EN BANC Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the
ot the minor or the mother, would be liable for the damages
G.R. No. 34840 September 23, 1931
NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ, ABELARDO
VELASCO, and SATURNINO CORTEZ, defendants-appellants.
L.D. Lockwood for appellants Velasco and Cortez.
San Agustin and Roxas for other appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This is an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the five
defendants, to recover damages in the amount of P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a
result of an automobile accident. On judgment being rendered as prayed for by the plaintiff,
both sets of defendants appealed.
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of private ownership collided while
attempting to pass each other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South Road in the municipality
of Las Piñas, Province of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and
was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez, a
lad 18 years of age, and was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel
Gutierrez. At the time of the collision, the father was not in the car, but the mother, together will
several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were accommodated therein. A
passenger in the autobus, by the name of Narciso Gutierrez, was en route from San Pablo,
Laguna, to Manila. The collision between the bus and the automobile resulted in Narciso
Gutierrez suffering a fracture right leg which required medical attendance for a considerable
period of time, and which even at the date of the trial appears not to have healed properly.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence pure and simple. The difference
between the parties is that, while the plaintiff blames both sets of defendants, the owner of the
passenger truck blames the automobile, and the owner of the automobile, in turn, blames the
truck. We have given close attention to these highly debatable points, and having done so, a
majority of the court are of the opinion that the findings of the trial judge on all controversial
questions of fact find sufficient support in the record, and so should be maintained. With this
general statement set down, we turn to consider the respective legal obligations of the
defendants.
In amplification of so much of the above pronouncement as concerns the Gutierrez family, it
may be explained that the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent chauffeur, that he was driving at
an excessive rate of speed, and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his head
and so contributed by his negligence to the accident. The guaranty given by the father at the
time the son was granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for
the acts of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
caused by the minor.
We are dealing with the civil law liability of parties for obligations which arise from fault or
negligence. At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we can take
cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. In the United States, it is uniformly
held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains it for the general use
of his family is liable for its negligent operation by one of his children, whom he designates or
permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the
pleasure of other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the law
is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the family is within the
scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the child because of the
relationship of master and servant. (Huddy On Automobiles, 6th ed., sec. 660; Missell vs.
Hayes [1914], 91 Atl., 322.) The liability of Saturnino Cortez, the owner of the truck, and of his
chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a different basis, namely, that of contract which, we think,
has been sufficiently demonstrated by the allegations of the complaint, not controverted, and
the evidence. The reason for this conclusion reaches to the findings of the trial court concerning
the position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the machine, and the lack of care
employed by the chauffeur. While these facts are not as clearly evidenced as are those which
convict the other defendant, we nevertheless hesitate to disregard the points emphasized by
the trial judge. In its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers approaching a narrow
bridge from opposite directions, with neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to
the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an accident.
The defendants Velasco and Cortez further contend that there existed contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, consisting principally of his keeping his foot outside the truck, which
occasioned his injury. In this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside from the fact that the
defense of contributory negligence was not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the
case is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield into speculative matters.
The last subject for consideration relates to the amount of the award. The appellee suggests
that the amount could justly be raised to P16,517, but naturally is not serious in asking for this
sum, since no appeal was taken by him from the judgment. The other parties unite in
challenging the award of P10,000, as excessive. All facts considered, including actual
expenditures and damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which may cause him
permanent lameness, in connection with other adjudications of this court, lead us to conclude
that a total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and reasonable. The difficulty in
approximating the damages by monetary compensation is well elucidated by the divergence of
opinion among the members of the court, three of whom have inclined to the view that P3,000
would be amply sufficient, while a fourth member has argued that P7,500 would be none too
much.
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the judgment appealed from will be modified, and the
plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo
Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of
both instances.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-21477-81 April 29, 1966
FRANCISCA VILUAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PATRICIO HUFANA and GREGORIO HUFANA, respondents.
Jose A. Solomon, for petitioner.
Lourdes M. Garcia, for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
Seven persons were killed and thirteen others were injured in Bangar, La Union, on February
16, 1958, when a passenger bus on which they were riding caught fire after hitting a post and
crashing against a tree. The bus, owned by petitioner and driven by Hermenegildo Aquino,
came from San Fernando, La Union and was on its way to Candon, Ilocos Sur.
It appears that, as the bus neared the gate of the Gabaldon school building in the municipality
of Bangar, another passenger bus owned by Patricio Hufana and driven by Gregorio Hufana
tried to overtake it but that instead of giving way, Aquino increased the speed of his bus and
raced with the overtaking bus. Aquino lost control of his bus as a result of which it hit a post,
crashed against a tree and then burst into flames.
Among those who perished were Timoteo Mapanao, Francisca Lacsamana, Narcisa Mendoza
and Gregorio Sibayan, whose heirs sued petitioner and the latter's driver, Hermenegildo
Aquino, for damages for breach of contract of carriage. Carolina Sabado, one of those injured,
also sued petitioner and the driver for damages. The complaints were filed in the Court of First
Instance of La Union.
In their answer, petitioner and her driver blamed respondent Gregorio Hufana for the accident.
With leave of court, they filed third party complaints against Hufana and the latter's employer,
Patricio Hufana.
After trial, the court found that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers
of the two buses and held both, together with their respective employers, jointly and severally
liable for damages.
The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the
plaintiff's entitled to damages to be paid jointly and severally by the defendants and
third-party defendants as follows:
(1) For plaintiff Juliana C. Vda. de Mapanao for the death of her son Timoteo
Mapanao, the sum of P5,000.00 for actual damages, P1,000.00 as moral damages
and P250.00 as attorney's fees;
(2) For plaintiff Leon Lacsamana for the death of his daughter Francisca Lacsamana,
the sum of P4,000.00 as actual damages, P1,000.00 as moral damages and P250.00
as attorney's fees;
(3) For plaintiffs Juan Mendoza and Magdalena Mendoza for the death of their mother
Narcisa Mendoza, the sum of P4,000.00 for actual damages, P1,000.00 for moral
damages and P250.00 as attorney's fees;
(4) For plaintiffs Agustina Sabado, Quintin Sibayan, Julita Sibayan, Primitivo Sibayan
and Avelina Sibayan, the sum of P4,000.00 for actual damages, P1,500.00 for moral
damages and P250.00 as attorney's fees;
(5) For the injured passenger Carolina Sabado, P649.00 for actual damages,
P1,000.00 for moral damages and P250.00 for attorney's fees.
All such amounts awarded as damages shall bear interest at the legal rate of six per
cent (6%) per annum from the date of this decision until the same shall have been
duly paid in full.
Defendants and third-party defendants are further ordered to pay proportionate costs."
Both petitioner and her driver and the respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals.
While affirming the finding that the accident was due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers
of both the Viluan and the Hufana buses, the Court of Appeals differed with the trial court in the
assessment of liabilities of the parties. In its view only petitioner Francisca Viluan, as operator
of the bus, is liable for breach of contract of carriage. The driver, Hermenegildo Aquino, cannot
be made jointly and severally liable with petitioner because he is merely the latter's employee
and is in no way a party to the contract of carriage. The court added, however —
Hermenegildo Aquino is not entirely free from liability. He may be held liable, criminally
and civilly, under the Revised Penal Code (Articles 100 and 103), but not in a civil suit
for damages predicated upon a breach of contract, such as this one (Aguas, et al. vs.
Vargas, et al., CA-G.R. No. 27161-R, Jan. 22, 1963). Furthermore, the common
carrier, Francisca Viluan could recover from Aquino any damages that she might have
suffered by reason of the latter's negligence.
Neither may respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana be held liable in the opinion of
the appellate court because the plaintiffs did not amend complaints in the main action so as to
assert a claim against the respondents as third party defendants.
The appellate court likewise disallowed the award of moral damages for P1,000.00 to Carolina
Sabado, there being no showing that the common carrier was guilty of fraud or bad faith in the
performance of her obligation. Accordingly, it rendered judgment as follows:
 IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we hereby find defendant-appellant Francisca
Viluan solely liable to the plaintiffs-appellees for the damages and attorney's fees
awarded to them by the court below and further declare null and void the lower court's
award of moral damages in the amount of P1,000.00 in favor of plaintiff Carolina
Sabado. Thus modified, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects,
with costs in this instance against defendant-appellant Francisca Viluan.
From this judgment petitioner brought this appeal. In brief, her position is that since the
proximate cause of the accident was found to be the concurrent negligence of the drivers of the
two buses, then she and respondent Patricio and Gregorio Hufana should have been held
equally liable to the plaintiffs in the damage suits. The fact that the respondents were not sued
as principal defendants but were brought into the cases as third party defendants should not
preclude a finding of their liability.
We agree with petitioner's contention. To begin with, the Court of Appeals' ruling is based on
section 5 of Rule 12 of the former Rules of Court, 1 which was adopted from Rule 14-a of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the latter provision has indeed been held to preclude a
judgment in favor of a plaintiff and against a third party defendant where the plaintiff has not
amended his complaint to assert a claim against a third party defendant, 2 yet, as held in
subsequent decisions, this rule applies only to cases where the third party defendant is brought
in on an allegation of liability to the defendants. The rule does not apply where a third-party
defendant is impleaded on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiffs, in which case no
amendment of the plaintiffs complaint is necessary. 3 As explained in the Atlantic Coast Line R.
Co. vs. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 52 F. Supp. 177 (1943):
From the sources of Rule 14 and the decisions herein cited, it is clear that this rule,
like the admiralty rule, "covers two distinct subjects, the addition of parties defendant
to the main cause of action, and the bringing in of a third party for a defendant's
remedy over." x x x
If the third party complaint alleges facts showing a third party's direct liability to plaintiff
on the claim set out in plaintiff's petition, then third party "shall" make his defenses as
provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against plaintiff as provided in Rule 13. In
the case of alleged direct liability, no amendment is necessary or required. The
subject-matter of the claim is contained in plaintiff's complaint, the ground of third
party's liability on that claim is alleged in third party complaint, and third party's
defense to set up in his an to plaintiff's complaint. At that point and without
amendment, the plaintiff and third party are at issue as to their rights respecting the
claim.
The provision in the rule that, "The third-party defendant may assert any defenses
which the third-party plaintiff may assert to the plaintiff's claim," applies to the other
subject, namely, the alleged liability of third party defendant. The next sentence in the
rule, "The third-party defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff's
liability to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff,"
applies to both subjects. If third party is brought in as liable only to defendant and
judgment is rendered adjudicating plaintiff's right to recover against defendant and
defendant's rights to recover against third party, he is bound by both adjudications.
That part of the sentence refers to the second subject. If third party is brought in as
liable to plaintiff, then third party is bound by the adjudication as between him and
plaintiff. That refers to the first subject. If third party is brought in as liable to plaintiff
and also over to defendant, then third party is bound by both adjudications. The next
sentence in the rule, "The plaintiff may amend his pleadings to assert against the third-
party defendant any claim which the plaintiff might have asserted against the third-
party defendant had he been joined originally as a defendant," refers to the second
subject, that is, to bringing in third party as liable to defendant only, and does not
apply to the alleged liability of third party directly to plaintiff."
In this case the third-party complaints filed by petitioner and her driver charged respondents
with direct liability to the plaintiffs. It was contended that the accident was due "to the fault,
negligence, carelessness and imprudence of the third party defendant Gregorio Hufana" and, in
petitioner's motion for leave to file a third party complaint, it was stated that "Patricio Hufana
and Gregorio Hufana were not made parties to this action, although the defendants are entitled
to indemnity and/or subrogation against them in respect of plaintiff's claim."
It should make no difference therefore whether the respondents were brought in as principal
defendants or as third-party defendants. As Chief Justice Moran points out, since the liability of
the third-party defendant is already asserted in the third-party complaint, the amendment of the
complaint to assert such liability is merely a matter of form, to insist on which would not be in
keeping with the liberal spirit of the Rules of Court. 4
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of petitioner springs from contract while that
of respondents arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we already ruled in Gutierrez vs.
Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177,5 that in case of injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver
of the bus on which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers as well as the
owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally liable for damages. Some members of the
Court, though, are of the view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified in the sense that petitioner as well
as respondents Patricio Hufana and Gregorio Hufana are jointly and severally liable for the
damages awarded by the trial court. The disallowance of moral damages in the amount of
P1,000.00 is correct and should be affirmed. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ.,
concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., and Barrera, JJ., took no part.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25292 November 29, 1969
ZAMBOANGA TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., and ZAMBOANGA RAPIDS
COMPANY, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE MARIO DAGAMANUEL, represented by PASCUALA
JULIAN DE PUNZALAN, respondents.
Oscar L. Uy for petitioners.
Climaco, Azcarraga and Silang for respondents.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28297-R,
affirming, with modifications, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City in its
Civil Case No. 574 — for breach of contract of carriage — wherein herein petitioners-
appellants, along with their driver named Valeriano Marcos, 1 were condemned to pay damages
to herein private respondent minor Jose Mario Dagamanuel, for the deaths of his father and
mother while on board a passenger bus owned (by purchase) and operated by petitioner-
appellant Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. but which, at the time of the mishap causing the
deaths referred to, was still registered with the Public Service Commission in the name of
petitioner-appellant Zamboanga Rapids Co., Inc.
The appeal being purely on question of law, We quote the antecedent facts, as set forth in the
pertinent portions of the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from, as follows:
In the evening of August 13, 1955, the spouses Ramon and Josefina Dagamanuel
boarded a bus at Manicahan, Zamboanga City, to attend a benefit dance at the
Bunguiao Elementary School, also in Zamboanga City, where Josefina was a public
school teacher. After the dance, the couple boarded the same bus to return to
Manicahan. At around 1 o'clock in the early morning of August 14, 1955, the bus, with
plate 1955 TPU-1137, and driven by Valeriano Marcos, fell off the road and pinned to
death the said spouses and several other passengers.
The plaintiff, the only child of the deceased spouses, through his maternal
grandmother, as guardian ad-litem, instituted this action against the defendants
Zamboanga Transportation Co., Inc. and the Zamboanga Rapids Co., Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as Zamtranco and Zambraco, respectively) for breach of contract of
carriage, alleging that the accident was due to the fault and negligence of the driver in
operating the bus and due to the negligence of the defendant companies in their
supervision of their driver. The plaintiff asks for actual or compensatory damages in
the sum of P40,000, moral damages in the sum of P40,000, exemplary damages in
the sum of P20,000, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000 and costs.
The Zamtranco filed a third-party complaint against the driver Marcos, admitting that 'it
is the owner by purchase of Motor Vehicle with plate number 1955 TPU-11327 and
employer' of said driver, but contending, among others, that the said driver had no
authority to drive the bus, hence, the driver alone should be adjudged liable. In
addition, the said defendant company alleged that with intent to place his property
beyond the reach of the creditors, the driver sold his property to his brother, hence its
additional prayer that the sale executed by the driver be declared null and void. The
Zambraco also filed a third-party complaint against the driver, admitting that "it is the
registered owner of Motor Vehicle with plate number 1955 TPU-11327 and employer
of herein third-party defendant" (the driver), but also contending, among others, that
the accident occurred due solely to the negligence of the driver for taking out the bus
without authority from it. It also asked for the annulment of the deed of sale made by
the driver of his property.
Answering the complaint, the Zambraco alleges that it is engaged in land
transportation business and that at the time of the accident it was the registered owner
of the ill-fated vehicle. In exculpation, it denies that Marcos was authorized to operate
the vehicle when it met with the accident. In its own answer, the Zambraco admits that
it is also engaged in land transportation business at the time of the accident, and
likewise claims that Marcos had no authority to operate the vehicle.
Finding that (1) the Zamtranco and the Zambraco were under one management at the
time of the accident; (2) the accident was due to the negligence of the driver who was
under their employ; and (3) the sale made by Marcos of his property was done with
intent to defraud his creditors, the trial court rendered judgment (1) sentencing the
three, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff P16,000 for the death of the spouses,
P4,000 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and costs; and (2)
annulling the deed of sale executed by Marcos.
All the three defendants appealed. Marcos' appeal was later dismissed; hence as to
him the judgment is already final and executory.
In their joint brief, the two appellant companies allege that the trial court erred in (1)
"deciding the case against the defendant Zamboanga Transportation Company, Inc., it
being the wrong party"; (2) "awarding damages based on an alleged contract of
carriage"; (3) "misquoting the very provision on which it based its decision, and
consequently gave a substantively wrong interpretation of the same to the detriment of
the appellants"; (4) "awarding excessive compensatory damages to the plaintiffs"; and
(5) "awarding exemplary damages."
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the contract of carriage, the testimony of the principal teacher Filoteo
de los Reyes sufficiently establishes the existence of such contract. The appellants
have not introduced evidence to dispute the fact that De los Reyes entered into a
contract for the bus to make the trip to Bungiao, and that he paid for it. Neither have
they contradicted Marcos' affidavit (exh. C-28) to the effect that he was authorized by
the manager of the Zamtranco to make the trip in question.
 xxx xxx xxx
This being a case of violation of a contract of carriage resulting in death to
passengers, the presumption is that the appellants as carriers have been at fault or
have acted negligently (art. 1756, new Civil Code; Sy vs. Malate Taxicab, L-8937,
Nov. 29, 1957). This presumption can, however, be rebutted by (1) proof of
extraordinary diligence or (2) proof that the accident was due to a fortuitous event.
With respect to the first possible defense, the appellants have not even as much as
hinted either at the trial or in this appeal that they had exercised the diligence required
of them as carriers. All they did was to deny that the driver was authorized to operate
the vehicle in question. As to the second, we note that only the driver has interposed
fortuitous event below, but as we have already noted, his appeal has been dismissed,
and as to him, the decision a quo had already become final and executory. Anent his
second defense, the appellants have raised this belatedly, as they did it only on
appeal. At all events, the occurrence of fortuitous event is belied by the report of
investigation (exh. C) to the effect that the driver was under the influence of liquor, and
that the bus was running at a fast clip in spite of the fact that the road was slippery.
xxx xxx xxx
It is undisputed that Josefina was 32 years old it the time she died and a public school
teacher receiving P120 a month or P1,440 a year, with the prospect of increase in
salary. The probabilities that she would live until she reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 cannot be discounted for there is no evidence that she was
suffering from any sickness. There is likewise no dispute that her husband Ramon
was 27 years old at the time of his death, a farmer by calling and in good health. All
these have been established, and the appellants have not presented rebuttal evidence
(t.s.n. 60. id). Allowing him a minimum income of P120 a month, he was earning at
least P1,440 a year. The probabilities of advancement are also not remote as he was
still young.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . The manner with which the driver operated the vehicle as described in exh. C,
and appellants' absolute lack of precaution in assigning the driver to this particularly
dangerous night trip notwithstanding the driver's record of previous traffic violations
(exh. C-47), are so reprehensible as to call for the imposition of large exemplary
damages to serve as a deterrent to others. To us, the amount of P5,000 could serve
the purpose.
ACCORDINGLY, with the modification that the following damages are hereby
awarded, to wit, (1) P12,000 for the death of the spouses Ramon and Josefina
Dagamanuel, (2) P11,520 for the loss of earnings of both spouses, (3) P5,000 as
moral damages, and (4) P5,000 as exemplary damages, the judgment a quo is
affirmed in all other respects, at defendants-appellants' cost.
In due time petitioners-appellants moved for the reconsideration of the above-quoted judgment
of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied; hence, this appeal via the present petition
for certiorari.
Petitioners now contend that the Court of Appeals committed the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN HOLDING PETITIONER ZAMTRANCO,
THE UNREGISTERED OWNER OF THE ILL-FATED VEHICLE, JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE ZAMBRACO, THE REGISTERED OWNER, AND
WITH THE DRIVER THEREOF.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW AND APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT, IN (A) AWARDING EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES FOR THE DEATH OF THE PARENTS OF RESPONDENT
DAGAMANUEL; EXCESSIVE COMPENSATORY DAMAGES; AND EXCESSIVE
MORAL DAMAGES TO RESPONDENT, WITHOUT THE LATTER APPEALING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND (B) IN HOLDING PETITIONERS JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE DRIVER BY WAY OF EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES FOR THE LATTER'S WRONGFUL ACT.
That the Court of Appeals did not commit the first error assigned by appellants is obvious.
While it is true that according to previous decisions of this Court, transfer of a certificate of
public convenience to operate a transportation service is not effective and binding insofar as
the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in its relation to the public is concerned,
without the approval of the transfer by the Public Service Commission required by the Public
Service Act,2 and that in contemplation of law, the transferor of such certificate continues to be
the operator of the service as long as the transfer is not yet approved, and as such operator, he
is the one responsible jointly and severally with his driver for damages incurred by passengers
or third persons in consequence of injuries or deaths resulting from the operation of such
service,3 We do not find any need for applying these rulings to the present petitioners for the
simple reason that in their respective third-party complaints, as noted by the Court of Appeals,
they both admitted separately that they are the owners of the bus involved in the incident in
question and that Valeriano Marcos, the driver of said bus at the time of said incident, was in
their employ. And there is nothing strange in this because, as found by said appellate court:
There is abundant evidence that although the Zambraco appears to be the registered
owner, Zamtranco was in fact the operator. To start with, there is the testimony of
Filoteo de los Reyes, principal teacher of Josefina, to the effect that for the trip to and
from Bunguiao where the benefit dance was held, he contracted with Zamtranco at
Tetuan (t.s.n. 13-14, Aug. 7, 1956, Cabato); that he saw in Bunguiao the bus sent by
Zamtranco (t.s.n. 33, id.); and that he paid the fare to the driver of Zamtranco (t.s.n
21 id.). This testimony was never contradicted by the appellants, either by
documentary or testimonial evidence. . . .
In their own brief in this instance, appellants make these significant admissions:
 The facts that TPU Bus No. 11327 which figured in the accident that caused the death
of the spouses Ramon Dagamanuel and Josefina Punzalan was registered in the
name of Zambraco in the year 1955, is not disputed. At that time, the sale and merger
of this Zambraco with the Zamtranco was to be the subject of application with the
Public Service Commission. Pending such approval, the ill-fated bus was again
registered in the name of the Zambraco in the year 1956, according to the testimony
given at the trial by Leonardo Galvez, then Acting Registrar of the Motor Vehicle Office
in Zamboanga.
Indeed, under these circumstances, We cannot find any reason to disagree with Mr. Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro who penned the appealed decision in his ruling to the effect that:
We do not find any application of the ruling in the foregoing cases to the case at bar.
There, the registered owners invariably sought to pass on liability to the actual
operators on the pretext that they had already sold or transferred their units to the
latter, whereas in the present case, the registered owner, the Zambraco, admits
whatever liability it has and vigorously objects to any finding that the actual operator,
the Zamtranco, is also liable with it, claiming that as registered owner, it alone should
be adjudged liable. We would not inquire into the motive of the Zambraco why instead
of sharing whatever liability it has with the Zamtranco, it prefers to shoulder it alone.
But the fact stands out in bold relief that although still the registered owner at the time
of the accident, it had already sold the vehicle to Zamtranco and the latter was actually
operating it.
It is our view that it is for the better protection of the public that both the owner of
record and the actual operator, as held by us in the past, should be adjudged jointly
and severally liable with the driver (see Dizon vs. Octavio, et al., 51 O.G. No. 8, 4059-
4061; Castanares vs. Pages, CA-G.R. 21809-R, March 8, 1962; Redado vs. Bautista,
CA-G.R. 19295-R, Sept. 19, 1961; Bering vs. Noeth, CA-G.R. 28483-R, April 29
1965).
The second assignment of error refers to the different items of damages awarded by the
respondent court. Petitioners complain that the same are excessive if not without legal basis.
To a certain extent, petitioners are right.
It may be recalled that the trial court's judgment regarding the matter of damages was as
follows:
1) P8,000.00 for the death of Ramon Dagamanuel;
2) P8,000.00 for the death of Josefina Punzalan;
3) P4,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) P2,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
5) Costs.
From this judgment, only petitioners appealed. Private respondents did not appeal. Accordingly,
petitioners are correct in inviting Our attention thus:
The respondent did not appeal any portion of the decision of the lower Court, thus
indicating that he is fully satisfied with the same. On the other hand, the driver of the
ill-fated bus failed to perfect his appeal and consequently, as against him, the decision
of the lower Court is already final.
The lower Court rendered a decision against the driver of the bus and the two
petitioners herein for the death of the parents of the respondent in the sum of
P16,000.00 together with P4,000.00 exemplary damages. But notwithstanding the
automatic exclusion of the driver from the effects of the appealed decision, the Court
of Appeals, while reducing the death award to P12,000.00 increased the exemplary
damages to P5,000.00 adding thereto P11,520.00 compensatory damages and
P5,000.00 moral damages. We humbly contend that to award damages when none
was allowed by the lower Court, and to increase damages when the successful party
did not appeal, is simply improper and amounts to pure abuse of discretion on the part
of the respondent appellate Court, contrary to the doctrines laid down by the
Honorable Supreme Court in the following cases, to wit:
"The discretion in fixing moral and exemplary damages primarily lay in the
trial court and the same should be respected. (Coleongco vs. Claparols, No.
L-18616, March 31, 1964; emphasis ours)."
"It is well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a
civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the
decision of the court below. An appellee, who is not appellant, may assign
errors in his brief where his purpose is to maintain the judgment on other
grounds, but he may not do so if his purpose is to have the judgment
modified or reversed, for, in such a case, he must appeal. HERE, THE
RESPONDENT DID NOT APPEAL AND SO IT WAS ERROR FOR THE
COURT OF APPEALS TO AWARD HIM A RELIEF NOT GRANTED BY THE
LOWER COURT. (Dy, et al. vs. Kuison, L-16654, Nov. 30, 1961; emphasis
ours)."
Furthermore, it is respectfully submitted, that a child 3-year old, as the respondent
herein was when his parents died, cannot yet feel the mental anguish resulting from
their death, as to warrant such excessive award of P5,000.00 moral damages. We
venture to ask, therefore, what degree of mental torture could have been possibly
endured by a boy of such tender age? We believe that the measure of moral
damages, if any, must be commensurate with the mental anguish suffered by the heir.
(Mercado, et al. vs. Lira, et al., Nos. L-13328-29 and L-13358, Sept. 29, 1961.)
True it is, the awards of P8,000 each for the death of the parents of respondent Jose Mario
Dagamanuel may not be increased anymore, but We cannot say that they should be reduced.
Quite, on the contrary, We consider the judgment of the Court of Appeals in respect to the
matter of damages to be more in accordance with the facts, except perhaps, as to the item of
moral damages, considering the tender age of the above-named respondent child, and We
would have upheld the same had private respondent appealed from the decision of the trial
court.4 Indeed, the Court of Appeals properly interpreted the P16,000 awarded by the trial court
as including not only damages for the deceased couple but also the other items of recoverable
damages, like compensatory or actual, etc. Thus viewed, the amounts awarded by the trial
court cannot be considered excessive.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, with the
modification that as to damages, petitioners are sentenced to pay jointly and severally no more
than the amounts of damages adjudged by the trial court.

No costs in this instance.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Teehankee,
JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
Castro, J., took no part.
 EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30115 September 28, 1973
FE PEREZ, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JOSEFINA GUTIERREZ, defendant third-party plaintiff-appellee, PANFILO ALAJAR, third-
party defendant-appellee.
Julian C. Gonzales, Jr. for plaintiff-appellant.
Gerardo E. Angeles for defendant-third-party plaintiff-appellee.
Apostadera, Palabrica and Muyco for third-party defendant-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
This appeal from the decision dated June 9, 1967 of the Court of First Instance of Davao in its
civil case 3163 poses objections to the manner the trial court adjudicated the claim for
damages filed by the plaintiff-appellant Fe Perez against the defendant-third-party plaintiff-
appellee Josefina Gutierrez.
The complaint (later amended) filed on October 29, 1959 by Fe Perez with the Court of First
Instance of Davao against Josefina Gutierrez, for breach of contract of carriage, alleges that on
September 6, 1959 while she, together with nine co-teachers, was a passenger of an AC
jeepney registered under the name of the defendant Gutierrez, the said vehicle, due to the
reckless negligence of its driver Leopoldo Cordero, met with an accident, resulting in injuries to
herself which required her hospitalization. In her answer, Josefina Gutierrez averred that if the
claim of Fe Perez is at all justified, responsibility therefor should devolve on one Panfilo Alajar,
the actual owner, by purchase, of the said passenger jeepney when the accident occurred and
against whom she has filed a third-party complaint.
The deed of sale attached to the third-party complaint recites, inter alia,
That it is mutually agreed by the herein vendor and vendee that the TITLE to
the aforementioned vehicle shall remain with the VENDOR, pending approval
of the herein SALE by the Public Service Commission, said motor vehicle
being registered as a public utility auto-calesa under "AC" denomination; ...
That the vendee herein, by these presents, do [sic] hereby binds himself and
do [sic] hereby assume, [sic] responsibility for all actions, claims, demands,
and rights of action, and whatever kind and nature, that may hereafter
develop as a consequence of or in the course of operation of the
aforementioned vehicle; ...
In his answer to the third-party complaint, Panfilo Alajar disclaimed responsibility for the
accident, alleging that (a) the mentioned deed of sale is null and void because it has not been
registered with the Public Service Commission despite repeated demands on the 3rd-party
complainant to do so; (b) the said passenger jeepney remained in the control of the 3rd-party
complainant who, together with her lawyer-husband, had been collecting rentals from him for
the use of the said vehicle; and (c) by express agreement, title to the said vehicle remained
with the 3rd-party complainant pending approval of the sale by the Public Service Commission.
The defendant Leopoldo Cordero was declared in default and did not appeal.
On June 9, 1967, after trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered its decision, in the main
finding Leopoldo Cordero guilty of reckless imprudence, and finding that Panfilo Alajar owned
and operated the auto calesa in question and, in fact, after the accident, even assumed
responsibility for the payment of the hospital bills due to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital for
treatment of the injuries suffered by Fe Perez. Based on these findings as well as the proof of
the damages suffered by Fe Perez, the court adjudged as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
third-party defendant Panfilo Alajar to pay plaintiff the amount of P1,552.20
hospital expenses; P2,000.00, actual damages; P5,000.00 moral damages;
P500.00 incidental expenses; and P2,000.00 attorney's fees.
Ordering likewise Panfilo Alajar to pay defendant third-party plaintiff Josefina
Gutierrez P500.00 moral damages; and P1,000.00 attorney's fees, and to
pay the costs of the proceedings on both cases.
The present appeal questions the correctness of the dispositive portion of the decision a quo
which adjudged Panfilo Alajar, instead of Josefina Gutierrez, as the party liable to her for the
payment of the damages adjudicated in her favor. Specifically, Fe Perez argues that the
registered owner of a motor vehicle should be the one held liable for damages resulting from
breach of contract of carriage by a common carrier.
We find the appeal meritorious and in accord with settled law on the matter.
In Peralta vs. Mangusang1 this Court, in approbation of a similar argument, said:
The law (Sec. 20 [g], Public Service Act) really requires the approval of the
Public Service Commission in order that a franchise, or any privileges
pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate
issued to the grantee. The reason is obvious. Since a franchise is personal in
nature any transfer or lease thereof should be submitted for approval of the
Public Service Commission, so that the latter may take proper safeguards to
protect the interest of the public. It follows that if the property covered by the
franchise is transferred or leased to another without obtaining the requisite
approval, the transfer is not binding on the Public Service Commission and,
in contemplation of law, the grantee continues to be responsible under the
franchise in relation to the Commission and to the public for the
consequences incident to the operation of the vehicle, one of them being the
collision under consideration. (Montoya v. Ignacio, 50 O.G. No. 1. 108; Vda.
de Medina, et al. v. Cresencia, et al., 52 O.G. No. 10, 4604; Erezo v. Jepte,
et al., G.R. No. L-9605, Sept. 30, 1957; Tamayo v. Aquino, 56 O.G. No.
36,5617).
In the earlier case of Erezo vs. Jepte,2 which is cited in the foregoing opinion, this Court held in turn, hereby held answerable to Josefina Gutierrez for such amount as the latter may pay to
that the doctrine making the registered owner of a common carrier answerable to the public for Fe Perez in satisfaction of the judgment appealed from. Costs against both the defendant-third
negligence injuries to its passengers or third persons, even though the vehicle had already party plaintiff-appellee Josefina Gutierrez and the third party defendant-appellee Panfilo Alajar.
been transferred to another, is based upon the principle —
Makalintal, Actg.. C.J., Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
... that in dealing with vehicles registered under the Public Service Law, the Esguerra, JJ., concur.
public has the right to assume or presume that the registered owner is the
actual owner thereof, for it would be difficult for the public to enforce the
actions that they may have for injuries caused to them by the vehicles being
negligently operated if the public should be required to prove who the actual
owner is. How would the public or third persons know against whom to
enforce their rights in case of subsequent transfers of the vehicles? We do
not imply by this doctrine, however, that the registered owner may not
recover whatever amount he had paid by virtue of his liability to third persons
from the person to whom he had actually sold, assigned or conveyed the
vehicle.

In Tamayo vs. Aquino,3 also cited in Mangusang, supra, this Court, reiterating what was
stated en passant in Jepte, supra, described the nature of the liability of the actual transferee of
a vehicle the negligent operation of which gives rise to injuries to its passengers:

The question that is posed, therefore, is how should the holder of the
certificate of public convenience Tamayo participate with his transferee
operator Rayos, in the damages recoverable by the heirs of the deceased
passenger, if their liability is not that of joint tortfeasors in accordance with
Article 2194 of the Civil Code. The following considerations must be borne in
mind in determining this question. As Tamayo is the registered owner of the
truck, his responsibility to the public or to any passenger riding in the vehicle
or truck must be direct, for the reasons given in our decision in the case
of Erezo vs. Jepte, supra, as quoted above. But as the transferee, who
operated the vehicle when the passenger died, is the one directly responsible
for the accident and death, he should in turn be made responsible to the
registered owner for what the latter may have been adjudged to pay. In
operating the truck without transfer thereof having been approved by the
Public Service Commission, the transferee acted merely as agent of the
registered owner and should be responsible to him (the registered owner), for
any damages that he may cause the latter by his negligence."

Upon the foregoing, it is quite clear that the court below erred in holding Panfilo Alajar, rather
than Josefina Gutierrez, as the one directly liable to Fe Perez for the latter's injuries and the
corresponding damages incurred. This Court notes moreover, that the court below inexplicably
failed to hold the driver (Leopoldo Cordero), whom it found guilty of reckless imprudence, jointly
and solidarily liable with Josefina Gutierrez to Fe Perez in accordance with the provisions of
article 2184 in relation to article 2180 of the new Civil Code. 4

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment below is hereby modified in the sense that Josefina Gutierrez
and Leopoldo Cordero are hereby adjudged directly and jointly and solidarily liable to Fe Perez
for the sums adjudicated in the judgment below in her (Fe Perez') favor, while Panfilo Alajar is,
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-57298 September 7, 1984
MYC-AGRO-INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
PURIFICACION CAMERINO VDA. DE CALDO, LEONILA, NEMENCIO, YOLANDA, EDNA,
LORNA and GENY all surnamed CALDO and represented herein by PURIFICACION
CAMERINO VDA. DE CALDO; PETRA SARDIDO DE ARO, TEODORA S. TABING, LUCILA
RAMOS VDA. DE PAKINGAN, GERALDO, ROWENA, and ISIDRO, all surnamed
PAKINGAN and represented herein by LUCILA RAMOS VDA. DE PAKINGAN; EMILIANO
NAVARRETE, NEMENCIO NAVARRETE, RODOLFO NAVARRETE, EDUARDO
NAVARRETE, MELANIO NAVARRETE, AIDA, LUALHATI and DOMINADOR, all surnamed
NAVARRETE and represented herein by EMILIANO NAVARRETE; CONSTANCIA
MANALAYSAY VDA. DE LACSON, ALMARIO, SOLEDAD, SUSAN, ELVIRA, CAROLINA,
CECILIA and ARIEL, all surnamed LACSON and represented herein by CONSTANCIA
MANALAYSAY VDA. DE LACSON; BELLA BALAJADIA, ERLINDA CANDADO, SOTERA
RAMIREZ, ROGELIO and FELICITACION GONZAGA, RUBY GONZAGA, represented
herein by ROGELIO GONZAGA; ALFREDO RODOLFO, ROSARIO GONZALES-ORDOÑEZ,
HERMOGENA BAUTISTA, RODOLFO ALCARAZ, FELICIDAD ALCARAZ, LENIZA
ALCARAZ, represented herein by RODOLFO ALCARAZ; ANIANO BAUTISTA, MAXIMINA
BAUTISTA, EPIFANIA and CORNELIO BAUTISTA, represented herein by ANIANO
BAUTISTA; AVELINO IGNACIO, NICANOR SILLA and ROSILA REYES; and BENEDICTO
KALAW KATIGBAK in his capacity as the General Manager of the MYC Agro-Industrial
Corporation; and CEFERINO AREVALO; and JAGUAR TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.,
FEDERAL INSURANCE CO., INC., F. E. ZUELLIG, and CASTO MADAMBA INSURANCE
AGENCY; and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
V.E. del Rosario & Associates for petitioner.
Remulla, Estrella, Bihasa, Lata & Associates for respondents.
Austria & Vargas for respondents Federal Ins., Castro Ins. Agency and F.E. Zuellig Inc.
Rodolfo Ma. Acob for respondent Jaguar Transit Co., Inc.
Pedro Magpayo, Jr. for respondent Federal Zuellig.
RELOVA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the then Court of Appeals in CA. G. R. No. 56343-
R, finding petitioner liable for damages.
About 4:30 in the afternoon of March 21, 1971, a Toyota truck with Plate No. 12-90-4 CT '70
owned by petitioner and operated by Ceferino Arevalo hit the right center side of a jeepney with
Plate No. 24-97-40-3 1970 owned by Nicanor Silla and operated by Alfredo Rodolfo. There
were fifteen (15) passengers of the jeepney, namely: (1) Laureano Lacson, (2) Salome
Bautista, (3) Chona Alcaraz, (4) Ruby Gonzaga, (5) Felicitacion Gonzaga, (6) Epifania Bautista,
(7) Avelino Ignacio, (8) Erlinda Candado, (9) Leniza Alcaraz, (10) Sotera Ramirez, (11) Rosario
Ordoñez, (12) Maximina Bautista, (13) Cornelio Bautista, (14) Hermogena Bautista and (15)
Felicidad Alcaraz. The jeepney, at the time of the impact, was parked at Regiment Street,
Anabu Imus, Cavite. As a consequence, said jeepney turned turtle and was pushed to a
cemented fence owned by Lucila Reyes, pinning down to death Carlito Pakingan, Hipolito
Caldo, Azucena Camaclang-Navarrete and Fortunato Bonifacio. Likewise, the passengers:
Laureano Lacson, Salome Bautista and Chona Alcaraz died because of the injuries sustained
in this incident; the other passengers suffered various injuries on the different parts of their
bodies.
The aforementioned jeepney and the wall fence were also damaged.
Complaint for damages was filed by the owner of the wall fence, the aforementioned victims
and the heirs of the deceased victims against petitioner MYC-AGRO-INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, the registered owner of the Toyota truck; Ceferino Arevalo, the driver of said
truck; and, Benedicto Kalaw-Katigbak, the general manager of petitioner corporation.
In its responsive pleading, petitioner admitted ownership of the Toyota truck but alleged that the
same, together with nine (9) other units were leased to the Jaguar Transportation, Inc. and that
Ceferino Arevalo, as well as Benedicto Kalaw-Katigbak are not its (petitioner) employees.
Thereafter, petitioner, defendant in the damage suit, filed a third-party complaint against Jaguar
Transportation Company.
Third-party Jaguar pleads that its liability is only secondary and that it had already complied
with its obligation under its contract of lease with petitioner when it secured a third-party liability
insurance from Federal Insurance Company, Inc. It then filed a fourth-party complaint against
Federal Insurance Company, Inc., F. E. Zuellig, Inc. and Casto Madamba, claiming that Jaguar
had obtained an insurance policy from Federal Insurance Company, Inc. of which F. E. Zuellig
is its general manager, and fourth-party defendant Casto Madamba is the general agent of
defendant Federal Insurance Company, Inc.
In its answer to the fourth-party complaint, the fourth-party defendants alleged that Jaguar has
no cause of action against them because F. E. Zuellig is only the general manager of Federal
Insurance Company, Inc.; that Casto Madamba is only the general agent of Federal Insurance
Company, Inc., and that the proper party in interest is herein petitioner, the registered owner of
the Toyota truck.
Ceferino Arevalo, driver of the truck in question was named defendant in Criminal Case No. 53-
71 of the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty
to the crimes of multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries, multiple less serious
physical injuries, slight physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence.
Evidence is clear that the death of seven (7) persons and the injuries suffered by private
respondents were due to the negligence and reckless operation of the Toyota truck, owned by
herein petitioner and driven by Ceferino Arevalo. On March 21, 1971, when the accident
happened, subject vehicle was registered in the name of petitioner which, however, would want
to exculpate itself from liability because of the contract of lease with sale (Exhibit "1") allegedly
executed on December 1, 1970 between it and Jaguar Transportation Company. Petitioner
claims that because of the lease contract with sale to Jaguar it had no more control over the
vehicle; that Ceferino Arevalo is not its employee but that of Jaguar. On this score, the trial
court as well as the then Court of Appeals made the finding that —
 ... A reading of said contract cannot but produce the conviction that the same
was drawn up for no other purpose but to set up a buffer between MYC and
the public. It is really nothing but a simulated contract, a subterfuge, intended
to shift liability from MYC to Jaguar Transportation Company which appears
to be nothing more than a conduit of MYC. The obvious purpose is to create
an apparent relationship of employer-employee between Jaguar and the
persons operating MYC's trucks. Thus, while the contract is denominated as
one of lease with sale and the ten Toyota trucks were supposed to be leased
to Jaguar; the right of Jaguar to use these trucks was subject to a hauling
contract with defendant MYC. The supposed lessee Jaguar may use these
trucks only if the lessor shall have no more need for the trucks herein leased.
(Par. 3 of Exhibit 1) Even if Jaguar should be able to lease these trucks to
other parties because the lessor MYC has no more need for the same as the
milling season is over, said contract executed by Jaguar with a third party
shag be terminated as soon as the milling season is over, said contract
executed by Jaguar with a third party shall be terminable as soon as the
lessor shall have a need for the leased motor vehicle. Par. 2 of the lease
contract exposes the true nature of this alleged contract of lease with sale as
nothing more than a disguise effected by defendant MYC to relieve itself of
the burdens and responsibilities of an employer with respect to these trucks.
That the defendant MYC remained the true and real owner and possessor of
these trucks is further indicated by the fact that those trucks, although
purportedly sold to Jaguar on installment, were never mortgaged to MYC by
way of security; the same trucks leased and sold to Jaguar were exclusively
used for the business of MYC in the hauling of its agricultural products; said
trucks may not be sold, leased, alienated or encumbered by Jaguar without
MYC's written consent. During the 3 year period of the contract Exhibit I
before full payment of the supposed installment price of P362,129.10 by
Jaguar all these trucks continue to be under the effective dominion of MYC
— all the rights of ownership — to use, enjoy and dispose of these —
remained with MYC. As a matter of fact, the ownership was not to be
transferred until after three years. After the incident of March 21, 1971, the
trucks were all "repossessed" by defendant MYC, a mere ceremony since
MYC never lost possession. (pp. 175-177, Record on Appeal)
Reyes; by way of actual and compensatory damages; by way of exemplary damages, the
amount of P50,000.00 likewise awarded to plaintiffs as exemplary damages to be divided
among them in proportion of their share of actual and compensatory damages. Defendant is
further ordered to pay to plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as Attorney's fees and the costs of
this suit. The Complaint against Benedicto Katigbak, the counterclaim, the third-party and fourth
party complaint are dismissed." (pp. 181-182, Record on Appeal)
From the foregoing judgment which was affirmed in toto by respondent Court of Appeals,
petitioner went to this Court alleging in substance that the appellate court erred in holding that
Jaguar Transportation Company was a mere dummy or conduit of petitioner which should be
considered as the true owner of the vehicle.
We cannot uphold the contention of petitioner. In the first place, Jaguar's answer to third party
complaint tendered no genuine or real issue. Secondly, Jaguar's representative did not even
appear in court after impleading fourth party defendants and its President, Benedicto Katigbak,
did not adduce evidence in his behalf. Thirdly, the sign MYC which stands for petitioner still
appears on subject vehicle and, as aptly observed by the appellate court the agreement which
allegedly transferred the truck from MYC to Jaguar failed to provide for a chattel mortgage to
secure said transfer. The well-known practice is that motor vehicles acquired through
installment payments are secured by a chattel mortgage over the vehicle sold. None exists in
the instant case (p. 51, Rollo)." Finally, it is undisputed that the registered owner of the Toyota
truck is petitioner. As held in Vargas vs. Langcay, 6 SCRA 174, "[t]he registered owner/operator
of a passenger vehicle is jointly and severally hable with the driver for damages incurred by
passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries (or death) sustained in the operation
of said vehicles. ... Regardless of who the actual owner of a vehicle is, the operator of record
continues to be the operator of the vehicles as regards the public and third persons, and as
such is directly and primarily responsible for the consequences incident to its operation, so that,
in contemplation of law, such owner/operator of record is the employer of the driver, the actual
operator and employer being considered merely as his agent."
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment ordering "defendants MYC Agro-Industrial
Corporation and Ceferino Arevalo jointly and severally to pay to plaintiffs the following:
P3,348.75 to Felicidad Alcaraz; P3,399.15 to Rodolfo, Felicidad and Leniza, all surnamed
Alcaraz; P18,000.00 to Rodolfo and Felicidad Alcaraz; P4,689.80 for Sotera Ramirez;
P20,300.00 for Teodora Sardido-Tabing and Petra de Aro; P45,485.00 for Constancia
Manalaysay Vda. de Lacson, Almario, Solidad, Susan, Elvira, Carolina, Cecilia, and Ariel, all
surnamed Lacson; P22,760.00 for Purificacion Camerino Vda. de Caldo, Leonila, Nemencia,
Yolanda, Edna, Lorna and Genie all surnamed Caldo; P21,000.00 for Lucila Ramos Vda. de
Pakingan, Geraldo, Rowena, and Isidro all surnamed Pakingan; P20,500.00 for plaintiff Bella
Balajadia-Bonifacio; P1,989.49 for Erlinda Candado; P230.50 for Avelino Ignacio; P8,484.00 for
Nicanor Silla P2,150.00 for Aniano Maximina, Epifania and Cornelio, all surnamed Bautista;
P4,724.50 to plaintiffs Rogelio, Felicitacion and Ruby, all surnamed Gonzaga; P1,724.55 for the
injuries sustained by Ruby Gonzaga; P850.00 for plaintiff Hermogena Bautista; P23,000.00 for
plaintiffs Emiliano, Nemencio, Rodolfo, Eduardo, Melanio, Aida, Lualhati, and Dominador, all
surnamed Navarrete; P221.10 for plaintiff Alfredo Rodolfo and P300.00 for plaintiff Rosila