TORTS-Batch 2 Cases

1) Articles 2177, 2178, 2179

2) Batangas, Laguna, Taybas Bus Co. vs CA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38482 June 18, 1976

BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and TEOTIMO DE MESA, respondents.

Domingo E. de Lara & Associates for petitioner.

Manual A. Alvero & Associates for private respondent.

MARTIN, J.:

The issue in this petition is whether an employee who has already received his separation pay can
still recover retirement benefits from his employer.

Private respondent was first employed as a bus conductor by the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, the herein petitioner, on July 1, 1933 and worked with it until December 31, 1941 when it
ceased operation in its transportation business due to the outbreak of World War II. When the
petitioner resumed its business after the war, the private respondent rejoined the company on May
22, 1945. From a mere bus conductor, the private respondent rose to the position of administrative
officer of the petitioner with a basic salary of P1,000.00 a month. His total length of service was for
30 years, 9 months and 17 days which under Republic Act No. 1787 amounts to 31 years. Sometime
in the month of September, 1967, the private respondent drew two cash advances or "vales" of
P100.00 each or a total of P200.00 from the company's station at Infants, Quezon where he was
then on vacation without the prior approval of the petitioner, in violation of a memorandum restricting
cash advances of confidential employee to P100.00 each payroll period. Due to this infraction, the
services of private respondent were terminated in a Special Order issued by the petitioner's Acting
General Manager effective September 9, 1967. As a result of his dismissal, the private respondent
was constrained to file a complaint before the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Branch III) against
the petitioner to recover the sums of P19,987.56 as separation pay; P17,050.00 as retirement
benefits; P35,018.53 as "would be earnings" had he not been separated and reached the
compulsory retirement age; P13,720.50 for loss of Social Security benefits; P200,000.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P10,000.00 for attorney's fees and P2,000.00 as
expenses for litigation.
In answer, the petitioner denies the claim of private respondent that he was unceremoniously and
without any valid cause or investigation summarily dismissed from the service by its Acting Manager.
According to the petitioner, the private respondent's act of obtaining from the company's dispatcher
in Infanta, Quezon, two cash advances or "vales" in the total amount of P200.00 without the previous
approval of the petitioner, was a violation of the company's memorandum restricting cash advances
of confidential employees to P100.00 each payroll period, and constituted an abuse of trust and
confidence reposed upon him. Petitioner belies the charge of the private respondent that his
dismissal was arbitrary as he was fully aware of the strict policy of the company restricting the cash
advances or "vales" of its confidential employees and that he even signed a promissory note that if
found to be abusing the same he was willing to receive severe punishment from the company.
However, in spite of his promise the private respondent still obtained cash advances for the payroll
period ending May 31, 1967 (Exhibit D-18,), and June 5, 1967 (Exhibit D-19) in excess of P100.00
limit allowed for each payroll period without the approval of the petitioner. Then again on September
1 and 6, 1967 despite his promissory note the private respondent drew the unauthorized cash
advances of P200.00 in violation of the existing memorandum of the company.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Branch III) found that the dismissal of the private
respondent was for just cause and that he was therefore not entitled to separation pay and that since
it has not been shown that the petitioner had violated the law or contract or had committed any act
of quasi-delict, said court also ruled that the private respondent has no cause of action against the
petitioner for unearned income, Social Security benefits and damages. However, it ordered the
petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P17,050.00 as his retirement pay with interest
thereon at the legal rate from filing of the case until fully paid, plus attorney's fees of P2,000.00 and
the cost of the suit and dismissed all other claims of the private respondent.

From said decision, both the petitioner and the private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals,
with the private respondent pressing upon the following errors:

1. That the lower court erred in not holding that plaintiff-appellant's dismissal was
unlawful and or arbitrary.

2. That the lower court erred in dismissing all of plaintiff-appellant's claim with the
exception of retirement pay.

and with petitioner alleging the following errors:

1. That while the lower court correctly found that the dismissal of plaintiff was for just
cause, nevertheless the lower court erred in directing defendant to pay P17,050.00
as retirement benefits to the plaintiff, with interest thereon at the legal rate from the
date of filing of the case until fully paid, plus attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.

2. That the lower court erred in failing to order plaintiff to pay his indebtedness to
defendant in the sum of P13,087.86 with legal interest thereon from the date of
demand, as embodied in the Special Order dated September 9, 1967, as well as to
pay a reasonable sum as attorney's fees and the costs.

3. That the lower court erred in not rendering judgment for the defendant in all
respects and in not completely absolving defendant from all liability.

On February 28, 1974, the Court of Appeals thru a Special Division of Five Justices modified the
decision of the trial court by ordering the petitioner to pay the private respondent, in addition to the
retirement benefit of P17,050.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of
this case until fully paid, plus attorney's fees of P2,000.00, the sum of P19,987.56 as separation pay,
also with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid minus the
indebtedness of private respondent in the amount of P13,087.86 with legal interest from September
9, 1967 until paid with costs against the petitioner. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera of the
respondent Court of Appeals, however, dissented from the majority opinion. A motion for
reconsideration of the decision was denied.

Hence this instant petition to review on certiorari the decision of the respondent Court.

There is no dispute that at the time of his dismissal on September 9, 1967, private respondent had
an outstanding account of P13,087.86 with the petitioner. Due to the abuse of the "vale" privilege,
specially by the confidential employees, the petitioner issued on July 21, 1965, a Memorandum
(Exhibit 26) prohibiting the employees from drawing cash advances in excess of P100.00 every
payroll period. Then on May 25, 1967, the Finance Manager of the petitioner issued a Circular in the
following tenor:

To all Employees Concerned:

In view of the increase on the payroll shortages, the Management is planning to

transfer your payroll shortage to Due from Officer & Employees, provided that you
sign the promissory note below that you will not get short again.

Remember this will definitely be the last time.

(Sgd.) R.Z. NAVARRO

Finance Officer

At the bottom of one of the copies of the Circular, the private respondent signed a
promissory note (Exhibit I) which reads:

Promissory Note

I promise that from now on, I will never abuse my vale privilege
should I be found abusing my vale privilege and get short again, the
Management will have the right to impose severe disciplinary action
against me.

(Sgd.) TEOTIMO DE MESA

(Signature of Employee P R No.)

In total disregard of the foregoing promissory note, the private

respondent again obtained cash advances for the payroll period
ending May 31, 1967 (Exhibit D-18) and June 15, 1967 (Exhibit D-
19), without the approval of the management, thus exceeding the limit
allowed in the petitioner's memorandum of July 21, 1965 (Exhibit 26).
As the abuse of the "vale" privilege remained unabated, the company
issued again another memorandum on June 2, 1967 limiting the cash
advances of confidential employees to P100.00 for every payroll
period, any excess of which shall be approved by the President,
General Manager or Finance Officer (Exhibit 23). Thereafter, came
the memorandum of July 1, 1967 which again restricted the cash
advances of confidential employees to P100.00 per payroll period.
Despite the last memorandum of July 1, 1967 and his promissory
note on May 25, 1967, the private respondent drew cash advances in
the amount of P200.00 between September 1 and 6, 1967. This
precipitated the action of the petitioner to dismiss the private
respondent on September 9, 1967.

The main contention of private respondent is that his dismissal was

unlawful and or arbitrary because (a) he was not given a hearing on
the alleged cause of his dismissal; (b) the petitioner disregarded his
Service Manual and (c) the petitioner violated the "Schedule of
Penalties" (Exhibit K) which had been agreed upon between the
petitioner and its employees. One of the fundamental duties of the
employee is to yield obedience to all reasonable rules, orders and
instructions of the employer and willful or intentional disobedience
thereof, as a general rule justifies recission of the contract of service
and the peremptory dismissal of the employee. However, in order to
constitute disobedience, the employee's conduct must have been
willful or intentional, willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and
perverse mental attitude rendering, the employee's act inconsistent
with proper subordination. 1 The rules, instructions or commands in
order to be a ground for discharge on the score of disobedience,
must be reasonable and lawful, must be known to the employee, and
must pertain to the duties which the employees have been engaged
to discharge. 2 There can be no doubt that the private respondent
here has repeatedly abused the "vale" privilege and therefore in this
respect can be considered willful. He cannot claim that he is ignorant
of the memoranda and the circulars limiting the cash advances of
employees to not more than P100.00 each payroll period. But the
rules, instructions or commands limiting the cash advances of
confidential employees, do not pertain to the duties which the
petitioner has been engaged to discharge. Said rules, instructions or
commands are primarily intended for the benefit of the company itself
and have nothing to do with the duties of its employees and therefore
cannot be a valid ground for their discharge on the score of
disobedience.

But even granting that a willful disobedience of said rules, instructions

or commands limiting the cash advances of the employees is a valid
cause for his discharge, yet his dismissal was arbitrary because he
was not given a hearing on the alleged cause of his dismissal in total
disregard of the Service Manual of 1962 of the joint management of
the Laguna Tayabas Company and Batangas Transportation
Company (Exhibit I) which among others provides:

2. In all cases where punishment of any sort is

imposed, the penalty shall be commensurate with the
nature and gravity of the offenses charged, taking into
consideration the varying circumstances surrounding
each particular case; the offender shall, however, be
 given the benefit of all doubts that may exist as to his
responsibility for the offense charged.

3. No employee shall be s primarily punished for any

offense or dereliction alleged to have been
committed without having been given an opportunity
to be heard and defend himself.Unless otherwise
decided by the Management, the Legal Department is
designated to investigate all complaints against
employees and to take such statement or hear such
defenses as the erring employee may wish to make.
Upon termination of the investigation, the Legal
Department will submit its findings to the
Management for decision. No penalty involving a fine,
suspension or dismissal will take effect until finally
approved by the General Manager. (Chapter X, pars.
2 and 3. Exh. I-1; emphasis supplied.)

They also violate the following Table of Penalties (Exhibit K):

O 1 2 3 4 5 6
F
F s n r t t t
E t d d h h h
N
S
E
S
x
x
x
x
A W W D D D D
b a a i i i i
u r r s s s s
s n n c c c c
i
n
g

V
a
l
e

P
r
i
v
il
e
g
e
7 8 9 1 M
t t t 0 A
 h h h t X
h
D D D D D
i i i i i
s s s s s
c c c c c
h h

(Exhibit K-1)

It is explicitly provided in the Service Manual of 1962 that the petitioner cannot summarily be
punished for any offense or dereliction alleged to have been committed without having been given
an opportunity to be heard and defend himself. The records do not show that private respondent was
ever given any hearing for the alleged violation of the memorandum of July 1, 1967. He was not
given a chance to give his side. Besides the memorandum of petitioner of July 1, 1967 is
inconsistent with the Table of Penalties which fixes the penalty for violation of the "vale" privilege
was indicated in the above table. The table does not provide for dismissal. It simply mentions
warning for the first and second offense and discipline for the third, fourth, fifth, sixth offense, etc.
The word "discipline" is by itself vague. It is doubtful if it includes outright dismissal and in case of
such doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the employee. Besides, the memorandum
allegedly violated by the private respondent cannot prevail over the Table of Penalties which is the
result of the mutual agreement of the petitioner and its employees, unlike the memorandum which is
only prepared by the petitioner. The fact that the private respondent obtained two cash advances in
the total amount of P200.00 without previous approval of the petitioner does not warrant his
summary dismissal considering his length of service and considering further the fact that had he not
been dismissed summarily, the salary which he expected to receive for the quincena of September
1967 would be more than enough to cover the advance of P200.00 to private respondent. Likewise
in Article X of the Labor Agreement entered into by and between the petitioner and the Batangas
Transportation Company Employees Association of Batangas on August 27, 1967 which also
appears in the Labor Agreement entered into by the petitioner with its Laguna side employees in its
Article X thereof, it is so provided that:

1. Considering the nature of the business of the COMPANY and its obligations to the
public, the right to discipline all employees is hereby vested solely in the COMPANY.
The management, operation of the business and the supervision of the working
forces and also hereby vested exclusively in the COMPANY, including but not limited
to, the right to hire, suspend, lay off, transfer, promote, demote, reprimand, fine, or
discharged an employee for lack of work or other just cause. It is understood that no
employee shall be suspended or discharged from the service without cause and
without proper hearing and investigation: PROVIDED HOWEVER, that the parties
hereto recognize as sufficient for this purpose the current practice and procedure of
the COMPANY with respect to hearing and investigation of erring employees:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that in case of grave offenses the penalty for which is
vested in the discretion of the management, the employee may be allowed to be
confronted with the witnesses against him. Any employee not satisfied with the action
taken against him after said investigation shall have the right to appeal, by himself
directly or through the President of the ASSOCIATION, to the President of the
COMPANY or his authorized representative. The decision rendered in such appeal
shall be respected by the ASSOCIATION and the employees concerned;
HOWEVER, the ASSOCIATION and/or the employees are not precluded from
resorting to the mediation procedure hereinafter provided or from bringing the case to
the proper agency of the Government if they are not satisfied with the decision.
(emphasis supplied.)
Obviously under the foregoing provisions of the Labor Agreement, the petitioner cannot arbitrarily
and summarily dismiss the private respondent for alleged violation of the memorandum of July 1,
1967 and of his promissory note dated May 25, 1967 without giving him the opportunity to be heard
and defend himself. Having promulgated the Service Manual itself, the petitioner is bound by its
provisions. So with the labor agreement it had signed with the Batangas Transportation Employees
Association of which private respondent is a member. It must be noted that the terms and conditions
of a collective bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. 3 Those who are entitled to
its benefits can invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation prescribed therein is not fulfilled,
the aggrieved party can go to court for redress. 4 Undoubtedly, the act of the petitioner in dismissing
private respondent without the benefit of a hearing is in violation of the Service Manual of the
petitioner and the Labor Agreement it has with its employees. Besides, the failure of petitioner to
give the private respondent the benefit of a hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an
infringement on his constitutional right to due process of law and not to be denied the equal
protection of the laws. 5 The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be his property within the
meaning of the constitutional guarantee. This is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived of
his labor or work without due process of law. 6Since the right of private respondent to his labor is in
itself a property and that the labor agreement between him and petitioner is the law between the
parties, his summary and arbitrary dismissal amounted to a deprivation of his property without due
process. For such unlawful dismissal, the private respondent is entitled to separation pay. Section 1,
Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act No. 1787, provides:

SEC. 1. In cases of employment without a definite period, in a commercial, industrial,

or agricultural establishment or enterprise, the employer or the employee may
terminate at any time the employment with just cause; or without just cause in the
case of an employee by serving written notice on the employer at least one month in
advance, or in the case of an employer, by serving such notice to the employee at
least one month in advance or one- half month for every year of notice of the
employee, whichever is longer, a fraction of at least six months being considered as
one whole year.

The employer, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of
employment without just cause may hold the employee liable for damages.

The employee, upon whom no such notice was served in case of termination of
employment without just cause shall be entitled to compensation from the date of
termination of his employment in an amount equivalent to his salaries or wages
corresponding to the required period of notice. (emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, since private respondent was dismissed without cause, he is
entitled to compensation from the date of termination of his employment equivalent to his wages or
salaries corresponding to the required period of notice. Private respondent worked with the petitioner
from July 1, 1933 up to December 31, 1941, covering a period of 8 years and 6 months and then
after the war he re-entered the service of petitioner on May 22, 1945 until he was separated on
September 9, 1967 or a period of 22 years, 8 months and 21 days. His total length of service is 30
years, 9 months and 17 days which under Republic Act No. 1787 is equivalent to 31 years and his
basic salary was P1,000.00 a month. Since his dismissal was without cause he is entitled under the
law to one half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, so for 31 years of service he is entitled to
15-1/2 months salary or the amount of P19,957.56 as his separation pay with legal interest from the
filing of the complaint until fully paid.
After finding private respondent's dismissal from the service to be without cause and arbitrary and
upholding his right to separation pay, is he also entitled to retirement benefits pursuant to the Labor
Agreement entered by petitioner with its employees under Section 5, Article XVI thereof which reads:

A member or his designated beneficiary shall be entitled to receive the benefits

established under this Plan should he retire or is separated from the company for any
cause provided for in Section 4. The benefits which a member or his beneficiary is
entitled to receive shall be paid by the COMPANY in lump sum within a period of
thirty (30) days, if possible, but in no case beyond sixty (60) days, from the date of
accrual ...

One of the grounds for retirement provided for in Section 4(b) is "upon attainment of his optional
retirement." And according to Section 1, paragraph (g), Article XVI, of the Labor Agreement "by
optional retirement is meant retirement of an employee after his 8 years in the service at which date
an employee may elect to retire subject to conditions herein below established." Considering that
private respondent has already served the petitioner 31 years he has more than reached the
optional retirement age under the agreement. According to his Certificate of Baptism, private
respondent (Exh. C) was born on December 9, 1909 so that when his services were terminated on
September 9. 1967, he was exactly 58 years, 9 months and 10 days old. Under Section 6, Article
XVI of the same Labor Agreement, "an employee shall receive one-half (1/2) month's salary for
every year of service as defined in Sections l(a) and 2(a) above, and therefore the same excludes
overtime pay, bonuses and other supplements from the time an employee entered the service up to
his retirement or separation from the service of the company." And under Section 7, thereof, "an
employee who has rendered at least eight (8) years of continuous service may, at its option, retire
and enjoy the benefits prescribed in the Plan: ... "

But petitioner contents that private respondent can only avail himself of either separation pay or
retirement benefits but not both, citing in support thereof, the ruling of this Court in the case of
Cipriano vs. San Miguel Corporation. 7 The foregoing ruling cannot be made to apply to the present
suit because in said case it is so expressly provided in the Labor Agreement that:

Regular employees who are separated from the service of the company for any
reason other than misconduct or voluntary resignation shall be entitled to either
100% of the benefits provided in Section 2, Article VIII hereof regardless of their
length of service in the company or to the severance pay provided by law, whichever
is the greater amount.

This in said case the employee was entitled to either the amount prescribed in the plan or the
severance pay provided by law whichever is the greater amount. In the present case, there is
nothing in the labor agreement entered into by petitioner with the Batangas Transportation
Employees Association of which private respondent is a member barring the latter from recovering
whatever benefits he is entitled to under the law in addition to the gratuity benefits under the labor
agreement between him and his employer. Neither is there any provision in the Termination Pay Law
(Republic Act No. 1052, as amended by Republic Act No. 1787) that an employee who receives his
termination pay upon separation from the service without cause is precluded from recovering any
other benefits agreed upon by him and his employer. In the absence of any such prohibition, both in
the aforesaid Labor Agreement and the Termination Pay Law the private respondent has the right to
recover from the petitioner whatever benefits he is entitled to under the Termination Pay Law in
addition to other benefits conferred upon him by the aforesaid labor agreement.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 35 Am. Jur., p. 478.

2 Am. Jur., p. 479.

3 Mactan Workers vs. Aboitiz, 45 SCRA 577.

4 Citing Art. 1159 and Art. 1700-1702 of the Civil Code, also Shell Oil Workers Union
v. Shell Co. of the Phil., 39 SCRA 276.

5 Art. IV, Sec. 1(1) Constitution.

6 Phil. Movie Workers Association vs. Premier Productions, Inc., 92 Phil. 843, citing
11 Am. Jur., Section 344, pp. 1168-1171.

7 24 SCRA 103.

3) Padua vs Robles

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-40486 August 29, 1975

PAULINO PADUA and LUCENA BEBIN PADUA, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
GREGORIO N. ROBLES and BAY TAXI CAB, defendants-appellees.

Alberto R. de Joya for plaintiffs-appellants.

Cardenas & Peralta Law Office for defendants-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:

Resolving this appeal by the spouses Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua, we set aside the order
dated October 25, 1972 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales dismissing their complaint, in civil
case 1079-O, and remand this case for further proceedings.

In the early morning of New Year's Day of 1969 a taxicab (bearing 1968 plate no. TX-9395 and
driven by Romeo N. Punzalan but operated by the Bay Taxi Cab owned by Gregorio N. Robles)
struck ten-year old Normandy Padua on the national road in barrio Barretto, Olongapo City. The
impact hurled Normandy about forty meters away from the point where the taxicab struck him, as a
result of which he died.

Subsequently, Normandy's parents (Paulino and Lucena Bebin Padua), by complaint filed with the
Court of First Instance of Zambales (civil case 427-O), sought damages from Punzalan and the Bay
Taxi Cab; likewise, the city Fiscal of Olongapo, by information filed with the same court (criminal
case 1158-O), charged Punzalan with homicide through reckless imprudence.

On October 27, 1969 the court a quo, in civil case 427-O, adjudged for the Paduas as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant Romeo

Punzalan to pay the plaintiffs the sums of P12,000.00 as actual damages, P5,000.00
as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees;
and dismissing the complaint insofar as the Bay Taxicab Company is concerned.
With costs against the defendant Romeo Punzalan. (Emphasis supplied)

Almost a year later, on October 5, 1970, the court a quo, in criminal case 1158-O, convicted
Punzalan, as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the cost. The civil liability of the accused
has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled Paulino
Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al.' (Emphasis supplied)

After the judgment in civil case 427-O became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof. This
proved futile; the corresponding court officer returned the writ of execution unsatisfied.

Unable to collect the amount of P27,000 awarded in their favor, the Paduas instituted action in the
same court against Gregorio N. Robles to enforce the latter's subsidiary responsibility under the
provisions of article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a motion to dismiss based on (1)
bar of the cause of action by a prior judgment and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action.

Thereafter, the court a quo, in an order dated October 25, 1972, granted Robles' motion to dismiss
on the ground that the Paduas' complaint states no cause of action. This order the Paduas
questioned in the Court of Appeals which, by resolution dated March 5, 1975, certified the case to
this Court for the reason that the appeal involves only questions of law.
The Paduas predicate their appeal on eighteen errors allegedly committed by the court a quo. These
assigned errors, however, raise only one substantial issue: whether the judgment dated October 5,
1970 in criminal case 1158-O includes a determination and adjudication of Punzalan's civil liability
arising from his criminal act upon which Robles' subsidiary civil responsibility may be based.

The sufficiency and efficacy of a judgment must be tested by its substance rather than its form. In
construing a judgment, its legal effects including such effects that necessarily follow because of legal
implications, rather than the language used govern. Also, its meaning, operation, and consequences
must be ascertained like any other written instrument. Thus, a judgment rests on the intention of the
court as gathered from every part thereof, including the situation to which it applies and the
attendant circumstances.

It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly
its decretal portion, easily results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said
judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful
study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances,
would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of
the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the
corresponding indemnity therefor.

Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs)
has the option between an action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with
the criminal action, unless expressly waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended
party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of damages twice for the same
negligent act or omission.

In the case at bar, the Court finds it immaterial that the Paduas chose, in the first instance, an action
for recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the Civil
Code, which action proved ineffectual. The Court also takes note of the absence of any
inconsistency between the aforementioned action priorly availed of by the Paduas and their
subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability arising from the offense committed by
Punzalan and consequently, for exaction of Robles' subsidiary responsibility. Allowance of the latter
application involves no violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same
negligent act or omission. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the court a quo
returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity
awarded to the Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double
recovery of damages for the same negligent act or omission. Finally, the Court notes that the same
judge * tried, heard, and determined both civil case 427-O and criminal case 115-O. Knowledge of an familiarity with all the facts and
circumstances relevant and relative to the civil liability of Punzalan may thus be readily attributed to the judge when he rendered judgment in
the criminal action.

In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a
quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas
to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary
award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the
statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the
determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or
"gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect whatever. The substance of such
statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances,
makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the
civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by
including such statement in the decretal portion of the said judgment, the court intended to adopt the
same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case
1158-O.

There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal
portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting
from his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright and direct instead of circuitous
and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must
surely have a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more
interpretations, that which achieves moral justice should be adopted, eschewing the other
interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.

It is not amiss at this juncture to emphasize to all magistrates in all levels of the judicial hierarchy
that extreme degree of care should be exercise in the formulation of the dispositive portion of a
decision, because it is this portion that is to be executed once the decision becomes final. The
adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties, and the dispositions made as well as the
directions and instructions given by the court in the premises in conformity with the body of the
decision, must all be spelled out clearly, distinctly and unequivocally, leaving absolutely no room for
dispute, debate or interpretation.

We therefore hold that the Paduas' complaint in civil case 1079-O states a cause of action against
Robles whose concommitant subsidiary responsibility, per the judgment in criminal case 1158-O,
subsists.

ACCORDINGLY, the order a quo dated October 25, 1972 dismissing the complaint in civil case
1079-O is set aside, and this case is hereby remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
conformably with this decision and with law. No pronouncement as to costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., concurs and submits a brief opinion.

Barredo, J., concurs with a separate opinion.

Muñoz Palma, J., took no part.

Antonio, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out the decisive issue and how to resolve it
to achieve the desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels concurrence. I do so. What is
more, there is to my mind a distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which the novel
question raised was settled. If the trend manifest in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be
followed, then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims of vehicular accidents,
unfortunately of rather frequent occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That dissipates
whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view of certain traditional procedural concepts about the
correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of those hard cases which, if an old law is to
be believed, may result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out with great
persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the
successor in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men in the field H.L.A. Hart.1 The
more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the law and
settled principles of adjudication may not clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on
an argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the sociological
school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to indicate in this
brief concurrence, the decision reached by us is in consonance with either approach. With the
natural law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on moral justice, I am
comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision reached
deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice, or social control.

1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint of a right either granted or recognized
by law. As was so clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would appear that a plain
reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily
results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment assessed no civil
liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment
in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the
conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to
the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding
indemnity therefor."2 There is much to be said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot
reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to
omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which
Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor.
Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment
in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in
civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect
whatsoever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies
and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord
affirmation to the Padua's right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in
criminal case 1158-O."3 Whatever misgivings therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-
O the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not suffice, to my mind, to render
nugatory the admitted subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case No. 1158-O which is
necessarily attendant upon the conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a difficulty could
have been avoided had greater care been exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may
be had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law from being rendered illusory in fact.

2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It
would conduce to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if there be recognition in the
codes of the right of next kin to damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives being
snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what had been accurately described as dealers of
death on the road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure that it is nothing more than
a barren form of words. This is what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as distinguished from
law in action. To recall an expression from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent bequest
in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay.
The obvious answer is:' With what?"

This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly lends itself to ambiguity considering the
facts disclosed and found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the imposition of liability
on the offending taxicab company. There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not place
such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old
boy being hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this tragedy could have been
avoided. To say now that doubts engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit could
nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary liability of the employer in the criminal case finding
the accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious consequences. The party just as much
responsible for the mishap, with his operation of the transportation service, would be absolved from
liability. It need not be so, but certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful, not
excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling public, it could be a green light for less
vigilance over the conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety is not hard to imagine.
Moreover, from the standpoint of the feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important a
policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left unexplored to mitigate the harshness of
fate. To paraphrase Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire world to compensate
the parents for the loss of their child.4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full concurrence.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

On strictly legal considerations, it would seem possible to dismiss the petition for review in this case.
But there are certain considerations of equity and substantial justice obviously underlying the cause
of petitioners which I find difficult to ignore. It would be unfair and unjust to deprive said petitioners of
their right to damages for the death of their child unquestionably caused by the fault of respondent's
employee merely because the dispositive portion of the decision of Judge Amores in the criminal
case appears to be rather equivocal on its face as to respondent's liability therefor, albeit under the
incontrovertible facts extant in the record such liability is indisputable in law and the language of
Judge Amores' judgment does not anyway exonerate either respondent's driver or private
respondent, and what is more, does not exclude the idea that, as explained in the able main opinion
of Mr. Justice Castro, the judge intended to merely adopt and incorporate in said judgment the
assessment of amount of damages which said judge himself had already made in the civil case he
had previously decided. It is on these fundamental considerations that I base my concurrence in the
judgment in this case.

As I have already indicated, from the standpoint of strict adjective law, the petition should be
dismissed because in truth, there is yet no showing that any attempt has been made by petitioners
to have the judgment in the criminal cases, assuming it includes an imposition of civil liability upon
the accused driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, executed. What appears in the record is that it was the writ
of execution issued against said Punzalan in the previous civil case that was returned unsatisfied. Of
course, this point is highly technical, because all that has to be done is for petitioners to have
another execution in the criminal case, which it can even now be forseen will have exactly the same
result. I am therefore agreeable as a matter of equity that the Court hold that for all legal intents and
purposes, We may consider the return of insolvency of Punzalan in the civil case as in effect the
return in the criminal case, since equity considers as done what ought to have been done when
otherwise injustice would result. And so, the paramount question arises, was there any civil liability
to impose in the criminal judgment of Judge Amores? As related in the main opinion, the judgment of
October 27, 1969 in the civil case ordered Punzalan "to pay plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the sums of
P12,000.00 as actual damages P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees," although absolving at the same time the herein private respondent, and then, on
October 5, 1970, the judgment in the criminal case was as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The civil liability of the accused
has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled 'Paulino
Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al. (Emphasis supplied)

Succintly, the decisive issue presented to Us now is whether this judgment just transcribed imposes
upon Punzalan a civil liability by adoption by reference of the civil liability already a judged in the civil
case or it exonerates him from any civil liability arising from the offense of which he has been found
guilty inasmuch as he was already found civilly liable in the civil case. It must be admitted in candor
that both constructions are literally tenable, with the particularity, however, that the first
interpretation, if adopted could not involve the assumption that the judge committed a grievous and
palpable error of law whereas the second would necessarily mean that he did.

It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent
act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of
liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil
negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each
other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and
substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article
2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission,
which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may
recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered
paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled
in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been
paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the
case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the
amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher
amount.

Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
hence, the judgment in the criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of civil liability, unless
the basis therefor has been shown not to exist, which is not the case here. And since the judgment
in question says that "the civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in
Civil Case No. 427-O entitled Paulino Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et al.," it is but logical to
conclude that the meaning of such statement is that the same amounts of damages fixed in the
previous case were being awarded to the offended party in the criminal case. Otherwise, We would
have to indulge in the assumption that Judge Amores committed the grievous and palpable error of
law of exonerating Punzalan of all civil liabilities in the criminal case just because he had already
been sentenced to pay damages in the civil case. I am not ready to accept such assumption. The
law and jurisprudence on the matter are so clear and well-settled that I refuse to believe that a judge
of the experience of Judge Amores would not be cognizant thereof. Besides, Judge Amores knew or
ought to have known that having absolved herein respondent in the civil case, the only possible
recourse has left to petitioners to recover from said respondent damages for the death of their child
caused by the indisputable negligence of his employee Punzalan is in the form of the subsidiary
liability of the employer under the Penal Code. Indeed, I cannot believe that Judge Amores intended
to allow respondent to escape liability altogether, it being evident under the circumstances which he
himself has found in both cases, civil and criminal, that Punzalan, their employee, had cause the
death of the ten-year-old child of petitioners thru reckless imprudence and that in such a situation in
the law exacts liability from both the employee and the employer. What is more, I consider it but
equitable to hold that the rather equivocal phraseology of the decision of Judge Amores should be
read in the sense it was understood by the petitioners, who in the faith and reliance that the law had
been complied with by Judge Amores and that he had accordingly awarded them in the criminal
case the civil liability that by law goes with it, did not anymore move for clarification or
reconsideration nor appeal from said decision. My understanding is that the filing of the subject civil
action by petitioners proceeded from that assumption, namely, that Punzalan has been found civilly
liable for the same amounts adjudged in the civil case and, therefore, respondent is subsidiarily
liable therefor in the face of Punzalan's insolvency.

Accordingly, I concur in that the order of dismissal of respondent judge should be set aside and that
petitioners' action should be tried on the merits.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

The clarity and lucidity with which Justice Castro spelled out the decisive issue and how to resolve it
to achieve the desirable goal of moral justice in adjudication compels concurrence. I do so. What is
more, there is to my mind a distinct advance in the juridical frontiers in the mode in which the novel
question raised was settled. If the trend manifest in the view taken by the Court would thereafter be
followed, then the protective ramparts the law throws ground victims of vehicular accidents,
unfortunately of rather frequent occurrence here, will be further strengthened. That dissipates
whatever doubts I may have originally felt in view of certain traditional procedural concepts about the
correctness of the decision reached. It is true this is one of those hard cases which, if an old law is to
be believed, may result in bad law. It need not be so, of course, as pointed out with great
persuasiveness in the 1971 inaugural lecture at Oxford given by Professor Ronald Dworkin, the
successor in the chair of jurisprudence to one of the most eminent men in the field H.L.A. Hart.1 The
more accurate way of viewing the matter is that whenever there is an apparent gap in the law and
settled principles of adjudication may not clearly indicate the answer, then a judge may rely either on
an argument of policy or an argument of principle, the former having kinship with the sociological
school of jurisprudence and the latter with the analytical. As I hope I may be able to indicate in this
brief concurrence, the decision reached by us is in consonance with either approach. With the
natural law thinking manifest in the opinion of the Court, witness its stress on moral justice, I am
comforted by the reflection that the procedural barrier is not insurmountable, the decision reached
deriving support from the viewpoint of law as logic, justice, or social control.

1. Dworkin identifies a matter of principle from the standpoint of a right either granted or recognized
by law. As was so clearly pointed out in the opinion of Justice Castro: "It would appear that a plain
reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily
results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment assessed no civil
liability arising from the offense charged against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment
in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant circumstances, would yield the
conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to
the civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalan and awarded the corresponding
indemnity therefor."2 There is much to be said therefor for the view expressed therein that "it cannot
reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case 1158-O, to
omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which
Punzalan was adjudged guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor.
Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the statement in the decretal portion of the judgment
in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of Punzalan's civil liability in
civil case 427-O to be pure jargon or 'gobbledygook' and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect
whatsoever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies
and the attendant circumstances, makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord
affirmation to the Padua's right to the civil liability arising from the judgment against Punzalan in
criminal case 1158-O."3 Whatever misgivings therefore may be felt because in the civil case No. 427-
O the complaint against Bay Taxi Cab Co. is dismissed, do not suffice, to my mind, to render
nugatory the admitted subsidiary liability arising from a decision in criminal case No. 1158-O which is
necessarily attendant upon the conviction of the driver, Romeo N. Punzalan. Such a difficulty could
have been avoided had greater care been exercised by the lower court, but precisely recourse may
be had to our corrective powers to avoid a right granted in law from being rendered illusory in fact.

2. There is thus the strongest policy consideration that buttresses the conclusion reached by us. It
would conduce to less respect for the law as an agency of social control if there be recognition in the
codes of the right of next kin to damages arising from the tragic occurrence of young lives being
snuffed out due to reckless driving on the part of what had been accurately described as dealers of
death on the road and then by lack of care on the part of a judge assure that it is nothing more than
a barren form of words. This is what Dean Pound referred to as law in books as distinguished from
law in action. To recall an expression from Justice Jackson, it is comparable to a munificent bequest
in a pauper's will. It is less than realistic to assert that anyway the guilty driver can be made to pay.
The obvious answer is:' With what?"

This is not to deny that a previous judgment that certainly lends itself to ambiguity considering the
facts disclosed and found by the trial court does interpose juristic difficulty to the imposition of liability
on the offending taxicab company. There can be no blinking the fact though that if it did not place
such vehicles on the road driven in such a reckless and culpable manner resulting in a ten-year old
boy being hurled about forty meters away from the point of impact, this tragedy could have been
avoided. To say now that doubts engendered by the previous ruling in the culpa aquiliana suit could
nullify what the law decrees as to the subsidiary liability of the employer in the criminal case finding
the accused guilty would be fraught with pernicious consequences. The party just as much
responsible for the mishap, with his operation of the transportation service, would be absolved from
liability. It need not be so, but certainly for entrepreneurs more enterprising than careful, not
excessively concerned with the safety of the traveling public, it could be a green light for less
vigilance over the conduct of their drivers. The resulting injury to public safety is not hard to imagine.
Moreover, from the standpoint of the feelings of the bereaved parents, and this is just as important a
policy consideration, I feel that no avenue should be left unexplored to mitigate the harshness of
fate. To paraphrase Justice Malcolm, there is not enough money in the entire world to compensate
the parents for the loss of their child.4 To repeat, the decision reached has my full concurrence.

BARREDO, J., concurring:

On strictly legal considerations, it would seem possible to dismiss the petition for review in this case.
But there are certain considerations of equity and substantial justice obviously underlying the cause
of petitioners which I find difficult to ignore. It would be unfair and unjust to deprive said petitioners of
their right to damages for the death of their child unquestionably caused by the fault of respondent's
employee merely because the dispositive portion of the decision of Judge Amores in the criminal
case appears to be rather equivocal on its face as to respondent's liability therefor, albeit under the
incontrovertible facts extant in the record such liability is indisputable in law and the language of
Judge Amores' judgment does not anyway exonerate either respondent's driver or private
respondent, and what is more, does not exclude the idea that, as explained in the able main opinion
of Mr. Justice Castro, the judge intended to merely adopt and incorporate in said judgment the
assessment of amount of damages which said judge himself had already made in the civil case he
had previously decided. It is on these fundamental considerations that I base my concurrence in the
judgment in this case.

As I have already indicated, from the standpoint of strict adjective law, the petition should be
dismissed because in truth, there is yet no showing that any attempt has been made by petitioners
to have the judgment in the criminal cases, assuming it includes an imposition of civil liability upon
the accused driver, Romeo N. Punzalan, executed. What appears in the record is that it was the writ
of execution issued against said Punzalan in the previous civil case that was returned unsatisfied. Of
course, this point is highly technical, because all that has to be done is for petitioners to have
another execution in the criminal case, which it can even now be forseen will have exactly the same
result. I am therefore agreeable as a matter of equity that the Court hold that for all legal intents and
purposes, We may consider the return of insolvency of Punzalan in the civil case as in effect the
return in the criminal case, since equity considers as done what ought to have been done when
otherwise injustice would result. And so, the paramount question arises, was there any civil liability
to impose in the criminal judgment of Judge Amores? As related in the main opinion, the judgment of
October 27, 1969 in the civil case ordered Punzalan "to pay plaintiffs (herein petitioners) the sums of
P12,000.00 as actual damages P5,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and P10,000.00 as
attorney's fees," although absolving at the same time the herein private respondent, and then, on
October 5, 1970, the judgment in the criminal case was as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Romeo Punzalan y Narciso guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, as
defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, attended by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and hereby sentences him to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The civil liability of the accused
has already been determined and assessed in Civil Case No. 427-O, entitled 'Paulino
Padua, et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan, et al. (Emphasis supplied)

Succintly, the decisive issue presented to Us now is whether this judgment just transcribed imposes
upon Punzalan a civil liability by adoption by reference of the civil liability already a judged in the civil
case or it exonerates him from any civil liability arising from the offense of which he has been found
guilty inasmuch as he was already found civilly liable in the civil case. It must be admitted in candor
that both constructions are literally tenable, with the particularity, however, that the first
interpretation, if adopted could not involve the assumption that the judge committed a grievous and
palpable error of law whereas the second would necessarily mean that he did.

It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that a negligent
act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at least two separate and independent kinds of
liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil
negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each
other that exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and
substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other, although Article
2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent act or omission,
which means that should there be varying amounts awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may
recover, in effect, only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered
paid an amount in one case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled
in the second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already been
paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second case. Thus, in the
case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to pay the herein petitioners the
amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case, he could not be adjudged to pay a higher
amount.

Now, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, a person criminally liable is also civilly liable,
hence, the judgment in the criminal case is supposed to include the imposition of civil liability, unless
the basis therefor has been shown not to exist, which is not the case here. And since the judgment
in question says that "the civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed in
Civil Case No. 427-O entitled Paulino Padua et al. vs. Romeo Punzalan et al.," it is but logical to
conclude that the meaning of such statement is that the same amounts of damages fixed in the
previous case were being awarded to the offended party in the criminal case. Otherwise, We would
have to indulge in the assumption that Judge Amores committed the grievous and palpable error of
law of exonerating Punzalan of all civil liabilities in the criminal case just because he had already
been sentenced to pay damages in the civil case. I am not ready to accept such assumption. The
law and jurisprudence on the matter are so clear and well-settled that I refuse to believe that a judge
of the experience of Judge Amores would not be cognizant thereof. Besides, Judge Amores knew or
ought to have known that having absolved herein respondent in the civil case, the only possible
recourse has left to petitioners to recover from said respondent damages for the death of their child
caused by the indisputable negligence of his employee Punzalan is in the form of the subsidiary
liability of the employer under the Penal Code. Indeed, I cannot believe that Judge Amores intended
to allow respondent to escape liability altogether, it being evident under the circumstances which he
himself has found in both cases, civil and criminal, that Punzalan, their employee, had cause the
death of the ten-year-old child of petitioners thru reckless imprudence and that in such a situation in
the law exacts liability from both the employee and the employer. What is more, I consider it but
equitable to hold that the rather equivocal phraseology of the decision of Judge Amores should be
read in the sense it was understood by the petitioners, who in the faith and reliance that the law had
been complied with by Judge Amores and that he had accordingly awarded them in the criminal
case the civil liability that by law goes with it, did not anymore move for clarification or
reconsideration nor appeal from said decision. My understanding is that the filing of the subject civil
action by petitioners proceeded from that assumption, namely, that Punzalan has been found civilly
liable for the same amounts adjudged in the civil case and, therefore, respondent is subsidiarily
liable therefor in the face of Punzalan's insolvency.

Accordingly, I concur in that the order of dismissal of respondent judge should be set aside and that
petitioners' action should be tried on the merits.

Footnotes

* Judge Augusto M. Amores.

1 Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 Harv. Law Review 1057 (1975).

2 Padua v. Robles, L-40486.

3 Ibid.

4 Cf. Bernal v. House, 54 Phil. 327 (1930).

4) Casupanan v Laroya

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002]

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs.

MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution [1] dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution [2] dated
August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).

The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (Laroya for brevity)
and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (Capitulo for brevity) and driven by
petitioner Avelino Casupanan (Casupanan for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC for brevity) of
Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other
hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil
case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil
case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case
is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The
MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan
and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court
(Capas RTC for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66,[3] assailing the MCTCs Order of
dismissal.

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by
the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy
should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for
certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even
on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure
error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC
denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:

In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and
believe that the accident was caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless
imprudence against the second party.On the other hand, the second party, together
with his operator, believing themselves to be the real aggrieved parties, opted in turn
to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case. [4]

Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal
case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate
civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasi-delict is different
from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a
criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident.
They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can
proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was
not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-delict but also
Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not
state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited
their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper
remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the
order of dismissal is already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal
question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal[5] that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with prejudice. [6] Absent a
declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without
prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41[7] provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice
is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action
under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that where the judgment or final
order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65. Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on
the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a
favorable judgment.[8] Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases
pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.[9] However, there
is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly allow
the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil
action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal
case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the
civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code.These articles on culpa aquiliana read:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by

preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or
negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can file a separate
civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure (2000 Rules for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.

No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in

the criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim
in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such
separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (1985 Rules for
brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently
of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action.Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the
evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were
deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
 Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985
Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such
action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal
action.Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the
reservation of the right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before
the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
of the accused.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and
now provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.

The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

xxx

(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is deemed instituted with the criminal
action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All
the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer
deemed instituted, and may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action
based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions
based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the
criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are
separate, distinct and independent of the civil action deemed instituted in the criminal
action.[10]
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a
separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil action before filing the
criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but
its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the criminal
action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising
from the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code.[11]
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if
reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered
in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of
the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied
only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply
to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this
procedure, to wit:

SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted,
the latter shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on
the merits. The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is rendered in the civil
action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the
evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to
cross-examine the witnesses presented by the offended party in the criminal case and
of the parties to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.

During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription
of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.

x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate
civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the
criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after
commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to recover damages ex-
delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the
offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended
party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:

SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent
civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules,
expressly allows the offended party to bring an independent civil action under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111,
this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
 There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present
Rule 111 expressly states that the offended party may bring such an action but the
offended party may not recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos[12] where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim
for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the absence of clear-cut rules
governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof. Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim
for civil liability. The Court further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case
against the offended party after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance
with the new Rules which may be promulgated. The Court explained that a cross-claim,
counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily
complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules
precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the
accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the
criminal case. However, the same provision states that any cause of action which could
have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be
litigated in a separate civil action. The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file
his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal
action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but
may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the
independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating
the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended
party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused. In some
instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6,
Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the
accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to
litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not
file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the
period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177
of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy
which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the
criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the
ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the
criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil
action. This possibility has always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced
in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the
independent civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. In Azucena vs. Potenciano,[13] the Court declared:

x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the
civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent
character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of
a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from
the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case and
the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
 One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December
1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before
the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -

x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to

actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. [14]

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No.
17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

[1]
Penned by Judge Josefina D. Ceballos.
[2]
Penned by Judge Cesar M. Sotero.
[3]
Docketed as Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
[4]
Petition for Review on Certiorari dated October 27, 2000, pp. 1 & 2; Rollo, pp. 9 &10.
[5]
Records of Special Civil Action No. 17 C-99, Order of March 26, 1999, pp. 12-14.
[6]
Sto. Domingo-David vs. Guerrero, 296 SCRA 277 (1998).
[7]
Section 9, Rule 40 (Appeal from Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts) provides:
SEC. 9. Applicability of Rule 41. The other provisions of Rule 41 shall apply to appeals provided for
herein insofar as they are not inconsistent with or may serve to supplement the provisions of this Rule.
[8]
Melo vs. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 94 (1999).
[9]
International School, Inc. (Manila) vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 474 (1999).
[10]
Neplum, Inc. vs. Evelyn V. Orbeso, G. R. No. 141986, prom. July 11, 2002, at pp. 11-12.
Section 1 of Rule 31, however, allows consolidation, in the discretion of the trial court, of actions
[11]

involving common questions of law or fact pending before the same court (Cojuangco, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals (203 SCRA 619 [1991]), or pending even in different branches of the same regional trial court if
one of the cases has not been partially tried (Raymundo vs. Felipe, 42 SCRA 615 [1971]).
[12]
271 SCRA 391 (1997).
[13]
5 SCRA 468 (1962).
People vs. Arrojado, 350 SCRA679 (2001) citing Ocampo vs. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 27 (1989),
[14]

Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 (1983) & Peo

5) Phoenix Construction vs IAC

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-65295 March 10, 1987

PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL, petitioners,

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO, respondents.

FELICIANO, J:

In the early morning of 15 November 1975 — at about 1:30 a.m. — private respondent Leonardo
Dionisio was on his way home — he lived in 1214-B Zamora Street, Bangkal, Makati — from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During
the cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving
his Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street,
when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and
thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump
truck, owned by and registered in the name of petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc. ("Phoenix"), was
parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street (i.e., on the right hand side of a person
facing in the same direction toward which Dionisio's car was proceeding), facing the oncoming
traffic. The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to
stick out onto the street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-
called "early warning" reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump
truck had earlier that evening been driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular
driver, with the permission of his employer Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early
the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left
but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio
suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial scars, a "nervous breakdown" and
loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically
claiming that the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which
Carbonel had parked the dump truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and
Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own
recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the influence of liquor, without his
headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due
rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and
ordered the latter:

(1) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 15,000.00 for hospital bills and
the replacement of the lost dentures of plaintiff;

(2) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 1,50,000.-00 as loss of expected
income for plaintiff brought about the accident in controversy and which is the result
of the negligence of the defendants;

(3) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000. as moral damages
for the unexpected and sudden withdrawal of plaintiff from his lifetime career as a
marketing man; mental anguish, wounded feeling, serious anxiety, social humiliation,
besmirched reputation, feeling of economic insecurity, and the untold sorrows and
frustration in life experienced by plaintiff and his family since the accident in
controversy up to the present time;

(4) To pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 10,000.00 as damages for the
wanton disregard of defendants to settle amicably this case with the plaintiff before
the filing of this case in court for a smaller amount.

(5) To pay the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P 4,500.00 due as and for
attorney's fees; and

(6) The cost of suit. (Emphasis supplied)

Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. That court in CA-G.R. No.
65476 affirmed the decision of the trial court but modified the award of damages to the following
extent:

1. The award of P15,000.00 as compensatory damages was reduced

to P6,460.71, the latter being the only amount that the appellate court
found the plaintiff to have proved as actually sustained by him;

2. The award of P150,000.00 as loss of expected income was

reduced to P100,000.00, basically because Dionisio had voluntarily
resigned his job such that, in the opinion of the appellate court, his
loss of income "was not solely attributable to the accident in
question;" and

3. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages was held by the

appellate court as excessive and unconscionable and hence reduced
to P50,000.00.

The award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as

attorney's fees and costs remained untouched.

This decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is now before us on a petition for review.

Both the trial court and the appellate court had made fairly explicit findings of fact relating to the
manner in which the dump truck was parked along General Lacuna Street on the basis of which both
courts drew the inference that there was negligence on the part of Carbonel, the dump truck driver,
and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Dionisio's injuries. We note,
however, that both courts failed to pass upon the defense raised by Carbonel and Phoenix that the
true legal and proximate cause of the accident was not the way in which the dump truck had been
parked but rather the reckless way in which Dionisio had driven his car that night when he smashed
into the dump truck. The Intermediate Appellate Court in its questioned decision casually conceded
that Dionisio was "in some way, negligent" but apparently failed to see the relevance of Dionisio's
negligence and made no further mention of it. We have examined the record both before the trial
court and the Intermediate Appellate Court and we find that both parties had placed into the record
sufficient evidence on the basis of which the trial court and the appellate court could have and
should have made findings of fact relating to the alleged reckless manner in which Dionisio drove his
car that night. The petitioners Phoenix and Carbonel contend that if there was negligence in the
manner in which the dump truck was parked, that negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's recklessness constituted an intervening, efficient
cause determinative of the accident and the injuries he sustained. The need to administer
substantial justice as between the parties in this case, without having to remand it back to the trial
court after eleven years, compels us to address directly the contention put forward by the petitioners
and to examine for ourselves the record pertaining to Dionisio's alleged negligence which must bear
upon the liability, or extent of liability, of Phoenix and Carbonel.

There are four factual issues that need to be looked into: (a) whether or not private respondent
Dionisio had a curfew pass valid and effective for that eventful night; (b) whether Dionisio was
driving fast or speeding just before the collision with the dump truck; (c) whether Dionisio had
purposely turned off his car's headlights before contact with the dump truck or whether those
headlights accidentally malfunctioned moments before the collision; and (d) whether Dionisio was
intoxicated at the time of the accident.

As to the first issue relating to the curfew pass, it is clear that no curfew pass was found on the
person of Dionisio immediately after the accident nor was any found in his car. Phoenix's evidence
here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who had taken Dionisio, unconscious, to the
Makati Medical Center for emergency treatment immediately after the accident. At the Makati
Medical Center, a nurse took off Dionisio's clothes and examined them along with the contents of
pockets together with Patrolman Cuyno. 1 Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during the
trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years
after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that
private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of
effectivity of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass
during the night of the accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during that night. The
relevance of possession or non-possession of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other related issues: whether
Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to avoid detection and
possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.

On the second issue — whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night — both the trial court
and the appellate court were completely silent.

The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was at the scene
of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being
barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of
the accident told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights
on. 2 Dionisio, on the other hand, claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30
kilometers per hour and had just crossed the intersection of General Santos and General Lacuna
Streets and had started to accelerate when his headlights failed just before the collision took place. 3
Private respondent Dionisio asserts that Patrolman Cuyno's testimony was hearsay and did not fag
within any of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule since the facts he testified to were not
acquired by him through official information and had not been given by the informants pursuant to
any duty to do so. Private respondent's objection fails to take account of the fact that the testimony
of Patrolman Cuyno is admissible not under the official records exception to the hearsay rule 4 but
rather as part of the res gestae. 5 Testimonial evidence under this exception to the hearsay rule
consists of excited utterances made on the occasion of an occurrence or event sufficiently startling
in nature so as to render inoperative the normal reflective thought processes of the observer and
hence made as a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event, and not the result of reflective
thought. 6

We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object
in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective,
reactions from observers who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman
Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been considered by the
trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been ascribed to such testimony, even though it
did not, as it could not, have purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at winch
Dionisio was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.

A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, or whether his
headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before the accident. The Intermediate Appellate
Court expressly found that the headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but
was non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut
off his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be detected by the police in
the police precinct which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered
by private respondent Dionisio — i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment,
these had in some mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded
in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck.

A fourth and final issue relates to whether Dionisio was intoxicated at the time of the accident. The
evidence here consisted of the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno to the effect that private respondent
Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his smashed car and brought to the Makati
Medical Center in an unconscious condition. 7This testimony has to be taken in conjunction with the
admission of Dionisio that he had taken "a shot or two" of liquor before dinner with his boss that
night. We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under
the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless
imprudence. 8 There simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken
and the effects of that upon his physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. We are
also aware that "one shot or two" of hard liquor may affect different people differently.

The conclusion we draw from the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent
Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and driving faster
than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the intersection of
General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent
manner in which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel.
That there was a reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand
and the accident and respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different
manner, the collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable
consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static
condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and
that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the
accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are
drawn from a reading of some of the older cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we
are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments have any validity for our jurisdiction. We
note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which
the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited." Professors and
Keeton make this quite clear:

Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active
"cause" of the harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If
the defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the damage
possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the fact of causation is
concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important
part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active forces
and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the
result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable
because of the danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has
done quite as much to bring about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk
which the defendant has created, the defendant will not escape responsibility. Even
the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not
necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the highway may still be liable to
another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and "condition" still find
occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost entirely
discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where
the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of
apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the
distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause. 9

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static
condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck
and the private respondent's car would in an probability not have occurred had the dump truck not
been parked askew without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the
dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street
and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view, Dionisio's
negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's negligence and therefore closer to
the accident, was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. What the Petitioners describe as
an "intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequent manner which the truck driver
had parked the dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the very risk the truck
driver had created. Dionisio's negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to
cut, as it were, the chain of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability. It is helpful to quote once more from Professor
and Keeton:

Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary

human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has
 reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be
negligence among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the
defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Thus one who sets a fire may be
required to foresee that an ordinary, usual and customary wind arising later wig
spread it beyond the defendant's own property, and therefore to take precautions to
prevent that event. The person who leaves the combustible or explosive material
exposed in a public place may foresee the risk of fire from some independent source.
... In all of these cases there is an intervening cause combining with the defendant's
conduct to produce the result and in each case the defendant's negligence consists
in failure to protect the plaintiff against that very risk.

Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or a
substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has subjected the
plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the
scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite
generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not
supersede the defendant's responsibility.

Thus it has been held that a defendant will be required to anticipate the usual
weather of the vicinity, including all ordinary forces of nature such as usual wind or
rain, or snow or frost or fog or even lightning; that one who leaves an obstruction on
the road or a railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it; ...

The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. ... [The standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against 'that occasional negligence which is one of
the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated.' Thus, a
defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the plaintiff to walk in a street where
the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks of heavy traffic becomes liable when the
plaintiff is run down by a car, even though the car is negligently driven; and one who
parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of
responsibility when another negligently drives into it. --- 10

We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate
and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to
mitigation by the courts (Article 2179, Civil Code of the Philippines).

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine. The theory
here of petitioners is that while the petitioner truck driver was negligent, private respondent Dionisio
had the "last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence his injuries, and that Dionisio having
failed to take that "last clear chance" must bear his own injuries alone. The last clear chance doctrine
of the common law was imported into our jurisdiction by Picart vs. Smith 11 but it is a matter for debate whether,
or to what extent, it has found its way into the Civil Code of the Philippines. The historical function of that doctrine in the common law was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine or rule that of contributory negligence. 12 The common law rule of contributory
negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as
compared with the wrongful act or omission of the defendant. 13 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to
do so. 14 Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in
Article 2179 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 15

Is there perhaps a general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law
matrix and utilized as a general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do
not believe so. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical terms, is to determine whose
negligence — the plaintiff's or the defendant's — was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That
task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics, as the petitioners seem to
imply by the use of terms like "last" or "intervening" or "immediate." The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the
relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of
the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such
act or omission for the rest of the community. The petitioners urge that the truck driver (and therefore
his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior negligence because the
unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become necessary to avoid
the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must
respond for the forseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-
delicts seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the
members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of
society.

Petitioner Carbonel's proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of his
employer Phoenix 16in supervising its employees properly and adequately. The respondent appellate court in effect found, correctly
in our opinion, that Phoenix was not able to overcome this presumption of negligence. The circumstance that Phoenix had allowed its truck
driver to bring the dump truck to his home whenever there was work to be done early the following morning, when coupled with the failure to
show any effort on the part of Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck is parked when away from company premises, is an
affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the part of Phoenix.

Turning to the award of damages and taking into account the comparative negligence of private
respondent Dionisio on one hand and petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix upon the other hand, 17 we
believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and
costs, shall be borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who
shall be solidarity liable therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by
the petitioners. Phoenix is of course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient reason for disturbing the reduced
award of damages made by the respondent appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is modified by reducing the aggregate
amount of compensatory damages, loss of expected income and moral damages private respondent
Dionisio is entitled to by 20% of such amount. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 TSN, 16 March 1978, pp. 25-26.

2 TSN, 16 March 1978, p. 13.

3 TSN, 23 February 1977, pp. 13-14; TSN, 7 October 1977, pp. 24-25.

4 Rule 130, Section 38,

5 Rules of Court. Rule 130, Section 36, Rules of Court.

6 People v. Berame, 72 SCRA 184 [1976]; McCormick on Evidence, Section 297 [3rd
ed., 1984].

7 TSN, 16 March 1978, pp. 18-19.

8 Compare Wright v. Manila Railroad Co., 28 Phil. 116 (1914), where it was held,
among others, that "[m]ere intoxication is not negligence, nor does the mere fact of
intoxication establish a want of ordinary care. It is but a circumstance to be
considered with the other evidence tending to prove negligence. " Id, at 125.

9 The Law on Torts [5th ed. 1984], pp. 277-278; emphasis supplied; footnotes
omitted.

10 Ibid., pp. 303-305; emphasis supplied; footnotes omitted.

11 37 Phil. 809 (1918).

12 Prosser & Keeton, supra note 9, p. 464 and note 11.

13 See Rakes v. Manila Railroad Co., 7 Phil. 359, at 370 (1907).

14 MacIntyre The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1225 (1940) and
James Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47 Yale L.J. 704 (1938).

15 See Rakes, 7 Phil. at 374.

16 Poblete v. Fabros, 93 SCRA 202 (1979); Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263 (1976);
and Saludares v. Martinez, 29 SCRA 745 (1969).

17 See Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, 370375 (1907), where the
Court allocated the damages on a 50-50 basis between plaintiff and defendant
applying the notion of comparative negligence or proportional damages. Cf. Taylor v.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., 16 Phil. 8 at 29 (1910).

18 Lanuzo v. Ping, 100 SCRA 205 (1980).