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U.S. Military Intervention
in Crisis, 1945-1994
AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY OF JUST WAR THEORY
MICHAELJ. BUTLER
Departmentof Political Science
Universityof Connecticut
One compellingaspectof U.S. foreignpolicy duringthe cold warwas the propensityof policy makersto
seek harmonybetweenthe pursuitof securityobjectivesand a statedAmericanbelief in enduringvalues of
peace andjustice. One need look no furtherthancampaignmonikerssuch as "OperationJust Cause"and
"OperationRestoreHope"or declarationsof the existence of an "axisof evil" for morerecentanecdotalevi-
dence of the moraljustificationsfor U.S. militaryactions.The questionof whetherthis "rhetoricof justice,"
which has been pressed into service as a public rationalefor U.S. militaryintervention,might consist of
more than mere rhetoricis addressed.The historicallygrounded,yet timely, theory of the "just war"is
appliedto a set of U.S. militaryinterventiondecisions to assess conditionsin which considerationsof justice
may have drivenU.S. decisions to employ militaryforce in internationalcrisis.
1. Some would also include Clausewitz;Phillips (1984) for one implies that Clausewitzunderstood
warin the Kantiansense, thatis, bothas an idealized,abstractedconceptandas an empiricalreality.By this
reading,the formerunderstandingexplains Clausewitz'spronouncementson the need to wage war abso-
lutely; the latterexplains his pragmaticdiscussion of war's limits.
AUTHOR'S NOTE:The data set used herein is a modified version of Michael Brecherand Jonathan
Wilkenfeld's InternationalCrisis Behavior (ICB) data set and is availableonline at http://www.yale.edu/
unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm. Special thanksare due to MarkA. Boyer, Melissa J. Butler,and Natalie B. Floreafor
criticalinsight at variousstages of the developmentof this analysis.Errorsor oversightsremainentirelythe
provinceof the author.
JOURNAL OFCONFLICT Vol.47 No.2, April2003226-248
RESOLUTION,
DOI:10.1177/0022002702251031
? 2003SagePublications
226
Butler/U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN CRISIS,1945-1994 227
THEORETICAL APPROACH
2. Gelb andBetts (1979) offer nine such framingcategoriesin theirtreatmentof the U.S. involvement
in Vietnam.
3. Conceptually,Hoffman's(1984) notionof (regional)hegemonicpowercould be considereda sub-
set of structuralrealism, but nonetheless, his discussion distinctly lays out these three frameworksas
benchmarksfor thinkingabout interventionsince the Second WorldWar.
Butler/ U.S. MILITARY
INTERVENTION
IN CRISIS,1945-1994 229
pline human law (laws enacted by governments) to the stricturesof natural law
(humanity'sbest attemptat replicatingeternallaw in the temporalsphere).
Just war's antecedentscan be located long before the writings of Augustine or
Aquinason the subject;for example,Platoextensivelydiscusses the rulesof warin The
Republic(Plato 1974), and Hebrewteachingsappearin the Old Testamentcalling for
limits to destructionand violence in the conquestof Canaan(Deut. 2), grieving over
violence and offering appealsto the God, who can bringwarto an end anddestroyits
implementsin the Psalms (Ps. 46, 120), andcondemningatrocitiesin war(Amos 1-2).
Nonetheless, it is these two classical theologians and the common theme that binds
them-that humanity,thoughfallen, is nonethelessworthpreservingthroughhuman-
kind'sbest attemptsto establishandmaintainpeace andorderaccordingto the dictates
of the divine and eternallaw-that serve to frameJWT in the modernmindset.
The theoryof thejust warthatemergedfromthis traditionandwas refinedandclar-
ified throughoutthe centuriesis actuallyof two parts,a deliberationover the initiation
of war (jus ad bellum)and a set of questionsover properconductin war(jus in bello),
the formerof which is the focus of this research.6Thejus ad bellumlaw is an attemptto
set cautiouslimitationson the initiationof militaryactionto ensurethatit retainsajust
character(Phillips 1984). As Johnson(1999, 27) economicallystates,it is "howtojus-
tify a resort to war,"whereas O'Brien (1979) calls it simply a war-decision law.
Althoughcriticshave chargedJWTwith being purposefullyunderspecified(pointing
to cases of historicalmisapplicationby religious authoritiesto justify militarycam-
paigns as evidence of its selectivity), the law as formulatedis crucial for addressing
Kantianconcernsover the pursuitof liberalgoals throughilliberalactions.7
The five mainprinciplesdelineatingajust warin accordancewith thejus ad bellum
test are
1. presenceof justcause,
2. presenceof competentauthority to act,
3. rightintentionin action,
4. reasonablehopeof success,and
5. overallproportionalityof good(inendsdesired).8
The most common criteriadefining the rightto resortto force for the primaryjust
warprincipleof just cause are (a) defense of the innocentagainstwrongfulattack;(b)
reclamationof persons,property,or otherthingsof valuethatwere wronglytaken;and
(c) punishmentof fundamentally"evil"acts againsthumanity.In the case of compe-
tent authority,the lone criterionis thatmilitaryactionmustbe clearly sanctionedby a
duly authorizedrepresentativeof some sovereignpolitical authority.9Right intention
has two definitions,each with associatedcriteria;in its negativeconnotation,it refers
to militaryaction markedby the absenceof (a) territorialacquisition;(b) intimidation
or coercion;or (c) cruelty,hate,or vengeance.In its positive connotation,it consists of
militaryaction possessing eitherpeacekeepingor justice-buildingefforts.
Possibly the definitivetreatmentof JWTduringthe cold war era was the NCCB's
(1983) pastoralletter The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,
which simultaneouslyelucidatedboththe principlesandpremisesof thejust wartradi-
tion within the RomanCatholicChurchand the currencyof its applicationto moder
methodsof war,especially (butnot exclusively) of the nuclearvariety.Throughoutthe
text,the mainconcernof TheChallengeof Peace is the expositionof whatit statesto be
transcendentanduniversalmoralprinciplesconcerningwarandpeace thatemphasize
the intrinsicdignityandvalueof all humanlife andthe extensiveapplicabilityof codes
providingfor the ethical conductof warfare(i.e., thejust warprinciples)for civil and
religiousleadersalike in protectingthatdignityandvalue.The letteraffirmsthe appli-
cabilityof JWTfor modernity,contendingthatthe objectsas well as the methodsof its
precautionremainvalid sources of concernregardlessof evolutionarydevelopments
in war making or the internationalsystem. Moreover,the letter exhorts those con-
cernedwith curbingthe savageryof warto "lookat the worldas it is, not simply as we
would want it to be" (p. 22). In this, the letter'sauthorscontend,thejust wartradition
offers its practitionersnot only a set of principlesto objectively examine and guide
theirown decisions andconductin the prosecutionof warbutalso providesthem with
the necessaryspace for the objectiveexaminationof the conductof otherinvolvedpar-
ties and of the context and dynamics of the situation itself. Although one's moral
agency is restrictedin terms of goal selection-one's inalienable obligation is to
defend peace againstaggression at every turn-it is unleashedwith respectto moral
deliberationoverthe appropriatemeansfor attainingthis goal-means thatclearlycan
takethe shapeof ajust warif the appropriateconditionsfor embarkingon such a cam-
paign entail.
In concertwith the NCCB pastoralletter,JWThas been appliedto the questionsof
moder warfareand statecraftin works by O'Brien, Johnson,and Phillips as well as
PaulRamsey(1968) andMichaelWalzer(1977). Althougheach of these explorations
in JWTis markedby particulardifferencesof opinion over implementationquestions
RESEARCH DESIGN
STUDY OBJECTIVES
Hypothesis 1: The probability of the United States employing military force in a cold war era
interventionwill increaseif oneormoreof thethreemajorprinciples
ofjus ad bellumis
evidentin a crisis.
This hypothesis arises directly from the assumption,explained above, that JWT,in
general,andthejus ad bellumlaw,in particular,providefor greateragency in decision
makingaboutintervention.As stated,it presupposestwo interestingphenomenaabout
10. These questionsof implementationconcern,particularly,preemptivefirst strikes,involvementin
wars of nationalliberationor secessionist movements,and the role of nonstatebodies in prosecutinga just
war.
11. Walzer(1977) providesdetailedcase studies throughouthistoryup to and includingpresent-day
conflicts to illustrateJWT in practice.
Butler /U.S. MILITARY IN CRISIS,1945-1994
INTERVENTION 235
U.S. decision making duringthe cold war era. The first is that U.S. decision makers
were stronglyinclined if not predisposedto select the militaryoption when interven-
ing as a third party.If, as shown above, the jus ad bellum decision rules provide a
greaterrole bothfor agency in decision makingandfor finerdistinctionson ethicaland
political grounds,andyet the probabilityof interventionstill increases,it may reason-
ably be inferredthat U.S. interventionpolicy, in a sense, favoredthe militaryoption.
The second is that U.S. decision making about interventionwith militaryforce was
stronglyinfluencedby considerationsofjustice-either the promotionof justice or the
correctionof injustice. If militaryinterventionhas a higher probabilityof being the
policy instrumentof choice whenjust warvariablesarepresent,at the least one can in-
fer thatjustice was a key componentof cold war era decision makingaboutinterven-
tion. (One might also infer thatU.S. decision makersbelieved thatinjusticedeserved
to be correctedwith force, or thatthey felt thatinjusticewas a compellingrationaledo-
mestically,althoughneitherof these far-reachinginferencesis testablein the models
presentedbelow.)
2: Theprobability
Hyphothesis of theUnitedStatesemployingmilitaryforcein a coldwar
is mostaffectedby theevidenceof thejustcauseprinciplesof jus ad
eraintervention
bellumin a crisis.
Hypothesis3: The impactof the principlesofjus ad bellumon the probabilityof the United
Statesto employmilitaryforcein a coldwareraintervention is notsignificantly
affected
by regionalhegemony,structural realist,or ideologicalconflictconsiderations.
12. This was because of an obvious reluctanceto provokea directshowdownthatcould lead to full-
scale, possibly nuclear,war.
13. It shouldbe stressedagainthatthis analysisdoes not allow testingfor the inversescenario;thatis, I
cannotaddressthe significantquestionof whetherideologically motivatedinterventionswere impactedone
way or anotherbyjustice considerationsin anyof the modelsI provide.Althoughleavingthis questionunan-
swered does not limit this analysis of JWT (as it pertainsto the strengthof ideologically orientedexplana-
tions), it remainsanalyticallyimportantnonetheless.
14. For similarreasons,the nullificationof any or all of the hypotheseswould proveas valid andvalu-
able as supportingthem.Findingthatthejus ad bellumlaw has not been importantin cold warmilitaryinter-
ventions;or thatjust cause is the least importantof the threeprinciples;or thatjustice considerationsarenot
resilientin the face of geographic,alliance,or ideological factorswouldbe at least as serviceablein general-
izing about the political and ethical deliberationsof decision makersconcerning militaryinterventionas
"proving"them.
Butler/U.S.MILITARYINTERVENTIONIN 1945-1994 237
CRISIS,
METHODOLOGY
15. This case selection criteriaadmittedlyexposes the researchto a potentialcase selection problem;
namely,if internationallegal or moralimperativesare, in fact, active in the cases selected, it could be those
factorsthatdictatethe U.S. involvement(or noninvolvement)and, by extension, the U.S. militaryinvolve-
ment (or nonmilitaryinvolvement).This can be overcome by recalling that the actualdependentvariable
being considered here is whetherthe United States used militaryforce in any cases in which it became
involved(an agency question),not whatexternalconsiderationsmay have precipitatedU.S. involvementin
the first place or a particulartype of U.S. involvement(a structurequestion).
16. To illustrate,U.S. involvement in Laos prior to full-scale U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia
(PathetLao Offensive, case 180), or in Cambodiaafter disengagementfrom that theatre(Mayaguez,case
259), were acceptedundermy criteria,but intrawarcrises occurringduringthatfull-scale involvement(Tet
Offensive,case 225) were rejected.Intrawar,protractedcrises (such as the series of Arab-Israeliconflicts in
the Middle East) were fully eligible for inclusion,providedthe United Statesplayed some third-partyinter-
ventionistrole andtherewas a significantthreatto one or moretargetstates.The eligibility of all cases of cri-
sis includedin this analysis was determinedin a multistageprocess based initially on the empiricalcharac-
terizationsby Brecherand Wilkenfeld (2000) included within the InternationalConflict Behavior (ICB)
238 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
data set and then corroboratedusing crisis summariesprovided by Bercovitch and Jackson (1997) and
Tillema (1991).
17. Cases with an ICB value of 1 (U.S. not active) were droppedfromthis analysispermy earliercase
selection criteria.
18. To controlfor potentialbias in coding the five new independentvariablesintroducedin this analy-
sis, an independentcoderwas utilized.The intercodercorrelationresultsfor all five variableswas .872. With
one exception(x 10 = targetstateauthority)intercoderreliabilitycorrelationresultswere greaterthan.9. The
correlationscore for xlO was .56, a lower figure probably best explained by the inherent subjectivity
involvedin determiningprecisely whatembodiesconveyanceof authorityto intervenein a conflict by a cri-
sis actor.The author'stendencywas towardthe conservative,coding in the affirmativeonly cases in which
directdiplomaticappealshave been documentedin the case summariesor supplementaryhistoricalmateri-
als consulted.
STAGE la
(Component)
7
\^ * STA
(Exp
|*
19. Given thatthe hypothesesas formulatedare directionalin nature,in exploringthe possibility that
U.S. militaryinterventionin a crisis will increasewith the presenceof just warconditionsin thatcrisis, sig-
nificance levels are based on a one-tailed test.
242 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION
TABLE 1
Impact of Major Just War Precepts on
U.S. Military Intervention Decisions, 1945-1994
n= 171
PseudoR2 = .412
TABLE2
Impact of Major Just War Precepts on
U.S. Military Intervention Decisions (controls introduced)
n= 171
Pseudo R2 = .510
The findings of this research,as might be expected, signal a clear need for further
investigationof U.S. interventiondecision-makingprocessesandrationales.Hypothe-
ses relatingto therelevanceof thejus ad bellumlaw in U.S. decisions to intervenemili-
tarilyduringthe cold war era, as well as the primacyof the just cause preceptof that
law,were statisticallyconfirmed.However,the law's influenceon theprobableodds of
undertakinga militaryinterventionduring that period was dramaticallyrecast after
this main decision law of JWTwas placed in a contextualsetting.The resultwas nei-
therthe triumphof JWTin explainingU.S. interventiondecisions nor its repudiation.
The same can be said for the alternativesystemic frameworks,pervasivewithinthe lit-
erature,which were tested againstthejus ad bellumlaw and also found to be farfrom
definitivein termsof the level of explanationthey provide.Perhapsit is this muddled
resultthatis the ultimatelesson of this analysis;it serves as confirmationof the earlier
assertionthat actor-leveldeliberationsshould not be wholly ignored in constructing
interpretationsof why the United States decides to intervene with force when and
where it does.
Buildingon the findingsof this study,threebroadareasemergethatseem to provide
promisinggroundfor futureresearch.First,as has only begun to be outlinedhere, the
interactiveeffects of actor-levelethical and moral deliberationswith realist concep-
tions of an interest-basedforeignpolicy on decisions to intervenemilitarilyin an inter-
national crisis are complex and demand a much more robust treatmentthan I have
REFERENCES