft and corruption, and an
increasing number of abusive elements in what are otherwise noble
institutions in our country-the military and law enforcement agencies. We are,
however, convinced that, by and large, the great majority of the officers and
men of these institutions have remained decent and honorable, dedicated to
their noble mission in the service of our country and people.
The tragedy opened our eyes and for the first time confirmed our worst fears
of what unchecked evil would be capable of doing. As former Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban observes. "Nobody who has great authority can be trusted
not to go beyond its proper limits." Social apathy, passivity and indifference
and neglect have spawned in secret a dark force that is bent on destroying the
values held sacred by freedom-loving people.
To assert our proper place in the civilized world, it is imperative that public
officials should regard public service as a reflection of human Ideals in which
the highest sense of moral values and integrity are strictly required.
A tragedy like that which happened on August 21, 1983, and the crisis that
followed, would have normally caused the resignation of the Chief of the
Armed Forces in a country where public office is viewed with highest esteem
and respect and where the moral responsibilities of public officials transcend
all other considerations.

It is equally the fact that the then President through all his recorded public acts
and statements from the beginning disdained and rejected his own Board's
above findings and insisted on the military version of Galman being Ninoy's
assassin. In upholding this view that "there is no involvement of anyone in his
government in the assassination," he told David Briscoe (then AP Manila
Bureau Chief in a Radio-TV interview on September 9, 1983 that "I am
convinced that if any member of my government were involved, I would have
known somehow ... Even at a fairly low level, I would have known. I know how
they think. I know what they are thinking of." 7 He told CBS in another
interview in May, 1984 (as his Fact Finding Board was holding its hearings)
the following:
CBS: But indeed there has been recent evidence that seems to contradict
earlier reports, namely, the recent evidence seems to indicate that some of the
guards may have been responsible (for shooting Ninoy).
MARCOS: Well, you are of course wrong. What you have been reading are
the newspapers and the newspaper reports have been biased. The evidence
still proves that Galman was the killer. The evidence also shows that there
were intelligence reports connecting the communist party to the killing. 8
In his reply of October 25, 1984 to General Ver's letter of the same date going
on leave of absence upon release of the Board's majority report implicating
him, he wrote that "(W)e are even more aware, general, that the
circumstances under which the board has chosen to implicate you in its
findings are fraught with doubt and great contradictions of opinion and
testimony. And we are deeply disturbed that on the basis of so-called
evidence, you have been so accused by some members of the Board," and
extended "My very best wishes to you and your family for a speedy resolution
of your case," 9 even as he announced that he would return the general to his
position as AFP Chief "if he is acquitted by the Sandiganbayan." In an
interview on June 4, 1985 with the Gamma Photo Agency, as respondent
court was hearing the cases, he was quoted as saying that "as will probably
be shown, those witnesses (against the accused) are perjured witnesses." 10
It was against this setting that on November 11, 1985 petitioners Saturnina
Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late
Rolando Galman, and twenty-nine (29) other petitioners, composed of three
former Justices of this Court, five incumbent and former university presidents,
a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and
solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that
respondents Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities
constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the
Philippines to due process of law. They asserted that the Tanodbayan did not
represent the interest of the people when he failed to exert genuine and
earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary
evidence for the prosecution and that the Sandiganbayan Justices were
biased, prejudiced and partial in favor of the accused, and that their acts
"clouded with the gravest doubts the sincerity of government to find out the
truth about the Aquino assassination." Petitioners prayed for the immediate
issuance of a temporary restraining order restraining the respondent
Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending
criminal cases which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that
judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal
by an unbiased prosecutor. 10-a
At the hearing on November 18, 1985 of petitioners' prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two
votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted
petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments
and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-
page memorandum for the prosecution as filed in the Sandiganbayan, the
signature page of which alone had been submitted to the Court as Annex 5 of
his comment.
But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to- two-
vote ratio in reverse, 12 resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the
temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision.13 The same Court majority
denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of
respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently
was not served on them and which they alleged was "very material to the
question of his partiality, bias and prejudice" within which to file a consolidated
reply thereto and to respondents' separate comments, by an eight-to-three
vote, with Justice Gutierrez joining the dissenters. 14
On November 29, 1985, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging
that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging
that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of
partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence
by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs
demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial
tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is
suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire
proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the
Page 57 of 129
Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled
anew on December 2, 1985.
On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the
motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December
2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision
acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and
totally absolving them of any civil liability. This marked another unusual first in
that respondent Sandiganbayan in effect convicted the very victim Rolando
Galman (who was not on trial) as the assassin of Ninoy contrary to the very
information and evidence submitted by the prosecution. In opposition,
respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same
Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit,
with the writer and Justice Abad Santos maintaining our dissent.
On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion
for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for
reconsideration was the startling and theretofore unknown revelations of
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of
the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had
ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo
Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the
criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of
acquittal.
On April 3, 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for
reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. 15
Respondent Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez stated in his Manifestation filed
on April 11, 1986 that he had ceased to hold office as Tanodbayan as of April
8, 1986 when he was replaced by the new Tanodbayan, Raul M. Gonzales,
but reiterating his position in his comment on the petition, he added "relative to
the reported alleged revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera,
herein respondent never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his
actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived
attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation, and
actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two (2) murder cases below
against herein private party respondents." He candidly admitted also in his
memorandum: "There is not much that need be said about the existence of
pressure. That there were pressures can hardly be denied; in fact, it has never
been denied." 15-a He submitted that "even as he vehemently denies
insinuations of any direct or indirect complicity or participation in any alleged
attempt to supposedly whitewash the cases below, . . . should this Honorable
Court find sufficient cause to justify the reopening and retrial of the cases
below, he would welcome such development so that any wrong that had been
caused may be righted and so that, at the very least the actuations of herein
respondent in the premises may be reviewed and reexamined, confident as he
is that the end will show that he had done nothing in the premises that violated
his trust as Tanodbayan (Ombudsman)." New Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales
in his comment of April 14, 1986 "interposed no objection to the reopening of
the trial of the cases . . . as, in fact, he urged that the said cases be reopened
in order that justice could take its course."
Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective
comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them
was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the
law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan
and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured
into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the
trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the
reopening of those cases, if only to allow justice to take its course."
Respondent Sandiganbayan Justice Bienvenido C. Vera Cruz, in a separate
comment, asserted that he passed no note to anyone; the note being bandied
about is not in his handwriting; he had nothing to do with the writing of the note
or of any note of any kind intended for any lawyer of the defense or even of
the prosecution; and requested for an investigation by this Court to settle the
note passing issue once and for all.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera, in his comment of April 14, 1986
affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were
ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. He
amplified his revelations, as follows:
1. AB INITIO, A. VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL!
Incidents during the preliminary investigation showed ominous signs that the
fate of the criminal case on the death of Ex-Senator Benigno Aquino and
Rolando Galman on August 21, 1983 was doomed to an ignominous end.
Malacanang wanted dismissal-to the extent that a prepared resolution was
sent to the Investigating Panel (composed of the undersigned, Fiscals Ernesto
Bernabe and Leonardo Tamayo) for signature. This, of course, was resisted
by the panel, and a resolution charging all the respondents as principals was
forwarded to the Tanodbayan on January 10, 1985.
2. MALACAÑANG CONFERENCE PLANNED SCENARIO OF TRIAL
At 6:00 p.m. of said date (January 10) Mr. Ferdinand E. Marcos (the former
President) summoned to Malacañang Justice Bernardo Fernandez (the
Tanodbayan), Sandiganbayan Justice Manuel Pamaran (the Presiding
Justice) and an the members of the Panel

Also present at the meeting were Justice Manuel Lazaro (the Coordinator) and
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, who left earlier, came back and left again. The former
President had a copy of the panel's signed resolution (charging all accused as
principals), evidently furnished him in advance, and with prepared notes on the
contents thereof.
The former President started by vehemently maintaining that Galman shot
Aquino at the tarmac. Albeit initially the undersigned argued against the
theory, to remain silent was the more discreet posture when the former
President became emotional (he was quite sick then).
During a good part of the conference, the former President talked about
Aquino and the communists, lambasting the Agrava Board, specially the Legal
Panel. Shifting to the military he rumbled on such statements as: "It will be
bloody . . . Gen. Ramos, though close to me, is getting ambitious and poor
Johnny does not know what to do". . . 'our understanding with Gen. Ramos is
that his stint is only temporary, but he is becoming ambitious "the boys were
frantic when they heard that they will be charged in court, and wig be detained
at city jail."
From outright dismissal, the sentiment veered towards a more pragmatic
approach. The former President more or less conceded that for political and
legal reasons all the respondents should be charged in court, Politically, as it
will become evident that the government was serious in pursuing the case
towards its logical conclusion, and thereby ease public demonstrations; on the
other hand, legally, it was perceived that after (not IF) they are acquitted,
double jeopardy would inure. The former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent.
In the matter of custody of the accused pendente lite the Coordinator was
ordered to get in touch with Gen. Narciso Cabrera, Gen. Vicente Eduardo and
Director Jolly Bugarin to put on record that they had no place in their
respective institutions. The existence of PD No. 1950 (giving custody to
commanding officers of members of AFP charged in court) was never
mentioned.
It was decided that the presiding justice (First Division) would personally
handle the trial, and assurance was made by him that it would be finished in
four to six months, pointing out that, with the recent effectivity of the New
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the trial could be expedited.
Towards the end of the two-hour meeting and after the script had been tacitly
mapped out, the former President uttered: "Mag moro-moro na lang kayo."
The parting words of the former President were: "Thank you for your
cooperation. I know how to reciprocate."
While still in the palace grounds on the way out, the undersigned manifested
his desire to the Tanodbayan to resign from the panel, or even the office. This,
as well as other moves to this effect, had always been refused. Hoping that
with sufficient evidence sincerely and efficiently presented by the prosecution,
all involves in the trial would be conscience-pricked and realize the futility and
injustice of proceeding in accordance with the script, the undersigned opted to
say on.
Herrera further added details on the "implementation of the script," such as the
holding of a "make-believe raffle" within 18 minutes of the filing of the
Informations with the Sandiganbayan at noon of January 23, 1985, while there
were no members of the media; the installation of TV monitors directly
beamed to Malacanang; the installation of a "war room" occupied by the
military; attempts to direct and stifle witnesses for the prosecution; the
suppression of the evidence that could be given by U.S. Airforce men about
the "scrambling" of Ninoy's plane; the suppression of rebuttal witnesses and
the bias and partiality of the Sandiganbayan; its cavalier disregard of his plea
that it "should not decide these cases on the merits without first making a final
ruling on the Motion for Inhibition;" and the Presiding Justice's over-kill with the
declaration that "the Court finds all accused innocent of the crimes charged in
the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil
liability," adding that "in the almost twenty years that the undersigned has
been the prosecutor in the sala of the Presiding Justice this is the only
occasion where civil liability is pronounced in a decision of acquittal. " He
"associated himself with the motion for reconsideration and likewise prayed
that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan and its decision be declared null
and void."
New Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoñez' comment of April 25, 1986 submitted
that a declaration of mistrial will depend on the veracity of the evidence
supportive of petitioners' claim of suppression of evidence and collusion. He
submitted that this would require reception of evidence by a Court-appointed
or designated commissioner or body of commissioners (as was done in G.R.
No. 71316, Fr. Romano case; and G.R. No. 61016, Morales case; and G.R.
No. 70054, Banco Filipino case); and that if petitioners' claim were
substantiated, a reopening of the double murder case is proper to avoid a
miscarriage of justice since the verdict of acquittal would no longer be a valid
basis for a double jeopardy claim.
Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and
prayed for its denial. Respondent Olivas contended that the proper step for the
government was to file a direct action to annul the judgment of acquittal and at
a regular trial present its evidence of collusion and pressures.
Page 58 of 129
As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and
invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the
rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-
accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas,
as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal
is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment
where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear,
competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity.
After Petitioners had filed their consolidated reply, the Court resolved per its
resolution of June 5, 1986 to appoint a three-member commission composed
of retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired
Intermediate Appellate Court Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa
as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of
the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice
to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition.
The Commission conducted hearings on 19 days, starting on June 16, 1986
and ending on July 16, 1986, On the said last day, respondents announced in
open hearing that they decided to forego the taking of the projected deposition
of former President Marcos, as his testimony would be merely corroborative of
the testimonies of respondents Justice Pamaran and Tanodbayan Fernandez.
On July 31, 1986, it submitted its extensive 64-page Report 16 wherein it
discussed fully the evidence received by it and made a recapitulation of its
findings in capsulized form, as follows:
1. The Office of the Tanodbayan, particularly Justice Fernandez and
the Special Investigating Panel composed of Justice Herrera, Fiscal Bernabe
and Special Prosecutor Tamayo, was originally of the view that all of the
twenty-six (26) respondents named in the Agrava Board majority report should
all be charged as principals of the crime of double murder for the death of
Senator Benigno Aquino and Rolando Galman.
2. When Malacanang learned of the impending filing of the said
charge before the Sandiganbayan, the Special Investigating Panel having
already prepared a draft Resolution recommending such course of action,
President Marcos summoned Justice Fernandez, the tree members of the
Special Investigating Panel, and justice Pamaran to a conference in
Malacanang in the early evening of January 10, 1985.
3. In said conference, President Marcos initially expressed his
disagreement with the recommendation of the Special Investigating Panel and
disputed the findings of the Agrava Board that it was not Galman who shot
Benigno Aquino.
4. Later in the conference, however, President Marcos was
convinced of the advisability of filing the murder charge in court so that, after
being acquitted as planned, the accused may no longer be prosecuted in view
of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
5. Presumably in order to be assured that not all of the accused
would be denied bail during the trial, considering that they would be charged
with capital offenses, President Marcos directed that the several accused be
"categorized" so that some of them would merely be charged as accomplices
and accessories.
6. In addition to said directive, President Marcos ordered that the
case be handled personally by Justice Pamaran who should dispose of it in
the earliest possible time.
7. The instructions given in the Malacanang conference were
followed to the letter; and compliance therewith manifested itself in several
specific instances in the course of the proceedings, such as, the changing of
the resolution of the special investigating panel, the filing of the case with the
Sandiganbayan and its assignment to Justice Pamaran, suppression of some
vital evidence, harassment of witnesses, recantation of witneses who gave
adverse testimony before the Agrava Board, coaching of defense counsels,
the hasty trial, monitoring of proceedings, and even in the very decision
rendered in the case.
8. That that expression of President Marcos' desire as to how he
wanted the Aquino-Galman case to be handled and disposed of constituted
sufficient pressure on those involved in said task to comply with the same in
the subsequent course of the proceedings.
9. That while Justice Pamaran and Justice Fernandez manifested no
revulsion against complying with the Malacañang directive, justice Herrera
played his role with manifestly ambivalent feelings.
10. Sufficient evidence has been ventilated to show a scripted and
pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case, as stage-managed from Malacañang and performed by willing
dramatis personnae as well as by recalcitrant ones whipped into line by the
omnipresent influence of an authoritarian ruler.
The Commission submitted the following recommendation.
Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the
prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and
decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved
to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the
prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it
could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of
the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to
the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court that the proceedings
in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby
respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a
mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People vs.
Luther Custodia et al.," be granted.
The Court per its Resolution of July 31, 1986 furnished all the parties with
copies of the Report and required them to submit their objections thereto. It
thereafter heard the parties and their objections at the hearing of August 26,
1986 and the matter was submitted for the Court's resolution.
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds on the
basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by the
Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and knowledge
set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President (code named
Olympus) had stage-managed in and from Malacanang Palace "a scripted and
pre-determined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman
murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some
pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist', and which not
only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the
evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined
the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents
accused of all criminal and civil liability.
The Court finds that the Commission's Report (incorporated herein by
reference) and findings and conclusions are duly substantiated by the
evidence and facts of public record. Composed of distinguished members of
proven integrity with a combined total of 141 years of experience in the
practice of law (55 years) and in the prosecutoral and judicial services (86
years in the trial and appellate courts), experts at sifting the chaff from the
grain, 17 the Commission properly appraised the evidences presented and
denials made by public respondents, thus:
The desire of President Marcos to have the Aquino-Galman case disposed of
in a manner suitable to his purposes was quite understandable and was but to
be expected. The case had stirred unprecedented public outcry and wide
international attention. Not invariably, the finger of suspicion pointed to those
then in power who supposedly had the means and the most compelling motive
to eliminate Senator Aquino. A day or so after the assassination, President
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator
Aquino was killed not by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It
was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President Marcos would want the
case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory thereof
which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any
suspected guilty participation in the assassination.
The calling of the conference was undoubtedly to accomplish this purpose. . . .
President Marcos made no bones to conceal his purpose for calling them.
From the start, he expressed irritation and displeasure at the recommendation
of the investigating panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents as
principals of the crime of double murder. He insisted that it was Galman who
shot Senator Aquino, and that the findings of the Agrava Board were not
supported by evidence that could stand in court. He discussed and argued
with Justice Herrera on this point. Midway in the course of the discussion,
mention was made that the filing of the charge in court would at least mollify
public demands and possibly prevent further street demonstrations. It was
further pointed out that such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they
may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid
another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear when President
Marcos is no longer in office.
xxx xxx xxx
After an agreement was reached as to filing the case, instead of dismissing it,
but with some of the accused to be charged merely as accomplices or
accessories, and the question of preventive custody of the accused having
thereby received satisfactory solution, President Marcos took up the matter of
who would try the case and how long it would take to be finished.
According to Justice Herrera, President Marcos told Justice Pamaran 'point
blank' to personally handle the case. This was denied by Justice Pamaran. No
similar denial was voiced by Justice Fernandez in the entire course of his two-
day testimony. Justice Pamaran explained that such order could not have
been given inasmuch as it was not yet certain then that the Sandiganbayan
would try the case and, besides, cases therein are assigned by raffle to a
division and not to a particular Justice thereof.
It was preposterous to expect Justice Pamaran to admit having received such
presidential directive. His denial, however, falls to pieces in the light of the fact
that the case was indeed handled by him after being assigned to the division
headed by him. A supposition of mere coincidence is at once dispelled by the
circumstance that he was the only one from the Sandiganbayan called to the
Malacanang conference wherein the said directive was given. . . .
The giving of such directive to Justice Pamaran may also be inferred from his
admission that he gave President Marcos the possible time frame when asked
as to how long it would take him to finish the case.
Page 59 of 129
The testimony of Justice Herrera that, during the conference, and after an
agreement was reached on filing the case and subsequently acquitting the
accused, President Marcos told them "Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;" and that on their way out of the room President Marcos expressed his
thanks to the group and uttered "I know how to reciprocate," did not receive
any denial or contradiction either on the part of justice Fernandez or justice
Pamaran. (No other person present in the conference was presented by the
respondents. Despite an earlier manifestation by the respondents of their
intention to present Fiscal Bernabe and Prosecutor Tamayo, such move was
abandoned without any reason having been given therefor.)
The facts set forth above are all supported by the evidence on record. In the
mind of the Commission, the only conclusion that may be drawn therefrom is
that pressure from Malacanang had indeed been made to bear on both the
court and the prosecution in the handling and disposition of the Aquino-
Galman case. The intensity of this pressure is readily deductible from the
personality of the one who exerted it, his moral and official ascendancy over
those to whom his instructions were directed, the motivation behind such
instructions, and the nature of the government prevailing at that time which
enabled, the then head of state to exercise authoritarian powers. That the
conference called to script or stage-manage the prosecution and trial of the
Aquino-Galman case was considered as something anomalous that should be
kept away from the public eye is shown by the effort to assure its secrecy.
None but those directly involved were caned to attend. The meeting was held
in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal
Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to
take the back door in going to the room where the meeting was held,
presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. Actually, no public mention alas ever made of this conference
until Justice Herrera made his expose some fifteen (15) months later when the
former president was no longer around.
President Marcos undoubtedly realized the importance of the matter he
wanted to take up with the officials he asked to be summoned. He had to do it
personally, and not merely through trusted assistants. The lack of will or
determination on the part of Justice Fernandez and Justice Pamaran to resist
the presidential summons despite their realization of its unwholesome
implications on their handling of the celebrated murder case may be easily
inferred from their unquestioned obedience thereto. No effort to resist was
made, despite the existence of a most valid reason to beg off, on the lame
excuses that they went there out of "curiosity," or "out of respect to the Office
of the President," or that it would be 'unbecoming to refuse a summons from
the President.' Such frame of mind only reveals their susceptibility to
presidential pressure and lack of capacity to resist the same. The very acts of
being summoned to Malacanang and their ready acquiescence thereto under
the circumstances then obtaining, are in themselves pressure dramatized and
exemplified Their abject deference to President Marcos may likewise be
inferred from the admitted fact that, not having been given seats during the
two-hour conference (Justice Fernandez said it was not that long, but did not
say how long) in which President Marcos did the talking most of the time, they
listened to him on their feet. Verily, it can be said that any avowal of
independent action or resistance to presidential pressure became illusory from
the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang Palace on January 10,
1985. 18
The Commission pinpointed the crucial factual issue thus: "the more
significant inquiry is on whether the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the
Tanodbayan actually succumbed to such pressure, as may be gauged by their
subsequent actuations in their respective handling of the case." It duly
concluded that "the pressure exerted by President Marcos in the conference
held on January 10, 1985 pervaded the entire proceedings of the Aquino
Galman [murder] cases" as manifested in several specific incidents and
instances it enumerated in the Report under the heading of "Manifestations of
Pressure and Manipulation."
Suffice it to give hereinbelow brief excerpts:—
1. The changing of the original Herrera panel draft Resolution
charging all the twenty-six accused as principals by conspiracy by categorizing
and charging 17 as principals, Generals Ver and Olivas and 6 others as
accessories and the civilian as accomplice, and recommending bail for the
latter two categories: "The categorization may not be completely justified by
saying that, in the mind of Justice Fernandez, there was no sufficient evidence
to justify that all of the accused be charged as principals. The majority of the
Agrava Board found the existence of conspiracy and recommended that all of
the accused be charged accordingly. Without going into the merit of such
finding, it may hardly be disputed that, in case of doubt, and in accordance
with the standard practice of the prosecution to charge accused with the most
serious possible offense or in the highest category so as to prevent an
incurable injustice in the event that the evidence presented in the trial will
show his guilt of the graver charge, the most logical and practical course of
action should have been, as originally recommended by the Herrera panel, to
charge all the accused as principals. As it turned out, Justice Fernandez
readily opted for categorization which, not surprisingly, was in consonance
with the Malacañang instruction." It is too much to attribute to coincidence that
such unusual categorization came only after the then President's instruction at
Malacanang when Gen. Ver's counsel, Atty. Coronel, had been asking the
same of Tanodbayan Fernandez since November, 1984; and "Justice
Fernandez himself, admit(ted) that, as of that time, [the Malacanang
conference on January 10, 1985], his own view was in conformity with that of
the Special Investigating Panel to charge all of the twenty-six (26) respondents
as principals of the crime of double murder." 19 As the Commission further
noted, "Justice Fernandez never denied the claim of Justice Herrera that the
draft resolution of January 10, 1985 (Exhibit 'B-1') [charging all 26 accused as
principals] was to have been the subject of a press conference on the
afternoon of said date which did not go through due to the summons for them
to go to Malacanang in the early evening of said date."20
2. Suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses:"
Realizing, no doubt, that a party's case is as strong as the evidence it can
present, unmistakable and persistent efforts were exerted in behalf of the
accused to weaken the case of the prosecution and thereby assure and justify
[the accused's] eventual scripted acquittal. Unfavorable evidences were
sought to be suppressed, and some were indeed prevented from being
ventilated. Adverse witnesses were harassed, cajoled, perjured or threatened
either to refrain from testifying or to testify in a manner favorable to the
defense."
The Report specified the ordeals of the prosecution witnesses:21 Cesar
Loterina, PAL employee, Roberta Masibay, Galman's step-daughter who
recanted their testimonies before the Fact Finding Board and had to be
discarded as prosecution witnesses before at the trial. Witnesses Viesca and
Rañas who also testified before the Board "disappeared all of a sudden and
could not be located by the police. The Commission narrated the efforts to
stifle Kiyoshi Wakamiya eyewitness who accompanied Ninoy on his fateful
flight on August 21, 1983 and described them as "palpable, if crude and
display(ing) sheer abuse of power." Wakamiya was not even allowed to return
to Manila on August 20, 1984 to participate in the first death anniversary of
Ninoy but was deported as an undesirable alien and had to leave on the next
plane for Tokyo. The Board had to go to Tokyo to hear Wakamiya give his
testimony before the Japanese police in accordance with their law and
Wakamiya claimed before the Commission that the English transcription of his
testimony, as prepared by an official of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, was
inaccurate and did not correctly reflect the testimony he gave "although there
was no clear showing of the discrepancy from the original transcription which
was in Nippongo. Upon his arrival at the MIA on August 21, 1985 on invitation
of Justice Herrera to testify at the ongoing trial, "a shot was fired and a soldier
was seen running away by media men who sought to protect Wakamiya from
harm by surrounding him." Wakamiya was forced by immigration officials to
leave the country by Saturday (August 24th) notwithstanding Herrera's request
to let him stay until he could testify the following Monday (August 26th). In the
case of principal eyewitness Rebecca Quijano, the Commission reported that
... Undoubtedly in view of the considerable significance of her proposed
testimony and its unfavorable effect on the cause of the defense, the efforts
exerted to suppress the same was as much as, if not more than those in the
case of Wakamiya. ... She recounted that she was in constant fear of her life,
having been hunted by armed men; that their house in Tabaco, Albay was
ransacked, her family harassed by the foreclosure of the mortgage on their
house by the local Rural Bank, and ejected therefrom when she ignored the
request of its manager to talk with her about her proposed testimony; that a
certain William Fariñas offered her plane tickets for a trip abroad; that Mayor
Rudy Fariñas of Laoag City kept on calling her sister in the United States to
warn her not to testify; that, later, Rudy and William Fariñas offered her two
million pesos supposedly coming from Bongbong Marcos, a house and lot in
Baguio, the dropping of her estafa case in Hongkong, and the punishment of
the persons responsible for the death of her father, if she would refrain from
testifying.
It is a matter of record, however, that despite such cajolery and harassments,
or perhaps because of them, Ms. Quijano eventually testified before the
Sandiganbayan. Justice Herrera was told by justice Fernandez of the
displeasure expressed by Olympus at justice Herrera's going out of his way to
make Ms. Quijano to testify, and for his refusal to honor the invitation to attend
the birthday party of the First Lady on May 1, 1985, as on the eve of Ms.
Quijano's testimony on May 2, 1985. The insiduous attempts to tamper with
her testimony, however, did not end with her taking the witness stand. In the
course of her testimony several notes were passed to Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez,
the defense counsel who cross-examined her, one of which suggested that
she be asked more questions about Dean Narvasa who was suspected of
having coached her as to what to declare (Exhibit "D"); and on another
occasion, at a crucial point in her testimony, a power brownout occurred;
which lasted for about twenty minutes, throwing the courtroom into darkness,
and making most of those present to scamper for safety, and Ms. Quijano to
pass over the railing of the rostrum so as to be able to leave the courtroom. It
was verified that the brownout was limited to the building housing the
Sandiganbayan, it not having affected the nearby Manila City Hall and the
Finance Building. Justice Herrera declared that the main switchboard of the
Sandiganbayan electrical system was located beside the room occupied by
Malacañang people who were keeping track of the proceedings.
Atty. Lupino Lazaro for petitioners further made of record at that August 26th
hearing that the two Olivas sisters, Ana and Catherine (hospitality girls)
disappeared on September 4, 1984, two weeks after Ninoy's assassination.
And the informant, by the name of Evelyn (also a hospitality girl) who jotted
down the number of the car that took them away, also disappeared. On
January 29, 1984, during the proceedings of the Board, Lina Galman, the
common-law wife of Rolando Galman, was kidnapped together with a
neighbor named Rogelio Taruc, They have been missing since then, despite
his attempts to find any of them. According to him, "nobody was looking for
these five persons because they said Marcos was in Power [despite his
appeal to the Minister of National Defense to locate them]. Today, still no one
is looking for these people." And he appealed to the new leadership for its
assistance in learning their fate.
Page 60 of 129
3. The discarding of the affidavits executed by U.S. airmen "While it
is true that the U.S. airmen's proposed testimonies would show an attempt of
the Philippine Air Force to divert the plane to Basa Airfield or some other
place, such showing would not necessarily contravene the theory of the
prosecution, nor the actual fact that Senator Aquino was killed at the Manila
International Airport. Justice Herrera had accurately pointed out that such
attempt of scrambling Aquino's plane merely showed a 'wider range of
conspiracy,' it being possibly just one of two or three other plans designed to
accomplish the same purpose of liquidating Senator Aquino. In any event,
even assuming that the said piece of evidence could go either way, it may not
be successfully contended that it was prudent or wise on the part of the
prosecution to totally discard the said piece of evidence. Despite minor
inconsistencies contained therein, its introduction could have helped the cause
of the prosecution. If it were not so, or that it would even favor the defense, as
averred by Justice Fernandez, the determined effort to suppress the same
would have been totally uncalled for."
4. Nine proposed rebuttal witnesses not presented.
5. The failure to exhaust available remedies against adverse
developments: "When the Supreme Court denied the petition of Justice
Fernandez [against the exclusion of the testimonies given by the military
respondents headed by Gen. Ver before the Fact Finding Board], the latter
almost immediately announced to media that he was not filing a motion for the
reconsideration of said denial for the reason that it would be futile to do so and
foolhardy to expect a favorable action on the same. ... His posture ... is, in the
least, indicative that he was living up to the instruction of finishing the trial of
the case as soon as possible, if not of something else."
6. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran: "Justice
Herrera testified that President Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran point-blank
to handle the case. The pro-forma denial by Justice Pamaran of such
instruction crumbles under the actuality of such directive having been
complied with to the letter. ...
"Justice Pamaran sought to discredit the claim that he was ordered by
President Marcos to handle the case personally by explaining that cases in the
Sandiganbayan are assigned by raffle and not to a particular Justice, but to a
division thereof. The evidence before the Comission on how the case
happened to be assigned to Justice Pamaran evinces a strong indication that
such assignment was not done fairly or regularly.
"There was no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a
regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran. ...
Despite an announcement that Justice Escareal would be presented by the
respondents to testify on the contents of his aforesaid Memorandum, such
was not done. No reason was given why Justice Escarel could not, or would
not like to testify. Neither was any one of the officials or employees of the
Sandiganbayan who, according to Justice Pamaran, were present during the
supposed raffle, presented to corroborate the claim of Justice
xxx xxx xxx
"It is also an admitted fact that the two Informations in the double murder case
were filed by Justice Herrera on January 23, 1985, at 12:02 p.m., and the
members of the Raffle Committee were summoned at 12:20 p.m. or only 18
minutes after the filing of the two Informations. Such speed in the actual
assignment of the case can truly be categorized as unusual, if not
extraordinary, considering that before a case filed may be included in the
raffle, there is need for a certain amount of paper work to be undertaken. If
such preliminary requirements were done in this case within the limited time
available therefor, the charge that the raffle was rushed to avoid the presence
of media people would ring with truth.
What is more intriguing is the fact that although a raffle might have been
actually conducted which resulted in the assignment of the case to the First
Division of the Sandiganbayan, the Commission did not receive any evidence
on how or why it was handled personally by Justice Pamaran who wrote the
decision thereof, and not by any one of the two other members of his division.
...
7. The custody of the accused their confinement in a military camp,
instead of in a civilian jail: "When the question of custody came up after the
case was filed in the Sandiganbayan, the latter issued an order directing the
confinement of the accused in the City Jail of Manila. This order was not
carried out in view of the information given by the Warden of the City Jail that
there was no space for the twenty-six accused in said jail. The same
information was given when the custody was proposed to be given to the
National Penitentiary in Muntinglupa and to the National Bureau of
Investigation. At that point, the defense came up with Presidential Decree No.
1950A which authorizes the custody of the accused military personnel with
their respective Commanding Officers. Justice Herrera claimed that the said
Presidential Decree was not known even to the Tanodbayan Justice
Fernandez who had to call up the then Minister of Justice Estelito Mendoza to
request a copy of the same, and was given such copy only after sometime. ..."
8. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from
Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel: "There is an uncontradicted
evidence that the progress of the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan as well
as the developments of the case outside the Court had been monitored by
Malacañang presumably for it to know what was happening and to take
remedial measures as may be necessary. Justice Pamaran had candidly
admitted that television cameras "boldly carrying the label of 'Office of the
President of the Philippines' " were installed in the courtroom for that purpose.
There was a room in the Sandiganbayan, mischievously caned 'war room',
wherein military and Malacañang personnel stayed to keep track of the
proceedings." the close monitoring by Malacañang showed its results on
several occasions specified in the Report. Malacañang was immediately
aware of the Japanese witness Wakamiya's presence injustice Herrera's office
on August 21, 1985 and forestalled the giving of his testimony by having the
Japanese Embassy advise Wakamiya to leave the country at once. Likewise,
Col. Balbino Diego, Malacañang intelligence chief, suddenly appeared at the
National Bureau of Investigation office when the "crying lady" Rebecca
Quijano was brought there by NBI agents for interrogation and therein sought
to obtain custody of her. "It is likewise an undisputed fact," the Commission
noted "that several military personnel pretended to be deputy sheriffs of the
Sandiganbayan and attended the trials thereof in the prescribed deputy
sheriffs' uniforms." The Commission's inescapable finding. " It is abundantly
clear that President Marcos did not only give instructions as to how the case
should be handled He saw to it that he would know if his instructions will be
complied with."
9. Partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: "That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted
may not be denied. The disposal of the case in said manner is an integral part
of the scenario which was cleverly designed to accomplish two principal
objectives, seemingly conflicting in themselves, but favorable both to then
administration and to the accused; to wit, [1] the satisfaction of the public
clamor for the suspected killers of Senator Aquino to be charged in court, and
[2] the foreclosure of any possibility that they may again be prosecuted for the
same offense in the event that President Marcos shall no longer be in power.
"In rendering its decision the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the
presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
glaringly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally
ignored and disregarded. ... It was deemed not sufficient to simply acquit all of
the twenty-six accused on the standard ground that their guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, as was the most logical and appropriate
way of justifying the acquittal in the case, there not being a total absence of
evidence that could show guilt on the part of the accused. The decision had to
pronounce them 'innocent of the crime charged on the two informations, and
accordingly, they incur neither criminal nor civil liability.' It is a rare
phenomenon to see a person accused of a crime to be favored with such total
absolution. ...
Doubt on the soundness of the decision entertained by one of the two justices
who concurred with the majority decision penned by Justice Pamaran was
revealed by Justice Herrera who testified that in October, 1985, when the
decision was being prepared, Justice Agusto Amores told him that he was of
the view that some of the accused should be convicted he having found
difficulty in acquitting all of them; however, he confided to Justice Herrera that
Justice Pamaran made it clear to him and Justice Vera Cruz that Malacañang
had instructions to acquit all of the twenty-six accused (TSN, July 17, 1986, p.
49). Justice Amores also told Justice Herrera that he would confirm this
statement (which was mentioned in Justice Herrera's comment to the Second
Motion for Reconsideration) if asked about it (TSN, June 19, 1986, pp. 92-93).
This testimony Justice Herrera remained unrebutted " (Emphasis supplied)
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then President
used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of
the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically
depicted in the Report, supra, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa
loquitur22) since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro,
his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of
the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the
demonstrators back to the streets 23 ) and at any rate was not acceptable to
the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26
accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacanang conference, would
accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for
the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their
acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy. 24
Indeed, the secret Malacanang conference at which the authoritarian
President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed by Deputy
Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig (moro-moro) the trial
and the close monitoring of the entire proceedings to assure the pre-
determined ignominious final outcome are without parallel and precedent in
our annals and jurisprudence. To borrow a phrase from Ninoy's April 14, 1975
letter withdrawing his petition for habeas corpus, 25 "This is the evil of one-
man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer
who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial authority with
respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice." 26 His obsession for "the boys' " acquittal led to several first
which would otherwise be inexplicable:—
1. He turned his back on and repudiated the findings of the very Fact
Finding Board that he himself appointed to investigate the "national tragedy
and national shame" of the "treacherous and vicious assassination of Ninoy
Aquino and "to ventilate the truth through free, independent and dispassionate
investigation by prestigious and free investigators."
Page 61 of 129
2. He cordially received the chairman with her minority report one day
ahead of the four majority members and instantly referred it to respondents
"for final resolution through the legal system" as if it were the majority and
controlling report; and rebuked the four majority members when they
presented to him the next day their report calling for the indictment of all 26
respondents headed by Gens. Ver and Olivas (instead of the lesser seven
under the chairman's minority report).
3. From the day after the Aquino assassination to the dictated verdict
of acquittal, he totally disregarded the Board's majority and minority findings of
fact and publicly insisted that the military's "fall guy" Rolando Galman was the
killer of Ninoy Aquino and sought futilely to justify the soldiers' incompetence
and gross negligence to provide any security for Ninoy in contrast to their
alacrity in gunning down the alleged assassin Galman and searing his lips.
4. The Sandiganbayan's decision (Pamaran, J. ponente) in effect
convicted Rolando Galman as Ninoy's assassin notwithstanding that he was
not on trial but the victim according to the very information filed, and evidence
to the contrary submitted, by the Herrera prosecution panel; and
5. Justice Pamaran's ponencia (despite reservations expressed by
Justice Amores who wanted to convict some of the accused) granted all 26
accused total absolution and pronounced them "innocent of the crimes
charged in the two informations, and accordingly, they incur neither criminal
nor civil liability," notwithstanding the evidence on the basis of which the Fact
Finding Board had unanimously declared the soldiers' version of Galman
being Aquino's killer a "perjured story, given deliberately and in conspiracy
with one another."
The fact of the secret Malacañang conference of January 10, 1985 at which
the authoritarian President discussed with the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan and the entire prosecution panel the matter of the imminent
filing of the criminal charges against all the twenty-six accused (as admitted by
respondent Justice Fernandez to have been confirmed by him to the then
President's "Coordinator" Manuel Lazaro on the preceding day) is not denied.
It is without precedent. This was illegal under our penal laws, supra. This
illegality vitiated from the very beginning all proceedings in the Sandiganbayan
court headed by the very Presiding Justice who attended. As the Commission
noted: "The very acts of being summoned to Malacañang and their ready
acquiescence thereto under the circumstances then obtaining, are in
themselves pressure dramatized and exemplified. ... Verily, it can be said that
any avowal of independent action or resistance to presidential pressure
became illusory from the very moment they stepped inside Malacanang
Palace on January 10, 1985."
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from
the very President who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the
hearing of oral arguments on November 8, 1984 on a petition challenging the
referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatory required by the
known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts
martial over criminal offenses committed by military men 26-a) made it
possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan, can be an impartial court,
which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then wrote,
"jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection
of the Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of
predetermining the outcome of individual cases. 26-b "This criminal collusion
as to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the
secret Malacanang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by
Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan
and voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the
extensive arguments of respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and
Olivas and those categorized as accessories, that there has been no evidence
or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous conclusions of Olivas
as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the
witnesses presented and suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to
present all these arguments and considerations at the remand and retrial of
the cases herein ordered before a neutral and impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty
of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts
of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were
allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to
subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose
judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who
seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a
wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and
prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are
entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In
life, as an accused before the military tribunal, Ninoy had pleaded in vain that
as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil
courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy,
as the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives
and sovereign people as the aggrieved parties plead once more for due
process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial the
non-trial of the century-and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal was
unlawful and void ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy.-It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy
cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts'
judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the
sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As the Court
stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar, 27
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove
its case its right to due process is thereby violated. 27-a
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional
rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's
right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director
of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]which cannot
be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental
right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right
is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 1973],
51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 [Feb. 27,
1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may
be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain
at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for
lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of
double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered;
and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court was
not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
the prosecution to due process.
In effect the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the
criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts
merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the
cases at bar where as we have held, the sham trial was but a mock trial where
the authoritarian president ordered respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to
assure the pre-determined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as
innocent of an the respondents-accused. Notwithstanding the laudable efforts
of Justice Herrera which saw him near the end "deactivating" himself from the
case, as it was his belief that its eventual resolution was already a foregone
conclusion, they could not cope with the misuse and abuse of the
overwhelming powers of the authoritarian President to weaken the case of the
prosecution, to suppress its evidence, harass, intimidate and threaten its
witnesses, secure their recantation or prevent them from testifying. Fully
aware of the prosecution's difficulties in locating witnesses and overcoming
their natural fear and reluctance to appear and testify, respondent
Sandiganbayan maintained a "dizzying tempo" of the proceedings and
announced its intention to terminate the proceedings in about 6 months time or
less than a year, pursuant to the scripted scenario. The prosecution
complained of "the Presiding Justice's seemingly hostile attitude towards (it)"
and their being the subject of warnings, reprimand and contempt proceedings
as compared to the nil situation for the defense. Herrera likewise complained
of being "cajoled into producing witnesses and pressed on making assurances
that if given a certain period, they will be able to produce their witnesses
Herrera pleaded for "a reasonable period of preparation of its evidence" and
cited other pending cases before respondent court that were pending trial for a
much longer time where the "dizzying tempo" and "fast pace" were not
maintained by the court. 28 Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign
people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased
Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure
exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his
instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that
in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment
at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing
which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to
the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: 29 If the authoritarian
head of the government becomes the law-breaker, he breeds contempt for the
law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy.
Respondents-accused's contention that the Sandiganbayan judgment of
acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed or re-opened, without being
put in double jeopardy was forcefully disposed of by the Court in People vs.
Court of Appeals, which is fully applicable here, as follows: "That is the
general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out,
however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches,
therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all By it no rights
are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void.
|lang1033 xxx xxx xxx
"Private respondent invoke 'justice for the innocent'. For justice to prevail the
scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of the society, which they have wronged must also be equally
considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A
Page 62 of 129
verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice. To the party
wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is where
the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.30
2. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved Ahead.-The
private prosecutors had filed a motion to disqualify and for inhibition of
respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan on grounds of manifest bias and
partiality to the defense and arising from then Atty. (now Tanodbayan) Raul M.
Gonzales' charge that Justice Vera-Cruz had been passing coaching notes to
defense counsel. Justice Herrera had joined the motion and pleaded at the
hearing of June 25, 1985 and in the prosecution memorandum that
respondent Sandiganbayan "should not decide the case on the merits without
first making a final ruling on the Motion for Inhibition." Herrera quoted the
exchange between him and the Presiding Justice to show the latter's
"following the script of Malacanang.
PJ PAMARAN
Well the court believes that we should proceed with the trial and then deal
later on with that. After all, the most important thing here is, shall we say, the
decision of the case.
J. HERRERA
I think more important than the decision of the case, Your Honor, is the
capacity of the justices to sit in judgment. That is more important than anything
else.(p. 13 TSN, June 25, 1985) (Emphasis supplied by Herrera). 31
But the Sandiganbayan brushed aside Herrera's pleas and then wrongly
blamed him, in the decision, for supposedly not having joined the petition for
inhibition, contrary to the facts above-stated, as follows:
... the motion for inhibition above referred to related exclusively for the
contempt proceeding. Too, it must be remembered that the prosecution
neither joined that petition, nor did it at any time manifest a desire to file a
similar motion prior to the submission of these cases for decision. To do it now
is not alone out of season but is also a confession of official insouciance (Page
22, Decision). 32
The action for prohibition was filed in the Court to seek the disqualification of
respondents Justices pursuant to the procedure recognized by the Court in the
1969 case of Paredes vs. Gopengco 33 since an adverse ruling by respondent
court might result in a verdict of acquittal, leaving the offended party without
any remedy nor appeal in view of the double jeopardy rule, not to mention the
overiding and transcendental public interest that would make out a case of
denial of due process to the People if the alleged failure on the part of the
Tanodbayan to present the complete evidence for the prosecution is
substantiated. 34
In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of
their petition and lifting of the temporary restraining order enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by
the Court which had required the respondents', including the
Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew,
respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of
total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. This is
the teaching of Valdez vs. Aquilizan35, Wherein the court in setting aside the
hasty convictions, ruled that "prudence dictated that (respondent judge) refrain
from deciding the cases or at the very least to hold in abeyance the
promulgation of his decision pending action by this Court. But prudence gave
way to imprudence; the respondent judge acted precipitately by deciding the
cases [hastily without awaiting this Court's action]. All of the acts of the
respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to
lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner."
3. Re: Objections of respondents.-The other related objections of
respondents' counsels must be rejected in the face of the Court's declaration
that the trial was a mock trial and that the pre-determined judgment of acquittal
was unlawful and void ab initio.
(a) It follows that there is no need to resort to a direct action to annul
the judgment, instead of the present action which was timely filed initially to
declare a mistrial and to enjoin the rendition of the void judgment. And after
the hasty rendition of such judgment for the declaration of its nullity, following
the presentation of competent proof heard by the Commission and the Court's
findings therefrom that the proceedings were from the beginning vitiated not
only by lack of due process but also by the collusion between the public
respondents (court and Tanodbayan) for the rendition of a pre-determined
verdict of acquitting all the twenty-six respondents-accused.
(b) It is manifest that this does not involve a case of mere irregularities
in the conduct of the proceedings or errors of judgment which do not affect the
integrity or validity of the judgment or verdict.
(c) The contention of one of defense counsel that the State and the
sovereign people are not entitled to due process is clearly erroneous and
contrary to the basic principles and jurisprudence cited hereinabove.
(d) The submittal of respondents-accused that they had not exerted
the pressure applied by the authoritarian president on public respondents and
that no evidence was suppressed against them must be held to be untenable
in the wake of the evil plot now exposed for their preordained wholesale
exoneration.
(e) Respondents' invocation of the writer's opinion in Luzon Brokerage
Co., Inc. vs. Maritime Bldg. Co., Inc. 36 is inappropriate. The writer therein
held that a party should be entitled to only one Supreme Court and may not
speculate on vital changes in the Court's membership for review of his lost
case once more, since public policy and sound practice demand that litigation
be put to an end and no second pro forma motion for reconsideration
reiterating the same arguments should be kept pending so long (for over six
(6) years and one (1) month since the denial of the first motion for
reconsideration), This opinion cannot be properly invoked, because here,
petitioners' second motion for reconsideration was filed promptly on March 20,
1986 following the denial under date of February 4th of the first motion for
reconsideration and the same was admitted per the Court's Resolution of April
3, 1986 and is now being resolved within five months of its filing after the
Commission had received the evidence of the parties who were heard by the
Court only last August 26th. The second motion for reconsideration is based
on an entirely new material ground which was not known at the time of the
denial of the petition and filing of the first motion for reconsideration, i.e, the
secret Malacañang conference on January 10, 1985 which came to light only
fifteen months later in March, 1986 and showed beyond per adventure (as
proved in the Commission hearings) the merits of the petition and that the
authoritarian president had dictated and pre-determined the final outcome of
acquittal. Hence, the ten members of the Court (without any new appointees)
unanimously voted to admit the second motion for reconsideration.37
4. With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must
now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor.-There has
been the long dark night of authoritarian regime, since the fake ambush in
September, 1972 of then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile (as now
admitted by Enrile himself was staged to trigger the imposition of martial law
and authoritarian one-man rule, with the padlocking of Congress and the
abolition of the office of the Vice-President.
As recently retired Senior Justice Vicente Abad Santos recalled in his
valedictory to the new members of the Bar last May, "In the past few years,
the judiciary was under heavy attack by an extremely powerful executive.
During this state of judicial siege, lawyers both in and outside the judiciary
perceptively surrendered to the animus of technicality. In the end, morality was
overwhelmed by technicality, so that the latter emerged ugly and naked in its
true manifestation."
Now that the light is emerging, the Supreme Court faces the task of restoring
public faith and confidence in the courts. The Supreme Court enjoys neither
the power of the sword nor of the purse. Its strength lies mainly in public
confidence, based on the truth and moral force of its judgments. This has been
built on its cherished traditions of objectivity and impartiallity integrity and
fairness and unswerving loyalty to the Constitution and the rule of law which
compels acceptance as well by the leadership as by the people. The lower
courts draw their bearings from the Supreme Court. With this Court's judgment
today declaring the nullity of the questioned judgment or acquittal and directing
a new trial, there must be a rejection of the temptation of becoming
instruments of injustice as vigorously as we rejected becoming its victims. The
end of one form of injustice should not become simply the beginning of
another. This simply means that the respondents accused must now face trial
for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor with all due process. What the past regime had denied the people
and the aggrieved parties in the sham trial must now be assured as much to
the accused as to the aggrieved parties. The people will assuredly have a way
of knowing when justice has prevailed as well as when it has failed.
The notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office
owe their primary allegiance to the appointing authority and are accountable to
him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The
function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government, is to fill the public posts. While the appointee may
acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public
service, the appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary
loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the Constitution and the
sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase
the late Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the
Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve
no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only, the Constitution and their
own conscience and honor.
5. Note of Commendation.- The Court expresses its appreciation with
thanks for the invaluable services rendered by the Commission composed of
retired Supreme Court Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, chairman, and retired
Court of Appeals Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as
members. In the pure spirit of public service, they rendered selflessly and
without remuneration thorough competent and dedicated service in
discharging their tasks of hearing and receiving the evidence, evaluating the
same and submitting their Report and findings to the Court within the
scheduled period and greatly easing the Court's burden.
ACCORDINGLY, petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted.
The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February
4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside
and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in
respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases
Page 63 of 129
Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther
Custodia et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be
conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the
requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice
done to an
This resolution is immediately executory. SO ORDERED.
Yap, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Feria, **** Fernan and Narvasa , ***** JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45129 March 6, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN RELOVA, in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Second Branch, and
MANUEL OPULENCIA, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, the People of the Philippines seek
to set aside the orders of the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976 and 8 November
1976, respectively, quashing an information for theft filed against private
respondent Manuel Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search
warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and
operated by the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered
that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the
necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed
inside the walls of the building" 1 owned by the private respondent. These
electric devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the petitioner
"designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current
consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage]
plant." 2 During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a
written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices
"in order to lower or decrease the readings of his electric meter. 3
On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before
the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for
violation of Ordinance No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this
ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from Five Pesos
(P5.00) to Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment, which shall not exceed thirty
(30) days, or both, at the discretion of the court." 4 This information reads as
follows:
The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal, accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of
ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with damage to the City Government of Batangas,
and penalized by the said ordinance, committed as follows:
That from November, 1974 to February, 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized
installations of electric wirings and devices to lower or decrease the
consumption of electric fluid at the Opulencia Ice Plant situated at Kumintang,
Ibaba, this city and as a result of such unathorized installations of electric
wirings and devices made by the accused, the City Government of Batangas
was damaged and prejudiced in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine currency, covering the period from November 1974 to February,
1975, to the damage and prejudice of the City Government of Batangas in the
aforestated amount of P41,062.16, Philippine currency.
The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the above information.
On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the
grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil
indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas
City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it
appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes two
months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the
information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the
offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas
City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11, another
information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power
under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal
Code. This information read as follows:
The undersigned Acting City Fiscal accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of the
crime of theft, defined and penalized by Article 308, in relation to Article 309,
paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on, during, and between the month of November, 1974, and the 21st day
of February, 1975, at Kumintang, lbaba, Batangas City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent
of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Batangas Electric Light
System, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
appropriate electric current valued in the total amount of FORTY ONE
THOUSAND, SIXTY TWO PESOS AND SIXTEEN CENTAVOS (P41,062.16)
Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the said Batangas
Electric Light System, owned and operated by the City Government of
Batangas, in the aforementioned sum of P41,062.16.
The above information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 266 before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned
thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976,
alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the
second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional
right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, the respondent
Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case
dismissed. The gist of this Order is set forth in the following paragraphs:
The only question here is whether the dismissal of the first case can be
properly pleaded by the accused in the motion to quash.
In the first paragraph of the earlier information, it alleges that the prosecution
"accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of violation of Sec. 3(b) in relation to Sec.
6(d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV of Ordinance No. 1, s. 1974, with damage to
the City Government of Batangas, etc. " (Emphasis supplied). The first case,
as it appears, was not simply one of illegal electrical connections. It also
covered an amount of P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with
intent to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the charge had
meant illegal electric installations only, it could have alleged illegal connections
which were done at one instance on a particular date between November,
1974, to February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from
November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent
to defraud the City Government of Batangas, without proper authorization from
any lawful and/or permit from the proper authorities, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric wirings
and devices, etc." (Emphasis supplied), it was meant to include the P
41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect, defrauded the city government.
The information could not have meant that from November 1974 to 21
February 1975, he had daily committed unlawful installations.
When, therefore, he was arraigned and he faced the indictment before the City
Court, he had already been exposed, or he felt he was exposed to
consequences of what allegedly happened between November 1974 to
February 21, 1975 which had allegedly resulted in defrauding the City of
Batangas in the amount of P 41,062.16. (Emphases and parentheses in the
original)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Order filed by the petitioner
was denied by the respondent Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976.
On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was
filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the
People.
The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is protection against a second or later
jeopardy of conviction for the same offense. The petitioner stresses that the
first information filed before the City Court of Batangas City was one for
unlawful or unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts
which were in violation of an ordinance of the City Government of Batangas.
Only two elements are needed to constitute an offense under this City
Ordinance: (1) that there was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor
had been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City Electrical
System or the District Engineer. The petitioner urges that the relevant terms of
the City Ordinance — which read as follows:
Section 3.-Connection and Installation
(a) xxx
(b) The work and installation in the houses and building and their
connection with the Electrical System shall be done either by the employee of
the system duly authorized by its Superintendent or by persons adept in the
matter duly authorized by the District Engineer. Applicants for electrical service
permitting the works of installation or connection with the system to be
undertaken by the persons not duly authorized therefor shall be considered
guilty of violation of the ordinance.
would show that:
Page 64 of 129
The principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical
installations on residences or buildings be done by persons duly authorized or
adept in the matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings.
It is primarily a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of
electric fluid which is already covered by the Revised Penal Code. 5
The gist of the offense under the City Ordinance, the petitioner's argument
continues, is the installing of electric wiring and devices without authority from
the proper officials of the city government. To constitute an offense under the
city ordinance, it is not essential to establish any mens rea on the part of the
offender generally speaking, nor, more specifically, an intent to appropriate
and steal electric fluid.
In contrast, the petitioner goes on, the offense of theft under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas in
Criminal Case No. 266 has quite different essential elements. These elements
are:
1. That personal property be taken;
2. That the personal property (taken) belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent of gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. 6
The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of electricity can be
effected even without illegal or unauthorized installations of any kind by, for
instance, any of the following means:
1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not register
the actual electrical consumption;
3. Under-reading of electrical consumption; and
4. By tightening the screw of the rotary blade to slow down the
rotation of the same. 7
The petitioner concludes that:
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is
not the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the
second offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and
that the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in
the first inforrnation 8
The above arguments made by the petitioner are of course correct. This is
clear both from the express terms of the constitutional provision involved —
which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
(Emphasis supplied; Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) 9
and from our case law on this point. 10 The basic difficulty with the petitioner's
position is that it must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence
of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second
sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth
the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not
available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from
the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and
second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second
sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition:
the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal
Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. This
was made clear sometime ago in Yap vs. Lutero. 11
In Yap, petitioner Manuel Yap was charged in Criminal Case No. 16054 of the
Municipal Court of Iloilo City, with violation of Article 14 of Ordinance No. 22,
Series of 1951, in relation to Ordinance No. 15, Series of 1954, of the City of
Iloilo. The information charged him with having "wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously drive[n] and operate[d]" an automobile — "recklessly and without
reasonable caution thereby endangering other vehicles and pedestrians
passing in said street." Three months later, Yap was again charged in Criminal
Case No. 16443 of the same Municipal Court, this time with serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence. The information charged him with
violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act No. 3992 as amended by
Republic Act No. 587) committed by driving and operating an automobile in a
reckless and negligent manner and as a result thereof inflicting injuries upon
an unfortunate pedestrian. Yap moved to quash the second information upon
the ground that it placed him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
This motion was denied by the respondent municipal judge. Meantime,
another municipal judge had acquitted Yap in Criminal Case No. 16054. Yap
then instituted a petition for certiorari in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo to
set aside the order of the respondent municipal judge. The Court of First
Instance of Iloilo having reversed the respondent municipal judge and having
directed him to desist from continuing with Criminal Case No. 16443, the
respondent Judge brought the case to the Supreme Court for review on
appeal. In affirming the decision appealed from and holding that the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy was available to petitioner
Yap, then Associate Justice and later Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
wrote:
To begin with, the crime of damage to property through reckless driving —
with which Diaz stood charged in the court of first instance — is a violation of
the Revised Penal Code (third paragraph of Article 365), not the Automobile
Law (Act No. 3992, as amended by Republic Act No. 587). Hence, Diaz was
not twice accused of a violation of the same law. Secondly, reckless driving
and certain crimes committed through reckless driving are punishable under
different provisions of said Automobile Law. Hence — from the view point of
Criminal Law, as distinguished from political or Constitutional Law — they
constitute, strictly, different offenses, although under certain conditions, one
offense may include the other, and, accordingly, once placed in jeopardy for
one, the plea of double jeopardy may be in order as regards the other, as in
the Diaz case. (Emphases in the original)
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first
sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense."
(Emphasis in the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that "if
an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the
first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the
same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act provided that he is charged with different
offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one
constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If
the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal
under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other.
12 Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the
plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as
jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense,
the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense,
even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
The issue in the case at bar hinges, therefore, on whether or not, under the
information in case No. 16443, petitioner could — if he failed to plead double
jeopardy — be convicted of the same act charged in case No. 16054, in which
he has already been acquitted. The information in case No. 16054 alleges,
substantially, that on the date and in the place therein stated, petitioner herein
had wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously driven and operated "recklessly and
without reasonable caution" an automobile described in said information. Upon
the other hand, the information in case No. 16443, similarly states that, on the
same date and in the same place, petitioner drove and operated the
aforementioned automobile in a "reckless and negligent manner at an
excessive rate of speed and in violation of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law (Act
No. 3992), as amended by Republic Act No. 587, and existing city
ordinances." Thus, if the theories mentioned in the second information were
not established by the evidence, petitioner could be convicted in case No.
16443 of the very same violation of municipal ordinance charged in case No.
16054, unless he pleaded double jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the lower court has not erred eventually sustaining
the theory of petitioner herein.
Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by
different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charge: the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist
between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where
one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the
accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to
the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is
available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or
have given rise to the offense charged under a statute.
The question may be raised why one rule should exist where two offenses
under two different sections of the same statute or under different statutes are
charged, and another rule for the situation where one offense is charged under
a municipal ordinance and another offense under a national statute. If the
second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had not been written into
the Constitution, conviction or acquittal under a municipal ordinance would
never constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act under a national
statute. An offense penalized by municipal ordinance is, by definition, different
from an offense under a statute. The two offenses would never constitute the
same offense having been promulgated by different rule-making authorities —
though one be subordinate to the other — and the plea of double jeopardy
would never lie. The discussions during the 1934-1935 Constitutional
Convention show that the second sentence was inserted precisely for the
Page 65 of 129
purpose of extending the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
situation which would not otherwise be covered by the first sentence. 13
The question of Identity or lack of Identity of offenses is addressed by
examining the essential elements of each of the two offenses charged, as
such elements are set out in the respective legislative definitions of the
offenses involved. The question of Identity of the acts which are claimed to
have generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by examining the location of
such acts in time and space. When the acts of the accused as set out in the
two informations are so related to each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and where
those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a continuing, intent or
voluntary design or negligence, such acts may be appropriately characterized
as an integral whole capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously
under different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a national
statute).
In Yap, the Court regarded the offense of reckless driving under the Iloilo City
Ordinance and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence under
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law as derived from the same act or sets of acts —
that is, the operation of an automobile in a reckless manner. The additional
technical element of serious physical injuries related to the physical
consequences of the operation of the automobile by the accused, i.e., the
impact of the automobile upon the body of the offended party. Clearly, such
consequence occurred in the same occasion that the accused operated the
automobile (recklessly). The moral element of negligence permeated the acts
of the accused throughout that occasion.
In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the same time frame:
from November 1974 to February 1975. During this period, the accused
Manuel Opulencia installed or permitted the installation of electrical wiring and
devices in his ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or authorization
from the municipal authorities. The accused conceded that he effected or
permitted such unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing
electric power bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment
that such unauthorized installation began. The immediate physical effect of the
unauthorized installation was the inward flow of electric current into
Opulencia's ice plant without the corresponding recording thereof in his
electric meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was integral with
the unauthorized installation of electric wiring and devices.
It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection
against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is
not to be understood with absolute literalness. The Identity of offenses that
must be shown need not be absolute Identity: the first and second offenses
may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily
includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or
where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof. 14 Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available,
not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in
the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent
harrassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. As Associate Justice
and later Chief Justice Ricardo Paras cautioned in People vs. del Carmen et
al., 88 Phil. 51 (1951):
While the rule against double jeopardy prohibits prosecution for the same
offense, it seems elementary that an accused should be shielded against
being prosecuted for several offenses made out from a single act. Otherwise,
an unlawful act or omission may give use to several prosecutions depending
upon the ability of the prosecuting officer to imagine or concoct as many
offenses as can be justified by said act or omission, by simply adding or
subtracting essential elements. Under the theory of appellant, the crime of
rape may be converted into a crime of coercion, by merely alleging that by
force and intimidation the accused prevented the offended girl from remaining
a virgin. (88 Phil. at 53; emphases supplied)
By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on the same
occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and
therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were,
to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal
ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find
It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the
information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that
such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused
of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under
the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 15
It is not without reluctance that we deny the people's petition for certiorari and
mandamus in this case. It is difficult to summon any empathy for a
businessman who would make or enlarge his profit by stealing from the
community. Manuel Opulencia is able to escape criminal punishment because
an Assistant City Fiscal by inadvertence or otherwise chose to file an
information for an offense which he should have known had already
prescribed. We are, however, compelled by the fundamental law to hold the
protection of the right against double jeopardy available even to the private
respondent in this case.

The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter. Because no
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action was made by the
Batangas City electric light system, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal
action both before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First
Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability whether by
prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy does not carry with it the
extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged. In the present case,
as we noted earlier, 16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted during the
police investigation having stolen electric current through the installation and
use of unauthorized elibctrical connections or devices. While the accused
pleaded not guilty before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny
having appropriated electric power. However, there is no evidence in the
record as to the amount or value of the electric power appropriated by Manuel
Opulencia, the criminal informations having been dismissed both by the City
Court and by the Court of First Instance (from which dismissals the Batangas
City electric light system could not have appealed 17) before trial could begin.
Accordingly, the related civil action which has not been waived expressly or
impliedly, should be remanded to the Court of First Instance of Batangas City
for reception of evidence on the amount or value of the electric power
appropriated and converted by Manuel Opulencia and rendition of judgment
conformably with such evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus is DENIED. Let the
civil action for related civil liability be remanded to the Court of First Instance of
Batangas City for further proceedings as indicated above. No pronouncement
as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ.,
concur.
Cruz, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36528 September 24, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE CITY COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH VI and AGAPITO GONZALES Y
VENERACION, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the order of the respondent City
Court of Manila, Branch VI, dated 20 January 1973, dismissing the information
(for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) against the
accused, herein respondent Agapito Gonzales, in Criminal Case No. F-147348
and its amended order, dated 16 March 1973, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the first order.
Respondent Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was
accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060
and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate
informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972.
On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the two (2) cases, the City Fiscal
amended the information in Criminal Case No. F-147347 (for violation of
Section 7 in relation to Section 11, Rep. Act No. 3060), by alleging that the
accused.
conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to
be publicly exhibited ... completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8
mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen
through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion
pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures for preview, examination and partnership, nor duly passed by
said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon
Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila].
On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348 (for
violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege
that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused,
conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the
mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of
projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion
pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally
naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act
in various lewd and obvious positions, among other similarly and equally
Page 66 of 129
obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit:
at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila].
On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, accused Agapito Gonzales pleaded not
guilty to both charges. The other accused, Roberto Pangilinan, was not
arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large.
On 26 June 1972, accused Agapito Gonzales filed a motion to quash the
informations in the two (2) cases, on the ground that said informations did not
charge an offense. The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases
were set for trial on 7 August 1972.
No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as the accused moved for
postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on two (2) other
dates. On 15 November 1972, the accused Gonzales moved for permission to
withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case No. F-147348, without
however, substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the motion
and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972.
On 27 December 1972, accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in
Criminal Case No. F-147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was
according to him, also pending against him Criminal Case No. F-147347, for
violation of Rep. Act No. 3060, where the information allegedly contains the
same allegations as the information in Criminal Case No. F-147348.
Petitioner opposed the motion to quash but the respondent City Court, in an
order, dated 20 January 1973, dismissed the case (Criminal Case No. F-
147348) stating thus:
In one case (F-147347), the basis of the charge is a special law, Rep. Act No.
3060. In the other case (F-147348), the basis of the same is the pertinent
provision of the Revised Penal Code. Considering that the allegations in the
information of said cases are Identical the plea entered in one case by the
accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in
the other case, as said allegations therein are not only similar but [sic]
Identical facts.
After the dismissal of Criminal Case No. F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in
Criminal Case No. F-147347, the accused changed his plea of "not guilty" and
entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of Rep. Act No. 3060. He was
accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00.
On 10 February 1973, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of 20 January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case No. F-147348. This was
however denied by respondent court in its order dated 15 March 1973, and in
its amended order dated 16 March 1973; hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the accused could not invoke the constitutional
guarantee against double jeopardy, when there had been no conviction,
acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings in another case for
the same offense. 1 The respondent, on the other hand, argues that conviction
or acquittal in, or dismissal or termination of a first case is not necessary, so
long as he had been put in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first
case of the same offense.2
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof
All these requisites do not exist in this case.
The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make
out only one offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other
words, the offense defined in section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the
exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for
Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in
Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent
and immoral motion pictures.
The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of
the two (2) laws involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different
and distinct from each other. The relevant provisions of Rep. Act No. 3060
state:
Sec. 7. It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to exhibit or cause to be
exhibited in any motion picture theater or public place, or by television within
the Philippines any motion picture, including trailers, stills, and other pictorial
advertisements in connection with motion pictures, not duly passed by the
Board; or to print or cause to be printed on any motion picture to be exhibited
in any theater, or public place or by television, a label or notice showing the
same to have been previously passed by the said Board when the same has
not been previously authorized, except motion pictures imprinted or exhibited
by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and
newsreels.
Sec. 11. Any violation of Section seven of this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than six months but not more than two years, or by a
fine of not less than six hundred nor more than two thousand pesos, or both at
the discretion of the court. If the offender is an alien he shall be deported
immediately. The license to operate the movie theater or television shall also
be revoked. Any other kind of violation shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than one month nor more than three months or a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than three hundred pesos, or both at the
discretion of the court. In case the violation is committed by a corporation,
partnership or association, the liability shall devolve upon the president,
manager, administrator, or any office thereof responsible for the violation.
On the other hand, Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions.- The
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from
200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon:
... 3. Those who in theaters, fairs, cinematographs, or any other place
open to public view, shall exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or
shows; ...
It is evident that the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The
gravamen of the offense defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the public exhibition
of any motion picture which has not been previously passed by the Board of
Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion picture may not be indecent or
immoral but if it has not been previously approved by the Board, its public
showing constitutes a criminal offense. 3 On the other hand, the offense
punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is the public showing of
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures. 4
The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime
punished in Rep. Act No. 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent
need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in
Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal
intent is an indispensable ingredient.
Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no Identity of
the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in
the other. 5 Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence
required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.
As aptly put in People v. Doriquez.6
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or Identical offense. A single act may offend against
two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does
not bar prosecution under the other. (People v. Bacolod, 89 Phil. 621; People
v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 24). Phrased elsewhere, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them
is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from
the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an
essential element of the other. (People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472).7 (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner also questions the propriety of allowing the accused in Criminal
Case No. F-147348 to withdraw his plea of not guilty in order to file a motion to
quash on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioner argues:
It is true that on February 3, 1973, the trial court finally convicted respondent
Gonzales in Criminal Case No. F-147347 by imposing on him a fine of
P600.00. But it is obvious that respondent Gonzales's conviction in that case
cannot retroactively supply the ground for the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
F-147348.
But even if conviction in Criminal Case No. F-147347 preceded the dismissal
of Criminal Case No. F-147348, still that conviction cannot bar the prosecution
for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, because, by
pleading to the charge in Criminal Case No. F-147348 without moving to
quash the information, the accused (now the respondent) Gonzales must be
taken to have waived the defense of double jeopardy, pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 117, section 10. (Barot v. Villamor, 105 Phil. 263 [1959]) It
is only in cases where, after pleading or moving to quash on some other
grounds, the accused learns for the first time that the offense of which he is
charged is an offense for which he has been in jeopardy that the court may in
its discretion entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on that
ground. ... In the case at bar, however, the fact is that the accused (now the
respondent Gonzales) was arraigned in the same court. He, therefore, cannot
claim ignorance of the existence of another charge against him for supposedly
the same offense. 8
Petitioner's argument is well-taken. Sec. 10, Rule 117, of the Rules of Court,
before its amendment stated —
SEC. 10. Failure to move to quash-Effect of- Exception. — If the defendant
does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto
he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion
to quash except when the complaint or information does not charge an
offense, or the court is without jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the
defendant learns after he has pleaded or has moved to quash on some other
ground that the offense for which he is now charged is an offense for which he
has been pardoned, or of which he has been convicted or acquitted or been in
jeopardy, the court may in its discretion entertain at any time before judgment
Page 67 of 129
a motion to quash on the ground of such pardon, conviction, acquittal or
jeopardy. (Emphasis supplied)
However, it must be noted that, under the 1985 Rules, the provision now reads
as follows:
Failure to move or quash or to allege any ground therefore. The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or
failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the
grounds for a motion to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack
of jurisdiction, extinction of the offense or penalty, and jeopardy. ... 9
The above, being an amendment favorable to the accused, the benefit thereof
can be extended to the accused-respondent. However, whatever benefit he
may derive from this amendment, is also illusory. For, as previously noted,
there is no double jeopardy which gave rise to a valid motion to quash.
The People (petitioner) rightly appealed the dismissal of Criminal Case No F-
147348. For, as ruled in People v. Desalisa: 10
As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of a case after arraignment and
plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the complaint or information (Sec. 9, Rule 113).
However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the
criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant,
and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon
by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be found
incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 11
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The appealed orders are hereby
reversal and set aside. Criminal Case No. F-147348 is ordered reinstated and
remanded to the respondent Court for trial according to law.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-54904 January 29, 1988
HEIRS OF TITO RILLORTA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ROMEO N. FIRME, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La
Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union; and ANDREW COSTALES,
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
May the civil award in a criminal case be appealed by the heirs of the offended
party? Of course. May the criminal aspect of the decision be modified as a
basis for the increase in the civil award? Certainly not. Is the case at bar
covered by the rule on double jeopardy or by the exception? We shall come to
that.
Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less
serious physical injuries and sentenced to twenty days of arresto menor and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court said
the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound
inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was
pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which
was needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had succumbed not to
the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of the
attending physician's gross incompetence. 1
The heirs of the deceased, herein petitioners, did not agree. Through their
counsel acting "under the direct control and supervision of the provincial
fiscal," they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision notified to them
on January 23, 1980. 2 This motion was sent by registered mail on February
2, 1980. 3 Heard on February 26, it was denied on February 28, 1980, in an
order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on March 18, 1980. 4
On March 20, 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the
signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor. 5 After
considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, the respondent
judge dismissed the appeal on April 14, 1980, for tardiness. 6 Both the fiscal
and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but
these were denied on May 12, 1980. 7 The dismissal of the appeal is now the
subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
It is clear that the notice of appeal was filed within the 15-day reglementary
period. The motion for reconsideration of the decision rendered in open court
on January 23, 1980, was filed on February 2, 1980, date of its posting by
registered mail. Only ten days had elapsed from the earlier date. The running
of the period was suspended while the motion was under study and until a
copy of the order denying the same was furnished the private prosecutor on
March 18, 1980. When two days later, on March 20, the fiscal and the private
prosecutor jointly filed a notice of appeal, only 12 days of the period of appeal
had been consumed. The appeal was thus perfected on time, conformably to
Rule 122, Section 6, of the Rules of Court, reading as follows:
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen
(15) days from promulgation or notice of the judgment or order appealed from.
This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted from the time a motion
for new trial is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall have
been served upon the defendant or his attorney.
The trial court thus lost jurisdiction over the appealed case on March 20, 1980,
and was obligated to elevate the records thereof to the appellate court. Having
become functus officio, it could no longer issue the challenged orders of April
14, 1980, and May 12, 1980, dismissing the appeal.
The question of whether or not the civil award in a criminal case may be
appealed is not new and has been resolved earlier by this Court. It is settled
that this can be done by the private prosecutor on behalf of the offended party
or his successors. The adequacy of the award may be challenged on the
ground that it is not commensurate with the gravity of the injuries sustained as
a result of the offense committed by the accused, Thus, we have held that —
... The offended party, be he the owner of the stolen or misappropriated
property, or the owner of the pawnshop, may appeal from the judgment of the
trial court with reference to the payment of the indemnity resulting from the
commission of the offense. The pawnbrokers in this case are deemed to have
been prejudiced by the commission of the crime, because by reason of the
fact that the jewels pledged to them had been stolen they will now be deprived
of their possession without first having a declaration of indemnity for the
amount of the pledges. 8
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, this court, in its resolution dated November 28, 1933, declared
the appeal of the accused abandoned. Therefore, the only question left to be
decided is the appeal of the private prosecution with regard to the civil liability
of the accused.
The trial courts resolution that, because the cause had been appealed by the
accused, it had lost its jurisdiction to pass upon the motion for reconsideration
filed by the private prosecution rune days after the date of the judgment, is
unfounded.
The right of the injured persons in an offense to take part in its prosecution
and to appeal for purpose of the civil liability of the accused (section 107,
General Orders, No. 58), necessarily implies that such right is protected in the
same manner as the right of the accused to his defense. If the accused has
the right within fifteen days to appeal from the judgment of conviction, the
offended party should have the right within the same period to appeal from so
much of the judgment as is prejudicial to him, and his appeal should not be
made dependent on that of the accused. 9
However, the civil indemnity may be increased only if it will not require an
aggravation of the decision in the criminal case on which it is based. In other
words, the accused may not, on appeal by the adverse party, be convicted of
a more serious offense or sentenced to a higher penalty to justify the increase
in the civil indemnity. This rule is applicable in the present case.
The petitioners are urging that the civil award in the sum of only P500.00 be
increased because the accused should not have been found guilty of only less
serious physical injuries but of homicide. They are not confining themselves to
the civil aspect of the challenged decision. In their own words, their appeal
involves "both the criminal aspect and the civil liabilities in the criminal cases."
10 This is not permitted under the rule on double jeopardy. 11
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the
Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double
jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United States,
12 where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine
Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution
from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty
imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has been
consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction.
It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less
then can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with
the civil indemnity.
The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information." 13 There is no
Page 68 of 129
question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused
in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide.
But the petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the
judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted
with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. This argument is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court
was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the
intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be
rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may
be.
In People v. City Court of Silay, 14 the trial court granted the defendant's
motion to dimiss a charge for falsification after the prosecution had rested,
holding that the guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court disagreed. Nevertheless, it held through Justice Munoz-
Palma that "however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and
although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot
now be lighted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy."
We have made similar rulings in several other cases, among them People v.
Hernando, 108 SCRA 121, People v. Francisco, 128 SCRA 110, and People
v. Villarin, 11 SCRA 550.
The cases cited by the petitioners are not in point because they all involve not
errors of judgment but denial of due process resulting in loss or lack of
jurisdiction. 15 The prosecution in each of these cases was allowed to appeal
because it had not been given its day in court. In the present case, a full trial
was held and both the prosecution and the defense were accorded the right to
be heard before the judgment was reached. There is no doubt at all that the
trial court had the requisite jurisdiction to pronounce the challenged sentence.
Even assuming it was incorrect, it was certainly not invalid.
It follows that the appeal should be limited to the civil award corresponding
only to the offense found against the accused, to wit, less serious physical
injuries. The award cannot be related to the victim's death, of which the
defendant has been absolved by the trial court. The problem then is whether
or not the sum of P500.00 was sufficient indemnification for the wound which,
the trial court has held, was not the proximate cause of the victim's death.
The determination of this question should normally be made by the appellate
court after examining the factual issues as originally resolved by the trial court.
This would require elevation of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals
in accordance with the usual procedure and an exchange again of pleadings
and arguments between the parties that will further prolong this case. But we
do not believe that such delay is necessary. We can decide the appeal
ourselves to expedite decision of this case. We have carefully studied the pros
and cons of this problem and can rule on it directly on the basis of the record
before us and in the interest of speedy justice.
Accordingly, we hold that the sum awarded by the trial court to the petitioners,
for the less serious physical injuries inflicted upon the victim — and not for his
death — is sufficient recompense. Therefore, the increase sought is denied.
While the Court sympathizes with the petitioners for their tragic loss, it is
unable to accord them a more satisfactory material settlement because it is
limited by the findings of the trial court and inhibitions of double jeopardy. If an
error has been committed somewhere — and on this it is not necessary for us
to rule — that error will nonetheless not relax the application of the salutary
rule on double jeopardy. It must be, as it is here, upheld.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the respondent court dated April 14, 1980, and
May 20, 1980, are SET ASIDE. However, the appeal sought shall no longer be
necessary because the questioned civil award in the amount of P500.00 is
hereby directly AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Paras and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75983 April 15, 1988
MANUEL R. CRUZ; PAULINO M. ARCEO; ELPIDIO G. CACHO; ROGELIO
P. GARCIA; MANUEL M. DELA CRUZ; WILLIAM H. LORENZANA; PABLO
P. GARCIA; RODRIGO A. HALASAN; ADRIANO B. CASTILLO;
LEONARDO L. PAQUINTO; NESTOR T. LIWANAG; ALEXANDER P.
ROXAS; PABLO M. MERCADO; EDUARDO P. GARCIA; GERARDO M.
LUCAS; LEONIDES G. MAÑABO; BRAULIO DEPUSOY; ALFREDO M.
TILA; JEOFREY T. METEORO; BENIGNO G. BANTOLINO; ANTONIO P.
DATUL; RENATO V. VENGCO; EDGARDO TERRENAL; EDUARDO D.
DELFIN; CORNELIO C. TACDERAN; AMANCIO D. LORIESTO; JOSE A.
SELOTERIO; APOLONIO E. ONIA; DOMINGO MARCO; ARTURO
VILLASANTA; ANTONIO OCCASIONES; TEODORO C. CARANDANG;
ROGELIO A. GARCIA; ROMEO A. BASENSE; HARRY B. BENLIRO;
ROLANDO B. BENLIRO; JAMES A. UMADHAY; VICENTE A. GENER;
ERNESTO A. CARPIO; MANUEL S. SALARDA; GETULIO B. BRAGA, JR.;
ARCADIO D. CELENDRO; VIRGILIO P. GOMEZ; SERGIO R. PREYE;
CIRIACOM DELA GUARDIA; RODITO B. SORIASO ANTONIO D. PUMAR;
FEDERICO B. VECINAL; CESARIO D. VECINAL; LORETO D. VECINAL;
ROGELIO D. VECINAL; MARCELO B. DE MESA; JULIAN DE MESA;
GAVINO B. DE MESA; REMIGIO B. DE MESA; DANILO B. DE MESA;
ROLANDO P. TOLENTINO; ANASTACIO P. DEL ROSARIO; REYNALDO
C. REYES; BENITO B. PANGANIBAN; ROMUALDO M. MONTENEGRO;
ROMULO C. OCAMPO; DEMOCRITO M. SILVESTRE; SALLY B. DIMAISIP;
FILIPINO B. DE LEON; NARCISO G. VIGO; TOMAS C. AMORTE;
CATALINO S. CRUZ; EDUARDO F. JAVIER; ROGELIO L. CARICUNGAN;
ERNESTO R. BARADI; RENE P. CORTEZ; EDUARDO D. RAMIREZ;
DONATO G. CABONITALIA; CAMILO PATAO; JOSE TORRES; ISABELO
NARNE; ERIC F. PICHAY; DELFIN PIANO; FRANCISCO PIANO; RUDY G.
ROMERO; MARIO G. MERCADO; JUANITO PIANO; REYNOSO J.
LAGMAY; PABLO S. CALLEJO; FLORANTE SAGUN; RUSSEL A.
PAULINO; LAUREL LAMACA; RUFINO GAMBOA; TIRSO F. BALA, JR.;
ANTONIO CRUZ; BENITO PUGAL; CASIMIRO PATAO; ROGELIO PATAO;
EULOGIO PUGAL; CARLITO PUGAL; ANDRES PATAO; VICENTE
ARCANO; MARIANO YTURIAGA RODOLFO MANUEL; EDUARDO
ABIHAY; MANUEL CARREON; CAMILO PIANO; LUCIO ARIMANDO
PABLO ACIERTO; EDUARDO PASCUAL; FERMIN PUGAL; FLOR PIANO;
RUDY PIANO; JUANITO BAFUL; GODOFREDO RAQUEÑO; CALIXTO
SOMERA; HILARION PATAO; DELFIN B. GUTIERREZ; TEODULO
BUGARIN; JAIME A. SABADO, JR.; ALMARIO VILLANUEVA; APOLONIO
SOMUDIO; OSCAR LITADA; ROLANDO L. TOLENTINO; HERMINIO
BATONGBAKAL; ROGELIO TURION; NELSON REMO; FERMIN CORREA;
DOMINGO SALAZAR; FELIPE PAREDES; DOMINGO RECINTO; SILVANO
BEATO; TOMAS GARCIA; RODOLFO ABIHAY; MELCHOR CA-AMIK;
NELITO C. LONTOC; EDERLINO LACSINA; DOMINGO R. REYES;
RODOLFO D. MANANSALA; ROSALINO R. DELOS SANTOS; RONIE A.
CELIZ; VIRGILIO M. MALGAPO; DIONISIO C. CABRERA; ROGELIO V.
PORTILLO; JOSE D. PAMINTUAN; ROBERTO P. GALVEZ; LINO B.
DAPADAP; FERNANDO R. ROMERO; LINO M. VILLARIN; EMILIANO P.
SICANGCO; PAULINO V. ZAMORA; LEONARDO C. REYES; GUMAL A.
SAMO; IMPERIAL D. USMAN; GERUNDIO A. BOYLES; ELPIDIO L.
URBANO; ROMEO S. CANTADA; SOFRONIO B. GALO; EUGENE D.
BALANSAG; CIRILO P. MARIANO; ROMEO C. CARIÑO EDGARDO L.
GOMEZ; EUGENIO CABAÑERO; AQUILINO LEYRAN; ANTONIO A.
HERMIDA; ALVARO P. CABASAG; PRIMITIVO SULAYAD; TEODORO B.
PATANO; DOMINGO R. RODRIGUEZ; ROGER N. MAGALLANES;
SALVADOR 0. CALDERON; LEOPOLDO B. ARCADIO; APLON M.
LINOGAMAN; JOSE E. ABRIA; JESUS N. ABRIA; ANDRES P. PARADO;
LARRY A. ARPON; JESSIE CABAÑGUNAY; MANUEL A. BARQUILLIA;
DANIEL S. CINCO; TIMOTEO C. LLAMERA JR.; ERNESTO D. DUMPA;
ORLANDO G. ACSALAN; BONIFACIO VALLETE; AGUSTIN VALLETE;
SAMSON ARANETA; ERNESTO DOCTOLERO; AVELINO HABULAN;
ROLANDO TUDIN; CONRADO M. GLORIA; DANIEL G. CAMPOS; JAIME
F. CO; VIRGILIO ALEJANDRO; SULPECIO L. REJUSO, JR.; MARCELO S.
GUESE; VICENTE PATAO; ROMEO IBAYAN; DANILO MAGALLANES;
RICARDO C. JARATA; ERNESTO H. ABOLOC; DIOSDADO RODRIGUEZ;
ALFREDO P. PEREZ; FEDERICO VILICINA; ROSENDO I. RAMOS; JOSE
C. SIOCHI; FEDERICO MARCELINO; BENJAMIN V. TAN; DANILO CRUZ;
CONSTANTE CABANILIA; LEOPOLDO V. JOSE; PACIFICO BATACAN;
VICENTE SY; JOSE TORDESILLAS; ANTONIO DEPUSOY; ARMANDO I.
ULPINDO; EDILBERTO LIBERATO; JIMMY C. REALIS; SULPICIO C.
REJUSO; GEDALTIE MARIN; RENATO BALLESTEROS; and DEMOCRITO
LORAÑA petitioners,
vs.
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GENERAL FIDEL RAMOS, GENERAL
(RET.) EMILIO N. CEA, MINISTER NEPTALI GONZALES AND BRIG.
GENERAL SAMUEL SORIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 79077 April 15, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
IMPERIAL D. USMAN AND SAMU GUMAL, ACSARA GUMAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE PRESIDENT OF
MILITARY COMMISSION NO. 30, THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS AND THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
G.R. Nos 79599-79600 April 15, 1988
CONRADO M. GLORIA AND DANILO V. MAGALLANES, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF STAFF (AFP), THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (AFP),
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS,
respondents.
G.R. No. 79862 April 15, 1988
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IN
BEHALF OF MANUEL DE LA CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. MELITON GOYENA (RET.), IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 80565 April 15, 1998
LEOPOLDO V. JOSE, petitioner,
Page 69 of 129
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, SECRETARY RAFAEL IL ETO, GENERAL
FIDEL RAMOS, SECRETARY SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ AND BRIG. GEN.
SAMUEL SORIANO, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioners in 75983.
Anselmo M. Mabuti for petitioners D. Cruz and F. Marcelino.
Lininding P. Pangandaman for petitioners in 79077.
Segundo M. Gloria, Jr. for petitioners in 79599-79600.
Jack L. Soriano for petitioner in 79862.
NARVASA, J.:
Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in this Court on October 1,
1986 1 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called
"political detainees 2 arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and
committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to
stand trial for common crimes 3 before various courts martial; 4 if any of these
offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded nor proved.
Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military
personnel. 5 One hundred and fifteen (115) accused had been condemned to
die. Forty-six (46) were sentenced to life imprisonment. To nine (9) others
were meted prison terms of from twenty to thirty years; to forty-one (41), prison
terms of ten to twenty years; and to three (3), less than ten years.
The present status of their cases are disparate, as might be expected. As of
the date of filing of the petitions in this Court, the sentences of sixty-eight (68)
had become final upon their approval by the Office of the President, 6 seventy-
five (75) cases were pending review in either that Office or before the Board of
Military Review, while the appeal or review of the remaining seventy-three (73)
cases either had been expressly suspended pending the outcome of these
petitions, or are simply not dealt with in the records.
Presidential amnesty was granted to petitioner Virgilio Alejandrino, 7 yet to this
date he remains a prisoner at the Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes, Antonio
Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they
were acquitted of the charges against them, 8 and Reynaldo C. Reyes and
Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences
imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted them. 9
The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of
all military tribunals as well as General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation,
and the nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these bodies as
a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Their plea is
for the grant of a retrial of their respective cases in the civil courts, where their
right to due process may be accorded respect. 10 The writ of habeas corpus
issued on July 31, 1987, two weeks after an amended petition 11 was filed
with leave of court, reiterating the arguments originally pleaded, and setting
forth the additional claim that the pronouncement of this Court of the lack of
jurisdiction of military tribunals to try cases of civilians even during martial rule,
as declared in Olaquer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al., 12 entitled
the petitioners to be unconditionally freed from detention.
The Solicitor General's return of the writ in behalf of the public respondents
stated that the latter "offer no objection or opposition to the release from
detention of petitioners-civilians ... (which) may be immediately effected,
unless there are other legal causes that may warrant their detention ... (while)
the other petitioners who are military personnel x x should not be released. 13
This return was shortly amended however 14 to urge that this Court take a
"second look" and undertake a "thorough re-examination of the Olaquer
decision," suggesting the inapplicability of the ruling to "cases involving
civilians charged with, and convicted of common crimes and ... cases where
the detained accused have, in effect, fully served the sentence by their
continued detention for the duration of the penalty imposed." Also suggested
was the giving of "limited retroactive" to the decision, considering the
consequences "of voiding earlier convictions, ... (such as) The grant of
immunity from prosecution as a result of prescription or of the Statute of
(L)imitations having run, witnesses having been scattered and no longer
available, ... memories hav(ing) also been taxed beyond permissible limits, ...
and (the annulment) of acquittal decisions, ... to the great prejudice of the
rights of the accused. 15
In Olaquer, this Court in no uncertain terms affed that —
... a military jurisdiction or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even
during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed
by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any
judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned (People v. Navarro,
63 SCRA 264, 274 [1975]). For the same reasons, Our pronouncement in
Aquino, Jr. v. Military Commission No. 2 (L-37364,63 SCRA 546) and all
decided cases affirming the same, in so far as they are inconsistent with this
pronouncement, should be deemed abandoned. 16
Such is the statement of the doctrine squarely applicable in these cases.
1. Clearly, no right to relief under Olaquer exists in favor of the 26
petitioners who were admittedly in the military service. 17 Over them the
courts martial yardly exercised jurisdiction. It need only be said that these
tribunals were created precisely to try and decide cases of military personnel,
and the validity of General Order No. 8 ordaining their creation, although
repeatedly challenged on constitutional grounds, has as many times been
upheld by the Court, either expressly or impliedly. 18 As to these petitioners,
the writ is thus unavailing.
2. Deference to the Olaquer decision impels on the other hand the
application thereof to all civilians, without distinction, who were haled before
military tribunals. To be sure, due consideration was given to the submittal that
the doctrine is, or should be declared as, limited in aplicability to "political of
fenders," and not "ordinary crimes" such as those of which the civilian
petitioners were convicted. 18a But distinction should not be set where none
were clearly intended. The issue in Olaquer, as here, is the jurisdiction of
courts martial over the persons of civilians, and not merely over the crimes
imputed to them, regardless of which they are entitled to trial by judicial, not
executive or military process. Conformably with this holding, the disposition of
these cases would necessarily have, as a premise, the invalidity of any and all
proceedings had before courts martial against the civilian petitioners. There is
all the more reason to strike down the proceedings leading to the conviction of
these non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts
of justice in the first place, as their offenses are totally unrelated to the
insurgency avowedly sought to be controlled by martial rule.
Due regard for consistency likewise dictates rejection of the proposal to merely
give "prospective effect" to Olaquer. No distinction should be made, as the
public respondents propose, between cases still being tried and those finally
decided or already under review. All cases must be treated alike, regardless of
the stage they happen to be in, and since according to Olaquer, all
proceedings before courts martial in cases involving civilians are null and void,
the court deems it proper to adhere to that unequivocal pronouncement,
perceiving no cogent reason to deviate from the doctrine.
The fact cannot be ignored, however, that crimes appear to have been
committed, and there are accusations against herein petitioners for those
offenses. Olaquer cannot and does not operate to absolve the petitioners of
these charges, or establish that the same are baseless, so as to entitle them
to immediate release from detention. It is not to be forgotten that the victims in
offenses ascribed to the petitioners have as much interest as the State has to
prosecute the alleged authors of the misdeeds. Justice will be better served if
the detention of such of the petitioners as are not hereby ordered released or
excepted, is continued until their cases are transferred to the ordinary courts
having jurisdiction, and the necessary informations have been filed against
them therein, as has already been done in the case of petitioners Imperial D.
Usman and Samu Gumal. 19 The State should be given a reasonable period
of time to accomplish this transfer, at which time the petitioners may apply for
bail for their temporary release.
The Solicitor General not unreasonably anticipates questions to arise as to the
availability of certain defenses to the petitioners upon their prosecution before
the civil courts. It seems evident, however, that no breach of the constitutional
prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense 20 would result from the retrial of the petitioners" cases, for the
simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and
convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. 21 Valid
previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy
can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. 22
Neither does the defense of prescription appear to be available to the
petitioners who, except for a handful, were charged with offenses punishable
by death or reclusion perpetua, which prescribe in twenty years. 23 Even the
few not so charged cannot raise such defense since the filing of the first
indictments suspended the running of the prescriptive period, and the
prosecutions under the informations to be filed should be regarded as mere
continuations of the previous proceedings. 24 At the very least, the filing of the
first charges should be considered as having interrupted the prescriptive
period notwithstanding the lack of jurisdiction of the military tribunal in which
they were filed, applying, by analogy, the ruling in People vs. Olarte. 25
In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments against all these
civilians are solely for the civil courts to weigh and decide upon after due
proceedings. Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have
explicitly requested of their respective cases in the civil courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted insofar as petitioners Vergilio
Alejandrino, 26 Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar Teodoro Patono, Andres
Parado, Del Campus, 27 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos 28
are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to
effect the immediate release of the above-mentioned petitioners, unless there
are other legal causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William
Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio B. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte,
Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo
Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera,
Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo,
Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin, Rosendo I. Ramos,
Pacifica Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis, Democrito Loraña who
are all military personnel.
Page 70 of 129
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO
FILE the necessary informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction
over the offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice
of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence
submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually
convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention shall be credited in their
favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO
CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the
grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-80838 November 29, 1988
ELEUTERIO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Esteban C. Manuel for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Eleuterio Perez raises both procedural and substantive issues in this
petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 04789 dated October 8, 1987 and its resolution of November 12, 1987
denying his motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are undisputed.
On October 21, 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against
Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction docketed as Criminal Case No. 618
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI. The accused pleaded
not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. On June 28, 1980 a judgment of
conviction was rendered against Perez.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of
Consented Abduction. In said decision, promulgated on October 29, 1982, the
Court of Appeals made the following statement:
xxx xxx xxx
This is not to say that the appellant did nothing wrong. With promises of
marriage, appellant succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, twice,
that night before they returned. She was seduced by appellant, as it turned out
that he made those promises just to accomplish his lewd designs That was
"seduction and not abduction," as explained by Justice Ramon Aquino. (Rollo,
p. 40.)
xxx xxx xxx
Subsequent to petitioner's acquittal complainant Yolanda Mendoza filed
another criminal complaint against Perez on July 22, 1983, this time for
Qualified Seduction, docketed as Criminal Case No. 83-8228 of the Municipal
Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch VI. * Petitioner Perez filed a motion to quash
invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of the
complainant. However, this motion and petitioner's motion for reconsideration
were denied.
Whereupon, petitioner Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 68122 questioning the denial of his
motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial Court in
Criminal Case No.
83-8228. In a resolution of the Second Division dated August 8, 1984, the
Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
On December 16, 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the
petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court. Said
the Intermediate Appellate Court:
As the order sought to be annulled is that of an inferior court, the petition in
this case should have been filed with the appropriate Regional Trial Court in
accordance with Rule 65, Sec. 4. We have already ruled in several cases that
BP 129, See. 9, in giving this court jurisdiction over applications for writs of
certiorari and prohibition "whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,"
was never meant to authorize the filing of petitions which, conformably to Rule
65, Sec. 4, should be filed with the Regional Trial Courts because they relate
to acts of inferior courts. The purpose of BP 129 is to enable this Court to take
cognizance of petitions which, because of the limitation imposed by the
requirement that the petition must be "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" could
or only be filed before with the Supreme Court (Diocese of Cabanatuan v.
Delizo, AC-G.R. SP No. 06410, Oct. 28, 1985; Uy v. Antonio, AC G.R R. SP
No. 05568, March 7, 1985; De Guzman v. Andres, AC-G.R. SP No. 04494,
Oct. 25, 1984). [Rollo p. 70.]
Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga docketed as Special Civil Case No. 7623.
Upon evaluation of the case, the court dismissed this petition and Perez'
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Perez thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
In a decision dated October 8, 1987 this petition was denied, being
inappropriate, aside from the fact that the decision sought to be reviewed had
become final and executory. As explained by the Court of Appeals:
xxx xxx xxx
... it is to be observed that what petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court was
an original petition for certiorari and prohibition which was dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. The appropriate remedy for
such dismissal is an appeal from said decision (by filing a notice of appeal with
the RTC concerned), and not a petition for review. Under the 1983 Interim
Rules of Court, all appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases
where a record on appeal is required, must be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from. (par.
19).<äre||anº•1àw> An appeal from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the former shall be taken
by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment or order
appealed from (par. 20, 1983 Interim Rules of Court) ...
For not having filed a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court of San
Fernando, Pampanga, the decision of said court in the petition for certiorari
and prohibition ... has become final and executory (CIR v. Visayan Electric
Co., 19 SCRA 696, 698) on July 12, 1987, fifteen (15) days after receipt by
petitioner of the decision of said court on May 18, 1987, deducting the period
during which his motion for reconsideration of said decision was pending
resolution before said court. ... Petitioner might plead liberality in the
interpretation of the rules of procedure, but this plea cannot be conceded
because it involves the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. It has been
repeatedly held that compliance with the manner and period for perfecting an
appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional Garganta vs. Cabangon, 109 Phil. 150
[1960]; Bilbao vs. Republic, 80 SCRA, 177 [1977]; Volkschen Labor Union vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, 98 SCRA 314, 322 [1980]) [Rollo, pp.
93-94.]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition for
review.
I. Petitioner claims that what he filed with the Regional Trial Court
was not an original petition for certiorari and prohibition but an appeal from the
resolutions of the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 83-8228 denying
his motions to quash and for reconsideration. Hence, when the Regional Trial
Court dismissed his certiorari and prohibition case, he invoked the proper
remedy which is a petition for review.
There is no merit in petitioner's claim.
Well-established is the rule that appeal is not the proper remedy from a denial
of a motion to quash [People v. Macandog, G.R. Nos. 18601-2, January 31,
1963, 7 SCRA 195; Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
63559, May 30, 1986,142 SCRA 171; Milo v. Salanga, G.R. No. 37007, July
20, 1987, 152 SCRA 113.] This is so because an order denying a motion to
quash is an interlocutory order and does not finally dispose of a case. Under
the Rules on Criminal Procedure prior to its amendment in 1985, ** after the
denial of defendant's motion to quash, he should immediately enter his plea
and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same question covered by
his motion to quash [See Sec. 1 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court and
Chuatoco v. Aragon, G.R. No. 20316, January 30, 1 968, 22 SCRA 346.]
Further, the record shows that what petitioner actually filed was a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition as evidenced by his prayer for (1) the
annulment and setting aside of the municipal trial judge's resolutions of April
11, 1984 and June 11, 1984 denying his motions to quash and for
reconsideration, respectively, and, (2) the prohibition of the same judge from
further taking cognizance of the criminal case for Qualified Seduction
[Annexes "K" and "L".]
A special civil action for certiorari is an original or independent action and not a
continuation or a part of the trial resulting in the rendition of the judgment
complained of [Palomares v. Jimenez, 90 Phil. 773, 776 (1952).] The same
holds true in case of a special civil action for prohibition. These writs may be
issued by the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Court [Art. X, Sec. 5 (1) of the 1987 Constitution and Secs. 9 (1) and 21 (1) of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.]
In a special civil action for certiorari, the petitioner seeks to annul or modify the
proceedings of any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial functions that
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
[Rule 65, sec. 1.] On the other hand, in a petition for prohibition directed
Page 71 of 129
against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person whether exercising judicial
or ministerial functions who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in the action or
matter specified in the petition [Rule 65, Sec. 2]
From a denial of a petition for certiorari and prohibition by the trial court, as in
this case, the losing party's remedy is an ordinary appeal to the Court of
Appeals by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment
or order appealed from [Sec. 20, Interim Rules of Court.] Failure to appeal
within fifteen (15) days from rendition of judgment renders the appealed
decision final and executory.
A petition for review of a judgment of the regional trial court is proper only
when the judgment sought to be reviewed is an appeal from the final judgment
or order of a municipal, metropolitan or municipal circuit trial court [Sec. 22 (b),
Interim Rules of Court].
Petitioner likewise faults the respondent Court of Appeals for dismissing his
petition for certiorari which "gave rise to the confusion caused by the case
being tossed around from one court to another ending in its dismissal on mere
technicality, thereby depriving [him] of his right to constitutional due process"
[Rollo, p. 133.]
Petitioner's assertion that he was consequently denied due process in
unfounded. Respondent court did not foreclose his right to seek his remedy
elsewhere as it is clear from its decision that "the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper
Regional Trial Court" [Rollo. p. 70.] Thus, petitioner was never denied
recourse to the appropriate court. On the contrary, the Intermediate Appellate
Court pointed the direction for petitioner to take.
II. Petitioner invokes double jeopardy to question the filing against
him of an information for Qualified Seduction after he was acquitted for
Consented Abduction.
The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973
Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same
offense" means Identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The
rule on double jeopardy under the Rules of Court is explicit:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.—When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information. [Sec. 9, Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court Procedure, now Sec. 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure.]
xxx xxx xxx
There is no question that petitioner was validly charged with the crime of
Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. That he had
been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was
subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. In the case at bar, the only
issue posed by petitioner relates to the Identity of the two offenses of
Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction.
In support of his argument that the filing of the subsequent information for
Qualified Seduction is barred by his acquittal in the case for Consented
Abduction, petitioner maintains that since the same evidence would support
charges for both offenses a trial and conviction for one, after he was acquitted
for the other, would constitute double jeopardy. Stated otherwise, petitioner
would rely on the "same evidence" test in support of his claim of double
jeopardy.
It is true that the two offenses for which petitioner was charged arose from the
same facts. This, however, does not preclude the filing of another information
against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each requiring different
elements, arose. As this Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
A single act may be an offense against two statutes and if each statute
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or
conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from
prosecution and conviction under the other. [U.S. v. Capurro, 7 Phil. 24, 34
(9106) citing In re Hans Neilsen (131 U.S. 176); Emphasis supplied.]
xxx xxx xxx
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may
appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against
double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or Identical
offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the
other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same
code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if
each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of
the other. [People v. Doriquez, G.R. Nos. 24444-45, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA
163, 171-172; Emphasis supplied.]
xxx xxx xxx
An examination of the elements of these two crimes would show that although
they may have arisen from the same set of facts, they are not Identical
offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy.
There are similar elements between Consented Abduction and Qualified
Seduction, namely: (1) that the offended party is a virgin, and, (2) that she
must be over twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age. However, two
elements differentiate the two crimes. Consented Abduction, in addition to the
two common elements, requires that: (1) the taking away of the offended party
must be with her consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender, and,
(2) the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd designs. On the
other hand, an information for Qualified Seduction also requires that: (1) the
crime be committed by abuse of authority, confidence or relationship, and, (2)
the offender has sexual intercourse with the woman.
Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any Identity
between them. As this Court has stated:
xxx xxx xxx
... the gravamen of the offense of the abduction of a woman with her own
consent, who is still under the control of her parents or guardians is "the alarm
and perturbance to the parents and family" of the abducted person, and the
infringement of the rights of the parent or guardian. But-in cases of seduction,
the gravamen of the offense is the wrong done the young woman who is
seduced. ... [U.S. v. Jayme, 24 Phil. 90, 94 (1913).]
xxx xxx xxx
III. Finally, petitioner avers that the complaint for Qualified Seduction
is barred by waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Yolanda Mendoza, the latter
having opted to consider the case as Consented Abduction. He also alleges
that her delay of more than nine (9) years before filing the second case
against him is tantamount to pardon by the offended party.
Petitioner's stance is unmeritorious. The complainant's filing of a subsequent
case against him belies his allegation that she has waived or is estopped from
filing the second charge against petitioner. Neither could she be deemed to
have pardoned him, for the rules require that in cases of seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, pardon by the offended party, to be effective,
must be expressly given [Rule 110, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, Ruled 110,
Sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.] Moreover the length of time
it took her to file the second case is of no moment considering that she filed it
within the ten (10)-year prescriptive period provided by Article 90 par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code for crimes punishable by a correctional penalty such as
Qualified Seduction [See Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code.]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* The crimes of consented abduction and qualified seduction are
both punishable by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
[Article 342 and 337 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively] or 6 months and
1 day to 4 years and 2 months. The seeming discrepancy as to what court
these two cases were filed notwithstanding similar penalties can be explained
however by the reorganization and renaming of the courts by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 in 1981 when the jurisdiction to hear criminal case punishable with
imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months was lodged with the
inferior courts.
** Applicable to the instant case because the denial of petitioner's motion to
quash happened in 1984.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-74053-54 January 20, 1988
Page 72 of 129
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION,
petitioners,
vs.
NATHANIEL M. GROSPE, Presiding Judge, Branch 44, Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga and MANUEL PARULAN, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
A special civil action for certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of
respondent Presiding Judge of Branch 44, Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
dismissing Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, and Criminal
Case No. 2813 for Estafa, for being "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on
the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases."
Respondent-accused, Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC, for short) in Bulacan.
In Criminal Case No. 2800 of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, he was
charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22 for having
issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20) in favor of SMC but which
was dishonored for having been drawn against 'insufficient funds and, in spite
of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check
to the damage and prejudice of SMC.
In Criminal Case No. 2813 of the same Court, Respondent-accused was
charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80
in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was
refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for
having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice
of SMC.
The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and
defense being the same for the two suits.
Based on the facts and the evidence, Respondent Judge arrived at the
following "Findings and Resolution:"
From the welter of evidence adduced in these two , this Court is convinced
that the two checks involved herein were issued and signed by the accused in
connection with the beer purchases made by him on various occasions at the
Guiguinto, sales office of SMC at Guiguinto, Bulacan and which checks he
handed and delivered to the sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio,
who holds office in that municipality. The Court finds it rather difficult to believe
the claim and testimony of the accused that these checks which he admittedly
signed and which he delivered to Mr. Cornelio in blank were filled up without
his knowledge particularly the amounts appearing therein which in the case of
the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2800 amounted to P86,071.20, and,
in the case of the check involved in Criminal Case No. 2813, amounted to
Pl1,918.80. The accused had been engaged in business for some time
involving amounts that are quite considerable, and it is hard to believe that he
will agree to this kind of arrangement which placed or exposed him to too
much risks and uncertainties.
But even as this Court is convinced that the accused had issued these checks
to the representative of SMC on the occasions testified to in these cases by
the witnesses for the prosecution which two checks were subsequently
dishonored due to lack of funds resulting in damage to SMC, the offended
party herein, this Court, after considering the totality of the evidence and the
circumstances that attended the issuance of these two checks until they were
both dishonored by the drawee bank, the Planters Development Bank, at
Santa Maria, Bulacan, has come to the conclusion that it is bereft of
jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of
these cases.
which he reasoned out, thus:
Deceit and damage are the two essential elements that make up the offenses
involving dishonored checks. And in order that this Court may have jurisdiction
to try these cases, it must be established that both or any one of these
elements composing the offenses charged must occur or take place within the
area over which this Court has territorial jurisdiction. Here, however, it is clear
that none of these elements took place or occurred within the jurisdictional
area of this Court.
As gleaned from the evidence, the two checks involved herein were issued by
the accused at Guiguinto, Bulacan. They were delivered and handed to
Supervisor Ruben Cornelio of San Miguel Corporation in his capacity as the
representative of the company holding office in that municipality where the
transactions of the accused with SMC took place. It was before Supervisor
Cornelio at Guiguinto, Bulacan that false assurances were made by the
accused that the checks issued by him were good and backed by sufficient
funds in his bank, the Planters Development Bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan,
only to turn out later on that this was not so.
The other element of damage pertaining to the offenses charged in these
cases was inflicted on the offended party, the SMC, right at the moment the
checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development
Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from the
BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purposes. The argument
advanced by the prosecution in its memorandum filed herein that the two
checks were deposited by SMC at the BPI, San Fernando, Branch, San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it maintained its accounts after receiving these
checks from its Guiguinto Sales Office which bank later on made the
corresponding deductions from the account of SMC in the amounts covered by
the dishonored checks upon receiving information that the checks so issued
by the accused had been dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa Maria,
Bulacan, is inconsequential. As earlier stated, the element of damage was
inflicted on the offended party herein right at the moment and at the place
where the checks issued in its favor were dishonored which is in Santa Maria,
Bulacan.
Respondent Judge then decreed:
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing these cases for lack of jurisdiction.
The bail bond posted by the accused in these cases are ordered cancelled.
This Petition for certiorari challenges the dismissal of the two criminal cases
on the ground that they were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
Respondent-accused adopts the contrary proposition and argues that the
order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and
that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits, would subject
Respondent-accused to double jeopardy.
Upon the attendant facts and circumstances we uphold the Petition.
The principal ground relied upon by Respondent Judge in dismissing the
criminal cases is that deceit and damage, the two essential elements that
make up the offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the
territorial jurisdiction of his Court in Pampanga, but rather in Bulacan where
false assurances were given by Respondent-accused and where the checks
he had issued were dishonored. The People maintain, on the other hand, that
jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
At the outset, it should be pointed out, as the Solicitor General has aptly called
attention to, that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the subject of
different penal laws and with different basic elements: (1) On June 13, 1983,
Respondent-accused issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria,
Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in
favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto,
Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San
Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC
Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine
Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On
July 8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the
said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa
Maria, Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the charge of Violation
of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22) in Criminal Case No. 2800 of the
lower Court (hereafter, the Bouncing Checks Case).
(2) On June 18, 1983, Respondent-accused likewise issued PDB
Check No. 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was
received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment
for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC
Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it
was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn deposited the
check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July
8,1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for
"insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. This dishonored check is the subject of the prosecution for Estafa by
postdating or issuing a bad check under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No, 2813 of the lower Court (briefly, the
Estafa Case).
In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and
damage are essential elements of the offense (U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383-
390) and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction.
For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of
deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that
offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the
insufficiency of his funds (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc.,
December 18, 1986; 146 SCRA 323; Dingle vs. IAC, G.R. No. 75243, March
16, 1987,148 SCRA 595). The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act
of issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder (Cruz vs.
IAC, No. I,66327, May 28,1984,129 SCRA 490. Malice and intent in issuing
the worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum (Que
vs. People of the Philippines, et. al., G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21,
1987). The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-
payment of an obligation (Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, supra).
A. With the distinction clarified, the threshold question is whether or
not venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga
in the two cases.
Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been
carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, specifically provides:
Page 73 of 129
SEC. 14. Place where action is to be instituted —
(a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in
any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In
transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to
the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in
another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being
understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the
others (Tuzon vs. Cruz. No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235).
However, if an the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its
consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the Court of that
municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case (People vs.
Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624).
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing
offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in
separate places (People vs. Yabut, supra). In this case, deceit took place in
San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in Bulacan where
the cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place (See People vs.
Yabut, supra). Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the
Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not
completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was
uttered and delivered. "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat
The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as
an obligation" (People vs. Larue, 83 P. 2d 725, cited in People vs. Yabut,
supra). For although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at
Guiguinto, Bulacan, that was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the
payee, SMC. Said supervisor was not the person who could take the check as
a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title
thereto. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must
be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee
of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof" (Sec. 190,
Negotiable Instruments Law, cited in People vs. Yabut, supra.) Thus, said
representative had to forward the check to the SMC Regional Office in San
Fernando, Pampanga, which was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat who,
in turn, deposited it at the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga.
The element of deceit, therefore, took place in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where the rubber check was legally issued and delivered so that jurisdiction
could properly be laid upon the Court in that locality.
The estafa charged in the two informations involved in the case before Us
appears to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in
Malolos, Bulacan, while the damage in Caloocan City, where the checks were
dishonored by the drawee banks there. Jurisdiction can, therefore, be
entertained by either the Malolos court or the Caloocan court. While the
subject checks were written, signed, or dated in Caloocan City, they were not
completely made or drawn there, but in Malolos, Bulacan, where they were
uttered and delivered. That is the place of business and residence of the
payee. The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not
necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of
decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is
the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation (People vs. Larue,
83 P. 2d 725). An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the
contract is revocable (Ogden, Negotiable Instruments, 5th ed., at 107). And
the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who
takes it as a holder, which means "(t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" (Sec. 190, Negotiable
Instruments Law). Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession,
whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to
transfer title thereto (Bailey, Brady on Bank Checks, 3rd ed. at 57-59; Sec.
190, Negotiable Instruments Law). Thus, the penalizing clause of the provision
of Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: "By postdating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his
funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check,"
Clearly, therefore, the element of deceit thru the issuance and delivery of the
worthless checks to the complainant took place in Malolos, Bulacan,
conferring upon a court in that locality jurisdiction to try the case.
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be
continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of
its performance (Colmenares vs. Villar, No. L-27126, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA
186); and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of
dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a
bouncing check (People vs. Hon. Veridiano, II, No. L-62243, 132 SCRA 523).
The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. As held in Que vs.
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 11, 1987 "the
determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the
check". However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or
drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential
ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the
accused be within one territory or another (People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R.
Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987). Accordingly, jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
And, as pointed out in the Manzanilla case, jurisdiction or venue is determined
by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling (Arches vs.
Bellosillo, 81 Phil. 190, 193, cited in Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28,
1975, 66 SCRA 235). The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the
crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the
jurisdiction of the Court below.
B. The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by Respondent Judge,
predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by Certiorari. The error
committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits.
Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be
averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of
discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (City of Davao vs. Dept.
of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111, 115). An error of
jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court nun and void.
C. The present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void
Decision of Respondent Judge does not place Respondent-accused in double
jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment
was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon Respondent
Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction"
over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on
the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same
offense (People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835,
837).
The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may
not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second
proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.
Since the order of dismissal was without authority and, therefore, null and
void, the proceedings before the Municipal Court have not been lawfully
terminated. Accordingly, there is no second proceeding to speak of and no
double jeopardy. A continuation of the proceedings against the accused for
serious physical injuries is in order. (People vs. Mogol, 131 SCRA 306, 308).
In sum, Respondent Judge had jurisdiction to try and decide the subject
criminal case, venue having been properly laid.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of Respondent Judge of February 17, 1986 is
hereby set aside and he is hereby ordered to reassume jurisdiction over
Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of
either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced
during the joint trial of said two cases.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-80778 June 20, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE PEDRO T. SANTIAGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
SEGUNDINA ROSARIO y SEMBRANO, respondents.
U.P. Office of Legal Services for petitioner University of the Philippines.
Candido G. Del Rosario & Associates for private respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari seeking to declare null and void the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City dated October 27,
1987 in Criminal Case No. 051672 entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Segundina Rosario y Sembrano," the issues raised are (1) whether or not
double jeopardy attaches in the event of a judgment of acquittal of the
accused without a trial on the merits; and (2) whether or not the complainant
or private offended party in a criminal case can file a special civil action for
certiorari questioning the validity of said judgment of acquittal without the
intervention of the Solicitor General.
On June 2, 1987 an information for violation of P.D. No. 772 was filed by the
Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the
RTC of the same city against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads,
among others, as follows:
That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for sometime prior thereto
and persisting up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the University of the Philippines, the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said
Page 74 of 129
property, by then and there construct his/her house therein for residential
purposes, without the consent and against the will of the said offended party. 1
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and a pre-trial conference
was held on August 14, 1987 wherein the accused informed the court that she
has a title, a building permit and survey plan covering the subject land. The
trial court then issued an order on the same day that reads as follows:
Considering that the accused has a title, building permit and a survey plan on
the subject land, the Court instructs both parties to submit their respective
proffer of documentary exhibits together with their positions as to whether this
case will be heard or dismissed. 2
The private prosecutor presented a position paper showing that the said
property belongs to the University of the Philippines (U.P.) as shown by TCT
No. 9462 covering about 493 hectares at Diliman, Quezon City which includes
the area in question; that a plan was submitted of the entire area; 3 that the
ownership of the so-called U.P. campus under TCT No. 9462 has been
sustained by several decisions of the Supreme Court; that the supposed title
of the accused, TCT No. 5762 has been cancelled by TCT No. 126671 in the
name of Bughay Construction and Development Corporation; that granting the
accused had a title thereto, the issue is whether or not the property described
in the title is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus which is adjacent to Bo. Kruz-
na-Ligas, Diliman, Quezon City; that the alleged title of the accused shows
that the property is situated in Bo. Gulod, Municipality of Marikina, Province of
Rizal; that this is also shown in the tax declaration presented by her; 4 that in
fact the accused paid the corresponding real estate tax at Marikina; 5 and that
the criminal case should proceed as it has been shown that the area on which
the accused made the construction belongs to the U.P. without the knowledge
and consent of the latter and in violation of P.D. No. 772.
On the other hand, the accused submitted a proffer of exhibits with a
manifestation tending to show that the accused applied for a building permit to
construct on the lot; that the lot is covered by a title in the name of the
accused; that a copy of the building permit was also submitted for which the
accused paid for the fee; that the relocation plan of the land and the field notes
were also submitted; and that she informed U.P. of her claim and asked them
not to intrude into her property.
An opposition thereto was filed by U.P. stating that the proffer of exhibits is
irregular and without basis as in fact the evidence was not marked in the pre-
trial; that the proffer of exhibits is not covered by Rule 118, Sections 1 and 2 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; that what is allowed only in Section 2
thereof is the marking of the exhibits for Identification purposes of
documentary evidence; that the manifestation submitting the case for
resolution has no legal basis; and thus it is prayed that the proffer of exhibits
and manifestation be denied for being irregular or not pursuant to the rules.
On October 27, 1978, the questioned decision was rendered by the
respondent judge acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de
oficio. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari filed by the counsel for the
private offended party, U.P., in behalf of the People of the Philippines. The
petition seeks to render null and void the aforesaid decision for want of due
process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the
merits.
The petition is impressed with merit. Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Rule 118 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provide as follows:
SECTION 1. Pre-trial: when proper.-To expedite the trial, where the accused
and counsel agree, the court shall conduct a pretrial conference on the
matters enumerated in Section 2 hereof, without impairing the rights of the
accused.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial conference; subjects.-The pre-trial conference shall consider
the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of facts;
(c) Marking for Identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial. (n)
SEC. 3. Pre-trial order.-After the pre-trial conference, the court shall issue an
order reciting the actions taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked.
Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial to matters not disposed of and
control the course of the action during the trial, unless modified by the court to
prevent manifest injustice.
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that in criminal cases a pre-trial may
be held by the trial court only where the accused and his counsel agree. Such
pre-trial shall cover plea bargaining, stipulation of facts, marking for
Identification of evidence of the parties, waiver of objections to admissibility of
evidence and such other matters as may promote a fair and expeditious trial.
After the pre-trial, the trial court shall issue an order reciting the actions taken,
the facts stipulated, and evidence marked, and thereafter the trial on the
merits shall proceed which shall be limited to matters not disposed of during
the pre-trial.
In this case, a pre-trial was held wherein the accused alleged that she has a
title covering the property in question. The respondent judge thus required the
parties to submit their proffer of documentary exhibits and their position paper
as to whether or not the case would be heard or dismissed. Under the
aforestated provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, particulary Section
2 thereof, what is specified is the marking for identification of evidence for the
parties and the waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence. A proffer of
exhibits or evidence is not among those enumerated. Such proffer of evidence
or more specifically in offer of evidence is generally made at the time a party
closes the presentation of his evidence in which case the adverse party is
given the opportunity to object thereto and the court rules on the same. When
evidence proposed to be presented is rejected by the court a proffer of
evidence is usually made stating its nature and purpose had it been admitted.
Assuming that such proffer of evidence, as directed by the respondent judge,
may be made at the pre-trial in a criminal case, the prosecution should be
given the opportunity to object to the admissibility. In this case, the prosecution
filed its opposition to the proffer of its exhibits stating that it is not authorized
under section 1 and 2 of Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure;
that the documentary evidence were not presented for marking at the pre-trial;
and that the manifestation submitting the case for the resolution with the
proffer of exhibits has no legal basis. In it position paper, U.P. also pointed out
that the alleged title of the accused covers property in Marikina and not in U.P.
Campus, Quezon City wherein the accused built her structure. The trial court
did not even rule on the admissibility of the exhibits of the accused.
The respondent judge despite the conflicting positions of the parties and the
objection of the U.P. to the resolution of the case without a trial on the merits,
nevertheless rendered a decision acquitting the accused by making the
following disquisition:
With all the documents of the prosecution and the defense on record, it may
now be asked: MAY THE ACCUSED BE CONVICTED OF THE CRIME OF
VIOLATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER 772?
Prosecution of the accused is anchored on the postulate that accused built a
structure over land belonging to the University of the Philippines and titled in
the name of the latter. Documents presented by the defense established that
accused has a title over the land on which she built the structure; that she has
a building permit for the structure; that she paid the corresponding fees for the
building permit; that she has a relocation plan with supporting data of field
notes and lot data computation (Exhs. "1", "2", "2-A", "3", "4", "5", "5-A," "6-B",
"5-B-1", "5-B-2", and "5-B-3").
Actually, there is now a collision between the claim of the prosecution and the
defense on rights of ownership to the land in question. It may be noted that
both land titles are torrens titles.
Under these well established facts, it cannot be stated with certainty that the
accused built her structure illegally. If somehow it is discernible that it is more
the inadequacy of details in the states evidence that makes it difficult for us to
arrive at definite conclusions rather than, perhaps, the actual facts themselves,
still we cannot pin responsibility on appellant (sic). That moral conviction that
may serve as basis of a finding of guilt in criminal cases is only that and which
is the logical and inevitable result of the evidence on record, exclusive of any
other consideration. Short of this, it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed, it is, even more, our constitutional duty to acquit him." So, said the
Supreme Court in People vs. Maisug, 27 SCRA 753. The same holds true to
the instant case. The scanty and/or inadequate evidence of the prosecution is
insufficient to sustain conviction.
It may be added that the torrens title of accused over the property on which
she built her structure cannot be collaterally attacked. The issue on the validity
of her title can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose
(Magay vs. Estiandan, 69 SCRA 456). The same doctrine has been reiterated
in Director of Lands vs. CFI of Misamis Oriental, Br. 1, No. L-58823, March 18,
1985, 135 SCRA 392). 6
This Court finds that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in rendering the aforestated decision without affording the
prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court. The issue before the Court
is whether or not the accused built the structure on the land belonging to U.P.
At the pre-trial, U.P. presented its title and plan showing that the accused built
a structure within its property. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and
manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land. However, as
stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not
in Quezon City and said title could not cover the very lot in question which is at
Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where the structure of accused was built. This
issue cannot be determined by a mere examination of the titles and
documents submitted by the parties. A trial on the merits should be
undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place where the
structure was built by the accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The
conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her structure illegally
as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual or legal
basis. Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the questioned decision
as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates
that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution to
establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of
due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its
evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution
is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case.
Page 75 of 129
Double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this
case. 7 There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or
information; 2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which defendant had
pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or
which was dismissed or terminated without his express consent. 8
In this case, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and
prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such imperative
is void for lack of jurisdiction. 9 It was not a court of competent jurisdiction
when it precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial
should follow a pre-trial. That is the mandate of the rules. 10 Obviously, double
jeopardy has not set in this case.
The question as to whether or not U.P., as the private offended party, can file
this special civil action for certiorari questioning the validity of said decision of
the trial court should be answered in the affirmative.
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role
is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. 11 The private offended party or complainant may not
take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. 12
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should
not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action
may be prosecuted in name of said complainant. 13
In this case, the Solicitor General upheld the right of U.P. to file the petition as
an aggrieved party. Inasmuch as the prosecution was deprived of due
process, the questioned decision of the respondent judge acquitting the
accused is null and void as it was rendered in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the
respondent judge dated October 27, 1987 is set aside and declared null and
void. The respondent judge is hereby directed to proceed with the trial on the
merits of the case, and thereafter, to decide the same on the basis of the
evidence adduced, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81861 September 8, 1989
BERNABE QUE and AMELIA QUE, spouses, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RODRIGO V. COSICO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch
17, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. No. 83114 September 8, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PAZ L. MARTELINO AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
(FOURTH DIVISION), respondents-appellees.
Lorenzo Coloso for petitioners in 81861.
Alberto A. Villaruz for respondents in 83114.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
These two petitions were consolidated as they involve substantially the same
facts, issues and arguments. Petitioners in G.R. No. 81861 and private
respondent in G.R. No. 83114 all stand as the accused in Criminal Case No.
C-2152 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents which case was
dismissed but subsequently reinstated. The main issue to be resolved in both
petitions is whether or not the reinstatement of the criminal case placed the
accused in double jeopardy.

The facts of the case, as narrated in the lower court's order dated November
27, 1987, are as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
The record shows that the information for estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents involving the amount of P 2,120,511.24 was filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch XVI, on November 29, 1985.
The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial on March 31, 1986. In a motion
for postponement dated March 24, 1986, which was received by the court on
April 1, 1986, Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for the accused Bernabe Que
and Amelia Que, filed a motion to postpone the arraignment and pre-trial set
on March 31, 1986. He prayed that the date be reset to May 8, 1986. On
March 31, 1986, the accused Gualberto Devera, Bernabe Que, Amelia Que,
Warren Machado and Paz L. Martelino were arraigned while the other
accused, namely, Antonio Blancaflor, Wilfredo Azarco, Renato Elauria and
Amelita Tutica could not be arraigned because they were still at-large. The
court then set a separate trial for some of the accused on May 8, 1986. On
that date, Judge Enrique Suplico directed the prosecution to file its written
stipulation of facts with respect to the U.S. checks with machine copies of the
said documents attached thereto, copy furnished all the defense counsel,
within thirty (30) days from May 8, 1986. In turn, the defense counsel were
given ten (10) days from receipt of the stipulation of facts to file their counter
proposal or answer. Upon motion of the City Fiscal, the pre-trial was then reset
to June 26, 1986. The setting for June 26, 1986 was, however, postponed to
July 22, 1986 due to the motion for postponement filed by Atty. Lorenzo
Coloso. On July 22, 1986, the City Fiscal submitted his proposals for
admission of facts, which was duly received on the same date by the defense
counsel. On the same, date, the court again directed the prosecution to furnish
machine copies of the 489 U.S. treasury warrants to the accused through
counsel within 15 days from the said date, after which the defense counsel
shall make their counter proposal within 10 days from receipt thereof. In the
meantime, the date was reset to September 17 and 18, 1986. On September
17, 1986, the prosecution submitted supplemental proposals for admission of
facts. The hearing of September 18, 1986 was reset to November 10 and 11,
1986 upon request of the prosecution and without objection on the part of the
defense counsel as the prosecution witnesses were in Manila. On November
10, 1986, Judge Enrique P. Suplico issued the questioned order. (Rollo, G.R.
No. 81861, pp. 23-24)
Also, the lower court's order dated May 22, 1987 stated:
xxx xxx xxx
It appears that when this case was called for hearing on the morning of
November 10, 1986, Atty. Rodriguez Dadivas, counsel for the accused
Gualberto Devera and Warren Machado, orally moved for the inhibition of the
presiding judge on the ground that he had some doubts as to the impartiality of
the judge against whom he and some nineteen (19) other practicing lawyers
had filed serious administrative charges with the President of the Philippines,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the Minister of Justice. Following
Atty. Dadivas, Atty. Roberto Barrios, former private prosecutor, also moved for
the inhibition of the judge for the same reason alleged by Atty. Dadivas. The
presiding judge, however, ruled Attys. Dadivas and Barrios out of order and
asked the City Fiscal to present the evidence for the prosecution. Thereupon,
the City Fiscal manifested that he was authorizing the private prosecutor to
actively handle the prosecution of the case. The prosecution was then ready
with its principal witness, Mr. Angel Yu, former local branch manager of
Republic Planters Bank, who was then present in Court ready to testify. Atty.
Roberto Barrios, however, insisted that the presiding judge should first rule on
their previous motion for inhibition. Instead of resolving the motion for
inhibition, the presiding judge asked the comments of Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso,
counsel for the accused Bernabe Que and Amelia Que, and Atty. Alberto
Villarruz, counsel for the accused Paz L. Martelino, who both invoked the
constitutional right of their clients to a speedy trial. The presiding judge asked
again the prosecution to present its evidence but the private prosecutor
insisted that a ruling be made by the presiding judge with regard to the
pending motion for inhibition. As a result, the presiding judge issued the order
dated November 10, 1986 dismissing this case. ... (Rollo, G.R. No. 81861, pp.
18-19)
The order dismissing the case stated, to wit:
After the court has ordered the prosecution thru City Fiscal Sergio Pestano as
well as Private Prosecutor Roberto Barrios to proceed with the presentation of
their evidence for three (3) times, still the prosecution refused to present
evidence. This case was postponed many times at the instances of the
prosecution and today's trial is set for two days.
On oral motion of Atty. Alberto Villarruz and Lorenzo Coloso, counsel for the
defense invoking their constitutional rights to speedy trial under the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, this court has no alternative but to dismiss
this case.
This case is hereby DISMISSED and the bail bonds of all the accused are
hereby cancelled.
So ORDERED.
Given in open court, November 10, 1986.
Page 76 of 129
ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO
Judge
On November 21, 1986, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration
from the order of dismissal. This was opposed by the defense.
In the meantime, the case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico, as the
former judge was not reappointed after the reorganization of the judiciary.
Judge Cosico in an order dated May 22, 1987, granted the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration and caused the case to be reopened. The
subsequent motion for reconsideration flied by the defense was denied in an
order dated November 27, 1987.
G.R. No. 83114
On December 17, 1987, accused Paz Martelino filed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari praying that the order of Judge Cosico
reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of double
jeopardy.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated April 22, 1988, found merit in the
petition and set aside Judge Cosico's order as "it amounts to double jeopardy
on the part of the petitioner." The decision of the appellate court is based on
precedents which discuss the failure of the prosecution to appear for trial,
produce its witnesses, or present its evidence. (Gandicela v. Lutero, 88 Phil.
299 [1951] ; People v. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714 [1954]; People v. Tacneng, 105 Phil.
1298 [1959]). Furthermore, the respondent Judge was permanently enjoined
from proceeding with Criminal Case No. C-2152.
The People of the Philippines filed the present petition docketed as G.R. No.
83114 to review on certiorari the decision of the Court of Appeals.
G.R. No. 81861
Meanwhile, the accused Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for
certiorari directly with this court seeking to declare Judge Cosico's orders
dated May 22, 1987 and November 27, 1987 as null and void and to prohibit
respondent from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. C-2152.
As stated earlier, the common issue of these two petitions is whether or not
the reopening of Criminal Case No. C-2152 puts the accused in double
jeopardy.
We rule that Criminal Case No. C-2152 may be reinstated as no double
jeopardy has attached.
The rule on double jeopardy is found in sec. 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
1987 Constitution which provides that "No person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. ... This is complemented by
Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended which
provides as follows:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.-When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information. ...
Thus, the requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are, to wit: 1)
a valid complaint or information; 2) a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the
accused has pleaded to the charge and 4) the accused has been convicted or
acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of
the accused.
The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case was dismissed
upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. The accused
Bernabe Que, Amelia Que and Paz Martelino invoked their constitutional right
to a speedy trial when the prosecution refused to present evidence until the
court had ruled on the motion for inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the
lower court ordered the case to be dismissed.
For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the case
must be without the express consent of the accused. [People v. Jardin, 124
SCRA 167 (1983); People v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81 (1977); People v. Cuevo, 104
SCRA 312 (1981)].
Moreover, as held in the case of Bermisa v. Court of Appeals, 92 SCRA
136,141-143 (1979):
Our organic and criminal laws expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. A
speedy trial 'is a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and
the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays. (Kalaw vs. Apostol, et al., 64 Phil. 852 [1937]). It can be one which
may be had as soon after indictment as the prosecution can with reasonable
diligence prepare for trial. And such a trial is denied an accused person where
through the vacillation and procrastination of prosecuting officers, the accused
is forced to wait many months or years for trial. (Conde vs. Judge, et al., 45
Phil. 173 [1923]).
xxxxxxxxx
In fact, the consent of petitioner to the dismissal constituted a waiver of his
constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the same offense.
... where a defendant expressly consents to or moves for the dismissal of the
case against him, even if the court or judge states in the order that the
dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice to
the filing of another information, the dismissal win not be a bar to a
subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense.Gandicela vs.
Lutero, 88 Phil. 299 [1951]).
The effect of a discharge (of a person committed on a criminal charge in case
of a failure to find an indictment or file an information within a certain time)
depends upon the particular statute. Under some statutes, the discharge does
not prevent another indictment for the same offense, since it is considered that
the effect of the discharge is merely to relieve the accused from imprisonment
or from being held to bail, and not to acquit him of the crime. ...... (27 Am. Jur.,
pp. 597-598)
There were no oppressive delays on the part of the prosecution. The
prosecution's insistence that Judge Suplico rule on the motion to inhibit before
further proceedings in the case was not dilatory. There is no reason apparent
from the records why Suplico should vacillate or show anger on a matter that
affects the subsequent course of the trial. He could have easily granted or
denied the motion, giving sound reasons for his ruling. He could have required
that the motion be submitted formally. The subsequent behavior of the former
Judge, especially his precipitate dismissal of the case shows that his reaction
was not mere impetuousness or pique. It bears the earmarks of bias and
prejudice. As noted by Judge Cosico in his order dated November 27, 1987:
... A closed scrutiny of the foregoing chronology of facts that transpired at the
Regional Trial Court does not show that the prosecution deliberately delayed
the prosecution of this case nor does it appear that the prosecution was
unprepared to present its evidence. The two (2) postponements requested by
the prosecution appear to be reasonable. Moreover, it appears that on
November 10, 1986, Mr. Angel Yu, principal witness for the prosecution, was
then present and ready to testify. On the other hand, it appears that Atty.
Lorenzo Coloso also asked for at least two (2) postponements. In invoking the
right of the accused to speedy trial, Atty. Coloso is not therefore coming to this
court with clean hands. Considering the two (2) postponements requested by
Atty. Coloso, the accused in effect waived their right to speedy trial." (Rollo, G.
R. No. 81861, pp. 24-25)
On the contention of the petitioners in G. R. No. 81861 that the oral motion for
inhibition is in violation of Rule 137, sec. 2, suffice it to say that among the
exceptions that all motions shall be in writing are those made in the course of
a hearing or trial (Rule 15, sec. 2, Rules of Court).
Also, as noted by Judge Cosico, "the record shows that a written motion for
inhibition was actually filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Roxas
City, by Atty. Rodriguez D. Dadivas although it was belatedly withdrawn after
the issuance of the challenged order.
WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. 81861 is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. The petition docketed as G. R. No. 83114 is GRANTED and the
questioned orders of Judge Cosico dated May 22, 1987 and November 27,
1978 are AFFIRMED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22,
1988 is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., (Chairman), Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 74989-90 November 6, 1989
JOEL B. CAES, petitioner,
vs.
Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Special Cases
Division), Hon. ALFREDO M. GORGONIO, in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
CXXV, National Capital Region and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Sanchez & Montebon Law Office for petitioner.
CRUZ, J.:
Page 77 of 129
We deal with a simple matter that should not detain us too long. Fittingly, we
shall decide it in favor of individual liberty rather than upon rebuttable
presumptions and dubious implications.
The facts are simple and mostly undisputed.
On November 21, 1981, petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate
informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of
marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. 1 The cases were
consolidated on December 10, 1981. 2
Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some
reason postponed. 3
On August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial was
scheduled for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the
parties. 5
On November 15, 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not
appear in the record. 6
On December 20, 1982, the trial was again postponed because the
prosecution witnesses were absent. 7
On January 19, 1983, the third resetting of the case was also canceled, no
reason appearing in the record. 8
On February 21, 1983, no trial could be held again, the because witnesses
being absent. 9
On March 21, 1983, the trial was reset once more, again because the
prosecution witnesses were absent. 10
On April 19, 1983, the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset
because the prosecution witnesses were again absent. 11
On June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution
witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had
been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing
scheduled on June 6, 1983. 12
On June 6, 1983, the trial was again postponed, this time because there was
no trial fiscal. 13
On July 12, 1983, trial was reset for lack of material time. 14
On September 6, 1983, The trial was once more reset by agree-judgment of
the parties. 15
On October 19, 1983, the trial was reset to November 14, 1983. 16
On November 14, 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of
the case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge
Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued the following order:
In view of the failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several
scheduled hearing and also for the hearing today which is an indication of lack
of interest, upon motion of the trial fiscal for the provisional dismissal of these
cases and with the conformity of the accused, the above-entitled cases are
hereby ordered Provisionally Dismissed, with costs de oficio. 17
On January 9, 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay
(he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado who alleged that
they could not attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983, for lack of
notice. 18 Copy of the motion was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City
but not the petitioner.
On May 18, 1984, the respondent judge issued the following order:
Acting on the "Motion for the Revival of the Case" dated December 5, 1983
filed by the complaining witnesses to which no opposition has been filed either
by the Fiscal or the defense, and considering that the dismissal of these cases
was only provisional, for reasons stated in the motion, the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, let these cases be set anew for hearing on June 13, 1984 at
8:30 in the morning. 19
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner dated June 7, 1984, was
denied on October 9, 1984, and the revived cases were set from hearing on
November 19, 1984. 20
The petitioner questioned the judge's order on certiorari with this Court, which
reffered his petition to the respondent court. The petition there was dismissed
for lack of merit on May 20, 1986, and reconsideration was denied on June 17,
1986. 21 Caes then came to us again.
The present petition is based on two arguments, to wit: (a) that the motion to
revive the cases was invalid because it was riot filed by the proper party nor
was a copy served on the petitioner; and (b) the revival of the cases would
place the petitioner double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights.
We sustain the petitioner on both counts.

It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of the
government prosecutor and must always be under his control. 22 This is true
even if a private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the
examination of the witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. 23 The
witnesses, even if they are the complaining witnesses, cannot act for the
prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although they may ask for the filing of
the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or revival as they
are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action.
Their only function is to testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is
represented by the government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority,
and by no one else.
It follows that the motion for the revival of the cases filed by prosecution
witnesses (who never even testified) should have been summarily dismissed
by the trial judge. The mere fact that the government prosecutor was furnished
a copy of the motion and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to
justify the action of these witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the
motion himself if he thought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the
motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a
person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him
again. The fact that he was not so informed made the irregularity even more
serious. It is curious that the motion was granted just the same, and ex parte
at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's subsequent objection was
brushed aside.
On the second issue, the position of the public respondent is that double
jeopardy has not attached because the case was only provisionally dismissed
and it was with the conformity of the accused. The petitioner denies that he
consented to the dismissal and submits that the dismissal was final
notwithstanding its description.
Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double
jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has
been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the
first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not
thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against
him for the same offense.
It has been held in a long line of cases 24 that to constitute double jeopardy,
there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent
court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been
previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at
bar. What we must resolve is the effect of the dismissal, which the petitioner
contends finally and irrevocably terminated the two cases against him. His
submission is that the dismissal was not provisional simply because it was so
designated, more so since he had not expressly consented thereto.
It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of
the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent
of the accused. 25 Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But
a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was
made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be
presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his
failure to object. As we have held in a number of cases, such consent must be
express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. 26
Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the
refiling of the case.
There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to
dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion
of the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer
to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such
dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an
acquittal. In People v. City of Silay, 27 for example, the trial court dismissed
the case on motion of the accused on the ground of insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence. The government came to this Court on certiorari, and
the accused pleaded double jeopardy. Our finding was that the case should
not have been dismissed because the evidence submitted by the prosecution
was not insufficient. Even so, the petitioner had to be denied relief because
the dismissal amounted to an acquittal on the merits which was therefore not
appealable. Justice Muñoz-Palma said: "However erroneous the order of the
respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said
order, such error cannot now be lighted because of the timely plea of double
jeopardy."
The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the
accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a
failure to prosecute. Concerning this right, the ruling in the old case of Conde
v. Rivera 28 is still valid doctrine. Here the prosecution was dismissed
because the accused was made to "dance attendance on courts" and
subjected to no less than eight unjustified postponements extending over a
year that unduly delayed her trial. In dismissing the charges against her,
Justice Malcolm declared for a unanimous Supreme Court:
On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources,
but fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has
been the Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set
an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court
Page 78 of 129
is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come
to an end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without
good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his
protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a
year, the accused is entitled to relief ...
The case at bar is not much different from Conde. As the record shows, the
petitioner was arraigned on August 31, 1982, but was never actually tried until
the cases were dismissed on November 14, 1983, following eleven
postponements of the scheduled hearings, mostly because the prosecution
was not prepared. The accused was never absent at these aborted hearings.
He was prepared to be tried, but either the witnesses against him were not
present, or the prosecutor himself was absent, or the court lacked material
time. Meantime, the charges against him continued to hang over his head
even as he was not given an opportunity to deny them because his trial could
not be held.
Under these circumstances, Caes could have himself moved for the dismissal
of the cases on the ground of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This
would have been in keeping with People v. Cloribel, 29 where the case
dragged for almost four years due to numerous postponements, mostly at the
instance of the prosecution, and was finally dismissed on motion of the
defendants when the prosecution failed to appear at the trial. This Court held
"that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a dismissal but an
acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to
appear on the date of trial."
The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was
described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that
dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the
consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an
acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof
that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent,
as we have repeatedly held, is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred
from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged
waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in
favor of the accused.
We conclude that the trial judge erred in ordering the revival of the cases
against the petitioner and that the respondent court also erred in affirming that
order. Caes having been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial, and
not having expressly consented to the "provisional" dismissal of the cases
against him, he was entitled to their final dismissal under the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy. 30
The Court expresses its stern disapproval of the conduct in these cases of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City which reveals at the very least a
lack of conscientiousness in the discharge of its duties. The informations
appear to have been filed in haste, without first insuring the necessary
evidence to support them. The prosecution witnesses repeatedly failed to
appear at the scheduled hearings and all the prosecution did was to
perfunctorily move for a resetting, without exerting earnest efforts to secure
their attendance. In the end, it moved for the "provisional" dismissal of the
cases without realizing, because it had not studied the matter more carefully,
that such dismissal would have the effect of barring their reinstatement.
Characteristically, it was also non-committal on the motion to revive the cases
filed by the prosecution witnesses only, thereby surrendering, by its own
silence, its authority in conducting the prosecution.
It is possible that as a result of its in attention, the petitioner has been
needlessly molested if not permanently stigmatized by the unproved charges.
The other possibility, and it is certainly worse, is that a guilty person has been
allowed to escape the penalties of the law simply because he may now validly
claim the protection of double jeopardy. In either event, the responsibility
clearly lies with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City for its
negligence and ineptitude.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the
respondent court dated May 20, 1986, and the orders of the trial court dated
May 18, 1984, and October 9, 1984, are SET ASIDE. The dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. C-16411(81) and C-16412(81) is hereby declared as
final.
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Secretary of Justice.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990
WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor, Department
of Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE
HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty."
Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released
from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).
Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The
testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up
twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 75,
Rollo).

On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order No. 8 dated September promulgated by the Military Commission finding five (5) of the accused
27, 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try namely:
and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be
referred to them." 1. Luis Tan

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, 2. Ang Tiat Chuan
"exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over
violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related 3. Mariano Velez, Jr.
to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of
the Republic. 4. Antonio Occaciones, and

In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . 5. Leopoldo Nicolas
. . as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and twenty-one
Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the (21) days, to twenty (20) years.
jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable
by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and
the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM, and was sentenced to suffer the
jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).
Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the
public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive Eight (8) of the accused, namely:
jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa.
1. Oscar Yaun
On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested
and charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 entitled, "People of the Philippines 2. Enrique Labita
vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military
Commission No. 1, for the crimes of: 3. Eusebio Tan

(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed 4. Alfonso Tan
firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of 5. Go E Kuan
Florentino Lim of tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and
6. William Tan (petitioner herein)
(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45
SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in 7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and
relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.
8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)
The accused were:
were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).
1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc
On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and
2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana abolished the military tribunals and commissions.

3. Mariano Velez, Jr. On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military
Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered
4. Antonio Occaciones on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al.
and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction,
5. Leopoldo Nicolas even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal
offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open
6. Enrique Labita and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. This Court
declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to try
7. Oscar Yaun civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:

8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the
accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be
9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping entitled to, among others, a trial. The trial contemplated by the due process
clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by
10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge judicial process, not by executive or military process, Military commissions or
tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within the
11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak Philippine judicial system. ...

12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga xxx xxx xxx

13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the
Government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided
14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong by the legislature for the President as Commander in-Chief to aid him in
properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing discipline therein, and
15. Manuel Beleta, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized military representatives.
Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing
16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition). constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power
and the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be
(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.) considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is
not, and it cannot be the function of the Executive Department, through the
Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President military authorities. And as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and
Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce are regularly functioning, as they do so today and as they did during the period
Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
defendants' lawyers) to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are
was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of Supplemental/Amended properly cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a
Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were detained without bail in the violation of the constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned.
P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, 158-160.)

Page 79 of 129

In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas
corpus petitions were filed in this Court by some 217 prisoners 1 in the
national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by
the military commissions during the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R.
Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled
Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700).
The petitioners asked the Court to declare unconstitutional General Order No.
8 creating the military tribunals, annul the proceedings against them before
these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil courts where their right to due
process may be accorded respect.
Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160
SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political
detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their
offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by
martial rule.
The Court —
(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of
those of some who had fully served their sentences, or had been acquitted, or
had been granted amnesty;
(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and
still serving the sentences meted to them by the military courts, but, without
ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of the
decision reads:
Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners Virgilio
Alejandrino, 2 Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres
Parado, Daniel Campus, 3 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, 4
are concerned. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to
effect the immediate release of the abovementioned petitioners, unless there
are other legal causes that may warrant their detention.
The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William
Lorenzana, Benigno Bantolino, Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte,
Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo
Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca, Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera,
Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio Urbano, Sofronio Galo,
Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin Rosendo I. Ramos Pacifico
Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito Lorana who are all
military personnel.
As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO
FILE the necessary informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction
over the offenses involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice
of this decision, without prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence
submitted by the parties and admitted by the Military Commission. If eventually
convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention shall be credited in their
favor.
The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO
CONDUCT with dispatch the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the
grant of bail which may be initiated by the accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et
al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-712.)
On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued
Department Order No. 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to
collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the
investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the
evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent
jurisdiction" (Annex C, Petition). On November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor
Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in hell of the
regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).
Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on
December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2)
informations for:
1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824;
and
2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15
original defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 including those who had
already died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)
The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:
this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court Order in the case of
Cruz, et al. vs. Ponce Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862
and 80565 as all accused are detained 6 except those that are already dead.
(p. 7, Rollo.)
He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p.
8, Rollo). Later, he increased the recommended bail to P140,000 for each
accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case
(Crim. Case No. 88-825), he recommended that the bail be increased to
Page 80 of 129
P250,000 for each of the accused, except Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, and
Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on October
28, 1988, he recommended no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9, Rollo) because
of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1) prize or reward; and (2)
use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City,
were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo.
Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued
an order on October 26, 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit
certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever
they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the
above-entitled cases, within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order (Annex
F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order for, as a
matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the criminal cases
against the herein petitioners and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case
No. MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none of
them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs. Enrile habeas
corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).
On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed
this petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in Crim.
Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated
October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any other
prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and
trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because they had already
been acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No.
MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).
On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition
for being premature as:
... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid
informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E)
whose annulment they seek from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure). The filing in the lower court of such motion is the plain,
speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners. The existence of that remedy
(which they have not yet availed of) bars their recourse to the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of
Court (p. 41, Rollo.)
Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court
that the lower court had issued warrants for their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we
issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the
respondents from implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them to
comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).
The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction
and gravely abused his discretion in reprosecuting them upon the supposed
authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:
1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of
informations by the Secretary of Justice against THOSE who, like the
petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the
period of martial law.
2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners
who were not parties in that case, who were not heard, and over whom the
court did not acquire jurisdiction.
3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to
protection against double jeopardy.
4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they
had been acquitted by the military tribunal which the State itself had clothed
with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State
may not retroactively divest of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and
acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).
5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court
that acquitted the petitioners would amount to an ex post facto ruling (p. 81,
Rollo, Supplemental Petition).
6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is
null and void because it was filed without a prior preliminary investigation, nor
a finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State
Prosecutor (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).
In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios
disclosed that the information in Criminal Case No. 88-824 for illegal
possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing
on January 27, 1988" (should be 1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for
dropping the charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito, the gunman
who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by the Military
Commission, is already dead-possibly executed. Hence, only the information
for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve (12)
others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37,
Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of the petitioners on the ground that it
will not constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the
military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from attaching,
thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same reason, res judicata is not
applicable. Neither prescription, because "it had been interrupted by the filing
of the earlier charge sheets with the Military Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings
involving civilians before a military commission were null and void because we
ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians,
hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-
prosecution for the same crime before a civil court (p. 102, Rollo).
The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their
discretion and acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing
the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz
vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions
against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by Military Commission
No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz
vs. Enrile, for the decision therein will be searched in vain for such authority to
reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much less those
who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the
petitioners Tan, et al. herein.
The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and
injustice unless given a limited application only to the parties/petitioners
therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings against
themselves and prayed for a retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases
against them. They alone are affected by the judgment in Cruz vs. Enrile, not
all and sundry who at one time or another had been tried and sentenced by a
court martial during the period of martial law.
Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in
a cause do not prejudice those who were not parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a
cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a case shall not
adversely affect persons who were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano
vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this court's pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile
nullifying the proceedings in military courts against the civilian petitioners
therein and ordering the refiling of informations against them in the proper civil
courts, may not affect the rights of persons who were not parties in that case
and who, not having submitted to the court's jurisdiction, did not have their day
in court (Busacay vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their reprosecution,
based on the decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took no part and were
not heard, would be violative of their right to due process, the same right of the
petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that this Court endeavored to protect when it
nullified the proceedings against them in the military tribunals by applying the
Olaguer doctrine that the trial of civilians by military process was not due
process. 7
There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the
Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs. Enrile which needs to be rectified. For, although
the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners who were
still serving their sentences after conviction by the military courts and
commissions, and we directed the Secretary of Justice to file the necessary
informations against them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the court
martial proceedings against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had finished
serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3) had been
acquitted by the military courts. We did not order their reprosecution, retrial,
and resentencing by the proper civil courts. We set them free.
In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by
the military courts and were still serving their sentences, and another rule for
those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their
sentences. The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group
(whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the proper civil courts)
and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court ordered to
be released from custody).
In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in
principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing
or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be
no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,
rendered by military courts against civilians before the promulgation of the
Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State.
Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that
there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the
nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the
violation of the constitutional rights of the accused, and not on the Olaguer
doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released
since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which
sentenced him to death without receiving evidence in his defense. It would be
a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for
reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been
accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already been
acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and
commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a military
court, much less those who were acquitted and released, desires to undergo
the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed,
why should one who has accepted the justness of the verdict of a military
court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his
sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil
court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier
penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted the second time around,
Page 81 of 129
it would be small comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the
completion of his second trial which may take as long as, if not longer than,
the sentence he has been serving or already served.
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals
and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which
were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise
of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored.
The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of
those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which
occurred long before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now
prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus, did this Court
rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question
arose as to whether the declaration of nullity of the creation of a municipality
by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government thus
abolished:
In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is
not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.' Accordingly, he held that bonds issued by a board of
commissioners created under an invalid statute were unenforceable.
Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the
acts done by the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate
powers are a nullity because the executive order is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed.' For the existence of
Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact which cannot justly be ignored.' As
Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
State Bank:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording
no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private
and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of
public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous
application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal,
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot be justified.
There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation
of the executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling
many an act done in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that
municipality. (Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the
petitioners and their co-accused before Military Commission No. 1. The
principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over
civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the
particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no
serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the
jurisdiction of the military commission that heard and decided the charges
against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court
(Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the
Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information
against the petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not
in constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the
strong arm of the State:
The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for
any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment,
enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either
to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is
a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-
producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison
grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever
it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines,
2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)
Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the military commission in their particular case by
retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had
exercised over them would amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in
sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory. An ex-post facto law or rule, is
one which —
1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed;
4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense;
5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and,
6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., 35
SCRA 428, 431)
Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an
ex post facto law or bill of attainder.
We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information
against them is invalid because there was no preliminary investigation, no
finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of
the information by the City Fiscal before it was filed.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge
the petitioners from the information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The
temporary restraining order which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby
made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Lorenzo G. Parungao for accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27
February 1989 with Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of
the National Capital Judicial Region, accused-appellant was charged for
violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended, committed as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of February 1989 in Kalookan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without any lawful motive or purpose, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one .38
cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live
ammunitions without authority of law, which firearm was used with treachery
and evident premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which
caused death.1
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989.2
Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for
the parties.
In a decision promulgated on 30 June 1989,3 the court a quo found accused-
appellant guilty and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused
EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to
suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo
Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of
P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and to
pay the costs.
Page 82 of 129
According to the trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the death penalty, the
sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of P.D. 1866, as amended",
should have been imposed.
On 5 July 1989 Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision4
which, however, was denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989.5 On
17 August accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.6 Hence, the case is
now before Us.
The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows:
That at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 24, 1989, while she
and her husband were sleeping inside their house, they were awakened by the
loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened the door and they saw that the
person who was knocking was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her
husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside
their house; once inside their house, accused sat down and the two (accused
and victim) exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun
to her husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her
husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from the two,
however, when she looked back to the place where her husband and the
accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five minutes later
and/or after she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused
knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally
shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya"
she got scared by the appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains
so she pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law
Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded to the house of the accused;
thereat, they saw the victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's
pulse and when she still felt some warmth on his body, she sought help that
her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by helping
them in carrying the victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps,
he changed his mind and put down the victim; accused reasoned out that the
victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's
help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich, some of her
neighbors arrived bringing with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen
arrived and so she caused the arrest of the accused; she spent about
P100,000.00 in connection with burial and wake of her husband.
Pat. Orlando Valencia of the Kalookan Police Force on the witness stand
testified that on February 24, 1989 in line with his duty as policemen, a
shooting incident was reported to him; he responded to the said report by
proceeding to the crime scene, thereat, he saw the lifeless body of the victim
as well as the accused whose clothing was full of bloodstains; the cadaver of
the victim was referred to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory
(PCCL) while the person of the accused was turned over to the Homicide
Section of the Kalookan City Police Station; the day after, at around 10:00
o'clock in the evening and upon instruction of Pfc. Alilam he together with
some Kalookan policemen accompanied the accused in retrieving the firearm
(Exh. "F") whom the accused threw at the grassy area particularly at the back
of the latter's house; aside from the firearm they also recovered two (2) spent
bullets (Exh. G-6 and G-7) and three live ammunitions (Exh. G-12, G-13 and
G-14).
NBI Ballistician Ernie Magtibay testified that he has been a ballistician of the
NBI since 1984; that pertinent to this case, he happened to examine a caliber
.38 Squires Bingham with serial number 180169 (Exh. "F"); that as per his
findings the evidence shells (Exhs. G-6 and G-7) were fired from the gun,
subject matter of this case.
Forensic chemist from the NBI Edwin Purificando testified that the paraffin test
he conducted on the dorsal aspect of the left and light hands, that is, from the
wristbones to the fingertips, of the deceased, gave negative result on the
presence of nitrates (Exh. "I"). Likewise, the paraffin test he conducted on the
dorsal aspects of the left hand and right hand of the accused yielded negative
results on the presence of nitrates (Exh. "J").
On the other hand, the version of the defense as testified to by the accused is
as follows:
That at about 11:30 in the evening of February 24, 1989 accused on his way
home, after coming from his work, passed by the house of his Pareng Nardo,
the victim herein; while passing infront of the said house, his Pareng Nardo
called him up; when he was about to enter the door of the house of the victim,
the latter, from the back of the door, poked a gun at him; he grabbed the gun
from his Pareng Nardo and at that instance, Rosalina Bolima emerging from
her room, saw him holding the gun; he returned the gun to his Pareng Nardo
and the latter tucked it in his waistline; he was served with a beer and after he
and the victim consumed about two bottles of beer, they went out to buy some
more; after they were able to buy some more bottles of beer, victim carried the
same and left ahead of the accused; accused was left behind to answer the
call of nature; while in the act of urinating, he heard two successive gunshots;
he followed the victim and he saw the latter already sprawled on the ground;
he inquired from his Pareng Nardo as to what had happened to him, "Pareng
Nardo, ano ang nangyari sa iyo? and the victim's replied (sic) was "Pare,
binaril ako", he further inquired as to who shot him but the victim who was
gasping for breath could no longer talk; thereafter, he saw a gun near the body
of his Pareng Nardo; moved by his desire to bring the said gun to the wife of
the victim, he picked the same, but after he got hold of the gun, he suddenly
realized that the policemen might see him holding it, so he threw the very
same gun to the grassy area; he then ran towards the house of the victim and
he informed the wife of the latter that his Pareng Nardo was shot to death; he
returned to the place where he left the body of the victim but the body of the
latter was no longer there; he later found out that townspeople carried the
body of the victim towards the main road; when the policemen arrived he was
ordered to go with them at the Kalookan Police Headquarters; when he was
asked by the policemen as to who shoot (sic) the victim, his answer was, he
did not see the actual shooting incident; never did he declare nor utter before
her Mareng Lina or before any police authorities that he accidentally shoot
(sic) the victim. However, he admitted that it was him who accompanied the
policemen in retrieving the fatal gun at the grassy area at the back of his
house.
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied
on circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to present an
eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting incident. It
considered the following circumstances which it deemed sufficient to convict
the accused-appellant pursuant to Rule 133, Section 5, of the Revised Rules
of Court:
The following are among the circumstances which points to the culpability of
the accused.
1) That the widow of the victim saw the accused holding a gun
immediately before shooting incident happened;
2) That accused was the last person seen in the company of the
victim immediately before the latter was shot to death;
3) That it was the accused who purposely went to the house of the
victim on that fatal evening; The testimony of the accused that he was merely
passing in front of the house of the victim when the latter who was standing at
the window of his house called him up is less credible than the testimony of
the widow of the victim, that they were already aslept (sic) inside their house
when or the aforesaid time accused knocked at their door.
4) That it was the accused who guided the policemen as to the place
where the fatal gun was recovered. Here the Court believes that the gun was
purposely hid at the grassy area at the back portion of accused's house. The
story of the accused that he picked the gun for the purpose of bringing it to the
widow of the victim but for fear that the policemen might see him holding the
gun, he then decided to throw it to the place where it was recovered, was too
flimsy to merit belief. Firstly, what is his reason for bringing it to the widow of
the victim when he surely knew fully well that it will be the policemen who will
investigate the case. Secondly, he knew for a fact, that the said gun could lead
as to the identity of the assailant of the victim, why then he threw it at the
grassy area when he could easily leave the same to the place where he
picked it up.
5) The testimony of the wife that after hearing two successive
gunshots, accused went back to her house and informed there (sic) that he
accidentally shot her husband deserves merit, Besides, the Court sees no
reason for the wife to concoct such story that would point to the accused as
the culprit specially so that had not the accused became (sic) the prime
suspect in this case, he would be the best person to be used as a prosecution
witness, with more reason that from the evidence presented, it appears that
the widow of the victim harbours no ill-feeling towards the accused otherwise,
she would have prevented accused accused's entry in her house on that fatal
evening.
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the
shooting incident took place admitted to her having accidentally shoot (sic) the
victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant since this is
covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae — Statement made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior tor (sic) subsequent thereto
with respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of
res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
7) The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and
that it is but (sic) the accused (sic) who owns the same and in fact the latter
even tucked it in his waistline immediately before the shooting incident
happened is improbable, for, how come then that the assailant was able to
drew (sic) the gun from the waistline of the victim and fired (sic) the same
towards the back portion of the victim's body. Is it not that the natural reaction
of a person was to face the person who suddenly and without permission drew
something from one's waistline. (sic)
While there is no eyewitness who testified to having seen accused shoot (sic)
the victim, yet all the foregoing circumstances meet the criteria set by Sec. 5,
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, and therefore points
(sic) to the accused as the person who unlawfully owns the fatal gun as well
as the same person who shoot (sic) to death the victim. "Circumstantial (sic)
evidence is admissible in the absence of an eyewitness to the commission of
the crime" (People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 125 [1983]).
The Court does not give credence to the denial of the accused that he was not
the one who shoot (sic) the victim as he was some distance away from the
victim answering the call of nature when the victim was killed. Instead, the
Court gives credence to the testimony of the widow that it was the accused
whom he saw in possession of the gun, that it was the accused who was the
last person seen in the company of the victim shortly before the latter died and
Page 83 of 129
it was the same accused who lead (sic) the policemen in retrieving the fatal
gun.
Admittedly, as per findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist, the accused's right
and left hand yielded negative result to the test of nitrates. However, the same
witness testified that even when a person fired gun, it does not necessarily
follows (sic) that his hand would be positive to the test of nitrates, as there are
still several factors which affects the presence or absence of nitrates in the
hands of a person.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the fact of death of the victim (Exh. "E") is undisputed, still the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident
premeditation being alleged in the Information, must be proven like the crime
itself.
To properly appreciate evident premeditation it is necessary to establish with
proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself (1) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that
the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time to
reflect upon the consequence of his act (People vs. Lorenzo, 132 SCRA 17
(1984); People vs. Obengue, 147 SCRA 1987). Although alleged in the
Information, the record of this case is bereft of any indication that evident
premeditation attended the killing of the victim.
However, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is appreciated in this case
since its presence could be established by the position/location of the wound
of the victim, that is at the back portion of his torso which necessarily imply
that he was treacherously shot by his assailant.7
Accused-appellant assigns only one error in this appeal:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION WITH MURDER
AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. 1866. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCES RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT IN ITS JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.8
and prays that the decision appealed from be reversed and another be
entered acquitting him.
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant submits that:
(a) Contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, he was not the one
holding the gun immediately before the shooting incident, for as admitted by
the victim's wife, her husband also "toyed or played with the gun;9
(b) The testimony of the victim's wife that he was the last person seen
in the company of the victim is unrealiable because she was left in the house
when the victim and accused-appellant went out to the store which is about
145 to 150 meters away;
(c) That the accused-appellant pointed the place where the gun
allegedly used in the killing was recovered, should not create the unfavorable
inference that he purposely hid the gun and should not be taken against him,
for knowing the reputation of police authorities, what he did was dictated by
the instinct of self-preservation rather than guilt;
(d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two
successive gunshots accused-appellant went back to her house and informed
her that he accidentally shot her husband, should not have been considered
by the trial court as part of the res gestae; and
(e) The "raciocination" of the trial court regarding the improbability of
the testimony of accused-appellant that he does not own the gun but that it
was the deceased who owned it which the latter tucked in his waistline before
the shooting incident is baseless as the records show that the deceased was
walking ahead of the accused-appellant who was left behind to answer a call
of nature; therefore, it is not highly improbable that some other person whom
the deceased might have met in the street could have taken the gun from the
waistline and shot him with it. It would not also be highly improbable that a
person from whose waistline a gun was grabbed could not face his assailant
especially when he is carrying something with his both hands, like the
deceased who was carrying one case of Gold Eagle beer when he was shot
at. Moreover, accused-appellant was found negative for nitrates when a
paraffin test was conducted on him by a forensic chemist of the NBI.10
The People, in its Brief filed by the Solicitor General on 18 April 1990,
disagrees with the accused-appellant, maintains that the prosecution was able
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and prays that subject decision
be affirmed in toto. It stresses that accused-appellant himself admitted and
confirmed that he and the victim went out together to buy some more bottles of
beer; he was with the victim after they bought the beer, and they separated
only when he had the urge to urinate seconds before the incident. The widow
did not testify that she saw what happened in the street; what she testified was
that the accused and the victim went out together and five minutes later she
heard two shots. There was, therefore, nothing improbable about her
testimony.
Appellee likewise contends that the conclusion of the trial court on the hiding
of the gun was based on the evidence on record; the accused himself testified
that he threw the gun on a grassy area. It further argues that the conclusion of
the court on the improbability of appellant's testimony concerning the
ownership of the gun is not baseless; on the contrary, it is the theory of the
appellant that it is probable that another person may have grabbed the gun
from the victim that is highly improbable. Since appellant was behind the victim
he could have seen a third person grabbing the gun. He did not testify that he
saw one. The negative result of the paraffin test cannot be singled out to
absolve the accused-appellant from liability.11
No Reply-Brief was filed.
We are now called upon to determine whether, on the basis of the evidence
adduced, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed or the accused-
appellant be acquitted.
We shall first focus our attention on the law under which accused-appellant is
indicted.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm,
ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing
that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the penalty of death shall be imposed."
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized
in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It
does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the
offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious
crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a
statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the
qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter
violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally
affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed
and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine then, the killing of a person with the
use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a)
violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused
cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against
double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special
law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal
Code.
In People vs. Domiguez,12 We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked
only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend
against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if
one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other
does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one
does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy
as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.13
In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine
gun which caused public panic among the people present and physical injuries
to one, informations for physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for
serious public disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was
convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of
double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple
act may be an offense against two different provisions of law and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an
acquittal or conviction under one does not bar prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offense –– the first against a person
and the second against public peace and order — one cannot be pleaded as a
bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty under Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 because of the resulting crime of homicide or murder, the
prosecution must allege in the information and prove by the quantum of
evidence required for conviction violation of said section and, more
specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the commission of homicide
or murder. In this regard, the information in this case is sufficient in form and
substance. It alleges illegal possession of a firearm and of murder, The latter
is covered by the clause "which firearm was used with treachery and evident
premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused his
death.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a quo that more than
one circumstantial evidence were duly proved and that these circumstances
point, beyond reasonable doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot
and killed the deceased Leonardo Bolima y Mesia. For circumstantial evidence
to be sufficient to convict an accused, it is necessary that the following
requisites must be satisfied: (a) there must be more than one circumstance,
Page 84 of 129
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt.14 Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment
of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of
all others, as the guilty person,15 i.e., the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that
of guilty.16
The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly
established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and
killed the victim. We do not, however, agree with the additional observation of
the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by
the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim immediately after the shooting
incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res
gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant case. Statements as
part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule
is that a witness "can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his own
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions.17
Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he heard other persons say
about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One of them is statements as part
of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to
be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be
deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal
act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance may also be received
as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim
is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told her, not what
any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-
appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res gestae, which
he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement
allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg that "we killed him"
(referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her
testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession" and not part of the
res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the
alleged statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from
questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the
testimony was given. The transcript of the stenographic notes of the testimony
of Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima, wife of the victim, clearly shows the
absence of an objection, thus:
Atty. Villano:
You said when you turned your back after taking a few steps and when you
turned your back, they were no longer there, will you please tell what
happened after that?
A And that was when they left it was 11:30 and when he came back
11:35 he was already knocking (referring to the person of the accused) telling
me while he was knocking: "Mare, mare nabaril ko si pare, hindi ko
sinasadya."
Q By the way Mrs. Witness, who is that "pare" you are telling us?
A Troping, sir (as the witness pointed to).
Q The same Troping here, is your "kumpare"?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, April 18,1989, p. 13).
The seventh circumstance mentioned by the court below is haphazardly
formulated. Something is wrong with the opening clause reading:
The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and that it is but
the accused who owns the same and in fact the latter even tucked it.
The words but the accused should have been the deceased.
Two more basic issues are left for determination, to wit: whether the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is
liable for illegal possession of firearms and whether the killing was attended by
the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation as alleged
in the information.
Our painstaking review of the records and the evidence fails to disclose that
the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant
was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. And,
contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no sufficient evidence to
prove the presence of treachery.
It must be stated, however, that had illegal possession of firearms been duly
proven as alleged, it would not have mattered whether the killing was simple
homicide or murder since Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 expressly provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
which penalty, however, had been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua
in view of the abolition of the death penalty.18
The issue concerning the failure of the prosecution to prove that he had no
authority to possess the firearm has not been raised in this appeal.
Interestingly, accused-appellant raised it in his motion to reconsider the
decision of the trial court.19 In its resolution denying the motion, the trial court
admitted, in effect, that the prosecution did not offer any evidence to prove that
the accused-appellant had no license to possess or carry the firearm in
question; it however, threw the burden on the accused-appellant to prove that
he has that authority. Thus, it ruled:
Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute
which is not in the enacting clause by which the offense is described and
forbidden, he has the burden of proving that he is within the exception.
Where the subject matter of a negative averment in the information, or a fact
relied upon by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to him personally
or otherwise lie peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the
burden of proof of such averment or fact is on him (16 C.J. sec. 998, p. 530).
An illustrative case of this rule may be found in prosecution for exercising a
trade or profession, or doing other acts, without a license. In such cases, it
would greatly inconvenience the prosecution to prove that the defendant had
no license, whereas the defendant could easily prove that he did have one.
In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the
negative averments in the information to the effect that the accused possesses
the firearms without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the
accused who is called upon to prove that he possesses the license. In other
words, the fact relied upon by the accused as a justification or excuse being
one that is related to him personally or otherwise within his peculiar
knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or
fact is on the accused" (Francisco, Handbook on Evidence, pp. 379-380, 1984
Ed., citing cases).20
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 reads:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire,
dispose, or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery,
tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any
firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
penalty of death shall be imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor.
Undoubtedly, there is unlawful possession under the foregoing section if one
does not have the license to possess the firearm. Even if he has the license,
he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority
therefor. It follows then that the lack or absence of a license is an essential
ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must allege and prove. Every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved.21
In People vs. Pajenado, L-27680-81, 27 February 1970,22 We said:
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA
758 could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent upon a person
charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a
license to possess the firearm, but we are of the considered opinion that under
the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that
in criminal cases the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on the
prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be
proven if "it is an essential ingredient of the offense charged", the burden of
proof was with the prosecution in to case to prove that the firearm used by
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The information
filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R.
No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no "license or permit to possess"
the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the
Page 85 of 129
prosecution's duty not merely to allege that negative fact but to prove it. This
view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303,
the accused was charged with "having criminally inscribed himself as a voter
knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a voter. It was
there held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an
essential element of the crime charged and should be proved by the
prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where the
accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he had
diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain
patients from whom he received monetary compensation, without having
previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of
Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of the Administrative Code,
this Court held that if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance,
the act of voting without the qualifications provided by law is an essential
ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving
the same, although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the
prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima facie case
from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and
the Solicitor General agree that there was not even a prima facie case upon
which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former
Chief Justice Moran upholds this view as follows:
The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of
proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party making the averment of
the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be
assumed to have acquired some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not
have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for
doing an act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a
license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it had acquired
no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-
existence of such license can, with more facility, be adduced by the defendant,
it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to
prove the allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one
which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the accused prima facie
evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus
upon him. (6 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8).
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the
firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a
firearm. The trial court then committed an error in holding the accused-
appellant guilty thereof. However, as above-stated, the accused-appellant did
not touch this issue in his Brief. Be that as it may, the rule is well-settled that
an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes
the review of the penalty, indemnity and the damages involved.23
In People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702, 708, We ruled:
. . . In a criminal case, an appeal to the Supreme Court throws the whole case
open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as
may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the
subjects of assignments of error or not. (People vs. Ofindo, 47 Phil. 1).
Accordingly, it is proper for this Court to consider in favor of the accused-
appellant the absence of proof of illegal possession of a firearm. But, may
accused-appellant be convicted for murder under the information for which he
was tried? The answer is in the affirmative since, as We stated earlier, the
information sufficiently alleges the commission of murder; hence, a conviction
for murder, if warranted by the facts, can be had under the information.24 If
murder is not proved by reason of the absence of any qualifying circumstance,
conviction for the lesser crime of homicide is also proper.25
We are also unable to agree with the trial court that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was duly established.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make, which means that no
opportunity was given to the latter to do so.26 It cannot be presumed; it must
be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing
itself.27 For, as held in U.S. vs. Perdon28 where no particulars are known as
to the manner in which the aggression was made or how the act which
resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be
established from mere suppositions, drawn from circumstances prior to the
very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with
treachery.29 Accordingly, treachery cannot be considered where the lone
witness did not see the commencement of the assault.30
In People vs. Manalo, supra, We ruled:
The fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does
not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. Such a finding must be based on
some positive proof and not merely an inference drawn more or less logically
from hypothetical facts. This Court has ruled that the suddenness of an attack
is not, of itself, enough to constitute treachery when the method of the killing
does not positively show that the assailant thereby knowingly intended to
ensure the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself from any
defense which the victim might put up. In other words, to sustain a finding of
treachery, the means, method or form of attack must be shown to have been
deliberately adopted by the appellant. (citing People vs. Carsano, 95 SCRA
146; People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 185; People vs. Satone, 74 SCRA 106;
People vs. Bongo, 55 SCRA 547).

In People vs. Ablao, 183 SCRA 65, 669, We said:
There being no direct evidence on how the shooting was committed, treachery
cannot be appreciated.
In the instant case, no witness who could have seen how the deceased was
shot was presented.1âwphi1 Absent the quantum of evidence required to
prove it, treachery cannot be considered against the accused-appellant.
Accordingly, accused-appellant could only be liable for HOMICIDE, which is
punished by RECLUSION TEMPORAL. It shall be imposed in its medium
period, whose duration is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and
4 months, since neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances had been
proved.31
The Indeterminate Sentence Law benefits the accused-appellant. Applying it in
this case, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight
years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight
months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased from
P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 conformably with our ruling in People vs. Sison,
G.R. No. 86455, 14 September 1990 and in People vs. Sazon, G.R. No.
89684, 18 September 1990.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision
of the trial court, and as Modified, FINDING the accused-appellant EUTROPIO
TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, for the killing of Leonardo Bolima, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is hereby SENTENCED to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment ranging from EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY of prision
mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN YEARS, EIGHT MONTHS AND ONE
DAY of reclusion temporal as Maximum, with the accessory penalties therefor,
to INDEMNIFY the heirs of Leonardo Bolima in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to REIMBURSE said heirs in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P50,000.00) as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial of Leonardo
Bolima.
Accused-appellant shall be given full credit for the period of his preventive
imprisonment.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 95642 May 28, 1992
AURELIO G. ICASIANO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
J.C. Baldoz & Associates for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Romana Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987
with the Supreme court against then acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of
Naic, Cavite, herein petitioner Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. for grave abuse of
authority, manifest partiality and incompetence. 1
The administrative complaint arose from two (2) orders of detention dated 18
and 27 November 1986 issued by the said acting judge against complainant
(Magbago) for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply
with a fifth alias writ of execution.
After evaluating the allegations of the complaint, respondent's comment
thereon and the Court Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court
dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc
resolution dated 2 February 1988. 2
Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, complainant Magbago also filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman the same letter-complaint earlier filed with the Supreme
Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]). The complaint with the
Ombudsman was docketed as TBP-87-00924.
After considering respondent Judge Icasiano's answer, in a resolution dated 7
April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended
Page 86 of 129
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was
approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. It
appears from the records of the Tanodbayan, which were forwarded to the
Supreme Court, upon order of the Court in connection with this case, that the
resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988.
The Solicitor General's memorandum in the present case (p. 3, par. 2) states
that the office of the Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same
Romana Magbago (complainant in TBP-87-00924) which was docketed this
time as TBP-87-01546. The exact date of filing of the second complaint is not
stated but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to
the then newly created office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the
transmitted records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-
87-00924.
Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the
case (TBP-87-01546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-
87-00924, because the following transpired in TB-87-01546:
1. Preliminary investigation.
2. Petitioner (Icasiano, Jr.) appeared on 7 November 1989 and asked
for 5 days to file counter affidavit; however no such counter-affidavit was filed.
3. The Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court of Naic, Cavite was
summoned to testify on the contempt proceedings held before said court.
4. A resolution of the investigator dated 30 January 1990 was issued
recommending the filing of the information.
5. A memorandum dated 5 March 1990 of Special Prosecution
Officer III Jane Aurora L. Lantion adopted the recommendation of the
investigator.
The corresponding information against herein petitioner was thereafter filed
with the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Criminal Case No. 14563.
After said information was filed on 21 March 1990, petitioner (as accused) filed
a motion for reinvestigation which resulted in the issuance of two (2) separate
resolutions from the respondent Sandiganbayan, namely, resolution dated 9
May 1990, reading:
Considering that the "MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION" filed by accused
Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr., which, among other things indicates that he has
been exonerated by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-87-
81 filed by the complaining party herein against the accused, the Prosecution
is given fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof to indicate if the judicial act or
acts complained of have been taken to a superior court for review (and the
resolution thereof, if any) as well as whether or not the Supreme Court
Resolution dated February 2, 1988 in the above mentioned administrative
matter had already resolved the issue at bar, considering that the question of
evidence required therein cannot be greater than in criminal cases such as
that initiated by the instant information.
and Order dated 21 May 1990, reading:
It appearing that the prosecution is still to submit its comment on this Court's
Resolution requiring a review and affirmation of the alleged exoneration of the
accused herein by the Supreme Court which exoneration, if true, would put at
very serious doubt the prosecution of this case against him, by agreement of
the parties, the arraignment of the accused is hereby reset for July 9, 1990, at
8:00 o'clock in the morning.
Special Prosecution Officer III Erdulfo Q. Querubin responded to the resolution
of 9 May 1990 with a Compliance/Manifestation dated 28 May 1990 stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That the records in the hands of the prosecution do not show any
indication that the judicial acts complained of have been taken to a superior
court for review;
2. That prosecution's records do not contain any document or paper
relative to A.M. No. MTJ-87-81, Romana Magbago vs. Judge Aurelio G.
Icasiano, Jr., Municipal Trial Court, Tanza, Cavite, except a xerox copy of the
Supreme Court's Resolution, dated February 2, 1988, which was attached to
copy (sic) of the Motion For Reinvestigation and Deferment of Arraignment,
dated May 8, 1990, furnished to the Office of the Deputy Special Prosecutor
on some date, and prosecution's information on the matter is limited to the text
of said resolution. 3
The petitioner's motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29 June 1990
resolution, of respondent court, which stated thus:
Both the accused and Atty. Jaime C. Baldos having received this Court's
Resolution dated May 29, 1990 before June 7, 1990 (when the registry notices
were received by this Court) or more than twenty-one (21) days ago, despite
which the accused had failed to present relevant papers and documents to
demonstrate action by the Supreme Court as (in) Administrative Matter MTJ
87-81 which would support his claims that the subject matter of this case has
been resolved by the Supreme Court in his favor, his motion for reinvestigation
is DENIED.

Petitioner then moved to quash the information on the following grounds:
1. that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the
resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case No. RTJ-87-81;
2. that there exists no valid cause of action as may be filed against
the accused;
3. that the Hon. Sandiganbayan cannot acquire valid jurisdiction over
the person of the accused and subject matter of this instant case. 4
Denying the motion to quash, the Sandiganbayan held:
Judge Aurelio Icasiano, Jr.'s Motion to Quash dated July 16, 1990 is denied.
The Supreme Court's resolution in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-87-81
lodged by the same complaining person, Romana Magbago, whether of
exoneration or conviction, even if evidence beyond reasonable doubt is
required for conviction in said proceedings, cannot serve as basis for the
defense of double jeopardy because MTJ-87-81 remains an administrative
case and the instant proceeding is criminal. One is not a bar to the other.
In an administrative matter against a deputy clerk of court of a Court of First
Instance and a clerk thereat for shortages in the collection of court fees, the
Supreme Court said, ". . . It is clear that both respondents Armando Soriano
and Mila Tijam are still administratively and criminally liable (despite
restitution) for which they may still be prosecuted for malversation." (Office of
the Court Administrator vs. Soriano, 136 SCRA 461, 465, emphasis and words
in parenthesis supplied).
Necessarily, the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction over the criminal
action arising from the subject matter of the administrative case against the
accused since it is only the Sandiganbayan which may hear prosecutions for
the violation of R.A. No. 3019.
A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied; hence the present petition
relying on the sole ground that the respondent court acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to
quash the information, and that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Initially, a temporary restraining order was issued by this Court ordering the
Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal
case. 5 After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the view
that the distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings must be
upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other.
It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy
does not apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case
(against the herein petitioner) was administrative in character while the
Sandiganbayan case also against said petitioner is criminal in nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or any of the
personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator,
imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies.
Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules.
Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the
same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the
following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. 6 All these elements do not apply vis-a-vis the
administrative case, which should take care of petitioner's contention that said
administrative case against him before the Supreme Court, which was, as
aforestated, dismissed, entitles him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in
the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. 7
The charge against petitioner Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for
grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having
issued two (2) orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago.
Ordinarily, complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of
detention in accordance with the Rules. It is only when in appellate court
reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or
incompetence be imputed to the judge. 8 Here no appeal from the questioned
orders of the issuing judge (petitioner Icasiano) was taken: instead,
administrative and criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing the
orders.
It is precisely for this reason, among others, that the administrative case
against petitioner was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit; and
yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that petitioner is not criminally liable
under R.A 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In
fact, the Ombudsman has found a prima facie case which led to the filing of
the information.
Page 87 of 129
We now recur to the fact that the Tanodbayan had earlier dismissed the
complaint against petitioner Judge Icasiano for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A.
3019. This was in TBP-87-00924. The case was dismissed for lack of merit on
14 April 1988. Because no motion to re-open or revive the case could be
found in the pleadings, a resolution of this Court dated 30 April 1991 required
the Office of the Ombudsman to submit the pertinent office memorandum
justifying the re-opening of a case which had already been dismissed and to
elevate the records to this Court.
The Ombudsman's compliance claims that it is not true that TBP-87-01546
was "reopened." "TBP-87-01546 was another case involving the same parties
and the same facts docketed separately from TBP-87-00924." 9
He further explained:
TBP-87-01546 was among the several cases transmitted to the then newly
created Office of the Ombudsman in line with the intention to relieve the
former Office of the Tanodbayan of some of its long-pending cases. The
record of TBP-87-01546 did not contain the resolution previously issued in
TBP-87-00924 which was approved by former Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales.
Upon the record of TBP-87-01546 being received in the Office of the
Ombudsman, it was assigned to Investigator Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr. for
appropriate action. Upon his recommendation, a preliminary investigation was
conducted with the respondent therein (herein petitioner Judge Icasiano, Jr.)
having been served with subpoena for the preliminary investigation scheduled
on November 7, 1989. Judge Icasiano affixed his signature to the said
subpoena and appeared at the hearing to ask for an extension of five (5) days
within which to file his counter-affidavit. Despite the extension granted him,
Judge Icasiano failed to file any counter-affidavit nor to call attention to the fact
that a similar case had earlier been dismissed by the former Office of the
Tanodbayan.
No memorandum justifying reopening of a case previously dismissed by the
Tanodbayan was submitted to this Court by the Office of the Ombudsman.
What was submitted is a memorandum dated 5 March 1990 signed by Jane
Aurora C. Lantion, Special Prosecution Officer III, which justifies the filing of
the information for violation of sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019 as amended, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
While there is no showing that a charge in writing or Petition for Contempt has
been filed against defendant Magbago before respondent's sala, records bear
out that petitions to declare defendant for Contempt have been previously filed
in Civil Case No. 404 on 10 February 1984, 13 June 1984 and 12 September
1984. There is no showing that these petitions have been acted upon by the
judges before whom the same were filed. This, plus the fact that the writs of
execution could not be enforced against defendant Magbago, could have been
the reasons for respondent's action herein complained of. Though the ends
may be justifiable, the means employed which contravene the requirements of
due process cannot put the imprimatur of legality to respondent's judicial
actuation subject of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
In any case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar
the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in
Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, 10 a
preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87-
00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches.
In Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 11 this Court also held:
Moreover, there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to conduct another
Preliminary investigation of a case under review by it (him). On the contrary,
under Presidential Decree No. 911, in relation to Rule 12, Administrative Order
No. VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon review, reverse the findings of the
investigator, and thereafter "where he finds a prima facie case, to cause the
filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same
sworn statements or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting
another preliminary investigation.
In the present controversy, it will be noted that a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in TBP-87-01546 to accord the
herein petitioner due process even if it could be argued that in TBP-87-01546,
the Ombudsman was merely reviewing the Tanodbayan's original dismissal of
the complaint in TBP-00924 (involving the same parties and the same facts),
and he could have filed the information even without a new preliminary
investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued
earlier is LIFTED; the Sandiganbayan is ordered to proceed with Criminal
Case No. 14563.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Nocon, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME MANUEL, respondents.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and the order of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated
February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for violation of
Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended.
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of
Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the
said section is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve
years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos. The
information against him reads:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu)
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)
During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter,
trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On
January 9, 1991, counsel for private respondent verbally manifested in open
court that private respondent was willing to change his former plea of "not
guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, R.A.
No. 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six
hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any pharmacist,
physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails
to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or
failure involves a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent Judge issued
an order (Annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private respondent to secure the
consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of
decision on January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge
postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, 1991 to give
private respondent another opportunity to secure the consent of the
prosecutor. Also, on the said date, the private respondent filed his Request to
Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge
issued another order (Annex "D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing the promulgation of
decision to February 25, 1991 to give private respondent further opportunity to
secure the consent of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor
filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex
"E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its
case on November 21, 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of private
respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong
evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the
prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991,
private respondent filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead
Guilty to a Lesser Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, among
other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific
period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
Subsequently, on February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision
granting the accused's motion, to wit:
It may well be appropriate at this time to state that the accused is not availing
of the "voluntary plea of guilt" as a mitigating circumstance envisioned under
Article 13, paragraph 7 of the Revised Penal Code. The accused simply wants
to avail of Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty. Fernando
Fernandez of the PAO, there is nothing in the said provision which requires
that the same be availed of prior to the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution. It is conceded though, as pointed out by the prosecution, that
such is a waste of time on the part of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
and of the Court, nonetheless, this Court, having in mind Section 2 of Rule 1
which provides that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding and also for humanitarian
considerations, hereby APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at bar.
Moreover, such an admission of guilt by the accused indicates his submission
to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform. (Vide: People vs.
Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966)
Let it be made of record however that the Court is not putting a premium on
the change of heart of the accused in mid-stream.
Page 88 of 129
WHEREFORE, finding the accused JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny
guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the crime of violation of Section 17, Article
III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, he is hereby sentenced to a straight
prison term of two (2) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, to pay a
fine of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be credited in full with the
period of his preventive imprisonment.
Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let
the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of
this case be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and be
turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of
according to law.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 24-25)
Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforestated
decision but the same was denied in the order of March 13, 1991, which
states:
It is the considered view of this Court that Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules
should not be interpreted to the letter in "victimless crimes" such as this case,
possession of regulated drugs, which is more of a "social disease" case so to
speak and in the light of (the) provision itself that "with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal." Is the fiscal the offended party?
Moreover as the records show, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not been
very consistent on this "lesser offense plea" thing. It would perhaps be in
consonance with justice that a guideline be laid down by the said Office, if only
to apprise the public, the Court and the accused on when said consent is to be
given by the fiscal as a matter of course and when it will be withheld. For to
leave the same undefined is in the mind of this Court, not conducive to a "just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 41-42)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A
LESSER OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST WAS FILED OUT OF TIME
AND THE CONSENT THERETO OF THE PROSECUTOR AND THE
OFFENDED PARTY WAS NOT OBTAINED.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN
CONVICTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE LESSER OFFENSE OF
VIOLATION OF SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425, AS AMENDED,
INSTEAD OF THE OFFENSE ORIGINALLY CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW, IN VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
CHANGE OF PLEA. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a temporary restraining order
to enjoin the respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment in the
aforesaid criminal case (Rollo, p. 86).
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to
court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or
some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence
than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made
during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still
permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. Thus,
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — The accused, with the consent
of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead
guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction
than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double jeopardy.
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under
the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but
is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court
(Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991, En Banc
Resolution).
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a
lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such
situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the
Prosecutor with yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA
437, 450), We held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution
does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-47462, February 28,
1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice Antonio Barredo explained clearly and
tersely the rationale of the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already rested, the only basis on which the
fiscal and the court could rightfully act in allowing the appellant to charge his
former plea of not guilty to murder to guilty to the lesser crime of homicide
could be nothing more nothing less than the evidence already in the record.
The reason for this being that Section 4 of Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116)
under which a plea for a lesser offense is allowed was not and could not have
been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining.
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait for a guideline from
the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to
change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or
against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the
prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of
the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to
disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Apparently,
the judgment under review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections (i.e.
waste of valuable time already spent by the court and prosecution) interposed
by the Fiscal which was the least persuasive. It must be recalled that the other
two grounds of objection were that the prosecution had already rested its case
and that the possibility of conviction of the private respondent of the crime
originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution.
Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent
judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of plea is improper and
irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the consent of the
fiscal is needed in crimes involving, violation of RA 6425 as amended because
there is no offended party to speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not
an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to
change his plea.
We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of
both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea
of guilty to a lesser offense (see Manuel v. Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The
reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67,
October 15, 1991). Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the proper
offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only
sustain the former (see People v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then
Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil.
393, 395-396).
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended party in crimes
under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts constituting the crimes are not
wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the
rights of others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the
integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People v. Ale, G.R. No.
70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58). Such pernicious effect is felt not
only by the addicts themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's
survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim
of the drug menace. The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As
guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who represents the
government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by crime,
to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the
offense (see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in this light, the
consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will have to be secured from the
Fiscal who acts in behalf of the government.
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that the private
respondent's change of plea and his conviction to the lesser offense of
violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as amended is no longer open to review
otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against double jeopardy given to the
accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court applies in cases where
both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the private respondent's
change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private respondent
cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable
provision is that found in Section 7, Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. —
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in
the former complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) ...;
(b) ...;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party;
Page 89 of 129
xxx xxx xxx
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be prosecuted under the
original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of
the lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e.,
the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was
irregular and improper.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment and order of
the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated
February 25 and March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D
(People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said
criminal case is hereby remanded to the trial court for continuation of trial on
the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended. The temporary restraining order issued in this case is made
permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 101557-58. April 28, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51,
PALAWAN, and LEONARDO SALDE, SR., LEONARDO SALDE, JR.,
FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDE-PANAGUITON, and JOJETA
PANAGUITON, respondent.
V. Dennis for petitioners.
Perfecto delos Reyes and Roberto delos Reyes for private respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
Jeopardy is the peril in which an accused is placed when put on trial before a
court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment or information which is
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. No person can be
twice put in this peril for the same offense. The Constitution prohibits it. Nemo
debet bis puniri pro uno delicto. This is the defense raised by accused-private
respondents after respondent Judge, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal,
ordered without notice and hearing the dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. 7396
and 7397 both for frustrated murder, which thereafter were reinstated upon
initiative of the Secretary of Justice and docketed anew as Crim: Cases Nos.
8572 and 8573.
It appears that on 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of
Puerto Princesa City filed Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 for frustrated
murder against accused Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita
Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring
together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting complainants, the spouses
Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking
him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area which
would have caused his death in Crim. Case No. 8572 (G.R. No. 101557), and
by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo which
would have caused her death in Crim. Case No. 8573 (G.R. No. 101558).
On 3 June 1988, accused Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita
Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all pleaded "not
guilty." On 2 August 1988, accused Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and
likewise entered a plea of "not guilty."
On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the
Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for the
suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the
accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal
Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor.
On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the
Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the
Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the
Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal of
the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that petitioner-
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the
accused only acted in self-defense.
On 9 February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the
Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of Crim. Cases
Nos. 7396 and 7397.
Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial
Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, two (2) new
Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by
Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala, docketed as Crim. Cases
Nos. 8572 and 8573.
On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the
accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was
opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial
court granted the motion and dismissed Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573.
The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial
Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Hence, this petition for
certiorari filed by private petitioners Amado and Teresa Rubite, complainants
in the court below.
Petitioners contend that the filing of the two (2) new Informations did not place
accused-private respondents in double jeopardy since the dismissal of the
previous cases was made with the latter's express consent, which can be
equated with their motion for reinvestigation of the cases, dismissal of the
cases being their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation. It is the
position of petitioners that when the dismissal is with the express consent of
the accused, such dismissal cannot be the basis of a claim of double jeopardy.
Petitioners further submit that the dismissal of the previous cases is null and
void as the motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Prosecutor which led to
the dismissal of the cases did not contain a notice of hearing; hence, it was
then a "mere scrap of paper" which the lower court should not even have
entertained.
Finally, petitioners maintain that where the prosecution has been deprived of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
violated.
In this regard, the Solicitor General, interestingly, concurs with petitioners.
Instead of filing a Comment as We required him to do, he filed a Manifestation,
citing Gumabon v. Dir. of the Bureau of Prisons, and submitting that
"[c]onsidering that the Order of respondent judge dated February 9, 1989
favorably granting the Motion to Dismiss without notice and hearing
constituted a violation of basic constitutional rights, the respondent court was
consequently ousted of its jurisdiction when its Order violated the right of the
prosecution to due process." In effect, the first jeopardy never terminated as
the respondent trial court was not competent to issue the 9 February 1989
Order.
While the Solicitor General concedes that "[w]hat should have been done by
the new Provincial Prosecutor was to refile the Informations in Crim. Cases
Nos. 7396 and 7397 and not to file new Informations which were docketed as
Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573," he nevertheless avers that the filing of the
new Informations amounted merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy and
did not expose the private respondents to a second jeopardy. People v. Bocar
laid down the requisites of a valid defense of double jeopardy: (a) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that in the first. Consequently, there being no valid
termination of the first jeopardy, the defense of double jeopardy must fail.
Private respondents on the other hand, invoking the now repealed Sec. 9,
Rule 117, of the Rules of Court, asseverate that the "rules provide and speak
of EXPRESS CONSENT" which cannot be equated with intention. Hence,
while they may have intended to have their cases dismissed upon moving for
reinvestigation, they never gave their express consent to the dismissal of the
cases. In fact, they never sought the dismissal of the charges against them.
Furthermore, private respondents, in response to the allegation that the orders
of respondent judge dismissing the first two cases were null and void, argue
that if indeed the dismissal orders were null and void, petitioners should not
have waited for the filing of the new Informations and their subsequent
quashal. They should have immediately challenged the dismissal order. After
sleeping on their rights, they cannot belatedly say that they were denied due
process.
The cases at bar raise two (2) fundamental issues: (a) whether private
respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original
Informations; and, (b) whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated.
We answer both in the negative. Then, double jeopardy lies.
The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any
person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted.
The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest,
assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and
anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. This Court, as
early as ninety (90) years back, in Julia v. Sotto, said —
"Without the safeguard this article establishes in favor of the accused, his
fortune, safety, and peace of mind would be entirely at the mercy of the
complaining witness, who might repeat his accusation as often as dismissed
by the court and whenever he might see fit, subject to no other limitation or
restriction than his own will and pleasure. The accused would never be free
from the cruel and constant menace of a never-ending charge, which the
malice of the complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over his
head . . ."
Page 90 of 129
Que v. Cosico enumerates the requisites which must concur for double
jeopardy to attach: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of
competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the
accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated
without the express consent of the accused.
The concurrence of all these circumstances constitutes a bar to a second
prosecution for the same offense, an attempt to commit the said offense, a
frustration of the said offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the first offense charged.
In the cases before Us, it is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated
murder, i.e., Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 were filed against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent
jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that private respondents, after being
properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then
remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their
express consent.
Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva
voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no
inference or implication to supply its meaning. This is hardly what private
respondents gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of the
case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the
accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning
of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the
accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original
Informations.
The Solicitor General then claims that there can be no valid defense of double
jeopardy since one of the requisites for its valid defense, i.e., that there be a
valid termination of the first jeopardy, is unavailing. He further argues that the
motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor should not have been
entertained, much less granted, since there was no notice of hearing, nor was
it actually set for hearing.
We do not agree.
While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice
of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases present an
unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a
hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Crim.
Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a
reinvestigation it was found that —
". . . the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The
spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused
Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the attack of
the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to
prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case."
Besides, who should invoke "lack of notice" but the party deprived of due
notice or due process. And when the Provincial Prosecutor moved to dismiss
on the ground that the complaining witnesses were instead the aggressors
and the accused simply acted in self-defense, would the accused have
opposed the motion as to require that he be first notified before the cases
against him be dismissed?
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be under the direction and control of the fiscal." It must be
remembered that as public prosecutor he is the —
"representative not of the ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such , he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that
guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."
Hence, the fiscal or public prosecutor always assumes and retains full
direction and control of the prosecution. The institution of a criminal action
depends upon his sound discretion. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to
determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court; whether a
prima facie case exists to sustain the filing of an Information; whether to
include in the charge those who appear to be responsible for the crime;
whether to present such evidence which he may consider necessary; whether
to call such witnesses he may consider material; whether to move for
dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. As in the case at bar, he
may move for the dismissal of the case if he believes that there is no cause of
action to sustain its prosecution, which was what in fact he did after being
convinced that it would be "unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the
accused" who were really the victims, as the reinvestigation showed.
Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who
thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was
not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases of
contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be
contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best interest if the accused did not
oppose the motion. The private complainants, on the other hand, are
precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the
dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss
would be useless and futile.
On the other hand, the order of the court granting the motion to dismiss,
notwithstanding the absence of a notice and hearing on the motion, cannot be
challenged in this petition for certiorari which assails the dismissal of the two
(2) cases on the ground of double jeopardy. Petitioners can no longer question
the dismissal of the previous cases as the order has already become final
there being no appeal therefrom.
It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the court, it
acquires jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent discretion to dismiss it.
While the prosecutor retains full control over the prosecution, he loses
jurisdiction over the entire proceedings. Hence, what petitioners should have
done was to appeal the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the said
motion failed to include a notice of hearing, and should not have waited for the
dismissal of the subsequent cases on the ground of double jeopardy, and
thereafter question the first dismissal, which by then had already become final,
erroneous though it may be.
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a
notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case.
The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The
remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set
aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the
complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari.
It must be stressed that after a court has obtained jurisdiction over the case,
the failure to give notice of a subsequent step in the proceedings does not
deprive the court of jurisdiction. If substantial injury results from failure of
notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the court may be held to
be erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding, but it is not an
act without or in excess of jurisdiction and is not void. There is a great
difference in the results which follow the failure to give the notice, which is
necessary to confer on the court jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter of the action, and that which follows a failure to give notice of a step
taken after the court has obtained such jurisdiction and is proceeding with the
action.
Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first
jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must
have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense
of double jeopardy must prevail.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, committed by
public respondent, and, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 127777 October 1, 1999
PETRONILA C. TUPAZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE BENEDICTO B. ULEP Presiding Judge of RTC Quezon
City, Branch 105, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
The case before us is a special civil action for certiorari with application for
temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Benedicto B.
Ulep of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying
Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, and to nullify respondent judge's order
reviving the information therein against petitioner, for violation of the Tax
Code, as the offense charged has prescribed or would expose petitioner to
double jeopardy.1âwphi1.nêt
The facts are as follows:
On June 8, 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information
against accused Petronila C. Tupaz and her late husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr.,
as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of
deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979, amounting to
P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the
Tax Code of
1977. 1 On September 11, 1990, the MeTC dismissed the information for lack
of jurisdiction. On November 16, 1990, the trial court denied the prosecution's
motion for reconsideration.
On January 10, 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, two (2) informations, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-91-17321 2 and
Page 91 of 129
Q-9l-17322, 3 against accused and her late husband, for the same alleged
nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal
Case No. Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105, 4 presided over by
respondent Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86,
then presided over by Judge Antonio P. Solano. The identical informations
read as follows:
That in Quezon City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court and upon verification and audit conducted by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue on the 1979 corporate annual income tax return and financial
statements of El Oro Engravers Corp., with office address at 809 Epifanio
delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila, it was ascertained that said
corporation was found liable to pay the amount of P2,369,085.46, as
deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979 and that, despite demand of
the payment of the aforesaid deficiency tax by the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and received by said corporation, which demand has already become final,
said El Oro Engravers Corp., through above-named accused, the responsible
corporate-officers of said corporation, failed and refused, despite repeated
demands, and still fail and refuse to pay said tax liability.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
On September 25, 1991, both accused posted bail bond in the sum of
P1,000.00 each, for their provisional liberty.
On November 6, 1991, accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash 6 information (Q-91-17322) for the
reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the accused
pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). However, on
November 11, 1991, Judge Solano denied the motion. 7
In the meantime, on July 25, 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in Quezon City.
Subsequently, accused Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep
granted in an order dated August 30, 1994. 8
On September 5, 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez
stated that no new issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and
no cogent reasons existed to alter, modify or reverse the findings of the
investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated, and
recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. 9
On September 20, 1994, the trial court (Branch No. 105) arraigned accused
Petronila C. Tupaz in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, and she pleaded not
guilty to the information therein.
On October 17, 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file amended information in
Criminal Case No. Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the commission
of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently thereafter.
Despite opposition of the accused, on March 2, 1995, the trial court granted
the motion and admitted the amended information. 10 Petitioner was not re-
arraigned on the amended information. However, the amendment was only on
a matter of form. 11 Hence, there was no need to re-arraign the accused. 12
On December 5, 1995, accused filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file and admit motion for
reinvestigation. The trial court granted the motion in its order dated December
13, 1995.
Prior to this, on October 18, 1995, Judge Ulep issued an order directing the
prosecution to withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17322,
pending before Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, after
discovering that said information was identical to the one filed with Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On April 16, 1996, State Prosecutor
Alfredo P. Agcaoili filed with the trial court a motion to withdraw information in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321. Prosecutor Agcaoili thought that accused was
charged in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321, for nonpayment of deficiency
contractor's tax, but found that accused was exempted from paying said tax.
On May 15, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case No. Q-
91-17322 with Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 pending before the Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date, the court 13 granted
the motion for consolidation.
On May 20, 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
105, granted the motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case No.
Q-91-17321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution.
On May 28, 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case
Q-91-17321, 14 stating that the motion to withdraw information was made
through palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought
that Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 was identical to Criminal Case No. Q-90-
12896, wherein accused was charged with nonpayment of deficiency
contractor's tax, amounting to P346,879.29.
Over the objections of accused, on August 6, 1996, the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion and ordered information in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321 reinstated. 15 On September 24, 1996,
accused filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December 4,
1996, the trial court denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
On July 9, 1997, we required respondents to comment on the petition within
ten (10) days from notice. On October 10, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his
comment. 16
On October 26, 1998, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda within twenty (20) days
from notice. The parties have complied.
Petitioner submits that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of
discretion in reinstating the information in Criminal Case No. Q-91-17321
because (a) the offense has prescribed; or (b) it exposes her to double
jeopardy.
As regards the issue of prescription, petitioner contends that: (a) the period of
assessment has prescribed, applying the three (3) year period provided under
Batas Pambansa No. 700; (b) the offense has prescribed since the complaint
for preliminary investigation was filed with the Department of Justice only on
June 8, 1989, and the offense was committed in April 1980 when she filed the
income tax return covering taxable year 1979.
Petitioner was charged with nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax
for the year 1979, which tax return was filed in April 1980. On July 16, 1984,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued a notice of assessment.
Petitioner contends that the July 16, 1984 assessment was made out of time.
Petitioner avers that while Sections 318 and 319 of the NIRC of 1977 provide
a five (5) year period of limitation for the assessment and collection of internal
revenue taxes, Batas Pambansa Blg. 700, enacted on February 22, 1984,
amended the two sections and reduced the period to three (3) years. As
provided under B.P. Blg. 700, the BIR has three (3) years to assess the tax
liability, counted from the last day of filing the return, or from the date the
return is filed, whichever comes later. Since the tax return was filed in April
1980, the assessment made on July 16, 1984 was beyond the three (3) year
prescriptive period.
Petitioner submits that B.P. Blg. 700 must be given retroactive effect since it is
favorable to the accused. Petitioner argues that Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, regarding the allowance of retroactive application of penal laws
when favorable to the accused shall apply in this case.
The Solicitor General, in his comment, maintains that the prescriptive period
for assessment and collection of petitioner's deficiency corporate income tax
was five (5) years. The Solicitor General asserts that the shortened period of
three (3) years provided under B.P. Blg. 700 applies to assessments and
collections of internal revenue taxes beginning taxable year 1984. Since the
deficiency corporate income tax was for taxable year 1979, then petitioner was
still covered by the five (5) year period. Thus, the July 16, 1984 tax
assessment was made within the prescribed period.1âwphi1.nêt
At the outset, it must be stressed that "internal revenue taxes are self-
assessing and no further assessment by the government is required to create
the tax liability. An assessment, however, is not altogether inconsequential; it
is relevant in the proper pursuit of judicial and extra judicial remedies to
enforce taxpayer liabilities and certain matters that relate to it, such as the
imposition of surcharges and interest, and in the application of statues of
limitations and in the establishment of tax liens." 17
An assessment contains not only a computation of tax liabilities, but also a
demand for payment within a prescribed period. The ultimate purpose of
assessment is to ascertain the amount that each taxpayer is to pay. 18 An
assessment is a notice to the effect that the amount therein stated is due as
tax and a demand for payment thereof. 19 Assessments made beyond the
prescribed period would not be binding on the taxpayer. 20
We agree with the Solicitor General that the shortened period of three (3)
years prescribed under B.P. Blg. 700 is not applicable to petitioner. B.P. Blg.
700, effective April 5, 1984, specifically states that the shortened period of
three years shall apply to assessments and collections of internal revenue
taxes beginning taxable year 1984. Assessments made on or after April 5,
1984 are governed by the five-year period if the taxes assessed cover taxable
years prior to January 1,
1984. 21 The deficiency income tax under consideration is for taxable year
1979. Thus, the period of assessment is still five (5) years, under the old law.
The income tax return was filed in April 1980. Hence, the July 16, 1984 tax
assessment was issued within the prescribed period of five (5) years, from the
last day of filing the return, or from the date the return is filed, whichever
comes later.
Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application in this case for the
simple reason that the provisions on the period of assessment can not be
considered as penal in nature.
Petitioner also asserts that the offense has prescribed. Petitioner invokes
Section 340 (now 281 of 1997 NIRC) of the Tax Code which provides that
violations of any provision of the Code prescribe in five (5) years. Petitioner
asserts that in this case, it began to run in 1979, when she failed to pay the
correct corporate tax due during that taxable year. Hence, when the BIR
Page 92 of 129
instituted criminal proceedings on June 8, 1989, by filing a complaint for
violation of the Tax Code with the Department of Justice for preliminary
investigation it was beyond the prescriptive period of five (5) years. At most,
the BIR had until 1984 to institute criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General avers that the information for violation
of the Tax Code was filed within the prescriptive period of five (5) years
provided in Section 340 (now 281 in 1997 NIRC) of the Code. It is only when
the assessment has become final and unappealable that the five (5) year
period commences to run. A notice of assessment was issued on July 16,
1984. When petitioner failed to question or protest the deficiency assessment
thirty (30) days therefrom, or on August 16, 1984, it became final and
unappealable. Consequently, it was from this period that the prescriptive
period of five (5) years commenced. Thus, the complaint filed with the
Department of Justice on June 8, 1989 was within the prescribed period.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the offense has not prescribed.
Petitioner was charged with failure to pay deficiency income tax after repeated
demands by the taxing authority. In Lim, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 22 we stated
that by its nature the violation could only be committed after service of notice
and demand for payment of the deficiency taxes upon the taxpayer. Hence, it
cannot be said that the offense has been committed as early as 1980, upon
filing of the income tax return. This is so because prior to the finality of the
assessment, the taxpayer has not committed any violation for nonpayment of
the tax. The offense was committed only after the finality of the assessment
coupled with taxpayer's willful refusal to pay the taxes within the allotted
period. In this case, when the notice of assessment was issued on July 16,
1984, the taxpayer still had thirty (30) days from receipt thereof to protest or
question the assessment. Otherwise, the assessment would become final and
unappealable. 23 As he did not protest, the assessment became final and
unappealable on August 16, 1984. Consequently, when the complaint for
preliminary investigation was filed with the Department of Justice on June 8,
1989, the criminal action was instituted within the five (5) year prescriptive
period.
Petitioner contends that by reinstating the information, the trial court exposed
her to double jeopardy. Neither the prosecution nor the trial court obtained her
permission before the case was dismissed. She was placed in jeopardy for the
first time after she pleaded to a valid complaint filed before a competent court
and the case was dismissed without her express consent. When the trial court
reinstated the information charging the same offense, it placed her in double
jeopardy.
Petitioner also asserts that the trial court gravely erred when, over her
objections, it admitted the amended information. She submits that the
amendment is substantial in nature, and would place her in double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General contends that reinstating the
information does not violate petitioner's right against double jeopardy. He
asserts that petitioner induced the dismissal of the complaint when she sought
the reinvestigation of her tax liabilities. By such inducement, petitioner waived
or was estopped from claiming her right against double jeopardy.
The Solicitor General further contends that, assuming arguendo that the case
was dismissed without petitioner's consent, there was no valid dismissal of the
case since Prosecutor Agcaoili was under a mistaken assumption that it was a
charge of nonpayment of contractor's tax.
We sustain petitioner's contention. The reinstatement of the information would
expose her to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he
is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in
another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his
consent. In the instant case, there was a valid complaint filed against petitioner
to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance
of the prosecution, without asking for accused-petitioner's consent. This
consent cannot be implied or presumed. 24 Such consent must be expressed
as to have no doubt as to the accused's conformity. 25 As petitioner's consent
was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final
and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. 26 Consequently, the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against
petitioner in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double
jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We enjoin the lower court, the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 105, from trying Criminal Case
No. Q-91-17321 and order its dismissal. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., pls. see dissenting opinion.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127444 September 13, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge,
RTC-Br. 88, Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case nudges the Court to revisit the doctrine on double jeopardy, a
revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of
answering twice for the same offense. In this case, after trial on the merits, the
accused was acquitted for insufficiency of the evidence against him in the
cases for murder and frustrated murder (although his co-accused was
convicted), and finding in the illegal carrying of firearm that the act charged did
not constitute a violation of law. But the State through this petition for certiorari
would want his acquittal reversed.
We narrate a brief factual backdrop.
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of
Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession. The shooting
claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother
Levi who permanently lost his left vision. Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr.
was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of
his body and burrowed in his stomach where it remained until extracted by
surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations - one (1) for homicide and
two (2) for frustrated homicide - were originally filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso,
and Godofredo Diego, a municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the
mayor. On 14 December 1993, however, the charges were withdrawn and a
new set filed against the same accused upgrading the crimes to murder (Crim.
Case No. 4004-M-93) and frustrated murder (Crim. Cases Nos. 4005-M-93
and 4006-M-93). Mayor Galvez was charged, in addition, with violation of PD
1866 (Crim. Case No. 4007-M-94) for unauthorized carrying of firearm outside
his residence; hence, a fourth Information had to be filed.
After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There
the cases were stamped with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-94-55484, Q-94-
55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and raffled to Branch 103
presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr. In the course of the proceedings,
the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-raffled to respondent Judge
Tirso D.C. Velasco of Branch 89.
On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was
promulgated. The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder.
However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to
insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal
carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law.
The acquittal of accused Honorato Galvez is now vigorously challenged by the
Government before this Court in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court and Sec. 1, Art. VIII, of the Constitution. It is the submission of
petitioner that the exculpation of the accused Galvez from all criminal
responsibility by respondent Judge Tirso Velasco constitutes grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Allegedly, in holding in favor of
Galvez, the judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts and
evidence on record which, if judiciously considered, would have led to a
finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Petitioner proposes
that this patently gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness should be rectified
by a re-examination of the evidence by the Court upon a determination that a
review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against
double jeopardy. It is urged that this is necessary because the judgment of
acquittal should be nullified and substituted with a verdict of guilt.
The main hypothesis of the Government is that elevating the issue of criminal
culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal
by the trial court should not be considered violative of the constitutional right of
the accused against double jeopardy, for it is now settled constitutional
doctrine in the United States that the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a
review of acquittals decreed by US trial magistrates where, as in this case, no
retrial is required should judgment be overturned.1 Since Philippine concepts
on double jeopardy have been sourced from American constitutional
principles, statutes and jurisprudence, particularly the case of Kepner v. United
States,2 and because similarly in this jurisdiction a retrial does not follow in the
event an acquittal on appeal is reversed, double jeopardy should also be
allowed to take the same directional course. Petitioner in this regard urges the
Court to take a second look at Kepner, it being the "cornerstone of the
battlement of the Double Jeopardy Clause" in the Philippines3 and seriously
examine whether the precedents it established almost a century ago are still
germane and useful today in view of certain modifications wrought on the
doctrine by the succeeding American cases of United States v. Wilson4 and
United States v. Scott.5
Two (2) threshold issues therefore, interlocked as they are, beg to be
addressed. One is the propriety of certiorari as an extraordinary mode of
review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court where the result actually intended
is the reversal of the acquittal of private respondent Galvez. The other is the
permissibility of a review by the Court of a judgment of acquittal in light of the
constitutional interdict against double jeopardy.
Page 93 of 129
The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged
assassins (not discounting too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from
the service) may arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic,
thus calling for a dismissal of the petition on this basis alone. The Court
however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of the paramount nature and object
of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering especially the
alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the doctrine of
double jeopardy. We are thus impelled to respond to the issues advanced by
petitioner for these bear unquestionably far-reaching contextual significance
and implications in Philippine juristic philosophy and experience, demanding
no less, explicit and definitive rulings.
For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none
of the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous
and tortuous route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person
not to be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same offense.6 This
prohibition does not consist merely of one rule but several, each rule applying
to a different situation, each rule marooned in a sea of exceptions.7 It must
have been this unique transpiration that prompted even the redoubtable Mr.
Justice Rehnquist of the U.S. Supreme Court to remark in Albernaz v. United
States8 that "the decisional law (in the area of double jeopardy) is a veritable
Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial
navigator." It is therefore necessary that, in forming a correct perspective and
full understanding of the doctrine on double jeopardy and the rules so far
established relative to the effect thereon of appeals of judgments of acquittal,
a compendious review of its historical growth and development be undertaken.
This approach is particularly helpful in properly situating and analyzing
landmark interpretive applications of the doctrine in light of the varying legal
and factual milieu under which it evolved.
Jeopardy, itself "a fine poetic word,"9 derives from the Latin "jocus" meaning
joke, jest or game,10 and also from the French term "jeu perdre" which
denotes a game that one might lose. Similarly, the Middle English word
"iuparti" or "jupartie" means an uncertain game.11 The genesis of the concept
itself however rests deep in the ancient Grecian view of tragedy and suffering
and in the old Roman legal concepts of punishment. Greek law bound
prosecutor and judge to the original verdict as can be seen in the remark of
Demosthenes in 355 B. C. that "the laws forbid the same man to be tried twice
on the same issue."12 The Justinian Digest13 providing that "(a) governor
should not permit the same person to be again accused of crime of which he
has been acquitted,"14 suggests certain philosophical underpinnings believed
to have been influenced by works of the great Greek tragedians of the 5th
century B.C. reflecting man’s "tragic vision" or the tragic view of life. For the
ancient Greeks believed that man was continuously pitted against a superior
force that dictated his own destiny. But this prevailing view was not to be taken
in the sense of man passing from one misfortune to another without relief, as
this idea was repugnant to Greek sensibilities. Rather, it expressed a universal
concept of catharsis or vindication that meant misfortune resolving itself into a
final triumph, and persecution, into freedom and liberation. To suffer twice for
the same misfortune was anathema to ancient thought.
The 18th century B. C. Babylonian king and lawgiver Hammurabi recognized
that humans could err in prosecuting and rendering judgment, thus limits were
needed on prosecutors and judges. A gruesome but effective way of
preventing a second trial by the same prosecutor after an acquittal can be
found in the first law of the Hammurabic Code: "If a man has accused a man
and has charged him with manslaughter and then has not proved [it against
him], his accuser shall be put to death."15
The repugnance to double trials strongly expressed by the Catholic Church is
consistent with the interpretation by St. Jerome in 391 A. D. of the promise by
God to his people through the prophet Nahum that "(a)ffliction shall not rise up
the second time"16 and "(t)hough I have afflicted thee, I will afflict thee no
more."17 Taken to mean that God does not punish twice for the same act, the
maxim insinuated itself into canon law as early as 847 A. D., succintly phrased
as "(n)ot even God judges twice for the same act."18
The most famous cause célèbre on double jeopardy in the Middle Ages was
the dispute between the English King Henry II and his good friend, Thomas á
Becket, Archbishop of Canterbury. Henry wished to continue the observance
of certain customs initiated by his predecessors called "avitae consuetudines,"
one of the known purposes of which was that clerics convicted of crimes
before Church courts be delivered to lay tribunals for punishment. He asserted
in the Constitutions of Clarendon that the clergy were also subject to the king’s
punishment. This was met with stinging criticism and stiff opposition by the
Archbishop who believed that allowing this practice would expose the clergy to
double jeopardy. The issue between the two erstwhile friends was never
resolved and remained open-ended, for Thomas was later on mercilessly
murdered in his cathedral, allegedly at the instance of his king.19
It was in England though, a century ago, that double jeopardy was formally
institutionalized "as a maxim of common law"20 based on the universal
principles of reason, justice and conscience, about which the Roman Cicero
commented: "Nor is it one thing at Rome and another at Athens, one now and
another in the future, but among all nations, it is the same."21 But even as
early as the 15th century, the English courts already began to use the term
"jeopardy" in connection with the doctrine against multiple trials.22 Thereafter,
the principle appeared in the writings of Hale (17th c.), Lord Coke (17th c.) and
Blackstone (18th c.).23 Lord Coke for instance described the protection
afforded by the rule as a function of three (3) related common law pleas:
autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and pardon.24 In Vaux’s Case,25 it was
accepted as established that "the life of a man shall not be twice put in
jeopardy for one and the same offense, and that is the reason and cause that
autrefois acquitted or convicted of the same offense is a good plea x x x x"
Blackstone likewise observed that the plea of autrefois acquit or a formal
acquittal is grounded on the universal maxim of the common law of England
that "(n)o man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the
same offense. And hence, it is allowed as a consequence that when a man is
once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment, or other prosecution before
any court having competent jurisdiction of the offense, he may plead such
acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime."26
The English dogma on double jeopardy, recognized as an "indispensable
requirement of a civilized criminal procedure," became an integral part of the
legal system of the English colonies in America. The Massachusetts Body of
Liberties of 1641, an early compilation of principles drawn from the statutes
and common law of England, grandly proclaimed that "(n)o man shall be twise
sentenced by Civill Justice for one and the same crime, offence or Trespasse"
and that "(e)verie Action betweene partie and partie, and proceedings against
delinquents in Criminall causes shall be briefly and destinctly entered on the
Rolles of every Court by the Recorder thereof."27 Ineluctably, this
pronouncement became the springboard for the proposal of the First Congress
of the United States that double jeopardy be included in the Bill of Rights. It
acknowledged that the tradition against placing an individual twice in danger of
a second prosecution for the same offense followed ancient precedents in
English law and legislation derived from colonial experiences and necessities.
Providing abundant grist for impassioned debate in the US Congress, the
proposal was subsequently ratified as part of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution.
In 1817 the Supreme Court of Tennessee dismissed an appeal by the State
after an acquittal from perjury, declaring that: "A writ of error, or appeal in the
nature of a writ of error, will not lie for the State in such a case. It is a rule of
common law that no one shall be brought twice into jeopardy for one and the
same offense. Were it not for this salutary rule, one obnoxious to the
government might be harassed and run down by repeated attempts to carry on
a prosecution against him. Because of this rule, a new trial cannot be granted
in a criminal case where the defendant is acquitted. A writ of error will lie for
the defendant, but not against him."28 Verily, these concepts were founded
upon that great fundamental rule of common law, "Nemo debet bis vexari pro
una et eadem causa," in substance expressed in the Constitution of the United
States as: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offense, to be twice
put into jeopardy of life or limb." It is in the spirit of this benign rule of the
common law, embodied in the Federal Constitution - a spirit of liberty and
justice, tempered with mercy - that, in several states of the Union, in criminal
cases, a writ of error has been denied to the State.29
The relationship between the prohibition against second jeopardy and the
power to order a new trial following conviction or dismissal stirred a no small
amount of controversy in United States v. Gibert.30 There, Mr. Justice Story,
on circuit, declared that "the court had no power to grant a new trial when the
first trial had been duly had on a valid indictment before a court of competent
jurisdiction." The opinion formulated was that the prohibition against double
jeopardy applied equally whether the defendant had been acquitted or
convicted.
But it must be noted that even in those times, the power to grant a new trial in
the most serious cases was already being exercised by many American
courts, the practice having been observed from an early date, in spite of
provisions of law against double jeopardy.31 For this reason, the rule in Gibert
was stoutly resisted.32 As if to taunt Gibert, the 1839 case of United States v.
Keen33 declared that the constitutional provision did not prohibit a new trial on
defendant’s motion after a conviction. In Hopt v. Utah,34 the defendant was
retried three (3) times following reversals of his convictions.
Then in 1896 the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Ball35 affirmed that
the double jeopardy rule did not prevent a second trial when, on appeal, a
conviction had been set aside. It declared that a defendant who procured on
appeal a reversal of a judgment against him could be tried anew upon the
same indictment or upon another indictment for the same offense of which he
had been convicted. This principle of autrefois convict was expanded nine (9)
years later in Trono v. United States36 where the Court affirmed the judgment
of the Supreme Court of the Philippines by holding that "since the plaintiffs in
error had appealed their convictions of the lower offense in order to secure a
reversal, there was no bar to convicting them of the higher offense in
proceedings in the appellate court that were tantamount to a new trial." Mr.
Justice Peckham, holding for the Court, concluded that "the better doctrine is
that which does not limit the court or the jury upon a new trial, to a
consideration of the question of guilt of the lower offense of which the accused
was convicted on the first trial, but that the reversal of the judgment of
conviction opens up the whole controversy and acts upon the original
judgment as if it had never been."37 It was ratiocinated that the result was
justified not only on the theory that the accused had waived their right not to
be retried but also on the ground that "the constitutional provision was really
never intended to x x x cover the case of a judgment x x x which has been
annulled at the request of the accused x x x x"
It must be stressed though that Ball also principally ruled that it had long been
settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a
defendant’s jeopardy, and, even when "not followed by any judgment, is a bar
to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. It is one of the elemental
principles of our criminal law that the Government cannot secure a new trial by
means of an appeal, even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous."
Page 94 of 129
In 1891 the United States Judiciary Act was passed providing that appeals or
writs of error may be taken from the district court or from the existing circuit
courts direct to the Supreme Court in any case that involved the construction
of the Constitution. The following year an issue was raised in United States v.
Sanges38 on whether this Act conferred upon the government the right to sue
out a writ of error in any criminal case. In that case, existing rules on double
jeopardy took a significant turn when the United States Supreme Court
observed that while English law was vague on the matter, it had been settled
by overwhelming American authority that the State had no right to sue out a
writ of error upon a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case,
except under and in accordance with express statutes, whether that judgment
was rendered upon a verdict of acquittal, or upon the determination by the
court of a question of law. The Court noted that in a few states, decisions
denying a writ of error to the State after a judgment for the defendant on a
verdict of acquittal proceeded upon the ground that to grant it would be to put
him twice in jeopardy, in violation of the constitutional provision.39 Sanges
therefore fixed the rule that absent explicit legislative authority, the United
States Government had no right of appeal in criminal cases in case of an
acquittal as it would expose the defendant twice to jeopardy.
Notably, however, in 1892 the Attorneys General of the United States began to
recommend the passage of legislation allowing the Government to appeal in
criminal cases. Their primary objective was to resist the power of a single
district judge (under the law then obtaining) by dismissing an indictment to
defeat any criminal prosecution instituted by the Government. No action was
taken on the proposal until 1906 when President Theodore Roosevelt in his
annual message to the US Congress demanded the enactment of legislation
on the matter. Consequently, on 2 March 1907 such legislative authority was
provided when the Criminal Appeals Act became a law40 Ch. 2564, 34 Stat.
1246.40 permitting the United States to seek a writ of error from the Supreme
Court from any decision dismissing all indictment on the basis of the "invalidity
or construction of the statute upon which the indictments is founded."41 The
law narrowed the right to appeal by the Government to cases in which the
ground of the District Court’s decision was invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the charge was founded, and that a verdict in favor of the
defendant based on evidence could not be set aside on appeal no matter how
erroneous the legal theory upon which it may be based. For these purposes, it
made no difference whether the verdict be the result of the jury’s decision or
that of the judge. In other words, Government could appeal from a decision
dismissing an indictment or arresting judgment on the basis of the statutory
invalidity or misconstruction of the pertinent criminal statute and from a
decision sustaining a special plea in bar, so long as the defendant would not
be put in jeopardy.42
On 10 December 1898 the Philippine Islands was ceded by Spain to the
United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris of 1898 which was ratified by the
State Parties on 11 April 1899. The Islands was placed under military rule until
the establishment of the Philippine Commission in 1902. On 23 April 1900 the
military government issued General Order No. 58 which amended the Code of
Criminal Procedure then in force by, among others, extending to the Islands
the double jeopardy provision under the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution. This was pursuant to the 7 April 1900 Instructions of President
McKinley issued to the Philippine Commission headed by William Howard
Taft. The Instructions read in part: "x x x the Commission should bear in mind,
and the people of the Islands should be made to understand, that there are
certain great principles of government which have been made the basis of our
governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law x x x and
maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness, however
much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with which they
are familiar x x x x Upon every division and branch of the Government of the
Philippines therefore must be imposed these inviolable rules: x x x that x x x
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense x x x x"43
General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 which permitted an
appeal by the government after acquittal. The Philippine Civil Government Act
of 1 July 1902 of the U.S. Congress repealed the Act, adopted and restored
the same principle in Gen. Order No. 58 as enunciated in the Fifth Amendment
and in McKinley’s Instructions by providing immunity from second jeopardy for
the same criminal offense. It did not take long however for the meaning and
significance of the doctrine held forth in McKinley’s Instructions to be placed
under severe test and scrutiny.
In 1901 Mr. Thomas E. Kepner, a practicing lawyer in Manila, Philippines, was
charged with embezzlement of funds (estafa). He was tried by a court of first
instance, minus a jury, and was acquitted of the crime. The U.S. Government
appealed to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and judgment was
reversed. Kepner was sentenced with imprisonment and suspended from
public office or place of trust.
Questioning his conviction before the US Supreme Court, Kepner argued that
the appeal by the US government to the Philippine Supreme Court of his
judgment of acquittal constituted double jeopardy construed in light of existing
US jurisprudence. On the other hand, the Attorney General for the Philippines
and the Solicitor General of the United States jointly contended that the
Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902 which included the prohibition against double
jeopardy should be construed from the perspective of the system of laws
prevailing in the Philippines prior to its cession to the United States. Under this
system, the Audiencia (Supreme Court) could entertain an appeal of a
judgment of acquittal since the proceedings before it were regarded not as a
new trial but an extension of preliminary proceedings in the court of first
instance. The entire proceedings constituted one continuous trial and the
jeopardy that attached in the court of first instance did not terminate until final
judgment had been rendered by the Audiencia. Double jeopardy was
described not only in the Spanish law Fuero Real44 as: "After a man accused
of any crime has been acquitted by the court, no one can afterwards accuse
him of the same offense (except in certain specified cases), but also in the
Siete Partidas45 which provided that: "If a man is acquitted by a valid
judgment of any offense of which he has been accused, no other person can
afterwards accuse him of the offense x x x x" Under this system of law, a
person was not regarded as jeopardized in the legal sense until there had
been a final judgment in the court of last resort. The lower courts then were
deemed examining courts, exercising preliminary jurisdiction only, and the
accused was not finally convicted or acquitted until the case had been passed
upon in the Audiencia or Supreme Court, whose judgment was subject to
review by the Supreme Court in Madrid (Spain) for errors of law, with power to
grant a new trial.
The U.S. Supreme Court however threw out the Government’s argument and
held that the proceedings after acquittal had placed the accused Kepner twice
in jeopardy. It declared in no uncertain terms that the appeal of the judgment
of conviction was in essence a trial de novo and that, whatever the Spanish
tradition was, the purpose of Congress was to carry some at least of the
essential principles of American constitutional jurisprudence to the Islands and
to engraft them upon the law of these people newly subject to its jurisdiction.
There was little question therefore that Kepner soldered into American
jurisprudence the precedent that as to the defendant who had been acquitted
by the verdict duly returned and received, the court could take no other action
than to order his discharge. "x x x (I)t is then the settled law of this court that
former jeopardy includes one who has been acquitted by a verdict duly
rendered, although no judgment be entered on the verdict, and it was found
upon a defective indictment. The protection is not x x x against the peril of
second punishment, but against being tried again for the same offense."46
This doctrine was echoed in United States v. Wills47 where the Court further
clarified that "jeopardy implies an exposure to a lawful conviction for an
offense of which a person has already been acquitted x x x x" It was reiterated
in 1957 in Green v. United States48 in which Mr. Justice Black, writing for the
Court, professed that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
was designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the hazards of
trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense. Thus,
under the Fifth Amendment, a verdict of acquittal was considered final, ending
the accused’s jeopardy and that once a person has been acquitted of an
offense, he cannot be prosecuted again on the same charge.
American jurisprudence on the effect of appealed acquittals on double
jeopardy since then sailed on, following the main sea lanes charted by Kepner,
but not without encountering perturbance along the way. For it may be
mentioned, albeit en passant, that the case of Bartkus v. Illinois49 did cause
some amount of judicial soul-shaking in 1959 when it burst into the scene.
Alfonse Bartkus was tried before a federal district court in Illinois and was later
acquitted by the jury. Less than a year later, Bartkus was indicted this time by
an Illinois grand jury on facts substantially identical to those of the federal
charge and was subsequently convicted. His conviction was affirmed by the
Illinois Supreme Court.
On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court, by a close vote of 5 to 4, affirmed the
conviction. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, declared that
the Fifth Amendment’s double jeopardy provision was inapplicable to states so
that an acquittal of a federal indictment was no bar to a prosecution by a state
based on the same charge. Since there was no proof offered to show that the
participation of the federal authorities in the Illinois state prosecution was of
such nature as to render the state proceedings a mere cover for a federal
prosecution to render the state indictment essentially a constitutionally
prohibited second prosecution, no double jeopardy attached.
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined in by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Mr.
Justice Douglas, with Mr. Justice Brennan writing a separate dissenting
opinion. Black rued that the Court’s ruling by a majority of one only resulted in
"further limiting the already weakened constitutional guarantees against
double prosecution," citing the earlier case of United States v. Lanza,50 where
the Court allowed the federal conviction and punishment of a man previously
convicted and punished for identical acts by a state court. The dissent called
attention to the fact that in Bartkus, for the first time in its history, the Court
allowed the state conviction of a defendant already acquitted of the same
offense in the federal court. This, Mr. Justice Black asserted, was
unacceptable, for as the Court previously found in Palko v. Connecticut,51
"double prosecutions for the same offense are so contrary to the spirit of our
free country that they violate even the prevailing view of the Fourteenth
Amendment since some of the privileges and immunities of the Bill of Rights . .
. have been taken over and brought within the Fourteenth Amendment by
process of absorption x x x x One may infer, from the fewness of the cases,
that retrials after acquittal have been considered particularly obnoxious, worse
even, in the eyes of many, than retrials after conviction."
Whether such forceful pronouncements steered back into course meandering
views on double jeopardy is open to question. Nonetheless, the case of Fong
Foo v. United States,52 decided per curiam, reaffirmed the pronouncements in
Ball and Kepner that "the verdict of acquittal was final, and could not be
reviewed x x x without putting (the petitioners) twice in jeopardy, and thereby
violating the Constitution."
In the meantime, from 1907 up to 1970 the Criminal Appeals Act underwent
significant alterations. The 1942 amendment of its Section 682 permitted for
the first time appeals to the circuit appeals court from orders sustaining
Page 95 of 129
demurrer to indictment in cases not directly appealable to the Supreme
Court.53 However, due to the many modifications the law was subjected to,
construction and interpretation became more laborious, effectively
transforming appeals into highly technical procedures. As such, the Criminal
Appeals Act developed into a judicial "bete noire," for even the U.S. Supreme
Court itself had "to struggle in a number of occasions with the vagaries of the
said Act."54 In one of those unhappy efforts, it concluded that the Act was "a
failure x x x a most unruly child that has not improved with age."55
The U.S. Congress finally got rid of the dismal statute in 1970 and replaced it
with a new Criminal Appeals Act intended to broaden the right of Government
to appeal whenever the Constitution would permit. It was apparent that the
legislative body left to the courts the prerogative to draw the constitutional
limits of double jeopardy rather than define them itself. Since then,
pronouncements by the courts on the jouble jeopardy guarantee of the Fifth
Amendment focused on three (3) related protections: against a second
prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution
for the same offense after conviction; and, against multiple punishments for
the same offense.56
In Wilson,57 the Court expressed that the interests underlying these three (3)
protections are quite similar. Thus, when a defendant has been once
convicted and punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality
require that he be not subjected to the possibility of further punishment by
being tried or sentenced for the same offense.58 And when a defendant has
been acquitted of an offense, the Clause guarantees that the State shall not
be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict him, "thereby subjecting
him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility
that even though innocent he may be found guilty."59 It can thus be inferred
from these cases that the policy of avoiding multiple trials has been
considered paramount so that exceptions to the rule have been permitted only
in few instances and under rigid conditions.
Accordingly, in United States v. Scott60 the US Supreme Court synthesized
two (2) venerable principles of double jeopardy jurisprudence: first, the
successful appeal of a judgment of conviction on any ground other than the
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict poses no bar to further
prosecution on the same charge; and second, a judgment of acquittal, whether
based on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that the
evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed and terminates the
prosecution when a second trial would be necessitated by a reversal.61 It
would seem that the conditionality of "when a second trial would be
necessitated by a reversal" was attached thereto because ordinarily, the
procedure obtaining was that if on appeal a judgment of acquittal is reversed,
i. e., a finding is had against the defendant, a remand of the case for another
trial may be allowed if needed.
At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also,
in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes
loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of
dismissals do not involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge:
(a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a matter of
law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a trier of facts (a jury); (b)
orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of evidence, as when
the statute upon which the indictment was based is defective; (c) conducts a
judicial process that is defective or flawed in some fundamental respect, such
as incorrect receipt or rejection of evidence, incorrect instructions, or
prosecutorial misconduct; (d) issues an order arresting judgment, i.e., an act of
a trial judge refusing to enter judgment on the verdict because of an error
appearing on the face of the record that rendered the judgment;62 or, (e)
pronounces judgment on a special plea in bar (a non obstante plea) - one that
does not relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, but which is set up
as a special defense relating to an outside matter but which may have been
connected with the case.63 Interestingly, the common feature of these
instances of dismissal is that they all bear on questions of law or matters
unrelated to a factual resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal,
will not involve a review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to
render appeals therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
This contextual situation in which appeals from dismissals of criminal cases
are allowed under American rules of procedure does not obtain in the
Philippines. To be sure, United States v. Scott positively spelled out that if an
acquittal was based on an appreciation of the evidence adduced, no appeal
would lie. Mr. Justice Rehnquist explained that what may seem superficially to
be a "disparity in the rules governing a defendant’s liability to be tried again"
refers to the underlying purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. He
elaborated that "(a)s Kepner and Fong Foo illustrate, the law attaches
particular significance to an acquittal. To permit a second trial after an acquittal
however mistaken x x x would present an unacceptably high risk that the
Government, with its vastly superior resources, might wear down the
defendant so that even though innocent he may be found guilty. x x x x On the
other hand, to require a criminal defendant to stand trial again after he has
successfully invoked the statutory right of appeal to upset his first conviction is
not an act of governmental oppression of the sort against which the x x x
Clause was intended to protect."
In proposing a re-evaluation of Philippine jurisprudence on double jeopardy,
petitioner insists that Wilson and Scott have unquestionably altered the
seascape of double jeopardy previously navigated by Kepner and Ball. Using
as its flagship the pronouncement in Wilson that appeals of acquittal are
possible provided the accused will not be subjected to a second trial, it argues
that this should apply to the case at bar because, anyway, a review of the
acquittal of private respondent Honorato Galvez will not result in another trial
inasmuch as the Court will only have to examine the evidence adduced below
to pass final judgment on the culpability of the accused.
Petitioner’s own hermeneutic sense of the phrase "another trial" is that which
solely adverts to a proceeding before a competent trial court that rehears the
case and receives evidence anew to establish the facts after the case has
been finally disposed of by the Supreme Court. Obviously, it adheres to the
Holmesian hypothesis in Kepner and, for that matter, the concept under
Spanish law then applicable in the Philippines before the American
colonization, that a trial consists of one whole continuing process from
reception of evidence by a trier of facts up to its final disposition by the
Supreme Court. But petitioner conveniently forgets that this theory has been
consistently spurned by both American and Philippine jurisprudence that has
faithfully adhered to the doctrine that an appeal of a judgment after the
defendant had been acquitted by the court in a bench trial is, quintessentially,
a new trial. In Kepner, the Court regarded the two (2) events, i. e., trial by the
lower court and the appellate proceedings, as equivalent to two (2) separate
trials, and the evil that the Court saw in the procedure was plainly that of
multiple prosecutions.64 Although Kepner technically involved only one
proceeding, the Court deemed the second factfinding, that is, the review by
the appellate court, as the equivalent of a second trial. Accordingly, in
subsequent cases, the Court has treated the Kepner principle as being
addressed to the evil of successive trials.65
No less than the case of Wilson,66 petitioner’s main anchor for its
propositions, affirms this rule. There, the Court emphasized that it has, up to
the present, rejected the theory espoused by the dissenting Mr. Justice
Holmes in Kepner that " a man cannot be said to be more than once in
jeopardy in the same cause however often he may be tried. The jeopardy is
one continuing jeopardy, from its beginning to the end of the cause." It
declared unequivocally that "we continue to be of the view that the policies
underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause militate against permitting the
Government to appeal after a verdict of acquittal." Wilson therefore
pronounced that if acquittal is declared on the basis of evidence adduced,
double jeopardy attaches for that particular cause.
To explain further, Wilson involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict
ruling of law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant
due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the indictment
prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been entered by the jury.
But it was not an acquittal that involved "factual resolution." It was one
anchored on an extraneous cause. Factual resolution is defined in United
States v. Sorenson67 following the rulings in Ball, Fong Foo and Sisson as
"the finding that government failed to prove all the elements of the offense." It
is clear therefore that the acquittal of Wilson, not being based on evidence,
could be appealed. The rule therefore fixed in Wilson is that where a judge
holds for the defendant on a ruling of law, and not on the basis of evidence,
after a jury entered a verdict of guilty, the prosecution may appeal the acquittal
without violating double jeopardy, as this is allowed under the pertinent law.68
This is so since no second trial will ensue, as a reversal on appeal would
merely reinstate the jury’s verdict.69 And if the prosecution is upheld, the case
simply goes back to the trial court for disposition of the remaining matters. It
bears emphasis that in Wilson, no double jeopardy problem was presented
because the appellate court, upon reviewing the asserted legal errors of the
trial judge, could simply order the jury’s guilty verdict reinstated, no new
factfinding would be necessary, and the defendant would not be put twice in
jeopardy.70
The case of Scott, also considerably relied upon by petitioner, involved an
accused who, having been indicted for several offenses, himself moved for the
dismissal of two (2) counts of the charges on the ground that his defense was
prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion.
Government appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the
appeal on the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself seeks to avoid his trial
prior to its conclusion by a motion for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause is
not offended by a second prosecution. Such a motion by the defendant is
deemed to be a deliberate election on his part to forego his valued right to
have his guilt or innocence determined by the first trier of facts."
The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once discernible. The
dismissal of the charges against private respondent Galvez was not upon his
own instance; neither did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be
considered as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent. Here,
trial on the merits was held during which both government and accused had
their respective day in court.
We are therefore insufficiently persuaded to adopt petitioner’s concept of
"another trial" because, as discussed above, it disregards the contextual
interpretation of the term in light of the legal and factual morphology of the
double jeopardy principle obtaining in Wilson and Scott. To sum up, in the
cause before us, the records show that respondent trial judge based his
finding of acquittal, no matter how erroneous it might seem to petitioner, upon
the evidence presented by both parties. The judgment here was no less than a
factual resolution of the case. Thus, to the extent that the post-verdict acquittal
in Wilson was based on a ruling of law and not on a resolution of facts, Wilson
is not, to reiterate, pertinent to nor persuasive in the case at bar. The same
observation holds true for Scott. That it was the defendant who secured the
dismissal of the charges against him without any submission to either judge or
Page 96 of 129
jury as to his guilt or innocence, but on a ground totally outside evidentiary
considerations, i.e., pre-indictment delay, definitely forecloses the applicability,
if not relevance, of Scott to the instant case.
Wilson, Scott and all other pertinent American case law considered, it still
behooves us to examine if at this time there is need to rethink our juristic
philosophy on double jeopardy vis-à-vis acquittals. In this respect, it would be
instructive to see how Philippine law and jurisprudence have behaved since
Kepner. Has the principle since then beneficially evolved, or has it remained
an "unruly child that has not improved with age?"
The moorings of double jeopardy in the Philippines, as Mr. Justice Manuel
Moran observed in People v. Tarok,71 are not indigenous but are a matter of
constitutional or statutory history. Enunciated in the Constitution of the United
States, from there it found its way into this country, first, in the Philippine Bill of
1902, then in the Jones Law of 1916, and finally, in the 1935 Philippine
Constitution. Being thus a mere recognition of the maxim of the common law,
and adopted from the Constitution of the United States, the principle of double
jeopardy followed in this jurisdiction the same line of development - no
narrower nor wider - as in the Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.
While some reservations may be had about the contemporary validity of this
observation considering the variety of offsprings begotten, at least in the
United States, by the mother rule since then, perhaps it is safer to say that not
much deviation has occurred from the general rule laid out in Kepner. For
Kepner may be said to have been the lighthouse for the floundering issues on
the effect of acquittals on jeopardy as they sail safely home. The cases of
People v. Bringas,72 People v. Hernandez,73 People v. Montemayor,74 City
Fiscal of Cebu v. Kintanar,75 Republic v. Court of Appeals,76 and Heirs of Tito
Rillorta v. Firme,77 to name a few, are illustrative. Certainly, the reason behind
this has not been due to a stubborn refusal or reluctance to "keep up with the
Joneses," in a manner of speaking, but to maintain fidelity to the principle
carefully nurtured by our Constitution, statutes and jurisprudence. As early as
Julia v. Sotto78 the Court warned that without this safeguard against double
jeopardy secured in favor of the accused, his fortune, safety and peace of
mind would be entirely at the mercy of the complaining witness who might
repeat his accusation as often as dismissed by the court and whenever he
might see fit, subject to no other limitation or restriction than his own will and
pleasure.
The 1935 Philippine Constitution provided in its Sec. 20, Art. III, that "(n)o
person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an
act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The
discussions by the members of the Constitutional Convention of 1934 on the
effect on double jeopardy of an appeal from a judgment of acquittal are
enlightening. Foreclosing appeal on a judgment of acquittal was recognized by
the Convention and the proposal to make an appeal from acquittal permissible
even only "on questions of law provided that a verdict in favor of the defendant
shall not be set aside by reason thereof" was strongly voted down. Thus -
MR. GULLAS: Dear Colleagues x x x x I wish to summarize our points. The
amendment is commendable, but we submit that the reason against far
outweighs the reason in favor of it. In the first place, it would tend to multiplicity
of suits and thus increase the burden of the Supreme Court. Second, suits will
be expensive if we meet fiscals who have an exaggerated opinion of
themselves, who have more ego than gray matter or more amor propio. In the
third place, as has been stated by a certain Gentleman, the provision would
convert the Supreme Court into a sort of academy of consulting body. In the
fourth place, as pointed out by Mr. Sevilla, fights in the Supreme Court would
be one-sided. In the fifth place, as demonstrated by Delegate Labrador, the
matter should be procedural rather than constitutional. And lastly, as explained
by Delegate Singson Encarnacion, should the Supreme Court reverse the
judgment of the lower court, the defendant would suffer morally for the rest of
his life. He would walk around under a veil of humiliation, carrying with him a
stigma.
For all these reasons, Mr. President, we oppose the amendment.
PRESIDENT: We can vote on the amendment. (Various delegates: YES).
Those who are in favor of the amendment please say YES. (A minority: YES).
Those against the amendment say NO. (A majority: NO). The amendment is
rejected x x x x
(1934 Constitutional Convention Record, Journal No. 95, November 24, 1934,
p. 361)
The case of People v. Bringas79 was the first case to be decided under this
Constitution pertinent to the matter at hand. There the Supreme Court, guided
by Kepner, cited its finding in United States v. Tam Yung Way80 against the
right of appeal by the government from a judgment discharging the defendant
in a criminal case after he has been brought to trial, whether defendant was
acquitted on the merits or whether his discharge was based upon the trial
court’s conclusion of law that the trial had failed for some reason to establish
his guilt as charged.
The Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 22, Art. IV thereof,
reproduced verbatim the same double jeopardy provision of the 1935
Constitution. So did the 1987 Freedom Constitution drafted by the 1986
Constitutional Commission.
Noteworthy is that during the deliberations by the 1986 Constitutional
Commission attempts were made to introduce into the Fundamental Law the
right of government to appeal verdicts of acquittal promulgated by trial courts.
The proposed text for Sec. 14, Art. VIII, on the Judicial Department read as
follows -
Sec. 12. - x x x x An appeal by the State and/or offended party from a
judgment of acquittal may be allowed in the discretion of the Supreme Court
by a petition for review on certiorari on the ground that it is manifestly against
the evidence with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.81
This proposal was strongly opposed, the controlling consideration as
expressed by Commissioner Rustico de los Reyes being the "inequality of the
parties in power, situation and advantage in criminal cases where the
government, with its unlimited resources, trained detectives, willing officers
and counsel learned in the law, stands arrayed against a defendant unfamiliar
with the practice of the courts, unacquainted with their officers or attorneys,
often without means and frequently too terrified to make a defense, if he had
one, while his character and his life, liberty or property rested upon the result
of the trial."82
Commissioner Joaquin Bernas likewise articulated his fear that "we could be
subjecting an accused individual to a very serious danger of harassment from
a prosecutor x x x x The harm, however, which will follow from waving this flag
of possibility of appeal x x x could be much more than letting a guilty person
go."83 Put to a vote, the proposal was defeated.84
Then again, during the debates on double jeopardy under Sec. 23, Art. III, on
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, Commissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla
reopened the matter already settled at the deliberations on the article on the
Judiciary. The following exchanges ensued:
MR. PADILLA. x x x On Section 23, on double jeopardy, there was Davide
resolution which allowed an appeal in a judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case that states: An acquittal by a trial court is, however, appealable provided
that in such event, the accused shall not be detained or put up bail. This has
been deleted by the Commission x x x x
FR. BERNAS. Yes.
MR. PADILLA. I recall that when this same idea, but in different phraseology,
was presented and approved by the Committee on the Judiciary, the great
objection was that it would violate the immunity against double jeopardy. But I
recall, the sponsor admitted, after I had explained the day before, that it did
not violate double jeopardy but it was unnecessary and harmful. What is the
real position, Mr. Presiding Officer? Is it in violation of double jeopardy or is it
just because it need not be stated in the Bill of Rights nor in the Article on the
Judiciary?
FR. BERNAS: I explained my position on that, Mr. Presiding Officer, when we
considered the matter in the Article on the Judiciary. The position I took was
that it was not a departure from existing jurisprudence. In fact, it was more
strict than existing jurisprudence in that it required not just abuse of discretion
but it also required that the judgment be clearly against the evidence.
MR. PADILLA. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we want to
make the exercise of that right by the state or offended party restrictive not
only through a petition for review on certiorari in the discretion of the Supreme
Court which may dismiss it outright, but also on certain grounds that are really
covered by "in excess or lack of jurisdiction."
But my common impression, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that most lawyers are of
the opinion that when a judgment of acquittal is rendered by a trial court, that
is final, executory and not appealable.
Does not the sponsor think, Mr. Presiding Officer, an appeal from an arbitrary
judgment of acquittal rendered by a few corrupt judges of the offended party or
the state will improve the administration of justice?
FR. BERNAS. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have expressed my position on this
when we voted on Third Reading on the Article on the Judiciary. But if the
Commissioner wants to raise the matter for reconsideration, he can present a
motion on the floor.
Padilla did not ask for a reconsideration.85
The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the
effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to constitutional provisions. The
pertinent portions of Sec. 7 of Rule 117 thereof provide -
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information x x x x
Page 97 of 129
From this procedural prescription alone, there can be no mistaking the
requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or
the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.86 It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do
not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from
a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule in
our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and
cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of
double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court
of Appeals.
In general, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is
a finding of mistrial, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan.87 Condemning the trial
before the Sandiganbayan of the murder of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy"
Aquino, which resulted in the acquittal of all the accused, as a sham, this
Court minced no words in declaring that "[i]t is settled doctrine that double
jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial court's
judgment of acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process x x x x [T]he sham trial was but
a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered respondents
Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial, and closely monitored the
entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and
absolution as innocent of all the respondent-accused x x x x Manifestly, the
prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a
partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive
monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian president to assure the
carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of
acquittal, such as that in the case at bar, is a void judgment. In legal
contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a
judgment is ‘a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw.’ It is a terrible
and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. 'To paraphrase
Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of government becomes the lawbreaker, he
breeds contempt for the law; he invites every man to become a law unto
himself; he invites anarchy.’ The contention of respondent-accused that the
Sandiganbayan judgment of acquittal ended the case and could not be
appealed or reopened without being put in double jeopardy was forcefully
disposed of by the Court in People v. Court of Appeals:88
x x x x That is the general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier
pointed out, however, respondent Court's Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it
no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless,
all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars
anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void x x
x x Private respondents invoke 'justice for the innocent.' For justice to prevail
the scales must balance. It is not to be dispensed for the accused alone. The
interests of the society which they have wronged, must also be equally
considered. A judgment of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice. A
verdict of acquittal neither necessarily spells a triumph of justice.1âwphi1 To
the party wronged, to the society offended, it could also mean injustice. This is
where the Courts play a vital role. They render justice where justice is due.
Thus, the doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after trial" may
apply only when the Court finds that the "criminal trial was a sham" because
the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case was
denied due process.89 The Court in People v. Bocar90 rationalized that the
"remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower
courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy."91
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x
x x x"92 Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."93
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction."94 The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively
to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a
desire to know the exact extent of one's liability.95 With this right of repose,
the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found
guilty in a subsequent proceeding.96
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal.97 This interest encompasses his right
to have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial
jury empanelled to try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy personal
strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal
proceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws.98
The ultimate goal is prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its
voice in the finality of the initial proceeding.99 As observed in Lockhart v.
Nelson,100 "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is
that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of
the criminal process." Because the innocence of the accused has been
confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a
second trial would be unfair.101
Petitioner resists the applicability of the finality-of-acquittal doctrine to the
Philippine adjudicative process on the ground that the principle is endemic to
the American justice system as it has specific application only to jury verdicts
of acquittal, and thus finds no valid use in our jurisdiction since the "underlying
rationale of jury acquittals, a special feature of American constitutional law,
has no parallel nor analogy in the Philippine legal system." This is a rather
strained if not facile approach to the issue at hand, for it attempts to introduce
the theory that insofar as the objective of factfinding is concerned, factfinding
forming the core of the philosophy behind double jeopardy, there exists a
difference between a jury acquittal and a "judge acquittal, Philippine version."
To support its contention, petitioner sedulously explains that in the United
States there is an "emerging consensus to differentiate the constitutional
impact of jury verdicts of acquittal vis-à-vis judgments of acquittal rendered by
the bench." While this consensus may have emerged in the United States, it is
not difficult to surmise that it must have been so because of countless
instances of conflict between jury verdicts and judgments of trial judges in the
same case. Resultantly, procedural statutes and jurisprudence have been
wont to draw lines of distinction between the two, hopefully to keep each other
at bay. Since this phenomenon does not occur in our jurisdiction, as we have
no juries to speak of, petitioner’s hypothesis is inappropriate.
Be that as it may, the invalidity of petitioner’s argument lies in its focus on the
instrumentality empowered to rule against the evidence, i.e., the American jury
versus the Philippine judge, no matter how emphatic it qualifies its proposition
with the phrase "underlying rationale of jury acquittals," rather than on the
essential function of factfinding itself which consists of reception, sifting and
evaluation of evidence. Where the main task of factfinding is concerned, there
exists no difference between the American jury and the Philippine trial judge.
Both are triers of facts. This much petitioner has to concede. The attempt
therefore to close the door on the applicability of the finality rule to our legal
system abjectly fails when one considers that, universally, the principal object
of double jeopardy is the protection from being tried for the second time,
whether by jury or judge. Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury
acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved
our own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations
cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and bounds of
double jeopardy having been clearly defined by both constitution and statute,
the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of acquittal upon a
determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an
accused against being twice placed in jeopardy should now be finally put to
rest.
Petitioner assails the decision rendered by the court a quo as blatantly
inconsistent with the material facts and evidence on record, reason enough to
charge respondent judge with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction resulting in a denial of due process. Citing People v. Pablo,102 it
alleges that "respondent aggravated his indiscretion by not x x x reviewing the
evidence already presented for a proper assessment x x x x It is in completely
ignoring the evidence already presented x x x that the respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion." It adds that "discretion must be
exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process,
i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but
of whim and caprice and outright arbitrariness."103
Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioner’s certiorari
as a mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to
camouflage the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to
petitioner’s assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny,
review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason
thereof, there cannot be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
judge to warrant issuance of the great writ of certiorari.
We agree. The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the
court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order
that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the
inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not proceeded according to
the essential requirements of the law. However, the original function and
purpose of the writ have been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It
is particularly so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the
writ and problems arise concerning the right of the state to appeal in a criminal
case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the
absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem comes into
sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the prosecution is
attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that
his constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon.104
Generally, under modern constitutions and statutes, provisions are available
as guides to the court in determining the standing of the prosecution to secure
by certiorari a review of a lower court decision in a criminal case which has
Page 98 of 129
favored the defendant. In most instances, provisions setting forth the scope
and function of certiorari are found together with those relating to the right of
the state to appeal or bring error in criminal matters. There is some indication
that courts view the writ of certiorari as an appeal in itself where the applicant
shows that there is no other adequate remedy available,105 and it is not
uncommon to find language in cases to the effect that the state should not be
permitted to accomplish by certiorari what it cannot do by appeal.106 Thus, if
a judgment sought to be reviewed was one entered after an acquittal by a jury
or the discharge of the accused on the merits by the trial court, the standing of
the prosecution to review it by certiorari is far more likely to be denied than if it
were such an order as one sustaining a demurrer to, or quashing the
indictment, or granting a motion for arrest of judgment after a verdict of
guilty.107
Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good
reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting
an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.
The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge
acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's
appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A
reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered
the evidence received at trial. These consisted among others of the
testimonies relative to the positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and
the trajectory, location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of
the expert witness for the prosecution. While the appreciation thereof may
have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does
not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed upon.
This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of
excess or lack of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and
therefore non-reviewable by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not
to be confused with errors in the exercise of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Puno, J., agree with J. Panganiban’s separate opinion.
Melo, J., in the result.
Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 140633 February 4, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division) and GERONIMO Z. VELASCO,
respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Assailed in the instant petition for certiorari1 is the Resolution dated October
11, 1999 of public respondent Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) in Criminal
Case No. 13006 ("People of the Philippines v. Geronimo Z. Velasco") granting
the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused and dismissing the said
criminal case for insufficiency of evidence.
The Information filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against Geronimo Velasco, then Minister of Energy, for violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act"), as amended, reads:
"That on or about and during the period from 1977 to 1986, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, being then the Minister of Energy and Chairman of the Board and
President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), a government
owned and controlled corporation, did then and there deliberately and
unlawfully, in evident bad faith and shameless abuse of his administrative
official function and power as such Minister of Energy and PNOC President
and Chairman of the Board, spend funds and utilize equipment and personnel
of PNOC and its subsidiaries at a total cost to PNOC of ₱3,032,993.00 in the
construction and maintenance of his own Telin Beach Resort located at
Bagac, Bataan, Philippines, managed by Telin Development Corporation and
owned by Gervel, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by said accused, thereby
giving himself unwarranted benefits and causing undue injury to PNOC, to the
damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of
₱3,032,993.00, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW."2
Upon arraignment, Velasco pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed, with leave of court, a
Demurrer to Evidence3 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, it
was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the
Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated October 11, 1999. Consequently, the
case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Hence the present petition.
Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, when it granted
respondent Velasco’s motion for reconsideration and dismissed Criminal Case
No. 13006. According to petitioner, respondent Velasco cannot invoke the rule
on double jeopardy since the assailed Resolution is null and void for failure of
the Sandiganbayan to state therein a summary of the facts proved by the
prosecution’s evidence, in violation of Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution,4 and Section 7 of P. D. No. 1606,5 as amended, and Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.6
The petition has no merit.
Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused’s demurrer to evidence, the
court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.7 The grant or
denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave
abuse of discretion.8 Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such
order amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused
would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.9 This
constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made
with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of
double jeopardy.10
In People v. Velasco,11 this Court had the opportunity to stress the finality-of-
acquittal rule, thus:
"The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into the ‘humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State x
x x.’ Thus, Green expressed the concern that ‘(t)he underlying idea, one that is
deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty.
"It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is ‘part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction.’ The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for ‘repose,’ a desire to
know the exact extent of one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding."
Such is the magnitude of the accused’s right against double jeopardy that
even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial
court will not lie.12 The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is
when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the
prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case, as in Gorion v.
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Br. 17,13 People v. Bocar,14 Portugal v.
Reantaso,15 People v. Albano,16 Saldana v. Court of Appeals,17 People v.
Court of Appeals,18 or that the trial was a sham, as in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan.19 However, while certiorari may be resorted to cure an
abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so
grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.20
Here, respondent Velasco filed his demurrer to evidence after the prosecution
adduced its evidence and rested its case. Obviously, petitioner was not
deprived of its right to due process. Thus, respondent Velasco’s plea of double
jeopardy must be upheld.
Section 14 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o decision
shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based." One of the purposes of the
constitutional requirement is to assure the parties that the judge arrived at his
decision through the processes of legal and factual reasoning. Thus, it is a
shield against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding by
ipse dixit.21 Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution
but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on
the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend
Page 99 of 129
on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his
decision.22
A careful review of the assailed Resolution shows that respondent
Sandiganbayan painstakingly and exhaustively passed upon, considered and
evaluated the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, adduced by the
prosecution. It likewise cited factual and legal bases for its conclusions, thus:
"The Information charges the accused with having by himself committed the
offense, without any allegations that he has conspired with others in doing so.
Moreover, that the accused committed the offense "in evident bad faith" is the
sole mode or means of commission alleged. Perforce, it was incumbent upon
the prosecution to adduce evidence that the accused directly and personally
committed the crime charged through "evident bad faith."
However, there is a complete vacuum as to any evidence of direct personal
participation by the accused in the subject transactions. An element of the
offense is that the act of the accused must have been "in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions," i.e., that said public officer
committed the prohibited acts during the performance of his official duties or in
relation to his public position. This is absent here. No evidence has been
presented to show that the accused himself, in his capacity as Minister of
Energy and/or as Chairman of the Board and President of PNOC, spent
government money and used government equipment and personnel for the
construction and maintenance of the Telin Beach Resort. No evidence has
likewise been presented that the accused, in his capacity as Minister of
Energy and/or as Chairman of the Board and President of PNOC, directed,
ordered, induced or caused others to do so. What the evidence does show is
that the transactions relating to Telin, while they were duly approved by "top
management," did not require approval by the accused and were not approved
by or at the level of the accused and that not one of the hundreds of
documents presented was signed or approved by the accused. In short, no
nexus exists between the evidence presented and the liability sought to be
imputed against the accused.
Of great significance is the manner by which PNOC has characterized the
account as "advances" approved by operating management, which were duly
recorded and fully documented as such in the usual manner, and were
complete and regular, and which upon audit were found to be regular. These
circumstances are wholly inconsistent with, and inherently contrary to, any
notion that the transactions were made with evident bad faith or with intent to
injure PNOC.
We reject the prosecution’s theory that since the accused knew of the work
that was done or being done at the Telin Resort, it follows that he had caused
the same to be done. In the first place, the evidence is not enough to lead to
any conclusion or inference that the accused knew that work was being done
at the Telin Resort by the PNOC. Indeed, even assuming that the accused did
have knowledge of such work being done, it would be too tenuous to conclude
on the sole basis thereof that he had in fact "caused" such work, much less
that he did so with "evident bad faith."
xxx
We also are unconvinced of the existence of the element of "undue injury" in
this case.1âwphi1 There is no reason to deviate from the very manner by
which PNOC itself has chosen to treat the account as "advances" approved by
operating management, duly recorded and fully documented as such, and
which passed muster upon audit. The alleged unpaid amount of
₱3,032,993.00 was not even considered a collectible or receivable, nor was
the same billed or such account considered delinquent by PNOC. Given this
state of facts, injury suffered by the PNOC, if any, is hardly of an undue
nature.
At best, all that the prosecution has presented is circumstantial evidence.
However, ‘(i)n order to convict a person accused of a crime on the strength of
circumstantial evidence alone, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to present
such circumstantial evidence which will and must necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the accused is guilty of the crime charged beyond reasonable
doubt, excluding all and each every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his
innocence.’ Furthermore, ‘if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
innocence of the accused of the crime charged and the other consistent with
their guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is
not sufficient to support a conviction.’ We believe that the facts borne out by
the evidence are entirely consistent with the proposition advanced by the
accused that the transactions are purely commercial in character, so much so
that any liability that the accused may have would be merely civil in nature. In
this connection, it appears that the prosecution has opted to pursue the issue
of any such civil liability in Civil Case No. 0003; hence, we are left with nothing
to proceed with in this case.
In fine, applying the standards set by Dramayo, we hold that the evidence of
the prosecution has failed to meet the degree of proof required to overcome
the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, and the case should
thus be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence."23 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, no trace of impetuosity or wantonness on the part of respondent
Sandiganbayan exists which would place this case within the purview of the
evil sought to be prevented by the said constitutional proscription. In Yao v.
Court of Appeals,24 this Court, through Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
struck down a decision of a Regional Trial Court for being "starkly hollow,
otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form." The challenged
Resolution can hardly be characterized as such.
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of respondent Sandiganbayan
warranting the nullification of its October 11, 1999 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., abroad on official business.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132081 November 26, 2002
JOEL M. SANVICENTE, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner was charged with homicide for the killing of one Dennis Wong y
Chua. On June 11, 1995, at around 5:30 p.m., petitioner fatally shot the victim
outside the Far East Bank along Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon
City after the latter allegedly attempted to rob him of a large amount of cash
which he had just withdrawn from the automatic teller machine.1
Responding policemen found the lifeless body of the victim at the parking
space in front of the Far East Bank and Trust Company Branch along
Katipunan Road, Loyola Heights, Quezon City. Recovered at the scene were
five empty caliber .45 shells, two live caliber .45 bullets and an ATM card in
the name of Violeta Sanvicente.2
On June 13, 1995, police authorities located petitioner’s car in Barrio Malapit,
San Isidro, Nueva Ecija and took custody thereof.
Petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Leonardo A. Valmonte, turned over to Police Station
9 petitioner’s .45 caliber Mark IV pistol bearing Serial No. 5504095. He also
wrote a letter addressed to P/Major Antonio Diaz, Station Commander of PNP
Station 9, CPDC, Anonas Road, Quezon City which reads as follows:
This is in connection with the alleged death of one Dennis Wong that occurred
in Katipunan Ave., Q.C., in the afternoon of June 11, 1995.
According to my client, Joel Sanvicente, on said date, place and hour above
he just withdrew from the Far East Bank and Trust Co., Katipunan branch a
large amount of cash. On his way out of the bank, said victim immediately
attacked him to grab the money he has just withdrew (sic). My said client
pulled out his gun (duly licensed with Permit to Carry) and fired a warning shot
upwards. Still the deceased continued his attack and grabbed his gun. After a
brief struggle, my client was forced to shoot the deceased in the defense of his
person and money. My client will submit a formal statement during the proper
preliminary investigation, if needed.
On June 13, 1995, my client’s car (Mercedes Benz with plate no. TFU 736)
was taken by your operatives led by Capt. Alejandro Casanova and [is] now in
your custody.
In view of the untoward incident, my client suffered serious anxiety and
depression and was advised to undergo medical treatment and confinement at
the Delos Santos Hospital in Rodriguez Ave., Q. C. My client would have no
objection if you assigned police escort/guard under your supervision pending
his confinement.
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender,
without admission of guilt on the part of my client.3
At his arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty.4
During the trial, the prosecution presented Ballistics Report No. B-046-95,
stating that slugs recovered from the crime scene, on the one hand, and
cartridge cases fired from petitioner’s caliber .45 Mark IV pistol, on the other
hand, were fired from the same firearm.5 The Medico-Legal Officer who
conducted the autopsy on the deceased failed to appear at the trial. In order to
dispense with her testimony, petitioner admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the medico-legal report. After trial, the prosecution filed its
Formal Offer of Exhibits,6 which included the above-quoted letter of
petitioner’s counsel to P/Maj. Antonio Diaz, marked as Exhibit LL. The trial
court admitted all the prosecution’s exhibits in its Order dated August 27,
1996.7
Meanwhile, petitioner begged leave to file a demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the trial court.8 Hence, on August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a
Motion To Dismiss (On Demurrer to Evidence),9 based on the following
grounds: (1) the lack of positive identification of the accused is a fatal omission
warranting dismissal; (2) prosecution’s evidence are totally
Page 100 of 129
hearsay/incompetent, hence, inadmissible and the guilt of the accused was
not proven by positive evidence beyond reasonable doubt.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court issued an Order dismissing the case
together with the civil aspect thereof for insufficiency of evidence.10
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration,11 which was denied on the
ground, among others, that with the dismissal of the case double jeopardy had
set in.12
The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43697. In a Decision dated July 25, 1997,13 the
appellate court nullified the October 7, 1996 Order of the trial court.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration14 was likewise denied in a Resolution
dated January 2, 1998.15
Hence, the instant petition.
In reversing the trial court’s Order dismissing the criminal case against
petitioner, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in preventing the prosecution from establishing the due
execution and authenticity of Exhibit LL which, it claimed, "positively identified
petitioner as the perpetrator of the crime charged."16
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without
leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to evidence, the court is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence
to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.17
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence
of a grave abuse of discretion.18 Significantly, once the court grants the
demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any further prosecution of
the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy.19 This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a
criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.20 The finality-of-acquittal rule was
stressed thus in People v. Velasco:21
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizens, when brought in unequal contest with the State
xxx."22 Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one
that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be
allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and
compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as
enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."23
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction."24 The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively
to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a
desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability.25 With this right of repose,
the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent,
even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found
guilty in a subsequent proceeding.26
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy,
even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie.27
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case,28 or where the trial was a sham.29 However, while certiorari
may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an
extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.30
In the instant case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence after the
prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. The trial court
subsequently dismissed the case after finding that the evidence presented by
the prosecution was insufficient to support the charge against petitioner. The
prosecution, which relied primarily on Exhibit LL as the basis for the indictment
against petitioner, however, contested the dismissal of the case allegedly
because the trial court prevented it from further identifying the genuineness
and due execution of said document "in the manner that it wanted."31
The crux of the problem lies in the confusion between the due execution of a
piece of documentary evidence vis-à-vis the truth of its contents. Likewise at
the core of the dilemma is the fundamental distinction between an admission
and a confession. The prosecution maintains that the letter, Exhibit LL,
constituted a confession and argues thus: "What better evidence is there to
positively identify the perpetrator of the crime than the confession of the
petitioner himself, freely and voluntarily given, assisted by counsel?"32
According to the prosecution, this "extrajudicial confession constitutes the
strongest evidence of guilt."33
An admission is defined under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court as
the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact. A confession,
on the other hand, under Rule 130, Section 33 is the declaration of an
accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged or any offense
necessarily included therein.
More particularly, a confession "is a declaration made at any time by a person,
voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement stating or acknowledging
that he had committed or participated in the commission of a crime. The term
admission, on the other hand, is usually applied in criminal cases to
statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused or of criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged."34
In short, in a confession, an accused acknowledges his guilt; while there is no
such acknowledgment of guilt in an admission.35 Only recently in People v.
Licayan,36 the Court distinguished "confession" and "admission" in this wise:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal
case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by
the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in
connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an
admission is something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment
of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to authorize a
conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
(Emphasis ours) 37
There is no question that the letter dated June 14, 1995 is an admission, not a
confession, because of the unmistakable qualification in its last paragraph that
– its case against the accused can not be gainsaid because, as has been stated
For all intense (sic) & purposes, this letter shall serve as a voluntary surrender,
without admission of guilt on the part of my client. . . (Emphasis and italics
supplied).
With the foregoing distinctions in mind, the trial court correctly rejected the
prosecution’s motion to have Exhibit LL further identified "in the manner that it
wanted,"38 i.e., through the proposed testimony of petitioner’s counsel, Atty.
Valmonte, who incidentally refused to testify. Aside from covering a subject
which squarely falls within the scope of "privileged communication", it would,
more importantly, be tantamount to converting the admission into a
confession.
It can not be denied that the contents of Exhibit LL, particularly with regard to
the details of the shooting communicated by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte, is
privileged because it is connected with the business for which petitioner
retained the services of the latter.39 More specifically, said communication
was relayed by petitioner to Atty. Valmonte in order to seek his professional
advice or assistance in relation to the subject matter of the employment, or to
explain something in connection with it, so as to enable him to better advice
his client or manage the litigation.40
Pertinent to this is Section 24 (b) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. – The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxxxxxxxx
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in
the course of, or with a view to, professional employment nor can an attorney’s
secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the
client and his employer, concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been
acquired in such capacity; x x x.
It is worthy to note that the prosecution did not summon petitioner himself to
testify although he too was a signatory of Exhibit LL. Apparently, it was aware
that petitioner could well invoke his right against self-incrimination and refuse
to answer its questions. The prosecution then attempted to draw out what it
could not constitutionally extract from his lawyer. Yet, and as stated
previously, said Exhibit LL had earlier been admitted in evidence by the trial
court in its Order dated August 27, 1996. What was objectionable was the
prosecution’s sole reliance on the document without proof of other facts to
establish its case against petitioner because of its mistaken assumption that
the same was a confession.
Significantly, the prosecution was neither barred nor prevented by the trial
court from establishing the genuineness and due execution of the document
through other means. Rule 132, Section 20of the Rules of Court provides the
following means of authenticating the document:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. – Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
Page 101 of 129
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed
to be.
Thus, the due execution of a document can be proved through the testimony
of: (1) the person/s who executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution
was acknowledged; or (3) any person who was present and saw it executed
and delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized
the signatures therein or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument
previously confirmed the execution thereof.41
Thus, respondent could have called to the witness stand P/Maj. Antonio Diaz,
the addressee of Exhibit LL, to identify the said document since it was
supposedly delivered to him personally. Samples of the signatures appearing
on the document which can be readily obtained or witnesses who are familiar
with them could have also been presented. The prosecution did not. Neither
did it subpoena P/Senior Inspector Alejandro M. Casanova, who prepared the
detailed Police Report of the incident used as the basis of the inquest
proceedings, nor were any eyewitnesses presented, notwithstanding that there
appeared to be at least two eyewitnesses to the incident.
It must be borne in mind that in a criminal trial, it is the prosecution that
determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and factual elements in
the case shall be utilized as components of the information.42 Stated
differently, the determination of what evidence to adduce to bolster a
successful prosecution of a criminal offense is the exclusive domain of
prosecutorial discretion. Indeed, courts generally can not interfere with the
prosecutor’s discretion as to control over criminal prosecutions.43 However, it
is the court which ultimately determines whether such evidence is sufficient to
sustain an indictment, thus, the care with which the prosecution must build up
time and again, in any criminal prosecution, the State must rely on the strength
of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence of the
defense.44
Viewed vis-a-vis the foregoing lapses detailed above, the prosecution’s
insistence to have Exhibit LL admitted "in the manner it wanted" shows only
too clearly a subtle but shrewd scheme to cover up for the foregoing
procedural missteps and to cut evidentiary corners to build its case at the
expense of the defense. This cannot be countenanced. An accused should not
be prejudiced for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden of
overcoming the constitutional presumption of innocence and to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.45 Indeed, if the prosecution
fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed,
it is even more the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.46
If at all, the foregoing acts of the prosecution underscores just how careless
and haphazard it had been in building up a case against the petitioner. For
such, it has nothing but itself to blame if the trial court in assaying the proof it
adduced found the same wanting. It will neither be allowed to sweep its
procedural miscues under the rug, so to speak, on the pretext that it was
denied due process when the trial court supposedly prevented it from
presenting Exhibit LL. To be more precise, the trial court had admitted Exhibit
LL in evidence but rejected the further admission of the document "in the
manner that it wanted." Verily, the prosecution can not have its cake and eat it
too.
Moreover, we agree with the trial court that the letter marked as Exhibit LL is
hearsay inasmuch as its probative force depends in whole or in part on the
competency and credibility of some person other than the witness by whom it
is sought to produce it.47 The term as used in the law of evidence "signifies all
evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness
from whom it is elicited, and which consequently does not depend wholly for
its credibility and weight upon the confidence which the court may have in him.
Its value, if any, is measured by the credit to be given to some third persons
not sworn as witnesses to that fact and consequently not subject to cross-
examination."48 In short, it is "the evidence not of what the witness knows
himself but of what he has heard from others."49 Thus, in one case we stated
that "[w]hen evidence is based on what was supposedly told the witness, the
same is without any evidentiary weight being patently hearsay."50 In the case
at bar, it is noteworthy that the statements in the letter were made by
petitioner’s counsel, who even began his narration of the events with the
phrase: "According to my client."51
In holding that petitioner was identified as the person who committed the
offense, the appellate court relied on the following circumstances: (1) he
admitted responsibility therefor through Exhibit LL, which was signed by him
and his counsel; (2) he surrendered even before the issuance of the warrant of
arrest; (3) his gun was also surrendered to the police authorities by his
counsel; (4) empty shells recovered at the scene of the crime matched his
gun; and (5) the letter-referral of P/Senior Inspector Alejandro Casanova to
Quezon City Prosecutor indicated that petitioner was under the custody of the
policeman on detail supposedly to guard him at the hospital.52
With regard to the first circumstance, suffice it to state that, as has lengthily
been discussed earlier, Exhibit LL is merely an admission and not a
confession. In fact, petitioner specifically denied criminal intent therein. By and
of itself it is insufficient to support a conviction unless it is considered in
connection with other proof to establish the ultimate fact of guilt.
The second and third incidents actually support petitioner’s innocence
because were he indeed guilty of the felony, he would not likely have
surrendered even before the warrant was issued for his arrest. Courts go by
the biblical truism that the "the wicked flee when no man pursueth but the
righteous are as bold as a lion."53
The fourth event merely proves the fact that the empty shells recovered from
the crime scene were fired from the surrendered gun. It, however, does not
answer the penultimate question of who actually pulled the trigger of the
firearm.
Lastly, the appellate court’s reading of the letter-referral,54 mentioning that
petitioner had been placed under the custody of a policeman, was inaccurate.
As explained by Atty. Valmonte in Exhibit LL, the policeman was actually
requested for petitioner’s personal safety owing to the untoward incident which
caused petitioner serious anxiety and depression, and for which he had to
undergo treatment and confinement.55
All told, we find no grave abuse on the part of the trial court in dismissing the
charges against petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1997 and the Resolution dated
January 2, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP No. 43697 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 172716 November 17, 2010
JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE
PONCE, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s ruling finding inapplicable the
Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the
accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second
prosecution.
The Facts
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
(Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband
Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner
posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.
On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case
No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this
conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
82366 for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense
of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3
After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the
arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No. 2803 as a prejudicial
question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and
ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment
until after his arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.
Page 102 of 129
Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the
RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for petitioner’s loss of standing to
maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803,
narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s forfeiture of standing to maintain
S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without
reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the RTC effectively affirmed the
MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803
constrained him to forego participation in the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence
sanctioning dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his
appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a pre-trial relief, not a
post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7
Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A.
2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner argues that his constitutional right not
to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in
Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same offense of reckless imprudence
charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple
consequences of such crime are material only to determine his penalty.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision
forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the
merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding
that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g.
homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in
Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case
No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor
General’s motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent
judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by
counsel.
The Issues
Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his
standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when the MeTC ordered his arrest
following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366;
and (2) if in the negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No.
82366.
The Ruling of the Court
We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal
Case No. 82366 did not divest him of personality to maintain the petition in
S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding
petitioner from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense bars further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366.
Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in
Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or
violation of the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph
of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to
"also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in
Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.
The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a
pre-arraignment ancillary question on the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under
procedural rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v.
Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling because Esparas stands for a
proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an
appeal by an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited
drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and was thus tried and
convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of
death sentences under Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of
Rule 124.10
The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his
arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as proof of his loss of standing
becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a
defendant who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under
Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its
bond (subject to cancellation should the bondsman fail to produce the accused
within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted.
Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the bondsman to produce the accused
underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert
the accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.
Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he
failed to attend the scheduled proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the
records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the
MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the
RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment
(the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s
arrest), petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as
of the filing of this petition.
Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366
The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense"13 protects him from, among others, post-
conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed
that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367 was rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on
the question whether Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367
involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting
that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The
MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight
Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not."15
We find for petitioner.
Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,
its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text
of the provision reads:
Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less
grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of
arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act
which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of
arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted
a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall
be imposed.
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted
in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times
such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.
A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon
any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some
wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.
In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound
discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty-four.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:
1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those
provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall
impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in
the period which they may deem proper to apply.
2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile
Law, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall
be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing
to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons,
time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases
in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger
clearly manifest.
Page 103 of 129
The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be
imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the injured parties
such help as may be in this hand to give.
Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings
relating to (1) the penalties attached to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and
"negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or
both quasi-offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts
in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the definition of "reckless
imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-
offenses penalize "the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,"16
unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the
mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct
species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the framework of our
penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we
already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of
the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that "reckless imprudence is not a
crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of
analysis: (1) the object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to
intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as distinct
offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of
minimal intent) and; (3) the different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and
intentional crimes:
The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless
imprudence" is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and
merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve
unqualified assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be
committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief,
etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a
mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a
mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act
itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is
the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness,
lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x
Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies,
operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the
mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so
grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would
require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the
penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty
for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the
negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision
correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony,
notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from
prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual
penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime,
but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis
supplied)
This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state
that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.19
Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to
hear a case for "Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence," its
jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional
crime conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in
quasi-crimes.
Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day
penal code) and since repeatedly reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual
foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of
committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned when the Court en banc
promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller
in 1939. Quizon rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding
that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of crimes and not
merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon
jurisprudence24 only by dint of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an
indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and the
complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which, as will be shown shortly, rests on erroneous conception of quasi-
crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a
related branch of jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-
offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense alleging one
resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging
another resulting act but arising from the same reckless act or omission upon
which the second prosecution was based.
Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-
offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that
conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for
the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded
this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to
Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for
"damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior case against
the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which
the first prosecution was based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then,
whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent
prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the consequences
alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in
the affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en
banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en
banc, per Bengzon J.), People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court
en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in 1966 by
the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968
by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of
Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division,
per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as
constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection
under the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses was best articulated by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution
for "serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless
imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of "slight physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same
act, the Court explained:34
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as
the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended
to its logical conclusion the reasoning of Quizon.
There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line
of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v.
Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed
the subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property despite his previous conviction for multiple physical
injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon
which the second prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the
post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly overrule it. At any
rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There,
we reviewed the Court of Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to
property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight and
less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same
act upon which the second charge was based. The Court of Appeals had
relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38
Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in
the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona decided on November 14, 1940.
However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968),
this Court, speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –
Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a
felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result
thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to
determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as
the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the
same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx
. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace
(now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First
Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the
consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second
accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.39
(Emphasis supplied)
Page 104 of 129
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.
It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his
earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the accused, a fact which did not
escape the Court’s attention:
Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his
MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the Rollo) admits
that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double
jeopardy and submits that "its affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in
Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to property
through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed
that "if double jeopardy exists where the reckless act resulted into homicide
and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow where
the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and
physical injuries. Verily, the value of a human life lost as a result of a vehicular
collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in
refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of protection afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to
petitioner’s case than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused,
who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in two separate
Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and
"Homicide with Serious Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following
his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but,
on reconsideration, found merit in the accused’s claim and dismissed the
second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of
the issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42
On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and
dismissed the case, holding: —
[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double
jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga
and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot,
Albay, with the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising
from a collision between the two automobiles driven by them (Crim. Case No.
88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise
disposed of, two other criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the
peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage to property
through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one
of the vehicles involved in the collision, and another for multiple physical
injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed
against Jose Belga only. After trial, both defendants were acquitted of the
charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga
moved to quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless
imprudence filed against him by the injured passengers, contending that the
case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he
had just been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose
Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the Court of First Instance of
Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless
imprudence filed by one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision
had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after Jose Belga
had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such
remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance two
informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, and another for damage to property through reckless
imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First Instance, upon
motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion
to quash. On appeal by the Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed
by the Supreme Court in the following language: .
The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the
case filed by the chief of police constitutes a bar to his subsequent prosecution
for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.
In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954,
the accused was charged in the municipal court of Pasay City with reckless
driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an
automobile in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’
After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was dismissed in that court
῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city
attorney filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging
the same accused with damage to property thru reckless imprudence. The
amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy,
the accused filed a motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the
ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice Montemayor —
The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of
violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted before the Pasay City Municipal
Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence
charged in the Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double
jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information (Rule 113, Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which
proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts alleged in
the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second
charge and vice versa; or whether one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention
of the prosecuting attorney that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view
of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The
prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant have been previously cleared by the inferior court.43
Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga
(and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application."44
We declined the invitation, thus:
The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case,
on the ground of double jeopardy, upon the basis of the acquittal of the
accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence.
In the same breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts
of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga case x x x, upon
which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor
General, however, urges a re-examination of said ruling, upon certain
considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We
find, nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the
Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or similar to those in the present
case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there
is nothing which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability
of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this Court has reiterated the
views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero,
etc., L-12669, April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)
Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the
MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but awkward attempts to harmonize
conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on
complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal Code. Article 48 is a
procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under
either of two categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation light felonies46); and (2)
when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The
legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of
serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the
most serious crime.
In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a
felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind the act, the dangerous
recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude
regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as
one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.
Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to
combine in a single prosecution multiple intentional crimes falling under Titles
1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the
complexities of human interaction can produce a hybrid quasi-offense not
falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in
multiple non-crime damages to persons and property with varying penalties
corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing prosecutorial
dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should
Article 48’s framework apply to "complex" the single quasi-offense with its
multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed
under a single charge, collectively alleging all the consequences of the single
quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties
under Article 365?
Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of
which involved the issue of double jeopardy) applied Article 48 by
"complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one
consequence amounts to a light felony, in which case charges were split by
grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less grave
felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other
hand, resulting acts amounting to light felonies and filing the charge with the
first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly
sanctioned (and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act
No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original jurisdiction to impose the
most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its
medium period.
Page 105 of 129
Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the
"complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365 involves only resulting acts
penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single
prosecution of all the resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one
of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other acts are
penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not
deemed to apply and the act penalized as a light offense is tried separately
from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.
The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single
prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime collectively alleged in one
charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each
consequence separately. Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted
paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries,"
as follows:
[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:
When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted
in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine
ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.
The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to
property the amount fixed therein shall be imposed, but if there are also
physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The
information cannot be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another
for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)
By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under
Article 365.
Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in
this field demands choosing one framework over the other. Either (1) we allow
the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into
separate offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-
crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365, discard its conception
under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple
consequences of a quasi-crime as separate intentional felonies defined under
Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single
prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless of their number and severity,
separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the
distinct concept of quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in
Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz line of
cases.1avvphi1
A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying
it the power to make laws constrains us to keep inviolate the conceptual
distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal
code. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365.
It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act
constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which
is a necessary means for committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in
Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double jeopardy does
not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence allegedly because the charge for that offense could not be joined
with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:
The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation
for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave
felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the
case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:
[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution
obliged to first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first
prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the
prosecuting attorney is not now in a position to press in this case the more
serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of
which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.
[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the
Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the
province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one and
the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting
of charges under Article 365, irrespective of the number and severity of the
resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second
prosecutions are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are
conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a
single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In
imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under
Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be
no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be
filed in the same first level court.55
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double
Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the
favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus
caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can
re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of
Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single
prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or
light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes
occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2
February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No 166995 January 13, 2014
DENNIS T. VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
CONSUELO C. ALIGA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 27, 2004 Decision1 and
August 10, 2004 Resolution,2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. R No.
25581entitled People of he Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga which acquitted
respondent Consuelo C. Aliga (Aliga) from the offense charged and, in effect,
reversed and set aside the July 12, 2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
RTC), Branch 147, Makati City.
On October 31, 1996, an Information was filed against respondent Aliga for
the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 30th day of October 1996, in the City of Makati,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then an accountant of Dentrade Inc., herein
represented by Dennis T. Villareal, and who has access to the company’s
checking accounts did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
grave abuse of confidence, with intent [to] gain and without the consent of the
owner thereof, take, steal and carry away from complainant’s office, United
Coconut Planters Bank Check No. HOF 681039 dated October 24, 1996 in the
amount of ₱5,000.00, once in possession of said check, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the amount by changing it to
₱65,000.00 and having the same encashed with the bank, thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the amount of
₱60,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, Dentrade
Inc., in the aforementioned amount of ₱60,000.00.4
During her arraignment on December 6, 1996, respondent Aliga pleaded not
guilty.5 After the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for issuance of a
hold departure order against respondent Aliga and the latter’s motion to
suspend proceedings,6 trial on the merits ensued. Both the prosecution and
the defense were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their
respective documentary exhibits.
The Court of Appeals, substantially adopting the trial court’s findings, narrated
the relevant facts as follows:
Apart from the documentary exhibits "A" to "F", the combined testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses Elsa Doroteo, Diosdado Corompido, Yolanda
Martirez and NBI agent John Leonard David tend to establish the following
factual milieu:
Page 106 of 129
Complainant Dennis T. Villareal is the President and General Manager of
Dentrade, Inc., a corporation with principal office address at the 7/F Citibank
Center 8741 Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. As a businessman, Villareal
maintains checking accounts with the head office of China Banking
Corporation (Chinabank) in Paseo de Roxas and United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB) in Makati Avenue, both banks are located in Makati City. He has
under his employ, Elsa Doroteo, as executive secretary, Diosdado Corompido,
as messenger, Yolanda Martirez, as chief accountant, [respondent] Consuelo
Cruz Aliga and Annaliza Perez, as accounting clerks. [Respondent] has
custody of the personal checks of Villareal. She prepares the personal checks
by typing its contents and submits them to Villareal for his signature. After the
signed checks are delivered to her, she in turn, gives the checks to the
messenger for encashment with the bank.
Sometime in October 1996, Villareal’s governess asked Doroteo for the
payment covering the year 1995 for his children’s teacher in horseback riding.
Doroteo replied that the said fees had been paid. To verify the matter, Doroteo
instructed Perez, one of the accounting clerks, to produce the originals of the
returned checks from [the] personal account of Villareal. Upon examining the
returned checks, Doroteo found out that the fees for the horseback riding
instructor had indeed been paid and that there were large encashments
reflected on the checks in typewritten form. Doroteo informed Villareal of her
findings. Villareal examined the returned checks and was surprised as he
never authorized the large encashments.
Upon advice of his lawyer, Atty. Victor Lazatin of the ACCRA Law Offices, Mr.
Villareal sent a letter to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) asking for
assistance in the investigation of the matter (Exh. "A"). A few days thereafter,
NBI agents John Leonard David and Rafael Ragos arrived at the Dentrade
office. They examined the particular checks which involved large amounts and
interviewed Doroteo.
When asked by the two NBI agents, Villareal told them that there were three
(3) checks pending for his signature, UCPB checks, all in petty cash: one
check was for ₱1,000.00, another for ₱5,000.00, and the last one for
₱6,000.00. They were all in typewritten form which [respondent] prepared. As
suggested by the NBI agents, Villareal signed the three (3) checks. Doroteo
had the three checks photocopied then released their originals to [respondent].
On instruction of Villareal, Doroteo and NBI agent David went to UCPB the
next day hoping that one of the checks will be encashed. At or about 3:00 p.m.
on that day, Doroteo asked the bank teller if Villareal’s three checks were
encashed. The bank teller informed Doroteo that UCPB check in the amount
of ₱65,000.00 was encashed. Doroteo was surprised because she was then
holding a photocopy of the original check for ₱5,000.00 while she saw the
teller holding a check for ₱65,000.00 but the check number and date were
exactly the same as that of its photocopy. Obviously, the number "6" was
intercalated in the check by adding the said number before the digits
"5,000.00." Upon Doroteo’s request, the teller gave her a photocopy of the
supposedly altered check.
Doroteo reported back to the Dentrade office and handed to Villareal the
photocopy of the check bearing the amount of ₱65,000.00. When summoned,
[respondent] arrived then executed a statement voluntarily giving back the
amount of ₱60,000.00 to Villareal in the presence of his lawyers Lazatin and
Vallente, and Doroteo. The said statement was in the handwriting of
[respondent] (Exh. "D"), which reads:
"After being confronted by Mr. Dennis T. Villareal, I am voluntarily
surrendering the ₱60,000.00 as part of the proceeds of UCPB check # 681039
dated October 30, 1996 as follows (in ₱1,000.00 bills) (serial no. of ₱1,000.00
bills subject of the statement)."
Doroteo photocopied the ₱1,000.00 bills (Exh. "E"). After [respondent]
admitted the taking of the excess amount of ₱60,000.00, the NBI agents
placed her under arrest and took her to the NBI detention center.
According to witness Corompido, Villareal’s messenger, at 10:00 a.m. of
October 30, 1996, he was bound for UCPB, Makati Avenue branch.
[Respondent] requested him to pay her "Extelcom" bill and asked him to meet
her at the UCPB bank. After several minutes, the two met at the bank.
[Respondent] handed to Corompido her "Extelcom" bill and one personal
check of Villareal in the amount of ₱65,000.00. [Respondent] returned to the
Dentrade [office]. Corompido gave to the teller [respondent’s] "Extelcom"
payment and also the personal check of Villareal for ₱65,000.00. The teller
release the ₱65,000.00 to Corompido who signed on the stamped portion of
the check. [Respondent] Aliga has a different version for her defense. She
claimed that on October 30, 1996 at around 2:30 p.m., the NBI agents
arrested her but they did [not] inform [her] of her constitutional rights to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel; that she was actually an accounting
assistant to Dentrade’s chief accountant, Yolanda Martirez, the accounting
clerk being Annaliza Perez; that she was not in charge of Villareal’s personal
checking account, but Martirez; that Perez was the one in custody of the
[checkbooks] pertaining to the personal checking accounts of Villareal with
UCPB and [Chinabank]; that Doroteo was in possession of another
[checkbook] and kept it in Villareal’s residence.
[Respondent] admitted that the UCPB and Chinabank checks were also used
for the replenishment of the cash advances made by Villareal; that the
replenishment was prepared using a typewriter by Martirez, Perez, Doroteo
and herself; that there was no regulation or control mechanism in their office
where the responsibility for preparing any particular check on the personal
account of Villareal could be identified; that the issuance of checks against the
personal checking accounts at the UCPB and Chinabank were frequent, from
5 to 12 checks daily; and that there were no accompanying vouchers to record
the purposes for which the checks were issued; and that it was Martirez who
monitors Villareal’s personal checks at the UCPB and Chinabank.7
Additionally, respondent Aliga claimed that Perez, Doroteo, and Martirez are
also using typewriter in the check preparation.8 Moreover, at the time she was
summoned by Villareal inside his office, the two NBI agents (David and
Ragos) and Villareal’s counsels (Attys. Lazatin and Vallente) were joined in by
NBI Director Toledo.9 The extent of the NBI’s participation is disputed. While
respondent Aliga10 maintained that she was already arrested by the NBI at
the moment she was called to the office of Villareal, David11 testified that they
were merely silent spectators therein, just witnessing the confrontation or
interview conducted by Villareal and not even talking to respondent Aliga.
The RTC succinctly opined that the evidence of the prosecution is very clear
that respondent Aliga must have been the one who made the intercalation in
the subject check, and that even without her written admission (Exhibit "D"),
the evidence presented constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt. The July
12, 2001 Decision disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court, finding the accused
CONSUELO CRUZ ALIGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, hereby sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 14
years, 8 months of reclusion temporal as the minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as the maximum.
It appearing that the amount of ₱60,000.00 subject of the offense was already
returned by the accused, the Court hereby absolves the accused of civil
liability in this case.
SO ORDERED.12
Respondent Aliga appealed to the CA, which, on April 27, 2004, reversed and
set aside the judgment of the RTC on the grounds that: (1) her admission or
confession of guilt before the NBI authorities, which already qualifies as a
custodial investigation, is inadmissible in evidence because she was not
informed of her rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of her own choice; and (2) the totality of the circumstantial
evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence of the accused.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA on August 10,
2004; hence, this petition raising the issues for resolution as follows:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING
INADMISSIBLE RESPONDENT’S VOLUNTARY ADMISSION OF GUILT, ON
ITS CLEARLY SPECULATIVE AND CONJECTURAL PREMISE THAT
RESPONDENT’S FREEDOM OF ACTION WAS IMPAIRED WHEN SHE
MADE THE ADMISSION, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. AS LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, AN ADMISSION OF
GUILT SHIFTS THE BURDEN TO THE DEFENSE TO SHOW THAT IT WAS
EXTRACTED BY FORCE OR DURESS.
B. CONTRARY TO THE JURISPRUDENTIAL GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY
CONCLUDED THAT RESPONDENT WAS "EFFECTIVELY PLACED UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION" BY THE SHEER PHYSICAL PRESENCE OF
THE NBI AGENTS WHEN THE ADMISSION WAS MADE. C.
RESPONDENT’S VOLUNTARY ADMISSION WAS MADE TO A PRIVATE
INDIVIDUAL, I.E., PETITIONER HEREIN.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, IF NOT ACTED IN EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION, WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE
PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO OVERCOME
RESPONDENT’S PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JURISPRUDENTIAL
RULING, THE COURT OF APPEALS ENTIRELY OVERLOOKED THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND EXACTED DIRECT EVIDENCE FROM THE
PROSECUTION.
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT IS INNOCENT IS BASED ON ITS FINDING OF A
SUPPOSED INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WHICH IS CONTRADICTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
C. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEPARTED FROM SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, REQUIRING FROM THE PROSECUTION A QUANTUM
OF EVIDENCE GREATER THAN PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT,
WHEN IT:
1. ERRONEOUSLY RULED THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT SOMEONE ELSE COULD HAVE
CAUSED THE ALTERATION ON THE CHECK; AND
Page 107 of 129
2. FAULTING THE PROSECUTION FOR NOT PRESENTING PETITIONER
AS A WITNESS.
D. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, BASED ON
NOTHING MORE THAN RESPONDENT’S DENIALS, IT DEPARTED FROM
THE WELL-SETTLED RULE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT
THAT THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
BASED THEREON, AS WELL AS ITS ASSESSMENT OF THE CREDIBILITY
OF THE WITNESSES, ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON APPELLATE COURTS.13
On the other hand, respondent Aliga countered that:
I.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED
FOR RAISING ONLY QUESTIONS OF FACTS.
II.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED
ON THE GROUND OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
III.
PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION FOR
REVIEW ON CERTIORARI.
IV.
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING ARGUMENTS, THE
PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR
FAILURE TO SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
GRIEVOUS ERROR IN ISSUING THE 27 APRIL 2004 AND 10 AUGUST
2004 DECISIONS; ON THE CONTRARY, THE DECISIONS APPEAR TO BE
IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTS AND THE APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.14
The petition is unmeritorious.
The petition should have been filed
by the State through the OSG
Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without
the representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In Bautista v.
Cuneta-Pangilinan,15 We underscored:
x x x The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before
the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG). Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. It shall have specific powers and functions to
represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA,
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.
The OSG is the law office of the Government.
To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on
behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may
question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again
espoused and maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane, it was
categorically stated that if the criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if
there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the case must be
instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the
private complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to
the civil aspect of the case. The same determination was also arrived at by the
Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Veridiano II. In the recent
case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan, the Court again upheld this guiding
principle.
Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago, wherein the Court had the
occasion to bring this issue to rest. The Court elucidated:
It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to
the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role
is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on
the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor
General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take
such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the
civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds,
the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such
case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so
he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the
respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should
not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action
may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.
Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the
offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to the civil liability arising therefrom. If a
criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by
the State through the Solicitor General. As a rule, only the Solicitor General
may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended
party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.16
In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the civil,
aspect of the CA Decision. It must even be stressed that petitioner never
challenged before the CA, and in this Court, the RTC judgment which
absolved respondent Aliga from civil liability in view of the return of the
₱60,000.00 subject matter of the offense on October 30, 1996. Therefore, the
petition should have been filed only by the State through the OSG. Petitioner
lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it
is only the OSG which can bring actions on behalf of the State in criminal
proceedings before the Supreme Court and the CA. Unlike in Montañez v.
Cipriano17 where we adopted a liberal view, the OSG, in its Comment on this
case,18 neither prayed that the petition be granted nor expressly ratified and
adopted as its own the petition for the People of the Philippines. Instead, it
merely begged to excuse itself from filing a Comment due to conflict of interest
and for not having been impleaded in the case.
A judgment of acquittal may be
assailed only in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
Petitioner also committed another procedural blunder. A petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45. The People may assail a judgment of
acquittal only via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the
petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of
the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against
double jeopardy would be violated.19 The Court made this clear in People v.
Sandiganbayan (First Div.),20 thus:
x x x A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are two and
separate remedies. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of
judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule
45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of
appeal. Under Section 1 of the said Rule, a party aggrieved by the decision or
final order of the Sandiganbayan may file a petition for review on certiorari with
this Court:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for
review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must
be distinctly set forth.
However, the provision must be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a
judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double
jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party
envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a
judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of
acquittal by a petition for review.
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The rule is that a
judgment acquitting the accused is final and immediately executory upon its
promulgation, and that accordingly, the State may not seek its review without
placing the accused in double jeopardy. Such acquittal is final and
unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it happens at the trial
court or on appeal at the CA. Thus, the State is proscribed from appealing the
judgment of acquittal of the accused to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.
xxxx
A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in
double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is burdened to establish
that the court a quo, in this case, the Sandiganbayan, acted without jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must
be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or virtual
refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of law or
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
Page 108 of 129
simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and
erroneous conclusions based on said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to
correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the findings and
conclusions of the trial court.21
The nature of certiorari action was expounded in People v. Court of Appeals
(Fifteenth Div.):22
x x x Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion is an extraordinary remedy.
Its use is confined to extraordinary cases wherein the action of the inferior
court is wholly void. Its aim is to keep the inferior court within the parameters
of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of
discretion may be attributed to the court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to correct
an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.23
and further in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of
Appeals:24
It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not
the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem –
beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not
go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh
the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness
of the evaluation of evidence. x x x It is not for this Court to re-examine
conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute
the findings of fact of the court a quo.25
The case does not fall within the
exception to rule on double jeopardy
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate
court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its
promulgation.26 The rationale for the rule is elucidated in the oft-cited case of
People v. Hon. Velasco:27
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial
court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws and in a jealous watchfulness
over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest with the State. x
x x." Thus, Green expressed the concern that "(t)he underlying idea, one that
is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is
that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted
defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the
absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal
justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful
conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to
verdicts of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire
to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal
justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those
whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be found guilty in a
subsequent proceeding.
Related to his right of repose is the defendant’s interest in his right to have his
trial completed by a particular tribunal. This interest encompasses his right to
have his guilt or innocence determined in a single proceeding by the initial jury
empanelled to try him, for society’s awareness of the heavy personal strain
which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is manifested in
the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate
its very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is
prevention of government oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of
the initial proceeding. As observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental
tenet animating the Double Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be
able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process."
Because the innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final
judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be
unfair.28
People v. Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Div.)29 also stated:
x x x The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily,
it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of
harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated
trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an
acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a
conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying
the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. In People v.
Velasco, we stressed that an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of
repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal x x x.30
However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which
are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a
finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion
under exceptional circumstances.31 Unfortunately for petitioner, We find that
these exceptions do not exist in this case.
First, there is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial.1âwphi1 In fact,
petitioner did not make any allegation to that effect. What the records show is
that during the trial, both parties had more than sufficient occasions to be
heard and to present their evidence. The same is true during the appeal
before the CA. The State, represented by the OSG, was not deprived of a fair
opportunity to prove its case.
And second, no grave abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA. It
could not be said that its judgment was issued without jurisdiction, and, for this
reason, void. Again, petitioner did not even allege that the CA gravely abused
its discretion. Instead, what he asserted was that the CA "gravely erred" in the
evaluation and assessment of the evidence presented by the parties.
Certainly, what he questioned was the purported errors of judgment or those
involving misappreciation of evidence or errors of law, which, as aforesaid,
cannot be raised and be reviewed in a Rule 65 petition. To repeat, a writ of
certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the
commission of grave abuse of discretion, not those which call for the
evaluation of evidence and factual findings.
x x x Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of
judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in
which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is
tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible
only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure
errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its
conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. Since no
error of jurisdiction can be attributed to public respondent in her assessment of
the evidence, certiorari will not lie.32
Upon perusal of the records, it is Our considered view that the conclusions
arrived at by the CA cannot, by any measure, be characterized as capricious,
whimsical or arbitrary. While it may be argued that there have been instances
where the appreciation of facts might have resulted from possible lapses in the
evaluation of the evidence, nothing herein detracts from the fact that relevant
and material evidence was scrutinized, considered and evaluated as proven
by the CA’s lengthy discussion of its opinion. We note that the petition
basically raises issues pertaining to alleged errors of judgment not errors of
jurisdiction which is tantamount to an appeal contrary to the express injunction
of the Constitution the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence.
Conformably then we need not embark upon review of the factual and
evidentiary issues raised by petitioner as these are obviously not within the
realm of Our jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
acquittal of herein respondent Consuelo C. Aliga by the Court of Appeals in its
April 27, 2004 Decision and August 10, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No.
25581 entitled People of the Philippines v. Consuelo Cruz Aliga is AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bill of attainder
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE
PETITIONER'S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner.
MAKASIAR, J.:.
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming
to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation
created under the laws of the land, and praying for a determination of the
validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a declaration of petitioner's rights and
duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, petitioner avers that it has
printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program of
government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of
said petition, petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates
to the Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted,
only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due
process clause, right of association, and freedom of expression and that it is
an ex post facto law.
Page 109 of 129
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the
questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of
expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and equal protection
clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of
the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and
denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-
interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal
change for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must
be "beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that
should be accorded primacy.1
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements
in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post
facto law is likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:.
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was
lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.3
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the
constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive
effect.4
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No.
6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts
committed after the approval of the law and not those perpetrated prior
thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely insinuates that Secs. 8(a)
and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its
approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective
upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of
Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias
"Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
Solicitor R. Mutuc for respondent Feliciano Co.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent Nilo Tayag.
CASTRO, J.:p
I. Statement of the Case
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-
Subversion
Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other
"subversive associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the
Party or of any other similar "subversive" organization.
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-
Subversion Act was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of
First Instance of Tarlac. On March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a
preliminary investigation and, finding a prima facie case against Co, directed
the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding information. The twice-
amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas,
Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking
leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal
organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means
of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the
purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the
government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an
instructor in the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the
New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the
Philippines.
That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating
circumstances are present, to wit:
(a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to
public authorities;
(b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
(c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of
attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the
same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with
subversion. After preliminary investigation was had, an information was filed,
which, as amended, reads:
The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly
designated by the Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal
of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby
accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA,
RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL ALAVADO,
BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES,
whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700,
otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in
the Province of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and
elsewhere in the Philippines, the above-named accused knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts organized, joined and/or remained as offices and/or ranking
leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive organization as
defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and COMMANDER
MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined
and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader
not only of the Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New
People's Army, the military arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines; and
that all the above-named accused, as such officers and/or ranking leaders of
the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and
feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and
stirring the people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms
against the government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to
overthrow the government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence,
deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means among which are the following:
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused
conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered
speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and
overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force,
violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward this end,
the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG
MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of
undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious
propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit
and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to
established in the Philippines a Communist regime.
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA,
together with FRANCISCO PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others,
pursued the above subversive and/or seditious activities in San Pablo City by
recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by instigating and
inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution,
deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the
Philippines a Communist Government.
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the
offense: (a) aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b)
craft, fraud, or disguise was employed.
Page 110 of 129
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute
on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him
the equal protection of the laws.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of
attainder and that it is vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations
against the two accused. The Government appealed. We resolved to treat its
appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or
ex port facto law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which
inflicts punishment without trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative
for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The constitutional ban against bills of
attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of powers 5 by
confining legislatures to
rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial
function.7 History in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress
unpopular causes and political minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the
constitutional prohibition is directed. The singling out of a definite class, the
imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatizea
statute as a bill of attainder. 9
In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo
as a bill of attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the
Philippines as a "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the
country; its existence, a 'clear, present and grave danger to the security of the
Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial court said, Congress usurped "the
powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy by pronouncing the
guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial." Finally,
according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or
not the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of
attainder because it has expressly created a presumption of organizational
guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow."
1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it
does not specify the Communist Party of the Philippines or the members
thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is simply to declare the
Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against membership in the
outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines" issued
solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the
Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having
the same purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on
conduct. 10
This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S.
vs. Brown, 12 was held to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional.
Section 504 provided in its pertinent parts as follows:
(a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
Party ... shall serve —
(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or
similar governing body, business agent, manager, organizer, or other
employee (other than as an employee performing exclusively clerical or
custodial duties) of any labor organization.
during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the
Communist Party....
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and
penalties on its members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto
disqualifies a person from becoming an officer or a member of the governing
body of any labor organization. As the Supreme Court of the United States
pointed out:
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress
undoubtedly possesses power under the Commerce Clause to enact
legislation designed to keep from positions affecting interstate commerce
persons who may use of such positions to bring about political strikes. In
section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by the
Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule
decreeing that any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain
characteristics (acts and characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them
likely to initiate political strikes) shall not hold union office, and leaves to courts
and juries the job of deciding what persons have committed the specified acts
or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it designates in no
uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and
therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability —
members of the Communist Party.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d
625, 81 S CT 1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an
appeal from an order by the Control Board ordering the Communist Party to
register as a "Communist-action organization," under the Subversive Activities
Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. 781 et seq. (1958 ed). The
definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to apply is set
forth in sec. 3 of the Act:
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed,
dominated, or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization
controlling the world Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title,
and(ii) operates primarily to advance the objectives of such world Communist
movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec. 782 (1958 ed.)
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of
attainder, reasoning that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon
which the deprivations setforth in the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets
forth a general definition. Although the Board has determined in 1953 that the
Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," the Court found the
statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would
always come within it:
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has
sustained its conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in
which it now engages, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at
anytime choose to abandon these activities, after it is once registered pursuant
to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d
at 683)
Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally
unnecessary to charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more,
would suffice to secure their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their
guilt still has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to prove at
the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully and by overt acts,
and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country
under the control and domination of a foreign power.
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless
imputed despite the requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party,
suffice it to say that is precisely the nature of conspiracy, which has been
referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all who participate in the criminal
covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the statute were
construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to
further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required
that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the
illegal objectives of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires
that membership, to be unlawful, must be shown to have been acquired
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The ingredient of specific intent to
pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt acts." 15 This
constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of guilty
knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the
organization's unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere
adherence to the organization's illegal objectives.
2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not
activities, this feature is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute
prohibiting partners or employees of securities underwriting firms from serving
as officers or employees of national banks on the basis of a legislative finding
that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation to commit acts
deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill of
attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society
having a membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person
who becomes a member of such society which fails to register or remains a
member thereof, was declared valid even if in its operation it was shown to
apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan. 17
In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18
requiring labor unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union
officers "to the effect that they are not members of the Communist Party and
that they are not members of any organization which teaches the overthrow of
the Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method," was
upheld by this Court. 19
Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on
them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this
ground that statutes which disqualified those who had taken part in the
rebellion against the Government of the United States during the Civil War
from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or which
prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act
on the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or
which made it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an
officer or employee of a labor union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of
attainder.
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally
acknowledged to be certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may
apply its own rules, and judicial hearing is not needed fairly to make such
determination. 25
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature
passed a law requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of
Page 111 of 129
at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who joined or remained a
member of such a society failing to register. While the statute did not specify
the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied to the KKK exclusively. In
sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated against the Ku
Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like
masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme
Court relied on common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux
Klan. The Court said:
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and
reached the conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference
between the two classes of associations shown by experience, and that the
difference consisted (a) in a manifest tendency on the part of one class to
make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and membership a cloak for acts
and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and (b) in the
absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association
in the included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this
organization functions largely at night, its members disguised by hoods and
gowns and doing things calculated to strike terror into the minds of the
people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations and their
purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many
years. Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint
against them regarding violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of
others." Another of the courts said: "It is a matter of common knowledge that
the association or organization of which the relator is concededly a member
exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of sundry classes
of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later said
of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The
benevolent orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already
received legislative scrutiny and have been granted special privileges so that
the legislature may well consider them beneficial rather than harmful
agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities of evil in secret
societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been
judicially demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders,
labor unions and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while
not immune from hostile criticism, have on the whole justified their existence."
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily
available including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the
House of Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation,
purposes and activities of the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting
aside controverted evidence — that the order was a revival of the Ku Klux
Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed from the Know
Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was
limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution
and printed creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to
the Constitution of the United States; in another exacted of its member an oath
to shield and preserve "white supremacy;" and in still another declared any
person actively opposing its principles to be "a dangerous ingredient in the
body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our national
commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews,
and Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was
striving for political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the
administration of local, state and national affairs; and that at times it was
taking into its own hands the punishment of what some of its members
conceived to be crimes. 27
In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of
continuing scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the
Philippines to be an illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the
objective of the Party was the "overthrow of the Philippine Government by
armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of
government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China." 29 More recently,
in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth
organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of
the New People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said:
"We entertain, therefore, no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of
men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and have
thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines.
3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order
that it may fall within the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is
also necessary that it must apply retroactively and reach past conduct. This
requirement follows from the nature of a bill of attainder as a legislative
adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a bill of
attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features.
This is the historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ...
Therefore, if [a statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if
it is not an ex post facto law, the reasons that establish that it is not are
persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld the validity of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or
employment in the service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or
department thereof, either elective or appointive, who has within five (5) years
prior to the effective date of this section advised, advocated, or taught, or who
may, after this section becomes effective, become a member of or affiliated
with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises,
advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised,
advocated, or taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of
the United States of America or of the State of California.
In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the
Act to the petitioner therein, thus:
... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision
insofar as it purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its
effective date. We assume that under the Federal Constitution the Charter
Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars from the city's public service
persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise, advocate, or reach
the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated with
any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an
employment qualification of loyalty to the State and the United States.
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners
were removed, the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and
prospectively operative standards of qualification and eligibility for public
employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any further payment of
compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these circumstances,
viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have
imposed penalties without judicial trial.
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby
assumed judicial magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute
claimed to be a bill of attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it
imposesare inescapable. As the U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to
the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities ControlAct of 1950:
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the
conduct which it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in
probability, few organizationswill come within the statutory terms. Legislatures
may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as harmful to the public
welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by manypersons or by
one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who
engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation
merely by altering thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no
complaintof an attainder. 33
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act.
Section 4 thereof expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to
acts committed"After the approval of this Act." Only those who
"knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate themselves with,become or
remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/or its
successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are
punished. Those whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive
associationat the time of the enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity
of purging themselves of liability byrenouncing in writing and under oath their
membershipin the Party. The law expressly provides that such
renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The
penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable.
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act
that the Communist Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of theGovernment is inteded not to provide the basis for a
legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party butrather to justify the
proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and freedom of
association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly,
any limitation on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a
substantive evil. This isthe reason why before enacting the statute in question
Congressconducted careful investigations and then stated itsfindings in the
preamble, thus:
... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political
party, is in fact an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the
Republic of the Philippinesnot only by force and violence but also by deceit,
subversionand other illegal means, for the purpose of establishing in
thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien dominationand control;
... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the
Philippines constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the
Philippines;
... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion,
national in scope but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party
of the Philippines and its activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to
cope withthis continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country.
In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of
making these findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy,
the trial courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction between
legislative fact and adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe
crucial distinction, thus:
Page 112 of 129
... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of
alcohol would raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has
a reasonable relationto public health, morals, and the enforcement problem.
Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating beverages (assuming itis not so vague
as to require supplementation by rule-making)would raise a question of
adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within the
meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the
Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate
conclusion founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing
them.
A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are
relevant to the legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine
whether there is a rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while
adjudicativefacts — those which tie the legislative enactment to the litigant —
are to be demonstrated and found according to the ordinarystandards
prevailing for judicial trials. 36
The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in
Lansang vs. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation
to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that
effect renders a court functus officio." The recital of legislative findings
implements this test.
With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal
Subversive Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action
organizations" are controlledby the foreign government controlling the
worldCommunist movement and that they operate primarily to"advance the
objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. Supreme Court
said:
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and
reject them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of
Congress over morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S.502, 516, 530. We certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational
imaginings. ... And if we accept them, as we mustas a not unentertainable
appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist organizations pose not
only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United States as
asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of
Congress to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is
extensive. 39
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings
articulated in the Anti-Subversion Act.
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a
proposition too plain to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate
value" of society. It surpasses and transcendes every other value, "forif a
society cannot protect its very structure from armedinternal attack, ...no
subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson so aptly said
in Dennis vs. United States: 41
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right'
to rebellion against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing
structure of government provides for peaceful and orderly change. We
rejectany principle of governmental helplessness in the face of preparationfor
revolution, which principle, carried to its logical conclusion,must lead to
anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of Congress to
prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence.
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly
described in sectin 4 thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that
"even throughthe governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial,that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stiflefundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 42 The requirement of
knowing membership,as distinguished from nominal membership, hasbeen
held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive
organization. 43 For, as has been stated:
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the
organization; and when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge
that the organization is engaged inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or
retaining membershipwith such knowledge makes himself a party to the
unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because
section 2 merely speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may
be achieved by peaceful means, misconceives the function of the
phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in section 4. Section 2 is merely
a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties prescribed for the
different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that
membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be
acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas"
clause makes clear thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by
forceand violence but also be deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The
absence of this qualificatio in section 2 appearsto be due more to an oversight
rather than to deliberateomission.
Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and
other illegal means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful
overthrow ofgovernments, and certainly the law does not speak in
metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act, the use ofthe word
"overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines
a totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and
domination of an alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for
sedition is appropos: "The language used by the appellant clearly imported
anoverthrow of the Government by violence, and it should beinterpreted in the
plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently intended to be understood.
The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring to an
ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip
[which the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an
instrument designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is
inconsistentwith the mild interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us
impute to the language." 45
IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the
Government by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in
freedom of speechand freedom of association is infringed by the
prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the Communist Party ofthe
Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and heavily
outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the
preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many
respects to the membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former
provides:
Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or
assembly of persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or
destruction of any such governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a
member of, or affiliatedwith, any such society, group or assembly of persons,
knowingthe purpose thereof —
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty
years, or both, and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or
any department or agencythereof, for the five years next following his
conviction.... 46
In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United
States: 47
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a
combination to promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports
to be a politicalparty, is not such association as is protected by the
firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why membership, whenit
constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this same
forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the
guarantees of that Amendment.
Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating
the exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and
intricate as inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S.
Federal Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as
to how that threat may best bemet consistently with the safeguards of personal
freedomsis not to be set aside merely because the judgment of judgeswould,
in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in truth, legislation,
"whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort at
compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and
when the legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the
court stands one step removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law."
49
V. The Act and its Title
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill." 50
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last
proviso of section 4 which reads:
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to
overthrow the Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the
government of any of its political subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit,
subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of placing such Government or
political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any lien power, shallbe
punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory
penalties provided therefor in the same code.
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in
the Communist Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any
conspiracyby two persons to overthrow the national or any local governmentby
illegal means, even if their intent is not to establisha totalitarian regime, burt a
democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place the nation under an
aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe United
States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain,
Japan, Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia."
Page 113 of 129
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of
the Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and
forOther Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be
known as the
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the
statuteunequivocally indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general
which has for its fundamental purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian
regime in place of theexisting Government and not merely subversion by
Communistconspiracies..
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need
not recite the details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but
clear termsthe nature, scope, and consequences of the proposed lawand its
operation. 52 A narrow or technical construction isto be avoided, and the
statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to thwart the legislative
intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these requirements.
VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we
cannot overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its
enforcement, operatingas it does in the sensitive area of freedom of
expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the following basic guidelines to be
observed in any prosecution under the Act.The Government, in addition to
proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish the following
elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any
other subversive association:
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist
Party of the Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow
the presentGovernment of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a
totalitarian regime under the domination of aforeign power; (b) that the
accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so knowingly, willfully and
byovert acts; and
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the
CPP continues to pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare
it to be an organizedconspiracy for the overthrow of the Government by
illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country under thecontrol of a
foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did so
willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a
member of the Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive
association: weleave this matter to future determination.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside,
and these two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the
merits. Costs de oficio.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar and Antonio, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 181704 December 6, 2011
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (BOCEA),
represented by its National President (BOCEA National Executive
Council) Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Finance, HON. NAPOLEON L. MORALES, in his capacity
as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, HON. LILIAN B. HEFTI, in
her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, to declare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335,2 otherwise known as the
Attrition Act of 2005, and its Implementing Rules and Regulations3 (IRR)
unconstitutional, and the implementation thereof be enjoined permanently.
The Facts
On January 25, 2005, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into
law R.A. No. 9335 which took effect on February 11, 2005.
In Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima4 (Abakada), we said of R.A. No. 9335:
RA [No.] 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions
through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of
their revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget
and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from
the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their
contribution in the excess collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the
Department of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the
Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or
his/her Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC
or their Deputy Commissioners, two representatives from the rank-and-file
employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the
allocation, distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures
for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with
the criteria adopted by the Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance
evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of rules and
regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
were tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations
of RA [No.] 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created for such purpose.5
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee approved the assailed IRR on
May 22, 2006. Subsequently, the IRR was published on May 30, 2006 in two
newspapers of general circulation, the Philippine Star and the Manila
Standard, and became effective fifteen (15) days later.6
Contending that the enactment and implementation of R.A. No. 9335 are
tainted with constitutional infirmities in violation of the fundamental rights of its
members, petitioner Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA), an
association of rank-and-file employees of the Bureau of Customs (BOC), duly
registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the
Civil Service Commission (CSC), and represented by its National President,
Mr. Romulo A. Pagulayan (Pagulayan), directly filed the present petition before
this Court against respondents Margarito B. Teves, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF), Commissioner Napoleon L.
Morales (Commissioner Morales), in his capacity as BOC Commissioner, and
Lilian B. Hefti, in her capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR). In its petition, BOCEA made the following averments:
Sometime in 2008, high-ranking officials of the BOC pursuant to the mandate
of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, and in order to comply with the stringent
deadlines thereof, started to disseminate Collection District Performance
Contracts7 (Performance Contracts) for the lower ranking officials and rank-
and-file employees to sign. The Performance Contract pertinently provided:
xxxx
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the Attrition Act of 2005, that provides for the
setting of criteria and procedures for removing from the service Officials and
Employees whose revenue collection fall short of the target in accordance with
Section 7 of Republic Act 9335.
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises,
parties unto this Agreement hereby agree and so agreed to perform the
following:
xxxx
2. The "Section 2, PA/PE" hereby accepts the allocated Revenue Collection
Target and further accepts/commits to meet the said target under the following
conditions:
a.) That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection Target and thereby
undertakes and binds himself/herself that in the event the revenue collection
falls short of the target with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated
under the Act and its IRR, he/she will voluntarily submit to the provisions of
Sec. 25 (b) of the IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and
b.) That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective
Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section the said Revenue
Collection Target and require them to execute a Performance Contract, and
direct them to accept their individual target. The Performance Contract
Page 114 of 129
executed by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be
submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the LAIC on or before
March 31, 2008.
x x x x8
BOCEA opined that the revenue target was impossible to meet due to the
Government’s own policies on reduced tariff rates and tax breaks to big
businesses, the occurrence of natural calamities and because of other
economic factors. BOCEA claimed that some BOC employees were coerced
and forced to sign the Performance Contract. The majority of them, however,
did not sign. In particular, officers of BOCEA were summoned and required to
sign the Performance Contracts but they also refused. To ease the brewing
tension, BOCEA claimed that its officers sent letters, and sought several
dialogues with BOC officials but the latter refused to heed them.
In addition, BOCEA alleged that Commissioner Morales exerted heavy
pressure on the District Collectors, Chiefs of Formal Entry Divisions, Principal
Customs Appraisers and Principal Customs Examiners of the BOC during
command conferences to make them sign their Performance Contracts.
Likewise, BOC Deputy Commissioner Reynaldo Umali (Deputy Commissioner
Umali) individually spoke to said personnel to convince them to sign said
contracts. Said personnel were threatened that if they do not sign their
respective Performance Contracts, they would face possible reassignment,
reshuffling, or worse, be placed on floating status. Thus, all the District
Collectors, except a certain Atty. Carlos So of the Collection District III of the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA), signed the Performance Contracts.
BOCEA further claimed that Pagulayan was constantly harassed and
threatened with lawsuits. Pagulayan approached Deputy Commissioner Umali
to ask the BOC officials to stop all forms of harassment, but the latter merely
said that he would look into the matter. On February 5, 2008, BOCEA through
counsel wrote the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to desist
from implementing R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR and from requiring rank-and-file
employees of the BOC and BIR to sign Performance Contracts.9 In his letter-
reply10 dated February 12, 2008, Deputy Commissioner Umali denied having
coerced any BOC employee to sign a Performance Contract. He also
defended the BOC, invoking its mandate of merely implementing the law.
Finally, Pagulayan and BOCEA’s counsel, on separate occasions, requested
for a certified true copy of the Performance Contract from Deputy
Commissioner Umali but the latter failed to furnish them a copy.11
This petition was filed directly with this Court on March 3, 2008. BOCEA
asserted that in view of the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR,
and their adverse effects on the constitutional rights of BOC officials and
employees, direct resort to this Court is justified. BOCEA argued, among
others, that its members and other BOC employees are in great danger of
losing their jobs should they fail to meet the required quota provided under the
law, in clear violation of their constitutional right to security of tenure, and at
their and their respective families’ prejudice.
In their Comment,12 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), countered that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR do not violate the right to due
process and right to security of tenure of BIR and BOC employees. The OSG
stressed that the guarantee of security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution is
not a guarantee of perpetual employment. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR provided
a reasonable and valid ground for the dismissal of an employee which is
germane to the purpose of the law. Likewise, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR
provided that an employee may only be separated from the service upon
compliance with substantive and procedural due process. The OSG added
that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR must enjoy the presumption of constitutionality.
In its Reply,13 BOCEA claimed that R.A. No. 9335 employs means that are
unreasonable to achieve its stated objectives; that the law is unduly
oppressive of BIR and BOC employees as it shifts the extreme burden upon
their shoulders when the Government itself has adopted measures that make
collection difficult such as reduced tariff rates to almost zero percent and tax
exemption of big businesses; and that the law is discriminatory of BIR and
BOC employees. BOCEA manifested that only the high-ranking officials of the
BOC benefited largely from the reward system under R.A. No. 9335 despite
the fact that they were not the ones directly toiling to collect revenue.
Moreover, despite the BOCEA’s numerous requests,14 BOC continually
refused to provide BOCEA the Expenditure Plan on how such reward was
distributed.
Since BOCEA was seeking similar reliefs as that of the petitioners in Abakada
Guro Party List v. Purisima, BOCEA filed a Motion to Consolidate15 the
present case with Abakada on April 16, 2008. However, pending action on
said motion, the Court rendered its decision in Abakada on August 14, 2008.
Thus, the consolidation of this case with Abakada was rendered no longer
possible.16
In Abakada, this Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona, declared Section 1217 of R.A. No. 9335 creating a Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the IRR as unconstitutional
and violative of the principle of separation of powers. However, the
constitutionality of the remaining provisions of R.A. No. 9335 was upheld
pursuant to Section 1318 of R.A. No. 9335. The Court also held that until the
contrary is shown, the IRR of R.A. No. 9335 is presumed valid and effective
even without the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.19
Notwithstanding our ruling in Abakada, both parties complied with our
Resolution20 dated February 10, 2009, requiring them to submit their
respective Memoranda.
The Issues
BOCEA raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335,
AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
OF THE COVERED BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES[;]
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE ATTRITION LAW, REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335,
AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THESE VIOLATE THE RIGHT OF BIR AND BOC
OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE
LAWS[;]
III.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO SECURITY OF
TENURE OF BIR AND BOC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES AS ENSHRINED
UNDER SECTION 2 (3), ARTICLE IX (B) OF THE CONSTITUTION[;]
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS THEY
CONSTITUTE UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE
REVENUE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS ENSHRINED IN THE
CONSTITUTION[; AND]
V.
WHETHER OR NOT REPUBLIC ACT [NO.] 9335 IS A BILL OF ATTAINDER
AND HENCE[,] UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT INFLICTS
PUNISHMENT THROUGH LEGISLATIVE FIAT UPON A PARTICULAR
GROUP OR CLASS OF OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITHOUT TRIAL.21
BOCEA manifested that while waiting for the Court to give due course to its
petition, events unfolded showing the patent unconstitutionality of R.A. No.
9335. It narrated that during the first year of the implementation of R.A. No.
9335, BOC employees exerted commendable efforts to attain their revenue
target of ₱196 billion which they surpassed by as much as ₱2 billion for that
year alone. However, this was attained only because oil companies made
advance tax payments to BOC. Moreover, BOC employees were given their
"reward" for surpassing said target only in 2008, the distribution of which they
described as unjust, unfair, dubious and fraudulent because only top officials
of BOC got the huge sum of reward while the employees, who did the hard
task of collecting, received a mere pittance of around ₱8,500.00. In the same
manner, the Bonds Division of BOC-NAIA collected 400+% of its designated
target but the higher management gave out to the employees a measly sum of
₱8,500.00 while the top level officials partook of millions of the excess
collections. BOCEA relies on a piece of information revealed by a newspaper
showing the list of BOC officials who apparently earned huge amounts of
money by way of reward.22 It claims that the recipients thereof included
lawyers, support personnel and other employees, including a dentist, who
performed no collection functions at all. These alleged anomalous selection,
distribution and allocation of rewards was due to the failure of R.A. No. 9335 to
set out clear guidelines.23
In addition, BOCEA avers that the Board initiated the first few cases of attrition
for the Fiscal Year 2007 by subjecting five BOC officials from the Port of
Manila to attrition despite the fact that the Port of Manila substantially complied
with the provisions of R.A. No. 9335. It is thus submitted that the selection of
these officials for attrition without proper investigation was nothing less than
arbitrary. Further, the legislative and executive departments’ promulgation of
issuances and the Government’s accession to regional trade agreements have
caused a significant diminution of the tariff rates, thus, decreasing over-all
collection. These unrealistic settings of revenue targets seriously affect BIR
and BOC employees tasked with the burden of collection, and worse,
subjected them to attrition.24
BOCEA assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR on the
following grounds:
1. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to due
process because the termination of employees who had not attained their
revenue targets for the year is peremptory and done without any form of
hearing to allow said employees to ventilate their side. Moreover, R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR do not comply with the requirements under CSC rules and
regulations as the dismissal in this case is immediately executory. Such
immediately executory nature of the Board’s decision negates the remedies
available to an employee as provided under the CSC rules.
Page 115 of 129
2. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to
equal protection of the law because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR unduly
discriminates against BIR and BOC employees as compared to employees of
other revenue generating government agencies like the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation, Department of Transportation and Communication,
the Air Transportation Office, the Land Transportation Office, and the
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, among others, which are not subject to
attrition.
3. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the BIR and BOC employees’ right to
security of tenure because R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR effectively removed
remedies provided in the ordinary course of administrative procedure afforded
to government employees. The law likewise created another ground for
dismissal, i.e., non-attainment of revenue collection target, which is not
provided under CSC rules and which is, by its nature, unpredictable and
therefore arbitrary and unreasonable.
4. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the 1987 Constitution because Congress
granted to the Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) the unbridled
discretion of formulating the criteria for termination, the manner of allocating
targets, the distribution of rewards and the determination of relevant factors
affecting the targets of collection, which is tantamount to undue delegation of
legislative power.
5. R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder because it inflicts punishment upon a
particular group or class of officials and employees without trial. This is evident
from the fact that the law confers upon the Board the power to impose the
penalty of removal upon employees who do not meet their revenue targets;
that the same is without the benefit of hearing; and that the removal from
service is immediately executory. Lastly, it disregards the presumption of
regularity in the performance of the official functions of a public officer.25
On the other hand, respondents through the OSG stress that except for
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9335, R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional, as
per our ruling in Abakada. Nevertheless, the OSG argues that the
classification of BIR and BOC employees as public officers under R.A. No.
9335 is based on a valid and substantial distinction since the revenue
generated by the BIR and BOC is essentially in the form of taxes, which is the
lifeblood of the State, while the revenue produced by other agencies is merely
incidental or secondary to their governmental functions; that in view of their
mandate, and for purposes of tax collection, the BIR and BOC are sui generis;
that R.A. No. 9335 complies with the "completeness" and "sufficient standard"
tests for the permissive delegation of legislative power to the Board; that the
Board exercises its delegated power consistent with the policy laid down in the
law, that is, to optimize the revenue generation capability and collection of the
BIR and the BOC; that parameters were set in order that the Board may
identify the officials and employees subject to attrition, and the proper
procedure for their removal in case they fail to meet the targets set in the
Performance Contract were provided; and that the rights of BIR and BOC
employees to due process of law and security of tenure are duly accorded by
R.A. No. 9335. The OSG likewise maintains that there was no encroachment
of judicial power in the enactment of R.A. No. 9335 amounting to a bill of
attainder since R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR merely defined the offense and
provided for the penalty that may be imposed. Finally, the OSG reiterates that
the separation from the service of any BIR or BOC employee under R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR shall be done only upon due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection, subject to Civil Service laws, rules and
regulations, and in compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
The OSG opines that the Performance Contract, far from violating the BIR and
BOC employees’ right to due process, actually serves as a notice of the
revenue target they have to meet and the possible consequences of failing to
meet the same. More, there is nothing in the law which prevents the aggrieved
party from appealing the unfavorable decision of dismissal.26
In essence, the issues for our resolution are:
1. Whether there is undue delegation of legislative power to the Board;
2. Whether R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR violate the rights of BOCEA’s members
to: (a) equal protection of laws, (b) security of tenure and (c) due process; and
3. Whether R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder.
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, we note that it is clear, and in fact uncontroverted, that BOCEA has
locus standi. BOCEA impugns the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR because its members, who are rank-and-file employees of the BOC, are
actually covered by the law and its IRR. BOCEA’s members have a personal
and substantial interest in the case, such that they have sustained or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9335 and its
IRR.27
However, we find no merit in the petition and perforce dismiss the same.
It must be noted that this is not the first time the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9335 and its IRR are being challenged. The Court already settled the majority
of the same issues raised by BOCEA in our decision in Abakada, which
attained finality on September 17, 2008. As such, our ruling therein is worthy
of reiteration in this case.
We resolve the first issue in the negative.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great
branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.28 Necessarily
imbedded in this doctrine is the principle of non-delegation of powers, as
expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata non delegari potest, which
means "what has been delegated, cannot be delegated." This doctrine is
based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of
his own judgment and not through the intervening mind of another.29
However, this principle of non-delegation of powers admits of numerous
exceptions,30 one of which is the delegation of legislative power to various
specialized administrative agencies like the Board in this case.
The rationale for the aforementioned exception was clearly explained in our
ruling in Gerochi v. Department of Energy,31 to wit:
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of legislative
power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed as an
exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety of interactions in
today’s society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws that will
deal adequately with and respond promptly to the minutiae of everyday life.
Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies — the principal agencies
tasked to execute laws in their specialized fields — the authority to promulgate
rules and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies.
All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation
is that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and
that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test.32
Thus, in Abakada, we held,
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the
completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test. A law is complete when
it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by
the delegate. It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the
standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.
RA [No.] 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the
President in fixing revenue targets and the implementing agencies in carrying
out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State to optimize the
revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a
Revenue Performance Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the
purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets."
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing" the delegated
power to the President to fix revenue targets:
"SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. — A Rewards and Incentives Fund,
hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is hereby created, to be sourced from the
collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue targets
of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating
Committee (DBCC), in the following percentages:
Excess of Collection [Over] the Revenue Targets Percent
(%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below — 15%
More than 30% — 15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the
remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately
following the year when the revenue collection target was exceeded and shall
be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection
expected of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as stated in the
Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the
President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the
distribution of the agencies’ revenue targets as allocated among its revenue
districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of the
BOC.
xxx xxx x x x"
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection
expected respectively of the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as
approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on
the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Board’s authority and
identifies the conditions under which officials and employees whose revenue
Page 116 of 129
collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be removed from the
service:
"SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. — The Board in the agency shall
have the following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and
employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least seven
and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all relevant factors
affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations
promulgated under this Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations
and compliance with substantive and procedural due process: Provided, That
the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding
two years in operation, and has no historical record of collection performance
that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in
the middle of the period under consideration unless the transfer was due to
nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance of revenue
targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility
covered by revenue or customs officials or employees has suffered from
economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or force majeure or
economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be
considered only after careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That such decision shall be immediately
executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be
without prejudice to the application of other relevant laws on accountability of
public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act;
xxx xxx x x x"
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards:
"public interest", "justice and equity", "public convenience and welfare" and
"simplicity, economy and welfare". In this case, the declared policy of
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC is infused with public interest.33
We could not but deduce that the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test were fully satisfied by R.A. No. 9335, as evident from the
aforementioned Sections 2, 4 and 7 thereof. Moreover, Section 534 of R.A.
No. 9335 also provides for the incentives due to District Collection Offices.
While it is apparent that the last paragraph of Section 5 provides that "[t]he
allocation, distribution and release of the district reward shall likewise be
prescribed by the rules and regulations of the Revenue Performance and
Evaluation Board," Section 7 (a)35 of R.A. No. 9335 clearly mandates and
sets the parameters for the Board by providing that such rules and guidelines
for the allocation, distribution and release of the fund shall be in accordance
with Sections 4 and 5 of R.A. No. 9335. In sum, the Court finds that R.A. No.
9335, read and appreciated in its entirety, is complete in all its essential terms
and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards as to negate BOCEA’s
supposition of undue delegation of legislative power to the Board.
Similarly, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
Equal protection simply provides that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated in a similar manner, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute
or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities. In
other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely
on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective.361awphil
Thus, on the issue on equal protection of the laws, we held in Abakada:
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a
classification that has a reasonable foundation or rational basis and not
arbitrary. With respect to RA [No.] 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and
the BOC. Since the subject of the law is the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or sanctions provided in
the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law
concerns only the BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct
primary function of generating revenues for the national government through
the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
"Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. — The Bureau of Internal
Revenue, which shall be headed by and subject to the supervision and control
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have
the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues
collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its
functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic
activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units;
and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx x x x"
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
"Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. — The Bureau of Customs which shall be
headed and subject to the management and control of the Commissioner of
Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the recommendation
of the Secretary [of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner,
shall have the following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and
penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds
within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of
vessels and aircrafts in all ports of entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports
under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.
xxx xxx x x x"
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally
perform the special function of being the instrumentalities through which the
State exercises one of its great inherent functions — taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of
the law. Hence, the classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the
BOC under RA [No.] 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal protection.37
As it was imperatively correlated to the issue on equal protection, the issues
on the security of tenure of affected BIR and BOC officials and employees and
their entitlement to due process were also settled in Abakada:
Clearly, RA [No.] 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only
means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the
employee. In the case of RA [No.] 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick
for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at least
7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of
collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the
performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules
and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process.38
In addition, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard,
or as applied to administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain one’s side.39 BOCEA’s apprehension of deprivation of due process
finds its answer in Section 7 (b) and (c) of R.A. No. 9335.40 The concerned
BIR or BOC official or employee is not simply given a target revenue collection
and capriciously left without any quarter. R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR clearly
give due consideration to all relevant factors41 that may affect the level of
collection. In the same manner, exemptions42 were set, contravening
BOCEA’s claim that its members may be removed for unattained target
collection even due to causes which are beyond their control. Moreover, an
employee’s right to be heard is not at all prevented and his right to appeal is
not deprived of him.43 In fine, a BIR or BOC official or employee in this case
cannot be arbitrarily removed from the service without according him his
constitutional right to due process. No less than R.A. No. 9335 in accordance
with the 1987 Constitution guarantees this.
Page 117 of 129
We have spoken, and these issues were finally laid to rest. Now, the Court
proceeds to resolve the last, but new issue raised by BOCEA, that is, whether
R.A. No. 9335 is a bill of attainder proscribed under Section 22,44 Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of
attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of
attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the
imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial.451avvphi1
In his Concurring Opinion in Tuason v. Register of Deeds, Caloocan City,46
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano traces the roots of a Bill of Attainder, to wit:
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In England a few
centuries back, Parliament would at times enact bills or statutes which
declared certain persons attainted and their blood corrupted so that it lost all
heritable quality (Ex Parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 [1867]). In more
modern terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation of judicial power by
a legislative body. It envisages and effects the imposition of a penalty — the
deprivation of life or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of
judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of special legislation,
a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other
than death) is in intent and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified
person or group of persons (and not upon the general community) without a
prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing, without an opportunity to
defend, without any of the civilized forms and safeguards of the judicial
process as we know it (People v. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382 [1972]; Cummings and
Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1867]; U.S. v. Lovett, 328, U.S. 303, 90
L.Ed. 1252 [1945]; U.S. v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 14 L.Ed. 2d. 484 [1965]. Such
is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of legislative oppression.
x x x47
R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not
seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays
down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and
provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still
followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply
protected.
A final note.
We find that BOCEA’s petition is replete with allegations of defects and
anomalies in allocation, distribution and receipt of rewards. While BOCEA
intimates that it intends to curb graft and corruption in the BOC in particular
and in the government in general which is nothing but noble, these intentions
do not actually pertain to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR, but
rather in the faithful implementation thereof. R.A. No. 9335 itself does not
tolerate these pernicious acts of graft and corruption.48 As the Court is not a
trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on
these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the
wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the
Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no
discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment
and language thereof.49 Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor
the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is
doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.50 We have so declared in Abakada,
and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief/s is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ex post facto Laws
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-56741-42 April 15, 1988
AURORA MEJIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO
MOLINA, Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the First Division
SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quiazon, De Guzman, Makalintal, Barot and Natividad T. Perez for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the SANDIGANBAYAN of April
23, 1981, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 1988, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b),
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to suffer perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Josefina
Meimban the sum of Pl,000.00 representing the money given to her; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 1989, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez
hereby found guilty beyond is and reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph
(b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to Buffer perpetual
disqualification from public office and to indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the
amount of P500 representing the money given to her.
Accused is further ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.
In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASES AGAINST PETITIONER AND IN
EVENTUALLY CONVICTING HER, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND
IN VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW
CONSIDERING THAT IT HAS NEITHER BEEN CREATED AS MANDATED
BY THE CONSTITUTION NOR CONSTITUTED AS CONCEIVED BY THE
DECREE FOR ITS CREATION;
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN BY RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN IN THE CASE AT BAR ARE VOID AB INITIO
CONSIDERING THAT THE DECREE CREATING IT PROVIDE FOR THE
PROCEDURES THAT PARTAKES THE NATURE OF AN EX-POST FACTO
LAW AND SUCH PROCEDURES VIOLATE THE GUARANTY TO EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW CONSIDERING THAT DIFFERENT AND
PREJUDICIAL METHOD OF APPEAL IS PRESCRIBED;
3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN
OFFENSE NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS WHEN THE
PRETENDED REQUEST AND RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS WAS ALLEGEDLY IN CONSIDERATION OF "THE
EARLY SETTING OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT AND A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION THEREON "WHEN SAID
COMPLAINANT WAS NEVER A PARTY TO ANY COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT (Crim. Case No. 1988);
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED
ON FATALLY DEFECTIVE INFORMATION AS WHEN SAID INFORMATION
CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY DEMANDED AND RECEIVED
P500 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT
WAS P1,000 Criminal Case 1988) AND WHEN THE INFORMATION
CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY REQUESTED AND RECEIVED
P1,000 AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE
AMOUNT WAS P500 (Crim Case No. 1989) (Annexes "B" and "C")
5. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON
RECORD TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT OF CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WAS MAINLY
HEARSAY AND THE MOTIVES OF COMMENT COMPLAINANTS CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED;
6. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IN HER CAPACITY AS BRANCH
CLERK OF COURT NTERVENES IN SETTING CASES FOR HEARING AND
FORMULATES RESOLUTIONS THEREON;
7. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN
COULD DISREGARD ESTABLISHED RULES OF PROCEDURE, AS WHEN
IT ALLOWED THE RECALL OF PETITIONER, AFTER EXHAUSTING
CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND SUBJECTED HER TO ADDITIONAL CROSS-
EXAMINATION ON ALLEGED ATTEMPT ON PETITIONER'S PART TO
BRIBE PROSECUTOR CRISTINA PATERNO, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN
PART OF THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IN CHIEF.
The findings of facts of the respondent court are as follows:
The instant prosecutions had their roots on six (6) ejectment cases filed
separately in the City Court of Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F.
Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando Antillon, Jose
Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All were decided by the City Court of Manila
against the defendants, all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First
Instance of Manila where the cases were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided
over b the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro, docketed therein as follows: Civil
Case No, L-22794 (Feliciano F. Endangan), Civil Case No. L-22795 (Josefina
Meimban).
Civil Case No. L-22796 (Teodorico Bontia), Civil Case No. L-22797 (Rolando
Antillon), Civil Case No. L-22798 (Jose Mabalot), Civil Cam No. L-22799
Page 118 of 129
(Vicente Villamor), On August 12, 1979, five (5) of the defendants-appellants,
namely, Endangan (Case No. L-22794), Bontia (Case No. L-22796, Antillon
(Case No. L-22797), Mabalot (Case No. L-22798) and Villamor (Case No. L-
22799) entered into a compromise agreement with the plaintiff, Eusebio Lu
whereby the appellants individually received from the appellee the sum of
P5,000 in consideration of which the appellants agreed to vacate the premises
in question and remove their houses therefrom within sixty (60) days 3m the
date of the execution of the agreement, failing which the appellee shall have
the authority to demolish the appellant's houses with costs thereof chargeable
against them the compromise agree went was-submitted to the court. Josefina
Meimban, the defendants-appellant-in Case No. L-22795, did not join her co-
defendants-appellees in entering into the compromise agreement (Exh. "A").
Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record of the defendant-
appellants was Atty. S. G. Doron., On August 22, 1979, Atty. Modesto R.
Espano of the Citizens Legal Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to
inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of the CLAO
regarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to Mm.
(Exh. "F-l"). As a consequence, Atty. Doron filed on August 30, 1979 his
MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE as counsel for defendant-appellant
Josefina Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795. (Exh. "F"). In short, while the five
(5) other defendants-appellants, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and
Villamor, have decided to settle with the plaintiff through compromise
agreement that they signed, Josefina Meimban resolved to prosecute her
appeal in her own case, Civil Case No. L-22795. These backdrops are not
disputed.
What transpired while the cases were pending in the Court of First Instance of
Manila insofar as material to the prosecutions at bar, are matters contested by
conflicting evidence of the prosecution and the defense.
Josefina Meimban testified that she followed up her case in Branch XVII of the
Court of First Instance of Manila and had occasion to talk to Danilo
Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was already submitted
for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed
by Atty. Espano to find out the real status of the case. She returned to the
court sometime in July 1979 and that was when she first came to know Atty.
Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided because
there was still one party who has not signed the compromise agreement
prepared by Atty. Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why
rich people were helping in that case, like a certain Atty. Lu a brother of the
plaintiff, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her she
would help them provided they give Pl,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to
which she replied she would broach the matter to her companions. From the
court, she went to Atty. Modesto Espano and told the lawyer the case was not
yet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron,
which she did. Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of defendant Jose
Mabalot in Civil Case No. L-22798, and Gloria Antonio, daughter of defendant
Vicente Villamor in Civil Case No. L-22799, about the help offered by Atty.
Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed
something. When she went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia
asked her if her companions were agreeable to the suggestion and she replied
she had already told them and that they would consider the matter.
On August 22, 1979, Meimban and Atty. Espano went to the City Hall and
Atty. Espano filed his formal appearance as counsel for Meimban in Civil Case
No. L-22795, Branch XXVI. On that Atty. Mejia again mentioned to Meimban
the gift she was asking from the latter to be given to the Judge, and added that
if Meimban wanted to win the case and she wanted her help, they have to give
to the Judge because she was the one making the decision. She was not able
to give any reply. She went home without telling Atty. Espano what Atty. Mejia
had told her When she returned on August 30, 1979 to deposit her rental, Atty.
Mejia asked her why her companions were not yet moving when they had a
chance of winning the case provided they returned the money they received
from the plaintiff under the compromise agreement. She replied she would tell
them again. When she told Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio about it, the two
replied that if they could still win their cases by returning the money, she
accompany them to Atty. Espano.
They saw Atty. Espano on October 26, 1979. After knowing the purpose of
their visit, Atty. Espano agreed to help Bautista and Antonio and prepared a
MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE E AND TO FILE
MEMORANDA (Exh."B") Bautista and Antonio signed the motion for their
fathers. The three women Meimban Bautista and Antonio and Atty. Espano
proceeded to the City Hall and filed the motion. From the court they went down
to the canteen at the mezzanine floor of the City Hall where Atty. Espano left
them to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia followed them to the
canteen. This time Atty. Mejia told Bautista she could help them provided they
gave her P500 for expenses. Bautista and Antonio just kept silent. Atty.
Espano returned to the canteen and rejoined them. Atty. Mejia told Atty.
Espano there was a chance of winning the Meimban case. Before leaving
them, Atty. Mejia told her Meimban to take care of her companions.
When she deposited her rentals on October 30, 1979, Atty. Mejia told her the
Judge needed the money right away. She promised to give Pl,000 on
November 20, 1979. From there she went to Atty. Espano and told him about
it. At Atty. Espano's suggestion they agreed to meet in Branch XXVI at 10:00
a.m. on November 20 when the, would entrap Atty. Mejia in the delivery of the
money with the assistance of her policeman friend assigned in the office of the
Mayor. She arrived in court with Sylvia Dizon from whom she borrowed P500
to complete the Pl,000 at about 11:00 a.m. but did not meet Atty. Espano. At
Atty. Mejia's instruction they waited for about an hour Sylvia Dizon seated
outside in the corridor fronting the door of Atty. Mejia office. Atty. Mejia asked
her if she had brought the money, she replied she had and gave the P1,000 to
Atty. Mejia. She and Sylvia Dizon then left and looked for Atty. Espano in the
different sala.8 of the court. Not finding him, they went to his office. Atty.
Espano got mad upon knowing that she had given the money to Atty. Mejia
and told her not to give anymore.
December 7, 1979 was the date set for the hearing of the MOTION TO
WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE AND TO FILE MEMORANDA (Motion in
short) filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their father (Exh-
"C"). Meimban and Pilar Bautista went to Branch XXVI for that hearing. Atty.
Mejia told them to wait and that if an oppositor to the Motion would appear,
she would accompany them to the sala of Judge Cui of Branch XXV (the pair
branch of Branch XXVI 1), where the Motion would be heard since Judge
Alejandro of Branch XXVI was on leave. While they were waiting, Atty. Mejia
approached her Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if
Bautista had brought one-half (1/2) of the P1,000.00. She asked Bautista and
the latter replied she did not have anything as she thought it was Meimban
who had the money. In the meantime, Atty. Mejia left and told her that if
Bautista would have the money, just put it in an envelope. Bautista borrowed
P500 from her, which was supposedly intended for the branch Clerk of Court
of Judge Cui. Bautista placed the money in an envelope and the two of them,
Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed the
envelope containing the money to Atty. Mejia who received it.
Pilar Bautista y Mabalot confirmed that her father, Jose Mabalot, had received
P5,000.00 from the plaintiff in Civil Case No. L-22798 pursuant to the
compromise agreement that her father had signed; that while they were
waiting for their house to be demolished Josefina Meimban told her they still
had hope of winning the case because she has been frequenting Branch XXVI
and talking with Atty. Mejia who had promised to assist them; that Gloria
Antonio, the daughter of one of the other defendants, Vicente Villamor,
convinced her that they try it; and that they asked Meimban to accompany
them to Atty. Espano of the CLAO on October 26, 1979. She testified further
that Atty. Espano prepared the Motion at hers and Antonio's request which
they signed for their fathers (Exh. "B"). With Atty. Espano, Meimban and
Antonio, they went to the court and Mod the motion with Atty. Mejia. They
proceeded to the canteen, and while there Atty. Espano left to have some
documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia arrived shortly after Atty. Espano had left.
Atty. Mejia told them if they wanted the resolution of the Motion expedited they
each give Pl,000.00 for expenses. They did not say anything. When Atty.
Espano rejoined them, Atty. Mejia commended him for his memorandum and
said it was well prepared and there was hope in the case. Atty. Mejia then left
and they went home after Meimban paid their bill which they shared among
themselves. On December 6,1979, in the afternoon, she and Meimban went to
Branch XXVI to file a motion for postponement of the hearing of the Motion
scheduled the next day, December 7,1979. Atty. Mejia told them to come just
the same on the following day despite their motion for postponement. So they
did return on December 7, reaching the court at about 8:30 a.m. Atty. Mejia
told them to wait because oppositors to the Motion might appear. When no
oppositor appeared, Atty. Mejia asked them to give even one-half of the
amount intended for expenses because the case was with the a of Judge Cui
as Judge Alejandro was absent, and the money was intended for the clerk of
court of Judge Cui. She asked Meimban if she had money with her and it was
from Meimban that she borrowed P500. At Meimban's suggestion that they put
the money in an envelope, they secured one near the GSIS building, put the
P500 in it and returned to the office of Atty. Mejia to whom she handed the
envelope containing the money. Atty. Mejia received the envelope and placed
it inside her desk drawer. A few days later, she received a copy of an order
dated December 10, 1979 signed by Judge Cui denying their Motion (Exh.
"D"). She forthwith went to Atty. Mejia and asked her what happened. Atty.
Mejia answered that she go to Meimban and get the P500 because Meimban
still lacked Pl,000, and that she also tell Mrs. Meimban to see her (Atty. Mejia).
She went to Meimban and told her what Atty. Mejia said. They went to Atty.
Espano who told her not to give anything.
Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion confirmed that she loaned P500 to Josefina
Meimban and went with her to the court on November 20, 1979 to verify if
Meimban really needed the money to give to Atty. Mejia. She was seated at
the corridor near the door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and
she saw Meimban handed an envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her
desk drawer.
Atty. Modesto Espano y Rodriguez was with the lawyer assigned by the CLAO
to assist Josefina Meimban in her case. He was with Meimban on August 22,
1979 when he filed his formal appearance in the case pending before Branch
XXVI of the Court of First Instance. On the occasion, he saw Atty. Mejia talk to
Meimban. Later, on October 26, 1979, Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia was
demanding money and gift to be given to the presiding judge of Branch XXVI,
of the Judge and that Atty. Mejia would reverse the decision of the City Court
in the appealed case. it was also on that day, October 26, 1979, in his office at
the CLAO that he met Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio for the first time
accompanied by Meimban. Bautista and Antonio were also seeking assistance
from the CLAO in their desire to withdraw a compromise agreement that their
fathers had signed and submitted to the court for approval. From his interview
of Bautista and Antonio, he gathered that Bautista's father, Jose Mabalot, and
Antonio's father Vicente Villamor, were defendants in the ejectment cases filed
by Eusebio Lu and that their fathers were misled by one Endangan and Atty.
Doron into signing the agreement. When he asked the whereabouts of their
fathers he was told that Vicente Villamor was in Cotabato and Jose Mabalot
was an octogenarian. He also gathered from Bautista and Antonio that they
had decided to withdraw the compromise agreement because Atty. Mejia had
told them that they had a chance of winning the case by having the decision of
Page 119 of 129
the lower court reversed if they returned the P5,000 given by the plaintiff, as
she was the one preparing the decisions for Branch XXVI. He prepared the
Motion (Exh. "B") and had it signed by Bautista for Jose Mabalot, and Antonio
for Vicente Villamor. That same afternoon of October 26, 1979, he filed the
Motion in court with Meimban, Bautista and Antonio. Meimban told him that
Atty. Mejia wanted to talk to her at the canteen. He and his female
companions went ahead to the canteen, but he left them there to have some
papers xeroxed at the ground floor of the City Hall. When he returned to the
canteen, he saw Atty. Mejia talking to his women companions. He joined them.
Atty. Mejia told him that they could win the Meimban case because the
decision of the lower court was against Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, and advised
him to file a good memorandum. Atty. Mejia also mentioned that there was a
good chance of winning the Mabalot and Villamor cases provided the P5,000
each received by the defendants was returned. He did not say anything since
he had advised his clients already not to give Atty. Mejia anything. After
leaving the canteen and while they were still at the ground floor his clients told
him that Atty. Mejia was demanding money from them for expenses for the
Judge. He reiterated his advise to them not to give any.
Testimony was also given regarding an alleged attempt of Atty. Mejia to bribe
the Tanodbayan Investigator who investigated the complaints that led to the
filing of the instant cases. Christina Corall-Paterna declared that she signed
and submitted her recommendation to prosecute the accused for violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the complaint of Josefina Meimban
and Pilar Bautista, and to drop the other complaints, on August 27, 1980. On
September 3, 1980, Atty. Mejia came to her to inquire (nangumusta) She
replied she had already collated the evidence and submitted her
recommendation to Director Herrera. Atty. Mejia then placed something on her
table wrapped in pink tissue paper and immediately stood up and left without
saying anything. She opened the wrapper and found an intricate gold chain
with a pendant bearing an inscription of letter "C." Her initial reaction was to
return it but on second thought that she needed somebody to witness the
returning of the jewelry, and it being almost 4:00 p.m. and Atty. Mejia might not
return to her office anymore, the waited till next morning and asked one of
their employees, Dante Ramos, to return the gold chain the first hour of
September 4. Dante Ramos was able to return it.
Under the first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent court acted
without jurisdiction and in violation of the guaranty of due process of law as it
has neither been created as mandated by the Constitution nor constituted as
conceived by the decree for its creation. Petitioners stress that the creation of
the Sandiganbayan by Presidential Decree No. 1606 is an arrogation by the
President of the power vested by the Constitution in the National Assembly.
In the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan 2 this Court categorically ruled on the
issue when it held:
It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in
this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution
contemplated that such an act should the National Assembly the 1976
Amendments made clear come from the National Assembly that he as
incumbent President" shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial
law shall have been lifted. 3 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this
Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 4 decided in 1975. In the
language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the
legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during the period of
Martial Law, ... . 5 As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority
to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already eating in favor of the
incumbent President during the period of Martial Law. 6
Under the second assigned error it is alleged that the procedure provided for
by the Sandiganbayan are and hence all proceedings taken against petitioner
are void ab initio being investigation violation of the Constitution.
It is further argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner
under PD No. 1606 which effectively deprives her of the intermediate recourse
to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court only issues of law
may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion
rather than a matter of right. Petitioner contends this is a denial of the equal
protection of the law.
Again, in Nuñez 7 this Court effectively disposed of this issue when it held:
2. Petitioner in memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal
protection in seeking to Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify?
To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration. 8 The Ideal
situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed
outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be
excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial
uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law.9 There is
recognition, however, in the opinion that what in fact eats "cannot approximate
the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into
account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not
to be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To
assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a
regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those
adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection
clause only if they can show that the governmental act assailed far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of
hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in reason. 10
Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason
decision anew "that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same
manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred and
the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every
person under circumstances which, if not Identical, are analogous. If law be
looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should
be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the
group equally binding on the rest. 11
3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set
forth in his memorandum that: 1. The Sandiganbayan proceedings violates
petitioner's right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of right
became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; — appeal likewise was
shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and
trial evidence; and there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari
to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other
estafa indicates are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law
and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and
thereafter to the Supreme Court. 12 That is hardly convincing, considering that
the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice
Laurel in People v. Vera 13 requiring that it must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply
equally to each member of the class. 14 To repeat, the Constitution
specifically makes the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty
in the public service. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such
court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17, 1973, when the
present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is
not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in Co
Chiong v. Cuaderno, 15 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the
Bill of rights included among which are the due process of law and equal
protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific provision, in that decision,
one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or utilities.
16 The scope of such a principle is not to be con stricted, It is certainly broad
enough to cover the instant situation.
4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary
to the ex post facto provision of the Constitution is similarly premised on the
allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted ordered efficacy
wise ... 17 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the
lack of persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami 18
decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by petitioner, supplies the most recent
and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the ponencia of
Justice Makasiar: An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act
done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was,
when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the
legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes
penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful,
and (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 19 Even the most careful scrutiny of
the above definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The lawful
protection to which an accused" has become entitled" is qualified, not given a
broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure provided for
in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a
controversial matter. This Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v.
Vilo, 20 a 1949 decision, speaking through the then Justice, later Chief Justice
Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine Justices there composing this
Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were
of the opinion that Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the
requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code with
eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed
before its enactment would not make the law ex post facto.
5. xxxx
9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to
recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner,
only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the
allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the
tenor and thrust" of the leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v.
Massachusetts. 21 Again this citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous
choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The
law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with
crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to
defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in very concept of a fair
trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable however, which may be the pressure of incriminating
proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament We are
to keep the balance true. 22 What is required for compliance with the due
process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson, 23 this Court
with Justice Tuason as ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and
impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the preparation of defense. 24 In
Page 120 of 129
criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is "informed
as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet, with his
conviction being made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after
full opportunity for him to rebut it and the sentence being implied in
accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that
rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction. 25 The above
formulation is a reiteration of what was decided by the American Supreme
Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United States 26
decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: This
court has had frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process
of law as applied to criminal procedure, and, generally speaking, it may be
said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished
after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be
heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law,
then he has had due process of law. 27
Under the third assigned error it is alleged that the information in Criminal
Case No. 1988 states that the pretended request and receipt of money by
petitioner from companions t witness Josefina Meimban was in consideration
of the early setting of the hearing of the motion to withdraw the compromise
agreement and to secure a favorable resolution thereof when in fact said
complainant was never a party to any compromise agreement so that she
could not be convicted of an offense not alleged in the information.
Under the fourth arraigned error the petitioner alleges that she cannot be
convicted on the two defective informations, the first of which (Crim. Case
1988) she allegedly demanded and received P 500.00 which the respondent
court found to be P1,000.00; and that in Criminal Case No. 1989 the
information charged that the petitioner requested and received P l,000.00
while the respondent court found that the amount received was P500.00 so
petitioner pleads she cannot be convicted on such defective informations.
Under both informations petitioner is charged for violation of Section
enumerates the corrupt practices of any public officer which are declared
unlawful as among others —
Sec. 3 (b). Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection
with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
The elements of the offense are that —
1. It must be committed by —
1) a public officer;
2) who requested and who received a gift, present, etc.;
3) the gift, present, etc. was for the benefit of said public officer;
4) said public officer requested and/or received the gift, present, etc.
in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; and
5) said officer has the right to intervene in such contract or
transaction in his/her official capacity under the law.
The finding of the respondent court is that the petitioner demanded and
received money from the persons involved in certain cases in Branch 26 of the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila where the petitioner was the branch
clerk of court in consideration of a promise that she will help in getting them a
favorable judgment. In the case of the complainant Josefina Meimban
although it is true that she did not enter into an amicable agreement regarding
her case as erroneously alleged in the information, nevertheless it has been
shown, and as it is also alleged in the information, that she yielded to the
request of petitioner for some money in consideration of a promise that
petitioner wig get a favorable judgment. In a prosecution under the foregoing
provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present, etc. is
immaterial nor is it determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused or
the penalty to be imposed. What is penalized is the receipt of any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract
or transaction with the Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene
in his official capacity.
Under the fifth assigned error petitioner argues that there was an ulterior
motive on the part of the complainants in testifying against her and that the
prosecution evidence is hearsay.
Petitioner therefore raises the question of credibility of the witnesses. The rule
is that the findings of facts of the respondent court are conclusive unless there
are some facts or circumstances that may have been overlooked that may
otherwise affect the result of the case. Petitioner has not successfully
demonstrated any cogent reason why this Court should depart from this rule.
Petitioner imputes that Meimban and Bautista testified against her as she
refused to intercede in their behalf with the judge to secure a favorable action.
The court is not persuaded. Contrary to her pretension that prosecution
witnesses were inmotivated in testifying against her. The Court finds that said
complaining witnesses would not impute the serious charges against petitioner
were it not the truth. Moreover, the testimony of said complaining witnesses
are corroborated by Atty. Modesto Espano and Sylvia Dizon who are certainly
disinterested witnesses. The bare denial of petitioner cannot prevail over such
positive evidence of the prosecution.
Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in
the setting of the hearing of cases and she does not formulate resolutions
thereof. The branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the
presiding judge whose duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of
the court and in all other matters not involving the exercise of discretion or
judgment of the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge
who presumably has reposed confidence in her which appears to have been
taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the complainants to give
her money in consideration of a promise to get a favorable resolution of their
cases.
Under the seventh assigned error the recall of petitioner for further cross-
examination on her attempt to bribe the Tanodbayan prosecutor is a matter
within the sound discretion of respondent court. Indeed the testimony of said
prosecutor that petitioner tried to persuade her not to prosecute petitioner by
giving her a gold chain with pendant wrapped in tissue paper which said
prosecutor returned is material evidence to establish the guilt of petitioner.
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds and so holds
that the guilt of the petitioner of the offenses charged against her has been
established beyond reasonable doubt. She took advantage of her position as
branch clerk of court by persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban
and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00,
respectively, in consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a favorable
resolution of their cases in court.
The evils of corruption are slowly corroding the pillars of our society. Our
courts are not spared by this plague. More often than not those in government
who are persuaded or tempted if not actively involved in graft and corruption
are the court personnel who lead litigants to believe that they could get a
favorable judgment or action in their favor or are otherwise approached or
persuaded to so help for a consideration. Worse still there are instances when
the corruption reaches the level of the judge which spells the doom of our
quest for an honest and impartial administration of justice. Anyone involved in
such corrupt exercise should be denounced. This Court does not hesitate to
apply the scalpel to cut off the roots of this cancer in the judicial system that
can destroy the very purpose of its existence.
Those who are involved in the administration of justice from the highest to the
lowest level must live up to the strictest standard of honesty and integrity in the
public service. The general public should respect and support such imperative.
No attempt to influence them one way or the other much less to bribe them
should be made. One cannot buy a bad case nor sell a good one. No amount
of money can make out a good case out of a bad one. And even if one
succeeds in so doing it would certainly be uncovered and reversed on appeal.
Justice will prevail.
This case should be an object lesson for those in the public service. All that we
need to do is to go back to the too well known rule of conduct that honesty is
the best policy. Those who cannot live up to this criterion should get out of the
government service. It is as simple as that.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa. Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr.,
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes and Griño-Aquino,
JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No 101724 July 3, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR., respondents.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the
resolution promulgated on August 1, 1991 by the Sandiganbayan which
granted the private respondent's motion to quash the information for violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) on the ground of
prescription of the crime charged.
Two letter-complaints were filed on October 28, 1986 and December 9, 1986,
with the Tanodbayan by Teofilo Gelacio, a political leader of Governor
Valentina Plaza, wife of Congressman Democrito O. Plaza of Agusan del Sur,
shortly after the private respondent had replaced Mrs. Plaza as OIC/provincial
governor of Agusan del Sur in March 1986 (p. 235, Rollo). Gelacio's complaint
questioned the issuance to Governor Paredes, when he was still the provincial
attorney in 1976, of a free patent title for Lot No. 3097-8, Pls. 67, with an area
Page 121 of 129
of 1,391 sq. m., more or less, in the Rosario public land subdivision in San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
On February 23, 1989, the tanodbayan referred the complaint to the City
Fiscal of Butuan City who subpoenaed Governor Paredes. However, the
subpoena was served on, and received by, the Station Commander of San
Francisco, Agusan del Sur, who did not serve it on Paredes. Despite the
absence of notice to Paredes, Deputized Tanodbayan/City Fiscal Ernesto M.
Brocoy conducted a preliminary investigation ex-parte. He recommended that
an information be filed in court. His recommendation was approved by the
Tanodbayan who, on August 10, 1989, filed the following information in the
Sandiganbayan where it was docketed as TBP Case No. 86-03368:
That on or about January 21, 1976, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then
the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, having been duly appointed and
qualified as such, taking advantage of his public position, did, then and there,
wilfully and unlawfully persuade, influence and induce the Land Inspector of
the Bureau of Lands, by the name of Armando L. Luison to violate an existing
rule or regulation duly promulgated by competent authority by misrepresenting
to the latter that the land subject of an application filed by the accused with the
Bureau of Lands is disposable by a free patent when the accused well knew
that the said land had already been reserved for a school site, thus by the
accused's personal misrepresentation in his capacity as Provincial Attorney of
Agusan del Sur and applicant for a free patent, a report favorably
recommending the issuance of a free patent was given by the said Armando L.
Luison, land inspector, thereby paving the way to the release of a decree of
title, by the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur, an act committed by the
accused, in outright prejudice of the public interest. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
Paredes was arrested upon a warrant issued by the Sandiganbayan. Claiming
that the information and the warrant of arrest were null and void because he
had been denied his right to a preliminary investigation. Paredes refused to
post bail. His wife filed a petition for habeas corpus praying this Court to order
his release (Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464), but we denied her
petition because the proper remedy was for Paredes to file a bail bond of
P20,000 fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty, and move to
quash the information before being arraigned.
On April 5, 1991, Paredes filed in the Sandiganbayan "An Urgent Motion to
Quash Information and to Recall Warrant of Arrest" alleging that:
1. he is charged for an offense which has prescribed:
2. the preliminary investigation, as well as the Information prepared
by the Tanodbayan and the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan
were invalid for lack of notice to him of the preliminary investigation conducted
by Deputized Tanodbayan Ernesto M. Brocoy and Tanodbayan Prosecutor
Josephine Z. Fernandez; and
3. his constitutional right to due process had been violated by the
long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation.
After the parties had filed their written arguments, the Sandiganbayan issued a
resolution on August 1, 1991 granting the motion to quash on the ground of
prescription of the offense charged. The Sandiganbayan's ratiocination of its
resolution is quoted below:
The crime charged is alleged to have been committed "on or about January
21, 1976" when the accused allegedly misrepresented to a Lands Inspector of
the Bureau of Lands that the land subject of the herein movant's Application
for a Free Patent was disposable land. This misrepresentation allegedly
resulted in the issuance of a Torrens Title under a Free Patent to the herein
accused-movant. This, the Information avers, was prejudicial to the public
interest because the land in question had been reserved for a school site and
was, therefore, not disposable.
Thus, the charge is for the violation of Sec. 3(a) of R.A. No. 3019 because the
accused had allegedly persuaded, induced and influenced the Public Lands
Inspector to violate existing law, rules and regulations by recommending
approval of the free patent application.
The accused asserts that since at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime (January 21, 1976) the period of prescription was ten (10) years under
Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 3019, the crime should have prescribed in 1986. The
prosecution seems to agree with the movant's statement as to the term of the
prescriptive period with the qualification that the period of prescription should
have commenced to run from March 28, 1985, when the complaint was
allegedly filed by the Republic for the cancellation of the title.
xxx xxx xxx
The question then is this: when should the period of prescription have
commenced to run as to the alleged misrepresentation which persuaded,
influenced and induced the Lands Inspector of the Bureau of Lands resulting
in the approval of the application of the accused for a free patent?
xxx xxx xxx
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that even in the case of falsification of
public documents, prescription commences from its recording with the
Registry of Deeds when the existence of the document and the averments
therein theoretically become a matter of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The matter of improper inducement, persuasion or influence upon the Lands
Inspector allegedly applied by the accused through his misrepresentation may
have been unknown to others besides the two of them because their
interaction would presumably have been private. The fact of the improper
segregation of the piece of land in question and the grant thereof to the
accused, however, became, presumptively at least, a matter of public
knowledge upon the issuance of a Torrens Title over that parcel of non-
disposable public land.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Notice to the whole world must be presumed at the very latest on
May 28, 1976 when the Register of Deeds of Agusan del Sur issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 8379 in the name of the accused as a result of the grant
of the patent on the school site reservation;
5. The act of filing the approved free patent with the Registry of
Deeds is notice duly given to the various offices and officials of the
government, e.g., the Department (Ministry) of Agriculture and the Bureau of
Lands, who are affected thereby specially because it is the Bureau of Lands
which files the approved patent application with the Registry of Deeds. If the
land in question was indeed reserved for as school site, then the Department
(Ministry) of Education would also know or would be presumed to know. (pp.
28-33, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan could not abide the fact that the Lands Inspector (Luison)
who was supposedly induced by Paredes to violate the law, and who did
violate it by recommending approval of Paredes' free patent application was
not charged with a crime. The Sandiganbayan concluded:
It would seriously strain credulity to say that while the violation of law, rules or
regulation by the Lands Inspector was obvious and public (since the school
site had been titled in the name of the alleged inducer Pimentel **), the
beneficiary thereof could not have been suspected of having induced the
violation itself. It would be grossly unfair and unjust to say that prescription
would run in favor of the Lands Inspector who had actually violated the law but
not to the public official who had benefitted therefrom and who may have,
therefore, instigated the favorable recommendation for the disposition of non-
disposable land.
In view of all the foregoing, the Motion to Quash the Information is granted. (p.
36, Rollo.)
The Sandiganbayan further observed that since R.A. No. 3019 is a special
law, the computation of the period for the prescription of the crime of violating
it is governed by Section 29 of Act No. 3326 which provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that "the date of the violation of the
law becomes the operative date for the commencement of the period of
prescription" (p. 34, Rollo).
Assuming that Paredes did induce Lands Inspector Luison to recommend
approval of his application for free patent (which both of them denied doing),
the date of the violation, for the purpose of computing the period of
prescription, would be the date of filing his application on January 21, 1976.
The theory of the prosecution that the prescriptive period should not
commence upon the filing of Paredes' application because no one could have
known about it except Paredes and Lands Inspector Luison, is not correct for,
as the Sandiganbayan pointedly observed: "it is not only the Lands Inspector
who passes upon the disposability of public land . . . other public officials pass
upon the application for a free patent including the location of the land and,
therefore, the disposable character thereof" (p. 30, Rollo). Indeed, practically
all the department personnel, who had a hand in processing and approving the
application, namely: (1) the lands inspector who inspected the land to
ascertain its location and occupancy: (2) the surveyor who prepared its
technical description: (3) the regional director who assessed the application
and determined the land classification: (4) the Director of Lands who prepared
the free patent: and (5) the Department Secretary who signed it, could not
have helped "discovering" that the subject of the application was
nondisposable public agricultural land.
The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that the "crime" whether it was the
filing of Paredes application for a free patent in January 1976 or his
supposedly having induced Luison to recommend its approval, prescribed ten
(10) years later, on January 21, 1986. Gelacio's complaint, dated October 28,
1986, was filed late.
Page 122 of 129
The reason for the extinction of the State's right to prosecute a crime after the
lapse of the statutory limitation period for filing the criminal action, is that:
Statutes of Limitation are construed as being acts of grace, and as a
surrendering by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to
prosecute at its discretion, and they are considered as equivalent to acts of
amnesty. Such statutes are founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions
should not be allowed to ferment endlessly in the files of the government to
explode only after witnesses and proofs necessary to the protection of
accused have by sheer lapse of time passed beyond availability. They serve,
not only to bar prosecutions on aged and untrustworthy evidence, but also to
cut off prosecution for crimes a reasonable time after completion, when no
further danger to society is contemplated from the criminal activity. (22 CJS
573-574.)
In the absence of a special provision otherwise, the statute of limitations
begins to run on the commission of an offense and not from the time when the
offense is discovered or when the offender becomes known, or it normally
begins to run when the crime is complete. (22 CJS 585; Emphasis supplied.)
Even if the ten-year prescriptive period commenced to run from the
registration and issuance of the free patent title by the Register of Deeds on
May 28, 1976, registration being constructive notice to the whole world, the
prescriptive period would have fully run its course on May 28, 1986, or five (5)
months before Gelacio filed his complaint, and more than thirteen (13) years
before judicial proceedings were initiated in the Sandiganbayan on August 10,
1989 by the filing of the information therein.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16, 1982, amending
Section 11 R.A. No. 3019 by increasing from ten (10) to fifteen (15) years the
period for the prescription or extinguishment of a violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, may not be given retroactive application
to the "crime" which was committed by Paredes in January 1976 yet, for it
should be prejudicial to the accused. It would deprive him of the substantive
benefit of the shorter (10 years) prescriptive period under Section 11, R.A.
3019, which was an essential element of the "crime" at the time he committed
it.
Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitation is a substantive right.
Where the statute fixes a period of limitation as to a prosecution for a
particular offense, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within
which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that
the indictment or information be actually filed within the time prescribed. (22
CJS 574.)
Fact that the statute of limitations is jurisdictional necessarily determined that a
prosecution within the period specified is an essential element of the offense.
(People vs. Allen, 118 P 2d, 927, Emphasis supplied.)
Unless statutes of limitation are clearly retrospective in their terms, they do not
apply to crimes previously committed (22 CJS 576; People vs. Lurd, 12 Hun
282; Martine vs. State, 24 Tex 61; Emphasis ours.)
To apply B.P. Blg. 195 to Paredes would make it an ex post facto law for it
would after his situation to his disadvantage by making him criminally liable for
a crime that had already been extinguished under the law existing when it was
committed. An ex post facto law is defined as:
A law passed after the occurrence of a fact or commission of an act, which
retrospectively changes the legal consequences or relations of such fact or
deed. By Art. I, Sec. 10 of U.S. Const., the states are forbidden to pass "any
ex post facto law". Most all state constitutions contain similar prohibitions
against ex post facto laws.
An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of
punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was
innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was
committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that changes
the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in
effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was
lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful
protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a
former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law
which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a
person to his disadvantage. Wilensky v. Fields, Fla., 267 So. 2d 1, 5. (Black's
Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, p. 520.)
Since an ex post facto law is proscribed by our Constitution (Sec. 22, Article
111, 1987 Constitution), the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in
ruling that Paredes may no longer be prosecuted for his supposed violation of
R.A. 3019 in 1976, six (6) years before B.P. Blg. 195 was approved on March
16, 1982. The new prescriptive period under that law should apply only to
those offense which were committed after the approval of B.P. 195.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The
resolution dated August 1, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No.
13800 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 113213 August 15, 1994
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE JOSE DE LA RAMA, RTC,
BRANCH 139, MAKATI, M.M. and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari for petitioner.
Aurora Salva Bautista collaborating for petitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramount principle of the law of extradition provides that a State may not
surrender any individual for any offense not included in a treaty of extradition.
This principle arises from the reality of extradition as a derogation of
sovereignty. Extradition is an intrusion into the territorial integrity of the host
State and a delimitation of the sovereign power of the State within its own
territory. 1 The act of extraditing amounts to a "delivery by the State of a
person accused or convicted of a crime, to another State within whose
territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive, it was committed and which asks
for his surrender with a view to execute justice." 2 As it is an act of "surrender"
of an individual found in a sovereign State to another State which demands his
surrender 3 , an act of extradition, even with a treaty rendered executory upon
ratification by appropriate authorities, does not imposed an obligation to
extradite on the requested State until the latter has made its own
determination of the validity of the requesting State's demand, in accordance
with the requested State's own interests.
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from
that arising from treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into
treaties of extradition principally for the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice
within the ambit of their laws, under conventions recognizing the right of
nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals within their jurisdiction and
control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective municipal laws. Since
punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the willingness of host
State to apprehend them and revert them to the State where their offenses
were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent
enforcement of penal laws can be effectively accomplished only by agreement
between States through treaties of extradition.
Desiring to make more effective cooperation between Australia and the
Government of the Philippines in the suppression of crime, 6 the two countries
entered into a Treaty of Extradition on the 7th of March 1988. The said treaty
was ratified in accordance with the provisions of Section 21, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution in a Resolution adopted by the Senate on September 10,
1990 and became effective thirty (30) days after both States notified each
other in writing that the respective requirements for the entry into force of the
Treaty have been complied with. 7
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach" which provides for
broader coverage of extraditable offenses between the two countries and
(which) embraces crimes punishable by imprisonment for at least one (1) year.
Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes committed prior to the
treaty's date of effectivity, provided that these crimes were in the statute books
of the requesting State at the time of their commission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting State agrees to extradite. . . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecution of the imposition or enforcement of a sentence in
the Requesting State for an extraditable offense." 8 A request for extradition
requires, if the person is accused of an offense, the furnishing by the
requesting State of either a warrant for the arrest or a copy of the warrant of
arrest of the person, or, where appropriate, a copy of the relevant charge
against the person sought to be extradited. 9
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses
"punishable under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a
period of at least one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty." 10 For the
purpose of the definition, the Treaty states that:
(a) an offense shall be an extraditable offense whether or not the laws
of the Contracting States place the offense within the same category or
denominate the offense by the same terminology;
(b) the totality of the acts or omissions alleged against the person
whose extradition is requested shall be taken into account in determining the
constituent elements of the offense. 11
Page 123 of 129
Petitioner, an Australian Citizen, was sought by Australian authorities for
indictable crimes in his country. Extradition proceedings were filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, which rendered a decision ordering the
deportation of petitioner. Said decision was sustained by the Court of Appeals;
hence, petitioner came to this Court by way of review on certiorari, to set aside
the order of deportation. Petitioner contends that the provision of the Treaty
giving retroactive effect to the extradition treaty amounts to an ex post facto
law which violates Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. He assails the
trial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the evidence
adduced in the court below failed to show that he is wanted for prosecution in
his country. Capsulized, all the principal issues raised by the petitioner before
this Court strike at the validity of the extradition proceedings instituted by the
government against him.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, 12 are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, Assistant Secretary Sime D. Hidalgo of the Department of
Foreign Affairs indorsed to the Department of Justice Diplomatic Note No.
080/93 dated February 19, 1993 from the Government of Australia to the
Department of Justice through Attorney General Michael Duffy. Said
Diplomatic Note was a formal request for the extradition of Petitioner Paul
Joseph Wright who is wanted for the following indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter — one count of Obtaining Property by Deception
contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and
2. Wright/Cracker Matter — Thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining
Properties by Deception contrary to Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act
of 1958; one count of attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to
Section 321(m) of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958; and one count of Perjury
contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of 1958, which crimes were
allegedly committed in the following manner:
The one (1) count of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section 81
(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and co-
offender, Herbert Lance Orr's, dishonesty in obtaining $315,250 from Mulcahy,
Mendelson and Round Solicitors (MM7R), secured by a mortgage on the
property in Bangholme, Victoria owned by Ruven Nominees Pty. Ltd., a
company controlled by a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that all
the relevant legal documents relating to the mortgage had been signed by
Rodney and Janine Mitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts of Obtaining Property by Deception contrary to
Section 81(1) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's
and co-offender Mr. John Carson Craker's receiving a total of approximately
11.2 in commission (including $367,044 in bonus commission) via Amazon
Bond Pty. Ltd., depending on the volume of business written, by submitting
two hundred fifteen (215) life insurance proposals, and paying premiums
thereon (to the acceptance of the policies and payment of commissions) to the
Australian Mutual Provident (AMP) Society through the Office of Melbourne
Mutual Insurance, of which respondent is an insurance agent, out of which life
proposals none are in existence and approximately 200 of which are alleged to
have been false, in one or more of the following ways:
(i) some policy-holders signed up only because they were told the
policies were free (usually for 2 years) and no payments were required.
(ii) some policy-holders were offered cash inducements ($50 or $100)
to sign and had to supply a bank account no longer used (at which a direct
debit request for payment of premiums would apply). These policy-holders
were also told no payments by them were required.
(iii) some policy-holders were introduced through the "Daily Personnel
Agency", and again were told the policies were free for 2 years as long as an
unused bank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders were found not to exist.
The one count of Attempting to Obtain Property by Deception contrary to
Section 321(m) of the Victorian Crimes Act of 1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's
and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause the payment of $2,870.68 commission to
a bank account in the name of Amazon Bond Pty. Ltd. by submitting one
proposal for Life Insurance to the AMP Society, the policy-holder of which
does not exist with the end in view of paying the premiums thereon to insure
acceptance of the policy and commission payments.
The one count of Perjury contrary to Section 314 of Victorian Crimes Act of
1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's signing and swearing before
a Solicitor holding a current practicing certificate pursuant to the Legal
Profession Practice Act (1958), a Statutory Declaration attesting to the validity
of 29 of the most recent Life Insurance proposals of AMP Society and
containing three (3) false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 of PD No. 1069, in relation to the Extradition Treaty
concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and Australia on
September 10, 1990, extradition proceedings were initiated on April 6, 1993 by
the State Counsels of the Department of Justice before the respondent court.
In its Order dated April 13, 1993, the respondent court directed the petitioner
to appear before it on April 30, 1993 and to file his answer within ten days. In
the same order, the respondent Judge ordered the NBI to serve summons and
cause the arrest of the petitioner.

The respondent court received return of the warrant of arrest and summons
signed by NBI Senior Agent Manuel Almendras with the information that the
petitioner was arrested on April 26, 1993 at Taguig, Metro Manila and was
subsequently detained at the NBI detention cell where petitioner, to date,
continue to be held.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed his answer.
In the course of the trial, the petitioner testified that he was jobless, married to
a Filipina, Judith David, with whom he begot a child; that he has no case in
Australia; that he is not a fugitive from justice and is not aware of the offenses
charged against him; that he arrived in the Philippines on February 25, 1990
returned to Australia on March 1, 1990, then back to the Philippines on April
11, 1990, left the Philippines again on April 24, 1990 for Australia and returned
to the Philippines on May 24, 1990, again left for Australia on May 29, 1990
passing by Singapore and then returned to the Philippines on June 25, 1990
and from that time on, has not left the Philippines; and that his tourist visa has
been extended but he could not produce the same in court as it was
misplaced, has neither produced any certification thereof, nor any temporary
working visa.
The trial court, in its decision dated 14 June 1993, granting the petition for
extradition requested by the Government of Australia, concluding that the
documents submitted by the Australian Government meet the requirements of
Article 7 of the Treaty of Extradition and that the offenses for which the
petitioner were sought in his country are extraditable offenses under Article 2
of the said Treaty. The trial court, moreover, held that under the provisions of
the same Article, extradition could be granted irrespective of when the offense
— in relation to the extradition — was committed, provided that the offense
happened to be an offense in the requesting State at the time the acts or
omissions constituting the same were committed. 13
Petitioner challenged the decision of the Regional Trial Court before the Court
of Appeals assigning the following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY
ERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE
EXTRADITION TREATY DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY THE RESPONDENT SHOW THAT THE ALLEGED
OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHT TO BE EXTRADITED
TOOK PLACE IN 1988-1989 AT THE TIME THERE WAS NO EXTRADITION
TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE
IN GIVING RETROACTIVE FORCE AND EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION
TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
AUSTRALIA AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW" AND VIOLATES
SECTION 21, ARTICLE VII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DO NOT SHOW THAT PETITIONER IS
WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN
MISINTERPRETING THE EXTENDED STAY OF PETITIONER AS
EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDE AND EVADE
PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN
ORDERING THE EXTRADITION OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SPECIFYING
IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION THE SPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH
PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on September 14, 1993
and denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14
Reiterating substantially the same assignments of error which he interposed in
the Court of Appeals, petitioner challenges in this petition the validity of the
extradition order issued by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
under the Treaty. Petitioner vigorously argues that the trial court order violates
the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. He avers that for the
extradition order to be valid, the Australian government should show that he
"has a criminal case pending before a competent court" in that country "which
can legally pass judgement or acquittal or conviction upon him."
Clearly, a close reading of the provisions of the Treaty previously cited, which
are relevant to our determination of the validity of the extradition order, reveals
that the trial court committed no error in ordering the petitioner's extradition.
Conformably with Article 2, Section 2 of the said Treaty, the crimes for which
the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were issued in
Australia were undeniably offenses in the Requesting State at the time they
were alleged to have been committed. From its examination of the charges
against the petitioner, the trial court correctly determined that the
corresponding offenses under our penal laws are Articles 315(2) and 183 of
the Revised Penal Code on swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury,
respectively. 15
The provisions of Article 6 of the said Treaty pertaining to the documents
required for extradition are sufficiently clear and require no interpretation. The
Page 124 of 129
warrant for the arrest of an individual or a copy thereof, a statement of each
and every offense and a statement of the acts and omissions which were
alleged against the person in respect of each offense are sufficient to show
that a person is wanted for prosecution under the said article. All of these
documentary requirements were dully submitted to the trial court in its
proceedings a quo. For purposes of the compliance with the provisions of the
Treaty, the signature and official seal of the Attorney-General of Australia were
sufficient to authenticate all the documents annexed to the Statement of the
Acts and Omissions, including the statement itself. 16 In conformity with the
provisions of Article 7 of the Treaty, the appropriate documents and annexes
were signed by "an officer in or of the Requesting State" 17 "sealed with . . .
(a) public seal of the Requesting State or of a Minister of State, or of a
Department or officer of the Government of the Requesting State," 18 and
"certified by a diplomatic or consular officer of the Requesting State accredited
to the Requested State." 19 The last requirement was accomplished by the
certification made by the Philippine Consular Officer in Canberra, Australia.
The petitioner's contention that a person sought to be extradited should have a
"criminal case pending before a competent court in the Requesting State
which can legally pass judgement of acquittal or conviction" 20 stretches the
meaning of the phrase "wanted for prosecution" beyond the intended by the
treaty provisions because the relevant provisions merely require "a warrant for
the arrest or a copy of the warrant for the arrest of the person sought to be
extradited." 21 Furthermore, the 'Charge and Warrant of Arrest Sheets' attest
to the fact that petitioner is not only wanted for prosecution but has, in fact,
absconded to evade arrest and criminal prosecution. Since a charge or
information under the Treaty is required only when appropriate, i.e., in cases
where an individual charged before a competent court in the Requesting State
thereafter absconds to the Requested State, a charge or a copy thereof is not
required if the offender has in fact already absconded before a criminal
complaint could be filed. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, limiting the
phrase "wanted for prosecution" to person charged with an information or a
criminal complaint renders the Treaty ineffective over individuals who abscond
for the purpose of evading arrest and prosecution. 22
This brings us to another point raised by the petitioner both in the trial court
and in the Court of Appeals. May the extradition of the petitioner who is
wanted for prosecution by the government of Australia be granted in spite of
the fact that the offenses for which the petitioner is sought in his country were
allegedly committed prior to the date of effectivity of the Treaty.
Petitioner takes the position that under Article 18 of the Treaty its enforcement
cannot be given retroactive effect. Article 18 states:
ENTRY INTO FORCE AND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter into force thirty (30) days after the date on which the
Contracting States have notified each other in writing that their respective
requirements for the entry into force of this Treaty have been complied with.
Either contracting State may terminate this Treaty by notice in writing at any
time and it shall cease to be in force on the one hundred and eightieth day
after the day on which notice is given.
We fail to see how the petitioner can infer a prohibition against retroactive
enforcement from this provision. The first paragraph of Article 18 refers to the
Treaty's date of effectivity; the second paragraph pertains to its termination.
Absolutely nothing in the said provision relates to, much less, prohibits
retroactive enforcement of the Treaty.
On the other hand, Article 2(4) of the Treaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may be granted pursuant to provisions of this Treaty
irrespective of when the offense in relation to which extradition is requested
was committed, provided that:
(a) it was an offense in the Requesting State at the time of the acts or
omissions constituting the offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions alleged would, if they had taken place in the
Territory of the Requested State at the time of the making of the request for
extradition, have constituted an offense against the laws in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is sought by his government are clearly
extraditable under Article 2 of the Treaty. They were offenses in the
Requesting State at the time they were committed, and, irrespective of the
time they were committed, they fall under the panoply of the Extradition
Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article 2 paragraph 4, quoted above.
Does the Treaty's retroactive application violate the Constitutional prohibition
against ex post facto laws? Early commentators understood ex post facto laws
to include all laws of retrospective application, whether civil or criminal. 23
However, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase, citing Blackstone, The Federalist
and other early U.S. state constitutions in Calder vs. Bull 24 concluded that the
concept was limited only to penal and criminal statutes. As conceived under
our Constitution, ex post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an act
punishable as a crime when such act was not an offense when committed; 2)
laws which, while not creating new offenses, aggravate the seriousness of a
crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishment for a crime already
committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules of evidence so as to make it
substantially easier to convict a defendant. 25 "Applying the constitutional
principle, the (Court) has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal
legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused." 26 This being
so, there is no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention that the ruling of
the lower court sustaining the Treaty's retroactive application with respect to
offenses committed prior to the Treaty's coming into force and effect, violates
the Constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. As the Court of
Appeals correctly concluded, the Treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute. "It merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution of an offense or a crime which
offense or crime was already committed or consummated at the time the treaty
was ratified." 27
In signing the Treaty, the government of the Philippines has determined that it
is within its interests to enter into agreement with the government of Australia
regarding the repatriation of persons wanted for criminal offenses in either
country. The said Treaty was concurred and ratified by the Senate in a
Resolution dated September 10, 1990. Having been ratified in accordance
with the provision of the 1987 Constitution, the Treaty took effect thirty days
after the requirements for entry into force were complied with by both
governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of respondent Court
of Appeals, we hereby AFFIRM the same and DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164815 February 22, 2008
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law
has a prospective, not retroactive, effect.1 However, penal laws that favor a
guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-
a These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on
effectivity of laws.
Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang
parusa ng bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi
pusakal na kriminal.
We apply the exception rather than the rule in this petition for review on
certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with
modification that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City, finding
petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
The Facts
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the
Criminal Investigation Division, Central Police District Command, received a
dispatch order2 from the desk officer.3 The order directed him and three (3)
other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest4 issued by Judge Ignacio
Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping
with ransom.5
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner,
checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.6 Eventually, the team
proceeded to the Integrated National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat,
Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was about to board a tricycle.7
SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.8 They put him under
arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him.9
Found tucked in his waist10 was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number
5231511 with five (5) live ammunition.12
Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.13
A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at
Camp Crame revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul
Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.14 Epifanio Deriquito, the records
verifier, presented a certification15 to that effect signed by Edwin C. Roque,
chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division.16
Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,17 as amended. The Information
read:
Page 125 of 129
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the
said accused without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under his/her
custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5)
live ammo. without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by
the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
(Sgd.)
GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP
Assistant City Prosecutor18
With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner
pleaded not guilty when arraigned on October 9, 1996.19 Trial on the merits
ensued.
SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner
stated above.
Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined
testimonies of petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol,
Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding
house of his children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon
City.20 He was roused from his slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in
civilian clothes bolted the room.21 They trained their guns at him22 and pulled
him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the
faucet.23 The raiding team went back inside and searched and ransacked the
room.24 SPO2 Disuanco stood guard outside with him.25 Moments later, an
operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril
sa loob!"26
Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we are authorized to shoot you
because there’s a shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning do so
something, do it right now."27 He was also told that there was a standing
warrant for his arrest.28 However, he was not shown any proof when he asked
for it.29 Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.30
According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The
gun seized from him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He
was, however, unable to present the documentation relative to the firearm
because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner further lamented that when
he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a counsel.
Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family.31
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still
with the Narcotics Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales
to white-wash a drug-related investigation involving friends of the said police
officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of a complaint filed with the
Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head of the
unit that conducted the search in his boarding house.32
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to
petitioner a Memorandum Receipt dated July 1, 199333 covering the subject
firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the verbal instruction of Col.
Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature34 on the said
receipt.35
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was
arrested, testified that on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered
his room as he was preparing for school.36 They grabbed his shoulder and led
him out.37 During all those times, a gun was poked at him.38 He was asked
where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to petitioner’s
room.39
Four (4) policemen then entered the room.40 He witnessed how they pointed
a gun at petitioner, who was clad only in his underwear.41 He also witnessed
how they forcibly brought petitioner out of his room.42 While a policeman
remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others went back inside
the room.43 They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his
locker,44 which yielded the subject firearm.45
RTC and CA Dispositions
On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended
by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4 years, 2 months and 1
day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the amount of
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. Let the same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP.
SO ORDERED.46
Petitioner moved to reconsider47 but his motion was denied on August 27,
1998.48 He appealed to the CA.
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC
disposition. The fallo of the CA decision reads:
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is
modified to 4 years and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, with the foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the
decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.49
His motion for reconsideration50 having been denied through a Resolution
dated August 3, 2004,51 petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule
45.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE
SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE
OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT
THE SAME IS THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY
SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS
(SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF
THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).52 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and ammunition, and (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned
the same does not have the corresponding license for it.53
The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established
through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.54 Defense witness Yuson also
identified the firearm.55 Its existence was likewise admitted by no less than
petitioner himself.56
As for petitioner’s lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified
that a verification of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315
with the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame revealed that the
seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was registered in the name of a
certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.57 As proof, Deriquito
presented a certification signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the
same office.58
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a
representative of, or a certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Firearms and Explosive Office attesting that a person is not a licensee of any
firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of
possession of illegal firearms.59 The prosecution more than complied when it
presented both.
The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule.
The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perception.60 Otherwise, the testimony is objectionable for being hearsay.61
On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an
exception to the hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of
Court which provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. – Entries in official records made in the
performance of his official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specifically enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie
evidence of the facts stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present
controverting evidence makes the presumption unrebutted. Thus, the
presumption stands.
Page 126 of 129
Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less
than an acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court.
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The
search was conducted after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room
he was occupying.62
This contention deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner’s version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual
findings made by the trial court and its calibration of the credibility of
witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice Ynares-Santiago in People v.
Rivera:63
x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who
had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on record. The
demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact and fancy
or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth. We have
consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which of the conflicting
versions of the prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the
assessment of the trial courts are generally viewed as correct and entitled to
great weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability or innocence of
the accused depends on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity
of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of
respect if not finality.64 (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief.
We find no compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score.
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only
claims to be highly decorated,65 but have effected a number of successful
arrests66 as well. Common sense would dictate that he must necessarily be
authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition.
Had the arresting officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner
by framing him up, they could have easily "planted" a more incriminating
evidence rather than a gun. That would have made their nefarious scheme
easier, assuming that there indeed was one.
The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to
possess the subject firearm and its five (5) ammunition.
Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject
firearm and its ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to
him by the PNP Narcotics Command.67
Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like
policemen are accorded presumption of regularity in the performance of their
official duties,68 it is only a presumption; it may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the presumption when it
proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was
anything but regular.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to
petitioner based on the verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col.
Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol’s testimony on cross-examination70
would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said receipt was
issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary
bureaucratic constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under
questionable circumstances.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is
competent testimony as to its existence.
Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have
been excluded as evidence because they were not formally offered by the
prosecution71 in violation of Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.72
We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of
the Memorandum Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence
of the subject firearm and its ammunition. Petitioner’s act may result to an
absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is declared valid, while the
subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by the
Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the
Memorandum Receipt useless.
In any case, petitioner’s contention has no leg to stand on.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the subject firearm73 and its five (5) live
ammunition74 were offered in evidence by the prosecution.75 Even assuming
arguendo that they were not offered, petitioner’s stance must still fail. The
existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by testimony, even
without its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,76 the non-presentation
of the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.77
As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live
ammunition were established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.78
Yuson also identified said firearm.79 Petitioner even admitted its existence.80
We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed
firearm is presented during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or
fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it is not offered in evidence, as long
as there is competent testimony as to its existence.
Penal and civil liabilities
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as
amended. It provides that "[t]he penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part
of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition."
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner
committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended
P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997,81 during the pendency of the case with the
trial court. The present law now states:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be
Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. – The penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered
firearm, such as rimfire handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar
firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition:
Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring supplied)
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they
acquire the character of an ex post facto law.82 An exception to this rule,
however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused. According to Mr.
Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on
the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception
based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice."83
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the
same is still advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment
is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period84 from reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua85 under P.D. No. 1866.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum
which ranges from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years, is the prescribed penalty and will form the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree lower, which
is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and
one [1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months).86 Hence, the penalty
imposed by the CA is correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional medium, as minimum term, to six (6) years of prision
correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in consonance with the Court’s
ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals87 and Barredo v. Vinarao.88
As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper
disposition should be made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code89
which provides, among others, that the proceeds and instruments or tools of
the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is
AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 206357 November 12, 2014
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISISON ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG),
Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN Conchita CarpioMorales, GREGORIO S.
LICAROS, GAUDENCIO BEDUYA, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., JOSE S.
ESTEVES, PLACIDO T. MAP A, JR., JULIO V. MACUJA, VICENTE
PATERNO, RAFAEL A. SISON, ROBERTO V. ONGPIN, ALICIA LL. REYES,
Former Members of the Board of Governors of the Development Bank of
the Philippines (DBP), RODOLFO M. CUENCA, EDILBERTO M. CUENCA,
JOSE Y. VILLONGCO, RODOLFO B. SANTIAGO, AURELIO Y. BAUTISTA,
GENOVEVA L. BUENO, BIENVENIDO D. CRUZ, ROMEO R. ECHAUZ,
JORGE W. JOSE, LEONILO M. OCAMPO, ANTONIO P. SAN JUAN, JR.,
Page 127 of 129
CLARENCIO S. YUJIOCO, All Officers of Resorts Hotels Corporation,
Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
annulment and setting aside of the Orders dated July 19, 2011 and March 8,
2012, rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-CC-03-0008-A,
entitled "Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) v. Rodolfo
Cuenca, et al."
The Facts
On October 18, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative
Order No. 13 creating a Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee). A few months later, President Ramos
issued Memorandum Order No. 61 prescribing certain criteria to be used by
the Ad Hoc Committee as a guide ininvestigating and studying loans granted
by government financing institutions that amount to behest loans.
One of the loan accounts referred to the Ad Hoc Committee for investigation
was that of Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC).
Incorporated in 1968 with a paid-up capital of ₱1.0 million, RHC was 37.2%
owned by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business associate. In 1969,
RHC obtained a total of 9.7 million from DBP, allegedly to pay the balance of
the purchase price of Baguio Pines Hotel and to construct an 8-storey building.
In 1973, the loan was restructured and DBP granted a direct loan of ₱14.4
million and guaranteed another ₱11.2 million. In 1974, an additional loan of
₱8.9 million was granted to RHC for the expansion of its hotel project, and
₱3.6 million for the cost of 10 luxury buses. In 1975, an additional loan of
₱27.8 million was again granted to RHC for another expansion project, and in
1977, it again obtained ₱11.3 million to refinance its unpaid obligations and
partly to finance Taal Vista.
To secure the loans totaling ₱86.9 million, RHC offered as collaterals the
assets that were acquired by these loans which included the Baguio Pines
Hotel, Taal Vista Lodge, Hotel Mindanao and the luxury buses.
In 1980, 40% of the amount wereconverted into DBP’s common shareholding
in RHC, and the balance of ₱58.4 million was restructured. The properties
were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of ₱11.97 million.
On the basis of the foregoing,the Ad Hoc Committee found that DBP’s total
exposure as of 1986 amounted to ₱99.1 million.1
Based on the above, the Ad Hoc Committee, on January 4, 1993, submitted a
report to the President where it concluded thatthe RHC account qualifies as
behest in character anchored on the following grounds:
a) The loans are under collateralized;
b) The borrower corporation is undercapitalized, for its paid-up capital
amounted only to ₱10.3 million upon the approval of the loans which totaled to
₱99,133,765.14 in 1986;
c) Stockholders and officers of the borrower corporation are identified as
Marcos cronies; and
d) As revealed by the marginal notes based on Hawaii documents on file with
PCGG, it was found out that thenPresident Marcos owned 20% of the shares
of stocks in RHC.
Agreeing that the said loans bear the characteristics of a behest loan on the
basis of the said Committee Report, the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003
with the Office of the Ombudsman, against respondent directors and officers
of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of
Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.2
Later, or on June 4, 2004, petitioner filed a Supplemental ComplaintAffidavit.3
In the questioned July 19, 2011 Order, the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner’s
Affidavit-Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The falloof the Order reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this complaint is DISMISSEDfor lack of
jurisdiction inasmuch as onlyPrivate (sic) parties are charged due to the
refusal of theDevelopment (sic) Bank of the Philippines to furnish the
[p]ertinent documents that will identify the public respondentsInvolved (sic).
Petitioner moved for reconsideration,arguing, among others, that the
Ombudsman erred in dismissing its Affidavit-Complaint since its Supplemental
Complaint-Affidavit enumerates the directors of DBP who conspired with
herein private respondents in granting the behest loans subject of the case.
Acting on the motion, the Ombudsman,on March 8, 2012, issued the second
assailed Order dismissing the complaint on the ground of prescription,
effectively denying the motion for reconsideration.

In the said Order, the Ombudsman stated that:
In as much as the record indicates that the instant complaint was filed with this
office only on 6 January 2003, or more than ten (10) years from the time the
crimes were discovered on 4 January 1993, the offenses charged herein had
already prescribed. This office, therefore has no other recourse but to
DISMISS the instant complaint.
In light of the foregoing discussion, this Office sees no need to dispose of the
other issues complainant raised in its Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, on account of prescription of the offenses charged, the
criminal complaint for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) of (sic) R.A. 3019
against respondents is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, petitioner seeks recoursefrom this Court, arguing that contrary to
the decision of the Ombudsman, the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner
insists that the prescriptive period should only commence to run on January 6,
2003 when it filed the Affidavit-Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman,
and not on January 4, 1993 when the crimes were discovered. This
argument,according to petitioner, is based on Section 2 of Act No. 33264
which states that "[p]rescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for
its investigation and punishment." Moreover, Section 11 of RA 3019 sets the
prescription of offenses under said law at fifteen (15) years,5 not ten (10) as
held by the Ombudsman.
The Issue
Based on the above backdrop, the issue submitted for this Court’s resolution is
whether or not respondent Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint dated January 6, 2003 on the ground of
prescription.
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit. RA 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses
punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten (10) years.This period was
later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage ofBatas Pambansa (BP)
Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however,
that the longer prescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019.
Following Our pronouncements in People v. Pacificador,6 the rule is that "in
the interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more
favorable to the accused is tobe adopted." As such, the longer prescriptive
period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot be applied to crimes
committed prior to the effectivityof the said amending law on March 16, 1982.
Considering that the crimes werecommitted in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and
1977, the applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in
RA 3019, the law in force at that time. What is, then, left for Our determination
is the reckoning point for the 10-year period.
Notably, RA 3019 is silent as to when the period of prescription shall begin to
run. This void, however, is remedied by Act No. 3326,7 Section 2 of which
provides in part:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation
and punishment. xxx.
Based on the above, there are two reckoning points for the counting of the
prescription of an offense: 1) the day of the commission of the violation of the
law; and 2) if the day whenthe violation was committed be not known, then it
shall begin to run from the discovery of said violation and the institution of
judicial proceedingsfor investigation and punishment.
The first mode being self-explanatory, We proceed with Our construction of
the second mode.
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation," this Court has, as early as 1992 in People v. Duque,8 held that
in cases where the illegality of the activity is not known to the complainant at
the time of its commission, Act No. 3326, Section 2 requires that prescription,
in such a case, would begin to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e.
discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.9
It is also in Duque10 where this Court espoused the raison d’être for the
second mode. We said, "[i]n the nature of things, acts made criminal by
special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for
this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special
law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act
or acts."11 Further clarifying the meaning ofthe second mode, the Court, in
Duque,12 held that Section 2 should be readas "[p]rescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time,from the discovery thereof and untilthe institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment."13 Explaining the
reason therefor, this Court held that a contrary interpretation would create the
absurd situation where "the prescription period would both begin and be
Page 128 of 129
interrupted by the same occurrence; the net effect would be that the
prescription period would not have effectively begun, having been rendered
academic by the simultaneous interruption of that same period."14
Additionally, this interpretation is consistent with the second paragraph of the
same provision which states that "prescription shall be interrupted when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, [and shall] begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."
Applying the same principle, We have consistently held in a number of cases,
some of which likewise involvebehest loans contracted during the Marcos
regime, that the prescriptive period for the crimes therein involved generally
commences from the discovery thereof, and not on the date of its actual
commission.
In the 199915 and 201116 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the Court, in said separate instances,
reversed the ruling of the Ombudsman that the prescriptive period therein
began to run at the time the behest loans were transacted and instead, it
should be counted from the dateof the discovery thereof.
In the 1999 case, We recognized the impossibility for the State, the aggrieved
party, to haveknown the violation of RA 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made inview of the fact that the public officials concerned
connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans." There, We
agreedwith the contention of the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
that the prescriptive period should be computed from the discovery of the
commission thereof and not from the day of such commission. It was also in
the same case where We clarified that the phrase "if the same be not known"
in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 does not mean "lack of knowledge" but that the
crime "is not reasonably knowable" is unacceptable. Furthermore, in this1999
case, We intimated that the determination of the date ofthe discovery of the
offense is a question of fact which necessitates the reception of evidence for
its determination.
Similarly, in the 2011 Desiertocase, We ruled that the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine applies considering that the plaintiff therein had no reasonable means
of knowing the existence of a cause of action.17 In this particular instance, We
pinned the running of the prescriptive period to the completion by the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee of an exhaustive investigation on
the loans. We elucidated that the first mode under Section 2 of Act No. 3326
would not apply since during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared
to question the legality of these transactions.18
Prior to the 2011 Desierto case came Our 2006 Resolution19 in Romualdez v.
Marcelo,20 which involved a violation of Section 7 of RA 3019. In resolving the
issue of whether or not the offenses charged in the said cases have already
prescribed, We applied the same principle enunciated in Duque21 and ruled
that the prescriptive period for the offenses therein committed began to run
from the discovery thereof on the day former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez filed the complaint with the PCGG.
This was reiterated in Disini v. Sandiganbayan22 where We counted the
running of the prescriptive period insaid case from the date of discovery of the
violation after the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation despite the highly
publicized and well-known nature of the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant
Project therein involved, recognizing the fact that the discovery of the crime
necessitated the prior exhaustive investigation and completion thereof by the
PCGG.
In Republic v. Cojuangco, Jr.,23 however, We held that not all violations of RA
3019 require the application of the second mode for computing the
prescription of the offense.1avvphi1 There, this Court held that the second
element for the second mode to apply, i.e. that the action could not have been
instituted during the prescriptive period because of martial law, is absent. This
is so since information about the questioned investment therein was not
suppressed from the discerning eye of the public nor has the Office of the
Solicitor General made any allegation to that effect. This Court likewise faulted
therein petitioner for having remained dormant during the remainder of the
period of prescription despite knowing ofthe investment for a sufficiently long
period of time.
An evaluation of the foregoing jurisprudence24 on the matter reveals the
following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the period
of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the
commission of the offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be
counted form the dateof discovery thereof.1âwphi1
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should
apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the information
relative to the crime should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could
be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies.
Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information
about the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the
exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the
date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which We
have recognized as a violation that, by their nature, could be concealed from
the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation,25
the second mode applies. We, therefore, count the running of the prescriptive
period from the dateof discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee reported to the President its
findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This being the case, the filing by
the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on
January 6,2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the
crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to
institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the Ombudsman to
dismiss petitioner’s complaint on the ground of prescription.

Simply put, and as correctly held by the Ombudsman, prescription has already
set in when petitioner PCGG filed the Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated

July 19, 2011 and March 8, 2012 rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-C-C-03-0008-A, entitled Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) v. Rodolfo Cuenca, et al., a:e hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page 129 of 129