段一 1127Jones and Davis’s Correspondent Inference Theory：

Jones and Davis’s (1965) correspondent inference theory is essentially a theory of person perception. It
maintains that the goal of the social perceiver is to identify intentions underlying behavior with the
purpose of inferring dispositions that will be robust across situations. This theory focuses on how people
go about inferring the intentions of others. We search for explanations for other people’s behavior that
are both stable and informative. According to the theory, the behavior of another person is most
informative if it can be judged to be intentional and to have been produced by a consistent underlying
intention, not one that changed from situation to situation.

段一 1128: Jones and Davis hypothesized that the social perceiver uses the unique consequences of a
person’s behavior to infer dispositions through the analysis of non-common effects (see Figure 6.3). That
is, they suggested that the social perceiver asks the question, “What is this action producing that other
actions would not have produced?” By comparing the consequences of an action that is actually taken
with the consequences of actions that are not taken, one may infer the strength of the underlying
intention by looking for distinctive consequences. For example, if I am offered two jobs that are very
similar except that one has a sports center and I choose that one, then you might infer that a sports
center is especially important to me. Furthermore, if many relatively negative elements (such as a lower
salary or a smaller cubicle) are incorporated into the chosen alternative relative to the unchosen ones,
you may infer that the distinctive elements of my choice (the sports center) are especially important to
me. A disposition will be more confidently inferred when there are fewer noncommon effects between
the chosen and unchosen alternatives.

红色括号 The Covariation Model:

When information falls below an adequate level, we seek out information along three dimensions:
distinctiveness, does the impression occur when the entity is there versus when it is not ( note that an
entity may be another person or a thing); consistency over time and modality, does the impression
occur each time and each way the entity is there; and consensus, is the impression experienced by other
people in the same way?

All 1130: It is important to recognize that Kelley’s model is a normative model of inference; that is, it is a
formal, idealized set of rules for validating attributions. Kelley did not believe that people routinely
calculate F ratios in everyday life. Nonetheless, it is worth asking how well this normative model
describes casual inference. Empirical evidence suggests that social perceivers depart in many ways from
the model of causal inference that Kelley detailed. Some of the empirical deviations result from the fact
that particular constellations of consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information are often
unavailable to people (Hewstone & Jaspers, 1987; Jaspers, Hewstone, & Fincham, 1983). People can use
information across these dimensions systematically and in roughly the ways Kelley outlined when the
information is given to them in this form (e.g., McArthur, 1972), but they do not systematically collect
information along these dimensions on their own (Fiedler, Walther, & Nickel, 1999). Often, people draw
on whatever covariation information is available to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the occurrence of an effect (Hewstone and Jaspers, 1987). Echoing an important insight from Jones and
Davis, research using Kelley’s model has found that people exhibit a robust tendency to seek and use
information about a target individual; in other words, just as Jones and Davis hypothesized, people tend
to make dispositional aittributions.
段一，二 1141 Causal Schemas:

Kelley’s models of causal schemas were also influential on the field. Specifically, he detailed the
concepts of multiple necessary causal schemas, which are characterized by the need for the presence of
several contributing causes to produce an effect, and multiple sufficient causal schemas, which are
characterized by conditions in which a behavior may be due to any of several present causes. Thus, to
succeed on a very difficult task requires both effort and ability (multiple necessary causes), whereas to
succeed on a very simple task requires only a little bit of ability or a little bit of effort (multiple sufficient
causes). For example, to win a marathon, multiple causes will need to be present to produce the
outcome, including ability, effort, good training, and favorable course conditions. But if I beat my 4-year-
old niece at checkers, you can attribute my victory to my ability, my effort, the fact that the task is more
familiar to me, or the fact that I can cheat and she will not know how to catch me. Any of the causes will
do.

Kelley made other important contributions to the study of causal attribution. He articulated the
discounting principle, which maintains that people discount the importance of one cause to the extent
that there is another sufficient cause present, and its mirror image, the augmenting principle, which
maintains that people augment the value of a cause to the extent that alternative causes are not
present. On the whole, research evidence supports the discounting principle (e.g., Van Overwalle & Van
Rooy, 2001); the augmenting principle, which requires people to generate information that is not
present, may typically play a lesser role in attribution processes.

段一 1209：Inhibiting stereotype-congruent or prejudice-like responses and intentionally replacing

them with nonprejudiced responses can be likened to the breaking of a bad habit. That is, automatic
stereotype activation functions in much the same way as a bad habit. Its consequences are spontaneous
and undesirable, at least for the low-prejudice person. For those who have integrated egalitarian ideals
into their value system, a conflict would exist between these ideals and expressions of racial prejudice.
The conflict experienced is likely to be involved in the initiation of controlled stereotype-inhibiting
processes that are required to eliminate the habitual response (activation). Ronis, Yates, and Kirscht (in
press) argued that elimination of a bad habit requires essentially the same steps as the formation of a
habit. The individual must (a) initially decide to stop the old behavior, (b) remember the resolution, and
(c) try repeatedly and decide repeatedly to eliminate the habit before the habit can be eliminated. In
addition, the individual must develop a new cognitive (attitudinal and belief) structure that is consistent
with the newly determined pattern of responses.

段一 1209：The model suggests that the change process involves developing associations between the
stereotype structure and the personal belief structure. For change to be successful, each time the
stereotype is activated the person must activate and think about his or her personal beliefs. That is, the
individual must increase the frequency with which the personal belief structure is activated when
responding to members of the stereotyped group. To the extent that the personal belief structure
becomes increasingly accessible, it will better provide a rival response to the responses that would likely
follow from automatic stereotype activation. In cognitive terms, before the newer beliefs and attitudes
can serve a s a rival, the strong association between the previously learned negative attitude and Blacks
to the new nonprejudiced attitudes and beliefs will have to be made stronger and conscious.
红色括号 1216: There may be a range of ironic side effects associated with the seemingly functional and
adaptive process of stereotype inhibition (see also Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1993). By
means of the well-established phenomenon of postsuppression rebound (e.g., Wegner et al., 1987;
Wegner et al., 1990; Wegner et al., 1991), for instance, formerly unwanted stereotypic thoughts may
reappear in mind and impact on perceivers’ treatment of a stereotyped target (Experiments 1 and 2). In
this respect, stereotypic beliefs about others appear to behave much like any other forbidden thought.
Whether the exiled item is a desire to eat junk food forever, to reveal one’s undying love for a close
friend, or simply to inform an Englishman that he’s a touch pompous, the consequences of
postsuppression rebound are equivalent in each case. Once inhibitory mechanisms are relaxed,
perceivers demonstrate a pervasive preoccupation with the formerly unwanted thought, with all the
pernicious implications that this entails for their ensuing cognitions and behavior (see Wegner, 1992,
1994; Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993; Wegner & Schneider, 1989). Out of sight, then, does not necessarily
mean out of mind, at least where unwanted thoughts are concerned.