Court Drops Sheriff From Rolls Due To Absences

Assigned case A.M. No.
17-11-272-RTC, January 31, 2018
RE: DROPPING FROM THE ROLLS OF LEMUEL H. VENDIOLA, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT (OCC), REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BIÑAN CITY, LAGUNA (RTC).
This administrative case stems from a request1 to drop Mr. Lemuel H. Vendiola (Vendiola), Sheriff
IV in the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Regional Trial Court of Biñan City, Laguna (RTC), from
the rolls due to his absences without official leave.
The Facts
The records of the Employees's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA), show that Vendiola has not submitted his Daily Time Record (DTR)
since May 2012 up to the present.2 He neither submitted any application for leave.3 His service
record4 shows that he was appointed Utility Worker I in the RTC, Branch 24 on November 10, 2004.
On April 27, 2009, he was appointed temporarily as Sheriff IV in the OCC, RTC. He was reappointed
to the same position on a permanent capacity on June 3, 2010.5 Vendiola did not submit the
requirements for initial salary; he did, however, submit his DTR until April 2012.
In a Letter6 dated February 21, 2013, Executive Judge Teodoro N. Solis of the RTC, Branch 25,
requested the OCA to drop Vendiola from the rolls and declare his position vacant considering his
absences without official leave since April 2012.7
Moreover, Vendiola's salaries and benefits have been withheld since December 2010 due to his
non-submission of requirements for his initial salary in connection with his reappointment on a
permanent capacity as Sheriff IV.8
The OCA informed the Court of its findings based on the records of its different offices, namely: (a)
Vendiola is still in the plantilla of court personnel, and thus, considered to be in active service; (b)
he has no application for retirement; and (c) no administrative case is pending against him; but (d)
he is, however, accountable for STF9 (Sheriff Trust Fund) and has yet to be audited.10
In its report and recommendation11 dated November 2, 2017, the OCA recommended that: (a)
Vendiola's name be dropped from the rolls effective May 2, 2012 for having been absent without
official leave; (b) his position be declared vacant; and (c) he be informed about his separation from
the service at his last known address on record at Kasilaga Compound Silangan St., San Francisco,
Biñan, Laguna. The OCA added, however, that Vendiola is still qualified to receive the benefits he
may be entitled to under existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.12
The Court's Ruling
The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation.
Section 63, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave, as amended by Memorandum Circular No. 13,
Series of 2007,13 states:
1
Section 63. Effect of absences without approved leave. — An official or employee who
is continuously absent without approved leave for at least thirty (30) working days shall be
considered on absence without official leave (AWOL) and shall be separated from the service or
dropped from the rolls without prior notice. x x x
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Based on this provision, Vendiola should be separated from service or dropped from the rolls in
view of his continued absence since April 2012.
Vendiola's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it

disrupted the normal functions of the court.14 It contravened the duty of a public servant to serve
with the utmost degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency.15 It should be reiterated
and stressed that a court personnel's conduct is circumscribed with the heavy responsibility of
upholding public accountability and maintaining the people's faith in the judiciary.16 By failing to
report for work since April 2012 up to the present, Vendiola grossly disregarded and neglected the
duties of his office. Undeniably, he failed to adhere to the high standards of public accountability
imposed on all those in the government service.17
The dropping from the rolls, however, shall be without prejudice to his liability, if any, upon
completion of the audit.
WHEREFORE, Mr. Lemuel H. Vendiola, Sheriff IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of
Biñan City, Laguna, is hereby DROPPED from the rolls effective May 2, 2012 and his position is
declared VACANT. He is, however, still qualified to receive the benefits he may be entitled to under
existing laws and may still be reemployed in the government.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served upon him at his address appearing in his 201 file pursuant to
Rule XVI, Section 63 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations, as amended.
33. A.C. No. 9149, September 04, 2013
JULIAN PENILLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., Respondent.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.
for violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for gross
misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
The antecedent facts follow:nadcralaw
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the
spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses defaulted
in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract against the
spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainant’s
payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that he
2
would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as
attorney’s fees and P10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before
Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Respondent
attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the hearing,
complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth, complainant and
respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and transactions that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that
they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a
favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later
acceded to respondent’s suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and delivered it to
respondent’s office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the
spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was “needed to
have [the resolution] reversed.”2 Respondent then prepared the motion and promised complainant
that he would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for lack of merit.
Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse decision and
presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the spouses for the refund
of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional P10,000 to respondent which he asked
for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the complaint, he was told by respondent to
await further notice as to the status of the case. Complainant claims that respondent never gave him
any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status of
the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he was
able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the spouses
could not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to determine the
whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to respondent’s office on January 24, 2005, but
because respondent was not around, complainant left with respondent’s secretary a letter
regarding the possible location of the spouses.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his
disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondent’s
possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio program “Ito ang Batas with Atty.
Aga” to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the Office of
the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on June 6,
20023 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was only P2,440 and
not P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio program also sent
respondent a letter calling his attention to complainant’s problem. The letter, like all of
complainant’s previous letters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty of
gross misconduct for violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and
for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
3
In an Answer4 filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
merit. He denied charging complainant P10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed that he
charged and received only P2,000. He also countered that the payment of P30,000 made by the
complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent likewise
denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the case before
the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the prosecutor;
that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged P5,000, as filing
fee for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to inform
petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the documents of
complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant was the fact
that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be attending his daily
court hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his
counsel attended.5 The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were
directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days,6 to which complainant and respondent
complied.7cralawlibrary
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply8 praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of factual
and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as complainant’s counsel when he filed
the criminal case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case before the
RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of both cases as his
job was to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was unethical for him to
guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such case for the client. He
continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a bottle of Carlos Primero I and
that the filing fees he collected totalled P20,000. Respondent argued that it is incredulous that the
total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected exceeded P30,000 – the amount being
claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation9 dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months “for negligence within the
meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,” viz:nadcralaw
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore thumb
rendering them difficult to escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for repair
of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a contract, oral
or written, the consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly actionable in a civil
suit for damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor, the liability of the
respondent is purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a contract of services and the
respondent (spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual obligation under the contract.
xxxx
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the
dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where
4
the actual damages claimed is P36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for P36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC [which]
has jurisdiction over the same. One of the “firsts” that a lawyer ascertains in filing an action is the
proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when the civil
complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that the
jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already P400,000.00.
xxxx
Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondent’s client as evidenced by the letters
marked as Exhibits “D”, “E”, “F”, “G” and “H” which were all received by complainant’s secretary,
except for Exhibit “H” which was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit “M” which was
sent by “Atty. Aga”. These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent with
good faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet with the
complainant and return the money and documents received by reason of the legal engagement, but
omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place for the meeting. This
failure suggests a clear disregard of the client’s demand which was done in bad faith on the part of
respondent.10
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646, adopting
and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution11 reads:nadcralaw
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s violation of Canon 18 and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration12 and asked that the penalty of suspension be
reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a “Motion
to Admit Amended ‘Motion for Reconsideration’ Upon Leave of Office.”13 Respondent asserted that
the failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed to him alone. He
stressed that complainant had always been informed that he only had time to meet with his clients
in the afternoon at his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice, complainant kept going to his
office in Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed lapses which would amount to
negligence in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were done unknowingly and without
malice or bad faith. He also stressed that this was his first infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.14 On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a
second Motion for Reconsideration15 which was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16cralawlibrary
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution17 and noted the aforementioned Notices of
Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued another
Resolution18 noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal and
respondent’s second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under Canon
18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we also find
respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyer’s Oath.
5
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.19cralawlibrary
The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the following
provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:nadcralaw
a) Canon 15 – A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client;
b) Rule 15.[06, Canon 15] – A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to
influence any public official, tribunal or legislative body;
c) Rule 16.01[, Canon 16] – A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from his client;
d) Canon 17 – A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him;
e) Canon 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
f) Rule 18.03[, Canon 18] – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable;
and
g) Rule 18.04[, Canon 18] – A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status
of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request
for information.20
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated
Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to “serve his client with
competence and diligence” when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of the
case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after the
complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a civil
case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an alternative
prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over complainant’s claim which amounts to only P36,000. As correctly stated in the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:nadcralaw
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,]
vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount of
demand does not exceed P200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the effectivity of the Act,
the same shall be adjusted to P400,000.00 (Sec. 34).21
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the
criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have been
easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for complainant.
What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing the estafa case
did not motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling the case of
complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due to what later
6
turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent
and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter. He
paid no attention and showed no importance to complainant’s cause despite repeated follow-ups.
Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of
professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to be
a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a
program in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his
attention.
Respondent’s negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays his
lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, “[e]very case a lawyer accepts deserves
his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer not to ‘neglect
a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.’
He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions or nonfeasance would be binding
upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and
a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning
and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.”22 Similarly, under Rule 18.04,
a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the status and developments of the case and all other
information relevant thereto. He must be consistently mindful of his obligation to respond
promptly should there be queries or requests for information from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the
cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is too
lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that
complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance
exhibited by complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules 18.03
and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a reasonable
time to the client’s request for information.
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that “[a] lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.” The legal
profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord the highest
degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the client’s interest. The most thorough
groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The
honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the entire duration of
his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests of the client and the
pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty and his omission is
tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyer’s Oath.
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the complainant
who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence23 the allegations in the complaint. In
the instant case, complainant was only able to prove respondent’s violation of Canons 17 and 18,
and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath.
Complainant failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon 15 and Rule 15.06 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed him to give a bottle of
7
Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get a favorable decision. Similarly,
complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed violated Rule 16.01 of Canon
16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required filing fees.
As to respondent’s proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03 and
18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer’s Oath, we find the same to
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, viz:nadcralaw
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. – A member of
the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision of
the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent Atty.
Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and 18, and
Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as the Lawyer’s Oath. This
Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice of law for a
period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision. Respondent is
further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of his clients,
and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be disseminated
to all courts throughout the country, to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.’s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance.
34. A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,vs.PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated February 1, 2008
filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the
lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client
informed of the status of the case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan,
secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the
heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement,
respondent filed the corresponding complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by
8
the RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14,
2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s
office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of ₱10,000.00 for the payment
of appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of
the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On September 12, 2007, Tan
handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal9 before
the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose
such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued
by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to
prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering the
technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the RTC and requested
for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he discovered that the
November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also
found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal had long been
dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against
respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that
resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to
have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed
for the court’s unfavorable decision.16
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly
recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against
him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-

founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s allegations squarely, particularly, the
issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved
on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s accusation that
the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was
respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about the
dismissal of complainant’s appeal and make it appear that there is still an available relief left for
Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21
9
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable
for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client constantly updated
on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping
the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of
trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on how the
lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer must constantly keep in
mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. Concomitantly,
the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client
who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and
competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the
dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to
inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when
he visited the former’s office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing
complainant’s appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period
therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such matters of
professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by fabricating the
November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied. In
so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue
prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
10
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency,
but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in which whether in his personal or
private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable
neglect to serve his client’s interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging
in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be
countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to keep
complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status through the use of a falsified court order
evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable
practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit
to practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal
moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A lawyer’s relationship with
others should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the
essence of the lawyer’s oath. The lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a
sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney
requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the
status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In Mejares
v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely and
adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid,
Jr.,32 the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the
status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In
Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in
order to mortgage and sell his client’s property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment
was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his

client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his case
had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the
latter. To the Court, respondent’s acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so
flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar.
His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession. Therefore, in
view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to his client,
respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
11
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country
for their information and guidance.
35.A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014
35. ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.
This is a verified Complaint for Disbarment/Gross Immoral Conduct1 filed with this Court on
September 18, 2006 by complainant Rolando Viray (complainant) against respondent Atty. Eugenio
T. Sanicas (respondent).
Factual Antecedents
Complainant alleges that he engaged the services of respondent relative to a labor case2 he filed
against Ester Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III (spouses Lopez). On February 26, 2001, the Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of complainant and disposed of the case as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester

Lopez and Teodoro Lopez III to pay complainant Rolando Viray of the following, to wit:
1. Backwages……………….……..P146,726.67
2. Separation Pay………………….…24,000.00
3. Service Incentive Leave Pay……….1,538.46
4. Attorney’s Fees………………...….17,226.51
or a total amount of One Hundred Eighty Nine Thousand Four Hundred Ninety One Pesos & 64/100
(P189,491.60) [sic] to be deposited with the Cashier of this Office, within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Subsequently, an Alias Writ of Execution4 was issued relative to aforesaid decision. During the
implementation of said writ, however, complainant discovered that respondent had already
collected the total amount of P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez. Respondent received said amount in
the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

02/05/2004 7802 P 20,000.00 Attorney’s fees
02/13/2004 7833 10,000.00 Partial payment for judgment
12
Total Amount: P 95,000.00
Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

authorized to receive payments on his behalf, when in truth and in fact he is not. Consequently,
complainant made several verbal demands to the respondent to remit to him the amount of
P95,000.00, less his attorney’s fees of P20,000.00. But respondent did not budge. Thus,
complainant lodged a complaint before the Office of the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Felisa, Bacolod
City. Respondent, however, ignored the summons to attend a conference before the barangay to
resolve the issues.
In his Comment,5 respondent admits that he received P95,000.00 from spouses Lopez on
installments, but denies that he was not authorized to accept it. He explains that complainant
agreed to pay him additional attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of the total monetary award, on top
of the attorney’s fees that may be awarded by the labor tribunal, and to refund all expenses
respondent incurred relative to the case. Thus, from the total award of P189,491.60, the sum of
P17,226.57 representing respondent’s professional fees has to be deducted, leaving a balance of
P172,275.13.6 Then from said amount, complainant proposed that he will get P100,000.00 and the
balance of P72,275.13 shall belong to respondent as and for his additional 25% attorney’s fees and
reimbursement for all expenses he incurred while handling the case. However, after receiving the
amount of P95,000.00 and deducting therefrom the amounts of P20,000.007 attorney’s fees,
P17,000.00 earlier given to complainant, and P2,000.00 paid to the sheriff, what was left to
respondent was only P56,000.00. Respondent whines that this amount is way below the promised
25% attorney’s fees and refund of expenses in the total amount of P72,275.13.
Respondent asserts that, in any event, complainant will still be receiving a sum greater than what
he expects to receive. He avers that complainant is still entitled to receive from spouses Lopez the
sum of P93,491.60. Adding the P17,000.00 respondent previously remitted to complainant, the
latter will get a total amount of P110,491.60. This amount, according to respondent, exceeds the
amount of P100,000.00 complainant agreed to and expected to receive.
IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On February 26, 2007,8 we referred this case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner
issued his Report and Recommendation9 with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the respondent be meted the penalty
of two (2) years suspension. Respondent is also ordered to return, in restitution all the amounts in
his possession which are due to complainant, less his rightful attorney’s fees.10
On October 28, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted Resolution No. XX-2011-139,11 which
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner suspending
respondent from the practice of law for two years, but with the modification that respondent
should restitute the sum of P85,500.0012 to the complainant.
Issue
13
The essential issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for his
failure to promptly account to his client the funds received in the course of his professional
engagement and return the same upon demand.
“The Code of Professional Responsibility demands the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in
dealing with the moneys entrusted to lawyers because of their fiduciary relationship.”13
Specifically, Rule 16.01 of the Code imposes upon the lawyer the duty to “account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client.” Rule 16.03 thereof, on the other hand,
mandates that “[a] lawyer shall deliver the funds x x x of his client when due or upon demand.”
In this case, respondent on nine separate occasions from February 5, 2004 to April 30, 2004
received payments for attorney’s fees and partial payments for monetary awards on behalf of
complainant from spouses Lopez. But despite the number of times over close to three months he
had been receiving payment, respondent neither informed the complainant of such fact nor
rendered an accounting thereon. It was only when an Alias Writ of Execution was issued and being
implemented when complainant discovered that spouses Lopez had already given respondent the
total amount of P95,000.00 as partial payment for the monetary awards granted to him by the labor
tribunal.
To make matters worse, respondent withheld and refused to deliver to the complainant said
amount, which he merely received on behalf of his client, even after demand. Complainant brought
the matter before the barangay, but respondent simply ignored the same. Such failure and
inordinate refusal on the part of the respondent to render an accounting and return the money after
demand raises the presumption that he converted it to his own use.14 His unjustified withholding of
the funds also warrants the imposition of disciplinary action against him.15cralawred
Respondent justifies his action by asserting that complainant authorized him to receive payment.
He implies that he is also authorized to apply the sum of money he received from spouses Lopez to
his additional 25% attorney’s fees and reimbursement for all expenses he incurred for the case, in
the total amount of P72,275.13. However, after deducting from the amount of P95,000.00 the
amounts of P20,000.00, P17,000.00, and P2,000.00, what was left to respondent, to his dismay was
only P56,000.00.
The Court is not impressed. As aptly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, other than his
self-serving statements, there is nothing in the records which would support respondent’s claim
that he was authorized to receive the payments. Neither is there proof that complainant agreed to
pay him additional 25% attorney’s fees and reimburse him for all expenses he allegedly incurred in
connection with the case. Respondent did not present any document, retainer’s agreement, or
itemized breakdown of the amount to be reimbursed to support his claim. In any event, even
assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does not exempt him from
his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the course of his
professional employment. “The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel and client
imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or
from the client. He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has
collected for his client.” 16 “The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney’s fees on the money in
his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt
accounting.”17 Moreover, a lawyer has no right “to unilaterally appropriate his client’s money for
14
himself by the mere fact alone that the client owes him attorney’s fees.”18cralawred
In sum, “[r]espondent’s failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and
upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral
soundness, and warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.”19cralawred
The Penalty
“The penalty for gross misconduct consisting in the failure or refusal despite demand of a lawyer to
account for and to return money or property belonging to a client has been suspension from the
practice of law for two years.”20 Thus, the IBP Board of Governors did not err in recommending the
imposable penalty. Considering, however, that this is respondent’s first offense and he is already a
nonagenarian,21the Court, in the exercise of its compassionate judicial discretion, finds that a
penalty of one year suspension is sufficient.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Eugenio T. Sanicas GUILTY of gross misconduct and
accordingly SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one (1) year upon the finality of this
Resolution, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
Atty. Sanicas is ordered to return to complainant, within 90 days from finality of this Resolution, the
net amount of P85,500.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of this Resolution
until the full amount is returned. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of a more severe penalty.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in Atty. Sanicas’
record as a member of the Bar.
36. A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013
MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant, vs.ATTY. RUSTICO B.

GAGATE, Respondent.
For the Court s resolution is an administrative complaint1 filed by Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui
Pitcher (complainant) against Atty. Rustico B. Gagate (respondent), . charging him for gross
ignorance of the law and unethical practice of law.
The facts
Complainant claimed to be the legal wife of David B. Pitcher (David),2 a British national who passed
away on June 18, 2004.3 Prior to his death, David was engaged in business in the Philippines and
owned, among others, 40% of the shareholdings in Consulting Edge, Inc.4 (Consulting Edge), a
domestic corporation. In order to settle the affairs of her deceased husband, complainant engaged
the services of respondent.5
On June 22, 2004, complainant and respondent met with Katherine Moscoso Bantegui Bantegui),6 a
major stockholder of Consulting Edge,7 in order to discuss the settlement of David’s interest in the
company.8 They agreed to another meeting which was, however, postponed by Bantegui.
15
Suspecting that the latter was merely stalling for time in order to hide something, respondent
insisted that the appointment proceed as scheduled.9
Eventually, the parties agreed to meet at the company premises on June 28, 2004. However, prior to
the scheduled meeting, complainant was prevailed upon by respondent to put a paper seal on the
door of the said premises, assuring her that the same was legal.10
On the scheduled meeting, Bantegui expressed disappointment over the actions of complainant and
respondent, which impelled her to just leave the matter for the court to settle. She then asked them
to leave, locked the office and refused to give them a duplicate key.11
Subsequently, however, respondent, without the consent of Bantegui, caused the change in the lock
of the Consulting Edge office door,12 which prevented the employees thereof from entering and
carrying on the operations of the company. This prompted Bantegui to file before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Makati (Prosecutor’s Office) a complaint for grave coercion against complainant
and respondent.13 In turn, respondent advised complainant that criminal and civil cases should be
initiated against Bantegui for the recovery of David's personal records/business interests in
Consulting Edge.14 Thus, on January 17, 2005, the two entered in Memorandum of
Agreement,15 whereby respondent undertook the filing of the cases against Bantegui, for which
complainant paid the amount of ₱150,000.00 as acceptance fee and committed herself to pay
respondent ₱1,000.00 for every court hearing.16
On November 18, 2004, the Prosecutor’s Office issued a Resolution17 dated October 13, 2004,
finding probable cause to charge complainant and respondent for grave coercion. The
corresponding Information was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 337985 (grave coercion case), and, as a matter of course, warrants of
arrest were issued against them.18 Due to the foregoing, respondent advised complainant to go into
hiding until he had filed the necessary motions in court. Eventually, however, respondent
abandoned the grave coercion case and stopped communicating with complainant.19 Failing to
reach respondent despite diligent efforts,20 complainant filed the instant administrative case before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1689.
Despite a directive21 from the IBP-CBD, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint. The
case was set for mandatory conference on November 24, 2006,22 which was reset twice,23 on
January 12, 2007 and February 2, 2007, due to the absence of respondent. The last notice sent to
respondent, however, was returned unserved for the reason "moved out."24 In view thereof,
Investigating Commissioner Tranquil S. Salvador III declared the mandatory conference terminated
and required the parties to submit their position papers, supporting documents, and affidavits.25
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On March 18, 2009, Investigating Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo)
issued a Report and Recommendation,26 observing that respondent failed to safeguard
complainant's legitimate interest and abandoned her in the grave coercion case. Commissioner
Magpayo pointed out that Bantegui is not legally obliged to honor complainant as subrogee of David
because complainant has yet to establish her kinship with David and, consequently, her interest in
Consulting Edge.27 Hence, the actions taken by respondent, such as the placing of paper seal on the
door of the company premises and the changing of its lock, were all uncalled for. Worse, when faced
16
with the counter legal measures to his actions, he abandoned his client's cause.28 Commissioner
Magpayo found that respondent’s acts evinced a lack of adequate preparation and mastery of the
applicable laws on his part, in violation of Canon 529 of the Code of Professional Responsibity
(Code), warranting his suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.30
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforementioned Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XX-2011-261 dated November 19, 2011 (November 19, 2011
Resolution), finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules.31
In a Resolution32 dated October 8, 2012, the Court noted the Notice of the IBP’s November 19, 2011
Resolution, and referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.33
The OBC's Report and Recommendation
On February 11, 2013, the OBC submitted a Report and Recommendation34 dated February 6, 2013,
concluding that respondent grossly neglected his duties to his client and failed to safeguard the
latter's rights and interests in wanton disregard of his duties as a lawyer.35 It deemed that the six-
month suspension from the practice of law as suggested by the IBP was an insufficient penalty and,
in lieu thereof, recommended that respondent be suspended for three years.36 Likewise, it ordered
respondent to return the ₱150,000.00 he received from complainant as acceptance fee.37
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the OBC.
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the relationship between a lawyer and his client is one
imbued with utmost trust and confidence. In this regard, clients are led to expect that lawyers
would be ever-mindful of their cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in
handling their affairs. For his part, the lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of
legal proficiency, and to devote his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.38 To this end, he is enjoined to employ
only fair and honest means to attain lawful objectives.39 These principles are embodied in Canon 17,
Rule 18.03 of Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code which respectively state:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 – A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
xxxx
Rule 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
xxxx
17
CANON 19 – A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 – A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his
client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal
charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
xxxx
Keeping with the foregoing rules, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise the required
diligence in handling complainant’s cause since he: first, failed to represent her competently and
diligently by acting and proffering professional advice beyond the proper bounds of law; and,
second, abandoned his client’s cause while the grave coercion case against them was pending.
Anent the first infraction, it bears emphasis that complainant's right over the properties of her
deceased husband, David, has yet to be sufficiently established. As such, the high-handed action
taken by respondent to enforce complainant's claim of ownership over the latter’s interest in
Consulting Edge – i.e., causing the change of the office door lock which thereby prevented the free
ingress and egress of the employees of the said company – was highly improper. Verily, a person
cannot take the law into his own hands, regardless of the merits of his theory. In the same light,
respondent's act of advising complainant to go into hiding in order to evade arrest in the criminal
case can hardly be maintained as proper legal advice since the same constitutes transgression of
the ordinary processes of law. By virtue of the foregoing, respondent clearly violated his duty to his
client to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking justice,40 in violation of Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of
the Code as above-quoted. To note further, since such courses of action were not only improper but
also erroneous, respondent equally failed to serve his client with competence and diligence in
violation of Canon 18 of the Code. In the same regard, he also remained unmindful of his client’s
trust in him – in particular, her trust that respondent would only provide her with the proper legal
advice in pursuing her interests – thereby violating Canon 17 of the Code.
With respect to the second infraction, records definitively bear out that respondent completely
abandoned complainant during the pendency of the grave coercion case against them; this
notwithstanding petitioner’s efforts to reach him as well as his receipt of the ₱150,000.00
acceptance fee. It is hornbook principle that a lawyer’s duty of competence and diligence includes
not merely reviewing the cases entrusted to his care or giving sound legal advice, but also consists
of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled hearings or
conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled cases with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination even without prodding from the client or the
court.41 Hence, considering respondent’s gross and inexcusable neglect by leaving his client totally
unrepresented in a criminal case, it cannot be doubted that he violated Canon 17, Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18, and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code.
In addition, it must be pointed out that respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint despite
due notice.1âwphi1 This demonstrates not only his lack of responsibility but also his lack of interest
in clearing his name, which, as case law directs, is constitutive of an implied admission of the
charges leveled against him.42 In fine, respondent should be held administratively liable for his
infractions as herein discussed. That said, the Court now proceeds to determine the appropriate
penalty to be imposed against respondent.
18
Several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable for gross negligence for infractions
similar to those committed by respondent were suspended from the practice of law for a period of
two years. In Jinon v. Jiz,43 a lawyer who neglected his client's case, misappropriated the client's
funds and disobeyed the IBP’s directives to submit his pleadings and attend the hearings was
suspended from the practice of law for two years. In Small v. Banares,44 the Court meted a similar
penalty against a lawyer who failed to render any legal service even after receiving money from the
complainant; to return the money and documents he received despite demand; to update his client
on the status of her case and respond to her requests for information; and to file an answer and
attend the mandatory conference before the IBP. Also, in Villanueva v. Gonzales,45 a lawyer who
neglected complainant’s cause; refused to immediately account for his client’s money and to return
the documents received; failed to update his client on the status of her case and to respond to her
requests for information; and failed to submit his answer and to attend the mandatory conference
before the IBP was suspended from the practice of law for two years. However, the Court observes
that, in the present case, complainant was subjected to a graver injury as she was prosecuted for
the crime of grave coercion largely due to the improper and erroneous advice of respondent. Were
it not for respondent’s imprudent counseling, not to mention his act of abandoning his client during
the proceedings, complainant would not have unduly suffered the harbors of a criminal
prosecution. Thus, considering the superior degree of the prejudice caused to complainant, the
Court finds it apt to impose against respondent a higher penalty of suspension from the practice of
law for a period of three years as recommended by the OBC.
In the same light, the Court sustains the OBC’s recommendation for the return of the ₱150,000.00
acceptance fee received by respondent from complainant since the same is intrinsically linked to
his professional engagement. While the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings
should only revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer’s administrative and not
his civil liability,46 it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities
which are purely civil in nature – for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the
lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement (such as the acceptance fee in this case). Hence, considering further that
the fact of respondent’s receipt of the ₱150,000.00 acceptance fee from complainant remains
undisputed,47 the Court finds the return of the said fee, as recommended by the OBC, to be in order.
WHEREFORE respondent Atty. Rustico B. Gagate is found guilty of violating Canon 17 Rule 18.03 of
Canon 18 and Rule 19.01 of Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three 3) years, effective upon the
finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Further, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Maria Cristina Zabaljauregui Pitcher the
₱150,000.00 acceptance fee he received from the latter within ninety (90) days from the finality of
this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more
severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
37. A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007
MA. LUISA HADJULA,complainant vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA,respondent
19
Under consideration is Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 of the Board of Governors, Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint for disbarment filed by herein complainant Ma.
Luisa Hadjula against respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda.
The case started when, in an AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT[1] bearing date September 7, 2002 and filed
with the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant charged Atty. Roceles F. Madianda with
violation of Article 209[2] of the Revised Penal Code and Canon Nos. 15.02 and 21.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
In said affidavit-complaint, complainant alleged that she and respondent used to be friends as they
both worked at the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) whereat respondent was the Chief Legal Officer
while she was the Chief Nurse of the Medical, Dental and Nursing Services. Complainant claimed
that, sometime in 1998, she approached respondent for some legal advice. Complainant further
alleged that, in the course of their conversation which was supposed to be kept confidential, she
disclosed personal secrets and produced copies of a marriage contract, a birth certificate and a
baptismal certificate, only to be informed later by the respondent that she (respondent) would refer
the matter to a lawyer friend. It was malicious, so complainant states, of respondent to have refused
handling her case only after she had already heard her secrets.
Continuing, complainant averred that her friendship with respondent soured after her filing, in the
later part of 2000, of criminal and disciplinary actions against the latter. What, per complainants
account, precipitated the filing was when respondent, then a member of the BFP promotion board,
demanded a cellular phone in exchange for the complainants promotion.
According to complainant, respondent, in retaliation to the filing of the aforesaid actions, filed a
COUNTER COMPLAINT[3] with the Ombudsman charging her (complainant) with violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019,[4] falsification of public documents and immorality, the last
two charges being based on the disclosures complainant earlier made to respondent. And also on
the basis of the same disclosures, complainant further stated, a disciplinary case was also instituted
against her before the Professional Regulation Commission.
Complainant seeks the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent for the latters act of disclosing
personal secrets and confidential information she revealed in the course of seeking respondents
legal advice.
In an order dated October 2, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline required respondent to
file her answer to the complaint.
In her answer, styled as COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT,[5] respondent denied giving legal advice to the
complainant and dismissed any suggestion about the existence of a lawyer-client relationship
between them. Respondent also stated the observation that the supposed confidential data
and sensitive documents adverted to are in factmatters of common knowledge in the BFP. The
relevant portions of the answer read:
5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in

paragraph 4 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT for reason that she never WAS MY
CLIENT nor we ever had any LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP that ever existed
20
ever since and that never obtained any legal advice from me regarding her
PERSONAL PROBLEMS or PERSONAL SECRETS. She likewise never delivered to me
legal documents much more told me some confidential information or secrets. That
is because I never entertain LEGAL QUERIES or CONSULTATION regarding
PERSONAL MATTERS since I know as a LAWYER of the Bureau of Fire Protection
that I am not allowed to privately practice law and it might also result to CONFLICT
OF INTEREST. As a matter of fact, whenever there will be PERSONAL MATTERS
referred to me, I just referred them to private law practitioners and never entertain
the same, NOR listen to their stories or examine or accept any document.
9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in

paragraph 8 of her AFFIDAVIT-COMPLAINT, the truth of the matter is that her
ILLICIT RELATIONSHIP and her illegal and unlawful activities are known in the
Bureau of Fire Protection since she also filed CHILD SUPPORT case against her lover
where she has a child .
Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me

sometime in 1998, are all part of public records .
Furthermore, F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA, is filing the instant case just
to get even with me or to force me to settle and withdraw the CASES I FILED
AGAINST HER since she knows that she will certainly be DISMISSED FROM SERVICE,
REMOVED FROM THE PRC ROLL and CRIMINALLY CONVICTED of her ILLICIT,
IMMORAL, ILLEGAL and UNLAWFUL ACTS.
On October 7, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline came
out with a Report and Recommendation, stating that the information related by complainant to the
respondent is protected under the attorney-client privilege communication. Prescinding from this
postulate, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have violated legal ethics when
she [revealed] information given to her during a legal consultation, and accordingly recommended
that respondent be reprimanded therefor, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent

Atty. Roceles Madianda be reprimanded for revealing the secrets of the complainant.
On November 4, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-472 reading as
follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A; and ,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering the actuation of revealing information
given to respondent during a legal consultation, Atty. Roceles Madianda is
hereby REPRIMANDED.
21
We AGREE with the recommendation and the premises holding it together.
As it were, complainant went to respondent, a lawyer who incidentally was also then a
friend, to bare what she considered personal secrets and sensitive documents for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and assistance. The moment complainant approached the then receptive
respondent to seek legal advice, a veritable lawyer-client relationship evolved between the two.
Such relationship imposes upon the lawyer certain restrictions circumscribed by the ethics of the
profession. Among the burdens of the relationship is that which enjoins the lawyer, respondent in
this instance, to keep inviolate confidential information acquired or revealed during legal
consultations. The fact that one is, at the end of the day, not inclined to handle the clients case is
hardly of consequence. Of little moment, too, is the fact that no formal professional engagement
follows the consultation. Nor will it make any difference that no contract whatsoever was executed
by the parties to memorialize the relationship. As we said in Burbe v. Magulta,[6] -
A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment

complainant asked respondent for legal advise regarding the formers business. To
constitute professional employment, it is not essential that the client employed the
attorney professionally on any previous occasion.
It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is

it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which
his service had been sought.
It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a

lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employments is established.
Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close

personal relationship between the lawyer and the complainant or the non-payment
of the formers fees.
Dean Wigmore lists the essential factors to establish the existence of the attorney-client privilege
communication, viz:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in
his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in
confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from
disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.[7]
With the view we take of this case, respondent indeed breached his duty of preserving the
confidence of a client. As found by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, the documents shown and
the information revealed in confidence to the respondent in the course of the legal consultation in
question, were used as bases in the criminal and administrative complaints lodged against the
complainant.
The purpose of the rule of confidentiality is actually to protect the client from possible breach of
confidence as a result of a consultation with a lawyer.
22
The seriousness of the respondents offense notwithstanding, the Court feels that there is room for
compassion, absent compelling evidence that the respondent acted with ill-will. Without meaning
to condone the error of respondents ways, what at bottom is before the Court is two former friends
becoming bitter enemies and filing charges and counter-charges against each other using whatever
convenient tools and data were readily available. Unfortunately, the personal information
respondent gathered from her conversation with complainant became handy in her quest to even
the score. At the end of the day, it appears clear to us that respondent was actuated by the urge to
retaliate without perhaps realizing that, in the process of giving vent to a negative sentiment, she
was violating the rule on confidentiality.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and

admonished to be circumspect in her handling of information acquired as a result of a lawyer-client
relationship. She is also STERNLY WARNED against a repetition of the same or similar act
complained of.
38. IPI No. 12-205-CA-J
BRION, J.:
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution[1] dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S.
Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we
also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia's counsel, to show cause why he should not be
cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adaza's explanation,[2] we find his account insufficient, and find him
guilty of indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect contempt as he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegia's counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice
Veloso's partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative
complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the
case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his
request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded.
Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client, especially when he
also believes in the merits of his client's case.
Atty. Adaza's explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince us
of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition
were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral
arguments of Merdegia's case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have
disposed of the issue of Justice Veloso's bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice
Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was allowed
to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.[3] Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza
doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for
23
certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that
administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other
judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling.[4]
While a lawyer has a duty to represent his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds
provided by law.[5] He is also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action
the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.[6]
A reading of Merdegia's administrative complaint[7] shows an apparent failure to understand that

cases are not always decided in one's favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an
extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case.[8] In
this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features
of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and
his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand of
him in acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to strike
a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with
the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and
enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of litigants
who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should we
shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people who decide
the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts
of erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative cases against them;
neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing so by a wrong signal from this Court
that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt when the complaints
they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case that,
when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his complaint is
merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza's penchant for filing
motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez
Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his client;
and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged
bias during the oral arguments on his case. These indicators, taken together with the baseless
administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order adverse to Atty. Adaza's
client, disclose that there was more to the administrative complaint than the report of legitimate
grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,[9] we cited a litigant in indirect contempt of
court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of
the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adaza's acts constitute an improper
conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
As a final note, Atty. Adaza's contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction as a
member of the bar.[10] If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are
prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8,
24
2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he should
not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty.
Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a disciplinary
action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense,
whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature of the charge
against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side.[11]
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,[12] a contempt proceeding
cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers,[13] and vice versa. There can be no
substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as officers of
the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals.
The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court.
The Court, in exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to
courts in general.[14] Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to
the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the
administration of justice;[15] thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that
constitute contempt of court.[16] Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal
and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to
contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer
be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an
accused's acquittal.[17]
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not
intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the
privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and
has, for its primary objective, public interest.[18] Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of
the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking
reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res
judicatato a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.[19]
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures.
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.[20]
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso,
and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this
judgment, a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on
his part may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.
39. GENEROSO SALIGUMBA et. Al v. MONICA PALANOG, G.R. No. 143365, DECEMBER 04, 2008
The Case
25
This is a petition for review of the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
5, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 5) in Civil Case No. 5288 for Revival of Judgment. The case is an
offshoot of the action for Quieting of Title with Damages in Civil Case No. 2570.
The Facts
Monica Palanog, assisted by her husband Avelino Palanog (spouses Palanogs), filed a complaint
dated 28 February 1977 for Quieting of Title with Damages against defendants, spouses
Valeria Saligumba and Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. (spouses Saligumbas), before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 3, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC-Branch 3). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 2570. In the
complaint, spouses Palanogs alleged that they have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous
possession as owners for more than 50 years of a parcel of land located in Solido, Nabas, Aklan. The
spouses Saligumbas allegedly prevented them from entering and residing on the subject premises
and had destroyed the barbed wires enclosing the land. Spouses Palanogs prayed that they be
declared the true and rightful owners of the land in question.
When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977,

Atty. Edilberto Miralles (Atty. Miralles), counsel for spouses Saligumbas, verbally moved for the
appointment of a commissioner to delimit the land in question. Rizalino Go, Deputy Sheriff of Aklan,
was appointed commissioner and was directed to submit his report and sketch within 30
days.[1] Present during the delimitation were spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas, and
Ernesto Saligumba, son of spouses Saligumbas.[2]
After submission of the Commissioners Report, spouses Palanogs, upon motion, were granted 10
days to amend their complaint to conform with the items mentioned in the report.[3]
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. At the hearing on 1 June 1984, only the counsel for
spouses Palanogs appeared. The trial court issued an order resetting the hearing to 15 August
1984 and likewise directed spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another counsel who
should be ready on that date.[4] The order sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was returned to the
court unserved with the notation PartyDeceased while the order sent to defendant
Valeria Saligumba was returned with the notation Party in Manila.[5]
At the hearing on 15 August 1984, spouses Palanogs direct examination was suspended and the
continuation of the hearing was set on 25 October 1984. The trial court stated that Atty. Miralles,
who had not withdrawn as counsel for spouses Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge, would be held responsible for the case of spouses Saligumbas until he
26
formally withdrew as counsel. The trial court reminded Atty. Miralles to secure the consent of
spouses Saligumbas for his withdrawal.[6] A copy of this order was sent to Valeria Saligumba but the
same was returned unserved with the notation Party in Manila.[7]
The hearing set on 25 October 1984 was reset to 25 January 1985 and the trial court directed that a
copy of this order be sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila.[8]
The presentation of evidence for spouses Palanogs resumed on 25 January 1985 despite the motion
of Atty. Miralles for postponement on the ground that his client was sick. The exhibits were
admitted and plaintiffs spouses Palanogs rested their case. Reception of evidence for the defendants
spouses Saligumbas was scheduled on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985.[9]
On 3 June 1985, only spouses Palanogs and counsel appeared. Upon motion of the
spouses Palanogs, spouses Saligumbas were deemed to have waived the presentation of their
evidence.
On 3 August 1987, after a lapse of more than two years, the trial court considered the case
submitted for decision.
On 7 August 1987, RTC-Branch 3 rendered a judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 declaring
spouses Palanogs the lawful owners of the subject land and ordering spouses Saligumbas, their
agents, representatives and all persons acting in privity with them to vacate the premises and
restore possession to spouses Palanogs.
The trial court, in a separate Order dated 7 August 1987, directed that a copy of the courts decision
be furnished plaintiff Monica Palanog and defendant Valeria Saligumba.
Thereafter, a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of the said decision was filed but the
trial court, in its Order dated 8 May 1997, ruled that since more than five years had elapsed after
the date of its finality, the decision could no longer be executed by mere motion.
Thus, on 9 May 1997, Monica Palanog (respondent), now a widow, filed a Complaint seeking to
revive and enforce the Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 which she claimed has
not been barred by the statute of limitations. She impleaded petitioners Generoso Saligumba and
Ernesto Saligumba, the heirs and children of the spouses Saligumbas, as defendants. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 5288 before the RTC-Branch 5.
27
Petitioner Generoso Saligumba, for himself and in representation of his brother Ernesto who was
out of the country working as a seaman, engaged the services of the Public Attorneys
Office, Kalibo, Aklan which filed a motion for time to allow them to file a responsive
pleading. Petitioner Generoso Saligumba filed his Answer[10]alleging that: (1) respondent had no
cause of action; (2) the spouses Saligumbas died while Civil Case No. 2570 was pending and no
order of substitution was issued and hence, the trial was null and void; and (3) the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the heirs of the spouses Saligumbas and therefore, the judgment was not
binding on them.
Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion

to implead additional defendants namely, Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumba, who are
also the heirs and children of spouses Saligumbas.[11] They were, however, declared in default on 1
October 1999 for failure to file any responsive pleading.[12]
The Trial Courts Ruling
On 24 May 2000, the RTC-Branch 5 rendered a decision in favor of respondent ordering the revival
of judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. The trial court ruled that the non-substitution of the deceased
spouses did not have any legal significance. The land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the
exclusive property of defendant Valeria Saligumba who inherited the same from her deceased
parents. The death of her husband, Eliseo Saligumba, Sr., did not change the complexion of the
ownership of the property that would require his substitution. The spouses Saligumbas children,
who are the petitioners in this case, had no right to the property while Valeria Saligumba was still
alive. The trial court further found that when defendant Valeria Saligumba died, her lawyer,
Atty. Miralles, did not inform the court of the death of his client. The trial court thus ruled that the
non-substitution of the deceased defendant was solely due to the negligence of counsel. Moreover,
petitioner Ernesto Saligumba could not feign ignorance of Civil Case No. 2570 as he was present
during the delimitation of the subject land. The trial court likewise held that the decision in Civil
Case No. 2570 could not be the subject of a collateral attack. There must be a direct action for the
annulment of the said decision.
Petitioners elevated the matter directly to this Court. Hence, the present petition.
The Courts Ruling
The instant case is an action for revival of judgment and the judgment sought to be revived in this
case is the decision in the action for quieting of title with damages in Civil Case No. 2570. This is not
one for annulment of judgment.
28
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years without it being
executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to re-open any issue affecting the
merits of the judgment debtors case nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment.[13] An
action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different and distinct from either
the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case, wherein the cause of action is the decision
itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered.[14] Revival of judgment is premised on the assumption that the decision to be revived,
either by motion or by independent action, is already final and executory.[15]
The RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 had been rendered final
and executory by the lapse of time with no motion for reconsideration nor appeal having been
filed. While it may be true that the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570 may be revived and its execution
may be had, the issue now before us is whether or not execution of judgment can be issued against
petitioners who claim that they are not bound by the RTC-Branch 3 Decision dated 7 August
1987 in Civil Case No. 2570.
Petitioners contend that the RTC-Branch 3 Decision of 7 August 1987 in Civil Case No. 2570 is null
and void since there was no proper substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas despite the
trial courts knowledge that the deceased spouses Saligumbas were no longer represented by
counsel. They argue that they were deprived of due process and justice was not duly served on
them.
Petitioners argue that the trial court even acknowledged the fact of death of
spouses Saligumbas but justified the validity of the decision rendered in that case despite lack of
substitution because of the negligence or fault of their counsel. Petitioners contend that the duty of
counsel for the deceased spouses Saligumbas to inform the court of the death of his clients and to
furnish the name and address of the executor, administrator, heir or legal representative of the
decedent under Rule 3 presupposes adequate or active representation by counsel. However, the
relation of attorney and client was already terminated by the appointment of counsel on record,
Atty. Miralles, as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge even before the deaths of the
spouses Saligumbas were known. Petitioners invoke the Order of 1 June 1984 directing the
spouses Saligumbas to secure the services of another lawyer to replace Atty. Miralles. The
registered mail containing that order was returned to the trial court with the notation
that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. was deceased. Petitioners thus question the decision in Civil Case No.
2570 as being void and of no legal effect because their parents were not duly represented by
counsel of record. Petitioners further argue that they have never taken part in the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 2570 nor did they voluntarily appear or participate in the case. It is unfair to bind
them in a decision rendered against their deceased parents. Therefore, being a void judgment, it has
no legal nor binding effect on petitioners.
Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title with damages which is an action involving real
property. It is an action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87[16] as the claim is not
extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in an action that survives, Section 17 of
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court[17] provides for the procedure, thus:
29
Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies and the claim is not thereby
extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of
the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of
thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative
fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure
the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be
specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on
behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The
heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without
requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a party, and upon proper notice, it is the
duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the
deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after receiving an informal notice of death
by the mere notation in the envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal representative or
heir of the deceased. There was no court order for deceaseds legal representative or heir to appear,
nor did any such legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the deceased.
Neither did the respondent ever procure the appointment of such legal representative, nor did the
heirs ever ask to be substituted.
It appears that Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984 while Valeria Saligumba died on 2
February 1985. No motion for the substitution of the spouses was filed nor an order issued for the
substitution of the deceased spouses Saligumbas in Civil Case No. 2570. Atty. Miralles and
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr., despite notices sent to them to appear, never confirmed the death
of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. and Valeria Saligumba. The record is bereft of any evidence proving the
death of the spouses, except the mere notations in the envelopes enclosing the trial courts orders
which were returned unserved.
Section 17 is explicit that the duty of the court to order the legal representative or heir to appear
arises only upon proper notice. The notation Party-Deceased on the unserved notices could not be
the proper notice contemplated by the rule. As the trial court could not be expected to know or take
judicial notice of the death of a party without the proper manifestation from counsel, the trial court
was well within its jurisdiction to proceed as it did with the case. Moreover, there is no showing
that the courts proceedings were tainted with irregularities.[18]
Likewise, the plaintiff or his attorney or representative could not be expected to know of the death
of the defendant if the attorney for the deceased defendant did not notify the plaintiff or his
attorney of such death as required by the rules.[19] The judge cannot be blamed for sending copies of
the orders and notices to defendants spouses in the absence of proof of death or manifestation to
that effect from counsel.[20]
30
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court likewise expressly provides:
SEC. 16. Duty of attorney upon death, incapacity or incompetency of party. - Whenever
a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the
duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity
or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative.
It is the duty of counsel for the deceased to inform the court of the death of his client. The failure of
counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to
inform the court of the death of his client and the non-substitution of such party will not invalidate
the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action survives the death of such party. The
decision rendered shall bind the partys successor-in-interest.[21]
The rules operate on the presumption that the attorney for the deceased party is in a better
position than the attorney for the adverse party to know about the death of his client and to inform
the court of the name and address of his legal representative.[22]
Atty. Miralles continued to represent the deceased spouses even after the latters demise. Acting on
their behalf, Atty. Miralles even asked for postponement of the hearings and did not even confirm
the death of his clients nor his appointment as Municipal Circuit Trial Court judge. These clearly
negate petitioners contention that Atty. Miralles ceased to be spouses Saligumbas counsel.
Atty. Miralles still remained the counsel of the spouses Saligumbas despite the alleged appointment
as judge. Records show that when Civil Case No. 2570 was called for trial on 25 October 1984,
Atty. Miralles appeared and moved for a postponement. The 25 October 1984 Order reads:
ORDER
Upon petition of Judge Miralles who is still the counsel on record of this case and
who is held responsible for anything that will happen in this case, postpone the
hearing of this case to JANUARY 25, 1985 AT 8:30 in the morning. x x x[23]
The trial court issued an Order dated 1 June 1984 directing the defendants to secure the services of
another counsel. This order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. by registered mail but the same was
returned with the notation Party-Deceased while the notice to Valeria Saligumba was returned with
the notation Party in Manila.[24]Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. died on 18 February 1984. When
Atty. Miralles appeared in court on 25 October 1984, he did not affirm nor inform the court of the
death of his client. There was no formal substitution. The trial court issued an order resetting the
hearing to 25 January 1985 and directed that a copy of the order be furnished
petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. at COA, PNB, Manila by registered mail.[25] When the case was called
31
on 25 January 1985, Atty. Miralles sought for another postponement on the ground that his client
was sick and under medical treatment in Manila.[26] Again, there was no manifestation from counsel
about the death of Eliseo Saligumba, Sr. The trial court issued an Order dated 25 January
1985 setting the reception of evidence for the defendants on 3, 4, and 5 June 1985. A copy of this
order was sent to Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. by registered mail. Nonetheless, as the trial court in Civil
Case No. 5288 declared, the non-substitution of EliseoSaligumba, Sr. did not have any legal
significance as the land subject of Civil Case No. 2570 was the exclusive property of
Valeria Saligumba who inherited it from her deceased parents.
This notwithstanding, when Valeria Saligumba died on 2 February 1985, Atty. Miralles again did not
inform the trial court of the death of Valeria Saligumba. There was no formal substitution nor
submission of proof of death of Valeria Saligumba. Atty. Miralles was remiss in his duty under
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The counsel of record is obligated to protect his
clients interest until he is released from his professional relationship with his client. For its part, the
court could recognize no other representation on behalf of the client except such counsel of record
until a formal substitution of attorney is effected.[27]
An attorney must make an application to the court to withdraw as counsel, for the relation does not
terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record; at least, so far as the opposite party is
concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation.[28] Unless properly
relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case.[29] Until his withdrawal shall have
been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is expected by his client as well as by the
court to do what the interests of his client require. He must still appear on the date of hearing for
the attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal of record.[30]
Petitioners should have questioned immediately the validity of the proceedings absent any formal
substitution. Yet, despite the courts alleged lack of jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners,
petitioners never bothered to challenge the same, and in fact allowed the proceedings to go on until
the trial court rendered its decision. There was no motion for reconsideration, appeal or even an
action to annul the judgment in Civil Case No. 2570. Petitioners themselves could not feign
ignorance of the case since during the pendency of Civil Case No. 2570, petitioner
Ernesto Saligumba, son of the deceased spouses, was among the persons present during the
delimitation of the land in question before the Commissioner held on 5 November
1977.[31] Petitioner Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. was likewise furnished a copy of the trial courts orders and
notices. It was only the Answer filed by petitioner Generoso Saligumba in Civil Case No. 5288 that
confirmed the dates when the spouses Saligumbas died and named the latters
children. Consequently, Atty. Miralles was responsible for the conduct of the case since he had not
been properly relieved as counsel of record. His acts bind his clients and the latters successors-in-
interest.
In the present case for revival of judgment, the other petitioners have not shown much interest in
the case. Petitioners Eliseo Saligumba, Jr. and Eduardo Saligumbawere declared in default for
failure to file their answer. Petitioner Ernesto Saligumba was out of the country working as a
seaman. Only petitioner GenerosoSaligumba filed an Answer to the complaint. The petition filed in
this Court was signed only by petitioner Generoso Saligumba as someone signed on behalf of
petitioner Ernesto Saligumba without the latters authority to do so.
32
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 24 May 2000 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 5, Kalibo, Aklan in Civil Case No. 5288. Costs against petitioners.
40. G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009
ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, Petitioner,

vs.
EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA T. DY and NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, Respondents.
Before Us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Resolution2 dated 31 October 2006, Decision3 dated 29 January 2007, and
Resolution4 dated 27 September 2007, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946.
The facts culled from the records are as follows:
On 26 September 1978, the National Power Corporation Board of Directors (NAPOCOR Board),
pursuant to its specific power and duty to fix the compensation, allowance and benefits of the
NAPOCOR employees under Section 6(c) of Republic Act No. 6395, as amended, passed Resolution
No. 78-119 approving the grant of a monthly welfare allowance equivalent to 10% of an employee’s
basic pay to all NAPOCOR employees effective 1 October 1978.5Pursuant thereto, the NAPOCOR
Welfare Plan Committee, renamed and reconstituted later on as the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund Board
of Trustees (NAPOCOR-WFBT), issued and promulgated a charter for the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund
which includes the following provisions:
ARTICLE VII
TERMINATION/AMENDMENT OF THE PLAN
"Section 1. Termination/Amendment of the Plan – The Board of Directors may amend, revise,
repeal any or all of the provisions herein contained and/or terminate the Plan, subject to the
pertinent provisions of the Trust Agreement.
Section 2. Payment of Member’s share – In the event of termination of the Plan, the balance to the
credit of each member and the General Reserve for Employee Benefits shall be paid to the members
in full. The accumulated amount in the General Reserve for Employee Benefits shall be distributed
among the members in the proportion to the amount outstanding to their credit as of the time of
termination.6
The NAPOCOR Board subsequently passed Resolution No. 82-172 fixing a NAPOCOR employee’s
contribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in a sum equivalent to 5% of his basic pay.7
Almost two decades thereafter, on 8 June 2001, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise
known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA). EPIRA directed the restructuring of the
power industry which includes the reorganization of NAPOCOR. Following the directive of EPIRA,
the NAPOCOR Board passed Resolution No. 2003-43 on 26 March 2003 abolishing the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund Department and other departments, and dissolving the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund upon
33
the effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001.8 Consequently, some of the employees in the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund Department and in other departments (who were also members of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund) resigned, retired or separated from service. Thereafter, the liquidation and
dissolution process for the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund commenced.
On 11 May 2004, the NAPOCOR-WFBT, with authority from the Commission on Audit, approved
Resolution No. 2004-001 authorizing the release of ₱184 million (which represented 40% of the
liquid assets of NAPOCOR Welfare Fund in the total amount of ₱462 million as of 16 April 2004) for
distribution to the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund members who resigned, retired, or separated upon the
effectivity of EPIRA on 26 June 2001 (EPIRA separated members).9
Pursuant to Resolution No. 2004-001, herein respondent Edmund P. Anguluan (Anguluan), as Ex-
Officio Chairman of NAPOCOR-WFBT, issued a memorandum on 17 May 2004 to implement the
release of ₱184 million only to the EPIRA separated members to the exclusion of the NAPOCOR
employees (who were also members of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund) who have resigned, retired, or
separated prior to the effectivity of EPIRA (non-EPIRA separated members).10
This prompted Mrs. Perla A. Segovia (Segovia), former Vice-President of Human Resources and
Administration and former Ex-Officio Chairman of the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in behalf of the 559 non-
EPIRA separated members and in her own personal capacity, to write a letter to Mr. Rogelio M.
Murga, then NAPOCOR President, demanding their equal shares in the remaining assets of the
NAPOCOR Welfare Fund and access to information and records thereof.11
On 13 July 2004, there being no action or response on her letter, Segovia, together with Mrs. Emma
C. Baysic (Baysic), former President of the NAPOCOR Employees Association and former member of
the NAPOCOR-WFBT, in their personal capacities and on behalf of the 559 non-EPIRA separated
members, filed with the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 217, a Petition
for Mandamus, Accounting and Liquidation with a Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order and Injunction against respondents NAPOCOR, the NAPOCOR Board, Anguluan (as NAPOCOR
Vice-President, Human Resources, Administration and Finance Department) and Lorna T. Dy (as
NAPOCOR Senior Department Manager on Finance).12 The Petition was docketed as Civil Case No.
Q04-53121.
Segovia, Baysic and the 559 non-EPIRA separated members were represented in Civil Case No. Q04-
53121 by petitioner Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio under a "Legal Retainer Agreement"13 dated 1
September 2004, pertinent portions of which are reproduced below:
SUBJECT: Petition for Mandamus with Damages Temporary Restraining Order/Injunction, etc. with
the Court "NPC RETIREES versus NPC, NP Board of Directors, et. al. before the RTC Quezon City for
the payment/settlement of their claims for NPC Welfare Fund (P462 Million assets and other assets
liquid or non-liquid).
Dear Ms. Segovia and Ms. Baysic:
In connection with the above-stated subject, hereunder are our terms and conditions, to wit:
1. No acceptance fee;
34
2. All costs of litigation ([filing] and docket fees, etc.), miscellaneous and out-of-pocket
expenses the prosecution of said action shall be for the account of the clients;
3. No appearance/meeting fee;
4. Contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amounts/value of assets

(liquid and/or non-liquid) are recovered;
5. This Retainer Agreement serves as Legal Authority for the Law Firm to receive and/or
collect its contingency/success fee without further demand.
On 22 February 2006, the parties in the above-mentioned case, duly assisted by their respective
counsels, executed a Compromise Agreement14 whereby they agreed to amicably settle their
dispute under the following terms and conditions:
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
xxxx
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed to settle the instant case amicably.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the parties herein have agreed as follows:
1. Both the NPC EPIRA separated members (those members of the Welfare Fund
affected by the EPIRA law and ceased to be members of the Welfare Fund anytime
from June 26, 2001 [effectivity of the EPIRA LAW] to March 1, 2003 [implementation
of the EPIRA law and date of abolition of the Welfare Fund]) and NPC non-EPIRA
separated members (those who ceased to be members of the Fund prior to June 26,
2001) are entitled to "Earnings Differential" of the NPC Welfare Fund;
2. "Corrected Earnings Differential" refers to a benefit which is a result of re-

computation of Member’s Equity Contributions and Earnings using the correct rates
of return vis-à-vis what was used when they were separated. Period covered by the
discrepancy is from 1989 to 2003. Hence, affected are WF members separated
anytime within the period 1989 to 2003;
xxxx
4. The Corrected Earnings Differential of all affected WF separated members shall earn 6%
legal interest per annum computed from the separation of the members from service up to
March 31, 2006 for all the non-EPIRA separated members and May 31, 2006 for the EPIRA
separated members;
5. As of March 2006, the estimated Corrected Earnings Differential for the non-EPIRA
separated members is ₱119.196 Million while for the EPIRA separated members is
₱173.589 Million or a total of ₱292.785 Million, inclusive of the 6% legal interest;
6. In conformity with the Retainer Agreement dated September 1, 2004 between Mrs.
Perla A. Segovia, Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic and Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio; and Irrevocable
35
Special Power of Attorney dated July 20, 2005 executed by Mrs. Perla A. Segovia and
Mrs. Emma Y. Baysic in favor of Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, counsel for petitioners,
(copies attached as Annexes "A" and "B" respectively), 15% attorney’s fees shall be
deducted from the corresponding Corrected Earnings Differential of those non-EPIRA
separated members who have already executed the corresponding Special Power of
Attorney/Written Authority for the deduction/payment of said attorney’s fees, and
shall be paid to V.V. Orocio and Associates Law Office, represented by Atty. Victoriano
V. Orocio, as compensation for his legal services as counsel for the non-EPIRA
separated members subject to deduction of applicable taxes;
xxxx
15. The parties herein shall exert their best effort in order that the terms and conditions of
this agreement are implemented and complied with in the spirit of fairness, transparency
and equity;
16. This Agreement is not contrary to law, good customs, public order or public policy and is
voluntarily entered into by the parties of their own free will.15
The parties filed with the RTC the very next day, 23 February 2006, a Joint Motion before the RTC
for the approval of their Compromise Agreement.16 The RTC rendered a Decision on 3 April 2006
granting the parties’ Joint Motion and approving the said Compromise Agreement.17
On 10 April 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for Approval of Charging (Attorney’s) Lien.
Petitioner asked the RTC to issue an order declaring him entitled to collect an amount equivalent to
15% of the monies due the non-EPIRA separated members as his attorney’s fees in conformity with
the Compromise Agreement.18 In an Order dated 15 May 2006, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion
and decreed that he is entitled to collect the amount so demanded.19
On 20 June 2006, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution of
the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006.20 Respondents opposed the motion on the ground that there
was no stipulation in the Compromise Agreement to the effect that petitioner is entitled to collect
an amount equivalent to 15% of the monies due the non-EPIRA separated members. Respondents
contended that the amount of ₱119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members under the
compromise agreement was a mere estimate and, as such, cannot be validly used by petitioner as
basis for his claim of 15% attorney’s fees.21
The RTC issued an Order on 25 July 2006 granting petitioner’s Motion22 and, accordingly, a Writ of
Execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006 was issued on 26 July 2006. Pursuant to the said
Writ of Execution, RTC Branch Sheriff Reynaldo B. Madoloria (Sheriff Madoloria) issued a Notice of
Garnishment to Ms. Aurora Arenas (Arenas), Assistant Vice-President and Business Manager of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB)-NAPOCOR Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City, and to Mr.
Emmanuel C. Mendoza (Mendoza), Unit Head of the Landbank of the Philippines-NAPOCOR
Extension Office, Diliman, Quezon City.23
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006.24
On 12 August 2006, Sheriff Madoloria served to Arenas an "Order for Delivery of Money."25
36
Respondents Anguluan and Dy filed before the Court of Appeals on 22 August 2006 a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95786, assailing the
RTC Order dated 25 July 2006 and praying that a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the implementation of the said RTC order.26 Respondent
NAPOCOR filed with the Court of Appeals on the same date another Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95946, also challenging the RTC Order
dated 25 July 2006 and praying that it be set aside and a temporary restraining order and/or a writ
of preliminary injunction be issued prohibiting the RTC from enforcing the said order and the
corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment.27 Subsequently, respondent NAPOCOR
filed a Motion to Consolidate CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 with CA-G.R. SP No. 95786 which was granted by
the appellate court.28
On 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution granting respondents’ application for
a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. It enjoined the RTC from implementing its Order dated 25
July 2006 and the corresponding writ of execution and notice of garnishment during the pendency
of CA-G.R. SP No. 95946 and No. 95786. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
resolution.29
On 29 January 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision annulling and setting aside: (1)
the RTC Order dated 25 July 2006; (2) the corresponding Writ of Execution dated 26 July 2006; (3)
the Notice of Garnishment dated 28 July 2006; and (4) Order for Delivery of Money dated 10 August
2006. It also held that petitioner was entitled only to an amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as attorney’s fees
on the basis of quantum meruit.
The Court of Appeals held that the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 sought to be collected by petitioner as
attorney’s fees, equivalent to 15% of the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential
for non-EPIRA separated members, was excessive based on the following reasons: (1) the corrected
earnings differential in the amount of ₱119,196,000.00 due the non-EPIRA separated members was
a mere estimate and was hypothetical. Thus, petitioner was unjustified in using said amount as
basis for his 15% attorney’s fees; (2) there was hardly any work by petitioner since (a) the
compromise agreement was reached without trial or hearing on the merits; (b) there was no issue
regarding the release and distribution of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund to the non-EPIRA separated
members as the enactment of EPIRA, not the efforts of petitioner, made such distribution possible;
(c) there was no issue on how much each non-EPIRA separated members would receive because
the amount of their respective contribution was duly recorded by the respondents; (d) respondents
have already distributed the corrected earnings differential to some non-EPIRA separated
members, and have given petitioner his corresponding partial attorney’s fees amounting to
₱3,512,007.32; (e) most of the non-EPIRA separated members have not yet received their share
under the compromise agreement but petitioner, who was merely their agent, was already given
partial payment as attorney’s fees; (f) the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 represents "only less than one
fourth partial release of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund which means that the equivalent of three-fourths
more would be demanded [by petitioner] in the future;" and (3) the money claim of the non-EPIRA
separated members was settled through a compromise agreement and not won by petitioner in a
trial on the merits.
The Court of Appeals determined that petitioner was entitled only to an amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as
attorney’s fees on the basis of quantum meruit. However, since petitioner already received
₱3,512,007.32 from respondents as partial payment of his supposed 15% attorney’s fees, it ruled
37
that such amount was more than sufficient and petitioner was not entitled to claim anymore the
additional amount of ₱14,282,565.38. The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed July 25, 2006 Order, the July 26, 2006 Writ of
Execution, the July 28, 2006 Notice of Garnishment, and the August 10, 2006 Order of Delivery of
Money are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one is ordered, CAPPING at
₱3,512,007.32, the amount manifested to have already been received from the welfare fund as
attorneys fees, as the maximum amount that may be billed or collected as attorneys fees from the
whole welfare fund – which amount is NOTED to have already exceeded what this court had fixed at
₱1,000,000.00 as the reasonable amount, on quantum meruit, that may be collected as attorneys’
fees, pursuant to the guidelines codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.30
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned Decision but this was denied by
the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated 27 September 2007.31
Hence, petitioner brought the instant petition before us assigning the following errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENTS EDMUND P. ANGULUAN, LORNA
T. DY AND NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) ARE ENTITLED TO [PRELIMINARY]
INJUNCTION AS THEY HAVE MATERIAL AND SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS, WHICH ARE CLEAR AND
UNMISTAKABLE, i.e. RIGHTS OF BEING CLIENTS TO QUESTION THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
ATTORNEY’S FEES OF A LAWYER. THIS ALLEGED RIGHT IS NON-EXISTENT AND IN FACT
FABRICATED CONSIDERING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE NOT THE CLIENTS AT ALL OF
PETITIONER, ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO;
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FIFTEEN PERCENT (15%)
CONTINGENCY/SUCCESS FEE OF PETITIONER VICTORIANO V. OROCIO IS UNCONSCIONABLE AND
UNREASONABLE DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE SAID ATTORNEY’S FEES IS AMONG
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF A JUDICIALLY APPROVED COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND
COURT ORDER APPROVING HIS CHARGING LIEN, WHICH AGREEMENT AND ORDER HAVE
ALREADY BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.32
In his first assigned error, petitioner assails the Resolution dated 31 October 2006 of the Court of
Appeals granting respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.lawphil.net He claims
that the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents because
petitioner allegedly violated respondents’ material and substantial right as petitioner’s clients to
pay only reasonable attorney’s fees. Petitioner asserts that none of the respondents is his client in
the present case; that even respondents themselves have not alleged or claimed that they are his
clients; that the amount of attorney’s fees he claimed was chargeable on a portion of the NAPOCOR
Welfare Fund due his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees; that if anyone would be injured
by his claim of attorney’s fees, it would be his clients, the non-EPIRA separated employees, and not
respondents; that none of his clients has questioned or complained about the amount of attorney’s
fees he is claiming; that respondents are not the real parties-in-interest and at most are merely
nominal parties-in-interest; that as mere nominal parties-in-interest, respondents are not entitled
38
to a writ of preliminary injunction under the Rules of Court; and that the requisites for the proper
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are lacking in the instant case.33
In its Resolution dated 31 October 2006, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ application for
a writ of preliminary injunction based on the following reasons:
This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima facie established [their] compliance with
strict requirements for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in this case. Under the leading
case of Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, 352 SCRA 72 (2001), the requisites of preliminary injunction
are as follows: (a) the invasion of the right of [herein respondents] is material and substantial; (b)
the right of [herein respondents] is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and
paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious irreparable damage to [herein respondents].
The right of [herein respondents] alleged to have been invaded is that a client has the right
to pay only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees and only for services actually rendered –
which is clearly and unmistakably available to all clients. What [herein respondents] are claiming is
a material and substantial right. This Court finds that [herein respondents] have prima
facie established an urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for, to avoid irreparable injury to [herein respondents]. x x x.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, the basis of the Court of Appeals in granting the writ was
petitioner’s alleged violation or invasion of respondents’ right, as petitioner’s clients, to pay only a
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to, and only for services actually rendered by, petitioner.
The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.
It should be made clear that petitioner is the counsel for the non-EPIRA separated members in the
latter’s quest to claim their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Petitioner was never hired or
employed by respondents as their counsel in the cases at bar. Respondents themselves do not claim
or allege that they are clients of petitioner. In fact, petitioner is representing the non-EPIRA
separated members, the opposing party to the respondents in the present cases.
Further, the amount of attorney’s fees being claimed by petitioner is chargeable to the
₱119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members.
Respondents have actually partially distributed such amount to some non-EPIRA separated
members pursuant to the Compromise Agreement. In other words, the non-EPIRA separated
members are the lawful owners/beneficiaries of the amount from which petitioner’s attorney’s fees
had been and shall be taken.
Hence, if anyone would be injured by petitioner’s claim for attorney’s fees, it would be his clients,
the non-EPIRA separated members, and not respondents. It appears, however, that none of the non-
EPIRA separated members has questioned or complained about petitioner’s claim for attorney’s
fees.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular
act or acts.34 A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit, as
well as a preservative remedy issued to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or
the relations between the parties during the pendency of the suit.35For a writ of preliminary
39
injunction to issue, the applicant is tasked to establish and convincingly show the following: (1) a
right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected; (2) a violation of that right; and (3)
there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.36
A clear legal right means one clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of
law.37 The existence of a right violated is a prerequisite to the granting of a writ of preliminary
injunction.38 A writ of preliminary injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse and which
may never arise.39 It may be issued only if the applicant has clearly shown an actual existing right
that should be protected during the pendency of the principal action.40 In the absence of a clear
legal right, or when the applicant’s right or title is doubtful or disputed, preliminary injunction is
not proper.41
It is evident from the foregoing that respondents do not have a clear right or right in esse to pay
only a reasonable amount of attorney’s fees to the petitioner because such right belongs solely to
petitioner’s clients, the non-EPIRA separated members. There can be no violation of a right which
does not exist in the first place. Also, there was no necessity for the writ of preliminary injunction
since the non-EPIRA separated members do not claim any damage or injury caused by the
execution of the RTC Order dated 15 May 2006. Even assuming that respondents would probably
suffer damages as administrators or custodians of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund if the writ of
preliminary injunction was not granted, our ruling would still be the same. We have held that the
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.42Given these considerations, we hold that the issuance
by the Court of Appeals of a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of respondents in its Resolution,
dated 31 October 2006, was improper.lawphil.net
With regard to his second assigned error, petitioner maintained that his claim for attorney’s fees
equivalent to 15% of the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-
EPIRA separated members was not unreasonable or unconscionable because such amount was
expressly agreed upon in the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated members
and respondents. The Compromise Agreement was submitted to the RTC for approval through the
joint motion of the non-EPIRA separated members and respondents, and the RTC had rendered a
final and executory decision approving the same. By virtue of res judicata, the Court of Appeals
cannot alter or change the terms of the Compromise Agreement by prohibiting petitioner from
collecting his stipulated amount of attorney’s fees.43
Petitioner also avers that the amount of ₱17,794,572.70, which is equivalent to 15% of the
₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-EPIRA separated members
from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is already the total, not partial, amount he is claiming as
attorney’s fees; that the ₱119,196,000.00 estimated corrected earnings differential due the non-
EPIRA separated members from the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund is not hypothetical, such amount
having been actually computed and fixed by respondents themselves without the participation of
petitioner and his clients, the non-EPIRA separated members; that he did a lot of legal work and
utilized his legal skills on discovery procedures to force respondents to enter into the Compromise
Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated members; that the passage of EPIRA merely paved the
way for the distribution of the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; that if not for his
legal work and skills, the non-EPIRA separated members would not have received their lawful
shares in the remaining assets of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; and that his claim for 15% attorney’s
fees is supported by jurisprudence.44
40
An attorney’s fee, in its ordinary concept, refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer
for the legal services he has rendered to a client.45 The client and his lawyer may enter into a
written contract whereby the latter would be paid attorney’s fees only if the suit or litigation ends
favorably to the client. This is called a contingency fee contract. The amount of attorney’s fees in
this contract may be on a percentage basis, and a much higher compensation is allowed in
consideration of the risk that the lawyer may get nothing if the suit fails.46 In the case at bar, the
non-EPIRA separated members and petitioner voluntarily entered into a contingency fee contract
whereby petitioner did not receive any acceptance fee or appearance/meeting fee. The non-EPIRA
separated members expressly agreed to pay petitioner "contingency or success fees of fifteen
percent (15%) of whatever amount/value of assets (liquid and/or non-liquid)" recovered; and
authorized petitioner’s law firm "to receive and/or collect its contingency/success fee without
further demand."
Contingent fee contracts are permitted in this jurisdiction because they redound to the benefit of
the poor client and the lawyer "especially in cases where the client has meritorious cause of action,
but no means with which to pay for legal services unless he can, with the sanction of law, make a
contract for a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of litigation. Oftentimes, the contingent
fee arrangement is the only means by which the poor clients can have their rights vindicated and
upheld." Further, such contracts are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.47
However, in cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer is tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.48
A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily

controls the amount of fees that the contracting lawyer may be allowed, unless the court finds such
stipulated amount to be unreasonable or unconscionable. If the stipulated amount for attorney’s
fees is excessive, the contract may be disregarded even if the client expressed their conformity
thereto.49 Attorney’s fees are unconscionable if they affront one’s sense of justice, decency or
reasonableness, or if they are so disproportionate to the value of the services rendered. In such a
case, courts are empowered to reduce the attorney’s fee or fix a reasonable amount thereof taking
into consideration the surrounding circumstances and the established parameters.50
The principle of quantum meruit (as much as he deserves) may be a basis for determining the
reasonable amount of attorney’s fees. Quantum meruit is a device to prevent undue enrichment
based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without paying for it.
It is applicable even if there was a formal written contract for attorney’s fees as long as the agreed
fee was found by the court to be unconscionable. In fixing a reasonable compensation for the
services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit, factors such as the time spent, and
extent of services rendered; novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; importance of the
subject matter; skill demanded; probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of
the proferred case; customary charges for similar services; amount involved in the controversy and
the benefits resulting to the client; certainty of compensation; character of employment; and
professional standing of the lawyer, may be considered.51
It appears that the non-EPIRA separated members chose petitioner as their counsel because the
latter, as former member of the NAPOCOR-WFBT for two terms or four years, is familiar and
knowledgeable on the operation of the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund.52 Yet, according to the contingency
41
fee contract agreement between petitioner and the non-EPIRA separated members, petitioner
received no acceptance fee and appearance/meeting fee when he took on the non-EPIRA separated
members’ case. Petitioner’s attorney’s fees were absolutely dependent on the success of non-EPIRA
separated members’ claim on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund. Despite these circumstances, petitioner
worked diligently in advocating the claims of the non-EPIRA separated members against
respondents as shown by the following: (1) petitioner took pains in verifying the identity and claim
of each of the 559 non-EPIRA separated members on the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (2) petitioner
prepared and filed a well-researched and well-argued petition with the RTC for the claims of the
non-EPIRA separated members;53 (3) he prepared and presented several witnesses and numerous
pertinent documents before the RTC in support of their application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondents’ plan to exclude the
non-EPIRA separated members from receiving their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund; (4) he
participated, as non-EPIRA separated members’ counsel, in the conduct of several hearings
regarding the said application for the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction;54 (5) he obtained a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction from the RTC which enjoined/prohibited respondents from excluding the non-EPIRA
separated members from their shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund;55 (6) he held numerous
conferences with the non-EPIRA separated members wherein he apprised the latter of the status of
their claims and his legal strategies pertinent thereto;56 and (7) he exerted utmost efforts which
eventually led to the execution of the Compromise Agreement between the non-EPIRA separated
members and respondents.
By reason of petitioner’s dedication and persistence as can be gleaned above, respondents finally
agreed to settle amicably with the non-EPIRA separated members as regards the latter’s claim for
shares in the NAPOCOR Welfare Fund by virtue of the Compromise Agreement.
Undoubtedly, were it not for petitioner’s vigilance and zeal, respondents would not have executed
the Compromise Agreement with the non-EPIRA separated members. Hence, it is fair to conclude
that petitioner was entitled to a reasonably high compensation.
However, petitioner’s attorney’s fees in the amount of ₱17,794,572.70 or equivalent to 15% of the ₱
119,196,000.00 corrected earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated members should be
equitably reduced.
In NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. The National Power Corporation
(NPC),57 we awarded separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus backwages to several NPC
employees because they were illegally dismissed by the NPC. The NPC employees were represented
by a certain Atty. Cornelio P. Aldon (Atty. Aldon) and Atty. Victoriano V. Orocio, (the petitioner in
the instant cases) under a legal retainer agreement which provides: (1) no acceptance fee; (2)
miscellaneous/out of pocket expenses in the amount of ₱25,000.00; and (3) twenty-five percent (25%)
of whatever amounts/monies are recovered in favor of said NPC personnel contingent on the success
of the case. Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio filed a Motion for Approval of Charging (Attorney’s) Lien
pursuant to the legal retainer agreement. Although we granted the said motion, we reduced the
amount of attorney’s fees which was chargeable on the monies recoverable by the NPC employees
from 25% to 10% because:
While we duly recognize the right of Atty. Aldon and Atty. Orocio to a charging lien on the amounts
recoverable by petitioners pursuant to our 26 September 2006 Decision, nevertheless, we deem it
proper to reduce the same. Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a written contract for
42
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. The amounts which petitioners may recover as the logical and
necessary consequence of our Decision of 26 September 2006, i.e., backwages and separation pay
(in lieu of reinstatement), are essentially the same awards which we grant to illegally dismissed
employees in the private sector. In such cases, our Labor Code explicitly limits attorney’s fees to a
maximum of 10% of the recovered amount. Considering by analogy the said limit on attorney’s fees
in this case of illegal dismissal of petitioners by respondent NPC, a government-owned and
controlled corporation; plus the facts that petitioners have suffered deprivation of their means of
livelihood for the last five years; and the fact that this case was originally filed before us, without
any judicial or administrative proceedings below; as well as the fundamental ethical principle that
the practice of law is a profession and not a commercial enterprise, we approve in favor of Atty.
Aldon and Atty. Orocio a charging lien of 10% (instead of 25%) on the amounts recoverable by
petitioners from NPC pursuant to our Decision dated 26 September 2006.
The abovementioned case may be reasonably applied by analogy in the instant case since they have
substantially similar circumstances. In the case before us, although the non-EPIRA separated
members were not illegally dismissed, they were, nevertheless, separated from work by reason of
EPIRA. In addition, the non-EPIRA separated members had a legal retainer agreement/contingency
fee contract with petitioner as their counsel.
It should also be emphasized that the practice of law is a profession not a moneymaking venture. A
lawyer is not merely the defender of his client’s cause and a trustee of his client’s cause of action
and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and participates in the
fundamental function of administering justice in society. It follows that a lawyer’s compensation for
professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that
the fees he charges and receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered,
but also to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon
taking his attorney’s oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the
courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.58
Thus, taking into account the foregoing circumstances and recognized principles, the 15%
attorney’s fees of petitioner should be reduced to 10%. As such, petitioner is entitled to collect
only, as attorney’s fees, an amount equivalent to 10% of the ₱119,196,000.00 or ₱11,919,600.00.
We note, however, that the compromise agreement was partially implemented in the first week of
April 2006 with the payment of ₱23,416,000.00 to some non-EPIRA separated
members.59 Petitioner admitted having already received an amount of ₱3,512,007.32 as his
attorney’s fees on the said partial payment of ₱23,416,000.00.60 Accordingly, the amount of
₱3,512,007.32 received by petitioner as attorney’s fees should be deducted from the fixed 10%
attorney’s fees or the amount of ₱11,919,600.00. Per computation, petitioner is entitled to recover
the amount of ₱8,407,592.68 as attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 31 October 2006
in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Decision and Resolution, dated 29 January 2007 and 27
September 2007, respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 95786 and 95946 are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is entitled to recover attorney’s fees in
the amount of ₱8,407,592.68 on the corrected earnings differential of the non-EPIRA separated
members. No costs.
43
41. A.C. No. 9091 December 11, 2013
CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A.

FAJARDO AND ENCARNACION A. FERNANDEZ, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN B. BAÑEZ, Respondent.
Complainants are the owners of three parcels of land located in Dinalupihan, Bataan.1 n 4
September 2002, they entered into an agreement, they stood to be paid ₱35,000.000 for all the lots
that would be sold in the subdivision.2For that purpose, they executed a Pecial Power of Attorney
authorizing Fevidal to enter into all agreements concerning the parcels of land and to sign those
agreements on their behalf.3
Fevidal did not update complainants about the status of the subdivision project and failed to accout
for the titles to the subdivided land.4 Complainants also found that he had sold a number of parcels
to third parties, but that he did not turn the proceeds over to them. Neither were complainants
invited to the ceremonial opening of the subdivision project.5
Thus, on 23 August 2005, they revoked the Special Power of Attorney they had previously executed
in his favor.6
Complainants subsequently agreed to settle with Fevidal for the amount of ₱10,000,000, but the
latter again failed to pay them.7
Complainants engaged the professional services of respondent for the purpose of assisting them in
the preparation of a settlement agreement.8
Instead of drafting a written settlement, respondent encouraged them to institute actions against
Fevidal in order to recover their properties. Complainants then signed a contract of legal
services,9 in which it was agreed that they would not pay acceptance and appearance fees to
respondent, but that the docket fees would instead be shared by the parties. Under the contract,
complainants would pay respondent 50% of whatever would be recovered of the properties. In
preparation for the filing of an action against Fevidal, respondent prepared and notarized an
Affidavit of Adverse Claim, seeking to annotate the claim of complainants to at least 195 titles in the
possession of Fevidal.10
A certain Luzviminda Andrade (Andrade) was tasked to submit the Affidavit of Adverse Claim to the
Register of Deeds of Bataan.11
The costs for the annotation of the adverse claim were paid by respondent. Unknown to him, the
adverse claim was held in abeyance, because Fevidal got wind of it and convinced complainants to
agree to another settlement.12
Meanwhile, on behalf of complainants, and after sending Fevidal a demand letter dated 10 July
2006, respondent filed a complaint for annulment, cancellation and revalidation of titles, and
damages against Fevidal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bataan on 13 October 2006.13
44
Complainants found it hard to wait for the outcome of the action. Thus, they terminated the services
of respondent on 8 June 2007, withdrew their complaint against Fevidal on 9 June 2007, and
finalized their amicable settlement with him on 5 July 2007.14
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Opposition15 dated 20 July 2007 before the RTC, alleging that
the termination of his services and withdrawal of the complaint had been done with the intent of
defrauding counsel. On the same date, he filed a Motion for Recording of Attorney’s Charging Lien in
the Records of the Above-Captioned Cases.16
When the RTC granted the withdrawal of the complaint,17 he filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration.18
After an exchange of pleadings between respondent and Fevidal, with the latter denying the
former’s allegation of collusion,19 complainants sought the suspension/disbarment of respondent
through a Complaint20 filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on 14 November
2007. Complainants alleged that they were uneducated and underprivileged, and could not taste the
fruits of their properties because the disposition thereof was "now clothed with legal problems"
brought about by respondent.21
In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

1.01,22 1.03,23 1.04,24 12.02,25 15.05,26 18.04,27and 20.0428 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
On 14 August 2008, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation29 of the investigating commissioner. It suspended respondent from the practice
of law for a period of one year for entering into a champertous agreement.30
On 26 June 2011, it denied his motion for reconsideration. On 26 November 2012, this Court noted
the Indorsement of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, as well as respondent’s second motion
for reconsideration. We find that respondent did not violate any of the canons cited by
complainants. In fact, we have reason to believe that complainants only filed the instant complaint
against him at the prodding of Fevidal.
Respondent cannot be faulted for advising complainants to file an action against Fevidal to recover
their properties, instead of agreeing to a settlement of ₱10,000,000 – a measly amount compared to
that in the original agreement, under which Fevidal undertook to pay complainants the amount of
₱35,000,000. Lawyers have a sworn duty and responsibility to protect the interest of any
prospective client and pursue the ends of justice.31
Any lawyer worth his salt would advise complainants against the abuses of Fevidal under the
circumstances, and we cannot countenance an administrative complaint against a lawyer only
because he performed a duty imposed on him by his oath. The claim of complainants that they were
not informed of the status of the case is more appropriately laid at their door rather than at that of
respondent. He was never informed that they had held in abeyance the filing of the adverse claim.
Neither was he informed of the brewing amicable settlement between complainants and Fevidal.
We also find it very hard to believe that while complainants received various amounts as loans from
respondent from August 2006 to June 2007,32 they could not spare even a few minutes to ask about
the status of the case. We shall discuss this more below. As regards the claim that respondent
refused to "patch up" with Fevidal despite the pleas of complainants, we note the latter’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 24 September 2007, in which they admitted that they could not
convince Fevidal to meet with respondent to agree to a settlement.33
45
Finally, complainants apparently refer to the motion of respondent for the recording of his
attorney’s charging lien as the "legal problem" preventing them from enjoying the fruits of their
property. Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court allows an attorney to intervene in a case to
protect his rights concerning the payment of his compensation. According to the discretion of the
court, the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of money rendered in a
case in which his services have been retained by the client. We recently upheld the right of counsel
to intervene in proceedings for the recording of their charging lien. In Malvar v. KFPI,34 we granted
counsel’s motion to intervene in the case after petitioner therein terminated his services without
justifiable cause. Furthermore, after finding that petitioner and respondent had colluded in order to
deprive counsel of his fees, we ordered the parties to jointly and severally pay counsel the
stipulated contingent fees. Thus, the determination of whether respondent is entitled to the
charging lien is based on the discretion of the court before which the lien is presented. The
compensation of lawyers for professional services rendered is subject to the supervision of the
court, not only to guarantee that the fees they charge remain reasonable and commensurate with
the services they have actually rendered, but to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession as well.35
In any case, an attorney is entitled to be paid reasonable compensation for his services.36
That he had pursued its payment in the appropriate venue does not make him liable for disciplinary
action.1âwphi1Notwithstanding the foregoing, respondent is not without fault. Indeed, we find that
the contract for legal services he has executed with complainants is in the nature of a champertous
contract – an agreement whereby an attorney undertakes to pay the expenses of the proceedings to
enforce the client’s rights in exchange for some bargain to have a part of the thing in dispute.37
Such contracts are contrary to public policy38 and are thus void or inexistent.39
They are also contrary to Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that
lawyers shall not lend money to a client, except when in the interest of justice, they have to advance
necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling for the client. A reading of the contract for
legal services40 shows that respondent agreed to pay for at least half of the expense for the docket
fees. He also paid for the whole amount needed for the recording of complainants’ adverse claim.
While lawyers may advance the necessary expenses in a legal matter they are handling in order to
safeguard their client’s rights, it is imperative that the advances be subject to reimbrusement.41 The
purpose is to avoid a situation in which a lawyer acquires a personal stake in the clients cause.
Regrettably, nowhere in the contract for legal services is it stated that the expenses of litigation
advanced by respondents shall be subject to reimbursement by complainants.
In addition, respondent gave various amounts as cash advances (bali), gasoline and transportation
allowance to them for the duration of their attorney-client relationship. In fact, he admits that the
cash advances were in the nature of personal loans that he extended to complainants.42
Clearly, respondent lost sight of his responsibility as a lawyer in balancing the clients interests with
the ethical standards of his profession. Considering the surrounding circumstances in this case, an
admonition shall suffice to remind him that however dire the needs of the clients, a lawyer must
always avoid any appearance of impropriety to preserve the integrity of the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Juan B. Bañez, Jr. is hereby ADMONISHED for advancing the litigation
expenses in a legal matter her handled for a client without providing for terms of reimbursement
46
and lending money to his client, in violation of Canon 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He us sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with
more severly.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Bañez, Jr.
42. G.R. No. 176425
HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG, represented by BELEN LIM VDA. DE UY, Petitioners,

vs.
MAURICIA MEER CASTILLO, HEIRS OF BUENAFLOR C. UMALI, represented by NANCY UMALI,
VICTORIA H. CASTILLO, BERTILLA C. RADA, MARIETTA C. CAVANEZ, LEOVINA C. JALBUENA
and PHILIP M. CASTILLO, Respondents.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the Decision1dated 23 January 2007 rendered by the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 84687,2 the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed January 27, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 59, in Civil Case No. 93-176, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new one entered declaring the AGREEMENT and the KASUNDUAN void ab initio for being contrary
to law and public policy, without prejudice to the attorney’s filing a proper action for collection of
reasonable attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit and without prejudice also to administrative
charges being filed against counsel for counsel’s openly entering into such an illegal AGREEMENT in
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility which action may be instituted with the
Supreme Court which has exclusive jurisdiction to impose such penalties on members of the bar.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and Underscore Ours)
The Facts
Alongside her husband, Felipe Castillo, respondent Mauricia Meer Castillo was the owner of four
parcels of land with an aggregate area of 53,307 square meters, situated in Silangan Mayao, Lucena
City and registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-42104, T-32227,
T-31752 and T-42103. With the death of Felipe, a deed of extrajudicial partition over his estate was
executed by his heirs, namely, Mauricia, Buenaflor Umali and respondents Victoria Castillo, Bertilla
Rada, Marietta Cavanez, Leovina Jalbuena and Philip Castillo. Utilized as security for the payment of
a tractor purchased by Mauricia’s nephew, Santiago Rivera, from Bormaheco, Inc., it appears,
however, that the subject properties were subsequently sold at a public auction where Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines (ICP) tendered the highest bid. Having consolidated its title, ICP
likewise sold said parcels in favor of Philippine Machinery Parts Manufacturing Co., Inc. (PMPMCI)
which, in turn, caused the same to be titled in its name.4
On 29 September 1976, respondents and Buenaflor instituted Civil Case No. 8085 before the then
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Quezon, for the purpose of seeking the annulment of the
transactions and/or proceedings involving the subject parcels, as well as the TCTs procured by
PMPMCI.5 Encountering financial difficulties in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 8085, respondents
47
and Buenaflor entered into an Agreement dated 20 September 1978 whereby they procured the
legal services of Atty. Edmundo Zepeda and the assistance of Manuel Uy Ek Liong who, as financier,
agreed to underwrite the litigation expenses entailed by the case. In exchange, it was stipulated in
the notarized Agreement that, in the event of a favorable decision in Civil Case No. 8085, Atty.
Zepeda and Manuel would be entitled to "a share of forty (40%) percent of all the realties and/or
monetary benefits, gratuities or damages" which may be adjudicated in favor of respondents.6
On the same date, respondents and Buenaflor entered into another notarized agreement
denominated as a Kasunduan whereby they agreed to sell their remaining sixty (60%) percent
share in the subject parcels in favor of Manuel for the sum of ₱180,000.00. The parties stipulated
that Manuel would pay a downpayment in the sum of ₱1,000.00 upon the execution of the
Kasunduan and that respondents and Buenaflor would retain and remain the owners of a 1,750-
square meter portion of said real properties. It was likewise agreed that any party violating the
Kasunduan would pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed in the sum of ₱50,000.00, together with
the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses incurred should a case be subsequently filed in court.
The parties likewise agreed to further enter into such other stipulations as would be necessary to
ensure that the sale would push through and/or in the event of illegality or impossibility of any part
of the Kasunduan.7
With his death on 19 August 1989,8 Manuel was survived by petitioners, Heirs of Manuel Uy Ek
Liong, who were later represented in the negotiations regarding the subject parcels and in this suit
by petitioner BelenLim Vda. de Uy. The record also shows that the proceedings in Civil Case No.
8085 culminated in this Court’s rendition of a 13 September 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 895619 in
favor of respondents and Buenaflor.10 Subsequent to the finality of the Court’s Decision,11 it appears
that the subject parcels were subdivided in accordance with the Agreement, with sixty (60%)
percent thereof consisting of 31,983 square meters equally apportioned among and registered in
the names of respondents and Buenaflor under TCT Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-72029, T-72030, T-
72031, T-72032 and T-72033.12 Consisting of 21,324 square meters, the remaining forty (40%)
percent was, in turn, registered in the names of petitioners and Atty. Zepeda under TCT No. T-
72026.13
Supposedly acting on the advice of Atty. Zepeda, respondents wrote petitioners a letter dated 22
March 1993, essentially informing petitioners that respondents were willing to sell their sixty
(60%) percent share in the subject parcels for the consideration of ₱500.00 per square
meter.14 Insisting on the price agreed upon in the Kasunduan, however, petitioners sent a letter
dated 19 May 1993, requesting respondents to execute within 15 days from notice the necessary
Deed of Absolute Sale over their 60% share as aforesaid, excluding the 1,750-square meter portion
specified in their agreement with Manuel. Informed that petitioners were ready to pay the
remaining ₱179,000.00 balance of the agreed price,15 respondents wrote a 28 May 1993 reply,
reminding the former of their purported refusal of earlier offers to sell the shares of Leovina and of
Buenaflor who had, in the meantime, died.16 In a letter dated 1 June 1993, respondents also called
petitioners’ attention to the fact, among others, that their right to ask for an additional
consideration for the sale was recognized under the Kasunduan.17
On 6 October 1993, petitioners commenced the instant suit with the filing of their complaint for
specific performance and damages against the respondents and respondent Heirs of Buenaflor, as
then represented by Menardo Umali. Faulting respondents with unjustified refusal to comply with
their obligation under the Kasunduan, petitioners prayed that the former be ordered to execute the
necessary Deed of Absolute Sale over their shares in the subject parcels, with indemnities for moral
48
and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and the costs of the
suit.18 Served with summons, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim and Motion to File
Third Party Complaint on 3 December 1993. Maintaining that the Agreement and the Kasunduan
were illegal for being unconscionable and contrary to public policy, respondents averred that Atty.
Zepeda was an indispensable party to the case. Together with the dismissal of the complaint and
the annulment of said contracts and TCT No. T-72026, respondents sought the grant of their
counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.19
The issues thereby joined, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 54, Lucena City, proveeded to
conduct the mandatory preliminary conference in the case.20 After initially granting respondents’
motion to file a third party complaint against Atty. Zepeda,21 the RTC, upon petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration,22 went on to issue the 18 July 1997 Order disallowing the filing of said pleading on
the ground that the validity of the Agreement and the cause of action against Atty. Zepeda, whose
whereabouts were then unknown, would be better threshed out in a separate action.23 The
denial24 of their motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order25 prompted respondents to file a
notice of appeal26 which was, however, denied due course by the RTC on the ground that the orders
sought to be appealed were non-appealable.27 On 14 December 1997, Menardo died28 and was
substituted by his daughter Nancy as representative of respondent Heirs of Buenaflor.29
In the ensuing trial of the case on the merits, petitioners called to the witness stand Samuel Lim Uy
Ek Liong30whose testimony was refuted by Philip31 and Leovina32 during the presentation of the
defense evidence. On 27 January 2005, the RTC rendered a decision finding the Kasunduan valid
and binding between respondents and petitioners who had the right to demand its fulfillment as
Manuel’s successors-in-interest. Brushing aside Philip’s testimony that respondents were forced to
sign the Kasunduan, the RTC ruled that said contract became effective upon the finality of this
Court’s 13 September 1990 Decision in G.R. No. 89561 which served as a suspensive condition
therefor. Having benefited from the legal services rendered by Atty. Zepeda and the financial
assistance extended by Manuel, respondents were also declared estopped from questioning the
validity of the Agreement, Kasunduan and TCT No. T-72026. With the Kasunduan upheld as the law
between the contracting parties and their privies,33 the RTC disposed of the case in the following
wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds for the petitioners and hereby:
1. Orders the respondents to execute and deliver a Deed of Conveyance in favor of the
petitioners covering the 60% of the properties formerly covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-3175, 42104, T-42103, T-32227 and T-42104 which are now covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-72027, T-72028, T-72029, T-72030, T-72031, T-72032,
T-72033 and T-72026, all of the Registry of Deeds of Lucena City, for and in consideration of
the amount of ₱180,000.00 in accordance with the provisions of the KASUNDUAN, and
2. Orders the petitioners to pay and deliver to the respondents upon the latter’s execution of
the Deed of Conveyance mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the amount of ₱179,000.00
representing the balance of the purchase price as provided in the KASUNDUAN, and
3. Orders the respondents to pay the petitioners the following amounts:
a). ₱50,000.00 as and for moral damages;
49
b). ₱50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and
c). ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.34
Dissatisfied with the RTC’s decision, both petitioners35 and respondents perfected their
appeals36 which were docketed before the CA as CA-G.R. CV No. 84687. While petitioners prayed for
the increase of the monetary awards adjudicated a quo, as well as the further grant of liquidated
damages in their favor,37 respondents sought the complete reversal of the appealed decision on the
ground that the Agreement and the Kasunduan were null and void.38 On 23 January 2007, the CA
rendered the herein assailed decision, setting aside the RTC’s decision, upon the following findings
and conclusions, to wit: (a) the Agreement and Kasunduan are byproducts of the partnership
between Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who, as a non-lawyer, was not authorized to practice law; (b) the
Agreement is void under Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code of the Philippines which prohibits
lawyers from acquiring properties which are the objects of the litigation in which they have taken
part; (c) jointly designed to completely deprive respondents of the subject parcels, the Agreement
and the Kasunduan are invalid and unconscionable; and (d) without prejudice to his liability for
violation of the Canons of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Zepeda can file an action to collect
attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit.39
The Issue
Petitioners seek the reversal of the CA’s decision on the following issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FIFTEENTH DIVISION, COMITTED A

REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED AND SET ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE RTC BRANCH
59, LUCENA CITY, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 93-176 DECLARING THE AGREEMENT AND KASUNDUAN
VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
ART. 1491 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.40
We find the petition impressed with partial merit.
At the outset, it bears pointing out that the complaint for specific performance filed before the RTC
sought only the enforcement of petitioners’ rights and respondents’ obligation under the
Kasunduan. Although the answer filed by respondents also assailed the validity of the Agreement
and TCT No. T-72026, the record shows that the RTC, in its order dated 18 July 1997, disallowed the
filing of a third-party complaint against Atty. Zepeda on the ground that the causes of action in
respect to said contract and title would be better threshed out in a separate action. As Atty.
Zepeda’s whereabouts were then unknown, the RTC also ruled that, far from contributing to the
expeditious settlement of the case, the grant of respondents’ motion to file a third-party complaint
would only delay the proceedings in the case.41 With the 1 October 1998 denial of their motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing order, respondents subsequently filed a notice of appeal which
was, however, denied due course on the ground that the orders denying their motion to file a third-
party complaint and their motion for reconsideration were interlocutory and non-appealable.42
50
Absent a showing that the RTC’s ruling on the foregoing issues was reversed and set aside, we find
that the CA reversibly erred in ruling on the validity of the Agreement which respondents executed
not only with petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Manuel, but also with Atty. Zepeda. Since it is
generally accepted that no man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger,43 the
rule is settled that a court must first acquire jurisdiction over a party – either through valid service
of summons or voluntary appearance – for the latter to be bound by a court decision.44 The fact that
Atty. Zepeda was not properly impleaded in the suit and given a chance to present his side of the
controversy before the RTC should have dissuaded the CA from invalidating the Agreement and
holding that attorney’s fees should, instead, be computed on a quantum meruit basis. Admittedly,
Article 1491 (5)45 of the Civil Code prohibits lawyers from acquiring by purchase or assignment the
property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue
of their profession. The CA lost sight of the fact, however, that the prohibition applies only during
the pendency of the suit46 and generally does not cover contracts for contingent fees where the
transfer takes effect only after the finality of a favorable judgment.47
Although executed on the same day, it cannot likewise be gainsaid that the Agreement and the
Kasunduan are independent contracts, with parties, objects and causes different from that of the
other. Defined as a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds himself, with
respect to the other to give something or to render some service,48 a contract requires the
concurrence of the following requisites: (a) consent of the contracting parties; (b) object certain
which is the subject matter of the contract; and, (c) cause of the obligation which is
established.49 Executed in exchange for the legal services of Atty. Zepeda and the financial
assistance to be extended by Manuel, the Agreement concerned respondents’ transfer of 40% of the
avails of the suit, in the event of a favorable judgment in Civil Case No. 8085. While concededly
subject to the same suspensive condition, the Kasunduan was, in contrast, concluded by
respondents with Manuel alone, for the purpose of selling in favor of the latter 60% of their share in
the subject parcels for the agreed price of ₱180,000.00. Given these clear distinctions, petitioners
correctly argue that the CA reversibly erred in not determining the validity of the Kasunduan
independent from that of the Agreement.
Viewed in the light of the autonomous nature of contracts enunciated under Article 130650 of the
Civil Code, on the other hand, we find that the Kasunduan was correctly found by the RTC to be a
valid and binding contract between the parties. Already partially executed with respondents’
receipt of ₱1,000.00 from Manuel upon the execution thereof, the Kasunduan simply concerned the
sale of the former’s 60% share in the subject parcel, less the 1,750-square meter portion to be
retained, for the agreed consideration of ₱180,000.00. As a notarized document that carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution,51 the Kasunduan was shown
to have been signed by respondents with full knowledge of its contents, as may be gleaned from the
testimonies elicited from Philip52 and Leovina.53
Although Philip had repeatedly claimed that respondents had been forced to sign the Agreement
and the Kasunduan, his testimony does not show such vitiation of consent as would warrant the
avoidance of the contract. He simply meant that respondents felt constrained to accede to the
stipulations insisted upon by Atty. Zepeda and Manuel who were not otherwise willing to push
through with said contracts.54
At any rate, our perusal of the record shows that respondents’ main objection to the enforcement of
the Kasunduan was the perceived inadequacy of the ₱180,000.00 which the parties had fixed as
consideration for 60% of the subject parcels. Rather than claiming vitiation of their consent in the
51
answer they filed a quo, respondents, in fact, distinctly averred that the Kasunduan was tantamount
to unjust enrichment and "a clear source of speculative profit" at their expense since their
remaining share in said properties had "a current market value of ₱9,594,900.00, more or less."55 In
their 22 March 1993 letter to petitioners, respondents also cited prices then prevailing for the sale
of properties in the area and offered to sell their 60% share for the price of ₱500.00 per square
meter56 or a total of ₱15,991,500.00. In response to petitioners’ insistence on the price originally
agreed upon by the parties,57respondents even invoked the last paragraph58 of the Kasunduan to
the effect that the parties agreed to enter into such other stipulations as would be necessary to
ensure the fruition of the sale.59
In the absence of any showing, however, that the parties were able to agree on new stipulations
that would modify their agreement, we find that petitioners and respondents are bound by the
original terms embodied in the Kasunduan. Obligations arising from contracts, after all, have the
force of law between the contracting parties60 who are expected to abide in good faith with their
contractual commitments, not weasel out of them.61 Moreover, when the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the rule is settled that the
literal meaning of its stipulations should govern. In such cases, courts have no authority to alter a
contract by construction or to make a new contract for the parties. Since their duty is confined to
the interpretation of the one which the parties have made for themselves without regard to its
wisdom or folly, it has been ruled that courts cannot supply material stipulations or read into the
contract words it does not contain.62 Indeed, courts will not relieve a party from the adverse effects
of an unwise or unfavorable contract freely entered into.63
Our perusal of the Kasunduan also shows that it contains a penal clause64 which provides that a
party who violates any of its provisions shall be liable to pay the aggrieved party a penalty fixed at
₱50,000.00, together with the attorney’s fees and litigation expenses incurred by the latter should
judicial resolution of the matter becomes necessary.65 An accessory undertaking to assume greater
liability on the part of the obligor in case of breach of an obligation, the foregoing stipulation is a
penal clause which serves to strengthen the coercive force of the obligation and provides for
liquidated damages for such breach.66 "The obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated
indemnity without the necessity of proof of the existence and the measure of damages caused by
the breach."67Articles 1226 and 1227 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages
and the payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in
the fulfillment of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.
Art. 1227. The debtor cannot exempt himself from the performance of the obligation by paying the
penalty, save in the case where this right has been expressly reserved for him. Neither can the
creditor demand the fulfillment of the obligation and the satisfaction of the penalty at the same
time, unless this right has been clearly granted to him. However, if after the creditor has decided to
require the fulfillment of the obligation, the performance thereof should become impossible
without his fault, the penalty may be enforced."
52
In the absence of a showing that they expressly reserved the right to pay the penalty in lieu of the
performance of their obligation under the Kasunduan, respondents were correctly ordered by the
RTC to execute and deliver a deed of conveyance over their 60% share in the subject parcels in
favor of petitiOners. Considering that the Kasunduan stipulated that respondents would retain a
portion of their share consisting of 1,750 square meters, said disposition should, however, be
modified to give full effect to the intention of the contracting parties. Since the parties also fixed
liquidated damages in the sum of ₱50,000.00 in case of breach, we find that said amount should
suffice as petitioners' indemnity, without further need of compensation for moral and exemplary
damages. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty generally substitutes the indemnity for
damages and the payment of interests in case of non-compliance.68 Usually incorporated to create
an effective deterrent against breach of the obligation by making the consequences of such breach
as onerous as it may be possible, the rule is settled that a penal clause is not limited to actual and
compensatory damages69
The RTC's award of attorney's fees in the sum of ₱50,000.00 is, however, proper.1âwphi1 Aside
from the fact that the penal clause included a liability for said award in the event of litigation over a
breach of the Kasunduan, petitioners were able to prove that they incurred said sum in engaging
the services of their lawyer to pursue their rights and protect their interests.70
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals' assailed 23 January 2007 Decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the RTC's 27 January 2005 Decision is REINSTATED
subject to the following MODIFICATIONS: (a) the exclusion of a 1,750-square meter portion from
the 60% share in the subject parcel respondents were ordered to convey in favor of petitioners; and
(b) the deletion of the awards of moral and exemplary damages. The rights of the parties under the
Agreement may be determined in a separate litigation.
43. Adm. Case No. 8383 December 11, 2012
AMPARO BUENO, Complainant, vs.ATTY. RAMON A. RAÑESES, Respondents
Before the Court is the Complaint for Disbarment1 against Atty. Ramon Rañeses filed on March 3,
1993 by Amparo Bueno with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD). Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, and subsequently Commissioner Victoria
Gonzalez- de los Reyes, conducted the fact-finding investigation on the complaint.
Commissioner Rico A. Limpingco submitted a Report and Recommendation2 dated September 29,
2008 to the IBP Board of Governors which approved it in a resolution dated December 11, 2008.
In a letter3 dated August 12, 2009, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal transmitted
to the Office of Chief Justice Reynato Puno (retired) a Notice of Resolution4 and the records of the
case.
Factual Antecedents
In her complaint,5 Bueno related that she hired Atty. Rañeses to
represent her in Civil Case No. 777. In consideration for his services, Bueno
paid Atty. Rañeses a retainer fee of P3,000.00. She also agreed to pay him
53
P300.00 for every hearing he attended. No receipt was issued for the retainer
fee paid.
Atty. Rañeses prepared and filed an answer in her behalf. He also attended hearings. On several
occasions, Atty. Rañeses would either be absent or late.
Bueno alleged that on November 14, 1988, Atty. Rañeses asked for P10,000.00. This amount would
allegedly be divided between him and Judge Nidea, the judge hearing Civil Case No. 777, so that
they would not lose the case. Atty. Rañeses told Bueno not to tell anyone about the matter. She
immediately sold a pig and a refrigerator to raise the demanded amount, and gave it to Atty.
Rañeses.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses asked for another P5,000.00 sometime in December 1988,
because the amount she had previously given was inadequate. Bueno then sold her sala set and
colored television to raise the demanded amount, which she again delivered to Atty. Rañeses.
Bueno later discovered that the trial court had required Atty. Rañeses to comment on the adverse
party’s offer of evidence and to submit their memorandum on the case, but Atty. Rañeses failed to
comply with the court’s directive. According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses concealed this development
from her. In fact, she was shocked when a court sheriff arrived sometime in May 1991 to execute
the decision against them.
Bueno went to Atty. Rañeses’ office to ask him about what happened to the case. Atty. Rañeses told
her that he had not received any decision. Bueno later discovered from court records that Atty.
Rañeses actually received a copy of the decision on December 3, 1990. When she confronted Atty.
Rañeses about her discovery and showed him a court-issued certification, Atty. Rañeses simply
denied any knowledge of the decision.
In a separate affidavit,6 Bueno related another instance where Atty. Rañeses asked his client for
money to win a case. Sometime in June 1991, Atty. Rañeses allegedly asked her to deliver a
telegram from Justice Buena of the Court of Appeals to her aunt, Socorro Bello. He told her to tell
Bello to prepare P5,000.00, an amount that Justice Buena purportedly asked for in relation to
Criminal Case No. T-1909 that was then on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
According to Bueno, Atty. Rañeses went to Bello’s residence two weeks later. In her (Bueno’s)
presence, Bello paid Atty. Rañeses P5,000.00. Bello demanded a receipt but Atty. Rañeses refused to
issue one, telling her that none of his clients ever dared to demand a receipt for sums received from
them.
Atty. Rañeses never filed an answer against Bueno’s complaint. He repeatedly failed to attend the
hearings scheduled by Commissioner Gonzaga on March 20, 2000,[7] on May 11, 20008 and on
October 2, 2000.9 During the hearing on October 2, 2000, Commissioner Gonzaga issued an
Order10 declaring Atty. Rañeses in default. Bueno presented her evidence and was directed to file a
formal offer.
On October 10, 2000, the IBP-CBD received a "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the Complaint
and Supporting Papers"11 (dated September 30, 2000) filed by Atty. Rañeses. Atty. Rañeses asked in
his motion that the hearing on October 2, 2000 be reset to sometime in December 2000, as he had
54
prior commitments on the scheduled day. He also asked for copies of the complaint and of the
supporting papers, claiming that he had not been furnished with these. In the interest of substantial
justice, Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled a clarificatory hearing on November 16, 200012
Atty. Rañeses failed to attend the hearing on November 16, 2000. In the same hearing, Commissioner
Gonzaga noted that the registry return card refuted Atty. Rañeses’ claim that he did not receive a
copy of the complaint. Commissioner Gonzaga scheduled another clarificatory hearing on January
17, 2001. He stated that if Atty. Rañeses failed to appear, the case would be deemed submitted for
resolution after the complainant submits her memorandum.13
Atty. Rañeses did not attend the January 17, 2001 hearing. On the same day, Commissioner Gonzaga
declared the case deemed submitted for resolution after the complainant’s submission of her
memorandum.14
At some point, the case was reassigned to Commissioner De los Reyes who scheduled another
hearing on March 14, 2003.15 During the hearing, only Bueno and her counsel were present. The
Commissioner noted that the IBP-CBD received a telegram from Atty. Rañeses asking for the
hearing’s resetting because he had prior commitments. The records, however, showed that Atty.
Rañeses never filed an answer and the case had already been submitted for resolution. Thus,
Commissioner De los Reyes issued an Order16 directing Bueno to submit her formal offer of
evidence and her documentary evidence, together with her memorandum.
The IBP-CBD received Bueno’s Memorandum17 on May 27, 2003, but she did not file any formal
offer, nor did she submit any of the documentary evidence indicated as attachments to her
complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner’s Findings
In his report18 to the IBP Board of Governors, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty.
Rañeses be absolved of the charge of negligence, but found him guilty of soliciting money to bribe a
judge.
Commissioner Limpingco noted that Bueno failed to provide the court records and certifications
that she indicated as attachments to her complaint. These would have proven that Atty. Rañeses
had indeed been negligent in pursuing her case. Without these documents, which are not difficult to
procure from the courts, Commissioner Limpingco concluded that he would only be left with
Bueno’s bare allegations which could not support a finding of negligence.
Commissioner Limpingco, however, found Bueno’s allegation that Atty. Rañeses solicited money to
bribe judges to be credible. According to Commissioner Limpingco, the act of soliciting money to
bribe a judge is, by its nature, done in secret. He observed that Bueno had consistently affirmed her
statements in her affidavit, while Atty. Rañeses did nothing to refute them.
Commissioner Limpingco also noted that Atty. Rañeses even made a false claim before the
investigating commissioners, as he alleged in his "Time Motion and Request for Copies of the
Complaint and Supporting Papers" that he did not receive the complaint against him, a fact belied
by the registry receipt card evidencing his receipt.
55
Thus, Commissioner Limpingco recommended that Atty. Rañeses be disbarred for failure to
maintain his personal integrity and for failure to maintain public trust.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and
Recommendation, but reduced the penalty to indefinite suspension from the practice of law.19
The Court approves the IBP’s findings but resolves to disbar Atty. Rañeses from the practice of law
in accordance with Commissioner Limpingco’s recommendation and based on our own
observations and findings in the case.
The charge of negligence
According to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should serve their clients
with competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.02 provides that "[a] lawyer shall not handle
any legal matter without adequate preparation." Rule 18.03, on the other hand, states that "[a]
lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
[therewith] shall render him liable."
"Once lawyers agree to take up the cause of a client, they owe fidelity to the cause and must always
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them."20 A client is entitled to the benefit of all
remedies and defenses authorized by law, and is expected to rely on his lawyer to avail of these
remedies or defenses.21
In several cases, the Court has consistently held that a counsel’s failure to file an appellant’s brief
amounts to inexcusable negligence.22 In Garcia v. Bala,23 the Court even found the respondent
lawyer guilty of negligence after availing of an erroneous mode of appeal. To appeal a decision of
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the respondent therein filed a
notice of appeal with the DARAB, instead of filing a verified petition for review with the Court of
Appeals. Because of his error, the prescribed period for filing the petition lapsed, prejudicing his
clients.
In this case, Atty. Rañeses’ alleged failure to file a comment on the adverse party’s offer of evidence
and to submit the required memorandum would have amounted to negligence. However, as noted
by Commissioner Limpingco, Bueno did not support her allegations with court documents that she
could have easily procured. This omission leaves only Bueno’s bare allegations which are
insufficient to prove Atty. Rañeses’ negligence. We support the Board of Governors’ ruling on this
point.
The charge of soliciting money
In Bildner v. Ilusorio,24 the respondent lawyer therein attempted to bribe a judge to get a favorable
decision for his client. He visited the judge’s office several times and persistently called his
residence to convince him to inhibit from his client’s case. The Court found that the respondent
lawyer therein violated Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility – the rule that instructs
lawyers to refrain from any impropriety tending to influence, or from any act giving the appearance
of influencing, the court. The respondent lawyer therein was suspended from the practice of law for
one year.
56
In this case, Atty. Rañeses committed an even graver offense. As explained below, he committed a
fraudulent exaction, and at the same time maligned both the judge and the Judiciary. These are
exacerbated by his cavalier attitude towards the IBP during the investigation of his case; he
practically disregarded its processes and even lied to one of the Investigating Commissioners
regarding the notices given him about the case.
While the only evidence to support Bueno’s allegations is her own word, the Investigating
Commissioner found her testimony to be credible. The Court supports the Investigating
Commissioner in his conclusion. As Commissioner Limpingco succinctly observed:
By its very nature, the act [of] soliciting money for bribery purposes would necessarily take place in
secrecy with only respondent Atty. Rañeses and complainant Bueno privy to it. Complainant
Amparo Bueno has executed sworn statements and had readily affirmed her allegations in this
regard in hearings held before the IBP Investigating Commissioners. Respondent Atty. Rañeses, for
his part, has not even seen it fit to file any answer to the complaint against him, much less appear in
any hearings scheduled in this investigation.25
Further, the false claim made by Atty. Rañeses to the investigating commissioners reveals his
propensity for lying. It confirms, to some extent, the kind of lawyer that Bueno’s affidavits depict
him to be.
Rather than merely suspend Atty. Rañeses as had been done in Bildner, the Court believes that Atty.
Rañeses merits the ultimate administrative penalty of disbarment because of the multi-layered
impact and implications of what he did; by his acts he proved himself to be what a lawyer should
not be, in a lawyer’s relations to the client, to the court and to the Integrated Bar.
First, he extracted money from his client for a purpose that is both false and fraudulent.1âwphi1 It
is false because no bribery apparently took place as Atty. Rañeses in fact lost the case. It is
fraudulent because the professed purpose of the exaction was the crime of bribery. Beyond these,
he maligned the judge and the Judiciary by giving the impression that court cases are won, not on
the merits, but through deceitful means – a decidedly black mark against the Judiciary. Last but not
the least, Atty. Rañeses grossly disrespected the IBP by his cavalier attitude towards its disciplinary
proceedings.
From these perspectives, Atty. Rañeses wronged his client, the judge allegedly on the "take," the
Judiciary as an institution, and the IBP of which he is a member. The Court cannot and should not
allow offenses such as these to pass unredressed. Let this be a signal to one and all – to all lawyers,
their clients and the general public – that the Court will not hesitate to act decisively and with no
quarters given to defend the interest of the public, of our judicial system and the institutions
composing it, and to ensure that these are not compromised by unscrupulous or misguided
members of the Bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Ramon A. Rañeses is

hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. The Office
of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to delete his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Costs against the
respondent.
Let all courts, through the Office of the Court Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, be notified of this Decision.
57
SO ORDERED.
44. A.C. No. 4549 December 2, 2013
NESTOR FELIPE, ALBERTO V. FELIPE, AURORA FELIPE-ORANTE, ASUNCION FELIPE-

DOMINGO, MILAGROS FELIPE CABIGTING, and RODOLFO V. FELIPE, Complainants,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO A. MACAPAGAL, Respondent.
On March 5, 1996, a Petition1 for disbarment was filed against respondent Atty. Ciriaco A.
Macapagal, docketed as A.C. No. 4549. In A Resolution2 dated June 19, 1996, we required
respondent to comment. Respondent received a copy of the Resolution on July 16, 1996.3 On August
15, 1996, respondent filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion For Extension Of Tme To File Comment.4 He
requested for additional period of 30 days within which to file his comment citing numerous
professional commitments. We granted said request in our October 2, 1996 Resolution.5 The
extended deadline passed sans respondent’s comment. Thus on January 29, 1997, complainants file
an Urgent Motion To Submit The Administrative Case For Resolution Without Comment Of
Respondent6 claiming the respondent is deemed to have waived his right to file comment.
On February 24, 1997, we referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.7
The case was initially assigned to Investigating Commissioner Elizabeth Hermosisima-Palma who
set the hearing on October 22, 1997 at 9:00 a.m.8
The Minutes of the Hearing9 showed that both parties were present.1âwphi1 The next hearing was
set on November 6, 199710 but was postponed upon request of the complainants' counsel.11
Noting that more than five months had lapsed after the postponement of the last hearing,
complainants moved to calendar the case.12
The new Investigating Commissioner, Arturo C. Delos Reyes, set the hearing of the case on January
12, 1999.13
During the scheduled hearing, complainants appeared and were directed to submit their Position
Paper.1âwphi1Respondent failed to attend despite receipt of notice.14
Complainants submitted their Position Paper15 on January 28, 1999.16
It took 11 years, more particularly on February 26, 2010, before the IBP, thru Investigating
Commissioner Agustinus V. Gonzaga, submitted its Report and Recommendation.17
In his Report, the Investigating Commissioner quoted verbatim the allegations in the Petition; he
then narrated the proceedings undertaken by the IBP. Unfortunately, no discussion was made
regarding the merits of the complaint. However, it was recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month. In Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated
November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification that respondent be suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year. In their Petition, complainants alleged that they are co-plaintiffs in Civil Case
58
No. A-95-22906 pending before Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City while
respondent is the counsel for the defendants therein; that respondent committed dishonesty when
he stated in the defendants' Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are
strangers to each other despite knowing that the defendants are half-brothers and half-sisters of
complainants; and that they filed a criminal case for Perjury [against the defendants in Civil Case
No. A-95-22906] docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending before Branch 36 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. Complainants also alleged that respondent introduced a
falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906; and that they
filed another Perjury charge [against the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906] before the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-15656-A. Next, complainants averred
that respondent knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction; that said pleading is not in accordance with
the rules of procedure; that the said filing delayed the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906;
and that they filed a Vigorous Opposition to the said pleading. Complainants insisted that by the
foregoing actuations, respondent violated his duty as a lawyer and prayed that he be disbarred and
ordered to pay complainants the amount of ₱500,000 representing the damages that they suffered.
In fine, complainants charged respondent with dishonesty (1) when he stated in the defendants'
Answer in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 that the parties therein are strangers to each other; (2) when
he introduced a falsified Certificate of Marriage as part of his evidence in Civil Case No. A-95-22906;
and (3) when he knowingly filed a totally baseless pleading captioned as Urgent Motion to Recall
Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction in the same case. At the outset, we note that
in order to determine whether respondent is guilty of dishonesty, we will have to delve into the
issue of whether the complainants are indeed related to the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-
22906 being half-brothers and half-sisters. We would also be tasked to make an assessment on the
authenticity of the Certificate of Marriage which respondent submitted in the proceedings in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906. Similarly, we will have to make a ruling on whether the Urgent Motion to
Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction which respondent filed was indeed
baseless and irrelevant to the proceedings in Civil Case No. A-95-22906. Clearly, these prerequisites
cannot be accomplished in this administrative case. The resolution of whether the parties are
related to each other appears to be one of the issues brought up in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 which
is a complaint for Partition, Reconveyance, Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Damages. The
complainants claimed that they are the legitimate children of the late Gregorio V. Felipe, Sr. This
was rebutted by the defendants therein, as represented by the respondent, who denied their
filiation with the complainants. Clearly, the issue of filiation must be settled in those proceedings,
and not in this administrative case. The same is true with regard to the issue of authenticity of the
Marriage Certificate which was submitted in evidence as well as the relevance of the Urgent Motion
to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
Besides, as complainants have asserted, a criminal case for Perjury had already been filed against
the defendants in Civil Case No. A-95-22906 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 41667 pending
before Branch 36 of the Manila MeTC for their alleged "untruthful" statement that they are
strangers to each other. They had also filed another Perjury charge against the defendants in Civil
Case No. A-95-22906 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, docketed as I.S. No. 95-
15656-A for allegedly submitting in evidence a falsified Marriage Certificate. Moreover, they
already filed a Vigorous Opposition to the Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution of the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction filed by the respondent. In fine, these issues are proper subjects of and must
be threshed out in a judicial action. We held in Anacta v. Resurreccion18 that -
x x x it is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of
the Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter
59
involves violations of the lawyer's oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court's
disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liablity,
and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter
would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the
Court's disciplinary authority. x x x19
Similarly, we held in Virgo v. Amorin,20 viz:
While it is true that disbarment proceedings look into the worthiness of a respondent to remain as
a member of the bar, and need not delve into the merits of a related case, the Court, in this instance,
however, cannot ascertain whether Atty. Amorin indeed committed acts in violation of his oath as a
lawyer concerning the sale and conveyance of the Virgo Mansion without going through the factual
matters that are subject of the aforementioned civil cases, x x x. As a matter of prudence and so as
not to preempt the conclusions that will be drawn by the court where the case is pending, the Court
deems it wise to dismiss the present case without prejudice to the filing of another one, depending
on the final outcome of the civil case.21 Thus, pursuant to the above pronouncements, the Petition
filed by complainants must be dismissed without prejudice. However, we cannot end our discussion
here. It has not escaped our notice that despite receipt of our directive, respondent did not file his
comment. Neither did he file his Position Paper as ordered by the IBP. And for this, he must be
sanctioned.
Respondent's unjustified disregard of the lawful orders of this Court and the IBP is not only
irresponsible, but also constitutes utter disrespect for the judiciary and his fellow lawyers. His
conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders
and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being
themselves officers of the court. As an officer of the court, respondent is expected to know that a
resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly
and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP as the investigating arm of the Court in
administrative cases against lawyers.22
Under the circumstances, we deem a reprimand with warning commensurate to the infraction
committed by the respondent.23
ACCORDINGLY , respondent Atty. Ciriaco A. Macapagal is REPRIMANDED for failing to give due
respect to the Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He is WARNED that commission of a
similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. Resolution No. XX-2011-246 dated November
19, 2011 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE. A.C. No. 4549 is DISMISSED without
prejudice. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a
member of the Bar, and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
45. G.R. No. 153031 December 14, 2006
PCL SHIPPING PHILIPPINES, INC. and U-MING MARINE TRANSPORT

CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and STEVE RUSEL, respondents.
60
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated December 18, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59976, which
affirmed the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated March 22, 2000 in
NLRC NCR CA No. 018120-99; and the Resolution of the CA dated April 10, 2002, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.2
The facts of the case, as found by the CA, are as follows:
In April 1996, Rusel was employed as GP/AB seaman by manning agency, PCL Shipping
Philippines, Inc. (PCL Shipping) for and in behalf of its foreign principal, U-Ming Marine
Transport Corporation (U-Ming Marine). Rusel thereby joined the vessel MV Cemtex
General (MV Cemtex) for the contract period of twelve (12) months with a basic monthly
salary of US$400.00, living allowance of US$140.00, fixed overtime rate of US$120.00 per
month, vacation leave with pay of US$40.00 per month and special allowance of US$175.00.
On July 16, 1996, while Rusel was cleaning the vessel's kitchen, he slipped, and as a
consequence thereof, he suffered a broken and/or sprained ankle on his left foot. A request
for medical examination was flatly denied by the captain of the vessel. On August 13, 1996,
feeling an unbearable pain in his ankle, Rusel jumped off the vessel using a life jacket and
swam to shore. He was brought to a hospital where he was confined for eight (8) days.
On August 22, 1996, a vessel's agent fetched Rusel from the hospital and was required to
board a plane bound for the Philippines.
On September 26, 1996, Rusel filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages,
overtime pay, claim for medical benefits, sick leave pay and damages against PCL Shipping
and U-Ming Marine before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. In their answer, the latter
alleged that Rusel deserted his employment by jumping off the vessel.
On July 21, 1998, the labor arbiter rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Wherefore, above premises duly considered we find the respondent liable for unjust
repatriation of the complainant.
Accordingly, the following award is hereby adjudged against the respondent:
1. The amount of $2,625.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment

representing three (3) months salary of the complainant due to his illegal dismissal.
2. The amount of $1,600.00 or its peso equivalent, representing sick wage benefits.
3. The amount of $550.00 or its peso equivalent, representing living allowance,

overtime pay and special allowance for two (2) months.
4. The amount of $641.66 or its peso equivalent, representing unpaid wages from
August 11 to 22, 1996.
5. Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.
61
The rest of the claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.3
Aggrieved by the Decision of the Labor Arbiter, herein petitioners appealed to the NLRC. In its
Decision dated March 22, 2000, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter but modified
the appealed Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision is as it is hereby ordered

MODIFIED in that the amount representing three months salary of the complainant due to
his illegal dismissal is reduced to US$1,620.00. Further the award of sick wage benefit is
deleted.
All other dispositions are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the NLRC denied the same in its Decision of May
3, 2000.5
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6 In its Decision dated December 18, 2001, the
CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the NLRC Decision.7
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
April 10, 2002.8
Hence, the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
I. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent was illegally dismissed from
employment.
xxxx
II. Likewise, the Court of Appeals erred in not upholding petitioners' right to pre-terminate
private respondent's employment.
xxxx
III. The private respondent is not entitled to other money claims, particularly as to the
award of attorney's fees.9
As to their first assigned error, petitioners contend that the CA erred in affirming the findings of the
NLRC that Rusel's act of jumping ship does not establish any intent on his part to abandon his job
and never return. Petitioners argue that Rusel's very act of jumping from the vessel and swimming
to shore is evidence of highest degree that he has no intention of returning to his job. Petitioners
further contend that if Rusel was indeed suffering from unbearable and unmitigated pain, it is
unlikely that he is able to swim two (2) nautical miles, which is the distance between their ship and
the shore, considering that he needed to use his limbs in swimming. Petitioners further assert that
62
it is error on the part of the CA to disregard the entries contained in the logbook and in the Marine
Note Protest evidencing Rusels' offense of desertion because while these pieces of evidence were
belatedly presented, the settled rule is that additional evidence may be admitted on appeal in labor
cases. Petitioners also contend that Rusel's act of desertion is a grave and serious offense and
considering the nature and situs of employment as well as the nationality of the employer, the twin
requirements of notice and hearing before an employee can be validly terminated may be
dispensed with.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming, for the sake of argument, that
Rusel is not guilty of desertion, they invoked the alternative defense that the termination of his
employment was validly made pursuant to petitioners' right to exercise their prerogative to pre-
terminate such employment in accordance with Section 19(C) of the Standard Terms and
Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels, which
provision was incorporated in Rusel's Contract of Employment with petitioners. Petitioners assert
that despite the fact that this issue was raised before the CA, the appellate court failed to resolve the
same.
Anent the last assigned error, petitioners argue that it is error on the part of the CA to affirm the
award of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months
because Rusel failed to submit substantial evidence to prove that he is entitled to these awards.
Petitioners further argue that these money claims, particularly the claim for living allowance,
should not be granted because they partake of the nature of earned benefits for services rendered
by a seafarer. Petitioners also contend that the balance of Rusel's wages from August 11-22, 1996
should be applied for the payment of the costs of his repatriation, considering that under Section
19(E) of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-
Board Ocean-Going Vessels, when a seafarer is discharged for any just cause, the employer shall
have the right to recover the costs of his replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages
and other earnings. Lastly, petitioners argue that the award of attorney's fees should be deleted
because there is nothing in the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC which states the reason
why attorney's fees are being awarded.
In his Comment, private respondent contends that petitioners are raising issues of fact which have
already been resolved by the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA. Private respondent argues that, aside
from the fact that the issues raised were already decided by three tribunals against petitioners'
favor, it is a settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. While there are exceptions to this rule, private
respondent contends that the instant case does not fall under any of these exceptions. Private
respondent asserts that petitioners failed to substantiate their claim that the former is guilty of
desertion. Private respondent further contends that the right to due process is available to local and
overseas workers alike, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution on labor and equal
protection as well as the declared policy contained in the Labor Code. Private respondent argues
that petitioners' act of invoking the provisions of Section 19(C) of the POEA Contract as an
alternative defense is misplaced and is inconsistent with their primary defense that private
respondent was dismissed on the ground of desertion. As to the award of attorney's fees, private
respondent contends that since petitioners' act compelled the former to incur expenses to protect
his interest and enforce his lawful claims, and because petitioners acted in gross and evident bad
faith in refusing to satisfy private respondent's lawful claims, it is only proper that attorney's fees
be awarded in favor of the latter. Anent the other monetary awards, private respondent argues that
63
these awards are all premised on the findings of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that private
respondent's dismissal was improper and illegal.
The Court finds the petition without merit.
Anent the first assigned error, it is a settled rule that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court.10 Judicial review by this Court does not extend to a re-
evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the proper labor tribunal has based its
determination.11 Firm is the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts, and this applies with
greater force in labor cases.12 Factual issues may be considered and resolved only when the findings
of facts and conclusions of law of the Labor Arbiter are inconsistent with those of the NLRC and the
CA.13 The reason for this is that the quasi-judicial agencies, like the Arbitration Board and the NLRC,
have acquired a unique expertise because their jurisdiction are confined to specific matters.14 In the
present case, the question of whether private respondent is guilty of desertion is factual. The Labor
Arbiter, NLRC and the CA are unanimous in their findings that private respondent is not guilty of
desertion and that he has been illegally terminated from his employment. After a review of the
records of the instant case, this Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of these
tribunals.
Petitioners assert that the entries in the logbook of MV Cemtex General15 and in the Marine Note
Protest16 which they submitted to the NLRC confirm the fact that private respondent abandoned the
vessel in which he was assigned. However, the genuineness of the Marine Note Protest as well as
the entries in the logbook are put in doubt because aside from the fact that they were presented
only during petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed with the NLRC, both the Marine Note
Protest and the entry in the logbook which were prepared by the officers of the vessel were neither
notarized nor authenticated by the proper authorities. Moreover, a reading of these entries simply
shows that private respondent was presumed to have deserted his post on the sole basis that he
was found missing while the MV Cemtex General was anchored at the port of Takehara, Japan.
Hence, without any corroborative evidence, these documents cannot be used as bases for
concluding that private respondent was guilty of desertion.
Petitioners also question the findings and conclusion of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that what
caused private respondent in jumping overboard was the unmitigated pain he was suffering which
was compounded by the inattention of the vessel's captain to provide him with the necessary
treatment inspite of the fact that the ship was moored for about two weeks at the anchorage of
Takehara, Japan; and, that private respondent's act was a desperate move to protect himself and to
seek relief for his physical suffering. Petitioners contend that the findings and conclusions of the
Labor Arbiter and the NLRC which were affirmed by the CA are based on conjecture because there
is no evidence to prove that, at the time he jumped ship, private respondent was really suffering
from an ankle injury.
It is true that no substantial evidence was presented to prove that the cause of private respondent's
confinement in a hospital in Takehara, Japan was his ankle injury. The Court may not rely on the
letter marked as Annex "B" and attached to private respondent's Position Paper because it was
unsigned and it was not established who executed the same.17 However, the result of the x-ray
examination conducted by the LLN Medical Services, Inc. on August 26, 1996, right after private
respondent was repatriated to the Philippines, clearly showed that there is a soft-tissue swelling
around his ankle joint.18 This evidence is consistent with private respondent's claim that he was
then suffering from an ankle injury which caused him to jump off the ship.
64
As to petitioners' contention that private respondent could not have traversed the distance
between the ship and the shore if he was indeed suffering from unbearable pain by reason of his
ankle injury, suffice it to say that private respondent is an able-bodied seaman and that with the full
use of both his arms and the help of a life jacket, was able to reach the shore.
As correctly defined by petitioners, desertion, in maritime law is:
The act by which a seaman deserts and abandons a ship or vessel, in which he had engaged
to perform a voyage, before the expiration of his time, and without leave. By desertion, in
maritime law, is meant, not a mere unauthorized absence from the ship, without leave, but
an unauthorized absence from the ship with an intention not to return to her service; or
as it is often expressed, animo non revertendi, that is, with an intention to
desert.19 (emphasis supplied)
Hence, for a seaman to be considered as guilty of desertion, it is essential that there be evidence to
prove that if he leaves the ship or vessel in which he had engaged to perform a voyage, he has the
clear intention of abandoning his duty and of not returning to the ship or vessel. In the present case,
however, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to show that when private
respondent jumped ship, he no longer had the intention of returning. The fact alone that he jumped
off the ship where he was stationed, swam to shore and sought medical assistance for the injury he
sustained is not a sufficient basis for petitioners to conclude that he had the intention of deserting
his post. Settled is the rule that in termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to
show that the dismissal is for a just and valid cause.20 The case of the employer must stand or fall on
its own merits and not on the weakness of the employee's defense.21 In the present case, since
petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that private respondent is guilty of desertion,
the Court finds no reason to depart from the conclusion of the Labor Arbiter, NLRC and the CA that
private respondent's dismissal is illegal.
In their second assigned error, petitioners cite Section 19(C) of POEA Memorandum Circular No.
055-9622 known as the Revised Standard Employment Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board Ocean-Going Vessels as their alternative basis in
terminating the employment of private respondent. Said Section provides as follows:
Section 19. REPATRIATION
xxxx
C. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three months before the
expiration of his contract, the master/ employer may repatriate the seafarer from such port
provided that the seafarer shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the seafarer shall
also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination pay equivalent to
one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of termination may only
be exercised by the master/employer if the original contract period of the seafarer is at
least ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination
shall not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court is not persuaded. POEA Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 took effect on January 1, 1997
while the contract of employment entered into by and between private respondent and petitioners
was executed on April 10, 1996. Hence, it is wrong for petitioners to cite this particular
65
Memorandum because at the time of petitioners' and private respondent's execution of their
contract of employment Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 was not yet effective.
What was in effect at the time private respondent's Contract of Employment was executed was
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989. It is clearly provided under the second
paragraph of private respondent's Contract of Employment that the terms and conditions provided
under Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 shall be strictly and faithfully observed. Hence,
it is Memorandum Circular No. 41, Series of 1989 which governs private respondent's contract of
employment.
Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum Circular No. 41, which has almost identical provisions with
Section 19 (C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96, provides as follows:
SECTION H. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
xxxx
6. If the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the
expiration of the Contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seaman from such port
provided that the seaman shall be paid all his earned wages. In addition, the seaman shall
also be paid his leave pay for the entire contract period plus a termination pay equivalent to
one (1) month of his basic pay, provided, however, that this mode of termination may only
be exercised by the master/employer if the original contact period of the seaman is at least
ten (10) months; provided, further, that the conditions for this mode of termination shall
not apply to dismissal for cause.
The Court agrees with private respondent's contention that petitioners' arguments are misplaced.
Petitioners may not use the above-quoted provision as basis for terminating private respondent's
employment because it is incongruent with their primary defense that the latter's dismissal from
employment was for cause. Petitioners may not claim that they ended private respondent's services
because he is guilty of desertion and at the same time argue that they exercised their option to
prematurely terminate his employment, even without cause, simply because they have the right to
do so under their contract. These grounds for termination are inconsistent with each other such
that the use of one necessarily negates resort to the other. Besides, it appears from the records that
petitioners' alternative defense was pleaded merely as an afterthought because it was only in their
appeal with the NLRC that they raised this defense. The only defense raised by petitioners in their
Answer with Counterclaim filed with the office of the Labor Arbiter is that private respondent was
dismissed from employment by reason of desertion.23Under the Rules of Court,24 which is
applicable in a suppletory character in labor cases before the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC pursuant
to Section 3, Rule I of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC25, defenses which are not raised
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.26
Granting, for the sake of argument, that petitioners may use Section H (6), Part I of Memorandum
Circular No. 41 or Section 19(C) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 as basis for terminating
private respondent's employment, it is clear that one of the conditions before any of these
provisions becomes applicable is when the vessel arrives at a convenient port within a period of
three (3) months before the expiration of the contract of employment. In the present case, private
respondent's contract was executed on April 10, 1996 for a duration of twelve months. He was
deployed aboard MV Cemtex General on June 25, 1996 and repatriated to the Philippines on August
66
22, 1996. Hence, it is clear that petitioners did not meet this condition because private respondent's
termination was not within a period of three months before the expiration of his contract of
employment.
Moreover, the Court finds nothing in the records to show that petitioners complied with the other
conditions enumerated therein, such as the payment of all of private respondent's earned wages
together with his leave pay for the entire contract period as well as termination pay equivalent to
his one month salary.
Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against him
and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side.
However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly only
when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed in
cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which afford
protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or abroad.
Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made)
governs in this jurisdiction.27 In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of Employment
entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here in the
Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other laws
affecting labor apply in this case.28 Accordingly, as to the requirement of notice and hearing in the
case of a seafarer, the Court has already ruled in a number of cases that before a seaman can be
dismissed and discharged from the vessel, it is required that he be given a written notice regarding
the charges against him and that he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend
himself personally or through a representative.29 Hence, the employer should strictly comply with
the twin requirements of notice and hearing without regard to the nature and situs of employment
or the nationality of the employer. Petitioners failed to comply with these twin requirements.
Petitioners also contend that the wages of private respondent from August 11-22, 1996 were
applied to the costs of his repatriation. Petitioners argue that the off-setting of the costs of his
repatriation against his wages for the aforementioned period is allowed under the provisions of
Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 which provides that when the seafarer is
discharged for any just cause, the employer shall have the right to recover the costs of his
replacement and repatriation from the seafarer's wages and other earnings.
The Court does not agree. Section 19(E) of Memorandum Circular No. 055-96 has its counterpart
provision under Section H (2), Part II of Memorandum Circular No. 41, to wit:
SECTION H. REPATRIATION
xxxx
2. When the seaman is discharged for disciplinary reasons, the employer shall have the right
to recover the costs of maintenance and repatriation from the seaman's balance of wages
and other earnings.
xxxx
67
It is clear under the above-quoted provision that the employer shall have the right to recover the
cost of repatriation from the seaman's wages and other earnings only if the concerned seaman is
validly discharged for disciplinary measures. In the present case, since petitioners failed to prove
that private respondent was validly terminated from employment on the ground of desertion, it
only follows that they do not have the right to deduct the costs of private respondent's repatriation
from his wages and other earnings.
Lastly, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the private respondent is not
entitled to his money claims representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and
special allowance as well as attorney's fees because he failed to present any proof to show that he is
entitled to these awards.
However, the Court finds that the monetary award representing private respondent's three months
salary as well as the award representing his living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and
special allowance should be modified.
The Court finds no basis in the NLRC's act of including private respondent's living allowance as part
of the three months salary to which he is entitled under Section 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 8042,
otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995." The pertinent
provisions of the said Act provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims –
xxxx
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as

defined by law or contract, the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less.
xxxx
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that what is included in the computation of the amount
due to the overseas worker are only his salaries. Allowances are excluded. In the present case, since
private respondent received a basic monthly salary of US$400.00, he is, therefore, entitled to
receive a sum of US$1200.00, representing three months of said salary.
As to the awards of living allowance, overtime pay, vacation pay and special allowance, it is clearly
provided under private respondent's Contract of Employment that he is entitled to these benefits as
follows: living allowance of US$140.00/month; vacation leave with pay equivalent to
US$40.00/month; overtime rate of US$120.00/month; and, special allowance of
US$175.00/month.30
With respect, however, to the award of overtime pay, the correct criterion in determining whether
or not sailors are entitled to overtime pay is not whether they were on board and can not leave ship
beyond the regular eight working hours a day, but whether they actually rendered service in excess
of said number of hours.31 In the present case, the Court finds that private respondent is not
68
entitled to overtime pay because he failed to present any evidence to prove that he rendered
service in excess of the regular eight working hours a day.
On the basis of the foregoing, the remaining benefits to which the private respondent is entitled is
the living allowance of US$140.00/month, which was removed in the computation of private
respondent's salary, special allowance of US$175.00/month and vacation leave with pay amounting
to US$40.00/month. Since private respondent rendered service for two months these benefits
should be doubled, giving a total of US$710.00.
As to the award of attorney's fees, this Court ruled in Reyes v. Court of Appeals,32 as follows:
x x x [T]here are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary
and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney's fee is the reasonable compensation
paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of
this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its
extraordinary concept, attorney's fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the
court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The instances where these may be
awarded are those enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, specifically par. 7 thereof
which pertains to actions for recovery of wages, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the
client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional
compensation or as part thereof. The extraordinary concept of attorney's fees is the one
contemplated in Article 111 of the Labor Code, which provides:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. – (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable
party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the amount of
wages recovered x x x
The afore-quoted Article 111 is an exception to the declared policy of strict

construction in the awarding of attorney's fees. Although an express finding of facts
and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any
showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the
wages. There need only be a showing that the lawful wages were not paid
accordingly, as in this case.
In carrying out and interpreting the Labor Code's provisions and its implementing
regulations, the employee's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate
spirit of the law as provided in Article 4 of the Labor Code which states that "[a]ll doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor] Code including its
implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor", and Article 1702 of
the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the
laborer."33 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, it is true that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC failed to state the reasons why
attorney's fees are being awarded. However, it is clear that private respondent was illegally
terminated from his employment and that his wages and other benefits were withheld from him
without any valid and legal basis. As a consequence, he is compelled to file an action for the
69
recovery of his lawful wages and other benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses. On these
bases, the Court finds that he is entitled to attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated December
18, 2001 and Resolution dated April 10, 2002 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the effect
that the award of US$1620.00 representing private respondent's three months salary is reduced to
US$1200.00. The award of US$550.00 representing private respondent's living allowance, overtime
pay, vacation pay and special allowance for two months is deleted and in lieu thereof, an award of
US$710.00 is granted representing private respondent's living allowance, special allowance and
vacation leave with pay for the same period.
No costs.
70

Court Drops Sheriff From Rolls Due To Absences

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Court Drops Sheriff From Rolls Due To Absences

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Assigned case A.M. No.

17-11-272-RTC, January 31, 2018

The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the OCA's recommendation.

Vendiola's prolonged unauthorized absences caused inefficiency in the public service as it

33. A.C. No. 9149, September 04, 2013

JULIAN PENILLA, Complainant, v. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID, JR., Respondent.

The antecedent facts follow:nadcralaw

Respondent harps a different tale.

34. A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014

JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,vs.PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against respondent to be well-

The Court’s Ruling

As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his

35.A.C. No. 7337, September 29, 2014

35. ROLANDO VIRAY, Complainant, v. ATTY. EUGENIO T. SANICAS, Respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondents Ester

All other claims are hereby denied for lack of merit.

Date Voucher No. Amount Purpose

Complainant also discovered that respondent misrepresented to spouses Lopez that he is

IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The Court’s Ruling

36. A.C. No. 9532 October 8, 2013

MARIA CRISTINA ZABALJAUREGUI PITCHER, Complainant, vs.ATTY. RUSTICO B.

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

The OBC's Report and Recommendation

The Court's Ruling

37. A.C. No. 6711 July 3, 2007

MA. LUISA HADJULA,complainant vs. ATTY. ROCELES F. MADIANDA,respondent

5. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in

9. I specifically deny the allegation of F/SUPT. MA. LUISA C. HADJULA in

Moreover, the alleged DOCUMENTS she purportedly have shown to me

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is

It a person, in respect to business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults a

Likewise, a lawyer-client relationship exists notwithstanding the close

IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Roceles F. Madianda is hereby REPRIMANDED and

38. IPI No. 12-205-CA-J

A reading of Merdegia's administrative complaint[7] shows an apparent failure to understand that

When the case was called for pre-trial on 22 September 1977,

Meanwhile, on 19 December 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion

The Trial Courts Ruling

The Courts Ruling

40. G.R. No. 179892-93 January 30, 2009

ATTY. VICTORIANO V. OROCIO, Petitioner,

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

Dear Ms. Segovia and Ms. Baysic:

4. Contingency or success fees of fifteen percent (15%) of whatever amounts/value of assets

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the parties herein have agreed as follows:

2. "Corrected Earnings Differential" refers to a benefit which is a result of re-

The Court of Appeals is clearly mistaken.

A stipulation on a lawyer’s compensation in a written contract for professional services ordinarily

CONCHITA A. BALTAZAR, ROLANDO SAN PEDRO, ALICIA EULALIO-RAMOS, SOLEDAD A.

In their complaint, they alleged that respondent had violated Canons

42. G.R. No. 176425

HEIRS OF MANUEL UY EK LIONG, represented by BELEN LIM VDA. DE UY, Petitioners,

SO ORDERED.3 (Italics and Underscore Ours)

3. Orders the respondents to pay the petitioners the following amounts:

a). ₱50,000.00 as and for moral damages;

c). ₱50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.