G.R. No.

162808 April 22, 2008
FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law
Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C. BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1
VALENTINO RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT,respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
the October 30, 2003 Resolution1 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and
Other Law Enforcement Offices - Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) which dismissed for
lack of probable cause the criminal complaint, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by
Feliciano Galvante2 (petitioner) against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie
Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary
detention, illegal search and grave threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order3 which
denied his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before I
could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1
Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and
PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l
Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed their
long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the release of the safety
lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG
IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I answered,
"WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no firearm," showing my waistline
when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and
showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding
an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came
down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer
but they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde,
Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if
they have any search warrant;

In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and
respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973,
asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still
one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions.4 The confiscated materials were
pointed to us, I searched my wallet and gave the asked [sic] document;
covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2, 1999. 5

8. That immediately the policemen left me and my companions without saying

Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against petitioner an Information6 for
anything bringing with them the firearm;
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections
(Comelec) Resolution No. 3258, docketed as Criminal Case No. 5047, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. 9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station
where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I
asked the police officers including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private respondents an
also;
administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave Misconduct,
before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG);7 and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B for Arbitrary 10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the
Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. 8 armed civilian person so I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who
immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office,
the disarming was done;
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated how, on May
14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily searched his vehicle
and put him in detention, thus: 11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by
Police Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May
16, 2001 after posting a bailbond;
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del
Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and inquire about the retirement procedure 12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of
for policemen; Illegal Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin
Conde, Jr., of Trento Police Station; PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1
Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.9
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with
Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the
Petitioner also submitted the Joint Affidavit10 of his witnesses, Lorenzo Sanoria and Percival
Plaza.
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he interposed
the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of Police/Officer-in-
Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered the detention. Petitioner
himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-Affidavit;11 and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,12 but admits that even though he was not
armed with a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in plain view, was
committing a violation of Comelec Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328 by carrying a firearm in
his person.
Apparently unaware of what transpired in Criminal Case No. 5047, Ombudsman Investigation &
Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued in OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, the October 30, 2003
Resolution, to wit:
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for any
of the offenses charged against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the
complaint, it appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a valid
warrantless arrest. The subsequent execution of an affidavit of desistance by the
complainant rendered the complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt,
especially so since it merely exculpated some but not all of the respondents. These
circumstances, coupled with the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty,
negates any criminal liability on the part of the respondents.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is hereby recommended that the above-

Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit dated March
captioned case be dismissed for lack of probable cause.21 (Emphasis supplied)
25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of private respondent Conde, viz:

Upon the recommendation of Director Bienvenido C. Blancaflor, Deputy Ombudsman for the
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated
Military Orlando C. Casimiro (Deputy Ombudsman) approved the October 30, 2003 Resolution. 22
among other things, that "we saw Feleciano "Nani" Galvante armed with a
handgun/pistol tucked on his waist;"
In his Motion for Reconsideration,23 petitioner called the attention of the Ombudsman to the
earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss of Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr.
2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said
and the RTC Order, all of which declared the warrantless search conducted by private
handgun was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team
respondents illegal,24 which are contradicted by the October 30, 2003 Ombudsman Resolution
leader during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after
declaring the warrantless search legal.
searching the same; and

The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the latter
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28,
offered "no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the reversal or modification" 25 of
2001 after we have already affixed our signatures thereon. 13
its October 30, 2003 Resolution.

Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with both the IAS
Petitioner filed the present petition, attributing to Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro, Director
and Ombudsman, absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but
Blancaflor and Prosecutor Garcia (public respondents) the following acts of grave abuse of
maintaining that private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and
discretion:
criminal cases.14

I. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, finding
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their
all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with suspension only. The
Resolution dated October 30, 2003, public respondents found that the incident upon
IAS noted however that private respondents were merely being "[enthusiastic] in the conduct of
which petitioner's criminal complaint was based stemmed from a valid warrantless
the arrest in line of duty." 15
arrest and dismissed petitioner's complaint despite the fact that:

Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Preliminary
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private
Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of Arrest. 16 The
respondents was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of
RTC granted the same in an Order17 dated August 17, 2001. Upon reinvestigation, Prosecutor II
the instances of valid warrantless searches.
Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a "Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss" dated November 22, 2001,
recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 5047 on the ground that "the action of the
policemen who conducted the warrantless search in spite of the absence of any circumstances B. Notwithstanding the absence of a valid warrant, petitioner was arrested
justifying the same intruded into the privacy of the accused and the security of his and detained by the private respondents.
property."18 Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said
recommendation.19
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order20 dated January 16, 2003. dated January 20, 2004, public respondents denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in a capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. 26
In its Memorandum,27 the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public respondents acted
within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-0109-B given that private
respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner and confiscating his firearm as the
former were merely performing their duty of enforcing the law against illegal possession of
firearms and the Comelec ban against the carrying of firearms outside of one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment28 and a Memorandum for himself.29 Private
respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their separate Letter-Comment dated
June 25, 2004.30
The petition lacks merit.
The Constitution vests in the Ombudsman the power to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts.31 The Court respects the relative autonomy of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute, and refrains from interfering when the latter exercises such powers either directly or
through the Deputy Ombudsman,32 except when the same is shown to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 33
Grave abuse of discretion is an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law as when judgment rendered is not based on law
and evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism.34 This does not obtain in the present case.
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges private
respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of a
warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those
legally obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the
commission of any other offense, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00
pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall procure a
search warrant without just cause, or, having legally procured the same, shall exceed
his authority or use unnecessary severity in executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee
who, in cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other
belongings of any person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in
their default, without the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-Complaint;
rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle without being
armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered by Articles 129 and
130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is civil, 35 under
Article 32, in relation to Article 221936 (6) and (10) of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975.37
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for
damages with the regular courts38 or an administrative case with the PNP/DILG,39 as petitioner
did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a criminal action with the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner filed
with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore proper, although the reasons
public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark because they relied
solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private respondents was valid and
that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the veracity of his
complaint.40 Public respondents completely overlooked the fact that the criminal complaint was
not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the
result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless criminal complaint for illegal search
which is not an offense under the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or
not public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is
completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public
respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the
offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and (c) the
detention is without legal grounds.41 The second element was not alleged by petitioner in his
Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his Comment42 and
Memorandum,43 petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that it was Police Chief
Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did petitioner allege that private
respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way involved in it. 44 There was,
therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against
private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed out that
the same is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private respondents aimed their
firearms at him.45 Such bare allegation stands no chance against the well-entrenched rule
applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the performance
of their official function.46 The IAS itself observed that private respondents may have been
carried away by their "enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty."47 Petitioner
expressed the same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he accepted that private
respondents may have been merely following orders when they pointed their long firearms at
him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint against private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179080 November 26, 2014
EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE and GENEROSO MARFIL alias
"TAPOL", Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution2 dated June 19,
2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in G.R. CR No. 26418, which set aside the November 15,
2001 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, Kidapawan City, Cotabato.
Petitioners Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" were charged
with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). 4 The
Information dated May 3, 1990 reads:
The undersigned accuses EDIGARDO GEROCHE, ROBERTO GARDE AND GENEROSO
MARFIL Alias "TAPOL" of the crime of Violation of Domicile, committed as follows:
That at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of May 14, 1989, at Sitio New Lantawan, Barangay
Greenhills, Municipality of President Roxas, Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named
accused EDIGARDO GEROCHE, being a Barangay Captain and the rest being CAFGUs,
hence, persons inauthority, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed
with garand rifles, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without proper judicial
order, entered the house of ROBERTO MALLO by forcibly breaking the door of said house
against the will of the occupants thereof, search the effects of the house without the previous
consent of the owner and then mauled one of the occupant BARILIANO LIMBAG inflicting
injuries to the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
During the arraignment on November5, 1990, all the petitioners pleaded not guilty.6 Thereafter,
trial ensued.
Baleriano Limbag (Baleriano) testified that the crime happened around 10:00 o’clock in the
evening of May 14, 1989 inside the house which he already bought from Roberto Mallo. He
roused from sleep when petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered
the house by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a garand rifle,
which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away his airgun.
Roberto Limbag, Baleriano’s nephew who was living with him, witnessed the whole incident and
corroborated his testimony.
Aside from presenting SPO4 Felomino Calfoforo, the Subpoena and Warrant Officer of
President Roxas Police Station who testified on the police blotter, Dr. Antonio Cabrera also took
the witness stand for the prosecution. Essentially, he affirmed the medical certificate that he
issued. His findings indicated that Baleriano suffered hematoma on the left side of the nose,
back portion of the body at the level of the hip region, and back portion at the right side of the
scapular region as well as abrasion on the right side of the breast and left side of the body at the
axilliary region.7 Dr. Cabrera opined that the injuries inflicted would heal from seven to ten
days.8 For the defense, petitioners denied the crime charged, declaring in unison that they were
in their respective houses the entire evening of May 14, 1989. They alleged, however, that the
night before, on May 13, 1989, they conducted a roving footpatrol, together with other barangay
officials, due to the rampant cattle rustling in the area. At the time, they recovered a stolen
carabao owned by a certain Francisco Pongasi9 from three unidentified persons who managed
to escape.
On November 15, 2001, the trial court found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and
one (1) day to six (6) months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that
petitioners are public officers, which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. It held:
The prosecution who has that onus probandifailed to prove one of the essential elements of the
crime; on the issue of whether or not all the accused were public officers; while it is true that
accused were named CVO’s and the other as a barangay captain and that even if the same
were admitted by them during their testimony in open court, such an admission is not enough to
prove that they were public officers; it is for the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing
evidence other than that of the testimony of witnesses that they werein fact public officers; there
exist a doubt of whether or not all the accused were in fact and in truth public officers; doubts
should be ruled in favorof the accused; that on this lone and essential element the crime
charged as violation of domicile is ruled out; that degree of moral certainty of the crime charged
was not established and proved by convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt; x x
x.10 Petitioners elevated the case to the CA, which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial
court’s judgment. While it agreed with both parties that petitioners should not be convictedfor
Less Serious Physical Injuries, the CA still ruled that they are guilty of Violation of Domicile
considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay captain (in the case of Geroche)
and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the case of Garde and Marfil). The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision states:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and the evidence on
hand, the appealed decision is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one entered finding the accused-
petitioners GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article
128 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to an indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
Months, One (1) Day of arresto mayor maximum to Six (6) Months and One (1) Day of prision
[correccional] minimum with the accessory penalty of suspension from public office and from the
right to follow a professionor calling pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this petition. They argue that there is
double jeopardy since the trial court already acquitted them of Violation of Domicile and such
judgment, being now final and executory, is res judicata. Petitioners insist that their appeal
before the CA is limited to their conviction for the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries,
focusing their arguments and defense for acquittal from said crime, and that the CA violated their
constitutional right to due process when it convicted them for Violation of Domicile.
We deny.
An appeal in a criminal case opensthe entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties.12 When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court,he or she
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate.13 An appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.14 The appellate court may, and generally does,look into the entire
records to ensure that no fact of weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied by the trial court.15
Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial court’s judgment of conviction for Less Serious
Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the prohibition on
doublejeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors as may be
found in the assailed judgment. Petitioners could not have been placed twice in jeopardy when
the CA set aside the ruling of the RTC by finding them guilty of Violation of Domicile as charged
in the Information instead of Less Serious Physical Injuries.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the Decision dated November 18, 2005 and Resolution
dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26418 finding petitioners
Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde and Generoso Marfil alias "Tapol" guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Violation of Domicile, penalized under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed is an indeterminate sentence from two
(2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9)
months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

The Court adopts the findings of factand conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimony before
the open court as well as in the pleadings they filed, neither Geroche denied that hewas a
barangay captain nor Garde and Marfil refuted that they were CAFGU members. In holding such
positions, they are considered as public officers/employees. 16

As to the penalty imposed by the CA, however, We modify the same. Under Article 128 of the
RPC, the penalty shall be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods (two [2] years,
four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime
or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after
the search made by the offender. In this case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while
they were sleeping at night and, in addition, they took away with them his airgun.

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law17 requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum
term of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code.1âwphi1 Yet the penalty prescribed by Article
128 of the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the
same Code requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty,
forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium
and maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:

Minimum – 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days

Medium – 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days

Maximum – 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years

Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3
years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period.

On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (or 4 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby
sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional, as maximum.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006 A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.

LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES
IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT.
NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG)
ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining order)
filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein
petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents.
The facts are:
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that the
military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-
A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the corresponding Information against
them.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent General
Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved
in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate investigation.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an Information
for coup d’etat 2against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually
raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was
consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before
Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal Case
No. 03-2784.

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre-Trial
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that some
Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges
members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated places of
for violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended, against
assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the AFP
the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of Article 63 for
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.
disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article
64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for mutiny or sedition, (d)
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and enlisted violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of
men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury Apartments on
Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted explosive devices
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners herein)
around the building.
filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume
jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked Republic Act (R.A.)
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned with No. 7055. 5
the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast
media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO) a
Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms and ammunition to
motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their
the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military
motion to assume jurisdiction.
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of support from their
Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of the Republic. They also
called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP. On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the AFP
Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be
charged before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a
Articles of War.
state of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all
necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then called
the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same day. Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found probable
cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6
In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with the
soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several
hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay down their arms In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and dropped
and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, the charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.
they returned to their barracks.
Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Final
Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the "doctrine of
absorption," those charged with coup d’etatbefore the RTCshould not be charged before the
military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges before
the court martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then proceeded
to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.
In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO,
reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the
officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a general
court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War.
accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the
Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July 13,
2005)." 17
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of
prohibition.
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law.
Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the
Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article 2
provides:
Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles and
shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or "persons
subject to military law," whenever used in these articles:

On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass. The
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or
AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the charge.
of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to
Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying that
active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military instructions; and all
respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty or for training in the said service,
War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.

Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February 11,
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman)
of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat, the
military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction. SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to military
law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or local
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies
government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused, victims, or
which offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of
offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil
Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are
court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is service-
properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of Article
connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-martial, Provided, That the
96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction
President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct at any time before
of the court martial.
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.

Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those defined in
issue that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as
alleged therein that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with
amended.
the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96 (conduct
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation
Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes was arraigned, and consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or
this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein local government ordinances.
petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they were not arraigned within
the prescribed period of two (2) years from the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in
violation of Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the
general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including
2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end
only at 12:00 midnight of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the general
suddenly changed its position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been
arraigned;" 14 and that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be service-
court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15 connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the law states an
exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice,
directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil court.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for lack of
merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned
on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, 2005, all the 29
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected crimes or absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by said court
offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests
97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by court martial. in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or offenses." What the law
This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial over crimes or has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows
offenses committed by military personnel. jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an action
which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional amendment or legislative enactment
that such act can be done. The first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the
Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar nature of
law "as they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes
military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void.
military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest form of discipline
in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is established not
merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and security of In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held:
the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to the public peace and safety
than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice has
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch 148) in
been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies in almost all countries of the
the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-
world look upon the power of military law and its administration as the most effective means of
martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the
enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an indispensable
crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was made without or in
part of any organized armed forces, it being the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity.
in peace and in war. 20

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) explicitly
Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act
gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
No. 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati City,
Articles 54 to 70:
Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to
defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and abused their
constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others, attempting to oust Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing
the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to protect, thereby
causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, conduct unbecoming an Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War.
Art. 56. False Muster.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours)
Art. 57. False Returns.
Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides:
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Nurse
Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct Art. 59. Desertion.
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. (Underscoring
ours)
Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service-connected.
This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted authorities.Such violation Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In short, the charge
has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally indicative
of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the same – Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
dismissal from the service – imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military profession of misfits and to Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
preserve the stringent standard of military discipline.
Defense.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged before
the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same has been
declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Articles 72 to 92:
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
Art. 83. Spies.
Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
or wrongful Disposition.
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 97. General Article.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
foregoing offenses. x x x.
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95
to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." In
fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of this
case is worth quoting, thus:
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged
crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and
generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25unlike here where different statutes
are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both
offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-
connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption
of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to military
personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a system of
discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]). Military
personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed to civilians. History,
experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate that military personnel must be
subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or unarmed
government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question his
reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a
soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his military commander
reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will
collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to enable the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and discipline the armed
forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military Law and
Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the disciplinary system that
ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over decisions of courts-
martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted provisions omitted).

xxx

While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so sparingly
and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil.
401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75 Phil. 563 [1945]). The
Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground that the offense charged
‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil courts. The
Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the service-connected offenses
specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the situation in the present case.

With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition,
suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as
to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their arraignment.
These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of review, as we are not a
trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of the
undisputed facts. 26

Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done
without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no appeal or
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated differently,
prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from
usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been vested by law. 28

In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court martial
and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201565 October 13, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO,
EDELBRANDO ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES
"NONONG NONOY ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large, TITING GALI BOOC-at large,
ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO large, TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a. "NEGRO MATERDAM,"
and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE LB
RANDO ESTONILO a.k.a. "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG
ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario
Estonilo (Rey), Edelbrando Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela
Cruz (Bulldog) seek liberty from the judgment1 of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 45, Manila, which found them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime ofMurder with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No. 05-238607.
The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo
(Nonoy),2 Titing Booc (Titing),3 and Gali Itcobanes (Gali),4 and Orlando Tagalog Materdam
(Negro)5 were all charged in an Information dated July 30, 2004 that reads:
That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary
School,6 Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill,
armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being the District
Supervisor of public schools, hitting the latter on the different parts of his body which caused his
instantaneous death.7
On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information,8 which provides:
That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality
of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of
Masbate, the above-named accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR
REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously induce their co-accused, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO AL[I]AS "EDEL
ESTONILO[,] " EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS "NONONG ITCOBANES[,] " NONOY
ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI ITCOBANES, ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS
"NEGRO MATERDAM[,]" [and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ AL[I]AS "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]" who
wereall armed with firearms, to attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public
schools, by then and there shooting the latter, hitting said FLORO A. CASAS on the
differentparts of his body which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter.9 When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the accused-appellants pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which stated,
among others:
a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:
1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;
2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the Honorable
Supreme Court asto the transfer of venue;
3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;
4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a District
Supervisor of the Department of Education.
b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit that Ex-Mayor
Carlos Estonilo, Sr. and Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene ofthe incident
during the incident.10
The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victim’s wife; Felix
Q. Casas (Felix), the victim’s son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health
Officer, Placer, Masbate; Senior Police Officer 4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan),
Placer Police Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo (Serapion), employee of Municipal Councilor
candidate Boy dela Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of Placer, Masbate; Diego
L.Casas (Diego), cousin of the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda), a resident of Placer,
Masbate; and Servando P. Rosales (Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr.11 The
testimonies of the foregoing witnesses consisted of the following:
Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned
down, he was with the latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School,
Placer, Masbate; that they were working on the closing ceremonies to be held the following day;
that one Ranio Morales called on Floro and told him that Mayor Carlos, Sr. wanted to see him at
his (Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor
Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation of 7th
Day Adventist that contained the names of the governor, the congressman, and Placer
mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero), as guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his
father why Cotero’s picture was so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s name was not mentioned in the
program; that Floro replied that he cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the
answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said "you are
now for Cotero but you’re only Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the voucher. This
is up to now thatyou will be the supervisor of Celera"; that Floro responded "when are you a
superintendent when you don’t have any scholastic standing. Just look if I will still vote for your
son"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "let’s see if you can still vote"; and that the following day,
Floro was shot to death.12
But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon
invitation of Nonoy, he joined the latter’s group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they
talked about the death of one Titing Villester; that Nonoy told Felix that "brod, do not be afraid,
because others are supposed to be afraid [of] us because they believe that we were the ones
who killed Titing Villester" that afterwards Felix and the group were fetched at the videoke bar by
Edel, a messenger of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to the house of one Bobong
Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in Daraga; that uponarriving thereat, Rey uttered "it’s
good that Dodong (Felix’s nickname) is with you; that Nonoy then said "who would not [be]
otherwise, his father would be the next victim after Titing Villester"; 13 that Rey then turned to
Felix and said, "it’s very important that your father is with us because a District Supervisor has a
big [role] in the Comelec’s choice for those teachers who would become members of the Board
of Election Inspectors"; that Felix clarified that Rey was then the 2004 mayoralty candidate for
Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along with him since he was in Daraga, the bailiwick of the
Estonilos.14
On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on
why it took him a long time to execute an affidavit relative to his father’s killing. Felix explained
that he went to Cebu to stay away from Placer, which isunder the Estonilo’s jurisdiction. 15 The
defense confronted Felix of a criminal case against him for illegal use of prohibited drugs, for
which he was out on bail.16
On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco yPedrano
and SPO4 Restituto Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation
offacts relative to their testimonies.
[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco’s testimony:]
1. That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is
expert in medicine;
2. That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead
body of Floro Casas yBaronda on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;
3. That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post Mortem Examination
Report, marked as Exhibit "F," the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P.
Francisco, marked as Exhibit "F-1";
4. That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit "G" and the
Sketch of a Human Body, marked as Exhibit "H";
5. The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-
Mortem Examination Report; and
6. In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three
slugs: the 1 st slug was marked as Exhibit "I," the fragmented slug as Exhibit "I-1," and
the metallic object consisting of two pieces of Exhibit "I-2."
[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.’s testimony:]
1. That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate
Police Station relativeto the shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera
Elementary School. Said Police Blotter was requested to be marked by the
prosecution as Exhibit "J";
2. That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the
blotter written on the Blotter Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as
Exhibit "J-1" and the signature of Sr. Police Officer IV Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as
Exhibit "J-1-a";
3. The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number
325. Said Police Blotter book page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. "K" and
the bracketed portion thereof as Exh. "K-1."17
According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm
based on the sizes of the slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The
counsel for the accused waived his cross examination. 18
Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal
Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the
night of April 5, 2004, he heard gunshots coming from inside the compound of the school; that
after two or three minutes, he saw more or less six persons coming out of the school; that he
was able to identify three of themas present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he
saw the six men approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a house nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle,
Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. "mission accomplished, sir"; that Mayor Carlos,
Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did using two motorbikes towards the
direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the
direction of Daraga.19
During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the
fact thathe has a pending criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on
bail.20 Antipolo testified that on April 5, 2004, he was riding his motorcycle and passing by the
gate of the Celera Elementary School when he heard gunshots and someone shouted that Floro
was shot; that he stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to the gate, and saw four persons
holding short firearms; that he identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about
seven times; that he identifiedEdel and Nonong as the two other gun holders; that at that
moment, Gali shouted "sir, that’s enough, escape!"; that Gali was accompanied by someone
named Ace, Titing and Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for them to escape, all of them
hurriedly left the school compound; that he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s pick-up vehicle arrive soon
thereafter; that Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the
proceedings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "leave it because it’s already dead"; and that
afterwards, the police officers arrived.21
In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case
against him for homicide of one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that
happened on October 30, 2005.22
Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances
surrounding the killing and its discovery, their family background, her husband’s line of work,
how she felt on their loss, and the expenses relative to his killing. She testified that she heard
there were people who were jealous of Floro’s position because he could bring voters to his side
during election time;that Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated medals for the 2003-2004
closing ceremony of the entire district of public schools; that during the closing ceremony, the
donor’s name was announced, which angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.;23 that when Floro was
processing a voucher worth ₱70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr. refused to sign the same and even
threw the voucher on the floor saying "let this be signed by Vicente Cotero"; and that Floro’s
cousin, Diego Casas, helped Floro secure the Mayor’s signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr.
that Floro was for him, and only then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher. 24
Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsa’s testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure
Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s signature on the voucher.25
Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and
told her thathe would kill her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus,
she went to the Placer Police Station and reported the incident; that she went to see her
husband, who was then campaigning for mayoralty candidateCotero, and informed him of what
happened; and that she went to Elsa’shouse and informed the latter of the threat.26
Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor
Carlos,Sr. together with said Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias
"S" [Ace], Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si
Floro Casas"; that Servando later learned thatthe mayor’s men were unsuccessful in their goal
because Floro was no longer in Barangay Taberna, where they intended to execute the mayor’s
order;and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary
School on April 4, 2004.27
During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latter’s Affidavit of
Retraction, which he executed on June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his
Sinumpaang Salaysaytaken on May 30, 2004 at the Philippine National Police-Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate City relative to
the criminal complaint for direct assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his
company. He was also asked about two criminal charges filed against him in Cebu relative
toviolation of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. 28 On
re-direct examination, Servando narrated that Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s nephew, Bobong Baldecir,
fetched him from his house and he was brought to the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga;
that from there, he was brought to Atty. Besario in Cebu; that Atty. Besario informed him about
the Affidavit of Retraction that he was supposed to sign, which he did not understand as it was
written in English; and that he clarified that the contents of the affidavit was not his but those of
Bobong.29
The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino
D. Calipay (Quirino), and the five accused-appellants.
Jesus denied Servando’s allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction.
Jesus narrated that Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that
upon their meeting, Servando told him that he wanted to retract his sworn statement because
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company did nothing wrong; that Jesus, Servando and Servando’s
wife went to Cebu to meet Atty. Besario; that while traveling, Servando told him that was evading
the men of Governor Go, Vicente Cotero and Casas because he feared for his life; that during
the meeting Atty. Besario prepared the affidavit and translated it to Cebuano dialect; that
afterwards, Jesus, Servando and Servando’s wife went to the Capitol so that Servando could
sign it before the prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario, Servado and his wife, and Dante Estonilo
(another nephew of Mayor Carlos) went to Manila to meet with the media; that the media asked
Servando whether he was forced to sign, or was given money or reward to sign the affidavit of
retraction, Servando replied in the negative; and that the purpose of the press meeting was to
present Servando and show that he was not kidnapped.30
But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that
Mayor Carlos, Sr. ishis uncle; that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the
kidnapping of Servando; and that it was Dante (Dante) Estonilo who arranged for the meeting
with the media, and who served as Servando’s and his wife’s companion, while he was with Atty.
Besario.31 During his turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that in the early evening
of April 5, 2004 hewas in a house near the Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party;
that while thereat, he heard successive gunshots and went out to ridehis vehicle so he could
check the source of the gunshots; that when he reached the school gate someone informed him
that Floro was gunned down; that he did not see the victim because according to the people it
was boarded in a jeep and brought to the hospital; and that he and his son, Rey, confirmed that
they were at the school minutes after the incident.32
During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he
learned that he and his son were suspects in Floro’s killing five months after the incident; that he
confirmed that Rey and Calvin dela Cruz were with him while inquiring about the shooting at the
school; and that he denied having met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing Rosalinda after April 5,
2004, or that Servando was his bodyguard.33
Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house
and was planning tocampaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to
said barangay, he passed by Celera Elementary School and noticed his father’s vehicle, and
that there were several people thereat; that he stopped and stayed in the school for a few
minutes, and then proceeded to meet his candidates for counselors at Ranio’s house; and that
afterwards, they all went to Barangay Matagantang.34
On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated
because his opponents could not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor. 35
Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at
their house located in front of Celera Elementary School’s guardhouse, when they heard
gunshots; that they immediately laid down, while Quirino ran across the road and took cover at
the school fence; that he peeped through the fence and saw three persons firing a gun; that he
could not identify them or their victim because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to 20 seconds,
hewent back home; that a certain Joel Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him to
go with them inside the school, once inside the school, they saw Floro lying face down; that he
took the liberty to go to the police headquarters located five minutes away; and that when he and
the Placer Chief of Police arrived at the school, he noticed Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near the
gate.36
For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was
engaged in a drinking spree in Nining Berdida’s house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and
that he stayed in her place until 11:00 p.m.37
During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr.
is his uncle and Rey is his second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s bodyguard, but
admitted that he handled the latter’s fighting cocks; and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45
minutes away from the poblacionof Placer.38
Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called
him to go to Ranio’s house in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera
Elementary School and saw that there were plenty of people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos,
Sr.; that their group stopped to inquire about what happened, and learned that Floro was gunned
down; and that he and his group stayed for about five minutes and left.39
Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor
Carlos, Sr. and his wife attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they
went to the school to check on what happened and learned that Floro was shot; and that they
did not stay long and went home to Daraga.40
During cross examination, he deniedthat he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he
was merely accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to
work.41
After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The fallo of its March 30, 2009 Decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS
ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias
"EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES alias "NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN
DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the
crime of Murder with Direct Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all
of the Revised Penal Code and each of said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.
As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the
accused are all hereby ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00). Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said
accused are furthermore ordered to solidarily pay the said family the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).
The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which
they have been denied.
Let this case be archivedas against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and
GALIITCOBANES who have warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large,
pending their arrest/s.
As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM," separate
trial isnecessary considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to
the other accused was already about to end.42
The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony
of Serapion, who were both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC
pronounced that the evidence on record showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a
common criminal design, that was the killing of Floro. Accused-appellants Nonoy and Negro
were the gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as backup gunmen.
Accused-appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts. 43
The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused
to kill Floro based on the testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill
Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And
accused-appellant Rey conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution was able to establish
conspiracy and evident premeditation among all the accused-appellants.44
The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification
of the prosecution witnesses. The accused appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in
Placer, Masbate when the shooting took place. However, they were not able to establish the
physical improbability of their being in the crime scene at the time of the shooting. The RTC was
convinced thatthe motive for the murder was due to Floro’s support for mayoral candidate
Vicente Cotero. Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the RTC convicted
the accused appellants of the complex crime of murder with direct assault. 45
All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals
alleging that the RTC erred in concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the
prosecution evidence and disregarding the salient points of the defense evidence, and in
convicting the accused.46
In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC
decision.47 The dispositive part thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30
March 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modificationin that the penalty imposed upon accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion
perpetua with its accessory penalties and that the award of civil indemnity is increased to
Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00).48
The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC
considering that the RTC had observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and
deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The Court of Appeals corrected the penalty
imposed, and explained that reclusion perpetuais an indivisible penalty which should be imposed
without specifying the duration.
On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration,49 which the Court of
Appeals denied in its November 8, 2011 Resolution.50 Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants
appealed their case before this Court.51
This Court’s Ruling
The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case
on the following assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving
credence and weight to the prosecution evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among
the accused-appellants, and (3) finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
based on the prosecution evidence.
In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their
conviction for murder with direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial evidence, and that the prosecution was not able
to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal fails.
After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-
appellants for murder with direct assault.
The age-old rule is that the task ofassigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the
witness stand and weighing their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand
impressions as a witness testifies before it. It is, thus, no surprise that findings and conclusions
of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of respect, for trial courts
have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 52
This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial
and the appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would
change the outcome of this case. The trial court and the appellate court did not err in giving
credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who was an
eyewitness to the crime.
Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could
possibly detract from his credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused
Negro as those who fired at Floro about seven times, while accused-appellants Edel and
Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms. He also witnessed accused Gali shouting to
the gunmen to stop and escape. He narrated that after all the accused left, Mayor Carlos, Sr.,
Rey and Materdam arrived aboard the mayor’s vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said "leave
it because it’s already dead." From his direct and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as
to the identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: 53 (1)
that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.54
In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor
Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel, Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3)
the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by
prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as treachery as below discussed; and
(4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.
Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense.
The Court finds that the prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.
For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined
together point to the accused-appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro.
It was Floro’s support for Vicente Cotero, who was Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in
Placer, Masbate. Second, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused appellants
planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was
present in Mayor Carlos, Sr.’shouse when they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor
Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His
testimony was corroborated by another witness, Serapion, who testified having seen the
accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he heard the gunshots. Serapion also
recounted having heard one of them said "mission accomplished sir," after which, Mayor Carlos,
Sr. ordered them to leave.
Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial
evidence. The testimony of the eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the
crime.
and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were
on standby also holding their firearms to insure the success of their "mission" without risk to
themselves; and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective
acts point to a clear case of treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the
positive identification made by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak
defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively
ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive testimony
prevails over negative testimony.57 The accused-appellants’ alibis that they were at different
places at the time of the shooting are negative and self-serving and cannot be given more
evidentiary value vis-à-vis the affirmative testimony of credible witnesses. The accused-
appellants, the victim, and the prosecution witnesses reside in the same municipality and are,
therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that the two principal accused in this case are
prominent political figures. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could not havebeen mistaken
on the accused appellants’ identity including those who remained at large.
Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the
following: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime;
and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its
commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the
crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must
demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have been physically present atthe crime
scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 58 Here, the accused-appellants
utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact, Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other
co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were near the school before the incident and
at the school minutes after the killing took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to
preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away from
where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.
Penalties

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should
facts in issue may be established by inference.55 It consists of proof of collateral facts and
be held accountable for the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of
circumstances from which the existence of the main fact may be inferred according to reason
committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal
and common experience.56 Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the testimonies of
Code. Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are that
Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill
there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
Floro. Whether this order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness
authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or
account as well as Serapion’s testimony.
on the occasion of such performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in
authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or
As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.
that he was present on the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning tokill
Floro. His categorical and straight forward narration proves the existence of evident
In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer,
premeditation.
Masbate, thus, was a person in authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there
was direct assault just because Floro was a person in authority, this Court clarifies that the
Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was, in reality,
concur: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) made by reason of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.
the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of
attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter,
warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
there arisesthe complex crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.
victim no chance to resist or escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro
successively fired at Floro about seven times – and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all
found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter no chance at all to evade the attack
The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be
imposed in the maximum period. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the felony of
murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been death. Plus the fact that there exists an
aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the
proper penalty is death. But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act
No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; thus,
the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed upon accused-appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Proper Indemnities

As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made
herein.1âwphi1 The award of ₱100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper
to conform with current jurisprudence.59

Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or

generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 223060 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, conformably with the above, the legal heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of
exemplary damages61 in the amount of ₱100,000.00.

Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the
damages awarded, to earn from the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line
with prevailing jurisprudence.62

At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid
Prison informed this Court of the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9,
2013. In view thereof, the case against deceased Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered
dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-
G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04142, affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 05-238607, finding accused
appellants REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO "EDEL" ESTONILO, EUTIQUIANO
"NONONG" ITCOBANES, and CAL VIN "BULLDOG" DELA CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder with Direct Assault, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, the award of
civil indemnity and moral damages is increased to ₱100,000.00 each, in addition to ₱100,000.00
as exemplary damages, and the imposition of 6% thereon as legal interest upon finality of this
Court's Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202692 November 12, 2014
EDMUND SYDECO y SIONZON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 are the December
28, 2011 Decision1and July 18, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 33567. The assailed issuances affirmed the decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 12, in Criminal Case Nos. 09-270107-08 which, in turn, affirmed that of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Manila adjudging petitioner Edmund Sydeco (Sydeco) guilty
of drunk driving and resisting arrest.4
The factual backdrop:
On July 20, 2006, separate Informations, one for Violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 41365 and another, for Violation of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)6 were filed
against petitioner Sydeco with the MeTC in Manila and eventually raffled to Branch 14 of that
court. The accusatory portions of the interrelated informations, docketed as Crim. Case No.
052527-CN for the first offense and Crim. Case No. 052528-CN for the second, respectively
read:
1. Crim. Case No. 052527-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then
the driver and owner of a car, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, drive, manage and
operate the same along Roxas Blvd. cor. Quirino Avenue, Malate, in said city, while under the
influence of liquor, in violation of Section 56(f) of Republic Act 4136.
Contrary to law.
2. Crim. Case No. 052528-CN
That on or about June 11, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then
and there willfully and unlawfully resist and disobey P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO2 Virgilio
Paulino, SPO4 Efren Bodino and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, bonafide member of the Philippine
National Police, Malate Police Station-9, duly qualified and appointed, and while in the actual
performance of their official duties as such police officers, by then and there resisting, shoving
and pushing, the hands of said officers while the latter was placing him under arrest for violation
of Article 151 of the Revised Penal Code.
Contrary to law.
By Order of September 19, 2006, the MeTC classified the cases as falling under, thus to be
governed by, the Rule on Summary Procedure.
When arraigned, petitioner, as accused, pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.
During the trial of the two consolidated cases, the prosecution presented in evidence the oral
testimonies of SPO4 Efren Bodino (Bodino),7 PO2 Emanuelle Parungao8 and Ms. Laura Delos
Santos,9 plus the documents each identified while in the witness box, among which was Exh.
"A", with sub-markings, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest10executed by SPO2 Bodino and two other
police officers. The defense’s witnesses, on the other hand, consisted of Sydeco himself, his
wife, Mildred, and Joenilo Pano.
The prosecution’s version of the incident, as summarized in and/or as may be deduced from, the
CA decision now on appeal is as follows:
On or about June 11, 2006, P/Insp. Manuel Aguilar (Aguilar), SPO4 Bodino, PO3 Benedict Cruz
III and another officer were manning a checkpoint established along Roxas Boulevard corner
Quirino Ave., Malate, Manila when, from about twenty (20) meters away, they spotted a
swerving red Ford Ranger pick up with plate number XAE-988. Petitioner was behind the wheel.
The team members, all inuniform, flagged the vehicle down and asked the petitioner to
alightfrom the vehicle so he could take a rest at the police station situated nearby,before he
resumes driving.11 Petitioner, who the policemen claimed was smelling of liquor, denied being
drunk and insisted he could manage to drive. Then in a raised voice, petitioner started talking
rudely to the policemen and in fact yelled at P/Insp. Aguilar blurting: "P…g ina mo, bakit mo ako
hinuhuli." Atthat remark, P/Insp. Aguilar, who earlier pointed out to petitioner that his team had
seen him swerving and driving under the influence of liquor, proceeded to arrestpetitioner who
put up resistance. Despite petitioner’s efforts to parry the hold on him, the police eventually
succeeded in subduing him who was then brought to the Ospital ng Maynila where he was
examined and found to be positive of alcoholic breath per the Medical Certificate issuedby that
hospital, marked as Exh. "F". Petitioner was then turned over to the Malate Police Station for
disposition.12 Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed tobe a victim in the incident in question,
adding in this regard that he has in fact filed criminal charges for physical injuries, robbery and
arbitrary detention against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. In his Counter-Affidavit13 and his Complaint-
Affidavit14 appended thereto, petitioner averred that, in the early morning of June 12, 2006, he
together with Joenilo Pano and Josie Villanueva, cook and waitress, respectively, in his
restaurant located along Macapagal Ave., Pasay City, were on the way home from on board his
pick-up when signaled to stop by police officers at the area immediately referred to above. Their
flashlights trained on the inside of the vehicle and its occupants, the policemen then asked the
petitioner to open the vehicle’s door and alight for a body and vehicle search, a directive he
refused to heed owing to a previous extortion experience. Instead, he opened the vehicle
window, uttering, "plain view lang boss, plain view lang." Obviously irked by this remark, one of
the policemen, P/Insp. Aguilar, as it turnedout, then told the petitioner that he was drunk,
pointing to three cases of empty beer bottles in the trunk of the vehicle. Petitioner’s explanation
about being sober and that the empty bottles adverted to came from his restaurant was ignored
as P/Insp. Aguilar suddenly boxed him (petitioner) on the mouth and poked a gun at his head, at
the same time blurting, "P…g ina mo gusto mo tapusin na kita dito marami ka pang sinasabi."
The officers then pulled the petitioner out of the driver’s seat and pushed him into the police
mobile car, whereupon he, petitioner, asked his companions to call up his wife. The policemen
then brought petitioner to the Ospital ng Maynila where they succeeded in securing a medical
certificate under the signature of one Dr. Harvey Balucating depicting petitioner as positive of
alcoholic breath, although he refused to be examined and no alcohol breath examination was
conducted. He was thereafter detained from 3:00 a.m.of June 12, 2006 and released in the
afternoon of June 13, 2006. Before his release, however, he was allowed to undergo actual
medical examination where the resulting medical certificate indicated that he has sustained
physical injuries but negative for alcohol breath. Ten days later, petitioner filed his Complaint-
Affidavit against Dr. Balucating, P/Insp. Aguilar and the other police officers.
Petitioner also stated in his counter-affidavit that, under Sec. 29 of R.A. 4136, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, the procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not to place
the erring driver under arrest, but to confiscate his driver’s license.
On June 26, 2009, the MeTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty as charged, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the prosecution having established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, his conviction of the offenses charges is hereby pronounced.
Accordingly, he is sentenced to:
1. Pay a fine of two hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052527-CN;
and
2. Suffer imprisonment of straight penalty of three (3) months and pay a fine of two
hundred fifty pesos (₱250.00) for Criminal Case No. 052528-CN.
For lack of basis, no civil liability is adjudged.
The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to certify to the Land Transportation Office the result of this
case, stating further the data required under Section 5815 of Republic Act 4136.
Therefrom, petitioner appealed to the RTC on the main submissions that the MeTC erred in: 1)
according credit to the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating, although the records
custodian of Ospital ng Maynila was presented to testify thereon instead of the issuing physician,
and 2) upholding the veracity of the joint affidavit of arrest of P/INSP Manuel Aguilar, SPO4
Efren Bodino, and PO3 Benedict Cruz III, considering that only SPO4 Bodino appeared in court
to testify.
By Decision16 dated February 22, 2010, the RTC affirmed the conviction of the petitioner,
addressing the first issue thus raised in the appeal in the following wise: Dr. Balucating’s failure
to testify relative to petitioner’s alcoholic breath, as indicatedin the medical certificate, is not fatal
as such testimony would only serve to corroborate the testimony on the matter of SPO4 Bodino,
noting thatunder the Rules of Court,17 observations of the police officers regarding the
petitioner’s behavior would suffice to support the conclusion of the latter’s drunken state on the
day he was apprehended.18
Apropos the second issue, the RTC pointed out that the prosecution has the discretion as to how
many witnesses it needs to present before the trial court, the positive testimony of a single
credible witness as to the guilt of the accused being reasonable enough to warrant a conviction.
The RTC cited established jurisprudence19 enunciating the rule that preponderance is not
necessarily with the greatest number as "[W]itnesses are to be weighed, not numbered."
Following the denial by the RTC of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner went to the CA on a
petition for review, the recourse docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 33567. By a Decision dated
December 28, 2011, as would be reiterated in a Resolution of July 18, 2012, the appellatecourt
affirmed that of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 22, 2010 of the
RTC, Manila, Branch 12, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition on the following stated issues:
I. The CA erred in upholding the presumption of regularity in the performance of duties
by the police officers; and
II. The CA erred in giving weight to the Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Harvey
Balucating, in the absence of his testimony before the Court.
The petition is meritorious.
Prefatory, the rule according great weight, even finality at times, to the trial court’s findings of
fact does hold sway when, as here, it appears in the record that facts and circumstancesof
weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in a case under
appeal.20 Corollary, it is basic that an appeal in criminal prosecutions throws the whole case
wide open for review, inclusive of the matter of credibility and appreciation of evidence.21` Peace
officers and traffic enforcers,like other public officials and employees are bound to discharge
their duties with prudence, caution and attention, which careful men usually exercise in the
management of their own affairs.22
In the case at bar, the men manning the checkpoint in the subject area and during the period
material appearednot to have performed their duties as required by law, or at least fell short of
the norm expected of peace officers. They spotted the petitioner’s purported swerving vehicle.
They then signaled him to stop which he obeyed. But they did not demand the presentation of
the driver’s license orissue any ticket or similar citation paper for traffic violation as required
under the particular premises by Sec. 29 of RA 4136, which specifically provides:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver’s License. – Law enforcement and peace officers of other
agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this
Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations x x x
confiscate the license ofthe driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issuedby the
Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt. The period so fixed
in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid thereafter.x x x (Emphasis added.)
Instead of requiring the vehicle’s occupants to answer one or two routinary questions out of
respectto what the Court has, in Abenes v. Court of Appeals,23 adverted to as the motorists’ right
of "free passage without [intrusive] interruption," P/Insp. Aguilar, et al. engaged petitioner in what
appears to be an unnecessary conversation and when utterances were made doubtless not to
their liking, they ordered the latter to step out of the vehicle, concluding after seeing three (3)
empty cases of beer at the trunk of the vehicle that petitioner was driving under the influence of
alcohol. Then petitioner went on with his "plain view search" line. The remark apparently pissed
the police officers off no end as one of them immediately lashed at petitioner and his
companions as "mga lasing" (drunk) and to get out of the vehicle, an incongruous response to
an otherwise reasonable plea. Defense witness, Joenilo Pano, graphically described this
particular event in his sinumpaang salaysay, as follows:
x x x matapos kami huminto ay naglapitan sa amin ang mga pulis, nag flash light sa loob ng
sasakyan at sa aming mga mukha.
x x x isang pulis ang nag-utos sa aminna kami ay magsi-baba at buksan ang pintuan ng
nasabing sasakyan.
x x x dahil doon sinabi ni Kuya sa mga pulis, na hindi pwede iyon at pinigilan niya ako at ang
aking kasama kong waitress na bumaba.
x x x iginiit ni Kuya sa mga pulisang salitang "PLAIN VIEW LANG BOSS, PLAIN VIEW LANG"
pero iyon ayhindi nila pinansin. Sa halip as isang pulis ang nagsabi na "MGA LASING KAYO
HETO MAY CASE PA KAYO NG BEER".
x x x habang nagpapaliwanag si Kuya, isang pulis ang biglang kumuha ng susi ng sasakyan
habang ang isang pulis ang biglang sumuntok sa bibig ni Kuya, nagbunot ng baril at tinutukan
sa ulo si Kuya.
x x x dahil doon ay nagmakaawa ako na wag barilin si Kuya subalit ako rin ay tinutukan ng baril.
x x x na matapos suntukin si Kuya aypinagtulungan siya ng mga pulis na ilabas sa sasakyan at
nang mailabas siyaay pinagtulakan siya ng mga pulis sa gilid ng kalsada habang hawak ang
kanilang baril.24
Pano’s above account ironicallyfinds in a way collaboration from the arresting officers
themselves who admitted that they originally had no intention to search the vehicle in question
nor subject its occupants to a body search. The officers wrote in their aforementioned joint
affidavit:
xxxx
That we arrested the suspect, Edmund Sydeco y Siozon x x x for violation of RA 4136 (Driving
under the influence of liquor), and violation of Article 151 of the RPC (Resisting Arrest) x x x
committed on or about 3:30A.M., June 11, 2006 along x x x Malate, Manila. x x x He began to
raise his voice and converse with us rudely without considering that we are in uniform, on duty
and performing our job. P/INSP Manuel Aguilar pointed out that we saw him swerving and
driving under the influence of liquor that was why we are inviting him to our police station in
which our intention was to make him rest for a moment before he continue to drive. x x x
(Emphasis added.)
In fine, at the time of his apprehension, or when he was signaled to stop, to be precise, petitioner
has not committed any crime or suspected of having committed one. "Swerving," as ordinarily
understood,refers to a movement wherein a vehicle shifts from a lane to another or to turn aside
from a direct course of action or movement.25 The act may become punishable when there is a
sign indicating that swerving is prohibited or where swerving partakes the nature ofreckless
driving, a concept defined under RA 4136, as:
SECTION 48. Reckless Driving. – Noperson shall operate a motor vehicle on any highway
recklessly or without reasonable caution considering the width, traffic, grades, crossing,
curvatures, visibility and other conditions of the highway and the conditions of the atmosphere
and weather, or so as to endanger the property or the safetyor rights of any person or so as to
cause excessive or unreasonable damage to the highway.
Swerving is not necessarily indicative of imprudent behavior let alone constitutive of reckless
driving. To constitute the offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a
mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wantondisregard of the
consequences is required.26 Nothing in the records indicate that the area was a "no swerving or
overtaking zone." Moreover, the swerving incident, if this be the case, occurred at around 3:00
a.m. when the streets are usually clear of moving vehicles and human traffic, and the danger to
life, limb and property to third persons is minimal. When the police officers stopped the
petitioner’s car, they did not issue any ticket for swerving as required under Section 29 of RA
4136. Instead, they inspected the vehicle, ordered the petitioner and his companions to step
down of their pick up and concluded that the petitioner was then drunk mainly because of the
cases of beer found at the trunk of the vehicle. On re-direct examination, SPO4 Bodino testified:
Q: On that particular date, time and place … what exactly prompted you to arrest the accused
(sic) the charged in for Viol. of Section 56(f) of R.A. 4136?
A: Noong mag check-up kami, naamoynamin na amoy alak siya at yung sasakyan ay hindi
maganda ang takbo.
Q: Now you stated in your affidavit of arrest Mr. Witness that you spotted the vehicle of the
accused swerving, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. Is that also the reason why you apprehended him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after Mr. Witness, when you approached the vehicle of the accused?
A: The accused was in a loud voice. He was asking, "Bakit daw siya pinahihinto?"
xxxx
Q: How do you describe the resistance Mr. Witness?
A: He refused to ride with usgoing to the hospital, Your Honor.
x x x x27
Going over the records, it is fairly clear that what triggered the confrontational stand-off between
the police team, on one hand, and petitioner on the other, was the latter’s refusal to get off of the
vehicle for a body and vehicle search juxtaposed by his insistence on a plain view search only.
Petitioner’s twin gestures cannot plausibly be considered as resisting a lawful order. 28 He may
have sounded boorish or spoken crudely at that time, but none of this would make him a
criminal. It remains to stress that the petitioner has not, when flagged down, committed a crime
or performed an overt act warranting a reasonable inference of criminal activity. He did not try to
avoid the road block established. He came to a full stop when so required to stop. The two key
elements of resistance and serious disobedience punished under Art. 151 of the RPC are: (1)
That a person in authority or his agent is engaged in the performance of official duty or gives a
lawful order to the offender; and (2) That the offender resists or seriously disobeys such person
or his agent.29
There can be no quibble that P/Insp. Aguilar and his apprehending team are persons in authority
or agents of a person in authority manning a legal checkpoint. But surely petitioner’s act of
exercising one’s right against unreasonable searches 30 to be conducted in the middle of the
night cannot, in context, be equated to disobedience let alone resisting a lawful order in
contemplation of Art. 151 of the RPC. As has often been said, albeit expressed differently and
under dissimilar circumstances, the vitality of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees, but
in the courage of the people to assert and use them whenever they are ignored or worse
infringed.31 Moreover, there is, to stress, nothing in RA 4136 that authorized the checkpoint-
manning policemen to order petitioner and his companions to get out of the vehicle for a vehicle
and body search. And it bears to emphasize that there was no reasonable suspicion of the
occurrence of a crime that would allow what jurisprudence refers to as a "stop and frisk" action.
As SPO4 Bodino no less testified, the only reason why they asked petitioner to get out of the
vehicle was not because he has committed a crime, but because of their intention toinvite him to
Station 9 so he could rest before he resumes driving. But instead of a tactful invitation, the
apprehending officers, in an act indicative of overstepping of their duties, dragged the petitioner
out of the vehicle and, in the process of subduing him, pointed a gun and punched him on the
face. None of the police officers, to note, categorically denied the petitioner’s allegation
aboutbeing physically hurt before being brought to the Ospital ng Maynila to be tested for
intoxication. What the policemen claimed was that it took the three (3) of them to subdue the
fifty-five year old petitioner. Both actions were done in excess of their authority granted under RA
4136. They relied on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Balucating attesting that petitioner
showed no physical injuries. The medical certificate was in fact challenged not only because the
petitioner insisted at every turn that he was not examined, but also because Dr. Balucating failed
to testify as to its content. Ms. Delos Santos, the medical record custodian ofthe Ospital ng
Maynila, testified, but only to attest that the hospital has a record of the certificate. The trial
court, in its decision, merely stated:
At the outset, the records of the case show that the same were not testified upon by the doctor
who issued it.1âwphi1Instead, the Records Custodian of the Ospital ng Maynila was presented
by the Prosecution to testify on the said documents.
However, although the doctor who examined the accused was unable to testify to affirm the
contents of the Medical Certificate he issued (re: that he was found to have an alcoholic breath),
this court finds that the observation of herein private complainants as to the accused’s behavior
and condition after the incident was sufficient.
Under Section 50 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of evidence:
The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding
xxxx
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or
appearance of a person Under Section 15 of the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, "at the
trial, the affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses
who executed the same."32
In sum, the MeTC, as echoed by RTC and CA later, did not rely on the medical certificate Dr.
Balucating issued on June 12, 2006 as to petitioner’s intoxicated state, as the former was not
able to testify as to its contents, but on the testimony of SPO4Bodino, on the assumption that he
and his fellow police officers were acting in the regular performance of their duties. It cannot be
emphasized enough that smelling of liquor/alcohol and be under the influence of liquor are
differing concepts. Corollarily, it is difficult to determine with legally acceptable certainty whether
a person is drunk in contemplation of Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136 penalizing the act of driving under
the influence of alcohol. The legal situation has of course changed with the approval in May
2013 of the Anti-Drunk and Drugged Driving Act of 2013 (RA 10586) which also penalizes
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUIA),33 a term defined under its Sec. 3(e) as the "act of
operating a motor vehicle while the driver’s blood alcohol concentration level has, after being
subjected to a breath analyzer test reached the level of intoxication as established jointly by the
[DOH], the NAPOLCOM] and the [DOTC]. And under Sec. 3(g) of the IRR of RA 10586, a driver
of a private motor vehicle with gross vehicle weight not exceeding 4,500 kilograms who has BAC
[blood alcohol concentration] of 0.05% or higher shall be conclusive proof that said driver
isdriving under the influence of alcohol. Viewed from the prism of RA 10586, petitioner cannot
plausibly be convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol for this obvious reason: he had
not been tested beyond reasonable doubt, let alone conclusively, for reaching during the period
material the threshold level of intoxication set under the law for DUIA, i.e., a BAC of 0.05% or
over. Under Art. 22 of the RPC,34penal laws shall be given retroactive insofar asthey are
favorable to the accused. Section 19 of RA 10586 expressly modified Sec. 56(f) of RA 4136.
Verily, even by force of Art. 22 ofthe RPC in relation to Sec. 3(e) of RA 10586 alone, petitioner
could very well be acquitted for the charge of driving under the influence of alcohol, even if the
supposed inculpatory act occurred in 2006.
Parenthetically, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila, per its Resolution35 of November 21,
2006 found, on the strength of another physical examination from the same Ospital ng Maynila
conducted by Dr. Devega on the petitioner on the same day,June 12, but later hour, probable
cause for slight physical injuries against P/Insp. Aguilar et al. That finding to be sure tends to
indicate that the police indeed man handled the petitioner and belied, or at least cancelled out,
the purported Dr. Balucating’s finding as to petitioner’s true state.
The Court must underscore at this juncture that the petitioner, after the unfortunate incident, lost
no time incommencing the appropriate criminal charges against the police officers and Dr.
Balucating, whomhe accused of issuing Exh. "F" even without examining him. The element of
immediacy in the filing lends credence to petitioner’s profession of innocence, particularly of the
charge of disobeying lawful order or resisting arrest. Certainly not to be overlooked is the fact
that petitioner,in so filing his complaint, could not have possibly been inspired by improper
motive, the police officers being complete strangers to him and vice versa. Withal, unless he had
a legitimate grievance, it is difficult to accept the notion that petitioner would expose himself to
harm’s way by filing a harassment criminal suit against policemen.
Conviction must come only after it survives the test of reason.36 It is thus required that every
circumstance favoring one’s innocence be duly taken into account. 37 Given the deviation of the
police officers from the standard and usual procedure in dealing with traffic violation by
perceived drivers under the influence of alcoholand executing an arrest, the blind reliance and
simplistic invocation by the trial court and the CA on the presumption of regularity in the conduct
of police duty is clearly misplaced. As stressed in People v. Ambrosio, 38 the presumption of
regularity is merely just that, a presumption disputable by contrary proof and which when
challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. And to be sure, this
presumption alone cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not
overcome by proof that obliterates all doubts as to the offender’s culpability. In the present case,
the absence of conclusive proof being under the influence of liquor while driving coupled with the
forceful manner the police yanked petitioner out of his vehicle argues against or at least cast
doubt on the finding of guilt for drunken driving and resisting arrest.
In case of doubt as to the moral certainty of culpability, the balance tips in favor of innocence or
at least infavor of the milderform of criminal liability. This is as it should be. For, it is basic,
almost elementary, that the burden of proving the guiltof an accused lies on the prosecution
which must rely on the strength of its evidence and noton the weakness of the defense.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33567 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASI:OE. Petitioner is
hereby acquitted of the crimes charged in Criminal Case No. 052527-CN and Criminal Case No.
052528-CN.
No pronouncement as to costs.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR: