G.R. No. 182484. June 17, 2008.
* facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
DANIEL MASANGKAY TAPUZ, AURORA TAPUZ-MADRIAGA, LIBERTY M.
ASUNCION, LADYLYN BAMOS MADRIAGA, EVERLY TAPUZ MADRIAGA, EXCEL
TAPUZ, IVAN TAPUZ AND MARIAN TIMBAS, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JUDGE
ELMO DEL ROSARIO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC Br. 5 Kalibo, SHERIFF
NELSON DELA CRUZ, in his capacity as Sheriff of the RTC, THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the PNP STATION
COMMANDER, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CEBU 18TH DIVISION,
SPOUSES GREGORIO SANSON & MA. LOURDES T. SANSON, respondents.
Forum Shopping; Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes,
degrades the administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate
violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, it may also
constitute direct contempt.—To restate the prevailing rules, “forum shopping is the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any
party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an
attempt to seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by appeal or a special civil action
for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice and congest court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the
rule against it is a ground for summary dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct
contempt.” Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is
defective as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners—Ivan Tapuz—did not sign, in violation of
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56
of the Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal
identification cards with the Notary Public.
Writ of Amparo; The Writ of Amparo, Explained.—To start off with the basics, the
writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and
effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are
purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo—in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its
issuance demands—requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact.
Same; The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminary satisfied with the prima facie
existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the
circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty
and security of the aggrieved party was or is being committed.—The writ shall issue if the
Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate facts
determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to
what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
party was or is being committed. The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is
anchored on the factual allegations heretofore quoted, that are essentially repeated in
paragraph 54 of the petition.
Same; If the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators
criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal
prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo.—
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners,
the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-relatedand focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
amparo.
Same; The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with these
processes—the situation obtaining in the present case.—Separately from these
considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the indicators, clear and patent
to us, that the petitioners’ present recourse via the remedy of the writ of amparo is a mere
subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners sought and failed to nullify
before the appellate court because of the use of an improper remedial measure. We discern
this from the petitioners’ misrepresentations pointed out above; from their obvious act of
forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the extraordinary remedies of the writs of
certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far from forthright and sufficiently
compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary course of law fail because of deficient
legal representation or the use of improper remedial measures, neither the writ of certiorari
nor that of amparo—extraordinary though they may be—will suffice to serve as a curative
substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should not issue when applied for as a
substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will inordinately interfere with
these processes—the situation obtaining in the present case. While we say all these, we note
too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules on the institution of separate
actions, for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions, and for the consolidation of petitions
for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently filed criminal and civil action.
These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure for dealing with petitions for the
issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to other parallel recourses.
Writ of Habeas Data; Section 6 of the Rule of the Writ of Habeas Data requires the
following material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas data.—Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following
material allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
“(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent; (b) The manner the
right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty
or security of the aggrieved party; (c) The actions and recourses taken by the
petitioner to secure the data or information; (d) The location of the files, registers
or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in possession or in
control of the data or information, if known; (e) The reliefs prayed for, which may
include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information
or files kept by the respondent. In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order
enjoining the act complained of; and (f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and
equitable.”
Same; Allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient.—These allegations obviously lack
what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a minimum, thus rendering the petition
fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful
violation of the right to privacy related to the right to life, liberty or security. The petition
likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any need for information under the
control of police authorities other than those it has already set forth as integral annexes.
The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of
previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been shown. In sum, the prayer for
the issuance of a writ of habeasdata is nothing more than the “fishing expedition” that this
Court—in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data—had in mind in defining what the
purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the outright denial of the petition for
the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Nelson A. Loyola pro bono counsel for petitioners.
Stephen C. Arceño for respondents.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Before us for the determination of sufficiency of form and substance (pursuant to Sections 1
and 4 of Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; Sections 1 and 5 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo;1 and Sections 1 and 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data2) is the petition for
certiorari and for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas data filed by the above-
named petitioners against the Honorable Judge Elmo del Rosario [in his capacity as
presiding judge of RTC Br. 5, Kalibo], Sheriff Nelson de la Cruz [in his capacity as Sheriff of
the RTC], the Philippine National Police stationed in Boracay Island, represented by the
PNP Station Commander, the Honorable Court of Appeals in Cebu, 18th Division, and the
spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson, respondents.
The petition and its annexes disclose the following material antecedents:
The private respondents spouses Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes T. Sanson (the "private
respondents"), filed with the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Buruanga-Malay, Aklan
(the "MCTC") a complaint3 dated 24 April 2006 for forcible entry and damages with a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the petitioners
Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, Aurora Tapuz-Madriaga, Liberty M. Asuncion, Ladylyn Bamos
Madriaga, Everly Tapuz Madriaga, Excel Tapuz, Ivan Tapuz and Marian Timbas (the
"petitioners") and other John Does numbering about 120. The private respondents alleged in
their complaint that: (1) they are the registered owners under TCT No. 35813 of a 1.0093-
hectare parcel of land located at Sitio Pinaungon, Balabag, Boracay, Malay, Aklan (the
"disputed land"); (2) they were the disputed land's prior possessors when the petitioners -
armed with bolos and carrying suspected firearms and together with unidentified persons
numbering 120 - entered the disputed land by force and intimidation, without the private
respondents' permission and against the objections of the private respondents' security men,
and built thereon a nipa and bamboo structure.
In their Answer4 dated 14 May 2006, the petitioners denied the material allegations of the
complaint. They essentially claimed that: (1) they are the actual and prior possessors of the
disputed land; (2) on the contrary, the private respondents are the intruders; and (3) the
private respondents' certificate of title to the disputed property is spurious. They asked for
the dismissal of the complaint and interposed a counterclaim for damages.
The MCTC, after due proceedings, rendered on 2 January 2007 a decision5 in the private
respondents' favor. It found prior possession - the key issue in forcible entry cases - in the
private respondents' favor, thus:
"The key that could unravel the answer to this question lies in the Amended Commissioner's Report
and Sketch found on pages 245 to 248 of the records and the evidence the parties have submitted. It
is shown in the Amended Commissioner's Report and Sketch that the land in question is enclosed by
a concrete and cyclone wire perimeter fence in pink and green highlighter as shown in the Sketch
Plan (p. 248). Said perimeter fence was constructed by the plaintiffs 14 years ago. The foregoing
findings of the Commissioner in his report and sketch collaborated the claim of the plaintiffs that
after they acquired the land in question on May 27, 1993 through a Deed of Sale (Annex 'A', Affidavit
of Gregorio Sanson, p. 276, rec.), they caused the construction of the perimeter fence sometime in
1993 (Affidavit of Gregorio Sanson, pp. 271-275, rec.).
From the foregoing established facts, it could be safely inferred that the plaintiffs were in actual
physical possession of the whole lot in question since 1993 when it was interrupted by the defendants
(sic) when on January 4, 2005 claiming to (sic) the Heirs of Antonio Tapuz entered a portion of the
land in question with view of inhabiting the same and building structures therein prompting
plaintiff Gregorio Sanson to confront them before BSPU, Police Chief Inspector Jack L. Wanky and
Barangay Captain Glenn Sacapaño. As a result of their confrontation, the parties signed an
Agreement (Annex 'D', Complaint p. 20) wherein they agreed to vacate the disputed portion of the
land in question and agreed not to build any structures thereon.
The foregoing is the prevailing situation of the parties after the incident of January 4, 2005 when the
plaintiff posted security guards, however, sometime on or about 6:30 A.M. of April 19, 2006, the
defendants some with bolos and one carrying a sack suspected to contain firearms with other John
Does numbering about 120 persons by force and intimidation forcibly entered the premises along the
road and built a nipa and bamboo structure (Annex 'E', Complaint, p. 11) inside the lot in question
which incident was promptly reported to the proper authorities as shown by plaintiffs' Certification
(Annex 'F', Complaint, p. 12) of the entry in the police blotter and on same date April 19, 2006, the
plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Office of the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay Balabag,
Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan but no settlement was reached as shown in their Certificate to File
Action (Annex 'G', Complaint, p. 13); hence the present action.
Defendants' (sic) contend in their answer that 'prior to January 4, 2005, they were already occupants
of the property, being indigenous settlers of the same, under claim of ownership by open continuous,
adverse possession to the exclusion of other (sic)'. (Paragraph 4, Answer, p. 25).
The contention is untenable. As adverted earlier, the land in question is enclosed by a perimeter
fence constructed by the plaintiffs sometime in 1993 as noted by the Commissioner in his Report and
reflected in his Sketch, thus, it is safe to conclude that the plaintiffs where (sic) in actual physical
possession of the land in question from 1993 up to April 19, 2006 when they were ousted therefrom
by the defendants by means of force. Applying by analogy the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court
in the case of Molina, et al. vs. De Bacud, 19 SCRA 956, if the land were in the possession of
plaintiffs from 1993 to April 19, 2006, defendants' claims to an older possession must be rejected as
untenable because possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities.
Defendants likewise contend that it was the plaintiffs who forcibly entered the land in question on
April 18, 2006 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon as shown in their Certification (Annex 'D',
Defendants' Position Paper, p. 135, rec.).
The contention is untenable for being inconsistent with their allegations made to the commissioner
who constituted (sic) the land in question that they built structures on the land in question only on
April 19, 2006 (Par. D.4, Commissioner's Amended Report, pp. 246 to 247), after there (sic) entry
thereto on even date.
Likewise, said contention is contradicted by the categorical statements of defendants' witnesses,
Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, in their
Joint Affidavit (pp. 143- '144, rec.) [sic] categorically stated 'that on or about April 19, 2006, a group
of armed men entered the property of our said neighbors and built plastic roofed tents. These armed
men threatened to drive our said neighbors away from their homes but they refused to leave and
resisted the intruding armed men'.
From the foregoing, it could be safely inferred that no incident of forcible entry happened on April 18,
2006 but it was only on April 19, 2006 when the defendants overpowered by their numbers the
security guards posted by the plaintiffs prior to the controversy.
 Likewise, defendants (sic) alleged burnt and other structures depicted in their pictures attached as
annexes to their position paper were not noted and reflected in the amended report and sketch
submitted by the Commissioner, hence, it could be safely inferred that these structures are built and
(sic) situated outside the premises of the land in question, accordingly, they are irrelevant to the
instant case and cannot be considered as evidence of their actual possession of the land in question
prior to April 19, 20066."
The petitioners appealed the MCTC decision to the Regional Trial Court ("RTC," Branch 6
of Kalibo, Aklan) then presided over by Judge Niovady M. Marin ("Judge Marin").
On appeal, Judge Marin granted the private respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction through an Order dated 26 February 2007, with the
issuance conditioned on the private respondents' posting of a bond. The writ 7 - authorizing
the immediate implementation of the MCTC decision - was actually issued by respondent
Judge Elmo F. del Rosario (the "respondent Judge") on 12 March 2007 after the private
respondents had complied with the imposed condition. The petitioners moved to reconsider
the issuance of the writ; the private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for
demolition.
The respondent Judge subsequently denied the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and
to Defer Enforcement of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in an Order dated 17 May 20078.
Meanwhile, the petitioners opposed the motion for demolition. 9 The respondent Judge
nevertheless issued via a Special Order10 a writ of demolition to be implemented fifteen (15)
days after the Sheriff's written notice to the petitioners to voluntarily demolish their house/s
to allow the private respondents to effectively take actual possession of the land.
The petitioners thereafter filed on 2 August 2007 with the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, a
Petition for Review11(under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and Order of Demolition of the RTC of Kalibo, Br. 6 in Civil
Case No. 7990.
Meanwhile, respondent Sheriff Nelson R. dela Cruz issued the Notice to Vacate and for
Demolition on 19 March 2008.12
It was against this factual backdrop that the petitioners filed the present petition last 29
April 2008. The petition contains and prays for three remedies, namely: a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; the issuance of a writ of habeas data
under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data; and finally, the issuance of the writ of amparo
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
To support the petition and the remedies prayed for, the petitioners present factual
positions diametrically opposed to the MCTC's findings and legal reasons. Most importantly,
the petitioners maintain their claims of prior possession of the disputed land and of
intrusion into this land by the private respondents. The material factual allegations of the
petition - bases as well of the petition for the issuance of the writ of amparo - read:
"29. On April 29, 2006 at about 9:20 a.m. armed men sporting 12 gauge shot guns intruded into
the property of the defendants [the land in dispute]. They were not in uniform. They fired their
shotguns at the defendants. Later the following day at 2:00 a.m. two houses of the defendants were
burned to ashes.
30. These armed men [without uniforms] removed the barbed wire fence put up by defendants to
protect their property from intruders. Two of the armed men trained their shotguns at the
defendants who resisted their intrusion. One of them who was identified as SAMUEL LONGNO y
GEGANSO, 19 years old, single, and a resident of Binun-an, Batad, Iloilo, fired twice.
31. The armed men torched two houses of the defendants reducing them to ashes. [...]
32. These acts of TERRORISM and (heinous crime) of ARSON were reported by one of the
HEIRS OF ANTONIO TAPUZ [...]. The terrorists trained their shotguns and fired at
minors namely IVAN GAJISAN and MICHAEL MAGBANUA, who resisted their intrusion.
Their act is a blatant violation of the law penalizing Acts of Violence against women and
children, which is aggravated by the use of high-powered weapons.
[…]
34. That the threats to the life and security of the poor indigent and unlettered petitioners continue
because the private respondents Sansons have under their employ armed men and they are
influential with the police authorities owing to their financial and political clout.
35. The actual prior occupancy, as well as the ownership of the lot in dispute by defendants and the
atrocities of the terrorists [introduced into the property in dispute by the plaintiffs] are attested by
witnesses who are persons not related to the defendants are therefore disinterested witnesses in the
case namely: Rowena Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin Alvarez and Edgardo Penarada.
Likewise, the affidavit of Nemia T. Carmen is submitted to prove that the plaintiffs resorted to
atrocious acts through hired men in their bid to unjustly evict the defendants.13"
The petitioners posit as well that the MCTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint for
forcible entry that the private respondents filed below. Citing Section 33 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691,14 they maintain that the
forcible entry case in fact involves issues of title to or possession of real property or an
interest therein, with the assessed value of the property involved exceeding P20,000.00;
thus, the case should be originally cognizable by the RTC. Accordingly, the petitioners
reason out that the RTC - to where the MCTC decision was appealed - equally has no
jurisdiction to rule on the case on appeal and could not have validly issued the assailed
orders.
OUR RULING
We find the petitions for certiorari and issuance of a writ of habeas data fatally
defective, both in substance and in form. The petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo, on the other hand, is fatally defective with respect to content and
substance.
The Petition for Certiorari
We conclude, based on the outlined material antecedents that led to the petition, that the
petition for certiorari to nullify the assailed RTC orders has been filed out of time. It is not
lost on us that the petitioners have a pending petition with the Court of Appeals (the "CA
petition") for the review of the same RTC orders now assailed in the present petition,
although the petitioners never disclosed in the body of the present petition the exact status of
their pending CA petition. The CA petition, however, was filed with the Court of Appeals on
2 August 2007, which indicates to us that the assailed orders (or at the very least, the latest
of the interrelated assailed orders) were received on 1 August 2007 at the latest. The
present petition, on the other hand, was filed on April 29, 2008 or more than eight months
from the time the CA petition was filed. Thus, the present petition is separated in point of
time from the assumed receipt of the assailed RTC orders by at least eight (8) months, i.e.,
beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days15 from receipt of the assailed order or
orders or from notice of the denial of a seasonably filed motion for reconsideration.
We note in this regard that the petitioners' counsel stated in his attached "Certificate of
Compliance with Circular #1-88 of the Supreme Court"16 ("Certificate of Compliance") that
"in the meantime the RTC and the Sheriff issued a NOTICE TO VACATE AND FOR
DEMOLITION not served to counsel but to the petitioners who sent photo copy of the same
NOTICE to their counsel on April 18, 2008 by LBC." To guard against any insidious
argument that the present petition is timely filed because of this Notice to Vacate, we feel it
best to declare now that the counting of the 60-day reglementary period under Rule 65
cannot start from the April 18, 2008 date cited by the petitioners' counsel. The Notice to
Vacate and for Demolition is not an order that exists independently from the RTC orders
assailed in this petition and in the previously filed CA petition. It is merely a notice, made
in compliance with one of the assailed orders, and is thus an administrative enforcement
medium that has no life of its own separately from the assailed order on which it is based. It
cannot therefore be the appropriate subject of an independent petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 in the context of this case. The April 18, 2008 date cannot likewise be the material
date for Rule 65 purposes as the above-mentioned Notice to Vacate is not even directly
assailed in this petition, as the petition's Prayer patently shows.17
Based on the same material antecedents, we find too that the petitioners have been guilty of
willful and deliberate misrepresentation before this Court and, at the very least, of forum
shopping.
By the petitioners' own admissions, they filed a petition with the Court of Appeals (docketed
as CA - G.R. SP No. 02859) for the review of the orders now also assailed in this petition,
but brought the present recourse to us, allegedly because "the CA did not act on the petition
up to this date and for the petitioner (sic) to seek relief in the CA would be a waste of time
and would render the case moot and academic since the CA refused to resolve pending urgent
motions and the Sheriff is determined to enforce a writ of demolition despite the defect of
LACK OF JURISDICTION."18
Interestingly, the petitioners' counsel - while making this claim in the body of the petition -
at the same time represented in his Certificate of Compliance19 that:
(e) the petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals to question the WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION copy of the petition is attached (sic);
(f) the CA initially issued a resolution denying the PETITION because it held that the
ORDER TO VACATE AND FOR DEMOLITION OF THE HOMES OF PETITIONERS is not
capable of being the subject of a PETITION FOR RELIEF, copy of the resolution of the CA is
attached hereto; (underscoring supplied)
(g) Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on August 7, 2007 but up to this date the same had
not been resolved copy of the MR is attached (sic).
The difference between the above representations on what transpired at the appellate court
level is replete with significance regarding the petitioners' intentions. We discern -- from the
petitioners' act of misrepresenting in the body of their petition that "the CA did not act on
the petition up to this date" while stating the real Court of Appeals action in the
Certification of Compliance -- the intent to hide the real state of the remedies the petitioners
sought below in order to mislead us into action on the RTC orders without frontally
considering the action that the Court of Appeals had already undertaken.
At the very least, the petitioners are obviously seeking to obtain from us, via the present
petition, the same relief that it could not wait for from the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 02859. The petitioners' act of seeking against the same parties the nullification of the
same RTC orders before the appellate court and before us at the same time, although made
through different mediums that are both improperly used, constitutes willful and deliberate
forum shopping that can sufficiently serve as basis for the summary dismissal of the
petition under the combined application of the fourth and penultimate paragraphs of
Section 3, Rule 46; Section 5, Rule 7; Section 1, Rule 65; and Rule 56, all of the Revised
Rules of Court. That a wrong remedy may have been used with the Court of Appeals and
possibly with us will not save the petitioner from a forum-shopping violation where there is
identity of parties, involving the same assailed interlocutory orders, with the recourses
existing side by side at the same time.
To restate the prevailing rules, "forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by any party against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek a favorable opinion in
another, other than by appeal or a special civil action for certiorari. Forum shopping trifles
with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the administration of justice and congest
court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation of the rule against it is a ground for summary
dismissal of the case; it may also constitute direct contempt."20
Additionally, the required verification and certification of non-forum shopping is defective
as one (1) of the seven (7) petitioners - Ivan Tapuz - did not sign, in violation of Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 7; Section 3, Rule 46; Section 1, Rule 65; all in relation with Rule 56 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Of those who signed, only five (5) exhibited their postal
identification cards with the Notary Public.
In any event, we find the present petition for certiorari, on its face and on the basis of the
supporting attachments, to be devoid of merit. The MCTC correctly assumed jurisdiction
over the private respondents' complaint, which specifically alleged a cause for forcible entry
and not - as petitioners may have misread or misappreciated - a case involving title to or
possession of realty or an interest therein. Under Section 33, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, exclusive jurisdiction over
forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases lies with the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. These first-level courts have
had jurisdiction over these cases - called accion interdictal - even before the R.A. 7691
amendment, based on the issue of pure physical possession (as opposed to the right of
possession). This jurisdiction is regardless of the assessed value of the property involved; the
law established no distinctions based on the assessed value of the property forced into or
unlawfully detained. Separately from accion interdictalare accion publiciana for the
recovery of the right of possession as a plenary action, and accion reivindicacion for the
recovery of ownership.21 Apparently, these latter actions are the ones the petitioners refer to
when they cite Section 33, par. 3, in relation with Section 19, par. 2 of The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, in which jurisdiction may
either be with the first-level courts or the regional trial courts, depending on the assessed
value of the realty subject of the litigation. As the complaint at the MCTC was patently for
forcible entry, that court committed no jurisdictional error correctible by certiorari under
the present petition.
In sum, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed for the cited formal
deficiencies, for violation of the non-forum shopping rule, for having been filed
out of time, and for substantive deficiencies.
The Writ of Amparo
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the
perceived lack of available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns.
It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an
extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules,
or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect
concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall
issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo - in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty
that its issuance demands - requires that every petition for the issuance of the Pwrit must
be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or
omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed
appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct
of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs." 22
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of
the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances
of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of
the aggrieved party was or is being committed.
The issuance of the writ of amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations
heretofore quoted,23that are essentially repeated in paragraph 54 of the petition. These
allegations are supported by the following documents:
"(a) Joint Affidavit dated 23 May 2006 of Rowena B. Onag, Apolsida Umambong, Ariel Gac, Darwin
Alvarez and Edgardo Pinaranda, supporting the factual positions of the petitioners, id., petitioners'
prior possession, private respondents' intrusion and the illegal acts committed by the private
respondents and their security guards on 19 April 2006;
(b) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Nemia Carmen y Tapuz, alleging the illegal acts (firing of guns, etc.)
committed by a security guard against minors - descendants of Antonio Tapuz;
(c) Unsubscribed Affidavit of Melanie Tapuz y Samindao, essentially corroborating Nemia's affidavit;
(d) Certification dated 23 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Jackson Jauod regarding the incident of
petitioners' intrusion into the disputed land;
(e) Certification dated 27 April 2006 issued by Police Officer Allan R. Otis, narrating the altercation
between the Tapuz family and the security guards of the private respondents, including the gun-
poking and shooting incident involving one of the security guards;
(f) Certification issued by Police Officer Christopher R. Mendoza, narrating that a house owned by
Josiel Tapuz, Jr., rented by a certain Jorge Buenavente, was accidentally burned by a fire."
On the whole, what is clear from these statements - both sworn and unsworn - is the
overriding involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of
physical possession of the property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating
to the right to life or to liberty can hardly be discerned except to the extent that the
occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right to security, on the other hand, is
alleged only to the extent of the threats and harassments implied from the presence of
"armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of weapons. Notably,
none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the rights
to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing.
A closer look at the statements shows that at least two of them - the statements of Nemia
Carreon y Tapuz and Melanie Tapuz are practically identical and unsworn. The
Certification by Police Officer Jackson Jauod, on the other hand, simply narrates what had
been reported by one Danny Tapuz y Masangkay, and even mentions that the burning of
two residential houses was "accidental."
As against these allegations are the cited MCTC factual findings in its decision in the
forcible entry case which rejected all the petitioners' factual claims. These findings are
significantly complete and detailed, as they were made under a full-blown judicial process,
i.e., after examination and evaluation of the contending parties' positions, evidence and
arguments and based on the report of a court-appointed commissioner.
We preliminarily examine these conflicting factual positions under the backdrop of a dispute
(with incidents giving rise to allegations of violence or threat thereof) that was brought to
and ruled upon by the MCTC; subsequently brought to the RTC on an appeal that is still
pending; still much later brought to the appellate court without conclusive results; and
then brought to us on interlocutory incidents involving a plea for the issuance of the writ of
amparo that, if decided as the petitioners advocate, may render the pending RTC appeal
moot.
Under these legal and factual situations, we are far from satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts that would justify the issuance of a writ of amparo.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the petitioners,
the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and focused on the
disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged
perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary
criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
amparo.
Nor do we believe it appropriate at this time to disturb the MCTC findings, as our action
may carry the unintended effect, not only of reversing the MCTC ruling independently of
the appeal to the RTC that is now in place, but also of nullifying the ongoing appeal process.
Such effect, though unintended, will obviously wreak havoc on the orderly administration of
justice, an overriding goal that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo does not intend to weaken or
negate.
Separately from these considerations, we cannot fail but consider too at this point the
indicators, clear and patent to us, that the petitioners' present recourse via the remedy of
the writ of amparo is a mere subterfuge to negate the assailed orders that the petitioners
sought and failed to nullify before the appellate court because of the use of an improper
remedial measure. We discern this from the petitioners' misrepresentations pointed out
above; from their obvious act of forum shopping; and from the recourse itself to the
extraordinary remedies of the writs of certiorari and amparo based on grounds that are far
from forthright and sufficiently compelling. To be sure, when recourses in the ordinary
course of law fail because of deficient legal representation or the use of improper remedial
measures, neither the writ of certiorari nor that of amparo - extraordinary though they may
be - will suffice to serve as a curative substitute. The writ of amparo, particularly, should
not issue when applied for as a substitute for the appeal or certiorari process, or when it will
inordinately interfere with these processes - the situation obtaining in the present case.
While we say all these, we note too that the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for rules
on the institution of separate actions,24 for the effect of earlier-filed criminal actions,25 and
for the consolidation of petitions for the issuance of a writ of amparo with a subsequently
filed criminal and civil action.26 These rules were adopted to promote an orderly procedure
for dealing with petitions for the issuance of the writ of amparo when the parties resort to
other parallel recourses.
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and
directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima
facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security - the personalconcern that the writ is
intended to protect - is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is
continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a
proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
The Writ of Habeas Data
Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material allegations
of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and
the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act
complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable."
Support for the habeas data aspect of the present petition only alleges that:
"1. [ … ] Similarly, a petition for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA is prayed for so that the
PNP may release the report on the burning of the homes of the petitioners and the acts
of violence employed against them by the private respondents, furnishing the Court and
the petitioners with copy of the same;
[…]
66. Petitioners apply for a WRIT OF HABEAS DATA commanding the Philippine
National Police [PNP] to produce the police report pertaining to the burning of the
houses of the petitioners in the land in dispute and likewise the investigation report if
an investigation was conducted by the PNP."
These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires as a
minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no concrete
allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to the right to
life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less demonstrated, any
need for information under the control of police authorities other than those it has already
set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the issuance of the writ,
based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure information, has not also been
shown. In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than the
"fishing expedition" that this Court - in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data - had
in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these lights, the
outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is fully in order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DISMISS the present
petition OUTRIGHT for deficiencies of form and substance patent from its body and
attachments.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182795. June 5, 2008.*
ARMANDO Q. CANLAS, MIGUEL D. CAPISTRANO, MARRIETA PIA,
petitioners, vs. NAPICO HOMEOWNERS ASS’N., I- XIII, INC., ET AL., respondents.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Petitioners’ claim to their dwelling, assuming
they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to them, does not
constitute right to life, liberty and security; There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance
of the writ of amparo.—The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final
judgment of the court, which in this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R.
Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as
stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made
available. Their claim to their dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and
executory judgment adverse to them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security.
There is, therefore, no legal basis for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Same; Same; No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the
supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected.—The factual and legal
basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not alleged in the petition at all. The
Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had already been threshed out and
settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may be issued unless there is a clear
allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the right sought to be protected. Under
Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the petition,
only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
PETITION for Issuance of Writ of Amparo.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE present petition filed on May 26, 2008 seeks the issuance of a Writ of Amparo upon the
following premise:
Petitioners were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined and embodied
in our Constitution, as the result of these nefarious activities of both the Private and Public
Respondents. This ardent request filed before this Honorable Supreme Court is the only solution to
this problem via this newly advocated principles incorporated in the Rules – the "RULE ON THE
WRIT OF AMPARO."1
It appears that petitioners are settlers in a certain parcel of land situated in Barangay
Manggahan, Pasig City. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time
of filing of the petition, or is about to be demolished pursuant to a court judgment.
While they attempted to focus on issuance of what they claimed to be fraudulent and
spurious land titles, to wit:
Petitioners herein are desirous to help the government, the best way they can, to unearth these so-
called "syndicates" clothed with governmental functions, in cahoots with the "squatting
syndicates" - - - - the low so defines. If only to give its proper meanings, the Government must be
the first one to cleans (sic) its ranks from these unscrupulous political protégées. If unabated would
certainly ruin and/or destroy the efficacy of the Torrens System of land registration in this Country.
It is therefore the ardent initiatives of the herein Petitioners, by way of the said prayer for the
issuance of the Writ of Amparo, that these unprincipled Land Officials be summoned to
answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious
titles, NOW, in the hands of the Private Respondents. The Courts of Justice, including this
Honorable Supreme Court, are likewise being made to believe that said titles in the
possession of the Private Respondents were issued untainted with frauds.2
what the petition ultimately seeks is the reversal of this Court’s dismissal of petitions in
G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701, 177038, thus:
That, Petitioners herein knew before hand that: there can be no motion for reconsideration for the
second or third time to be filed before this Honorable Supreme Court. As such therefore, Petitioners
herein are aware of the opinion that this present petition should not in any way be treated as such
motions fore reconsideration. Solely, this petition is only for the possible issuance of the writ of
amparo, although it might affect the previous rulings of this Honorable Supreme Court in these
cases, G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701 and 177038. Inherent in the powers of the Supreme
Court of the Philippines is to modify, reverse and set aside, even its own previous
decision, that can not be thwarted nor influenced by any one, but, only on the basis of
merits and evidence. This is the purpose of this petition for the Writ of Amparo.3
We dismiss the petition.
The Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in
this case was affirmed with finality by this Court in G.R. Nos. 177448, 180768, 177701,
177038, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted
Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available. Their claim to their
dwelling, assuming they still have any despite the final and executory judgment adverse to
them, does not constitute right to life, liberty and security. There is, therefore, no legal basis
for the issuance of the writ of amparo.
Besides, the factual and legal basis for petitioners’ claim to the land in question is not
alleged in the petition at all. The Court can only surmise that these rights and interest had
already been threshed out and settled in the four cases cited above. No writ of amparo may
be issued unless there is a clear allegation of the supposed factual and legal basis of the
right sought to be protected.
Under Section 6 of the same rules, the court shall issue the writ upon the filing of the
petition, only if on its face, the court ought to issue said writ.
Section 6. Issuance of the Writ. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall
immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall
issue the writ under the seal of the court; or in case of urgent necessity, the justice or the judge may
issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer or person to serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later
than seven (7) days from the date of its issuance.
Considering that there is no legal basis for its issuance, as in this case, the writ will not be
issued and the petition will be dismissed outright.
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the
protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life,
liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give
priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time
and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182165. November 25, 2009.*
P/SUPT. FELIXBERTO CASTILLO, POLICE OFFICERS ROMEO BAGTAS, RUPERTO
BORLONGAN, EDMUNDO DIONISIO, RONNIE MORALES, ARNOLD TRIA, and
GILBERTO PUNZALAN, ENGR. RICASOL P. MILLAN, ENGR. REDENTOR S. DELA
CRUZ, MR. ANASTACIO L. BORLONGAN, MR. ARTEMIO ESGUERRA, “TISOY,” and
JOHN DOES, petitioners, vs. DR. AMANDA T. CRUZ, NIXON T. CRUZ, and FERDINAND
T. CRUZ, respondents.
Writ of Amparo; Writ of Habeas Data; The coverage of the writs is limited to the
protection of rights to life, liberty and security; The writs cover not only actual but also
threats of unlawful acts or omissions.—The coverage of the writs is limited to the protection
of rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats
of unlawful acts or omissions.
Same; Same; To be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondent must meet the
threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened
with an unlawful act or omission.—To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs,
respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present
controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and
respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on
respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of
petitioners’ entry into the property.
Same; Same; Absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is
undue and continuing restraint on their liberty and/or that there exists threat or intimidation
that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the issuance of the writ
cannot be justified.—Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily
hinder supplication for the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the
petition that there is undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there
exists threat or intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their
persons, the issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
Same; Same; Petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies
which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a
property dispute.—It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs
of amparo and habeas data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to
stall the execution of a final and executory decision in a property dispute.
Same; Same; Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense
that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo
and habeas data.—At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs
of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them
had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in
accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the
proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during
trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by
the writs may, however, be made available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal
proceedings.
PETITION in the Supreme Court for Issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jeffrey C. Cruz for petitioners.
Francisco Galman Cruz for respondents.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
Petitioners1 , employees and members of the local police force of the City Government of
Malolos, challenge the March 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Branch 10 in a petition for issuance of writs of amparo and habeas data instituted
by respondents.
The factual antecedents.
Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz
(Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property),
refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of
Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects.
The Province thus filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Spouses Cruz before
the then Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bulacan, Bulacan.
By Decision of September 5, 1997, the MTC rendered judgment against the Spouses Cruz,
which judgment, following its affirmance by the RTC, became final and executory.
The finality of the decision in the ejectment case notwithstanding, the spouses Cruz refused
to vacate the property. They thereupon filed cases against the Province 2 and the judges who
presided over the case.3 Those cases were dismissed except their petition for annulment of
judgment lodged before Branch 18 of the RTC of Malolos, and a civil
case for injunction 833-M-2004 lodged before Branch 10 of the same RTC Malolos.
The Spouses Cruz sought in the case for injunction the issuance of a permanent writ of
injunction to prevent the execution of the final and executory judgment against them.
By Order of July 19, 2005, the RTC, finding merit in the Spouses Cruzes’ allegation that
subsequent events changed the situation of the parties to justify a suspension of the
execution of the final and executory judgment, issued a permanent writ of injunction, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated August 10, 2004
is hereby GRANTED. Order dated August 10, 2004 is hereby RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE.
Further, the verified petition dated November 05, 2002 are hereby REINSTATED and MADE
PERMANENT until the MTC-Bulacan, Bulacan finally resolves the pending motions of petitioners with
the same determines the metes and bounds of 400 sq. meters leased premises subject matter of this case
with immediate dispatch. Accordingly, REMAND the determination of the issues raised by the
petitioners on the issued writ of demolition to the MTC of Bulacan, Bulacan.
SO ORDERED.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
Finding that the fallo of the RTC July 19, 2005 Order treats, as a suspensive condition for
the lifting of the permanent injunction, the determination of the boundaries of the property,
the Province returned the issue for the consideration of the MTC. In a Geodetic Engineer’s
Report submitted to the MTC on August 31, 2007, the metes and bounds of the property
were indicated.
The MTC, by Order of January 2, 2008, approved the Report and ruled that the permanent
injunction which the RTC issued is ineffective. On motion of the Province, the MTC, by
Order of January 21, 2008, thus issued a Second Alias Writ of Demolition.
On receiving notice of the January 2, 2008 MTC Order, the Spouses Cruz filed a motion
before Branch 10 of the RTC for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) which
it set for hearing on January 25, 2008 on which date, however, the demolition had, earlier in
the day, been implemented. Such notwithstanding, the RTC issued a TRO. 5 The Spouses
Cruz, along with their sons-respondents Nixon and Ferdinand, thereupon entered the
property, placed several container vans and purportedly represented themselves as owners
of the property which was for lease.
On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were
deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito
R. Mendoza instructing him to "protect, secure and maintain the possession of the
property," entered the property.
Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that
the RTC July 19, 2005 Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from
repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their
indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats.
Respondents later filed on March 3, 2008 a "Respectful Motion-Petition for Writ of Amparo
and Habeas Data," docketed as Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008, which was
coincidentally raffled to Branch 10 of the RTC Malolos.
Respondents averred that despite the Permanent Injunction, petitioners unlawfully entered
the property with the use of heavy equipment, tore down the barbed wire fences and
tents,6 and arrested them when they resisted petitioners’ entry; and that as early as in the
evening of February 20, 2008, members of the Philippine National Police had already
camped in front of the property.
On the basis of respondents’ allegations in their petition and the supporting affidavits, the
RTC, by Order of March 4, 2008, issued writs of amparo and habeas data.7
The RTC, crediting respondents’ version in this wise:
Petitioners have shown by preponderant evidence that the facts and circumstances of the alleged offenses
examined into on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data that there have been an on-going hearings on the
verified Petition for Contempt, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 306-M-2006, before this Court for
alleged violation by the respondents of the Preliminary Injunction Order dated July 16, 2005 [sic] in Sp.
Civil Action No. 833-M-2002, hearings were held on January 25, 2008, February 12 and 19, 2008, where
the respondents prayed for an April 22, 2008 continuance, however, in the pitch darkness of February 20,
2008, police officers, some personnel from the Engineering department, and some civilians proceeded
purposely to the Pinoy Compound, converged therein and with continuing threats of bodily harm and
danger and stone-throwing of the roofs of the homes thereat from voices around its premises, on a pretext
of an ordinary police operation when enterviewed [sic] by the media then present, but at 8:00 a.m. to late
in the afternoon of February 21, 2008, zoomed in on the petitioners, subjecting them to bodily harm,
mental torture, degradation, and the debasement of a human being, reminiscent of the martial law police
brutality, sending chill in any ordinary citizen,8
rendered judgment, by Decision of March 28, 2008, in favor of respondents, disposing as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commitment Orders and waivers in Crim. Cases Nos. 08-
77 for Direct assault; Crim. Case No. 08-77 for Other Forms of Trespass; and Crim. Case No. 08-78
for Light Threats are hereby DECLARED illegal, null and void, as petitioners were deprived of their
substantial rights, induced by duress or a well-founded fear of personal violence. Accordingly, the
commitment orders and waivers are hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary release of the petitioners is
declared ABSOLUTE.
Without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED."9 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
supplied)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari, pursuant to Section 1910 of The Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC),11 which is essentially reproduced in the Rule on
the Writ of Habeas Data (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC).12
In the main, petitioners fault the RTC for
… giving due course and issuing writs of amparo and habeas data when from the allegations of the
petition, the same ought not to have been issued as (1) the petition in [sic] insufficient in substance as the
same involves property rights; and (2) criminal cases had already been filed and pending with the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, City of Malolos. (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court is, under the Constitution, empowered to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.13 In view of the heightening prevalence of extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued and took
effect on October 24, 2007 which coincided with the celebration of United Nations Day and
affirmed the Court’s commitment towards internationalization of human rights. More than
three months later or on February 2, 2008, the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data was
promulgated.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
From the above-quoted provisions, the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of
rights to life, liberty and security. And the writs cover not only actual but also threats of
unlawful acts or omissions.
Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo14 teaches:
As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and
"enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without
legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government;
the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.15 (Underscoring supplied, citations omitted)
To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold
requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an
unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute
between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus
between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and
security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property.
Apropos is the Court’s ruling in Tapuz v. Del Rosario:16
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of
available and effective remedies to address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address
violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent
remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these
Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands – requires that every petition for the issuance of the writ must be
supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima facie existence of the ultimate
facts determinable from the supporting affidavits that detail the circumstances of how and to what
extent a threat to or violation of the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is
being committed.17 (Emphasis and italics in the original, citation omitted)
Tapuz also arose out of a property dispute, albeit between private individuals, with the
petitioners therein branding as "acts of terrorism" the therein respondents’ alleged entry
into the disputed land with armed men in tow. The Court therein held:
On the whole, what is clear from these statements – both sworn and unsworn – is the overriding
involvement of property issues as the petition traces its roots to questions of physical possession of the
property disputed by the private parties. If at all, issues relating to the right to life or to liberty can
hardly be discerned except to the extent that the occurrence of past violence has been alleged. The right
to security, on the other hand, is alleged only to the extent of the treats and harassments implied from
the presence of "armed men bare to the waist" and the alleged pointing and firing of
weapons. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the
rights to life, liberty and security of the petitioners is imminent or continuing. 18 (Emphasis in
the original; underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or
continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations that petitioners "in
unison, conspiracy and in contempt of court, there and then willfully, forcibly and
feloniously with the use of force and intimidation entered and forcibly, physically
manhandled the petitioners (respondents) and arrested the herein petitioners
(respondents)"19 will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No
undue confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post
bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.20
Although respondents’ release from confinement does not necessarily hinder supplication for
the writ of amparo, absent any evidence or even an allegation in the petition that there is
undue and continuing restraint on their liberty, and/or that there exists threat or
intimidation that destroys the efficacy of their right to be secure in their persons, the
issuance of the writ cannot be justified.
That respondents are merely seeking the protection of their property rights is gathered from
their Joint Affidavit, viz:
11. Kami ay humarang at humiga sa harap ng mga heavy equipment na hawak hawak ang nasabing
kautusan ng RTC Branch 10 (PERMANENT INJUNCTION at RTC ORDERS DATED February 12, 17
at 19 2008) upang ipaglaban ang dignidad ng kautusan ng korte, ipaglaban ang prinsipyo ng "SELF-
HELP" at batas ukol sa "PROPERTY RIGHTS", Wala kaming nagawa ipagtanggol ang aming
karapatan sa lupa na 45 years naming "IN POSSESSION." (Underscoring supplied)
Oddly, respondents also seek the issuance of a writ of habeas data when it is not even
alleged that petitioners are gathering, collecting or storing data or information regarding
their person, family, home and correspondence.
As for respondents’ assertion of past incidents21 wherein the Province allegedly violated the
Permanent Injunction order, these incidents were already raised in the injunction
proceedings on account of which respondents filed a case for criminal contempt against
petitioners.22
Before the filing of the petition for writs of amparo and habeas data, or on February 22,
2008, petitioners even instituted a petition for habeas corpus which was considered moot
and academic by Branch 14 of the Malolos RTC and was accordingly denied by Order of
April 8, 2008.
More. Respondent Amanda and one of her sons, Francisco Jr., likewise filed a petition for
writs of amparo and habeas data before the Sandiganbayan, they alleging the commission of
continuing threats by petitioners after the issuance of the writs by the RTC, which petition
was dismissed for insufficiency and forum shopping.
It thus appears that respondents are not without recourse and have in fact taken full
advantage of the legal system with the filing of civil, criminal and administrative
charges.231avvphi1
It need not be underlined that respondents’ petitions for writs of amparo and habeas
data are extraordinary remedies which cannot be used as tools to stall the execution of a
final and executory decision in a property dispute.
At all events, respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should
have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were
arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule
11224 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is
a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data. The reliefs afforded by the writs may, however, be made
available to the aggrieved party by motion in the criminal proceedings.25
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged March 4, 2008 Order of Branch 10 of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos is DECLARED NULL AND VOID, and its March 28, 2008 Decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Special Civil Action No. 53-M-2008 is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182498. December 3, 2009.*
GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police Chief
Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime
and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R. GOLTIAO, Regional Director of
ARMM, PNP, petitioners, vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein represented by ATTY.
FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, respondent.
Writs of Amparo; Nature; Words and Phrases; The Writ of Amparo—a protective
remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and
security—does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance;
rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance
for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance;
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to
have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts;
Accountability refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge
relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who
carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation
of the enforced disappearance.—This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo—a
protective remedy against violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty
and security. It embodies, as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr.
Morced N. Tagitis. It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the
enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by
substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an
enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them,
the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties
in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these
cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the
disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are
restored.
Same; Same; The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress, as its
directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and through the
substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.—We highlight this nature of a Writ
of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique situations that call for the issuance of
the writ, as well as the considerations and measures necessary to address these situations,
may not at all be the same as the standard measures and procedures in ordinary court
actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)
issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be read, too, as a work in progress,
as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through time and jurisprudence and
through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.600
Same; Pleadings and Practice; While, as in any other initiatory pleading, the pleader
must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action, omitting the
evidentiary details, in an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must be read in light of
the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of uncertainty—the
petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or
who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained,
because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by those who caused the
disappearance.—The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete
in every detail in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any
other initiatory pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting
the cause of action, omitting the evidentiary details. In an Amparo petition, however, this
requirement must be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which
addresses a situation of uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with
certainty how the victim exactly disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or
arrest him or her, or where the victim is detained, because these information may purposely
be hidden or covered up by those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to
require the level of specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to
read into the Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for
violations of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security. To read the Rules of Court
requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo situation, the test in reading
the petition should be to determine whether it contains the details available to the petitioner
under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of action showing a violation of the
victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or private party action. The petition
should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in terms of its isolated component parts,
to determine if the required elements—namely, of the disappearance, the State or private
action, and the actual or threatened violations of the rights to life, liberty or security—are
present.601
Same; Same; Where the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled.—If a defect can at all
be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting affidavit, as required by
Section 5(c) of the AmparoRule. Owing to the summary nature of the proceedings for the
writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule incorporated the
requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can be used as the
affiant’s direct testimony. This requirement, however, should not be read as an absolute one
that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed. Where, as in
this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by submitting
a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for the sworn
statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the failure to
attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her witness (Mrs.
Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and February 18,
2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on this point, the
petition cannot be faulted.
Same; Same; Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—that
otherwise is not supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as
a means to “fish” for evidence.—These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that
reports have been made to the police authorities, and that investigations should have
followed. That the petition did not state the manner and results of the investigation that
the AmparoRule requires, but rather generally stated the inaction of the police, their failure
to perform their duty to investigate, or at the very least, their reported failed efforts, should
not be a reflection on the completeness of the petition. To require the respondent to
elaborately specify the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority, as well the manner and conduct of the investigation is an overly strict
interpretation of Section 5(d), given the respondent’s frustrations in securing an
investigation with meaningful results. Under these circumstances, we are more than
satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the investigations undertaken are
sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition forward. Section 5(e) is in
the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition—that otherwise is not supported by
sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action—as a means to “fish” for
evidence. The petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify what
“legally available efforts were taken by the respondent,” and that there was an “undue
haste” in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the
respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.
Same; Extralegal Killings and Enforced Disappearances; The phenomenon of enforced
disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und
Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941; In the mid-1970s, the
phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when
individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have “disappeared”
during the military regime in Argentina.—The phenomenon of enforced disappearance
arising from State action first attracted notice in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or
Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941. The Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a
State policy, was directed at persons in occupied territories “endangering German security”;
they were transported secretly to Germany where they disappeared without a trace. In
order to maximize the desired intimidating effect, the policy prohibited government officials
from providing information about the fate of these targeted persons. In the mid-1970s, the
phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and outraging the world when
individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were reported to have “disappeared”
during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced disappearances spread in Latin America,
and the issue became an international concern when the world noted its widespread and
systematic use by State security forces in that continent under Operation Condor and
during the Dirty War in the 1970s and 1980s. The escalation of the practice saw political
activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as part of governments’ counter-insurgency
campaigns. As this form of political brutality became routine elsewhere in the continent, the
Latin American media standardized the term “disappearance” to describe the phenomenon.
The victims of enforced disappearances were called the “desaparecidos,” which literally
means the “disappeared ones.”
Same; Same; Three Different Kinds of “Disappearance” Cases.—In general, there are
three different kinds of “disappearance” cases: 1) those of people arrested without witnesses
or without positive identification of the arresting agents and are never found again; 2) those
of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts
and the military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in
one detention center or another; and 3) those of victims of “salvaging” who have disappeared
until their lifeless bodies are later discovered.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Although the writ of amparo specifically covers
“enforced disappearances,” this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction;
As the law now stands, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized
under the Revised Penal Code and special laws.—The Amparo Rule expressly provides that
the “writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.” We
note that although the writ specifically covers “enforced disappearances,” this concept is
neither defined nor penalized in this jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court
Committee on the Revision of Rules (Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule
initially considered providing an elemental definition of the concept of enforced
disappearance: x x x In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the
House of Representatives and in the Senate on extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the
Rule. The Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its
power to address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental
definition may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts. As the law now stands,
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes
penalized separately from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these
killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code
and special laws. The simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter;
the determination of what acts are criminal and what the corresponding penalty these
criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the
power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and power structure.
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Even without the benefit of directly applicable
substantive laws on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the
Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to promulgate
“rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, by
their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of the constitutional
rights of individuals to life, liberty and security—the legal protection that the Court can
provide can be very meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances.—Even without the benefit of directly applicable
substantive laws on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, however, the
Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its own constitutional mandate to
promulgate “rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,” since extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or private party violation of
the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security. Although the Court’s
power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very meaningful through the
procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. The
Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards and thereby directly
compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations of constitutional
rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference—even if only
procedurally—in a situation when the very same investigating public authorities may have
had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Same; The Court’s intervention is in determining whether an enforced
disappearance has taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance,
and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address it; The burden for the public
authorities to discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold:
the first is to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under
pain of indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require; and, the second is to address the disappearance, so that the life
of the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored.—Lest this Court
intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on any issue
of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This is an
issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing penal
laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has taken
place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to
discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is
to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated
until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the
disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper
case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Same; Same; International Law; From the International Law perspective, involuntary
or enforced disappearance is considered a flagrant violation of human rights.—From the
International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is considered a
flagrant violation of human rights. It does not only violate the right to life, liberty and
security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of their right
to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member. Thus,
enforced disappearances have been said to be “a double form of torture,” with “doubly
paralyzing impact for the victims,” as they “are kept ignorant of their own fates, while
family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones” and
suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the
disappearance of the household breadwinner. The UN General Assembly first considered
the issue of “Disappeared Persons” in December 1978 under Resolution 33/173. The
Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep concern arising from “reports from
various parts of the world relating to enforced or involuntary disappearances,” and
requested the “UN Commission on Human Rights to consider the issue of enforced
disappearances with a view to making appropriate recommendations.”
Same; Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Convention); In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of
enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the United Nations General
Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, and fourteen years later (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General
Assembly adopted the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance.—In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of
enforced disappearance had become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance (Declaration). This Declaration, for the first time, provided in its third
preambular clause a working description of enforced disappearance, as follows: Deeply
concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced disappearances
occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against their
will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or
levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on
behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the
Government, followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the
persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty,
which places such persons outside the protection of the law. Fourteen years after (or on
December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the International Convention for
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Convention). The Convention
was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6, 2007. Article 2 of the Convention
defined enforced disappearance as follows: For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced
disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Convention is the first universal human rights
instrument to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that
this right is non-derogable.—The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument
to assert that there is a right not to be subject to enforced disappearance and that this right
is non-derogable. It provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under
any circumstances, be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public
emergency. It obliges State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense
punishable with appropriate penalties under their criminal law. It also recognizes the right
of relatives of the disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on
the fate and whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the
investigation. Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such that
statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the
Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced
disappearance as a crime.—To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the
Convention, so that the country is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced
disappearance as a crime. The absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling
block for action from this Court, as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced
disappearance is a violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the
Supreme Court is mandated by the Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its
terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a
member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and
ratified, particularly the conventions touching on humans rights.—Separately from the
Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in acting on Amparocases,
by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and by the
various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the conventions touching on
humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to “promote universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion.” Although no universal agreement has been
reached on the precise extent of the “human rights and fundamental freedoms” guaranteed
to all by the Charter, it was the UN itself that issued the Declaration on enforced
disappearance, and this Declaration states: Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence
to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and reaffirmed
and developed in international instruments in this field. As a matter of human right and
fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN Declaration, the ban on enforced
disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country, given our own adherence to
“generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The most widely accepted statement of sources of
international law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
which provides that the Court shall apply “international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law.”—The most widely accepted statement of sources of international
law today is Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides
that the Court shall apply “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law.” The material sources of custom include State practice, State legislation,
international and national judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international
instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and
resolutions relating to legal questions in the UN General Assembly. Sometimes referred to
as “evidence” of international law, these sources identify the substance and content of the
obligations of States and are indicative of the “State practice” and “opinio juris”
requirements of international law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Enforced disappearance as a State practice has been
repudiated by the international community so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the land, and
which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws and the international
conventions that bind us.—While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of
the Convention on enforced disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute)
and has not formally declared enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital
shows that enforced disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the
international community, so that the ban on it is now a generally accepted
principle of international law, which we should consider a part of the law of the
land, and which we should act upon to the extent already allowed under our laws
and the international conventions that bind us.
Same; Same; Past experiences in other jurisdictions relative to enforced
disappearances show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold: first, there may
be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct perpetrators; second, deliberate
concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; and, third is
the element of denial.—These difficulties largely arise because the State itself—the party
whose involvement is alleged—investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in
other jurisdictions show that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold. First, there
may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators. Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually members
of the military or police forces. Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence
of the disappearance is a distinct possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced
disappearance—i.e., the corpus delicti or the victim’s body—is usually concealed to
effectively thwart the start of any investigation or the progress of one that may have
begun. The problem for the victim’s family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to
pertinent evidence. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the
landmark case of Velasquez Rodriguez that inherent to the practice of enforced
disappearance is the deliberate use of the State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence.
The IACHR described the concealment as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect
crime. Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately
deny that the enforced disappearance ever occurred. “Deniability” is central to the policy of
enforced disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to
escape the application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights. Experience
shows that government officials typically respond to requests for information
about desaparecidos by saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the
missing people may have fled the country, or that their names have merely been invented.
Same; Same; Evidence; Burden of Proof; The characteristics of the Amparo Rule of
being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast
to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt in court
proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers to have the equivalent of an
administrative proceeding, albeit judicially conducted, in addressing Amparo situations; In
these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the substance
and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and prove the
allegations by substantial evidence, and once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
required.—These characteristics—namely, of being summary and the use of substantial
evidence as the required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or
proof beyond reasonable doubt in court proceedings)—reveal the clear intent of the framers
of the Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required—the duty
of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence—point, too, to the
extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases. Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with
the substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparopetition, as discussed above, and
prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took
place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
Same; Same; Same; Quantum of Evidence; Substantial Evidence; Words and Phrases;
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940),
provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive
at a valid decision in administrative proceedings.—The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court
of Industrial Relations provided the Court its first opportunity to define the substantial
evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in administrative proceedings. To directly
quote Ang Tibay: Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. [citations omitted] The statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing
in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the
mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a
desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The fair and proper rule is to consider all the pieces
of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible
under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced—we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason, i.e., to the relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence.—
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances
that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the
standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one
hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness
entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only
compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the
other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence
the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly
observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe
flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account. The fair and proper rule, to
our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is
consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to
the most basic test of reason—i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at
hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even
hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
Same; Same; Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance; Elements of Enforced Disappearance.—The Convention defines enforced
disappearance as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty
by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place
such a person outside the protection of the law.” Under this definition, the elements that
constitute enforced disappearance are essentially fourfold: (a) arrest, detention,
abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty; (b) carried out by agents of the
State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of the State; (c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a
concealment of the fate of the disappeared person; and (d) placement of the disappeared
person outside the protection of the law.
 Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; As a rule, minor inconsistencies indicate
truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in
contrast to testimonies from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail — the latter cannot
but generate witnesses that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of
a well thought of and prefabricated story.—Upon deeper consideration of these
inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is that the petitioners never really
steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the credibility of the respondent and
her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the petitioners point out relate, more than
anything else, to details that should not affect the credibility of the respondent and Mrs.
Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material points. We note, for example, that these
witnesses are lay people in so far as military and police matters are concerned, and
confusion between the police and the military is not unusual. As a rule, minor
inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than prevarication and only tend
to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies from various witnesses
dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion that the material
circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and prefabricated
story. Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in
enforced disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim
informed the respondent and her friends, based on the informant’s letter, that
Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI and who had been under surveillance since
January 2007, was “in good hands” and under custodial investigation for
complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar Patik and a certain
“Santos” of Bulacan, a “Balik Islam” charged with terrorism. The respondent’s and
Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain denial and his
claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of evidence that
supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted destruction of this
letter—effectively, a suppression of this evidence—raises the presumption that the letter, if
produced, would be proof of what the respondent claimed. For brevity, we shall call the
evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the respondent to be the “Kasim evidence.”615
Same; Same; Same; The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with the intent to make it
a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective
and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require—the Court
has no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances
with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.—To say that this piece of evidence is
incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it substantively states is to acknowledge—
as the petitioners effectively suggest—that in the absence of any direct evidence, we should
simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an immediate dismissal for this reason is no
different from a statement that the Amparo Rule—despite its terms—is ineffective, as it
cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties that are unavoidably present
in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with the intent to make it a
token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was promulgated to provide effective
and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and international experiences in
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the situation may require.
Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary difficulties inherent in
enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties demand.
Same; Same; Same; In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful
results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation made—to be sure, reports of top
police officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never
constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of
the activities undertaken to search for the missing subject; Indisputably, the police
authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the
Amparo Rule requires.—As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was
at best haphazard since the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially
did not even secure. The returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG
efforts themselves were confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various
departments and divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a
“black” operation because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody
would ever appear in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual
police or CIDG detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any
meaningful results or details on the depth and extent of the investigation
made. To be sure, reports of top police officials indicating the personnel and units they
directed to investigate can never constitute exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or
equal detailed investigative reports of the activities undertaken to search for Tagitis.
Indisputably, the police authorities from the very beginning failed to come up to the
extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
Same; Same; Same; The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard
investigations cannot but point to the conclusion that there was government complicity in the
disappearance, for why would the government and its officials engage in their chorus of
concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of the
disappearance?—Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure,
made in an unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations
cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage
in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of
the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances
of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly
the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that
the Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted, the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the
enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and
unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law—a situation that will subsist
unless this Court acts.
Same; Same; Same; The Court believes and so holds that the government in general,
through the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group (PNP-CIDG), and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together with Col.
Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis—the Court
holds these organizations accountable through their incumbent Chiefs who, under this
Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that extraordinary diligence, in
the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing the enforced disappearnce of
Tagitis.—Following the lead of this Turkish experience—adjusted to the Philippine legal
setting and the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts
and developments of this case—we believe and so hold that the government in general,
through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations
together with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of
Tagitis. The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975,
otherwise known as the “PNP Law,” specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the
mandate “to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring
offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution.” The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane
Pante (then Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the “investigative arm” of the PNP and is
mandated to “investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal
Code, particularly those considered as heinous crimes.” Under the PNP organizational
structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). No indication
exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI. Given their mandates, the
PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who were remiss in their duties
when the government completely failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that
the Amparo Rule requires. We hold these organization accountable through their incumbent
Chiefs who, under this Decision, shall carry the personal responsibility of seeing to it that
extraordinary diligence, in the manner the Amparo Rule requires, is applied in addressing
the enforced disappearance of Tagitis.
Same; Same; Same; The Court holds Col. Kasim accountable for his failure to disclose
under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance, and for the purpose of this
accountability, he is impleaded as a party to this case.—We hold Col. Kasim accountable for
his failure to disclose under oath information relating to the enforced disappearance. For
the purpose of this accountability, we order that Col. Kasim be impleadead as a party to this
case. The PNP is similarly held accountable for the suppression of vital information that
Col. Kasim could and did not provide, and, as the entity with direct authority over Col.
Kasim, is held with the same obligation of disclosure that Col. Kasim carries. We shall deal
with Col. Kasim’s suppression of evidence under oath when we finally close this case under
the process outlined below.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rogelio T. Linzag for private respondent.
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision dated March 7, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A-G.R. AMPARO No. 00009.2 This CA decision confirmed the
enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis (Tagitis) and granted the Writ of
Amparo at the petition of his wife, Mary Jean B. Tagitis (respondent). The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby
FINDS that this is an "enforced disappearance" within the meaning of the United Nations
instruments, as used in the Amparo Rules. The privileges of the writ of amparo are hereby
extended to Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Consequently: (1) respondent GEN. EDGARDO M. DOROMAL, Chief, Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG) who should order COL. JOSE VOLPANE
PANTE, CIDG-9 Chief, Zamboanga City, to aid him; (2) respondent GEN. AVELINO I.
RAZON, Chief, PNP, who should order his men, namely: (a) respondent GEN. JOEL
GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM PNP, (b) COL. AHIRON AJIRIM, both head of
TASK FORCE TAGITIS, and (c) respondent SR. SUPERINTENDENT LEONARDO A.
ESPINA, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response, to aid him as their superior-
are hereby DIRECTED to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts, not only to protect the
life, liberty and security of Engr. Morced Tagitis, but also to extend the privileges of the writ
of amparo to Engr. Morced Tagitis and his family, and to submit a monthly report of their
actions to this Court, as a way of PERIODIC REVIEW to enable this Court to monitor the
action of respondents.
This amparo case is hereby DISMISSED as to respondent LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO,
Commanding General, Philippine Army, and as to respondent GEN. RUBEN RAFAEL,
Chief Anti-Terror Task Force Comet, Zamboanga City, both being with the military, which
is a separate and distinct organization from the police and the CIDG, in terms of operations,
chain of command and budget.
This Decision reflects the nature of the Writ of Amparo – a protective remedy against
violations or threats of violation against the rights to life, liberty and security. 3 It embodies,
as a remedy, the court’s directive to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action
to address the disappearance of an individual, in this case, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. It does
not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it
determines responsibility, or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for
purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. Responsibility
refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a
measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the
appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without
bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or who are
imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary
diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance
of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so
that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.
We highlight this nature of a Writ of Amparo case at the outset to stress that the unique
situations that call for the issuance of the writ, as well as the considerations and measures
necessary to address these situations, may not at all be the same as the standard measures
and procedures in ordinary court actions and proceedings. In this sense, the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo4 (Amparo Rule) issued by this Court is unique. The Amparo Rule should be
read, too, as a work in progress, as its directions and finer points remain to evolve through
time and jurisprudence and through the substantive laws that Congress may promulgate.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The background facts, based on the petition and the records of the case, are summarized
below.
The established facts show that Tagitis, a consultant for the World Bank and the Senior
Honorary Counselor for the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) Scholarship Programme, was
last seen in Jolo, Sulu. Together with Arsimin Kunnong (Kunnong), an IDB scholar, Tagitis
arrived in Jolo by boat in the early morning of October 31, 2007 from a seminar in
Zamboanga City. They immediately checked-in at ASY Pension House. Tagitis asked
Kunnong to buy him a boat ticket for his return trip the following day to Zamboanga. When
Kunnong returned from this errand, Tagitis was no longer around. 5 The receptionist related
that Tagitis went out to buy food at around 12:30 in the afternoon and even left his room
key with the desk.6 Kunnong looked for Tagitis and even sent a text message to the latter’s
Manila-based secretary who did not know of Tagitis’ whereabouts and activities either; she
advised Kunnong to simply wait.7
On November 4, 2007, Kunnong and Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli, a UP professor of
Muslim studies and Tagitis’ fellow student counselor at the IDB, reported Tagitis’
disappearance to the Jolo Police Station.8 On November 7, 2007, Kunnong executed a sworn
affidavit attesting to what he knew of the circumstances surrounding Tagitis’
disappearance.9
More than a month later (on December 28, 2007), the respondent filed a Petition for the
Writ of Amparo (petition) with the CA through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Felipe P.
Arcilla.10 The petition was directed against Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano, Commanding General,
Philippine Army; Gen. Avelino I. Razon, Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Gen.
Edgardo M. Doromal, Chief, Criminal Investigation and Detention Group (CIDG); Sr. Supt.
Leonardo A. Espina, Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response; Gen. Joel Goltiao,
Regional Director, ARMM-PNP; and Gen. Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terror Task Force
Comet [collectively referred to as petitioners]. After reciting Tagitis’ personal circumstances
and the facts outlined above, the petition went on to state:
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take
his early lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives, forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then
sped away without the knowledge of his student, Arsimin Kunnong;
8. As instructed, in the late afternoon of the same day, Kunnong returned to the pension
house, and was surprised to find out that subject Engr. Tagitis cannot [sic] be contacted by
phone and was not also around and his room was closed and locked;
9. Kunnong requested for the key from the desk of the pension house who [sic] assisted him
to open the room of Engr. Tagitis, where they discovered that the personal belongings of
Engr. Tagitis, including cell phones, documents and other personal belongings were all
intact inside the room;
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another
IDB scholar and reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying
to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police
authorities in Jolo, he was immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could have
been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group and other groups known to be fighting against the
government;
12. Being scared with [sic] these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers,
Kunnong reported the matter to the [respondent, wife of Engr. Tagitis] by phone and other
responsible officers and coordinators of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines,
who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM who was then preparing to attend the OIC
meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [Respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land
Bank in Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur who likewise sought help from some of
their friends in the military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her
husband;
14. All of these efforts of the [respondent] did not produce any positive results except the
information from persons in the military who do not want to be identified that Engr. Tagitis
is in the hands of the uniformed men;
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in
the custody of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga
City, being held against his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect
Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist groups;
xxxx
17. [Respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station in the ARMM in Cotobato
and in Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but
[respondent’s] request and pleadings failed to produce any positive results;
18. Instead of helping the [respondent], she [sic] was told of an intriguing tale by the police
that her husband, subject of the petition, was not missing but was with another woman
having good time somewhere, which is a clear indication of the [petitioners’] refusal to help
and provide police assistance in locating her missing husband;
19. The continued failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to release and/or turn-over subject
Engr. Tagitis to his family or even to provide truthful information to [the respondent] of the
subject’s whereabouts, and/or allow [the respondent] to visit her husband Engr. Morced
Tagitis, caused so much sleepless nights and serious anxieties;
20. Lately, [the respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM
Police Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters
including [those] in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and all these places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband,
which entailed expenses for her trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings
and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends and relatives only to try complying [sic] to
the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which, her efforts produced no
positive results up to the present time;
21. In fact at times, some police officers, who [sympathized with] the sufferings undergone
by the [respondent], informed her that they are not the proper persons that she should
approach, but assured her not to worry because her husband is [sic] in good hands;
22. The unexplained uncooperative behavior of the [petitioners] to the [respondent’s] request
for help and failure and refusal of the [petitioners] to extend the needed help, support and
assistance in locating the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis who had been declared missing since
October 30, 2007 which is almost two (2) months now, clearly indicates that the [petitioners]
are actually in physical possession and custody of [respondent’s] husband, Engr. Tagitis;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no
avail, and under the circumstances, [the respondent] has no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy to protect and get the release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the
illegal clutches of the [petitioners], their intelligence operatives and the like which are in
total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights, except the issuance of
a WRIT OF AMPARO. [Emphasis supplied]
On the same day the petition was filed, the CA immediately issued the Writ of Amparo, set
the case for hearing on January 7, 2008, and directed the petitioners to file their verified
return within seventy-two (72) hours from service of the writ.11
In their verified Return filed during the hearing of January 27, 2008, the petitioners denied
any involvement in or knowledge of Tagitis’ alleged abduction. They argued that the
allegations of the petition were incomplete and did not constitute a cause of action against
them; were baseless, or at best speculative; and were merely based on hearsay evidence. 12
The affidavit of PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon, attached to the Return, stated that: he did
not have any personal knowledge of, or any participation in, the alleged disappearance; that
he had been designated by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as the head of a special body
called TASK FORCE USIG, to address concerns about extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances; the Task Force, inter alia, coordinated with the investigators and local
police, held case conferences, rendered legal advice in connection to these cases; and gave
the following summary:13
4.
a) On November 5, 2007, the Regional Director, Police Regional Office ARMM submitted a report on
the alleged disappearance of one Engr. Morced Tagitis. According to the said report, the victim
checked-in at ASY Pension House on October 30, 2007 at about 6:00 in the morning and then roamed
around Jolo, Sulu with an unidentified companion. It was only after a few days when the said victim
did not return that the matter was reported to Jolo MPS. Afterwards, elements of Sulu PPO
conducted a thorough investigation to trace and locate the whereabouts of the said missing person,
but to no avail. The said PPO is still conducting investigation that will lead to the immediate
findings of the whereabouts of the person.
b) Likewise, the Regional Chief, 9RCIDU submitted a Progress Report to the Director, CIDG. The
said report stated among others that: subject person attended an Education Development Seminar
set on October 28, 2007 conducted at Ateneo de Zamboanga, Zamboanga City together with a Prof.
Matli. On October 30, 2007, at around 5:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis reportedly arrived at
Jolo Sulu wharf aboard M/V Bounty Cruise, he was then billeted at ASY Pension House. At about
6:15 o’clock in the morning of the same date, he instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket
bound for Zamboanga City and will depart from Jolo, Sulu on October 31, 2007. That on or about
10:00 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Tagitis left the premises of ASY Pension House as stated by the
cashier of the said pension house. Later in the afternoon, the student instructed to purchase the
ticket arrived at the pension house and waited for Engr. Tagitis, but the latter did not return. On its
part, the elements of 9RCIDU is now conducting a continuous case build up and information
gathering to locate the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
c) That the Director, CIDG directed the conduct of the search in all divisions of the CIDG to find
Engr. Tagitis who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence
Operatives since October 30, 2007, but after diligent and thorough search, records show that no such
person is being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
5. On this particular case, the Philippine National Police exhausted all possible efforts,
steps and actions available under the circumstances and continuously search and
investigate [sic] the instant case. This immense mandate, however, necessitates the
indispensable role of the citizenry, as the PNP cannot stand alone without the cooperation of
the victims and witnesses to identify the perpetrators to bring them before the bar of justice
and secure their conviction in court.
The petitioner PNP-CIDG Chief, Gen. Edgardo M. Doromal, submitted as well his affidavit,
also attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that upon receipt of the Writ of Amparo,
he caused the following:14
xxxx
That immediately upon receipt on December 29, 2007 of the Resolution of the Honorable Special Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, I immediately directed the Investigation Division of this Group [CIDG]
to conduct urgent investigation on the alleged enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced Tagitis.
That based on record, Engr. Morced N. Tagitis attended an Education Development Seminar on October
28, 2007 at Ateneo de Zamboanga at Zamboanga City together with Prof. Abdulnasser Matli. On October
30, 2007, at around six o’clock in the morning he arrived at Jolo, Sulu. He was assisted by his student
identified as Arsimin Kunnong of the Islamic Development Bank who was also one of the participants of
the said seminar. He checked in at ASY pension house located [sic] Kakuyagan, Patikul, Sulu on October
30, 2007 with [sic] unidentified companion. At around six o’clock in the morning of even date, Engr.
Tagitis instructed his student to purchase a fast craft ticket for Zamboanga City. In the afternoon of the
same date, Kunnong arrived at the pension house carrying the ticket he purchased for Engr. Tagitis, but
the latter was nowhere to be found anymore. Kunnong immediately informed Prof. Abdulnasser Matli
who reported the incident to the police. The CIDG is not involved in the disappearance of Engr. Morced
Tagitis to make out a case of an enforced disappearance which presupposes a direct or indirect
involvement of the government.
That herein [petitioner] searched all divisions and departments for a person named Engr. Morced N.
Tagitis, who was allegedly abducted or illegally detained by covert CIDG-PNP Intelligence Operatives
since October 30, 2007 and after a diligent and thorough research records show that no such person is
being detained in CIDG or any of its department or divisions.
That nevertheless, in order to determine the circumstances surrounding Engr. Morced
Tagitis [sic] alleged enforced disappearance, the undersigned had undertaken immediate
investigation and will pursue investigations up to its full completion in order to aid in the
prosecution of the person or persons responsible therefore.
Likewise attached to the Return of the Writ was PNP-PACER15 Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A.
Espina’s affidavit which alleged that:16
xxxx
That, I and our men and women in PACER vehemently deny any participation in the alleged abduction
or illegally [sic] detention of ENGR. MORCED N. TAGITS on October 30, 2007. As a matter of fact,
nowhere in the writ was mentioned that the alleged abduction was perpetrated by elements of PACER
nor was there any indication that the alleged abduction or illegal detention of ENGR. TAGITIS was
undertaken jointly by our men and by the alleged covert CIDG-PNP intelligence operatives alleged to
have abducted or illegally detained ENGR. TAGITIS.
That I was shocked when I learned that I was implicated in the alleged disappearance of ENGR.
MORCED in my capacity as the chief PACER [sic] considering that our office, the Police Anti-Crime and
Emergency Response (PACER), a special task force created for the purpose of neutralizing or eradicating
kidnap-for-ransom groups which until now continue to be one of the menace of our society is a respondent
in kidnapping or illegal detention case. Simply put, our task is to go after kidnappers and charge them in
court and to abduct or illegally detain or kidnap anyone is anathema to our mission.
That right after I learned of the receipt of the WRIT OF AMPARO, I directed the Chief of PACER
Mindanao Oriental (PACER-MOR) to conduct pro-active measures to investigate, locate/search the
subject, identify and apprehend the persons responsible, to recover and preserve evidence related to the
disappearance of ENGR. MORCED TAGITIS, which may aid in the prosecution of the person or persons
responsible, to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning the disappearance and to
determine the cause, manner, location and time of disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
may have brought about the disappearance.
That I further directed the chief of PACER-MOR, Police Superintendent JOSE ARNALDO BRIONES
JR., to submit a written report regarding the disappearance of ENGR. MORCED.
That in compliance with my directive, the chief of PACER-MOR sent through fax his written report.
That the investigation and measures being undertaken to locate/search the subject in coordination with
Police Regional Office, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (PRO-ARMM) and Jolo Police Provincial
Office (PPO) and other AFP and PNP units/agencies in the area are ongoing with the instruction not to
leave any stone unturned so to speak in the investigation until the perpetrators in the instant case are
brought to the bar of justice.
That I have exercised EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE in dealing with the WRIT OF AMPARO just
issued.
Finally, the PNP PRO ARMM Regional Director PC Supt. Joel R. Goltiao (Gen. Goltiao), also submitted
his affidavit detailing the actions that he had taken upon receipt of the report on Tagitis’ disappearance,
viz:17
xxxx
3) For the record:
1. I am the Regional Director of Police Regional Office ARMM now and during the time of the incident;
xxxx
4. It is my duty to look into and take appropriate measures on any cases of reported enforced
disappearances and when they are being alluded to my office;
5. On November 5, 2007, the Provincial Director of Sulu Police Provincial Office reported to me through
Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1105-07-2007 that on November 4, 2007 at around 3:30 p.m., a certain
Abdulnasser Matli, an employee of Islamic Development Bank, appeared before the Office of the Chief of
Police, Jolo Police Station, and reported the disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis, scholarship
coordinator of Islamic Development Bank, Manila;
6. There was no report that Engr. Tagibis was last seen in the company of or taken by any member of the
Philippine National Police but rather he just disappeared from ASY Pension House situated at
Kakuyagan Village, Village, Patikul, Sulu, on October 30, 2007, without any trace of forcible abduction or
arrest;
7. The last known instance of communication with him was when Arsimin Kunnong, a student scholar,
was requested by him to purchase a vessel ticket at the Office of Weezam Express, however, when the
student returned back to ASY Pension House, he no longer found Engr. Tagitis there and when he
immediately inquired at the information counter regarding his whereabouts [sic], the person in charge in
the counter informed him that Engr. Tagitis had left the premises on October 30, 2007 around 1 o’clock
p.m. and never returned back to his room;
8. Immediately after learning the incident, I called and directed the Provincial Director of Sulu Police
Provincial Office and other units through phone call and text messages to conduct investigation [sic] to
determine the whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the person or persons responsible for the threat,
act or omission, to recover and preserve evidence related to the disappearance of Engr. Tagitis, to identify
witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning his disappearance, to determine the cause and
manner of his disappearance, to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
disappearance so that they shall be brought before a competent court;
9. Thereafter, through my Chief of the Regional Investigation and Detection Management Division, I
have caused the following directives:
a) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1122-07-358 dated November 22, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to
conduct joint investigation with CIDG and CIDU ARMM on the matter;
b) Radio Message Cite No. RIDMD-1128-07-361 dated November 28, 2007 directing PD Sulu PPO to
expedite compliance to my previous directive;
c) Memorandum dated December 14, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO reiterating our series of
directives for investigation and directing him to undertake exhaustive coordination efforts with the
owner of ASY Pension House and student scholars of IDB in order to secure corroborative statements
regarding the disappearance and whereabouts of said personality;
d) Memorandum dated December 24, 2007 addressed to PD Sulu PPO directing him to maximize
efforts to establish clues on the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis by seeking the cooperation of Prof.
Abdulnasser Matli and Arsimin Kunnong and/or whenever necessary, for them to voluntarily submit
for polygraph examination with the NBI so as to expunge all clouds of doubt that they may somehow
have knowledge or idea to his disappearance;
e) Memorandum dated December 27, 2007 addressed to the Regional Chief, Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group, Police Regional Office 9, Zamboanga City, requesting assistance to investigate
the cause and unknown disappearance of Engr. Tagitis considering that it is within their area of
operational jurisdiction;
f) Memorandum from Chief, Intelligence Division, PRO ARMM dated December 30, 2007 addressed
to PD Sulu PPO requiring them to submit complete investigation report regarding the case of Engr.
Tagitis;
10. In compliance to our directives, PD Sulu PPO has exerted his [sic] efforts to conduct investigation
[sic] on the matter to determine the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and the circumstances related to his
disappearance and submitted the following:
a) Progress Report dated November 6, 2007 through Radio Message Cite No. SPNP3-1106-10-2007;
b) Radio Message Cite No. SPIDMS-1205-47-07 informing this office that they are still monitoring
the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis;
c) Investigation Report dated December 31, 2007 from the Chief of Police, Jolo Police Station, Sulu
PPO;
11. This incident was properly reported to the PNP Higher Headquarters as shown in the following:
a) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Chief, PNP informing him of the facts of
the disappearance and the action being taken by our office;
b) Memorandum dated November 6, 2007 addressed to the Director, Directorate for Investigation
and Detection Management, NHQ PNP;
c) Memorandum dated December 30, 2007 addressed to the Director, DIDM;
4) In spite of our exhaustive efforts, the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis cannot be determined but our office
is continuously intensifying the conduct of information gathering, monitoring and coordination for the
immediate solution of the case.
Since the disappearance of Tagistis was practically admitted and taking note of favorable actions so far
taken on the disappearance, the CA directed Gen. Goltiao – as the officer in command of the area of
disappearance – to form TASK FORCE TAGITIS.18
Task Force Tagitis
On January 11, 2008, Gen. Goltiao designated PS Supt. Ahiron Ajirim (PS Supt. Ajirim) to head TASK
FORCE TAGITIS.19 The CA subsequently set three hearings to monitor whether TASK FORCE TAGITIS
was exerting "extraordinary efforts" in handling the disappearance of Tagitis. 20 As planned, (1) the first
hearing would be to mobilize the CIDG, Zamboanga City; (2) the second hearing would be to mobilize
intelligence with Abu Sayyaf and ARMM; and (3) the third hearing would be to mobilize the Chief of
Police of Jolo, Sulu and the Chief of Police of Zamboanga City and other police operatives. 21
In the hearing on January 17, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted to the CA an intelligence report
from PSL Usman S. Pingay, the Chief of Police of the Jolo Police Station, stating a possible motive for
Tagitis’ disappearance.22 The intelligence report was apparently based on the sworn affidavit dated
January 4, 2008 of Muhammad Abdulnazeir N. Matli (Prof. Matli), Professor of Islamic Studies at the
University of the Philippines and an Honorary Student Counselor of the IDB Scholarship Program in the
Philippines, who told the Provincial Governor of Sulu that: 23
[Based] on reliable information from the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila, Tagitis has reportedly taken
and carried away… more or less Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00) deposited and entrusted to his …
[personal] bank accounts by the Central Office of IDB, Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which [was]
intended for the … IDB Scholarship Fund.
In the same hearing, PS Supt. Ajirim testified that since the CIDG was alleged to be responsible, he
personally went to the CIDG office in Zamboanga City to conduct an ocular inspection/investigation,
particularly of their detention cells.24 PS Supt. Ajirim stated that the CIDG, while helping TASK FORCE
TAGITIS investigate the disappearance of Tagitis, persistently denied any knowledge or complicity in
any abduction.25 He further testified that prior to the hearing, he had already mobilized and given
specific instructions to their supporting units to perform their respective tasks; that they even talked to,
but failed to get any lead from the respondent in Jolo.26 In his submitted investigation report dated
January 16, 2008, PS Supt. Ajirim concluded:27
9. Gleaned from the undersigned inspection and observation at the Headquarters 9 RCIDU and the
documents at hand, it is my own initial conclusion that the 9RCIDU and other PNP units in the area had
no participation neither [sic] something to do with [sic] mysterious disappearance of Engr. Morced Tagitis
last October 30, 2007. Since doubt has been raised regarding the emolument on the Islamic Development
Bank Scholar program of IDB that was reportedly deposited in the personal account of Engr. Tagitis by
the IDB central office in Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Secondly, it could might [sic] be done by
resentment or sour grape among students who are applying for the scholar [sic] and were denied which
was allegedly conducted/screened by the subject being the coordinator of said program.
20. It is also premature to conclude but it does or it may and [sic] presumed that the motive behind the
disappearance of the subject might be due to the funds he maliciously spent for his personal interest and
wanted to elude responsibilities from the institution where he belong as well as to the Islamic student
scholars should the statement of Prof. Matli be true or there might be a professional jealousy among
them.
xxxx
It is recommended that the Writ of Amparo filed against the respondents be dropped and
dismissed considering on [sic] the police and military actions in the area particularly the
CIDG are exerting their efforts and religiously doing their tasked [sic] in the conduct of its
intelligence monitoring and investigation for the early resolution of this instant case. But
rest assured, our office, in coordination with other law-enforcement agencies in the area, are
continuously and religiously conducting our investigation for the resolution of this case.
On February 4, 2008, the CA issued an ALARM WARNING that Task Force Tagitis did not
appear to be exerting extraordinary efforts in resolving Tagitis’ disappearance on the
following grounds:28
(1) This Court FOUND that it was only as late as January 28, 2008, after the hearing, that GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO and COL. AHIRON AJIRIM had requested for clear photographs when it should
have been standard operating procedure in kidnappings or disappearances that the first agenda was
for the police to secure clear pictures of the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, for dissemination
to all parts of the country and to neighboring countries. It had been three (3) months since GEN.
JOEL GOLTIAO admitted having been informed on November 5, 2007 of the alleged abduction of
Engr. Morced Tagitis by alleged bad elements of the CIDG. It had been more than one (1) month
since the Writ of Amparo had been issued on December 28, 2007. It had been three (3) weeks when
battle formation was ordered through Task Force Tagitis, on January 17, 2008. It was only on
January 28, 2008 when the Task Force Tagitis requested for clear and recent photographs of the
missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis, despite the Task Force Tagitis’ claim that they already had an
"all points bulletin", since November 5, 2007, on the missing person, Engr. Morced Tagitis. How
could the police look for someone who disappeared if no clear photograph had been disseminated?
(2) Furthermore, Task Force Tagitis’ COL. AHIROM AJIRIM informed this Court that P/Supt
KASIM was designated as Col. Ahirom Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s official designated post.
Yet, P/Supt KASIM’s subpoena was returned to this Court unserved. Since this Court was made to
understand that it was P/Supt KASIM who was the petitioner’s unofficial source of the military
intelligence information that Engr. Morced Tagitis was abducted by bad elements of the CIDG (par.
15 of the Petition), the close contact between P/Supt KASIM and Col. Ahirom Ajirim of TASK
FORCE TAGITIS should have ensured the appearance of Col. KASIM in response to this court’s
subpoena and COL. KASIM could have confirmed the military intelligence information that bad
elements of the CIDG had abducted Engr. Morced Tagitis.
Testimonies for the Respondent
On January 7, 2008, the respondent, Mary Jean B. Tagitis, testified on direct examination
that she went to Jolo and Zamboanga in her efforts to locate her husband. She said that a
friend from Zamboanga holding a high position in the military (whom she did not then
identify) gave her information that allowed her to "specify" her allegations, "particularly
paragraph 15 of the petition."29 This friend also told her that her husband "[was] in good
hands."30 The respondent also testified that she sought the assistance of her former boss in
Davao City, Land Bank Bajada Branch Manager Rudy Salvador, who told her that "PNP
CIDG is holding [her husband], Engineer Morced Tagitis."31 The respondent recounted that
she went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City where she met Col. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim
(Col. Kasim/Sr. Supt Kasim) who read to her and her friends (who were then with her) a
"highly confidential report" that contained the "alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis" and
informed her that her husband was abducted because "he is under custodial investigation"
for being a liaison for "J.I. or Jema’ah Islamiah."32
On January 17, 2008, the respondent on cross-examination testified that she is Tagitis’
second wife, and they have been married for thirteen years; Tagitis was divorced from his
first wife.33 She last communicated with her husband on October 29, 2007 at around 7:31
p.m. through text messaging; Tagitis was then on his way to Jolo, Sulu, from Zamboanga
City.34
The respondent narrated that she learned of her husband’s disappearance on October 30,
2007 when her stepdaughter, Zaynah Tagitis (Zaynah), informed her that she had not heard
from her father since the time they arranged to meet in Manila on October 31, 2007.35 The
respondent explained that it took her a few days (or on November 5, 2007) to personally ask
Kunnong to report her husband’s disappearance to the Jolo Police Station, since she had the
impression that her husband could not communicate with her because his cellular phone’s
battery did not have enough power, and that he would call her when he had fully-charged I appreciate the effort of Col. Ancanan on trying to solve the case of my husband Engr.
his cellular phone’s battery.36 Morced Tagitis, yet failed to do so.

The respondent also identified the high-ranking military friend, who gave her the The respondent also narrated her encounter with Col. Kasim, as follows: 41
information found in paragraph 15 of her petition, as Lt. Col. Pedro L. Ancanan, Jr (Col.
Ancanan). She met him in Camp Karingal, Zamboanga through her boss.37 She also testified
On November 7, 2007, I went to Land Bank of the Philippines, Bajada Branch, Davao City
that she was with three other people, namely, Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin and her two
to meet Mr. Rudy Salvador. I told him that my husband, Engineer Morced Tagitis was
friends from Mati City, Davao Oriental, when Col. Kasim read to them the contents of the
presumed to be abducted in Jolo, Sulu on October 30, 2007. I asked him a favor to contact
"highly confidential report" at Camp Katitipan, Davao City. The respondent further
his connections in the military in Jolo, Sulu where the abduction of Engr. Tagitis took place.
narrated that the report indicated that her husband met with people belonging to a terrorist
Mr. Salvador immediately called up Camp Katitipan located in Davao City looking for high-
group and that he was under custodial investigation. She then told Col. Kasim that her
ranking official who can help me gather reliable information behind the abduction of subject
husband was a diabetic taking maintenance medication, and asked that the Colonel relay to
Engineer Tagitis.
the persons holding him the need to give him his medication.38

On that same day, Mr. Salvador and my friend, Anna Mendoza, Executive Secretary,
On February 11, 2008, TASK FORCE TAGITIS submitted two narrative reports, 39 signed by
accompanied me to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim. Mr. Salvador introduced me to Col.
the respondent, detailing her efforts to locate her husband which led to her meetings with
Kasim and we had a short conversation. And he assured me that he’ll do the best he can to
Col. Ancanan of the Philippine Army and Col. Kasim of the PNP. In her narrative report
help me find my husband.
concerning her meeting with Col. Ancanan, the respondent recounted, viz:40

After a few weeks, Mr. Salvador called me up informing me up informing me that I am to go

On November 11, 2007, we went to Zamboanga City with my friend Mrs. Marydel Talbin.
Our flight from Davao City is 9:00 o’clock in the morning; we arrived at Zamboanga Airport
at around 10:00 o’clock. We [were] fetched by the two staffs of Col. Ancanan. We
immediately proceed [sic] to West Mindanao Command (WESTMINCOM).
On that same day, we had private conversation with Col. Ancanan. He interviewed me and
got information about the personal background of Engr. Morced N. Tagitis. After he
gathered all information, he revealed to us the contents of text messages they got from the
cellular phone of the subject Engr. Tagitis. One of the very important text messages of Engr.
Tagitis sent to his daughter Zaynah Tagitis was that she was not allowed to answer any
telephone calls in his condominium unit.
While we were there he did not tell us any information of the whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis.
After the said meeting with Col. Ancanan, he treated us as guests to the city. His two staffs
accompanied us to the mall to purchase our plane ticket going back to Davao City on
November 12, 2007.
When we arrived in Davao City on November 12, 2007 at 9:00 in the morning, Col. Ancanan
and I were discussing some points through phone calls. He assured me that my husband is
alive and he’s last looked [sic] in Talipapao, Jolo, Sulu. Yet I did not believe his given
statements of the whereabouts of my husband, because I contacted some of my friends who
have access to the groups of MILF, MNLF and ASG. I called up Col. Ancanan several times
begging to tell me the exact location of my husband and who held him but he refused.
While I was in Jolo, Sulu on November 30, 2007, I called him up again because the PNP,
Jolo did not give me any information of the whereabouts of my husband. Col. Ancanan told
me that "Sana ngayon alam mo na kung saan ang kinalalagyan ng asawa mo." When I was
in Zamboanga, I was thinking of dropping by the office of Col. Ancanan, but I was hesitant
to pay him a visit for the reason that the Chief of Police of Jolo told me not to contact any
AFP officials and he promised me that he can solve the case of my husband (Engr. Tagitis)
within nine days.
to Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim for he has an urgent, confidential information to
reveal.
On November 24, 2007, we went back to Camp Katitipan with my three friends. That was
the time that Col. Kasim read to us the confidential report that Engr. Tagitis was allegedly
connected [with] different terrorist [groups], one of which he mentioned in the report was
OMAR PATIK and a certain SANTOS - a Balik Islam.
It is also said that Engr. Tagitis is carrying boxes of medicines for the injured terrorists as a
supplier. These are the two information that I can still remember. It was written in a long
bond paper with PNP Letterhead. It was not shown to us, yet Col. Kasim was the one who
read it for us.
He asked a favor to me that "Please don’t quote my Name! Because this is a raw report." He
assured me that my husband is alive and he is in the custody of the military for custodial
investigation. I told him to please take care of my husband because he has aliments and he
recently took insulin for he is a diabetic patient.
In my petition for writ of amparo, I emphasized the information that I got from Kasim.
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Marydel Martin Talbin (Mrs. Talbin)
to corroborate her testimony regarding her efforts to locate her husband, in relation
particularly with the information she received from Col. Kasim. Mrs. Talbin testified that
she was with the respondent when she went to Zamboanga to see Col. Ancanan, and to
Davao City at Camp Katitipan to meet Col. Kasim.42
In Zamboanga, Mrs. Talbin recounted that they met with Col. Ancanan, who told them that
there was a report and that he showed them a series of text messages from Tagitis’ cellular
phone, which showed that Tagitis and his daughter would meet in Manila on October 30,
2007.43
She further narrated that sometime on November 24, 2007, she went with the respondent allegation that 9 RCIDU personnel were involved in the disappearance of Tagitis was
together with two other companions, namely, Salvacion Serrano and Mini Leong, to Camp baseless, since they did not conduct any operation in Jolo, Sulu before or after Tagitis’
Katitipan to talk to Col. Kasim.44 The respondent asked Col. Kasim if he knew the exact reported disappearance.67 Col. Pante added that the four (4) personnel assigned to the Sulu
location of Engr. Tagitis. Col. Kasim told them that Tagitis was in good hands, although he CIDT had no capability to conduct any "operation," since they were only assigned to
was not certain whether he was with the PNP or with the Armed Forces of the Philippines investigate matters and to monitor the terrorism situation.68 He denied that his office
(AFP). She further recounted that based on the report Col. Kasim read in their presence, conducted any surveillance on Tagitis prior to the latter’s disappearance. 69 Col. Pante
Tagitis was under custodial investigation because he was being charged with terrorism; further testified that his investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance was unsuccessful; the
Tagitis in fact had been under surveillance since January 2007 up to the time he was investigation was "still facing a blank wall" on the whereabouts of Tagitis.70
abducted when he was seen talking to Omar Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik
Islam" charged with terrorism. Col. Kasim also told them that he could not give a copy of
THE CA RULING
the report because it was a "raw report."45 She also related that the Col. Kasim did not tell
them exactly where Tagitis was being kept, although he mentioned Talipapao, Sulu.Prof.,
lalabas din yan."50 Prof. Matli also emphasized that despite what his January 4, 2008 On March 7, 2008, the CA issued its decision71 confirming that the disappearance of Tagitis
affidavit indicated,51 he never told PS Supt. Pingay, or made any accusation, that Tagitis was an "enforced disappearance" under the United Nations (UN) Declaration on the
took away money entrusted to him.52 Prof. Matli confirmed, however, that that he had Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances. 72 The CA ruled that when military
received an e-mail report53 from Nuraya Lackian of the Office of Muslim Affairs in Manila intelligence pinpointed the investigative arm of the PNP (CIDG) to be involved in the
that the IDB was seeking assistance of the office in locating the funds of IDB scholars abduction, the missing-person case qualified as an enforced disappearance. The conclusion
deposited in Tagitis’ personal account.54 that the CIDG was involved was based on the respondent’s testimony, corroborated by her
companion, Mrs. Talbin. The CA noted that the information that the CIDG, as the police
intelligence arm, was involved in Tagitis’ abduction came from no less than the military –
On cross-examination by the respondent’s counsel, Prof. Matli testified that his January 4,
an independent agency of government. The CA thus greatly relied on the "raw report" from
2008 affidavit was already prepared when PS Supt. Pingay asked him to sign it. 55 Prof Matli
Col. Kasim’s asset, pointing to the CIDG’s involvement in Tagitis’ abduction. The CA held
clarified that although he read the affidavit before signing it, he "was not so much aware
that "raw reports" from an "asset" carried "great weight" in the intelligence world. It also
of… [its] contents."56
labeled as "suspect" Col. Kasim’s subsequent and belated retraction of his statement that
the military, the police, or the CIDG was involved in the abduction of Tagitis.
On February 11, 2008, the petitioners presented Col. Kasim to rebut material portions of
the respondent’s testimony, particularly the allegation that he had stated that Tagitis was
The CA characterized as "too farfetched and unbelievable" and "a bedlam of speculation"
in the custody of either the military or the PNP.57 Col. Kasim categorically denied the
police theories painting the disappearance as "intentional" on the part of Tagitis. He had no
statements made by the respondent in her narrative report, specifically: (1) that Tagitis was
previous brushes with the law or any record of overstepping the bounds of any trust
seen carrying boxes of medicines as supplier for the injured terrorists; (2) that Tagitis was
regarding money entrusted to him; no student of the IDB scholarship program ever came
under the custody of the military, since he merely said to the respondent that "your
forward to complain that he or she did not get his or her stipend. The CA also found no basis
husband is in good hands" and is "probably taken cared of by his armed abductors;" and (3)
for the police theory that Tagitis was "trying to escape from the clutches of his second wife,"
that Tagitis was under custodial investigation by the military, the PNP or the CIDG
on the basis of the respondent’s testimony that Tagitis was a Muslim who could have many
Zamboanga City.58 Col. Kasim emphasized that the "informal letter" he received from his
wives under the Muslim faith, and that there was "no issue" at all when the latter divorced
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. 59 He also
his first wife in order to marry the second. Finally, the CA also ruled out kidnapping for
stressed that the information he provided to the respondent was merely a "raw report"
ransom by the Abu Sayyaf or by the ARMM paramilitary as the cause for Tagitis’
sourced from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow-up" as to its
disappearance, since the respondent, the police and the military noted that there was no
veracity.60
acknowledgement of Tagitis’ abduction or demand for payment of ransom – the usual modus
operandi of these terrorist groups.
On cross-examination, Col. Kasim testified that the information he gave the respondent was
given to him by his informant, who was a "civilian asset," through a letter which he
Based on these considerations, the CA thus extended the privilege of the writ to Tagitis and
considered as "unofficial."61 Col. Kasim stressed that the letter was only meant for his
his family, and directed the CIDG Chief, Col. Jose Volpane Pante, PNP Chief Avelino I.
"consumption" and not for reading by others.62 He testified further that he destroyed the
Razon, Task Force Tagitis heads Gen. Joel Goltiao and Col. Ahiron Ajirim, and PACER
letter right after he read it to the respondent and her companions because "it was not
Chief Sr. Supt. Leonardo A. Espina to exert extraordinary diligence and efforts to protect
important to him" and also because the information it contained had no importance in
the life, liberty and security of Tagitis, with the obligation to provide monthly reports of
relation with the abduction of Tagitis.63 He explained that he did not keep the letter because
their actions to the CA. At the same time, the CA dismissed the petition against the then
it did not contain any information regarding the whereabouts of Tagitis and the person(s)
respondents from the military, Lt. Gen Alexander Yano and Gen. Ruben Rafael, based on
responsible for his abduction.64
the finding that it was PNP-CIDG, not the military, that was involved.

In the same hearing on February 11, 2008, the petitioners also presented Police Senior
On March 31, 2008, the petitioners moved to reconsider the CA decision, but the CA denied
Superintendent Jose Volpane Pante (Col. Pante), Chief of the CIDG-9, to disprove the
the motion in its Resolution of April 9, 2008.73
respondent’s allegation that Tagitis was in the custody of CIDG-Zamboanga City.65 Col.
Pante clarified that the CIDG was the "investigative arm" of the PNP, and that the CIDG
"investigates and prosecutes all cases involving violations in the Revised Penal Code THE PETITION
particularly those considered as heinous crimes."66 Col. Pante further testified that the
In this Rule 45 appeal questioning the CA’s March 7, 2008 decision, the petitioners mainly
dispute the sufficiency in form and substance of the Amparo petition filed before the CA; the
sufficiency of the legal remedies the respondent took before petitioning for the writ; the
finding that the rights to life, liberty and security of Tagitis had been violated; the
sufficiency of evidence supporting the conclusion that Tagitis was abducted; the conclusion
that the CIDG Zamboanga was responsible for the abduction; and, generally, the ruling that
the respondent discharged the burden of proving the allegations of the petition by
substantial evidence.74
THE COURT’S RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
Sufficiency in Form and Substance
In questioning the sufficiency in form and substance of the respondent’s Amparo petition,
the petitioners contend that the petition violated Section 5(c), (d), and (e) of the Amparo
Rule. Specifically, the petitioners allege that the respondent failed to:
1) allege any act or omission the petitioners committed in violation of Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty
and security;
2) allege in a complete manner how Tagitis was abducted, the persons responsible for his
disappearance, and the respondent’s source of information;
3) allege that the abduction was committed at the petitioners’ instructions or with their consent;
4) implead the members of CIDG regional office in Zamboanga alleged to have custody over her
husband;
5) attach the affidavits of witnesses to support her accusations;
6) allege any action or inaction attributable to the petitioners in the performance of their duties in
the investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance; and
7) specify what legally available efforts she took to determine the fate or whereabouts of her
husband.
A petition for the Writ of Amparo shall be signed and verified and shall allege, among others
(in terms of the portions the petitioners cite):75
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation
is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and
addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of
the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
The framers of the Amparo Rule never intended Section 5(c) to be complete in every detail
in stating the threatened or actual violation of a victim’s rights. As in any other initiatory
pleading, the pleader must of course state the ultimate facts constituting the cause of action,
omitting the evidentiary details.76 In an Amparo petition, however, this requirement must
be read in light of the nature and purpose of the proceeding, which addresses a situation of
uncertainty; the petitioner may not be able to describe with certainty how the victim exactly
disappeared, or who actually acted to kidnap, abduct or arrest him or her, or where the
victim is detained, because these information may purposely be hidden or covered up by
those who caused the disappearance. In this type of situation, to require the level of
specificity, detail and precision that the petitioners apparently want to read into the
Amparo Rule is to make this Rule a token gesture of judicial concern for violations of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security.
To read the Rules of Court requirement on pleadings while addressing the unique Amparo
situation, the test in reading the petition should be to determine whether it contains the
details available to the petitioner under the circumstances, while presenting a cause of
action showing a violation of the victim’s rights to life, liberty and security through State or
private party action. The petition should likewise be read in its totality, rather than in
terms of its isolated component parts, to determine if the required elements – namely, of the
disappearance, the State or private action, and the actual or threatened violations of the
rights to life, liberty or security – are present.
In the present case, the petition amply recites in its paragraphs 4 to 11 the circumstances
under which Tagitis suddenly dropped out of sight after engaging in normal activities, and
thereafter was nowhere to be found despite efforts to locate him. The petition alleged, too,
under its paragraph 7, in relation to paragraphs 15 and 16, that according to reliable
information, police operatives were the perpetrators of the abduction. It also clearly alleged
how Tagitis’ rights to life, liberty and security were violated when he was "forcibly taken
and boarded on a motor vehicle by a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence
operatives," and then taken "into custody by the respondents’ police intelligence operatives
since October 30, 2007, specifically by the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, x x x held against
his will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect [him] with different
terrorist groups."77
These allegations, in our view, properly pleaded ultimate facts within the pleader’s
knowledge about Tagitis’ disappearance, the participation by agents of the State in this
disappearance, the failure of the State to release Tagitis or to provide sufficient information
about his whereabouts, as well as the actual violation of his right to liberty. Thus, the
petition cannot be faulted for any failure in its statement of a cause of action.
If a defect can at all be attributed to the petition, this defect is its lack of supporting
affidavit, as required by Section 5(c) of the Amparo Rule. Owing to the summary nature of
the proceedings for the writ and to facilitate the resolution of the petition, the Amparo Rule
incorporated the requirement for supporting affidavits, with the annotation that these can
be used as the affiant’s direct testimony.78 This requirement, however, should not be read as
an absolute one that necessarily leads to the dismissal of the petition if not strictly followed.
Where, as in this case, the petitioner has substantially complied with the requirement by
submitting a verified petition sufficiently detailing the facts relied upon, the strict need for
the sworn statement that an affidavit represents is essentially fulfilled. We note that the
failure to attach the required affidavits was fully cured when the respondent and her
witness (Mrs. Talbin) personally testified in the CA hearings held on January 7 and 17 and
February 18, 2008 to swear to and flesh out the allegations of the petition. Thus, even on
this point, the petition cannot be faulted.
Section 5(d) of the Amparo Rule requires that prior investigation of an alleged
disappearance must have been made, specifying the manner and results of the
investigation. Effectively, this requirement seeks to establish at the earliest opportunity the
level of diligence the public authorities undertook in relation with the reported
disappearance.79
We reject the petitioners’ argument that the respondent’s petition did not comply with the
Section 5(d) requirements of the Amparo Rule, as the petition specifies in its paragraph 11
that Kunnong and his companions immediately reported Tagitis’ disappearance to the police
authorities in Jolo, Sulu as soon as they were relatively certain that he indeed had
disappeared. The police, however, gave them the "ready answer" that Tagitis could have
been abducted by the Abu Sayyaf group or other anti-government groups. The respondent
also alleged in paragraphs 17 and 18 of her petition that she filed a "complaint" with the
PNP Police Station in Cotobato and in Jolo, but she was told of "an intriguing tale" by the
police that her husband was having "a good time with another woman." The disappearance
was alleged to have been reported, too, to no less than the Governor of the ARMM, followed
by the respondent’s personal inquiries that yielded the factual bases for her petition. 80
These allegations, to our mind, sufficiently specify that reports have been made to the police
authorities, and that investigations should have followed. That the petition did not state the
manner and results of the investigation that the Amparo Rule requires, but rather generally
stated the inaction of the police, their failure to perform their duty to investigate, or at the
very least, their reported failed efforts, should not be a reflection on the completeness of the
petition. To require the respondent to elaborately specify the names, personal
circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority, as well the manner and
conduct of the investigation is an overly strict interpretation of Section 5(d), given the
respondent’s frustrations in securing an investigation with meaningful results. Under these
circumstances, we are more than satisfied that the allegations of the petition on the
investigations undertaken are sufficiently complete for purposes of bringing the petition
forward.
Section 5(e) is in the Amparo Rule to prevent the use of a petition – that otherwise is not
supported by sufficient allegations to constitute a proper cause of action – as a means to
"fish" for evidence.81 The petitioners contend that the respondent’s petition did not specify
what "legally available efforts were taken by the respondent," and that there was an "undue
haste" in the filing of the petition when, instead of cooperating with authorities, the
respondent immediately invoked the Court’s intervention.
We do not see the respondent’s petition as the petitioners view it.
Section 5(e) merely requires that the Amparo petitioner (the respondent in the present case)
allege "the actions and recourses taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the
aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission."
The following allegations of the respondent’s petition duly outlined the actions she had
taken and the frustrations she encountered, thus compelling her to file her petition.
xxxx
7. Soon after the student left the room, Engr. Tagitis went out of the pension house to take his early
lunch but while out on the street, a couple of burly men believed to be police intelligence operatives,
forcibly took him and boarded the latter on a motor vehicle then sped away without the knowledge of his
student, Arsimin Kunnong;
xxxx
10. When Kunnong could not locate Engr. Tagitis, the former sought the help of another IDB scholar and
reported the matter to the local police agency;
11. Arsimin Kunnong, including his friends and companions in Jolo, exerted efforts in trying to locate the
whereabouts of Engr. Tagitis and when he reported the matter to the police authorities in Jolo, he was
immediately given a ready answer that Engr. Tagitis could [have been] abducted by the Abu Sayyaf
group and other groups known to be fighting against the government;
12. Being scared with these suggestions and insinuations of the police officers, Kunnong reported the
matter to the [respondent](wife of Engr. Tagitis) by phone and other responsible officers and coordinators
of the IDB Scholarship Programme in the Philippines who alerted the office of the Governor of ARMM
who was then preparing to attend the OIC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia;
13. [The respondent], on the other hand, approached some of her co-employees with the Land Bank in
Digos branch, Digos City, Davao del Sur, who likewise sought help from some of their friends in the
military who could help them find/locate the whereabouts of her husband;
xxxx
15. According to reliable information received by the [respondent], subject Engr. Tagitis is in the custody
of police intelligence operatives, specifically with the CIDG, PNP Zamboanga City, being held against his
will in an earnest attempt of the police to involve and connect Engr. Tagitis with the different terrorist
groups;
xxxx
17. [The respondent] filed her complaint with the PNP Police Station at the ARMM in Cotobato and in
Jolo, as suggested by her friends, seeking their help to find her husband, but [the respondent’s] request
and pleadings failed to produce any positive results
xxxx
20. Lately, [respondent] was again advised by one of the [petitioners] to go to the ARMM Police
Headquarters again in Cotobato City and also to the different Police Headquarters including the police
headquarters in Davao City, in Zamboanga City, in Jolo, and in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and all these
places have been visited by the [respondent] in search for her husband, which entailed expenses for her
trips to these places thereby resorting her to borrowings and beggings [sic] for financial help from friends
and relatives only to try complying to the different suggestions of these police officers, despite of which,
her efforts produced no positive results up to the present time;
xxxx
25. [The respondent] has exhausted all administrative avenues and remedies but to no avail, and under
the circumstances, [respondent] has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to protect and get the
release of subject Engr. Morced Tagitis from the illegal clutches of [the petitioners], their intelligence
operatives and the like which are in total violation of the subject’s human and constitutional rights,
except the issuance of a WRIT OF AMPARO.
Based on these considerations, we rule that the respondent’s petition for the Writ of Amparo
is sufficient in form and substance and that the Court of Appeals had every reason to
proceed with its consideration of the case.
The Desaparecidos
The present case is one of first impression in the use and application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo in an enforced disappearance situation. For a deeper appreciation of the
application of this Rule to an enforced disappearance situation, a brief look at the historical
context of the writ and enforced disappearances would be very helpful.
The phenomenon of enforced disappearance arising from State action first attracted notice
in Adolf Hitler’s Nact und Nebel Erlass or Night and Fog Decree of December 7, 1941.82 The
Third Reich’s Night and Fog Program, a State policy, was directed at persons in occupied
territories "endangering German security"; they were transported secretly to Germany
where they disappeared without a trace. In order to maximize the desired intimidating
effect, the policy prohibited government officials from providing information about the fate
of these targeted persons.83
In the mid-1970s, the phenomenon of enforced disappearances resurfaced, shocking and
outraging the world when individuals, numbering anywhere from 6,000 to 24,000, were
reported to have "disappeared" during the military regime in Argentina. Enforced
disappearances spread in Latin America, and the issue became an international concern
when the world noted its widespread and systematic use by State security forces in that
continent under Operation Condor84 and during the Dirty War85 in the 1970s and 1980s.
The escalation of the practice saw political activists secretly arrested, tortured, and killed as
part of governments’ counter-insurgency campaigns. As this form of political brutality
became routine elsewhere in the continent, the Latin American media standardized the
term "disappearance" to describe the phenomenon. The victims of enforced disappearances
were called the "desaparecidos,"86 which literally means the "disappeared ones."87 In
general, there are three different kinds of "disappearance" cases:
1) those of people arrested without witnesses or without positive identification of the arresting
agents and are never found again;
2) those of prisoners who are usually arrested without an appropriate warrant and held in complete
isolation for weeks or months while their families are unable to discover their whereabouts and the
military authorities deny having them in custody until they eventually reappear in one detention
center or another; and
3) those of victims of "salvaging" who have disappeared until their lifeless bodies are later
discovered.88
In the Philippines, enforced disappearances generally fall within the first two
categories,89 and 855 cases were recorded during the period of martial law from 1972 until
1986. Of this number, 595 remained missing, 132 surfaced alive and 127 were found dead.
During former President Corazon C. Aquino’s term, 820 people were reported to have
disappeared and of these, 612 cases were documented. Of this number, 407 remain missing,
108 surfaced alive and 97 were found dead. The number of enforced disappearances dropped
during former President Fidel V. Ramos’ term when only 87 cases were reported, while the
three-year term of former President Joseph E. Estrada yielded 58 reported cases.
KARAPATAN, a local non-governmental organization, reports that as of March 31, 2008,
the records show that there were a total of 193 victims of enforced disappearance under
incumbent President Gloria M. Arroyo’s administration. The Commission on Human Rights’
records show a total of 636 verified cases of enforced disappearances from 1985 to 1993. Of
this number, 406 remained missing, 92 surfaced alive, 62 were found dead, and 76 still have
undetermined status.90 Currently, the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearance91 reports 619 outstanding cases of enforced or involuntary
disappearances covering the period December 1, 2007 to November 30, 2008.92
Enforced Disappearances
Under Philippine Law
The Amparo Rule expressly provides that the "writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof."93 We note that although the writ specifically
covers "enforced disappearances," this concept is neither defined nor penalized in this
jurisdiction. The records of the Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of Rules
(Committee) reveal that the drafters of the Amparo Rule initially considered providing an
elemental definition of the concept of enforced disappearance:94
JUSTICE MARTINEZ: I believe that first and foremost we should come up or formulate a
specific definition [for] extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. From that
definition, then we can proceed to formulate the rules, definite rules concerning the same.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO: … As things stand, there is no law penalizing extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances… so initially also we have to [come up with] the
nature of these extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances [to be covered by the
Rule] because our concept of killings and disappearances will define the jurisdiction of the
courts. So we’ll have to agree among ourselves about the nature of killings and
disappearances for instance, in other jurisdictions, the rules only cover state actors. That is
an element incorporated in their concept of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. In other jurisdictions, the concept includes acts and omissions not only of
state actors but also of non state actors. Well, more specifically in the case of the Philippines
for instance, should these rules include the killings, the disappearances which may be
authored by let us say, the NPAs or the leftist organizations and others. So, again we need
to define the nature of the extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances that will be
covered by these rules. [Emphasis supplied] 95
In the end, the Committee took cognizance of several bills filed in the House of
Representatives96 and in the Senate97 on extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
and resolved to do away with a clear textual definition of these terms in the Rule. The
Committee instead focused on the nature and scope of the concerns within its power to
address and provided the appropriate remedy therefor, mindful that an elemental definition
may intrude into the ongoing legislative efforts.98
As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances in this
jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately from the component criminal acts
undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced disappearances and are now penalized
under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. 99 The simple reason is that the Legislature
has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what acts are criminal and what the
corresponding penalty these criminal acts should carry are matters of substantive law that
only the Legislature has the power to enact under the country’s constitutional scheme and
power structure.
Even without the benefit of directly applicable substantive laws on extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances, however, the Supreme Court is not powerless to act under its
own constitutional mandate to promulgate "rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts,"100 since extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances, by their nature and purpose, constitute State or
private party violation of the constitutional rights of individuals to life, liberty and security.
Although the Court’s power is strictly procedural and as such does not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights, the legal protection that the Court can provide can be very
meaningful through the procedures it sets in addressing extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. The Court, through its procedural rules, can set the procedural standards
and thereby directly compel the public authorities to act on actual or threatened violations
of constitutional rights. To state the obvious, judicial intervention can make a difference –
even if only procedurally – in a situation when the very same investigating public
authorities may have had a hand in the threatened or actual violations of constitutional
rights.
Lest this Court intervention be misunderstood, we clarify once again that we do not rule on
any issue of criminal culpability for the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance. This
is an issue that requires criminal action before our criminal courts based on our existing
penal laws. Our intervention is in determining whether an enforced disappearance has
taken place and who is responsible or accountable for this disappearance, and to define and
impose the appropriate remedies to address it. The burden for the public authorities to
discharge in these situations, under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, is twofold. The first is
to ensure that all efforts at disclosure and investigation are undertaken under pain of
indirect contempt from this Court when governmental efforts are less than what the
individual situations require. The second is to address the disappearance, so that the life of
the victim is preserved and his or her liberty and security restored. In these senses, our
orders and directives relative to the writ are continuing efforts that are not truly terminated
until the extrajudicial killing or enforced disappearance is fully addressed by the complete
determination of the fate and the whereabouts of the victim, by the production of the
disappeared person and the restoration of his or her liberty and security, and, in the proper
case, by the commencement of criminal action against the guilty parties.
Enforced Disappearance - Under International Law
From the International Law perspective, involuntary or enforced disappearance is
considered a flagrant violation of human rights.101 It does not only violate the right to life,
liberty and security of the desaparecido; it affects their families as well through the denial of
their right to information regarding the circumstances of the disappeared family member.
Thus, enforced disappearances have been said to be "a double form of torture," with "doubly
paralyzing impact for the victims," as they "are kept ignorant of their own fates, while
family members are deprived of knowing the whereabouts of their detained loved ones" and
suffer as well the serious economic hardship and poverty that in most cases follow the
disappearance of the household breadwinner.102
The UN General Assembly first considered the issue of "Disappeared Persons" in December
1978 under Resolution 33/173. The Resolution expressed the General Assembly’s deep
concern arising from "reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or
involuntary disappearances," and requested the "UN Commission on Human Rights to
consider the issue of enforced disappearances with a view to making appropriate
recommendations."103
In 1992, in response to the reality that the insidious practice of enforced disappearance had
become a global phenomenon, the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (Declaration).104 This Declaration,
for the first time, provided in its third preambular clause a working description of enforced
disappearance, as follows:
Deeply concerned that in many countries, often in a persistent manner, enforced
disappearances occur, in the sense that persons are arrested, detained or abducted against
their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of different branches or levels of
Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting on behalf of, or with the
support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, followed by a refusal
to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of the law.
[Emphasis supplied]
Fourteen years after (or on December 20, 2006), the UN General Assembly adopted the
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
(Convention).105 The Convention was opened for signature in Paris, France on February 6,
2007.106 Article 2 of the Convention defined enforced disappearance as follows:
For the purposes of this Convention, "enforced disappearance" is considered to be the arrest,
detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the
State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the
protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
The Convention is the first universal human rights instrument to assert that there is a
right not to be subject to enforced disappearance 107 and that this right is non-derogable.108 It
provides that no one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance under any circumstances,
be it a state of war, internal political instability, or any other public emergency. It obliges
State Parties to codify enforced disappearance as an offense punishable with appropriate
penalties under their criminal law.109 It also recognizes the right of relatives of the
disappeared persons and of the society as a whole to know the truth on the fate and
whereabouts of the disappeared and on the progress and results of the
investigation.110 Lastly, it classifies enforced disappearance as a continuing offense, such
that statutes of limitations shall not apply until the fate and whereabouts of the victim are
established.111
Binding Effect of UN - Action on the Philippines
To date, the Philippines has neither signed nor ratified the Convention, so that the country
is not yet committed to enact any law penalizing enforced disappearance as a crime. The
absence of a specific penal law, however, is not a stumbling block for action from this Court,
as heretofore mentioned; underlying every enforced disappearance is a violation of the
constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that the Supreme Court is mandated by the
Constitution to protect through its rule-making powers.
Separately from the Constitution (but still pursuant to its terms), the Court is guided, in
acting on Amparo cases, by the reality that the Philippines is a member of the UN, bound by
its Charter and by the various conventions we signed and ratified, particularly the
conventions touching on humans rights. Under the UN Charter, the Philippines pledged to
"promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."112 Although no universal
agreement has been reached on the precise extent of the "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" guaranteed to all by the Charter,113 it was the UN itself that issued the
Declaration on enforced disappearance, and this Declaration states:114
Any act of enforced disappearance is an offence to dignity. It is condemned as a denial of the
purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and as a grave and flagrant violation of
human rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and reaffirmed and developed in international instruments in this field.
[Emphasis supplied]
As a matter of human right and fundamental freedom and as a policy matter made in a UN
Declaration, the ban on enforced disappearance cannot but have its effects on the country,
given our own adherence to "generally accepted principles of international law as part of the
law of the land."115
In the recent case of Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v.
Duque III,116 we held that:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either
by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law. [Emphasis supplied]
We characterized "generally accepted principles of international law" as norms of general or
customary international law that are binding on all states. We held further:117
[G]enerally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of
the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules
accepted as binding result from the combination [of] two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element
known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. [Emphasis in the original]
The most widely accepted statement of sources of international law today is Article 38(1) of
the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which provides that the Court shall apply
"international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."118 The material
sources of custom include State practice, State legislation, international and national
judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of
treaties in the same form, the practice of international organs, and resolutions relating to
legal questions in the UN General Assembly.119 Sometimes referred to as "evidence" of
international law,120 these sources identify the substance and content of the obligations of
States and are indicative of the "State practice" and "opinio juris" requirements of
international law.121 We note the following in these respects:
First, barely two years from the adoption of the Declaration, the Organization of American
States (OAS) General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention on Enforced
Disappearance of Persons in June 1994.122 State parties undertook under this Convention
"not to practice, permit, or tolerate the forced disappearance of persons, even in states of
emergency or suspension of individual guarantees."123 One of the key provisions includes the
States’ obligation to enact the crime of forced disappearance in their respective national
criminal laws and to establish jurisdiction over such cases when the crime was committed
within their jurisdiction, when the victim is a national of that State, and "when the alleged
criminal is within its territory and it does not proceed to extradite him," which can be
interpreted as establishing universal jurisdiction among the parties to the Inter-American
Convention.124 At present, Colombia, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela have
enacted separate laws in accordance with the Inter-American Convention and have defined
activities involving enforced disappearance to be criminal.1251avvphi1
Second, in Europe, the European Convention on Human Rights has no explicit provision
dealing with the protection against enforced disappearance. The European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), however, has applied the Convention in a way that provides ample
protection for the underlying rights affected by enforced disappearance through the
Convention’s Article 2 on the right to life; Article 3 on the prohibition of torture; Article 5 on
the right to liberty and security; Article 6, paragraph 1 on the right to a fair trial; and
Article 13 on the right to an effective remedy. A leading example demonstrating the
protection afforded by the European Convention is Kurt v. Turkey, 126where the ECHR found
a violation of the right to liberty and security of the disappeared person when the
applicant’s son disappeared after being taken into custody by Turkish forces in the Kurdish
village of Agilli in November 1993. It further found the applicant (the disappeared person’s
mother) to be a victim of a violation of Article 3, as a result of the silence of the authorities
and the inadequate character of the investigations undertaken. The ECHR also saw the lack
of any meaningful investigation by the State as a violation of Article 13.127
Third, in the United States, the status of the prohibition on enforced disappearance as part
of customary international law is recognized in the most recent edition of Restatement of
the Law: The Third,128 which provides that "[a] State violates international law if, as a
matter of State policy, it practices, encourages, or condones… (3) the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals."129 We significantly note that in a related matter that finds
close identification with enforced disappearance – the matter of torture – the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court held in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala130 that the
prohibition on torture had attained the status of customary international law. The court
further elaborated on the significance of UN declarations, as follows:
These U.N. declarations are significant because they specify with great precision the
obligations of member nations under the Charter. Since their adoption, "(m)embers can no
longer contend that they do not know what human rights they promised in the Charter to
promote." Moreover, a U.N. Declaration is, according to one authoritative definition, "a
formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and
lasting importance are being enunciated." Accordingly, it has been observed that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights "no longer fits into the dichotomy of ‘binding treaty’
against ‘non-binding pronouncement,' but is rather an authoritative statement of the
international community." Thus, a Declaration creates an expectation of adherence, and
"insofar as the expectation is gradually justified by State practice, a declaration may by
custom become recognized as laying down rules binding upon the States." Indeed, several
commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of
binding, customary international law. [Citations omitted]
Fourth, in interpreting Article 2 (right to an effective domestic remedy) of the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which the Philippines is both a
signatory and a State Party, the UN Human Rights Committee, under the Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, has stated that the act of enforced disappearance violates
Articles 6 (right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment) and 9 (right to liberty and security of the person) of the ICCPR, and the act
may also amount to a crime against humanity.131
Fifth, Article 7, paragraph 1 of the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International
Criminal Court (ICC) also covers enforced disappearances insofar as they are defined as
crimes against humanity,132 i.e., crimes "committed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack." While more than 100
countries have ratified the Rome Statute,133 the Philippines is still merely a signatory and
has not yet ratified it. We note that Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute has been incorporated
in the statutes of other international and hybrid tribunals, including Sierra Leone Special
Court, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-Leste, and the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.134 In addition, the implementing legislation of State
Parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC has given rise to a number of national criminal
provisions also covering enforced disappearance.135
While the Philippines is not yet formally bound by the terms of the Convention on enforced
disappearance (or by the specific terms of the Rome Statute) and has not formally declared
enforced disappearance as a specific crime, the above recital shows that enforced
disappearance as a State practice has been repudiated by the international community, so
that the ban on it is now a generally accepted principle of international law, which we
should consider a part of the law of the land, and which we should act upon to the extent
already allowed under our laws and the international conventions that bind us.
The following civil or political rights under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
ICCPR and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR)
may be infringed in the course of a disappearance:136
1) the right to recognition as a person before the law;
2) the right to liberty and security of the person;
3) the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
4) the right to life, when the disappeared person is killed;
5) the right to an identity;
6) the right to a fair trial and to judicial guarantees;
7) the right to an effective remedy, including reparation and compensation;
8) the right to know the truth regarding the circumstances of a disappearance.
9) the right to protection and assistance to the family;
10) the right to an adequate standard of living;
11) the right to health; and
12) the right to education [Emphasis supplied]
Article 2 of the ICCPR, which binds the Philippines as a state party, provides:
Article 2
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. [Emphasis
supplied]
In General Comment No. 31, the UN Human Rights Committee opined that the right to an
effective remedy under Article 2 of the ICCPR includes the obligation of the State to
investigate ICCPR violations promptly, thoroughly, and effectively, viz:137
15. Article 2, paragraph 3, requires that in addition to effective protection of Covenant rights, States
Parties must ensure that individuals also have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate those
rights… The Committee attaches importance to States Parties' establishing appropriate judicial and
administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under domestic law…
Administrative mechanisms are particularly required to give effect to the general obligation to
investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectivelythrough independent and
impartial bodies. A failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of violations could in and of itself
give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant. Cessation of an ongoing violation is an essential element
of the right to an effective remedy. [Emphasis supplied]
The UN Human Rights Committee further stated in the same General Comment No. 31
that failure to investigate as well as failure to bring to justice the perpetrators of ICCPR
violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant, thus:138
18. Where the investigations referred to in paragraph 15 reveal violations of certain Covenant rights,
States Parties must ensure that those responsible are brought to justice. As with failure to investigate,
failure to bring to justice perpetrators of such violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate
breach of the Covenant. These obligations arise notably in respect of those violations recognized as
criminal under either domestic or international law, such as torture and similar cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment (article 7), summary and arbitrary killing (article 6) and enforced disappearance
(articles 7 and 9 and, frequently, 6). Indeed, the problem of impunity for these violations, a matter of
sustained concern by the Committee, may well be an important contributing element in the recurrence of
the violations. When committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population,
these violations of the Covenant are crimes against humanity (see Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, article 7). [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo,139 this Court, in ruling that the right to security
of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one’s right by the government, held that:
The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees
full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is
the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially
when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations,
organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its
own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or
his family or upon their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government.
[Emphasis supplied]
Manalo significantly cited Kurt v. Turkey,140 where the ECHR interpreted the "right to
security" not only as a prohibition on the State against arbitrary deprivation of liberty, but
also as the imposition of a positive duty to afford protection to the right to liberty. The Court
notably quoted the following ECHR ruling:
[A]ny deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and
procedural rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over that individual, it is
incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be
seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a person has
been taken into custody and has not been seen since. [Emphasis supplied]
These rulings effectively serve as the backdrop for the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, which
the Court made effective on October 24, 2007. Although the Amparo Rule still has gaps
waiting to be filled through substantive law, as evidenced primarily by the lack of a concrete
definition of "enforced disappearance," the materials cited above, among others, provide
ample guidance and standards on how, through the medium of the Amparo Rule, the Court
can provide remedies and protect the constitutional rights to life, liberty and security that
underlie every enforced disappearance.
Evidentiary Difficulties Posed by the Unique Nature of an Enforced Disappearance
Before going into the issue of whether the respondent has discharged the burden of proving
the allegations of the petition for the Writ of Amparo by the degree of proof required by the
Amparo Rule, we shall discuss briefly the unique evidentiary difficulties presented by
enforced disappearance cases; these difficulties form part of the setting that the
implementation of the Amparo Rule shall encounter.
These difficulties largely arise because the State itself – the party whose involvement is
alleged – investigates enforced disappearances. Past experiences in other jurisdictions show
that the evidentiary difficulties are generally threefold.
First, there may be a deliberate concealment of the identities of the direct
perpetrators.141 Experts note that abductors are well organized, armed and usually
members of the military or police forces, thus:
The victim is generally arrested by the security forces or by persons acting under some form of
governmental authority. In many countries the units that plan, implement and execute the program are
generally specialized, highly-secret bodies within the armed or security forces. They are generally
directed through a separate, clandestine chain of command, but they have the necessary credentials to
avoid or prevent any interference by the "legal" police forces. These authorities take their victims to
secret detention centers where they subject them to interrogation and torture without fear of judicial or
other controls.142
In addition, there are usually no witnesses to the crime; if there are, these witnesses are
usually afraid to speak out publicly or to testify on the disappearance out of fear for their
own lives.143 We have had occasion to note this difficulty in Secretary of Defense v.
Manalo144 when we acknowledged that "where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise."
Second, deliberate concealment of pertinent evidence of the disappearance is a distinct
possibility; the central piece of evidence in an enforced disappearance – i.e., the corpus
delicti or the victim’s body – is usually concealed to effectively thwart the start of any
investigation or the progress of one that may have begun.145 The problem for the victim’s
family is the State’s virtual monopoly of access to pertinent evidence. The Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) observed in the landmark case of Velasquez
Rodriguez146 that inherent to the practice of enforced disappearance is the deliberate use of
the State’s power to destroy the pertinent evidence. The IACHR described the concealment
as a clear attempt by the State to commit the perfect crime. 147
Third is the element of denial; in many cases, the State authorities deliberately deny that
the enforced disappearance ever occurred.148 "Deniability" is central to the policy of enforced
disappearances, as the absence of any proven disappearance makes it easier to escape the
application of legal standards ensuring the victim’s human rights. 149 Experience shows that
government officials typically respond to requests for information about desaparecidos by
saying that they are not aware of any disappearance, that the missing people may have fled
the country, or that their names have merely been invented.150
These considerations are alive in our minds, as these are the difficulties we confront, in one
form or another, in our consideration of this case.
Evidence and Burden of Proof in Enforced Disappearances Cases
Sections 13, 17 and 18 of the Amparo Rule define the nature of an Amparo proceeding and
the degree and burden of proof the parties to the case carry, as follows:
Section 13. Summary Hearing. The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However,
the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and
determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
xxxx
Section 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. – The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.
The respondent who is a private individual must prove that ordinary diligence as required by applicable
laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent who is a public official or employee must prove that extraordinary diligence as required
by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed in the performance of duty.
The respondent public official or employee cannot invoke the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed or evade responsibility or liability.
Section 18. Judgment. – … If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. [Emphasis supplied]
These characteristics – namely, of being summary and the use of substantial evidence as the
required level of proof (in contrast to the usual preponderance of evidence or proof beyond
reasonable doubt in court proceedings) – reveal the clear intent of the framers of the
Amparo Rule to have the equivalent of an administrative proceeding, albeit judicially
conducted, in addressing Amparo situations. The standard of diligence required – the duty
of public officials and employees to observe extraordinary diligence – point, too, to the
extraordinary measures expected in the protection of constitutional rights and in the
consequent handling and investigation of extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearance
cases.
Thus, in these proceedings, the Amparo petitioner needs only to properly comply with the
substance and form requirements of a Writ of Amparo petition, as discussed above, and
prove the allegations by substantial evidence. Once a rebuttable case has been proven, the
respondents must then respond and prove their defenses based on the standard of diligence
required. The rebuttable case, of course, must show that an enforced disappearance took
place under circumstances showing a violation of the victim’s constitutional rights to life,
liberty or security, and the failure on the part of the investigating authorities to
appropriately respond.
The landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations151
provided the Court its
first opportunity to define the substantial evidence required to arrive at a valid decision in
administrative proceedings. To directly quote Ang Tibay:
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [citations omitted] The
statute provides that ‘the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not
be controlling.’ The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative
boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent in judicial proceedings would not invalidate the
administrative order. [citations omitted] But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence
having rational probative force. [Emphasis supplied]
In Secretary of Defense v. Manalo,152 which was the Court’s first petition for a Writ of
Amparo, we recognized that the full and exhaustive proceedings that the substantial
evidence standard regularly requires do not need to apply due to the summary nature of
Amparo proceedings. We said:
The remedy [of the writ of amparo] provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding
that requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is
not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for
damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[Emphasis supplied]
Not to be forgotten in considering the evidentiary aspects of Amparo petitions are the
unique difficulties presented by the nature of enforced disappearances, heretofore discussed,
which difficulties this Court must frontally meet if the Amparo Rule is to be given a chance
to achieve its objectives. These evidentiary difficulties compel the Court to adopt standards
appropriate and responsive to the circumstances, without transgressing the due process
requirements that underlie every proceeding.
In the seminal case of Velasquez Rodriguez,153 the IACHR – faced with a lack of direct
evidence that the government of Honduras was involved in Velasquez Rodriguez’
disappearance – adopted a relaxed and informal evidentiary standard, and established the
rule that presumes governmental responsibility for a disappearance if it can be proven that
the government carries out a general practice of enforced disappearances and the specific
case can be linked to that practice.154 The IACHR took note of the realistic fact that enforced
disappearances could be proven only through circumstantial or indirect evidence or by
logical inference; otherwise, it was impossible to prove that an individual had been made to
disappear. It held:
130. The practice of international and domestic courts shows that direct evidence, whether testimonial or
documentary, is not the only type of evidence that may be legitimately considered in reaching a decision.
Circumstantial evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the facts.
131. Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is especially important in allegations of disappearances,
because this type of repression is characterized by an attempt to suppress all information about the
kidnapping or the whereabouts and fate of the victim. [Emphasis supplied]
In concluding that the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez (Manfredo) was carried out by
agents who acted under cover of public authority, the IACHR relied on circumstantial
evidence including the hearsay testimony of Zenaida Velásquez, the victim’s sister, who
described Manfredo’s kidnapping on the basis of conversations she had with witnesses who
saw Manfredo kidnapped by men in civilian clothes in broad daylight. She also told the
Court that a former Honduran military official had announced that Manfredo was
kidnapped by a special military squadron acting under orders of the Chief of the Armed
Forces.155 The IACHR likewise considered the hearsay testimony of a second witness who
asserted that he had been told by a Honduran military officer about the disappearance, and
a third witness who testified that he had spoken in prison to a man who identified himself
as Manfredo.156
Velasquez stresses the lesson that flexibility is necessary under the unique circumstances
that enforced disappearance cases pose to the courts; to have an effective remedy, the
standard of evidence must be responsive to the evidentiary difficulties faced. On the one
hand, we cannot be arbitrary in the admission and appreciation of evidence, as arbitrariness
entails violation of rights and cannot be used as an effective counter-measure; we only
compound the problem if a wrong is addressed by the commission of another wrong. On the
other hand, we cannot be very strict in our evidentiary rules and cannot consider evidence
the way we do in the usual criminal and civil cases; precisely, the proceedings before us are
administrative in nature where, as a rule, technical rules of evidence are not strictly
observed. Thus, while we must follow the substantial evidence rule, we must observe
flexibility in considering the evidence we shall take into account.
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in
their totality, and to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to
be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced. In other words, we
reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason – i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the
issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even
hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies this basic minimum test.
We note in this regard that the use of flexibility in the consideration of evidence is not at all
novel in the Philippine legal system. In child abuse cases, Section 28 of the Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness157 is expressly recognized as an exception to the hearsay
rule. This Rule allows the admission of the hearsay testimony of a child describing any act
or attempted act of sexual abuse in any criminal or non-criminal proceeding, subject to
certain prerequisites and the right of cross-examination by the adverse party. The
admission of the statement is determined by the court in light of specified subjective and
objective considerations that provide sufficient indicia of reliability of the child
witness.158 These requisites for admission find their counterpart in the present case under
the above-described conditions for the exercise of flexibility in the consideration of evidence,
including hearsay evidence, in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearance cases.
Assessment of the Evidence
The threshold question for our resolution is: was there an enforced disappearance within the
meaning of this term under the UN Declaration we have cited?
The Convention defines enforced disappearance as "the arrest, detention, abduction or any
other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the
disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law." 159Under
this definition, the elements that constitute enforced disappearance are essentially
fourfold:160
(a) arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) carried out by agents of the State or persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization,
support or acquiescence of the State;
(c) followed by a refusal to acknowledge the detention, or a concealment of the fate of the disappeared
person; and
(d) placement of the disappeared person outside the protection of the law. [Emphasis supplied]
We find no direct evidence indicating how the victim actually disappeared. The direct
evidence at hand only shows that Tagitis went out of the ASY Pension House after
depositing his room key with the hotel desk and was never seen nor heard of again. The
undisputed conclusion, however, from all concerned – the petitioner, Tagitis’ colleagues and
even the police authorities – is that Tagistis disappeared under mysterious circumstances
and was never seen again. The respondent injected the causal element in her petition and
testimony, as we shall discuss below.
We likewise find no direct evidence showing that operatives of PNP CIDG Zamboanga
abducted or arrested Tagitis. If at all, only the respondent’s allegation that Tagistis was
under CIDG Zamboanga custody stands on record, but it is not supported by any other
evidence, direct or circumstantial.
In her direct testimony, the respondent pointed to two sources of information as her bases
for her allegation that Tagistis had been placed under government custody (in contrast with
CIDG Zamboanga custody). The first was an unnamed friend in Zamboanga (later identified
as Col. Ancanan), who occupied a high position in the military and who allegedly mentioned
that Tagitis was in good hands. Nothing came out of this claim, as both the respondent
herself and her witness, Mrs. Talbin, failed to establish that Col. Ancanan gave them any
information that Tagitis was in government custody. Col. Ancanan, for his part, admitted
the meeting with the respondent but denied giving her any information about the
disappearance.
The more specific and productive source of information was Col. Kasim, whom the
respondent, together with her witness Mrs. Talbin, met in Camp Katitipan in Davao City.
To quote the relevant portions of the respondent’s testimony:
Q: Were you able to speak to other military officials regarding the whereabouts of your husband particularly those in
charge of any records or investigation?
A: I went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City. Then one military officer, Col. Casim, told me that my husband is being
abducted [sic] because he is under custodial investigation because he is allegedly "parang liason ng J.I.", sir.
Q: What is J.I.?
A: Jema’ah Islamiah, sir.
Q: Was there any information that was read to you during one of those visits of yours in that Camp?
A: Col. Casim did not furnish me a copy of his report because he said those reports are highly confidential, sir.
Q: Was it read to you then even though you were not furnished a copy?
A: Yes, sir. In front of us, my friends.
Q: And what was the content of that highly confidential report?
A: Those alleged activities of Engineer Tagitis, sir.161 [Emphasis supplied]
She confirmed this testimony in her cross-examination:
Q: You also mentioned that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And a certain Col. Kasim told you that your husband was abducted and under custodial investigation?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: And you mentioned that he showed you a report?
A: Yes, ma’am.
Q: Were you able to read the contents of that report?
A: He did not furnish me a copy of those [sic] report because those [sic] were highly confidential. That is a military report,
ma’am.
Q: But you were able to read the contents?
A: No. But he read it in front of us, my friends, ma’am.
Q: How many were you when you went to see Col. Kasim?
A: There were three of us, ma’am.
Q: Who were your companions?
A: Mrs. Talbin, tapos yung dalawang friends nya from Mati City, Davao Oriental, ma’am. 162
xxxx
Q: When you were told that your husband is in good hands, what was your reaction and what did you do?
A: May binasa kasi sya that my husband has a parang meeting with other people na parang mga terorista na mga tao.
Tapos at the end of the report is [sic] under custodial investigation. So I told him "Colonel, my husband is sick. He is
diabetic at nagmemaintain yun ng gamot. Pakisabi lang sa naghohold sa asawa ko na bigyan siya ng gamot, ma’am."163
xxxx
Q: You mentioned that you received information that Engineer Tagitis is being held by the CIDG in Zamboanga, did you go
to CIDG Zamboanga to verify that information?
A: I did not go to CIDG Zamboanga. I went to Camp Karingal instead. Enough na yun na effort ko because I know that
they would deny it, ma’am.164
On February 11, 2008, the respondent presented Mrs. Talbin to corroborate her testimony that her husband was abducted
and held under custodial investigation by the PNP-CIDG Zamboanga City, viz:
Q: You said that you went to Camp Katitipan in Davao City sometime November 24, 2007, who was with you when you
went there?
A: Mary Jean Tagitis, sir.
Q: Only the two of you?
A: No. We have some other companions. We were four at that time, sir.
Q: Who were they?
A: Salvacion Serrano, Mini Leong, Mrs. Tagitis and me, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk, see some other officials at Camp Katitipan during that time?
A: Col. Kasim (PS Supt. Julasirim Ahadin Kasim) only, sir.
Q: Were you able to talk to him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: The four of you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What information did you get from Col. Kasim during that time?
A: The first time we met with [him] I asked him if he knew of the exact location, if he can furnish us the location of Engr.
Tagitis. And he was reading this report. He told us that Engr. Tagitis is in good hands. He is with the military, but he is
not certain whether he is with the AFP or PNP. He has this serious case. He was charged of terrorism because he was
under surveillance from January 2007 up to the time that he was abducted. He told us that he was under custodial
investigation. As I’ve said earlier, he was seen under surveillance from January. He was seen talking to Omar Patik, a
certain Santos of Bulacan who is also a Balik Islam and charged with terrorism. He was seen carrying boxes of medicines.
Then we asked him how long will he be in custodial investigation. He said until we can get some information. But he also
told us that he cannot give us that report because it was a raw report. It was not official, sir.
Q: You said that he was reading a report, was that report in document form, in a piece of paper or was it in the computer or
what?
A: As far as I can see it, sir, it is written in white bond paper. I don’t know if it was computerized but I’m certain that it
was typewritten. I’m not sure if it used computer, fax or what, sir.
Q: When he was reading it to you, was he reading it line by line or he was reading in a summary form?
A: Sometimes he was glancing to the report and talking to us, sir.165
xxxx
Q: Were you informed as to the place where he was being kept during that time?
A: He did not tell us where he [Tagitis] was being kept. But he mentioned this Talipapao, Sulu, sir.
Q: After that incident, what did you do if any?
A: We just left and as I’ve mentioned, we just waited because that raw information that he was reading to us [sic] after the
custodial investigation, Engineer Tagitis will be released. [Emphasis supplied] 166
Col. Kasim never denied that he met with the respondent and her friends, and that he provided them information based on
the input of an unnamed asset. He simply claimed in his testimony that the "informal letter" he received from his
informant in Sulu did not indicate that Tagitis was in the custody of the CIDG. He also stressed that the information he
provided the respondent was merely a "raw report" from "barangay intelligence" that still needed confirmation and "follow
up" as to its veracity.167
To be sure, the respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies were far from perfect, as the
petitioners pointed out. The respondent mistakenly characterized Col. Kasim as a "military
officer" who told her that "her husband is being abducted because he is under custodial
investigation because he is allegedly ‘parang liason ng J.I.’" The petitioners also noted that
"Mrs. Talbin’s testimony imputing certain statements to Sr. Supt. Kasim that Engr. Tagitis
is with the military, but he is not certain whether it is the PNP or AFP is not worthy of
belief, since Sr. Supt. Kasim is a high ranking police officer who would certainly know that
the PNP is not part of the military."
Upon deeper consideration of these inconsistencies, however, what appears clear to us is
that the petitioners never really steadfastly disputed or presented evidence to refute the
credibility of the respondent and her witness, Mrs. Talbin. The inconsistencies the
petitioners point out relate, more than anything else, to details that should not affect the
credibility of the respondent and Mrs. Talbin; the inconsistencies are not on material
points.168 We note, for example, that these witnesses are lay people in so far as military and
police matters are concerned, and confusion between the police and the military is not
unusual. As a rule, minor inconsistencies such as these indicate truthfulness rather than
prevarication169and only tend to strengthen their probative value, in contrast to testimonies
from various witnesses dovetailing on every detail; the latter cannot but generate suspicion
that the material circumstances they testified to were integral parts of a well thought of and
prefabricated story.170
Based on these considerations and the unique evidentiary situation in enforced
disappearance cases, we hold it duly established that Col. Kasim informed the respondent
and her friends, based on the informant’s letter, that Tagitis, reputedly a liaison for the JI
and who had been under surveillance since January 2007, was "in good hands" and under
custodial investigation for complicity with the JI after he was seen talking to one Omar
Patik and a certain "Santos" of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. The
respondent’s and Mrs. Talbin’s testimonies cannot simply be defeated by Col. Kasim’s plain
denial and his claim that he had destroyed his informant’s letter, the critical piece of
evidence that supports or negates the parties’ conflicting claims. Col. Kasim’s admitted
destruction of this letter – effectively, a suppression of this evidence – raises the
presumption that the letter, if produced, would be proof of what the respondent
claimed.171 For brevity, we shall call the evidence of what Col. Kasim reported to the
respondent to be the "Kasim evidence."
Given this evidence, our next step is to decide whether we can accept this evidence, in lieu of
direct evidence, as proof that the disappearance of Tagitis was due to action with
government participation, knowledge or consent and that he was held for custodial
investigation. We note in this regard that Col. Kasim was never quoted to have said that the
custodial investigation was by the CIDG Zamboanga. The Kasim evidence only implies
government intervention through the use of the term "custodial investigation," and does not
at all point to CIDG Zamboanga as Tagitis’ custodian.
Strictly speaking, we are faced here with a classic case of hearsay evidence – i.e., evidence
whose probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witnesses (the
respondent, Mrs. Talbin and Col. Kasim himself) but on the knowledge of some other person
not on the witness stand (the informant).172
To say that this piece of evidence is incompetent and inadmissible evidence of what it
substantively states is to acknowledge – as the petitioners effectively suggest – that in the
absence of any direct evidence, we should simply dismiss the petition. To our mind, an
immediate dismissal for this reason is no different from a statement that the Amparo Rule –
despite its terms – is ineffective, as it cannot allow for the special evidentiary difficulties
that are unavoidably present in Amparo situations, particularly in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances. The Amparo Rule was not promulgated with this intent or with
the intent to make it a token gesture of concern for constitutional rights. It was
promulgated to provide effective and timely remedies, using and profiting from local and
international experiences in extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, as the
situation may require. Consequently, we have no choice but to meet the evidentiary
difficulties inherent in enforced disappearances with the flexibility that these difficulties
demand.1avvphi1
To give full meaning to our Constitution and the rights it protects, we hold that, as in
Velasquez, we should at least take a close look at the available evidence to determine the
correct import of every piece of evidence – even of those usually considered inadmissible
under the general rules of evidence – taking into account the surrounding circumstances
and the test of reason that we can use as basic minimum admissibility requirement. In the
present case, we should at least determine whether the Kasim evidence before us is relevant
and meaningful to the disappearance of Tagistis and reasonably consistent with other
evidence in the case.
The evidence about Tagitis’ personal circumstances surrounded him with an air of mystery.
He was reputedly a consultant of the World Bank and a Senior Honorary Counselor for the
IDB who attended a seminar in Zamboanga and thereafter proceded to Jolo for an overnight
stay, indicated by his request to Kunnong for the purchase of a return ticket to Zamboanga
the day after he arrived in Jolo. Nothing in the records indicates the purpose of his
overnight sojourn in Jolo. A colleague in the IDB, Prof. Matli, early on informed the Jolo
police that Tagitis may have taken funds given to him in trust for IDB scholars. Prof Matli
later on stated that he never accused Tagitis of taking away money held in trust, although
he confirmed that the IDB was seeking assistance in locating funds of IDB scholars
deposited in Tagitis’ personal account. Other than these pieces of evidence, no other
information exists in the records relating to the personal circumstances of Tagitis.
The actual disappearance of Tagitis is as murky as his personal circumstances. While the
Amparo petition recited that he was taken away by "burly men believed to be police
intelligence operatives," no evidence whatsoever was introduced to support this allegation.
Thus, the available direct evidence is that Tagitis was last seen at 12.30 p.m. of October 30,
2007 – the day he arrived in Jolo – and was never seen again.
The Kasim evidence assumes critical materiality given the dearth of direct evidence on the
above aspects of the case, as it supplies the gaps that were never looked into and clarified by
police investigation. It is the evidence, too, that colors a simple missing person report into
an enforced disappearance case, as it injects the element of participation by agents of the
State and thus brings into question how the State reacted to the disappearance.
Denials on the part of the police authorities, and frustration on the part of the respondent,
characterize the attempts to locate Tagitis. Initially in Jolo, the police informed Kunnong
that Tagitis could have been taken by the Abu Sayyaf or other groups fighting the
government. No evidence was ever offered on whether there was active Jolo police
investigation and how and why the Jolo police arrived at this conclusion. The respondent’s
own inquiry in Jolo yielded the answer that he was not missing but was with another
woman somewhere. Again, no evidence exists that this explanation was arrived at based on
an investigation. As already related above, the inquiry with Col. Ancanan in Zamboanga
yielded ambivalent results not useful for evidentiary purposes. Thus, it was only the inquiry
from Col. Kasim that yielded positive results. Col. Kasim’s story, however, confirmed only
the fact of his custodial investigation (and, impliedly, his arrest or abduction), without
identifying his abductor/s or the party holding him in custody. The more significant part of
Col. Kasim’s story is that the abduction came after Tagitis was seen talking with Omar
Patik and a certain Santos of Bulacan, a "Balik Islam" charged with terrorism. Mrs. Talbin
mentioned, too, that Tagitis was being held at Talipapao, Sulu. None of the police agencies
participating in the investigation ever pursued these leads. Notably, Task Force Tagitis to
which this information was relayed did not appear to have lifted a finger to pursue these
aspects of the case.
More denials were manifested in the Returns on the writ to the CA made by the petitioners.
Then PNP Chief Gen. Avelino I. Razon merely reported the directives he sent to the ARMM
Regional Director and the Regional Chief of the CIDG on Tagitis, and these reports merely
reiterated the open-ended initial report of the disappearance. The CIDG directed a search in
all of its divisions with negative results. These, to the PNP Chief, constituted the exhaustion
"of all possible efforts." PNP-CIDG Chief General Edgardo M. Doromal, for his part, also
reported negative results after searching "all divisions and departments [of the CIDG] for a
person named Engr. Morced N. Tagitis . . . and after a diligent and thorough research,
records show that no such person is being detained in the CIDG or any of its department or
divisions." PNP-PACER Chief PS Supt. Leonardo A. Espina and PNP PRO ARMM Regional
Director PC Superintendent Joel R. Goltiao did no better in their affidavits-returns, as they
essentially reported the results of their directives to their units to search for Tagitis.
The extent to which the police authorities acted was fully tested when the CA constituted
Task Force Tagitis, with specific directives on what to do. The negative results reflected in
the Returns on the writ were again replicated during the three hearings the CA scheduled.
Aside from the previously mentioned "retraction" that Prof. Matli made to correct his
accusation that Tagitis took money held in trust for students, PS Supt. Ajirim reiterated in
his testimony that the CIDG consistently denied any knowledge or complicity in any
abduction and said that there was no basis to conclude that the CIDG or any police unit had
anything to do with the disappearance of Tagitis; he likewise considered it premature to
conclude that Tagitis simply ran away with the money in his custody. As already noted
above, the Task Force notably did not pursue any investigation about the personal
circumstances of Tagitis, his background in relation to the IDB and the background and
activities of this Bank itself, and the reported sighting of Tagistis with terrorists and his
alleged custody in Talipapao, Sulu. No attempt appears to have ever been made to look into
the alleged IDB funds that Tagitis held in trust, or to tap any of the "assets" who are
indispensable in investigations of this nature. These omissions and negative results were
aggravated by the CA findings that it was only as late as January 28, 2008 or three months
after the disappearance that the police authorities requested for clear pictures of Tagitis.
Col. Kasim could not attend the trial because his subpoena was not served, despite the fact
that he was designated as Ajirim’s replacement in the latter’s last post. Thus, Col. Kasim
was not then questioned. No investigation – even an internal one – appeared to have been
made to inquire into the identity of Col. Kasim’s "asset" and what he indeed wrote.
We glean from all these pieces of evidence and developments a consistency in the
government’s denial of any complicity in the disappearance of Tagitis, disrupted only by the
report made by Col. Kasim to the respondent at Camp Katitipan. Even Col. Kasim, however,
eventually denied that he ever made the disclosure that Tagitis was under custodial
investigation for complicity in terrorism. Another distinctive trait that runs through these
developments is the government’s dismissive approach to the disappearance, starting from
the initial response by the Jolo police to Kunnong’s initial reports of the disappearance, to
the responses made to the respondent when she herself reported and inquired about her
husband’s disappearance, and even at Task Force Tagitis itself.
As the CA found through Task Force Tagitis, the investigation was at best haphazard since
the authorities were looking for a man whose picture they initially did not even secure. The
returns and reports made to the CA fared no better, as the CIDG efforts themselves were
confined to searching for custodial records of Tagitis in their various departments and
divisions. To point out the obvious, if the abduction of Tagitis was a "black" operation
because it was unrecorded or officially unauthorized, no record of custody would ever appear
in the CIDG records; Tagitis, too, would not be detained in the usual police or CIDG
detention places. In sum, none of the reports on record contains any meaningful results or
details on the depth and extent of the investigation made. To be sure, reports of top police
officials indicating the personnel and units they directed to investigate can never constitute
exhaustive and meaningful investigation, or equal detailed investigative reports of the
activities undertaken to search for Tagitis. Indisputably, the police authorities from the very
beginning failed to come up to the extraordinary diligence that the Amparo Rule requires.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE AMPARO REMEDY
Based on these considerations, we conclude that Col. Kasim’s disclosure, made in an
unguarded moment, unequivocally point to some government complicity in the
disappearance. The consistent but unfounded denials and the haphazard investigations
cannot but point to this conclusion. For why would the government and its officials engage
in their chorus of concealment if the intent had not been to deny what they already knew of
the disappearance? Would not an in-depth and thorough investigation that at least credibly
determined the fate of Tagitis be a feather in the government’s cap under the circumstances
of the disappearance? From this perspective, the evidence and developments, particularly
the Kasim evidence, already establish a concrete case of enforced disappearance that the
Amparo Rule covers. From the prism of the UN Declaration, heretofore cited and
quoted,173the evidence at hand and the developments in this case confirm the fact of the
enforced disappearance and government complicity, under a background of consistent and
unfounded government denials and haphazard handling. The disappearance as well
effectively placed Tagitis outside the protection of the law – a situation that will subsist
unless this Court acts.
This kind of fact situation and the conclusion reached are not without precedent in
international enforced disappearance rulings. While the facts are not exactly the same, the
facts of this case run very close to those of Timurtas v. Turkey, 174 a case decided by ECHR.
The European tribunal in that case acted on the basis of the photocopy of a "post-operation
report" in finding that Abdulvahap Timurtas (Abdulvahap) was abducted and later detained
by agents (gendarmes) of the government of Turkey. The victim's father in this case brought
a claim against Turkey for numerous violations of the European Convention, including the
right to life (Article 2) and the rights to liberty and security of a person (Article 5). The
applicant contended that on August 14, 1993, gendarmes apprehended his son, Abdulvahap
for being a leader of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) in the Silopi region. The petition
was filed in southeast Turkey nearly six and one half years after the apprehension.
According to the father, gendarmes first detained Abdulvahap and then transferred him to
another detainment facility. Although there was no eyewitness evidence of the apprehension
or subsequent detainment, the applicant presented evidence corroborating his version of
events, including a photocopy of a post-operation report signed by the commander of
gendarme operations in Silopi, Turkey. The report included a description of Abdulvahap's
arrest and the result of a subsequent interrogation during detention where he was accused
of being a leader of the PKK in the Silopi region. On this basis, Turkey was held responsible
for Abdulvahap’s enforced disappearance.
Following the lead of this Turkish experience - adjusted to the Philippine legal setting and
the Amparo remedy this Court has established, as applied to the unique facts and
developments of this case – we believe and so hold that the government in general, through
the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and in particular, the Chiefs of these organizations together diligence, with the obligation to show investigation results acceptable to this
with Col. Kasim, should be held fully accountable for the enforced disappearance of Tagitis. Court;

The PNP and CIDG are accountable because Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise
known as the "PNP Law,"175 specifies the PNP as the governmental office with the mandate
"to investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to
justice and assist in their prosecution." The PNP-CIDG, as Col. Jose Volpane Pante (then
Chief of CIDG Region 9) testified, is the "investigative arm" of the PNP and is mandated to
"investigate and prosecute all cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly those considered as heinous crimes."176 Under the PNP organizational
structure, the PNP-CIDG is tasked to investigate all major crimes involving violations of the
Revised Penal Code and operates against organized crime groups, unless the President
assigns the case exclusively to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). 177 No indication
exists in this case showing that the President ever directly intervened by assigning the
investigation of Tagitis’ disappearance exclusively to the NBI.
Given their mandates, the PNP and PNP-CIDG officials and members were the ones who
were remiss in their duties when the government completely failed to exercise the
extral'>To fully enforce the Amparo remedy, we refer this case back to the CA for
appropriate proceedings directed at the monitoring of the PNP and the PNP-CIDG
investigations and actions, and the validation of their results through hearings the CA may
deem appropriate to conduct. For purposes of these investigations, the PNP/PNP-CIDG
shall initially present to the CA a plan of action for further investigation, periodically
reporting the detailed results of its investigation to the CA for its consideration and action.
On behalf of this Court, the CA shall pass upon: the need for the PNP and the PNP-CIDG to
make disclosures of matters known to them as indicated in this Decision and as further CA
hearings may indicate; the petitioners’ submissions; the sufficiency of their investigative
efforts; and submit to this Court a quarterly report containing its actions and
recommendations, copy furnished the petitioners and the respondent, with the first report
due at the end of the first quarter counted from the finality of this Decision. The PNP and
the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their investigation. The CA shall
submit its full report for the consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter
counted from the finality of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petitioners’ petition for review on
certiorari for lack of merit, and AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7,
2008 under the following terms:
a. Recognition that the disappearance of Engineer Morced N. Tagitis is an
enforced disappearance covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
e. Ordering Colonel Julasirim Ahadin Kasim impleaded in this case and holding
him accountable with the obligation to disclose information known to him and to
his "assets" in relation with the enforced disappearance of Engineer Morced N.
Tagitis;
f. Referring this case back to the Court of Appeals for appropriate proceedings
directed at the monitoring of the PNP and PNP-CIDG investigations, actions and
the validation of their results; the PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall initially present
to the Court of Appeals a plan of action for further investigation, periodically
reporting their results to the Court of Appeals for consideration and action;
g. Requiring the Court of Appeals to submit to this Court a quarterly report with
its recommendations, copy furnished the incumbent PNP and PNP-CIDG Chiefs
as petitioners and the respondent, with the first report due at the end of the first
quarter counted from the finality of this Decision;
h. The PNP and the PNP-CIDG shall have one (1) full year to undertake their
investigations; the Court of Appeals shall submit its full report for the
consideration of this Court at the end of the 4th quarter counted from the finality
of this Decision;
These directives and those of the Court of Appeals’ made pursuant to this Decision shall be
given to, and shall be directly enforceable against, whoever may be the incumbent Chiefs of
the Philippine National Police and its Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, under
pain of contempt from this Court when the initiatives and efforts at disclosure and
investigation constitute less than the extraordinary diligence that the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo and the circumstances of this case demand. Given the unique nature of Amparo
cases and their varying attendant circumstances, these directives – particularly, the referral
back to and monitoring by the CA – are specific to this case and are not standard remedies
that can be applied to every Amparo situation.
The dismissal of the Amparo petition with respect to General Alexander Yano, Commanding
General, Philippine Army, and General Ruben Rafael, Chief, Anti-Terrorism Task Force
Comet, Zamboanga City, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

b. Without any specific pronouncement on exact authorship and responsibility,

declaring the government (through the PNP and the PNP-CIDG) and Colonel
Julasirim Ahadin Kasim accountable for the enforced disappearance of Engineer
Morced N. Tagitis;

c. Confirmation of the validity of the Writ of Amparo the Court of Appeals issued;

d. Holding the PNP, through the PNP Chief, and the PNP-CIDG, through its
Chief, directly responsible for the disclosure of material facts known to the
government and to their offices regarding the disappearance of Engineer Morced
N. Tagitis, and for the conduct of proper investigations using extraordinary
 G.R. No. 189155. September 7, 2010.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND THE WRIT OF HABEAS
DATA IN FAVOR OF MELISSA C. ROXAS, MELISSA C. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, GILBERT TEODORO, GEN. VICTOR S. IBRADO, P/DIR. GEN. JESUS AME
VERZOSA, LT. GEN. DELFIN N. BANGIT, PC/SUPT. LEON NILO A. DELA CRUZ, MAJ. GEN.
RALPH VILLANUEVA, PS/SUPT. RUDY GAMIDO LACADIN, AND CERTAIN PERSONS WHO GO BY
THE NAME[S] DEX, RC AND ROSE, respondents.
Writ of Amparo; Doctrine of Command Responsibility; The doctrine of command
responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and by this account,
cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition; The
doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.—It must be stated at the outset that the use by the
petitioner of the doctrine of command responsibility as the justification in impleading the
public respondents in her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The
doctrine of command responsibility is a rule of substantive law that establishes liability and,
by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a party-respondent in
an amparo petition. The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo (613 SCRA 233 [2010]), which was the
first to examine command responsibility in the context of an amparo proceeding, observed
that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.
Same; Same; The doctrine is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or
administrative case rather than in a summary amparo proceeding; The writ of amparo is a
protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial
measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to address specific
violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or security.—Since
the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability,
it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a
summary amparoproceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself: The
writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial
determination of whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats
thereof had transpired—the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such
disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be criminal, civil or
administrative under the applicable substantive law.
Same; Same; The inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in an
amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading military or police
commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were committed with
their direct or indirect acquiescence; Commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the
basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability.—It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of
command responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude
impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the
petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v.
Tagitis(606 SCRA 598 [2009]), the distinct, but interrelated concepts of responsibility and
accountability were given special and unique significations in relation to
an amparo proceeding.
Same; Same; In Amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel
circumstances as evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-
availability of other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity
and affiliation of the perpetrators; Direct evidence of identity when obtainable must be
preferred over mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity.—
In Amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of
other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation
of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over
mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former
indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise
clearly and directly ascertain.
Same; Same; An order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of
liability.—To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her
belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold public
respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner. In the first place, an order
directing the public respondents to return the personal belongings of the petitioner is
already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability. The order itself is a
substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public respondents has
been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above, matters of
liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.214
Same; Same; Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which defines the scope and extent of the
writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.—But perhaps the more fundamental
reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with the fact that a person’s right to be
restituted of his property is already subsumed under the general rubric of property rights—
which are no longer protected by the writ of amparo. Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, which
defines the scope and extent of the writ, clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
Same; Same; Inspection Order; An inspection order is an interim relief designed to
give support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the
court before making a decision.—An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give
support or strengthen the claim of a petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the
court before making a decision. A basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an
inspection order is that the place to be inspected is reasonably determinable from the
allegations of the party seeking the order. While the Amparo Rule does not require that the
place to be inspected be identified with clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum
for the issuance of an inspection order that the supporting allegations of a party be
sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie case. This, as was shown above, petitioner
failed to do.
Same; Same; Same; An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of allegations that
are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.—Since the very estimates and observations of
the petitioner are not strong enough to make out a prima facie case that she was detained in
Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order
cannot issue on the basis of allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy
enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy
of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
himself, particularly in the instances where such information is being collected through
unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.—The writ of habeas data was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals. The writ operates to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances where such information
is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. Needless to
state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. This, in the case at bench, the petitioner
failed to do.
PEREZ, J.:
At bench is a Petition For Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated 26 August 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00036-WRA — a petition that was commenced jointly under the
Rules on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule) and Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule). In its decision, the
Court of Appeals extended to the petitioner, Melissa C. Roxas, the privilege of the writs of amparo and
habeas data but denied the latter’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and return of
specified personal belongings. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. This Court hereby grants Petitioner the
privilege of the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data.
Accordingly, Respondents are enjoined to refrain from distributing or causing the distribution to the
public of any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers relative to Petitioner’s
Melissa C. Roxas, and/or Melissa Roxas; alleged ties to the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to the
complained incident. Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order, production order and for the return of
the specified personal belongings are denied for lack of merit. Although there is no evidence that
Respondents are responsible for the abduction, detention or torture of the Petitioner, said Respondents
pursuant to their legally mandated duties are, nonetheless, ordered to continue/complete the
investigation of this incident with the end in view of prosecuting those who are responsible. Respondents
are also ordered to provide protection to the Petitioner and her family while in the Philippines against
any and all forms of harassment, intimidation and coercion as may be relevant to the grant of these
reliefs.3
We begin with the petitioner’s allegations.
Petitioner is an American citizen of Filipino descent.4 While in the United States, petitioner
enrolled in an exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-
United States of America (BAYAN-USA) of which she is a member.5 During the course of her
immersion, petitioner toured various provinces and towns of Central Luzon and, in April of 2009,
she volunteered to join members of BAYAN-Tarlac6 in conducting an initial health survey in La
Paz, Tarlac for a future medical mission.7
In pursuit of her volunteer work, petitioner brought her passport, wallet with Fifteen Thousand
Pesos (₱15,000.00) in cash, journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external
hard disk, IPOD,8 wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope and medicines.9
After doing survey work on 19 May 2009, petitioner and her companions, Juanito Carabeo
(Carabeo) and John Edward Jandoc (Jandoc), decided to rest in the house of one Mr. Jesus Paolo
(Mr. Paolo) in Sitio Bagong Sikat, Barangay Kapanikian, La Paz, Tarlac.10 At around 1:30 in the
afternoon, however, petitioner, her companions and Mr. Paolo were startled by the loud sounds of
someone banging at the front door and a voice demanding that they open up. 11
Suddenly, fifteen (15) heavily armed men forcibly opened the door, barged inside and ordered
petitioner and her companions to lie on the ground face down. 12 The armed men were all in
civilian clothes and, with the exception of their leader, were also wearing bonnets to conceal their
faces.13
Petitioner tried to protest the intrusion, but five (5) of the armed men ganged up on her and tied
her hands.14 At this juncture, petitioner saw the other armed men herding Carabeo and Jandoc,
already blindfolded and taped at their mouths, to a nearby blue van. Petitioner started to shout
her name.15 Against her vigorous resistance, the armed men dragged petitioner towards the van—
bruising her arms, legs and knees.16 Once inside the van, but before she can be blindfolded,
petitioner was able to see the face of one of the armed men sitting beside her. 17 The van then sped
away.
After about an hour of traveling, the van stopped.18 Petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc were ordered
to alight.19 After she was informed that she is being detained for being a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), petitioner was separated
from her companions and was escorted to a room that she believed was a jail cell from the sound of
its metal doors.20 From there, she could hear the sounds of gunfire, the noise of planes taking off
and landing and some construction bustle.21 She inferred that she was taken to the military camp
of Fort Magsaysay in Laur, Nueva Ecija.22
What followed was five (5) straight days of interrogation coupled with torture. 23 The thrust of the
interrogations was to convince petitioner to abandon her communist beliefs in favor of returning to
"the fold."24 The torture, on the other hand, consisted of taunting, choking, boxing and suffocating
the petitioner.25
Throughout the entirety of her ordeal, petitioner was made to suffer in blindfolds even in her
sleep.26 Petitioner was only relieved of her blindfolds when she was allowed to take a bath, during
which she became acquainted with a woman named "Rose" who bathed her.27 There were also a
few times when she cheated her blindfold and was able to peek at her surroundings.28
Despite being deprived of sight, however, petitioner was still able to learn the names of three of
her interrogators who introduced themselves to her as "Dex," "James" and "RC." 29 "RC" even told
petitioner that those who tortured her came from the "Special Operations Group," and that she
was abducted because her name is included in the "Order of Battle."30
On 25 May 2009, petitioner was finally released and returned to her uncle’s house in Quezon
City.31 Before being released, however, the abductors gave petitioner a cellular phone with a
SIM32 card, a slip of paper containing an e-mail address with password,33 a plastic bag containing
biscuits and books,34 the handcuffs used on her, a blouse and a pair of shoes. 35 Petitioner was also
sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward will
happen to her and her family.36
Sometime after her release, petitioner continued to receive calls from RC via the cellular phone
given to her.37 Out of apprehension that she was being monitored and also fearing for the safety of
her family, petitioner threw away the cellular phone with a SIM card.
Seeking sanctuary against the threat of future harm as well as the suppression of any existing
government files or records linking her to the communist movement, petitioner filed a Petition for
the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data before this Court on 1 June 2009. 38 Petitioner impleaded
public officials occupying the uppermost echelons of the military and police hierarchy as
respondents, on the belief that it was government agents who were behind her abduction and
torture. Petitioner likewise included in her suit "Rose," "Dex" and "RC." 39
The Amparo and Habeas Data petition prays that: (1) respondents be enjoined from harming or
even approaching petitioner and her family; (2) an order be issued allowing the inspection of
detention areas in the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Magsaysay, Laur, Nueva Ecija; (3) respondents
be ordered to produce documents relating to any report on the case of petitioner including, but not
limited to, intelligence report and operation reports of the 7th Infantry Division, the Special
Operations Group of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and its subsidiaries or branch/es
prior to, during and subsequent to 19 May 2009; (4) respondents be ordered to expunge from the
records of the respondents any document pertinent or connected to Melissa C. Roxas, Melissa
Roxas or any name which sounds the same; and (5) respondents be ordered to return to petitioner
her journal, digital camera with memory card, laptop computer, external hard disk, IPOD,
wristwatch, sphygmomanometer, stethoscope, medicines and her ₱15,000.00 cash.40
In a Resolution dated 9 June 2009, this Court issued the desired writs and referred the case The initial investigation revolved around the statement of Mr. Paolo, who informed the
to the Court of Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action.41 The investigators of an abduction incident involving three (3) persons—later identified as
Resolution also directed the respondents to file their verified written return. 42 petitioner Melissa Roxas, Juanito Carabeo and John Edward Jandoc—who were all staying
in his house.57 Mr. Paolo disclosed that the abduction occurred around 1:30 o’clock in the
afternoon, and was perpetrated by about eight (8) heavily armed men who forced their way
On 18 June 2009, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Return of the Writs 43 on
inside his house.58Other witnesses to the abduction also confirmed that the armed men used
behalf of the public officials impleaded as respondents.
a dark blue van with an unknown plate number and two (2) Honda XRM motorcycles with
no plate numbers.59
We now turn to the defenses interposed by the public respondents.
At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of 19 May 2009, the investigators sent a Flash Message to
The public respondents label petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture as "stage the different police stations surrounding La Paz, Tarlac, in an effort to track and locate the
managed."44 In support of their accusation, the public respondents principally rely on the van and motorcycles of the suspects. Unfortunately, the effort yielded negative results. 60
statement of Mr. Paolo, as contained in the Special Report 45 of the La Paz Police Station. In
the Special Report, Mr. Paolo disclosed that, prior to the purported abduction, petitioner
On 20 May 2009, the results of the initial investigation were included in a Special
and her companions instructed him and his two sons to avoid leaving the house. 46 From this
Report61 that was transmitted to the Tarlac Police Provincial Office, headed by public
statement, the public respondents drew the distinct possibility that, except for those already
respondent P/S Supt. Rudy Lacadin (Supt. Lacadin). Public respondent Supt. Lacadin, in
inside Mr. Paolo’s house, nobody else has any way of knowing where petitioner and her
turn, informed the Regional Police Office of Region 3 about the abduction. 62 Follow-up
companions were at the time they were supposedly abducted.47 This can only mean, the
investigations were, at the same time, pursued.63
public respondents concluded, that if ever there was any "abduction" it must necessarily
have been planned by, or done with the consent of, the petitioner and her companions
themselves.48 On 26 May 2009, public respondent PC/Supt. Leon Nilo Dela Cruz, as Director of the
Regional Police Office for Region 3, caused the creation of Special Investigation Task
Group—CAROJAN (Task Group CAROJAN) to conduct an in-depth investigation on the
Public respondents also cited the Medical Certificate49 of the petitioner, as actually belying
abduction of the petitioner, Carabeo and Jandoc.64
her claims that she was subjected to serious torture for five (5) days. The public respondents
noted that while the petitioner alleges that she was choked and boxed by her abductors—
inflictions that could have easily produced remarkable bruises—her Medical Certificate only Task Group CAROJAN started its inquiry by making a series of background examinations
shows abrasions in her wrists and knee caps.50 on the victims of the purported abduction, in order to reveal the motive behind the
abduction and, ultimately, the identity of the perpetrators. 65 Task Group CAROJAN also
maintained liaisons with Karapatan and the Alliance for Advancement of People’s Rights—
For the public respondents, the above anomalies put in question the very authenticity of
organizations trusted by petitioner—in the hopes of obtaining the latter’s participation in
petitioner’s alleged abduction and torture, more so any military or police involvement
the ongoing investigations.66 Unfortunately, the letters sent by the investigators requesting
therein. Hence, public respondents conclude that the claims of abduction and torture was no
for the availability of the petitioner for inquiries were left unheeded.67
more than a charade fabricated by the petitioner to put the government in bad light, and at
the same time, bring great media mileage to her and the group that she represents. 51
The progress of the investigations conducted by Task Group CAROJAN had been detailed in
the reports68 that it submitted to public respondent General Jesus Ame Verzosa, the Chief of
Nevertheless, even assuming the abduction and torture to be genuine, the public
the Philippine National Police. However, as of their latest report dated 29 June 2009, Task
respondents insist on the dismissal of the Amparo and Habeas Data petition based on the
Group CAROJAN is still unable to make a definitive finding as to the true identity and
following grounds: (a) as against respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in
affiliation of the abductors—a fact that task group CAROJAN attributes to the refusal of the
particular, because of her immunity from suit,52 and (b) as against all of the public
petitioner, or any of her fellow victims, to cooperate in their investigative efforts.69
respondents, in general, in view of the absence of any specific allegation in the petition that
they had participated in, or at least authorized, the commission of such atrocities. 53
Military Action
Finally, the public respondents posit that they had not been remiss in their duty to
ascertain the truth behind the allegations of the petitioner. 54 In both the police and military Public respondent Gilbert Teodoro, the Secretary of National Defense, first came to know
arms of the government machinery, inquiries were set-up in the following manner: about the alleged abduction and torture of the petitioner upon receipt of the Resolution of
this Court directing him and the other respondents to file their return. 70 Immediately
thereafter, he issued a Memorandum Directive71 addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
Police Action
ordering the latter, among others, to conduct an inquiry to determine the validity of the
accusation of military involvement in the abduction.72
Police authorities first learned of the purported abduction around 4:30 o’clock in the
afternoon of 19 May 2009, when Barangay Captain Michael M. Manuel came to the La Paz
Acting pursuant to the Memorandum Directive, public respondent General Victor S. Ibrado,
Municipal Police Station to report the presence of heavily armed men somewhere
the AFP Chief of Staff, sent an AFP Radio Message73 addressed to public respondent
in Barangay Kapanikian.55 Acting on the report, the police station launched an initial
Lieutenant General Delfin N. Bangit (Lt. Gen. Bangit), the Commanding General of the
investigation.56
Army, relaying the order to cause an investigation on the abduction of the petitioner.74
For his part, and taking cue from the allegations in the amparo petition, public respondent
Lt. Gen. Bangit instructed public respondent Major General Ralph A. Villanueva (Maj. Gen.
Villanueva), the Commander of the 7th Infantry Division of the Army based in Fort
Magsaysay, to set in motion an investigation regarding the possible involvement of any
personnel assigned at the camp in the purported abduction of the petitioner. 75 In turn,
public respondent Maj. Gen. Villanueva tapped the Office of the Provost Marshal (OPV) of
the 7th Infantry Division, to conduct the investigation.76
On 23 June 2009, the OPV of the 7th Infantry Division released an Investigation
Report77 detailing the results of its inquiry. In substance, the report described petitioner’s
allegations as "opinionated" and thereby cleared the military from any involvement in her
alleged abduction and torture.78
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision,79 the Court of Appeals gave due weight and consideration to the petitioner’s
version that she was indeed abducted and then subjected to torture for five (5) straight days.
The appellate court noted the sincerity and resolve by which the petitioner affirmed the
contents of her affidavits in open court, and was thereby convinced that the latter was
telling the truth.80
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals disregarded the argument of the public
respondents that the abduction of the petitioner was "stage managed," as it is merely based
on an unfounded speculation that only the latter and her companions knew where they were
staying at the time they were forcibly taken.81 The Court of Appeals further stressed that
the Medical Certificate of the petitioner can only affirm the existence of a true abduction, as
its findings are reflective of the very injuries the latter claims to have sustained during her
harrowing ordeal, particularly when she was handcuffed and then dragged by her abductors
onto their van.82
The Court of Appeals also recognized the existence of an ongoing threat against the security
of the petitioner, as manifested in the attempts of "RC" to contact and monitor her, even
after she was released.83 This threat, according to the Court of Appeals, is all the more
compounded by the failure of the police authorities to identify the material perpetrators who
are still at large.84 Thus, the appellate court extended to the petitioner the privilege of the
writ of amparo by directing the public respondents to afford protection to the former, as well
as continuing, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, their existing investigations
involving the abduction.85
The Court of Appeals likewise observed a transgression of the right to informational privacy
of the petitioner, noting the existence of "records of investigations" that concerns the
petitioner as a suspected member of the CPP-NPA.86The appellate court derived the
existence of such records from a photograph and video file presented in a press conference
by party-list representatives Jovito Palparan (Palparan) and Pastor Alcover (Alcover), which
allegedly show the petitioner participating in rebel exercises. Representative Alcover also
revealed that the photograph and video came from a female CPP-NPA member who wanted
out of the organization. According to the Court of Appeals, the proliferation of the
photograph and video, as well as any form of media, insinuating that petitioner is part of
the CPP-NPA does not only constitute a violation of the right to privacy of the petitioner but
also puts further strain on her already volatile security. 87 To this end, the appellate court
granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data mandating the public respondents to refrain
from distributing to the public any records, in whatever form, relative to petitioner’s alleged
ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to her abduction and torture.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, however, the Court of Appeals was not convinced that the
military or any other person acting under the acquiescence of the government, were
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner.89 The appellate court stressed
that, judging by her own statements, the petitioner merely "believed" that the military was
behind her abduction.90 Thus, the Court of Appeals absolved the public respondents from
any complicity in the abduction and torture of petitioner.91 The petition was likewise
dismissed as against public respondent President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in view of her
immunity from suit.92
Accordingly, the petitioner’s prayers for the return of her personal belongings were
denied.93 Petitioner’s prayers for an inspection order and production order also met the
same fate.94
Hence, this appeal by the petitioner.
AMPARO
A. Petitioner first contends that the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the public
respondents from any responsibility in her abduction and torture.95 Corollary to this,
petitioner also finds fault on the part of Court of Appeals in denying her prayer for the
return of her personal belongings.96
Petitioner insists that the manner by which her abduction and torture was carried out, as
well as the sounds of construction, gun-fire and airplanes that she heard while in detention,
as these were detailed in her two affidavits and affirmed by her in open court, are already
sufficient evidence to prove government involvement.97
Proceeding from such assumption, petitioner invokes the doctrine of command responsibility
to implicate the high-ranking civilian and military authorities she impleaded as
respondents in her amparo petition.98 Thus, petitioner seeks from this Court a
pronouncement holding the respondents as complicit in her abduction and torture, as well
as liable for the return of her belongings.99
Command Responsibility in Amparo Proceedings
It must be stated at the outset that the use by the petitioner of the doctrine of command
responsibility as the justification in impleading the public respondents in her amparo
petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. The doctrine of command responsibility is a
rule of substantive law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper
legal basis to implead a party-respondent in an amparo petition.100
The case of Rubrico v. Arroyo,101 which was the first to examine command responsibility in
the context of an amparo proceeding, observed that the doctrine is used to pinpoint liability.
Rubrico notes that:102
The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of
laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in its
simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in
international wars or domestic conflict."103 In this sense, command responsibility is properly
a form of criminal complicity. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of
command responsibility,104foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior
accountable for the atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty
of control over them. As then formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of
individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes
committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators105 (as
opposed to crimes he ordered). (Emphasis in the orginal, underscoring supplied)
Since the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual
liability, it is more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than
in a summary amparo proceeding. The obvious reason lies in the nature of the writ itself:
The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security.106 While the principal objective of its proceedings is the initial determination of
whether an enforced disappearance, extralegal killing or threats thereof had transpired—
the writ does not, by so doing, fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats,
whether that may be criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive
law.107 The rationale underpinning this peculiar nature of an amparo writ has been, in turn,
clearly set forth in the landmark case of The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo: 108
x x x The remedy provides rapid judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the petitioner; it is not an action to
determine criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence that will
require full and exhaustive proceedings.109(Emphasis supplied)
It must be clarified, however, that the inapplicability of the doctrine of command
responsibility in an amparo proceeding does not, by any measure, preclude impleading
military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in the petition were
committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case, commanders may be
impleaded—not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but rather on the ground
of their responsibility, or at least accountability. In Razon v. Tagitis,110 the distinct, but
interrelated concepts of responsibility and accountability were given special and unique
significations in relation to an amparo proceeding, to wit:
x x x Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Responsibility of Public Respondents
At any rate, it is clear from the records of the case that the intent of the petitioner in
impleading the public respondents is to ascribe some form of responsibility on their part,
based on her assumption that they, in one way or the other, had condoned her abduction
and torture.111
To establish such assumption, petitioner attempted to show that it was government agents
who were behind her ordeal. Thus, the petitioner calls attention to the circumstances
surrounding her abduction and torture—i.e., the forcible taking in broad daylight; use of
vehicles with no license plates; utilization of blindfolds; conducting interrogations to elicit
communist inclinations; and the infliction of physical abuse—which, according to her, is
consistent with the way enforced disappearances are being practiced by the military or
other state forces.112
Moreover, petitioner also claims that she was held inside the military camp Fort
Magsaysay—a conclusion that she was able to infer from the travel time required to reach
the place where she was actually detained, and also from the sounds of construction, gun-
fire and airplanes she heard while thereat.113
We are not impressed. The totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner does not
inspire reasonable conclusion that her abductors were military or police personnel and that
she was detained at Fort Magsaysay.
First. The similarity between the circumstances attending a particular case of abduction
with those surrounding previous instances of enforced disappearances does not, necessarily,
carry sufficient weight to prove that the government orchestrated such abduction. We opine
that insofar as the present case is concerned, the perceived similarity cannot stand as
substantial evidence of the involvement of the government.
In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of
other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation
of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over
mere circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former
indubitably offers greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.
An amparo court cannot simply leave to remote and hazy inference what it could otherwise
clearly and directly ascertain.
In the case at bench, petitioner was, in fact, able to include in her Offer of Exhibits,114 the
cartographic sketches115of several of her abductors whose faces she managed to see. To the
mind of this Court, these cartographic sketches have the undeniable potential of giving the
greatest certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of petitioner’s abductors.
Unfortunately for the petitioner, this potential has not been realized in view of the fact that
the faces described in such sketches remain unidentified, much less have been shown to be
that of any military or police personnel. Bluntly stated, the abductors were not proven to be
part of either the military or the police chain of command.
Second. The claim of the petitioner that she was taken to Fort Magsaysay was not
adequately established by her mere estimate of the time it took to reach the place where she
was detained and by the sounds that she heard while thereat. Like the Court of Appeals, We
are not inclined to take the estimate and observations of the petitioner as accurate on its
face—not only because they were made mostly while she was in blindfolds, but also in view
of the fact that she was a mere sojourner in the Philippines, whose familiarity with Fort
Magsaysay and the travel time required to reach it is in itself doubtful. 116 With nothing else
but obscure observations to support it, petitioner’s claim that she was taken to Fort
Magsaysay remains a mere speculation.
In sum, the petitioner was not able to establish to a concrete point that her abductors were
actually affiliated, whether formally or informally, with the military or the police
organizations. Neither does the evidence at hand prove that petitioner was indeed taken to
the military camp Fort Magsaysay to the exclusion of other places. These evidentiary gaps,
in turn, make it virtually impossible to determine whether the abduction and torture of the
petitioner was in fact committed with the acquiescence of the public respondents. On
account of this insufficiency in evidence, a pronouncement of responsibility on the part of
the public respondents, therefore, cannot be made.
Prayer for the Return of Personal Belongings
This brings Us to the prayer of the petitioner for the return of her personal belongings.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals denied the above prayer of the petitioner by reason of
the failure of the latter to prove that the public respondents were involved in her abduction
and torture.117 We agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals, but not entirely with
the reason used to support it. To the mind of this Court, the prayer of the petitioner for the
return of her belongings is doomed to fail regardless of whether there is sufficient evidence
to hold public respondents responsible for the abduction of the petitioner.
In the first place, an order directing the public respondents to return the personal
belongings of the petitioner is already equivalent to a conclusive pronouncement of liability.
The order itself is a substantial relief that can only be granted once the liability of the public
respondents has been fixed in a full and exhaustive proceeding. As already discussed above,
matters of liability are not determinable in a mere summary amparo proceeding.118
But perhaps the more fundamental reason in denying the prayer of the petitioner, lies with
the fact that a person’s right to be restituted of his property is already subsumed under the
general rubric of property rights—which are no longer protected by the writ of
amparo.119 Section 1 of the Amparo Rule,120 which defines the scope and extent of the writ,
clearly excludes the protection of property rights.
B. The next error raised by the petitioner is the denial by the Court of Appeals of her prayer
for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort Magsaysay. 121
Considering the dearth of evidence concretely pointing to any military involvement in
petitioner’s ordeal, this Court finds no error on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying
an inspection of the military camp at Fort Magsaysay. We agree with the appellate court
that a contrary stance would be equivalent to sanctioning a "fishing expedition," which was
never intended by the Amparo Rule in providing for the interim relief of inspection
order.122 Contrary to the explicit position123 espoused by the petitioner, the Amparo Rule
does not allow a "fishing expedition" for evidence.
An inspection order is an interim relief designed to give support or strengthen the claim of a
petitioner in an amparo petition, in order to aid the court before making a decision. 124 A
basic requirement before an amparo court may grant an inspection order is that the place to
be inspected is reasonably determinable from the allegations of the party seeking the order.
While the Amparo Rule does not require that the place to be inspected be identified with
clarity and precision, it is, nevertheless, a minimum for the issuance of an inspection order
that the supporting allegations of a party be sufficient in itself, so as to make a prima facie
case. This, as was shown above, petitioner failed to do.
Since the very estimates and observations of the petitioner are not strong enough to make
out a prima facie case that she was detained in Fort Magsaysay, an inspection of the
military camp cannot be ordered. An inspection order cannot issue on the basis of
allegations that are, in themselves, unreliable and doubtful.
HABEAS DATA
As earlier intimated, the Court of Appeals granted to the petitioner the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, by enjoining the public respondents from "distributing or causing the
distribution to the public any records in whatever form, reports, documents or similar
papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged ties with the CPP-NPA or pertinently related to
her abduction and torture." Though not raised as an issue in this appeal, this Court is
constrained to pass upon and review this particular ruling of the Court of Appeals in order
to rectify, what appears to Us, an error infecting the grant.
For the proper appreciation of the rationale used by the Court of Appeals in granting the
privilege of the writ of habeas data, We quote hereunder the relevant portion 125 of its
decision:
Under these premises, Petitioner prayed that all the records, intelligence reports and reports on the
investigations conducted on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas be produced and eventually expunged
from the records. Petitioner claimed to be included in the Government’s Order of Battle under Oplan
Bantay Laya which listed political opponents against whom false criminal charges were filed based on
made up and perjured information.
Pending resolution of this petition and before Petitioner could testify before Us, Ex-army
general Jovito Palaparan, Bantay party-list, and Pastor Alcover of the Alliance for
Nationalism and Democracy party-list held a press conference where they revealed that
they received an information from a female NPA rebel who wanted out of the organization,
that Petitioner was a communist rebel. Alcover claimed that said information reached them
thru a letter with photo of Petitioner holding firearms at an NPA training camp and a video
CD of the training exercises.
Clearly, and notwithstanding Petitioner’s denial that she was the person in said video, there
were records of other investigations on Melissa C. Roxas or Melissa Roxas which violate her
right to privacy. Without a doubt, reports of such nature have reasonable connections, one
way or another, to petitioner’s abduction where she claimed she had been subjected to
cruelties and dehumanizing acts which nearly caused her life precisely due to allegation of
her alleged membership in the CPP-NPA. And if said report or similar reports are to be
continuously made available to the public, Petitioner’s security and privacy will certainly be
in danger of being violated or transgressed by persons who have strong sentiments or
aversion against members of this group. The unregulated dissemination of said unverified
video CD or reports of Petitioner’s alleged ties with the CPP-NPA indiscriminately made
available for public consumption without evidence of its authenticity or veracity certainly
violates Petitioner’s right to privacy which must be protected by this Court. We, thus, deem
it necessary to grant Petitioner the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data. (Emphasis
supplied).
The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.126 The writ
operates to protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in
the instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to
achieve unlawful ends.
Needless to state, an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended is the showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. 127 This, in the case at
bench, the petitioner failed to do.
The main problem behind the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that there is actually no
evidence on record that shows that any of the public respondents had violated or threatened
the right to privacy of the petitioner. The act ascribed by the Court of Appeals to the public
respondents that would have violated or threatened the right to privacy of the
petitioner, i.e., keeping records of investigations and other reports about the petitioner’s ties
with the CPP-NPA, was not adequately proven—considering that the origin of such records
were virtually unexplained and its existence, clearly, only inferred by the appellate court
from the video and photograph released by Representatives Palparan and Alcover in their
press conference. No evidence on record even shows that any of the public respondents had
access to such video or photograph.
In view of the above considerations, the directive by the Court of Appeals enjoining the
public respondents from "distributing or causing the distribution to the public any records
in whatever form, reports, documents or similar papers" relative to the petitioner’s "alleged
ties with the CPP-NPA," appears to be devoid of any legal basis. The public respondents
cannot be ordered to refrain from distributing something that, in the first place, it was not
proven to have.
Verily, until such time that any of the public respondents were found to be actually
responsible for the abduction and torture of the petitioner, any inference regarding the
existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to privacy becomes
farfetched, and premature.
For these reasons, this Court must, at least in the meantime, strike down the grant of the
privilege of the writ of habeas data.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
Our review of the evidence of the petitioner, while telling of its innate insufficiency to
impute any form of responsibility on the part of the public respondents, revealed two
important things that can guide Us to a proper disposition of this case. One, that further
investigation with the use of extraordinary diligence must be made in order to identify the
perpetrators behind the abduction and torture of the petitioner; and two, that the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR), pursuant to its Constitutional mandate to
"investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights and to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights," 128must be tapped in
order to fill certain investigative and remedial voids.
Further Investigation Must Be Undertaken
Ironic as it seems, but part and parcel of the reason why the petitioner was not able to
adduce substantial evidence proving her allegations of government complicity in her
abduction and torture, may be attributed to the incomplete and one-sided investigations
conducted by the government itself. This "awkward" situation, wherein the very persons
alleged to be involved in an enforced disappearance or extralegal killing are, at the same
time, the very ones tasked by law to investigate the matter, is a unique characteristic of
these proceedings and is the main source of the "evidentiary difficulties" faced by any
petitioner in any amparo case.129
Cognizant of this situation, however, the Amparo Rule placed a potent safeguard—requiring
the "respondent who is a public official or employee" to prove that no less than
"extraordinary diligence as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations was observed
in the performance of duty."130 Thus, unless and until any of the public respondents is able
to show to the satisfaction of the amparo court that extraordinary diligence has been
observed in their investigations, they cannot shed the allegations of responsibility despite
the prevailing scarcity of evidence to that effect.
With this in mind, We note that extraordinary diligence, as required by the Amparo Rule,
was not fully observed in the conduct of the police and military investigations in the case at
bar.
A perusal of the investigation reports submitted by Task Group CAROJAN shows modest
effort on the part of the police investigators to identify the perpetrators of the abduction. To
be sure, said reports are replete with background checks on the victims of the abduction, but
are, at the same time, comparatively silent as to other concrete steps the investigators have
been taking to ascertain the authors of the crime. Although conducting a background
investigation on the victims is a logical first step in exposing the motive behind the
abduction—its necessity is clearly outweighed by the need to identify the perpetrators,
especially in light of the fact that the petitioner, who was no longer in captivity, already
came up with allegations about the motive of her captors.
Instead, Task Group CAROJAN placed the fate of their investigations solely on the
cooperation or non-cooperation of the petitioner—who, they claim, was less than
enthusiastic in participating in their investigative efforts.131 While it may be conceded that
the participation of the petitioner would have facilitated the progress of Task Group
CAROJAN’s investigation, this Court believes that the former’s reticence to cooperate is
hardly an excuse for Task Group CAROJAN not to explore other means or avenues from
which they could obtain relevant leads.132 Indeed, while the allegations of government
complicity by the petitioner cannot, by themselves, hold up as adequate evidence before a
court of law—they are, nonetheless, a vital source of valuable investigative leads that must
be pursued and verified, if only to comply with the high standard of diligence required by
the Amparo Rule in the conduct of investigations.
Assuming the non-cooperation of the petitioner, Task Group CAROJAN’s reports still failed
to explain why it never considered seeking the assistance of Mr. Jesus Paolo—who, along
with the victims, is a central witness to the abduction. The reports of Task Group
CAROJAN is silent in any attempt to obtain from Mr. Paolo, a cartographic sketch of the
abductors or, at the very least, of the one who, by petitioner’s account, was not wearing any
mask.1avvphi1
The recollection of Mr. Paolo could have served as a comparative material to the sketches
included in petitioner’s offer of exhibits that, it may be pointed out, were prepared under the
direction of, and first submitted to, the CHR pursuant to the latter’s independent
investigation on the abduction and torture of the petitioner. 133 But as mentioned earlier, the
CHR sketches remain to be unidentified as of this date.
In light of these considerations, We agree with the Court of Appeals that further
investigation under the norm of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken. This Court
simply cannot write finis to this case, on the basis of an incomplete investigation conducted
by the police and the military. In a very real sense, the right to security of the petitioner is
continuously put in jeopardy because of the deficient investigation that directly contributes
to the delay in bringing the real perpetrators before the bar of justice.
To add teeth to the appellate court’s directive, however, We find it fitting, nay, necessary to
shift the primary task of conducting further investigations on the abduction and torture of
the petitioner upon the CHR.134 We note that the CHR, unlike the police or the military,
seems to enjoy the trust and confidence of the petitioner—as evidenced by her attendance
and participation in the hearings already conducted by the commission.135 Certainly, it
would be reasonable to assume from such cooperation that the investigations of the CHR
have advanced, or at the very least, bears the most promise of advancing farther, in terms of
locating the perpetrators of the abduction, and is thus, vital for a final resolution of this
petition. From this perspective, We also deem it just and appropriate to relegate the task of
affording interim protection to the petitioner, also to the CHR.
Hence, We modify the directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as
follows—
1.) Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts; and
(b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
2.) Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.
3.) Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations
and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within
ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.
4.) Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her
stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
Accordingly, this case must be referred back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of monitoring
compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent reports or
recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public respondents
responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of Appeals shall submit
its own report with recommendation to this Court for final action. The Court of Appeals will continue to
have jurisdiction over this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY MERITORIOUS. We hereby render a
decision:
1.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for the return of her personal belongings;
2.) AFFIRMING the denial of the petitioner’s prayer for an inspection of the detention areas of Fort
Magsaysay.
3.) REVERSING the grant of the privilege of habeas data, without prejudice, however, to any
modification that this Court may make on the basis of the investigation reports and recommendations
submitted to it under this decision.
4.) MODIFYING the directive that further investigation must be undertaken, as follows—
a. APPOINTING the Commission on Human Rights as the lead agency tasked with conducting further
investigation regarding the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the Commission on Human
Rights shall, under the norm of extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to
identify the persons described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their
whereabouts; and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.
b. DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, and the incumbent Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing investigation
of the Commission on Human Rights, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations consistent with
the Constitution and existing laws.
c. Further DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police, or his successor, to furnish to this
Court, the Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its investigations
and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of this case, within ninety (90)
days from receipt of this decision.
d. Further DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights (a) to furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety
(90) days from receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and (b) to provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during her stay or visit to
the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this Court.
5.) REFERRING BACK the instant case to the Court of Appeals for the following purposes:
a. To MONITOR the investigations and actions taken by the PNP, AFP, and the CHR;
b. To DETERMINE whether, in light of the reports and recommendations of the CHR, the abduction and torture
of the petitioner was committed by persons acting under any of the public respondents; and on the basis of this
determination—
c. To SUBMIT to this Court within ten (10) days from receipt of the report and recommendation of the
Commission on Human Rights—its own report, which shall include a recommendation either for the
DISMISSAL of the petition as against the public respondents who were found not responsible and/or
accountable, or for the APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL MEASURES, AS MAY BE ALLOWED BY THE AMPARO
AND HABEAS DATA RULES, TO BE UNDERTAKEN as against those found responsible and/or accountable.
Accordingly, the public respondents shall remain personally impleaded in this petition to
answer for any responsibilities and/or accountabilities they may have incurred during their
incumbencies.
Other findings of the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 26 August 2009 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 00036-WRA that are not contrary to this decision are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178497. February 4, 2014.* PETITION for Issuance of a Writ of Amparo.
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P. The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL
Fernandez & Kasilag-Villa for petitioner in G.R. No. 178497.
CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 183711. February 4, 2014.* RESOLUTION
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, MAJ. GEN. DELFIN BANGIT, LT. COL. NOEL BRION, J.:
CLEMENT, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR CALDERON,
respondents.
G.R. No. 183712. February 4, 2014.* We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case, specifically:
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., LT. GEN. ROMEO P.
TOLENTINO, MAJ. GEN. JUANITO GOMEZ, LT. COL. MELQUIADES FELICIANO, and LT. COL.
(a) The determination of the relevance and advisability of the public disclosure of the documents
NOEL CLEMENT, respondents.
submitted by respondents President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Lt. Gen. Romeo P. Tolentino, Maj.
G.R. No. 183713. February 4, 2014.*
Gen. Juanito Gomez, Maj. Gen. Delfin Bangit, Lt. Col. Noel Clement, Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano,
EDITA T. BURGOS, petitioner, vs. CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
Director General Oscar Calderon, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, Gen.
PHILIPPINES, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army,
Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.; Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Alexander Yano;
LT. GEN. ALEXANDER YANO; and Chief of the Philippine National Police, DIRECTOR GENERAL
and Chief of the Philippine National Police, Director General Avelino Razon, Jr. to this Court per
AVELINO RAZON, JR., respondents.
paragraph III (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution; and

Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; Enforced Disappearances; As the Supreme Court

held in Razon, Jr. vs. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the writ of amparo merely embodies the
Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified courses of action to address the
enforced disappearance of an individual.—We note and conclude, based on the
developments highlighted above, that the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been
served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), the
writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake specified
courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ
of Amparo serves both a preventive and acurative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that
it directs. The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a
specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature
ofAmparo proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the
proceedings seek to achieve. In Razon Jr. v. Tagitis,we defined what the terms
“responsibility” and “accountability” signify in an Amparo case. We
said: Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the
directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in
the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance
without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court emphasized that its role in a writ of amparo
proceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to
determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate
remedies to address the disappearance.—As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a
writ of Amparoproceeding is merely to determine whether an enforced disappearance has
taken place; to determine who is responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the
appropriate remedies to address the disappearance. As shown above, the beneficial purpose
of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case with the CA’s final determination
of the persons responsible and accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the
commencement of criminal action against Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation
and prosecution proceedings are already beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding
now before us.
(b) The Urgent Ex Parle Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela1 (together with sealed attachments) filed by
petitioner Edita T. Burgos praying that the Court: (1) order the persons named in the sealed
documents impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo
on the basis of the newly discovered evidence (the sealed attachments to the motion); and (3) refer
the cases to the Court of Appeals (CA) for further hearings on the newly discovered evidence.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
A. The Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution
These incidents stemmed from our June 22, 2010 Resolution referring the present case to
the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) as the Court’s directly commissioned agency,
tasked with the continuation of the investigation of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos’ abduction with
the obligation to report its factual findings and recommendations to this Court. This referral
was necessary as the investigation by the Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG), by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Provost
Marshal, and even the initial CHR investigation had been less than complete. In all of them,
there were significant lapses in the handling of the investigation. In particular, we
highlighted the PNP-CIDG’s failure to identify the cartographic sketches of two (one male
and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based on their interview with the
eyewitnesses to the abduction.
In this same Resolution, we also affirmed the CA’s dismissal of the petitions for Contempt
and issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President Macapagal-Arroyo who was then
entitled, as President, to immunity from suit.
The March 15, 2011 CHR Report
On March 15, 2011, the CHR submitted to the Court its Investigation Report on the
Enforced Disappearance of Jonas Burgos (CHR Report), in compliance with our June 22,
2010 Resolution. On the basis of the gathered evidence, the CHR submitted the following
findings:
Based on the facts developed by evidence obtaining in this case, the CHR finds that the
enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos had transpired; and that his
constitutional rights to life liberty and security were violated by the Government have been
fully determined.
Jeffrey Cabintoy and Elsa Agasang have witnessed on that fateful day of April 28, 2007 the
forcible abduction of Jonas Burgos by a group of about seven (7) men and a woman from the
extension portion of Hapag Kainan Restaurant, located at the ground floor of Ever Gotesco
Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
xxxx
The eyewitnesses mentioned above were Jeffrey Cabintoy (Jeffrey) and Elsa Agasang (Elsa),
who at the time of the abduction were working as busboy and Trainee-Supervisor,
respectively, at Hapag Kainan Restaurant.
In his Sinumpaang Salaysay, Jeffrey had a clear recollection of the face of HARRY
AGAGEN BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors, apart from the faces of the two
abductors in the cartographic sketches that he described to the police, after he was shown
by the Team the pictures in the PMA Year Book of Batch Sanghaya 2000 and group pictures
of men taken some years thereafter.
The same group of pictures were shown to detained former 56th IB Army trooper Edmond
M. Dag-uman (Dag-uman), who also positively identified Lt. Harry Baliaga, Jr. Daguman’s
Sinumpaang Salaysay states that he came to know Lt. Baliaga as a Company Commander
in the 56th IB while he was still in the military service (with Serial No. 800693, from 1997
to 2002) also with the 56th IB but under 1Lt. Usmalik Tayaban, the Commander of Bravo
Company. When he was arrested and brought to the 56th IB Camp in April 2005, he did not
see Lt. Baliaga anymore at the said camp. The similar reaction that the pictures elicited
from both Jeffrey and Daguman did not pass unnoticed by the Team. Both men always look
pensive, probably because of the pathetic plight they are in right now. It came as a surprise
therefore to the Team when they could hardly hide their smile upon seeing the face of
Baliaga, as if they know the man very well.
Moreover, when the Team asked how certain Jeffrey was or [sic] that it was indeed Baliaga
that he saw as among those who actually participated in Jonas’ abduction. Jeffrey was able
to give a graphic description and spontaneously, to boot, the blow by blow account of the
incident, including the initial positioning of the actors, specially Baliaga, who even
approached, talked to, and prevented him from interfering in their criminal act.
A Rebel-returnee (RR) named Maria Vita Lozada y Villegas @KA MY, has identified the face
of the female in the cartographic sketch as a certain Lt. Fernando. While Lozada refuses to
include her identification of Lt. Fernando in her Sinumpaang Salaysay for fear of a
backlash, she told the Team that she was certain it was Lt. Fernando in the cartographic
sketch since both of them were involved in counter-insurgency operations at the 56th IB,
while she was under the care of the battalion from March 2006 until she left the 56th IB
Headquarters in October 2007. Lozada’s involvement in counter-insurgency operations
together with Lt. Fernando was among the facts gathered by the CHR Regional Office 3
Investigators, whose investigation into the enforced disappearance of Jonas Joseph Burgos
was documented by way of an After Mission Report dated August 13, 2008.
Most if not all the actual abductors would have been identified had it not been for what is
otherwise called as evidentiary difficulties shamelessly put up by some police and military
elites. The deliberate refusal of TJAG Roa to provide the CHR with the requested
documents does not only defy the Supreme Court directive to the AFP but ipso facto created
a disputable presumption that AFP personnel were responsible for the abduction and that
their superiors would be found accountable, if not responsible, for the crime committed. This
observation finds support in the disputable presumption "That evidence willfully suppressed
would be adverse if produced." (Paragraph (e), Section 3, Rule 131 on Burden of Proof and
Presumptions, Revised Rules on Evidence of the Rules of Court of the Philippines).
In saying that the requested document is irrelevant, the Team has deemed that the
requested documents and profiles would help ascertain the true identities of the
cartographic sketches of two abductors because a certain Virgilio Eustaquio has claimed
that one of the intelligence operatives involved in the 2007 ERAP 5 case fits the description
of his abductor.
As regards the PNP CIDG, the positive identification of former 56th IB officer Lt. HARRY
A. BALIAGA, JR. as one of the principal abductors has effectively crushed the theory of the
CIDG witnesses that the NPAs abducted Jonas. Baliaga’s true identity and affiliation with
the military have been established by overwhelming evidence corroborated by detained
former Army trooper Dag-uman.
For lack of material time, the Commission will continue to investigate the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos as an independent body and pursuant to its mandate under
the 1987 Constitution. Of particular importance are the identities and locations of the
persons appearing in the cartographic sketches; the allegations that CIDG Witnesses
Emerito G. Lipio and Meliza Concepcion-Reyes are AFP enlisted personnel and the alleged
participation of Delfin De Guzman @ Ka Baste in the abduction of Jonas Burgos whose case
for Murder and Attempted Murder was dismissed by the court for failure of the lone
witness, an army man of the 56th IB to testify against him.
Interview with Virgilio Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and
Justice (UMDJ), revealed that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the
cartographic sketch was among the raiders who abducted him and four others, identified as
Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and Dennis Ibona otherwise known as
ERAP FIVE.
Unfortunately, and as already pointed out above, The Judge Advocate General (TJAG)
turned down the request of the Team for a profile of the operatives in the so-called "Erap 5"
abduction on the ground of relevancy and branded the request as a fishing expedition per its
Disposition Form dated September 21, 2010.
Efforts to contact Virgilio Eustaquio to secure his affidavit proved futile, as his present
whereabouts cannot be determined. And due to lack of material time, the Commission
decided to pursue the same and determine the whereabouts of the other members of the
"Erap 5" on its own time and authority as an independent body.2
B. The Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution
On July 5, 2011, in light of the new evidence and leads the CHR uncovered, we issued a
Resolution: (1) issuing anew a Writ of Habeas Corpus and referring the habeas corpus
petition to the CA; (2) holding in abeyance our ruling on the merits of the Amparo aspect of
the case; referring back the same to the CA in order to allow Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. and
the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on the CHR Report; and ordering
Lt. Baliaga to be impleaded as a party to the Amparo petition; and (3) affirming the
dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt, without prejudice to the re-filing of the
contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the subsequent CHR investigation.
To quote the exact wording of our Resolution:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice and for the foregoing reasons, we RESOLVE to:
I. IN G.R. NO. 183711 (HABEAS CORPUS PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 99839)
a. ISSUE a Writ of Habeas Corpus anew, returnable to the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
who shall immediately refer the writ to the same Division that decided the habeas corpus petition;
b. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 99839 and G.R. No. 183711, and
REQUIRE him, together with the incumbent Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines; the
incumbent Commanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army at the time of the disappearance of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, Lt.
Col. Melquiades Feliciano, to produce the person of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos under the terms the
Court of Appeals shall prescribe, and to show cause why Jonas Joseph T. Burgos should not be
released from detention;
c. REFER back the petition for habeas corpus to the same Division of the Court of Appeals which
shall continue to hear this case after the required Returns shall have been filed and render a new
decision within thirty (30) days after the case is submitted for decision; and
d. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, separate from the original respondents impleaded in
the petition, and the dropping or deletion of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent.
II. IN G.R. NO. 183712 (CONTEMPT OF COURT CHARGE, CA-G.R. SP No. 100230)
e. AFFIRM the dismissal of the petitioner’s petition for Contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 100230, without
prejudice to the re-filing of the contempt charge as may be warranted by the results of the
subsequent CHR investigation this Court has ordered; and
f. ORDER the dropping or deletion of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-
respondent, in light of the unconditional dismissal of the contempt charge against her.
III. IN G.R. NO. 183713 (WRIT OF AMPARO PETITION, CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA)
g. ORDER Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., impleaded in CA-G.R. SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713,
without prejudice to similar directives we may issue with respect to others whose identities and
participation may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings;
h. DIRECT Lt. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., and the present Amparo respondents to file their Comments on
the CHR report with the Court of Appeals, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Resolution.
i. REQUIRE General Roa of the Office of the Judge Advocate General, AFP; the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and then Chief of Staff, AFP,
Gen. Ricardo David, (a) to show cause and explain to this Court, within a non-extendible period of
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt of this
Court for their defiance of our June 22, 2010 Resolution; and (b) to submit to this Court, within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, a copy of the documents
requested by the CHR, particularly:
1) The profile and Summary of Information and pictures of T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine
Army); Cpl. Maria Joana Francisco (Philippine Air Force); M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air
Force); an alias T.L. - all reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence Group 15 of Intelligence
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines - and 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer involved in the
counter-insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007;
2) Copies of the records of the 2007 ERAP 5 incident in Kamuning, Quezon City and the
complete list of the intelligence operatives involved in that said covert military operation,
including their respective Summary of Information and individual pictures; and
3) Complete list of the officers, women and men assigned at the 56th and 69th Infantry Battalion
and the 7th Infantry Division from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007 with their respective
profiles, Summary of Information and pictures; including the list of captured rebels and rebels
who surrendered to the said camps and their corresponding pictures and copies of their Tactical
Interrogation Reports and the cases filed against them, if any.
These documents shall be released exclusively to this Court for our examination to determine their
relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.
j. ORDER the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General of
the Philippine Army to be impleaded as parties, in representation of their respective organizations,
separately from the original respondents impleaded in the petition; and the dropping of President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as party-respondent;
k. REFER witnesses Jeffrey T. Cabintoy and Elsa B. Agasang to the Department of Justice for
admission to the Witness Protection Security and Benefit Program, subject to the requirements of
Republic Act No. 6981; and
l. NOTE the criminal complaint filed by the petitioner with the DOJ which the latter may investigate
and act upon on its own pursuant to Section 21 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. 3
C. The Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution
On August 23, 2011, we issued a Resolution resolving among others:
(a) to NOTE the Explanation separately filed by Brigadier Gen. Gilberto Jose C. Roa, Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), General Ricardo A. David, Jr., AFP (ret.), and Rear Admiral Cornelio A.
dela Cruz, Jr., AFP;
xxxx
(c) to LIMIT the documents to be submitted to this Court to those assigned at the 56th Infantry
Battalion (IB) from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, and to SUBMIT these materials within ten
(10) days from notice of this Resolution, without prejudice to the submission of the other documents
required under the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution, pertaining to those assigned at the other units of
the AFP, should the relevance of these documents be established during the Court of Appeal’s
hearing;
(d) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, of the Summary
of Information and individual pictures of the intelligence operatives involved in the ERAP 5 incident,
in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution;
(e) to REQUIRE the submission, within ten (10) days from notice of this Resolution, of the profile and
Summary of Information and pictures of an alias T.L., reportedly assigned with Military Intelligence
Group 15 of the Intelligence Service of the AFP and of a 2Lt. Fernando, a lady officer in the counter-
 insurgency operations of the 56th IB in 2006 to 2007, in compliance with the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution.4
The Respondents’ September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion
On September 23, 2011, the respondents submitted a Manifestation and Motion in
compliance with the Court’s August 23, 2011 Resolution. Attached to this Manifestation and
Motion are the following documents:
a. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID
from January 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007;
b. The Summary of Information (SOI) of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5
incident; and
c. The Summary of Information (SOI) of 2Lt. Fernando, who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID. 5
D. The Court’s September 6, 2011 Resolution
On August 19, 2011, the petitioner filed a Manifestation and a Motion for Clarificatory
Order praying among others that she be allowed to examine the documents submitted to the
Court pursuant to paragraph III (i) of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution. In our September
6, 2011 Resolution, we resolved, among others, to:
(3) DENY the petitioner’s request to be allowed to examine the documents submitted to this
Court per paragraph (i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution, without prejudice to our
later determination of the relevance and of the advisability of public disclosure of those
documents/materials;6
E. The Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution
On October 11, 2011, we issued a Resolution requiring the CHR to secure Virgilio
Eustaquio’s affidavit, and to submit a report of its ongoing investigation of Jonas’ abduction,
viz:
(1) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to undertake all available measures to obtain the
affidavit of witness Virgilio Eustaquio in connection with his allegation that one of the male
abductors of Jonas Joseph T. Burgos, appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the "raiders"
who abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio and
Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE");
(2) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to submit to this Court, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Resolution, a Report, with its recommendations of its ongoing investigation of Burgos’
abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any, copy furnished the petitioner, the Court of
Appeals, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and the PNP-CIDG, and all the present
respondents before the Court of Appeals.7
F. The Court’s November 29, 2011 Resolution
On November 2, 2011, we received a letter dated October 28, 2011 from Commissioner Jose Manuel
S. Mamauag, Team Leader, CHR Special Investigation Team, requesting photocopies of the following
documents:
i. SOI of the officers and enlisted personnel of the 56th IB, 7th ID from January 1, 2004 to June
30, 2007;
ii. SOI of the intelligence operatives who were involved in the ERAP 5 incident; and
iii. SOI of 2Lt. Fernando who was a member of the 56th IB, 7th ID.8
In our November 29, 2011 Resolution, we denied the CHR's request considering the confidential
nature of the requested documents and because the relevance of these documents to the present case
had not been established. We referred the CHR to our July 5, 2011 Resolution where we pointedly
stated that these documents shall be "released exclusively to this Court for our examination to
determine their relevance to the present case and the advisability of their public disclosure."9
We held that "[w]e see no reason at this time to release these confidential documents since their
relevance to the present case has not been established to our satisfaction. It is precisely for this
reason that we issued our October 24, 2011 Resolution and directed the CHR to submit to this Court,
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Resolution, a Report with its recommendations of its
ongoing investigation of Jonas Burgos’ abduction, and the affidavit of Virgilio Eustaquio, if any.
Simply stated, it is only after the CHR's faithful compliance with our October 24, 2011 Resolution
that we will be able to determine the relevance of the requested documents to the present case." 10
G. The March 20, 2012 CHR Progress Report and Eustaquio’s Affidavit
On March 20, 2012, the CHR submitted its Progress Report detailing its efforts to secure
the affidavit of witness Eustaquio in relation with his allegation that one of the male
abductors of Jonas, appearing in the cartographic sketch, was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, identified as Jim Cabauatan, Jose Curament, Ruben Dionisio
and Dennis Ibona (otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE"). Attached to this Report is
Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit dated March 16, 2012, which pertinently stated:
1. I was one of the victims in the abduction incident on May 22, 2006 otherwise known as ERAP 5
and because of that, we filed a case with the Ombudsman against Commodore Leonardo Calderon, et
al., all then ISAFP elements, docketed as OMB-P-C-06-04050-E for Arbitrary Detention, Unlawful
Arrest, Maltreatment of Prisoners, Grave Threats, Incriminatory Machination, and Robbery.
2. On March 16, 2012, I was approached again by the CHR Special Investigation Team regarding the
information I have previously relayed to them sometime in September 2010 as to the resemblance of
the cartographic sketch of the man as described by the two eyewitnesses Elsa Agasang and Jeffrey
Cabintoy in the abduction case of Jonas Burgos;
3. I can say that the male abductor of Jonas Burgos appearing in the cartographic sketch is among
the raiders who abducted me and my four other companions because the cartographic sketch almost
exactly matched and/or resembled to the cartographic sketch that I also provided and described in
relation to the said incident at my rented house in Kamuning, Quezon City on May 22, 2006.
4. I am executing this affidavit voluntarily, freely and attest to the truth of the foregoing. 11
H. The March 18, 2013 CA Decision
On March 18, 2013, the CA issued its decision pursuant to the Court’s July 5, 2011
Resolution referring the Amparo and Habeas Corpus aspects of the case to the CA for
appropriate hearings and ruling on the merits of the petitions.
Petition for Habeas Corpus
The CA held that the issue in the petition for habeas corpus is not the illegal confinement or
detention of Jonas, but his enforced disappearance. Considering that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance, the present case is beyond the ambit of a petition for habeas corpus.
Petition for the Writ of Amparo
Based on its finding that Jonas was a victim of enforced disappearance, the CA concluded
that the present case falls within the ambit of the Writ of Amparo. The CA found that the
totality of the evidence supports the petitioner’s allegation that the military was involved in
the enforced disappearance of Jonas. The CA took note of Jeffrey Cabintoy’s positive
identification of Lt. Baliaga as one of the abductors who approached him and told him not to
interfere because the man being arrested had been under surveillance for drugs; he also
remembered the face of Lt. Baliaga – the face he identified in the pictures because he
resembles his friend Raven. The CA also held that Lt. Baliaga’s alibi and corroborative
evidence cannot prevail over Cabintoy’s positive identification, considering especially the
absence of any indication that he was impelled by hatred or any improper motive to testify
against Lt. Baliaga. Thus, the CA held that Lt. Baliaga was responsible and the AFP and
the PNP were accountable for the enforced disappearance of Jonas.
Based on these considerations, the CA resolved to:
1) RECOGNIZING the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance covered by
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
2) With regard to authorship,
a) DECLARING Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr. RESPONSIBLE for the enforced
disappearance of Jonas Burgos; and
b) DECLARING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and elements of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Army, ACCOUNTABLE for
the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos;
3) DECLARING the Philippine National Police ACCOUNTABLE for the conduct of an
exhaustive investigation of the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos. To this end, the PNP
through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, is directed to exercise extraordinary diligence
to identify and locate the abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to establish the
link between the abductors of Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident.
(4) DIRECTING the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Director General of the Philippine National Police, and their successors, to ensure the
continuance of their investigation and coordination on the enforced disappearance of Jonas
Burgos until the persons found responsible are brought before the bar of justice;
(5) DIRECTING the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent
investigation on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence
required under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo; and
(6) DIRECTING the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to
extend full assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s
investigation.
The Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights are hereby DIRECTED to
submit a quarterly report to this Court on the results of their respective investigation.
The filing of petitioner’s Affidavit-Complaint against Maj. Harry A. Baliaga, Jr., et al. before
the Department of Justice on June 9, 2011 is NOTED. Petitioner is DIRECTED to
immediately inform this Court of any development regarding the outcome of the case.12
The Respondent’s April 3, 2013 Motion for Partial Reconsideration
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the public respondents (the AFP Chief of Staff and the
PNP Director General), filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the March 18, 2013 CA
decision. The motion made the following submissions:
5. x x x[T]he Director General, PNP, respectfully takes exception to the Honorable Court’s findings
that the PNP, specifically the CIDG, "failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its
investigation." x x x [T]hat this Honorable Court arrived at a conclusion different from that of the
CIDG, or accorded different credence to the statements of the witnesses presented by the parties,
does not necessarily translate to the CIDG’s failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
6. The Chief of Staff, AFP also takes exception to the Honorable Court’s findings that the "Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Commanding General should be held
accountable for Jonas Burgos disappearance for failing to exercise extraordinary diligence in
conducting an internal investigation on the matter. The unwillingness of the respondent officers of
the 56th IB to cooperate in the investigation conducted by the CHR is a persuasive proof of the
alleged cover up of the military’s involvement in the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos."
The AFP and the Philippine Army conducted a thorough investigation to determine the veracity of
the allegations implicating some of its officers and personnel. After the conduct of the same, it is the
conclusion of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine Army, based on the evidence
they obtained, that Jonas Burgos has never been in custody.
7. The Chief of Staff, AFP, also respectfully takes exception to the finding of the Honorable Court
"recognizing the abduction of Jonas Burgos as an enforced disappearance."
xxxx
That the Honorable Court found a member of the Philippine Army or even a group of
military men to be responsible for the abduction of Jonas Burgos, does not necessarily make
the same a case of "enforced disappearance" involving the State. There is dearth of evidence
to show that the government is involved. Respondent Baliaga’s alleged participation in the
abduction and his previous membership in the 56th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army, by themselves, do not prove the participation or acquiescence of the State.13
I. The CA Resolution dated May 23, 2013
On May 23, 2013, the CA issued its resolution denying the respondents’ motion for partial
reconsideration. The CA ruled that as far as the PNP was concerned, its failure to elicit
leads and information from Cabintoy who witnessed Jonas’ abduction is eloquent proof of its
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the conduct of its investigation. As far as the
AFP was concerned, the CA held that the fact that Lt. Baliaga of the Philippine Army was
positively identified as one of the abductors of Jonas, coupled with the AFP’s lack of serious
effort to conduct further investigation, spoke loudly of the AFP leadership’s accountability.
To date, the respondents have not appealed to this Court, as provided under Section 19 of
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.14
J. The Petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela dated April 1, 2013
On April 1, 2013, the petitioner filed an Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela asking the
Court to: (1) order the persons named in the sealed documents to be impleaded in CA-G.R.
SP No. 00008-WA and G.R. No. 183713; (2) issue a writ of Amparo on the basis of the newly
discovered evidence (the sealed attachment to the motion); and (3) refer the cases to the CA
for further hearing on the newly discovered evidence.
The petitioner alleged that she received from a source (who requested to remain
anonymous) documentary evidence proving that an intelligence unit of the 7th Infantry
Division of the Philippine Army and 56th Infantry Battalion, operating together, captured
Jonas on April 28, 2007 at Ever Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City. This
documentary evidence consists of: (1) After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007; (2)
Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007; and (3) Autobiography of Jonas. The
petitioner also claimed that these are copies of confidential official reports on file with the
Philippine Army.
i. After Apprehension Report dated April 30, 2007
This report is a photocopy consisting six pages dated April 30, 2007, addressed to the Commanding
Officer, 7MIB, 7ID, LA, Fort Magsaysay, NE. The report detailed the planning and the objective of
apprehending target communist leaders, among them, one alias "Ramon" who was captured at Ever
Gotesco Mall, Commonwealth, Quezon City on April 28, 2007 by joint elements of the 72 MICO and
S2, 56th IB. This report also listed the names of the military personnel belonging to task
organization 72 MICO and 56th IB who conducted the operation.
ii. Psycho Social Processing Report dated April 28, 2007
This report details Jonas’ abduction and "neutralization"; the results of his interrogation and the
intelligence gathered on his significant involvements/activities within the CPP/NPA/NDF
organization.
iii. Undated Autobiography
This autobiography narrates how Jonas started as a student activist, his recruitment and eventual
ascent in the CPP/NPA as an intelligence officer.
K. The Court’s April 11, 2013 Resolution
In our April 11, 2013 Resolution, the Court resolved to require the respondents to Comment
on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela and its attachments,
within ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution. In the same Resolution, the Court:
(1) required BGen. Roa and Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to fully comply with the terms of Section
III (i) of the dispositive portion of our July 5, 2011 Resolution within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the resolution;
(2) required Lt. Gen. Emmanuel T. Bautista to submit a written assurance within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of the Resolution that the military personnel listed in the submitted After Apprehension
Report can be located and be served with the processes that the Court may serve;
(3) issued a Temporary Protection Order in favor of the petitioner and all the members of her
immediate family;
(4) directed the DOJ and the NBI to provide security and protection to the petitioner and her
immediate family and to submit a confidential memorandum on the security arrangements made;
(5) directed the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative assistance to the CHR as it may
require pursuant to the authority granted under the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution. 15
i. The respondents’ Comment from the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti
Cautela dated June 6, 2013
On June 6, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their
comments on the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
First, the respondents alleged that the documents submitted by the petitioner do not exist
in the concerned military units’ respective records, nor are they in the custody or possession
of their respective units. To support their allegations, the respondents submitted the
following:
a. Certification dated May 29, 2013 from Maj. Gen. Gregorio Pio P. Catapang, Jr. Commander, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents 16 submitted by the petitioner "do not
exist nor in the possession/custody of this Headquarters."
b. Certification dated May 29, 2013, from Lt. Col. Louie D.S. Villanueva, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army
stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner "could not be found nor do they exist in the
records of this Command."
c. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from Lt. Col. Bernardo M. Ona, Commanding Officer, 56th
Infantry Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army stating that the documents submitted by
the petitioner "do not exist at this unit."
d. Certification dated May 24, 2013 from 1Lt. Donal S. Frias, Acting Commanding Officer, 72nd
Military Intelligence Company, 7th Military Intelligence Battalion, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army stating that the documents submitted by the petitioner "do not exist at the records or in the
possession of this unit."17
The respondents also submitted the affidavits of Lt. Col. Melquiades Feliciano, Maj. Allan
M. Margarata and Cpl. Ruby Benedicto, viz:
a. In his June 3, 2013 Affidavit, Col. Feliciano stated:
1. That I was assigned as Battalion Commander of 56th Infantry Division, 7th Infantry Division, PA
last 17 January 2007 to 17 August 2007.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007 wherein
members of 56th IB, 7ID, PA were included therein.
 3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said document and the participation of my men
listed thereat. There were no military operations that I have authorized or approved regarding Jonas
Burgos. The contents thereof are false and utter fabrication of facts.
b. In his May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Maj. Margarata stated:
1. That I was assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company (72MICO), 7th Infantry Division, PA
from 01 July 2006 to 01 July 2008.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and
After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that on the last page of the Pyscho-Social Processing Report
appears my name therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the implication of my name in
the said documents. The contents thereof are purely a product of wild imagination. I have never seen
such document until now.
4. I can only surmise that these are plainly a fishing expedition on the part of Mrs. Edita Burgos. A
ploy to implicate any military personnel especially those belonging to the 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army.
c. In her May 31, 2013 Affidavit, Cpl. Benedicto stated:
1. That I was never assigned at 72nd Military Intelligence Company, 7th Infantry Division, PA.
2. That I was showed a photocopy of the Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007 and
After Apprehension Report dated 30 April 2007, both of which purportedly came from 72MICO, 7th
Infantry Division, Philippine Army and that on the last page of the Psycho-Social Processing Report
appears my name therein.
3. I vehemently oppose to (sic) the existence of the said documents and the implication of my name in
the said documents. The contents thereof are false and utter fabrication of facts. How can I ever be at
72MICO if I was never assigned thereat.
4. I have never been an interrogator in my entire military service. I have never been a member of
any operation which involves the name of Jonas Burgos or any other military operation for that
matter. I have never seen such document until now.
5. Furthermore, I have never worked with Maj. Allan Margarata or of his unit, 72MICO. 18
Second, the respondents note that none of the documents submitted by the petitioner were
signed; a writ of Amparo cannot be issued and the investigation cannot progress on the
basis of false documents and false information.
Lastly, the respondents argue that since the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
CHR are conducting their own investigations of the case, the petitioner’s motion at this
point is premature; the proceedings to be conducted by the CA will be at the very least
redundant.
ii. The Respondents’ Compliance dated June 7, 2013
On June 7, 2013, the respondents, through the Office of Judge Advocate General, complied
with our April 11, 2013 Resolution by submitting the following documents:
a. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with pictures of the personnel of 56th Infantry Battalion
(IB), 69th IB, and 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army (PA). These documents were submitted by
the 7th ID in sealed nine (9) small and three (3) big boxes (total of twelve (12) sealed boxes);
b. Investigation Report of the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) on the
2007 "ERAP 5" incident in Kamuning, Quezon City; Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with
pictures of the Intel Operatives involved in the "ERAP 5" incident; and certification issued by the
Command Adjutant of ISAFP concerning T/Sgt. Jason Roxas (Philippine Army), Cpl. Maria Joana
Francisco (Philippine Air Force), M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo (Philippine Air Force), an alias T.L., all
reportedly assigned with the Military Intelligence Group 15 of the Intelligence Service, AFP (MIG
15, ISAFP). These documents were submitted by ISAFP in a sealed envelope;
c. Profile/Summary of Information (SOI) with a picture of 2LT Fernando PA. This document was
submitted by Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, PA in a sealed envelope;
d. A certification issued by 56IB and 69IB, 7ID, PA concerning captured/surrendered rebels;
e. A certification stating the present location and whereabouts of military personnel listed in the
submitted After Apprehension Report, dated April 30, 2007, allegedly identified as members of the
Task Organization -72 MICO and 56th IB with the inclusion of four (4) separate certifications from
Commander, 7ID, PA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G1, 7ID, PA, Commanding
Officer, 72 MICO, and 56Ib, 71ID, PA, respectively, stating the non-existence of the following
documents: Psycho-Social Processing Report dated 28 April 2007; After-Apprehension Report dated
30 April 2007; Autobiography of Jonas Burgos; and Picture of Jonas Burgos;
f. Affidavit of Compliance of General Emmanuel T. Bautista, AFP, the Chief of Staff, assuring that
the active military personnel mentioned in the purported apprehension report can be located at their
given locations and be served with the processes that may be issued by the Honorable Court. 19
OUR RULING
A. On the relevancy and disclosure of the documents submitted to this Court per paragraph
III(i) of the fallo of our July 5, 2011 Resolution
The directive for the submission of the above-mentioned documents arose from our
determination in our June 22, 2010 Resolution that the PNP-CIDG failed to identify the
cartographic sketches of two (one male and one female) of the five abductors of Jonas, based
on their interview with eyewitnesses to the abduction. For this reason, the Court directly
commissioned the CHR to continue the investigation of Jonas’ abduction and the gathering
of evidence.
Based on its March 15, 2011 Report, the CHR uncovered a lead – a claim made by
Eustaquio, Chairman of the Union Masses for Democracy and Justice, that the male
abductor of Jonas appearing in the cartographic sketch was among the raiders who
abducted him and four others, known as the "ERAP FIVE."
This prompted the CHR to request copies of the documents embodied in par. III(i) of the
fallo of the Court’s July 5, 2011 Resolution from General Gilberto Jose C. Roa of the Office of
the Judge Advocate General, AFP. Gen. Roa initially denied this request but eventually
complied with the Court’s directive of July 5, 2011 to submit the documents via the
September 23, 2011 Manifestation and Motion and the June 7, 2013 Compliance. In the
same July 5, 2011 Resolution, the Court made it plain that these documents shall be
released exclusively to the Court for its examination to determine their relevance to the
present case and the advisability of their public disclosure.
Pursuant to the Court’s October 11, 2011 Resolution, the CHR submitted its March 20, 2012
Progress Report on its continuing investigation of Jonas’ abduction. Attached to this
Progress Report was Virgilio Eustaquio’s sworn affidavit stating that: (1) he was one of the
victims of the abduction incident on May 22, 2006, otherwise known as the "ERAP FIVE"
incident; (2) as a result of this incident, they filed a case with the Ombudsman against
Commodore Leonardo Calderon and other members of the Intelligence Service, AFP
(ISAFP) for arbitrary detention, unlawful arrest, maltreatment of prisoners, grave threats,
incriminatory machination and robbery; and (3) the male abductor of Jonas appearing in the
cartographic sketch shown to him by the CHR was among the raiders who abducted him
and his four companions because it resembled the cartographic sketch he described in
relation to the ERAP FIVE incident on May 22, 2006.
After reviewing the submissions of both the respondents20 and the CHR21 pursuant to the
Court’s July 5, 2011, August 23, 2011 and October 11, 2011 Resolutions, we resolve to grant
the CHR access to these requested documents to allow them the opportunity to ascertain the
true identities of the persons depicted in the cartographic sketches.
At this point, we emphasize that the sworn affidavit of Eustaquio (that attests to the
resemblance of one of Jonas’ abductors to the abductors of the ERAP FIVE) constitutes the
sought-after missing link that establishes the relevance of the requested documents to the
present case. We note that this lead may help the CHR ascertain the identities of those
depicted in the cartographic sketches as two of Jonas’ abductors (one male and one female)
who, to this day, remain unidentified.
In view of the sensitive and confidential nature of the requested documents, we direct the
Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly-authorized representatives of the
CHR to inspect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
The documents shall be examined and compared with the cartographic sketches of the two
abductors of Jonas, without copying and without bringing the documents outside the
premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. The inspection of the
documents shall be within office hours and for a reasonable period of time sufficient to allow
the CHR to comprehensively investigate the lead provided by Eustaquio.
To fully fulfill the objective of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, further investigation using
the standard of extraordinary diligence should be undertaken by the CHR to pursue the
lead provided by Eustaquio. We take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation being
conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ), through the NBI, on the disappearance of
Jonas.22 In this regard, we direct the NBI to coordinate and provide direct investigative
assistance to the CHR as the latter may require, pursuant to the authority granted under
the Court’s June 22, 2010 Resolution.
For this purpose, we require the CHR to submit a supplemental investigation report to the
DOJ, copy furnished the petitioner, the NBI, the incumbent Chiefs of the AFP, the PNP and
the PNP-CIDG, and all the respondents within sixty days (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution.
B. On the Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela
After reviewing the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner and considering
all the developments of the case, including the March 18, 2013 CA decision that confirmed
the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case, we resolve to deny the
petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela.
We note and conclude, based on the developments highlighted above, that the beneficial
purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the present case. As we held in Razon, Jr.
v. Tagitis,23 the writ merely embodies the Court’s directives to police agencies to undertake
specified courses of action to address the enforced disappearance of an individual. The Writ
of Amparo serves both a preventive and a curative role. It is curative as it facilitates the
subsequent punishment of perpetrators through the investigation and remedial action that
it directs.24The focus is on procedural curative remedies rather than on the tracking of a
specific criminal or the resolution of administrative liabilities. The unique nature of Amparo
proceedings has led us to define terms or concepts specific to what the proceedings seek to
achieve. In Razon Jr., v. Tagitis,25 we defined what the terms "responsibility" and
"accountability" signify in an Amparo case. We said:
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have
participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the
remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases
against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the
measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the enforced
disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance.26
In the present case, while Jonas remains missing, the series of calculated directives issued
by the Court outlined above and the extraordinary diligence the CHR demonstrated in its
investigations resulted in the criminal prosecution of Lt. Baliaga. We take judicial notice of
the fact that the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 216, has already found probable
cause for arbitrary detention against Lt. Baliaga and has ordered his arrest in connection
with Jonas’ disappearance.27
We also emphasize that the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision already ruled with finality on
the entities responsible and accountable (as these terms are defined in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis)
for the enforced disappearance of Jonas. In its March 18, 2013 decision, the CA found, by
substantial evidence, that Lt. Baliaga participated in the abduction on the basis of
Cabintoy’s positive identification that he was one of the abductors of Jonas who told him not
to interfere because the latter had been under surveillance for drugs. In the same Decision,
the CA also held the AFP and the PNP accountable for having failed to discharge the
burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance of
Jonas. Thus, the CA issued the following directives to address the enforced disappearance of
Jonas:
(1) DIRECT the PNP through its investigative arm, the PNP-CIDG, to identify and locate the
abductors of Jonas Burgos who are still at large and to establish the link between the abductors of
Jonas Burgos and those involved in the ERAP 5 incident;
(2) DIRECT the incumbent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Director
General of the Philippines National Police, and their successors, to ensure the continuance of their
investigation and coordination on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos until the persons
found responsible are brought before the bar of justice;
(3) DIRECT the Commission on Human Rights to continue with its own independent investigation
on the enforced disappearance of Jonas Burgos with the same degree of diligence required under the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo;
(4) DIRECT the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to extend full
assistance to the Commission on Human Rights in the conduct of the latter’s investigation; and
 (5) DIRECT the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Director General, Philippine
National Police and the Chairman, Commission on Human Rights to submit a quarterly report to the
Court on the results of their respective investigation.28
We note that the respondents did not appeal the March 18, 2013 CA decision and the May
23, 2013 CA resolution denying their motion for partial reconsideration.
Based on the above considerations, in particular, the final ruling of the CA that confirmed
the validity of the issuance of the Writ of Amparo and its determination of the entities
responsible for the enforced disappearance of Jonas, we resolve to deny the petitioner’s
prayer to issue the writ of Amparo anew and to refer the case to the CA based on the newly
discovered evidence. We so conclude as the petitioner’s request for the reissuance of the writ
and for the rehearing of the case by the CA would be redundant and superfluous in light of:
(1) the ongoing investigation being conducted by the DOJ through the NBI; (2) the CHR
investigation directed by the Court in this Resolution; and (3) the continuing investigation
directed by the CA in its March 18, 2013 decision.
As a final note, we emphasize that our ROLE in a writ of Amparo proceeding is merely to
determine whether an enforced disappearance has taken place; to determine who is
responsible or accountable; and to define and impose the appropriate remedies to address
the disappearance.1âwphi1
As shown above, the beneficial purpose of the Writ of Amparo has been served in the
present case with the CA’s final determination of the persons responsible and accountable
for the enforced disappearance of Jonas and the commencement of criminal action against
Lt. Baliaga. At this stage, criminal, investigation and prosecution proceedings are already
beyond the reach of the Writ of Amparo proceeding now before us.
Based on the above developments, we now hold that the full extent of the remedies
envisioned by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo has been served and exhausted.
Considering the foregoing, the Court RESOLVES to:

We emphasize that while the Rule on the Writ of Amparo accords the Court a wide latitude
in crafting remedies to address an enforced disappearance, it cannot (without violating the
nature of the writ of Amparo as a summary remedy that provides rapid judicial relief) grant
remedies that would complicate and prolong rather than expedite the investigations already
ongoing. Note that the CA has already determined with finality that Jonas was a victim of
enforced disappearance.
We clarify that by denying the petitioner’s motion, we do not thereby rule on the
admissibility or the merits of the newly discovered evidence submitted by the petitioner. We
likewise do not foreclose any investigation by the proper investigative and prosecutory
agencies of the other entities whose identities and participation in the enforced
disappearance of Jonas may be disclosed in future investigations and proceedings.
Considering that the present case has already reached the prosecution stage, the
petitioner’s motion should have been filed with the proper investigative and prosecutory
agencies of the government.
To expedite proceedings, we refer the petitioner’s motion, this Resolution and its covered
cases to the DOJ for investigation, for the purpose of filing the appropriate criminal charges
in the proper courts against the proper parties, if warranted, based on the gathered
evidence. For this purpose, we direct the petitioner to furnish the DOJ and the NBI copies of
her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed attachments to
the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution.
As mentioned, we take judicial notice of the ongoing investigation by the DOJ, through
NBI, of the disappearance of Jonas. This DOJ investigation is without prejudice to
Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation of
criminal aspect of this case should the case be determined to be cognizable by
Sandiganbayan.29
(1) DENY petitioner Edita Burgos’ Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela;
(2) REFER the petitioner’s Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, this Resolution and its
covered cases to the Department of Justice for investigation for the purpose of filing the appropriate
criminal charges in the proper courts against the proper parties if such action is warranted by the
gathered evidence. The referral to the Department of Justice is without prejudice to the Office of the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the investigation should the case be
determined to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan;
(3) DIRECT the petitioner to furnish the Department of Justice and the National Bureau of
Investigation copies of her Urgent Ex Parte Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, together with the sealed
attachments to the Motion, within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution;
(4) DIRECT the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court to allow the duly-authorized representatives of
the Commission on Human Rights to inspect the requested documents in camera within five (5) days
from receipt of this Resolution. For this purpose, the documents shall be examined and compared
with the cartographic sketches of the two abductors of Jonas Burgos without copying and bringing
the documents outside the premises of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court. The
inspection of the documents shall be conducted within office hours and for a reasonable period of
time that would allow the Commission on Human Rights to comprehensively investigate the lead
provided by Virgilio Eustaquio;
(5) DIRECT the National Bureau of Investigation to coordinate and provide direct investigative
assistance to the Commission on Human Rights as the latter may require, pursuant to the authority
granted under the Court's June 22, 2010 Resolution.
the
the (6) REQUIRE the Commission on Human Rights to submit a supplemental investigation report to
the the Department of Justice, copy furnished the petitioner, the National Bureau of Investigation, the
the incumbent Chiefs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and the
Philippine National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, and all the respondents,
within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Resolution.

As we direct below, further investigation for purposes of the present proceedings shall
continue to be undertaken by the CHR, in close coordination with the NBI, for the
completion of the investigation under the terms of our June 22, 2010 Resolution and the
additional directives under the present Resolution.
(7) DECLARE this Writ of Amparo proceeding closed and terminated, without prejudice to the
concerned parties' compliance with the above directives and subject to the Court's continuing
jurisdiction to enforce compliance with this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 193652. August 5, 2014.*
Infant JULIAN YUSAY CARAM, represented by his mother, MA. CHRISTINA YUSAY
CARAM, petitioner, vs.Atty. MARIJOY D. SEGUI, Atty. SALLY D. ESCUTIN, VILMA B.
CABRERA, and CELIA YANGCO, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; The Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its
present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.—Section 1 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows: SECTION 1. Petition.—The petition for a writ of
amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. In the landmark case of Secretary of National
Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 568 SCRA 1 (2008), this Court held: [T]he Amparo Rule was
intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e.,
without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced
disappearances” are “attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals
acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
Same; Same; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; As to what constitutes
“enforced disappearance,” the Supreme Court in Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618
(2012), enumerated the elements constituting “enforced disappearances” as the term is
statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9851.—This pronouncement on
the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545 (2012), where this Court explicitly declared that as it
stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes “enforced disappearance,” the
Court in Navia v. Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements constituting
“enforced disappearances” as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9851
to wit: (a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State
or a political organization; (c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject
person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.
Same; Same; Child Custody; Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is
involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for
all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied.—Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved
is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all
intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule
cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy
available to victims of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official
or employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the
right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality
of life.
PETITION for review on certiorari under the Rules of Court and the Rule on the Writ of Amparo of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 106.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alexander L. Bansil for petitioner.
88VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, and Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo2 seeking to set
aside the August 17, 20103 and September 6, 20104Orders of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 106 of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had
dismissed petitioner’s petition for the issuance ofa writ of amparo which petitioner filed in
order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay Caram (Baby Julian),
her biological child, from the respondent officers of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD). The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram(Christina) had an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became pregnant with the latter’s child without the benefit of
marriage. After getting pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During this time, she intended to have
the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Parañaque City to avoid
placing her family ina potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate son.5
On July 26, 2009, Christina gavebirth to Baby Julian at Amang Rodriguez Memorial MedicalCenter,
Marikina City.6Sun and Moon shouldered all the hospital and medical expenses. On August 13, 2009,
Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of Voluntary Commitment7 to the
DSWD.
On November 26, 2009, Marcelino suffered a heart attack and died8 without knowing about the birth of
his son. Thereafter, during the wake, Christina disclosed to Marcelino’s family that she and the deceased
had a son that she gave up for adoption due to financial distress and initial embarrassment. Marcelino’s
family was taken aback by the revelation and sympathized with Christina. After the emotional
revelation, they vowed to help her recover and raise the baby. 9 On November 27, 2009, the DSWD,
through Secretary Esperanza I. Cabral issued a certificate 10declaring Baby Julian as "Legally Available
for Adoption." A local matching conference was held on January 27, 2010 and on February 5, 2010, Baby
Julian was "matched" with the spouses Vergel and Filomina Medina (Medina Spouses) of the Kaisahang
Bahay Foundation. Supervised trial custody then commenced.11
On May 5, 2010, Christina who had changed her mind about the adoption, wrote a letter to the
DSWDasking for the suspension of Baby Julian’s adoption proceedings. She alsosaid she wanted her
family back together.12
On May 28, 2010, the DSWD, through respondent Atty. Marijoy D. Segui, sent a Memorandum 13 to
DSWD Assistant Secretary Vilma B. Cabrera informing her that the certificate declaring Baby Julian
legally available for adoption had attained finality on November 13, 2009, or three months after
Christina signed the Deed of Voluntary Commitment which terminated her parental authority and
effectively made Baby Julian a ward of the State. The said Memorandum was noted by respondent Atty.
Sally D. Escutin, Director IV of the Legal Service, DSWD.
On July 12, 2010, Noel Gicano Constantino, Marcelino’s brother, sent a letter to Atty. Escutin informing
her that a DNA testing was scheduled on July 16, 2010 at the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the
University of the Philippines.14
On July 16, 2010, Assistant Secretary Cabrera sent a letter 15 to Noel Constantino stating that it would
not allow Baby Julian to undergo DNA testing. Assistant Secretary Cabrera informed Noel Constantino
that the procedures followed relative to the certification on the availability of the child for adoption and
the child’s subsequent placement to prospective adoptive parents were proper, and that the DSWD was
no longer in the position to stop the adoption process. Assistant Secretary Cabrera further stated that
should Christina wish to reacquire her parental authority over Baby Julian or halt the adoption process,
she may bring the matter to the regular courts as the reglementary period for her to regain her parental
rights had already lapsed under Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9523. 16
On July 27, 2010, Christina filed a petition17 for the issuance of a writ of amparo before the
RTC of Quezon City seeking to obtain custody of Baby Julian from Atty. Segui, Atty.
Escutin, Assistant Secretary Cabrera and Acting Secretary Celia C. Yangco, all of the
DSWD.
In her petition, Christina accused respondents of "blackmailing" her into surrendering
custody of her childto the DSWD utilizing what she claims to be an invalid certificate of
availability for adoption which respondents allegedly used as basis to misrepresent that all
legal requisites for adoption of the minor child had been complied with.
Christina argued that by making these misrepresentations, the respondents had acted
beyond the scope of their legal authority thereby causing the enforced disappearance of the
said child and depriving her of her custodial rights and parental authority over him.
On the basis of the said petition,the RTC, Branch 106 of Quezon City, through its Presiding
Judge, the Honorable Angelene Mary W. Quimpo-Sale, issued a Writ of Amparo18 on July
28, 2010 commanding the four respondents to produce the body of Baby Julian at a hearing
scheduled on August 4, 2010. Respondents were alsorequired to file their verified written
return to the writ pursuant to Section 919 of the Amparo Rule, within five working days from
the service of the writ.
The respondents complied with the writ and filed their Return 20 on August 2, 2010 praying
that the petition be denied for being the improper remedy to avail of in a case relating toa
biological parent’s custodial rights over her child.
On August 4, 2010, respondents appeared before the RTC but respondents did not bring the
child, stating that threats of kidnapping were made on the child and his caregivers. To give
respondents another chance, the RTC reset the hearing to August 5, 2010.
At the August 5, 2010 hearing, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance as representative of the State and prayed that its lawyers be given time to file
their memorandum or position paper in this case. In turn, the RTC acknowledged the
appearance of the OSG and allowed its representatives to actively participate in the
arguments raised during the said hearing. Relative to the matter of the parties submitting
additional pleadings, Judge Sale narrowed the issues to be discussed by providing for the
following guidelines, thus:
To abbreviate the proceedings, in view of all the manifestations and counter-manifestations
made by the counsels, the court enjoined the parties to file their respective position papers
on the following issues:
1. Whether or not this court has jurisdiction over the instant case;
2. Whether or not this petition isthe proper remedy based on the facts of the case and prayer
in the petition; and
3. Whether or not the prayer in the petition should be granted and custody of the child be
given to his biological mother.
The parties were given five (5) days from today to file their respective position papers based
on these three main issues. They may include other related issues they deem essential for
the resolution of this case. Set this case for further hearing, if necessary, on August 18, 2010
at 9:00 a.m.21
In the same order, Judge Sale alsoacknowledged that the child subject of the case was
brought before the court and the petitioner was allowed to see him and take photographs of
him.
On August 17, 2010, the RTC dismissed the petition for issuance of a writ of amparo
without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate action in court. The RTC held that
Christina availed of the wrong remedy to regain custody of her child Baby Julian. 22 The
RTC further stated that Christina should have filed a civil case for custody of her child as
laid down in the Family Code and the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. If there is extreme urgency to secure custody of a
minor who has been illegallydetained by another, a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus may be availed of, either as a principal or ancillary remedy, pursuant to the
Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus inRelation to Custody of Minors. 23
On August 20, 2010, Christina filed a motion for reconsideration24 arguing that since the
RTC assumed jurisdiction of the petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo, the latter is
duty-bound to dispose the case on the merits.25 The RTC, however, deniedChristina’s motion
for reconsideration on September 6, 2010 maintaining that the latter availed of the wrong
remedy and that the Supreme Court intended the writ of amparo to address the problem of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.26
On September 28, 2010, Christina directly elevated the case before this Court, via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, in
relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. In her petition, Christina prayed
that the Court (1) set aside the August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010 Orders of the RTC,
(2) declare R.A. No. 9523 unconstitutional for being contrary to A.M. No. 02-6-02-
SC,27 which was promulgated by the Supreme Court, and for violating the doctrine of
separation of powers, (3) declare the "enforced separation" between her and Baby Julian as
violative of her rights to life, liberty and security, and (4) grant her the privilege of availing
the benefits of a writ of amparo so she could be reunited with her son. 28
The only relevant issue presented before the Court worthy of attention is whether a petition
for a writ of amparo is the proper recourse for obtaining parental authority and custody of a
minor child. This Court will not belabor to discuss Christina’s argumentsrelating to the
supposedunconstitutionality or R.A. No. 9523 as Congress has the plenary power to repeal,
alter and modify existing laws29 and A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC functions only as a means to
enforce the provisions of all adoption and adoption-related statutes before the courts.
Now, in her petition, Christina argues that the life, liberty and security of Baby Julian is
being violated or threatened by the respondent DSWD officers’ enforcement of an illegal
Deed of Voluntary Commitment between her and Sun and Moon. She claims thatshe had
been "blackmailed" through the said Deed by the DSWD officers and Sun and Moon’s
representatives into surrendering her child thereby causing the "forced separation" of the
said infant from his mother. Furthermore, she also reiterates that the respondent DSWD
officers acted beyond the scope of their authority when they deprived her of Baby Julian’s
custody.30
The Court rejects petitioner’s contentions and denies the petition.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparois a remedy available to any person whose right Christina's directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child and
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful actor omission of a placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a
lost child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. him.37 Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child
custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes,
has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
In the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al., 31 this Court
held:
To reiterate, the privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-
judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
[T]he AmparoRule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings"
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a
and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life,
instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
liberty and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand,
"enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest,
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groupsor private WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The August 17, 2010 and September 6, 2010
individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of Orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 106, Quezon City in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-
the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to 67604 are AFFIRMED without prejudice to petitioner's right to avail of proper legal
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of remedies afforded to her by law and related rules.
law.
No costs.
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the latter case of
Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo32 where this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the SO ORDERED.
writ of amparo is confined only to cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the
Court in Navia v. Pardico33 enumerated the elementsconstituting "enforced disappearances"
as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 985134 to wit:

(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of

liberty;

(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of,
the State ora political organization;

(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal to

acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject
of the amparopetition; and,

(d) that the intention for such refusal isto remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.1âwphi1

In this case, Christina alleged that the respondent DSWD officers caused her "enforced
separation" from Baby Julian and that their action amounted to an "enforced
disappearance" within the context of the Amparo rule. Contrary to her position, however,
the respondent DSWD officers never concealed Baby Julian's whereabouts. In fact,
Christina obtained a copy of the DSWD's May 28, 2010 Memorandum 35 explicitly stating
that Baby Julian was in the custody of the Medina Spouses when she filed her petition
before the RTC. Besides, she even admitted in her petition for review on certiorari that the
respondent DSWD officers presented Baby Julian before the RTC during the hearing held in
the afternoon of August 5, 2010.36 There is therefore, no "enforced disappearance" as used in
the context of the Amparo rule as the third and fourth elements are missing.
 G.R. No. 202666. September 29, 2014.*
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA,
petitioners, vs. ST. THERESA’S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN
DOES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); Writ of Habeas Data;
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.—The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right
to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering,
collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed
to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational
privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself,
particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.
Same; Same; Same; The existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the
writ may be extended.—In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an
individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in
fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from
abuse in the information age.” The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an
alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires
the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life,
liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation
of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the
privilege of the writ may be extended.
Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; The writ of habeas data can be availed of
as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to
informational privacy.—Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the
writ only to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored
portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been
made. Habeas data, to stress, was designed “to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in
the information age.” As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule prepared by the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that: The writ of habeas data,
however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against
the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction
of the database or information or files in possession or in control of respondents. (emphasis
ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Data may also be availed of in cases
outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Same; Same; Same; Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data.—Nothing in the Rule would suggest that
the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or
entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided
under Section 1 of the Rule: Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of habeas data is a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.
Same; Same; Same; Habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of
public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or
storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her
family.—The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys
the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public
officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing
data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family.
Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data. To
“engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage”
means “to do or take part in something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must
be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
Same; Same; Same; The Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies
that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to
remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.—The Court saw the pressing need to
provide for judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of
data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy. In the same
vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,
promulgated on January 30, 2013, recognized that “[t]he law has to take into account the
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in
the eyes of the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to
changing times, acting cautiously and with wisdom.” Consistent with this, the Court, by
developing what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect,
recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is
not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
Same; Same; Same; Online Social Networks; The purpose of an Online Social
Networks (OSN) is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to other
members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses,
photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site.—Briefly, the
purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to
other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of
statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is
akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or “walls,” the contents
of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a
user/owner can post anything –– from text, to pictures, to music and videos –– access to
which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see
his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites, including the one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use “to stay
connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Facebook; Facebook connections are established through
the process of “friending” another user.—Facebook connections are established through the
process of “friending” another user. By sending a “friend request,” the user invites another
to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all “Public” and “Friends Only”
posts of the other. Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both users are
permitted to view the other user’s “Public” or “Friends Only” posts, among others.
“Friending,” therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with
other users, whereby the user gives his or her “Facebook friend” access to his or her profile
and shares certain information to the latter.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Informational Privacy; Before one can have an
expectation of privacy in his or her Online Social Networks (OSN) activity, it is first
necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners, manifest the intention to keep
certain posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to
limit its visibility.—Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN
activity, it is first necessary that said user, in this case the children of
petitioners, manifest the intention to keep certain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. And
this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy
tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation, in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering that the default setting for Facebook
posts is “Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to
everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph.—Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
“Public,” it can be surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the
photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to
informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d, is
most instructive: [A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances
such as here, where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that
would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Messages sent to the public at large in the chat room
or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of
privacy.—Also, United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, held that “[t]he more open the
method of transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the
public at large in the chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
“Friends” is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook
friends with the source of the content.—That the photos are viewable by “friends only” does
not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is
agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of
the zones of privacy in view of the following: (1) Facebook “allows the world to be more open
and connected by giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way”; (2)
A good number of Facebook users “befriend” other users who are total strangers; (3) The
sheer number of “Friends” one user has, usually by the hundreds; and (4) A user’s Facebook
friend can “share” the former’s post, or “tag” others who are not Facebook friends with the
former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends. It is well to
emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to “Friends” is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with
the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his
or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is
Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is
tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was
tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at “Friends.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; There can be no quibbling that the images in
question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in
nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in
a conservative institution.—In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question,
or to be more precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature,
likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare
assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to
them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case
within the ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a cyberspace community member, one has to be
proactive in protecting his or her own privacy.—It has been said that “the best filter is the
one between your children’s ears.” This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN
users and internet consumers in general is the best means of avoiding privacy rights
violations. As a cyberspace community member, one has to be proactive in protecting his or
her own privacy. It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.
Responsible social networking or observance of the “netiquettes” on the part of teenagers
has been the concern of many due to the widespread notion that teenagers can sometimes go
too far since they generally lack the people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves
sensibly in a public forum.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Considering the complexity of the cyber world and
its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations.—Considering the complexity of the
cyber world and its pervasiveness, as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly
or unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the
participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good
digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed
that “to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise
due diligence in their online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting
their rights.—It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their
online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity
serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants
themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been
violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves
did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the
information private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and
the site’s layout often.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Br. 14.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mercado & Associates for petitioners.
Florido & Largo Law Office for respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an
equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal
adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure
and communication of himself to others, in light of the environmental conditions and social
norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in
relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of
Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their
habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were,
during the period material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC),
Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach
party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne, along with several others, took digital
pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded
by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high
school department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures
online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then
asked her students if they knew who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily
identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook
accounts and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and
Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and
Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles of clothing that show virtually the
entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s students claimed that there
were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos was not
confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook
page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for
appropriate action. Thereafter, following an investigation, STC found the identified students
to have deported themselves in a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to
wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains
sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading
pictures on the Internet that entail ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in
question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima),
STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting,
they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC officials present in the conference,
including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is
more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of their penalty,
they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan
(Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC,
et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be
enjoined from implementing the sanction that precluded Angela from joining the
commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the
fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed
their memorandum, containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That
same day, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to
attend the graduation ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from
participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement
exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained
unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for
posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday
beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends
Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have
known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew
or ought to have known that the girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the
victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the
minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
 4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and
reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by
saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s
officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information,
data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by
respondents through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with
Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing
constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ
of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit with
the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the preliminary
hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data,
and digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have
been illegally obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July
5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were
directed to file their verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within
five (5) working days from service of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written
return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners
are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping;
(c) the instant case is not one where a writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no
violation of their right to privacy as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on
Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The
dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened
violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on
Facebook without restrictions as to who may view them, lost their privacy in some way.
Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs through legal means and for a legal
purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section
19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould
be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the
pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the
right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official
or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image,
privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a
person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which
such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful
ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to
informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas
dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."13 The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized
access to information about a person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus
between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at
least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be
extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a
habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this
requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it
facilitates and promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans
the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2) that any
information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which
are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the
purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data.
However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be
filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within
the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in
the preceding paragraph. (emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of
extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2,
reflecting a variance of habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the
information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the
Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, after explaining that the Writ of Habeas
Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce
one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies
against the violation of such right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files in possession or in control of
respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay
also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being
an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is,
nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be
available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering,
storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose
right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea
that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of
private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the
aggrieved party and his or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual
or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage"
means "to do or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity
must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be
gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or
her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one
pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or
even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to
said person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the
writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data
gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan
instrument designed to protect a right which is easily violated in view of rapid
advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great
majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the
controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements
having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right to Privacy, 20 where he explained the
three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational privacy; 21(2)
informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case
at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to
control information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing
nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions,
there is more reason that every individual’s right to control said flow of information should
be protected and that each individual should have at least a reasonable expectation of
privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites,
however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking]
environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies
that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to
remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African
High Court, in its Decision in the landmark case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013,
recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the changing realities not only
technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x
It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously
and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as
the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally
speaking, having an expectation of informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible
with engaging in cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs?
Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time,
the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which
would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay
connected to other members of the same or different social media platform through the
sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the
site. It is akin to having a room filled with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls,"
the contents of which are under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin
board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––access
to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the other users to see
his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to the
creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay
connected with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By
sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they
can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is
accepted, the link is established and both users are permitted to view the other user’s
"Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to
form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or
her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to the
latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed
with different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile 31 as well
as information uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized
this ability of the users to "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat:
"Facebook states in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital
images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile
picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy setting:
(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view
the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of
the Facebook user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to
broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos,
among others, from another user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users
an avenue to make the availability of their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to
"when and to what extent to disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the
position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on one’s
desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold certain
information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless
to say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that
user’s particular post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the
case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to
have a subjective expectation that only those to whomthey grant access to their profile will
view the information they post or upload thereto.35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected
expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary
that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain
posts private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its
visibility.36 And this intention can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the
OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in
cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy. 37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to
his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which
necessarily accompanies said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a
feckless exercise, such that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal
information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom
list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed public
by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility. Such
position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also
disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the
confines of his or her private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other
Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did
the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the images were kept within their
zones of privacy? This determination is necessary in resolving the issue of whether the
minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the
images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated,
insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies
ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’
privacy since their Facebook accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only
Friends" setting safeguarded with a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s
disclosure was only limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore,
according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including respondents, are
barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent. Aspetitioner’s
children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable
by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some
pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are
senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then
said [that] there are still many other photos posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls.
At the computer lab, these students then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and
accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been
times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason:
failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation
that the photos were viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate
their statement that the images were visible only to the five of them, and without their
challenging Escudero’s claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their
statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her
students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own
Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe
allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by Escudero’s students, 43 and that it is
reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their
Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that
the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that
petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the
case, they cannot invoke the protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and
renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here,
where the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices that would have
controlled access to the Web page or the photograph itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is,
the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat
room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance
of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’
contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this
setting still remain to be outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users
the tools to interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total
strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who
are not Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her
own Facebook friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to
"Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not
Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share
said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user
tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is
shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared
the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
"Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook
friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial
audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends
plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the
audience who can view the post is effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards
user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages
broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated
their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is
suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily,
more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned
students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived
privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol.
Respondents were mere recipients of what were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful
means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had
legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and
broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of
offensive disclosure was no more than the actuality that respondents appended said
photographs in their memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational
privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the
photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if
indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a conservative
institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other than bare assertions that
they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them or to a
select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the
ambit of their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an
expectation of privacy with respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original
uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been
screened to limit access to a select few, through the "Custom" setting, the result may have
been different, for in such instances, the intention to limit access to the particular post,
instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse,
becomes more manifest and palpable.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings
and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the
vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take
utmost care in safeguarding a right which they allege to have been violated. These are
indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to
place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful
enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of
Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's
layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights,
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.

On Cyber Responsibility In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.

It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears." 53 This means WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-
means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
to be proactive in protecting his or her own privacy. 55 It is in this regard that many OSN
users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the
No pronouncement as to costs.
"netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the
widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the
people skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum. 57 SO ORDERED.

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship
in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it
is not only STC but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it
important to include digital literacy and good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs
and curricula in view of the risks that the children are exposed to every time they
participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world
and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or unwittingly
exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is
encouraged by these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such
risks, there’s no substitute for parental involvement and supervision."59

As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to
beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit
enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that,
in the process, it violated the students’ rights.

OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they
engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to
control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information
about themselves they are willing to give up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by
entering or uploading any kind of data or information online, they are automatically and
inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the
ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise private,
voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or
may not be allowed access to such.
G.R. No. 184769. October 5, 2010.*
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ALEXANDER S. DEYTO and RUBEN A. SAPITULA,
petitioners, vs.ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM, respondent.
Writ of Habeas Data; Right to Privacy; Labor Law; Transfers; An employee’s plea that
she be spared from complying with her employer’s Memorandum directing her reassignment
under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does
not fall within the province of a writ of habeas data; The habeas data rule, in general, is
designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual—it is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s
right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional
guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of
information technology.—Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with
MERALCO’s Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the
guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall
within the province of a writ of habeas data. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ
of HabeasData provides: Section 1. Habeas Data.—The writ of habeas datais a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved
party. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) The habeas data rule, in general, is designed
to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and
freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right
to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees
of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information
technology.
Same; Same; Same; Like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances—its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those provided
under prevailing Rules; The writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful—employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution.—It bears reiteration that like the writ
of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and
available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security as a remedy independently from those provided under prevailing Rules. Castillo v.
Cruz, 605 SCRA 628 (2009), underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario,
554 SCRA 768 (2008), that the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect
purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment constitutes a property right under the
context of the due process clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s
reservations on the real reasons for her transfer—a legitimate concern respecting the terms
and conditions of one’s employment—are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary
remedy of habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
Same; Same; Same; To argue that the employer’s refusal to disclose the contents of
reports allegedly received on the threats to the employee’s safety amounts to a violation of her
right to privacy is at best speculative.—In another vein, there is no showing from the facts
presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of
respondent’s right to privacy vis-à-vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that
petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to
respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative.
Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations from unknown individuals in
her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as “highly suspicious, doubtful or are
just mere jokes if they existed at all.” And she even suspects that her transfer to another
place of work “betray[s] the real intent of management]” and could be a “punitive move.”
Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.
PETITION for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Horacio Enrico M. Bona, Teresita M. Magpayo, Elias M. Santos, Lynnette Deloria-Manarang for petitioners.
Romerico S. Espera for respondent.
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The Court is once again confronted with an opportunity to define the evolving metes and
bounds of the writ of habeas data. May an employee invoke the remedies available under
such writ where an employer decides to transfer her workplace on the basis of copies of an
anonymous letter posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the company and calling for
her to leave, which imputation it investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO).
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Metering Office of the
Administration building of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which respondent is
assigned, denouncing respondent. The letter reads:
Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN
AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG
GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA
LOOB….1
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Informed
about it, respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the
Philippine National Police.2
By Memorandum3 dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head of MERALCO’s
Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to MERALCO’s Alabang
Sector in Muntinlupa as "A/F OTMS Clerk," effective July 18, 2008 in light of the receipt of
"… reports that there were accusations and threats directed against [her] from unknown
individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and security."
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula, Vice-
President and Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed her transfer
and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and misgivings on the matter,
claiming that the "punitive" nature of the transfer amounted to a denial of due process.
Citing the grueling travel from her residence in Pampanga to Alabang and back entails, and
violation of the provisions on job security of their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
respondent expressed her thoughts on the alleged threats to her security in this wise:
xxxx
I feel that it would have been better . . . if you could have intimated to me the nature of the
alleged accusations and threats so that at least I could have found out if these are credible
or even serious. But as you stated, these came from unknown individuals and the way they
were handled, it appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly
suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.
Assuming for the sake of argument only, that the alleged threats exist as the management
apparently believe, then my transfer to an unfamiliar place and environment which will
make me a "sitting duck" so to speak, seems to betray the real intent of management which
is contrary to its expressed concern on my security and safety . . . Thus, it made me think
twice on the rationale for management’s initiated transfer. Reflecting further, it appears to
me that instead of the management supposedly extending favor to me, the net result and
effect of management action would be a punitive one.4 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her transfer pending
resolution of the issues she raised.
No response to her request having been received, respondent filed a petition 5 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bulacan, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioners’ unlawful act and omission consisting of their
continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged
report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and
security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security, correctible
by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ commanding petitioners
to file a written return containing the following:
a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the
report purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and
security; the nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;
b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or
information; and
c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.
Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
enjoining petitioners from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.
By Order6 of August 29, 2008, Branch 7 of the Bulacan RTC directed petitioners to file their
verified written return. And by Order of September 5, 2008, the trial court granted
respondent’s application for a TRO.
Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the grounds
that, inter alia, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).7
By Decision8 of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of respondent
including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners to desist from
implementing respondent’s transfer until such time that petitioners comply with the
disclosures required.
The trial court justified its ruling by declaring that, inter alia, recourse to a writ of habeas
data should extend not only to victims of extra-legal killings and political activists but also
to ordinary citizens, like respondent whose rights to life and security are jeopardized by
petitioners’ refusal to provide her with information or data on the reported threats to her
person.
Hence, the present petition for review under Rule 45 of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and
the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data9 contending that 1) the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
the case and cannot restrain MERALCO’s prerogative as employer to transfer the place of
work of its employees, and 2) the issuance of the writ is outside the parameters expressly
set forth in the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data.101avvphi1
Maintaining that the RTC has no jurisdiction over what they contend is clearly a labor
dispute, petitioners argue that "although ingeniously crafted as a petition for habeas data,
respondent is essentially questioning the transfer of her place of work by her
employer"11 and the terms and conditions of her employment which arise from an employer-
employee relationship over which the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters under Article 217 of the
Labor Code have jurisdiction.
Petitioners thus maintain that the RTC had no authority to restrain the implementation of
the Memorandum transferring respondent’s place of work which is purely a management
prerogative, and that OCA-Circular No. 79-200312 expressly prohibits the issuance of TROs
or injunctive writs in labor-related cases.
Petitioners go on to point out that the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data directs the issuance
of the writ only against public officials or employees, or private individuals or
entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an
aggrieved party’s person, family or home; and that MERALCO (or its officers) is clearly not
engaged in such activities.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Respondent’s plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO’s Memorandum
directing her reassignment to the Alabang Sector, under the guise of a quest for information
or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of
habeas data.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or
entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
informationregarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant
to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus
safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security
against abuse in this age of information technology.

It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy independently from those
provided under prevailing Rules.13

Castillo v. Cruz14 underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario15 that the
writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or
doubtful.16 Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution.17 It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real reasons
for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of one’s
employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of habeas data.
Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiters.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed
any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent’s right to privacy vis-a-vis the right to
life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners’ refusal to disclose the contents of reports
allegedly received on the threats to respondent’s safety amounts to a violation of her right to
privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and accusations
from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as
"highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all."18 And she even
suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of
management]" and could be a "punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the
issue is labor-related.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2008 Decision of the
Bulacan RTC, Branch 7 in SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. SP. Proc. No. 213-M-2008 is, accordingly, DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 203254. October 8, 2014.* Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 30, 2012 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the
privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, petitioner, vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, respondent.

Constitutional Law; Habeas Data Rule (A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC); A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, The Facts
or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was conceived as a response,
given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012, Ilagan alleged
number of killings and enforced disappearances.—A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the
that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former common law partners.
Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas DataRule), was conceived as a response, given the lack of
Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter's condominium, rested for a while and
effective and available remedies, to address the extraordinary rise in the number of killings
thereafter, proceeded to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was
and enforced disappearances. It was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right
missing.4 On August 23, 2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter's office regarding a
to privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals, which is
purported sex video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving
defined as “the right to control the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data
Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to return the
about oneself.”
camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly slammed Lee’s head
against a wall inside his office and walked away.6 Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video
Same; Same; As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data
as evidence in filing various complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for
now stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
violation of Republic Act No. 9262,7 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
and Their Children Act of 2004," before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati; and (b)
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission
data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved
(NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of reproducing the subject video and
party.”—As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now
threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading
stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
it to the internet violated not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
that of the other woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is
employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
warranted.9
of data or information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of
the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ,
Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas Data10 dated
among others, “[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo, and to produce Ilagan’s digital
it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, camera, as well as the negative and/or original of the subject video and copies thereof, and
the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to to file a verified written return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
In her Verified Return11 dated July 2, 2012, Lee admitted that she indeed kept the memory
evidenceshowing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
card of the digital camera and reproduced the aforesaid video but averred that she only did
security of the victim. In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas data will
so to utilize the same as evidence in the cases she filed against Ilagan. She also admitted
not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked
that her relationship with Ilagan started sometime in 2003 and ended under disturbing
in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.
circumstances in August 2011, and that she only happened to discover the subject video
when Ilagan left his camera in her condominium. Accordingly, Lee contended that Ilagan’s
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; Sex Videos; As the rules and existing jurisprudence on
petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data should be dismissed because: (a) its filing
the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the
was only aimed at suppressing the evidence against Ilagan in the cases she filed; and (b) she
cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a
is not engaged in the gathering, collecting, or storing of data regarding the person of
failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible.—In this case,
Ilagan.12
the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest The RTC Ruling
in the suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or
be uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he failed to explain the connection In a Decision13 dated August 30, 2012, the RTC granted the privilege of the writ of habeas
between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts data in Ilagan’s favor, and accordingly, ordered the implementing officer to turn-over copies
cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing of the subject video to him, and enjoined Lee from further reproducing the same.14
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between one’s
privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases,
so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the gathering,
dismissible, as in this case. collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding that her acts of
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 224.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people, i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers,
Donn Rico G. Kapunan for petitioner.
Nicasio M. Salamera for respondent.
violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and caused him to suffer humiliation and mental
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
anguish. In this relation, the RTC opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in
the various cases she filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction.
Nevertheless, the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and
not on its admissibility before other tribunals.15
Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the RTC correctly extended
the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC, or the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data (Habeas Data Rule), was
conceived as a response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. 16 It was
conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to privacy, most especially the right
to informational privacy of individuals,17 which is defined as "the right to control the
collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of data about oneself."18
Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-serving testimony which hardly
meets the substantial evidence requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is
because nothing therein would indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act
towards the end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would
anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude 22 that Lee was going to use the
subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends - say for instance, to spread it to the public
so as to ruin Ilagan' s reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony
that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the
same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the glaring absence of
substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse the R TC Decision and dismiss
the habeas data petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as "a
remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home, and correspondence of the
aggrieved party." Thus, in order to support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section
6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among
others, "[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party." In other words,
the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.[[19]]
Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that the writ of habeas
data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds
invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague and doubtful. 21

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to
privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed
reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a
privacy interest in the suppression of this video – which he fears would somehow find its
way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the internet for public consumption – he failed to explain
the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or
security.1âwphi1 Indeed, courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible
transgressions. As the rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and
eventually proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty
or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure on either account
certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.

In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would equally be
dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As the records show, all that
G.R. No. 199199. August 27, 2013.*
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, Chairman of the BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-
SORSOGON, petitioner, vs. HON. RAMON PAJE, in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, REYNULFO A. JUAN, Regional
Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, DENR, HON. RAUL R. LEE, Governor, Province
of Sorsogon, ANTONIO C. OCAMPO, JR., VICTORIA A. AJERO, ALFREDO M. AGUILAR,
and JUAN M. AGUILAR, ANTONES ENTERPRISES, GLOBAL SUMMIT MINES DEV’T
CORP., and TR ORE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Jurisdiction; None is more well-settled than
the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and
decide a case, is conferred by law.―None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction,
which is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by
law. It may either be over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person
of the defendants or over the issues framed in the pleadings. By virtue of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section
21(1) thereof provides that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction — in the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court does not have the power to confer
jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is lodged solely in
Congress.―A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18
of B.P. Blg. 129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch
of the RTC shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by
the Court merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not
have the power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction
is lodged solely in Congress. It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the
Government. Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Continuing Mandamus; The concept of continuing
mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA 661 (2008); Similar to the procedure under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (A.M. No.
09-6-8-SC) requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a
court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright.―The
concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 574 SCRA 661 (2008). Now cast in stone
under Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure
than that of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws,
which are covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4,
Rule 8 of the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and
substance before a court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright. Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due
course to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied
in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in
mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Same; Same; Same; On matters of form, the petition for continuing mandamus must
be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an
act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency
of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain substantive
allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at
the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ.―On matters of form, the
petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as well as a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who
is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer
concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must
contain substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission
and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the writ, viz.: (1)
an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right;
(2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its officer is
specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in
connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or
a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of
law.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that
may be availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.” The
petition should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or
a right therein.―The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be
availed of “to compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.” The petition
should mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation
or a right therein. The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or
order is apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under
Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit: (c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in
an environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof to perform an act or series of acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain
effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
Same; Same; Same; A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of
continuing compliance with a final judgment as it “permits the court to retain jurisdiction
after judgment in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated
under the court’s decision.”―Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in
conformity with Rule 8, Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court
still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is
performing its tasks as mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said
tasks. It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final
return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has
been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. A
writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a
final judgment as it “permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to
ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision.”
Same; Same; Same; Failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a
fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed.―Failure to furnish a copy of the petition
to the respondents is not a fatal defect such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC
could have just required the petitioners to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents.
It should be remembered that “courts are not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the
prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory
character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation
and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be heard.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order and resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Br. 53.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
National Union for People’s Lawyer (NUPL) and Joven G. Laura for petitioner.
Gabriel & Mendoza Law Office for respondent Global Summit Mines Development Corporation.
Del Rosario Law Office for respondent Antonio C. Ocampo, Jr.
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Order2 dated September 16, 2011 and Resolution3 dated October 18, 2011 issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon, Branch 53. The assailed issuances dismissed Civil
Case No. 2011-8338 for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and Attorney’s Fees with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection Order.
Antecedent Facts
On September 15, 2011, petitioner Maricris D. Dolot (Dolot), together with the parish priest
of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog
(petitioners), filed a petition for continuing mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with
the RTC of Sorsogon, docketed as Civil Case No. 2011-8338.4 The petition contained the
following pertinent allegations: (1) sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining
operations being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development
Corporation and TR Ore in Barangays Balocawe and Bon-ot Daco, located in the
Municipality of Matnog, to no avail; (2) Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and
there is a need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the
municipality; (3) Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the
environmental dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence
and landslide hazard; (4) after investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not
have the required permit to operate; (5) Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor
Sally Lee issued to the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have
authority to issue; (6) the representatives of the Presidential Management Staff and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), despite knowledge, did not do
anything to protect the interest of the people of Matnog;5 and (7) the respondents violated
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942
or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and the Local Government Code. 6 Thus, they prayed
for the following reliefs: (1) the issuance of a writ commanding the respondents to
immediately stop the mining operations in the Municipality of Matnog; (2) the issuance of a
temporary environment protection order or TEPO; (3) the creation of an inter-agency group
to undertake the rehabilitation of the mining site; (4) award of damages; and (5) return of
the iron ore, among others.7
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, Branch 53 being the
designated environmental court.8 In the Order9 dated September 16, 2011, the case was
summarily dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution 10 dated
October 18, 2011. Aside from sustaining the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction, the
RTC11 further ruled that: (1) there was no final court decree, order or decision yet that the
public officials allegedly failed to act on, which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of
continuing mandamus; (2) the case was prematurely filed as the petitioners therein failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies; and (3) they also failed to attach judicial affidavits
and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate agency, as required by
the rules.12
Petitioner Dolot went straight to this Court on pure questions of law.
Issues
The main issue in this case is whether the RTC-Branch 53 has jurisdiction to resolve Civil
Case No. 2011-8338. The other issue is whether the petition is dismissible on the grounds
that: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials allegedly
failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency.
Ruling of the Court
Jurisdiction and Venue
In dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction, the RTC, in its Order dated September 16,
2011, apparently relied on SC Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 7 defining the territorial
areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Regions 1 to 12, and Administrative Circular (Admin.
Circular) No. 23-2008,13 designating the environmental courts "to try and decide violations
of environmental laws x x x committed within their respective territorial
jurisdictions."14 Thus, it ruled that its territorial jurisdiction was limited within the
boundaries of Sorsogon City and the neighboring municipalities of Donsol, Pilar, Castilla,
Casiguran and Juban and that it was "bereft of jurisdiction to entertain, hear and decide
[the] case, as such authority rests before another co-equal court."15
Such reasoning is plainly erroneous. The RTC cannot solely rely on SC A.O. No. 7 and
Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 and confine itself within its four corners in determining
whether it had jurisdiction over the action filed by the petitioners.
None is more well-settled than the rule that jurisdiction, which is the power and authority
of the court to hear, try and decide a case, is conferred by law. 16 It may either be over the
nature of the action, over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the
issues framed in the pleadings.17 By virtue of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is vested in the RTC. Particularly, Section 21(1) thereof provides
that the RTCs shall exercise original jurisdiction –
in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions. (Emphasis
ours)
A.O. No. 7 and Admin. Circular No. 23-2008 was issued pursuant to Section 18 of B.P. Blg.
129, which gave the Court authority to define the territory over which a branch of the RTC
shall exercise its authority. These administrative orders and circulars issued by the Court
merely provide for the venue where an action may be filed. The Court does not have the
power to confer jurisdiction on any court or tribunal as the allocation of jurisdiction is
lodged solely in Congress.18 It also cannot be delegated to another office or agency of the
Government.19 Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, in fact, explicitly states that the territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch concerned for purposes of
determining the venue of all suits, proceedings or actions. It was also clarified in Office of
the Court Administrator v. Judge Matas20 that –
Administrative Order No. 3 [defining the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
in the National Capital Judicial Region] and, in like manner, Circular Nos. 13 and 19, did
not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial courts or its branches, such that
non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely
defines the limits of the administrative area within which a branch of the court may
exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. 21
The RTC need not be reminded that venue relates only to the place of trial or the
geographical location in which an action or proceeding should be brought and does not
equate to the jurisdiction of the court. It is intended to accord convenience to the parties, as
it relates to the place of trial, and does not restrict their access to the courts.22Consequently,
the RTC’s motu proprio dismissal of Civil Case No. 2011-8338 on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction is patently incorrect.
At most, the error committed by the petitioners in filing the case with the RTC of Sorsogon
was that of improper venue. A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases (Rules) specifically states that a special civil action for continuing
mandamus shall be filed with the "[RTC] exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the
actionable neglect or omission occurred x x x."23 In this case, it appears that the alleged
actionable neglect or omission occurred in the Municipality of Matnog and as such, the
petition should have been filed in the RTC of Irosin.24 But even then, it does not warrant the
outright dismissal of the petition by the RTC as venue may be waived. 25 Moreover, the
action filed by the petitioners is not criminal in nature where venue is an essential element
of jurisdiction.26 In Gomez-Castillo v. Commission on Elections,27 the Court even expressed
that what the RTC should have done under the circumstances was to transfer the case (an
election protest) to the proper branch. Similarly, it would serve the higher interest of
justice28 if the Court orders the transfer of Civil Case No. 2011 8338 to the RTC of Irosin for
proper and speedy resolution, with the RTC applying the Rules in its disposition of the case.
At this juncture, the Court affirms the continuing applicability of Admin. Circular No. 23-
2008 constituting the different "green courts" in the country and setting the administrative
guidelines in the raffle and disposition of environmental cases. While the designation and
guidelines were made in 2008, the same should operate in conjunction with the Rules.
A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC: Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
In its Resolution dated October 18, 2011, which resolved the petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, the RTC further ruled that the petition was
dismissible on the following grounds: (1) there is no final court decree, order or decision yet
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) there was failure to attach judicial
affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government or appropriate
agency.29 The respondents, and even the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of the
public respondents, all concur with the view of the RTC.
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.30 Now cast in stone under
Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a distinct procedure than that
of ordinary civil actions for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are
covered by Part II (Civil Procedure). Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court for special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of
the Rules requires that the petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a
court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the petition outright.
Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course to the
petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be applied in a
reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and always with the view in
mind of seeing to it that justice is served.31
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule 8,
Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof unlawfully
neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting evidence,
specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law, rule or regulation, and praying
that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until
the judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the malicious neglect to perform the duties of the respondent, under the law, rules or
regulations. The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping.1âwphi1
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting evidence as
well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. It is also necessary that the petitioner
must be one who is aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned. Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand,
necessitates that the petition must contain substantive allegations specifically constituting
an actionable neglect or omission and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis
for the issuance of the writ, viz: (1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use
or enjoyment of a right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty; (3) such duty results
from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement or violation of an
environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.32
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to compel
the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law." 33 The petition should mainly involve
an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right therein. The RTC’s
mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is apparently based on the
definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an environmental case directing any
agency or instrumentality of the government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of
acts decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment is fully satisfied.
(Emphasis ours)
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually pertains
to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an environmental case for
continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8, Section
7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction over the
case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated
by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks. It is only upon full
satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a final return of the writ shall be
made to the court and if the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. 34 A writ of continuing
mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance with a final judgment as it
"permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment in order to ensure the successful
implementation of the reliefs mandated under the court’s decision."35
The Court, likewise, cannot sustain the argument that the petitioners should have first filed SO ORDERED.
a case with the Panel of Arbitrators (Panel), which has jurisdiction over mining disputes
under R.A. No. 7942.

Indeed, as pointed out by the respondents, the Panel has jurisdiction over mining
disputes.36 But the petition filed below does not involve a mining dispute. What was being
protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of the small-scale mining operation
being conducted by Antones Enterprises, Global Summit Mines Development Corporation
and TR Ore in the Municipality of Matnog; the authority of the Governor of Sorsogon to
issue mining permits in favor of these entities; and the perceived indifference of the DENR
and local government officials over the issue. Resolution of these matters does not entail the
technical knowledge and expertise of the members of the Panel but requires an exercise of
judicial function. Thus, in Olympic Mines and Development Corp. v. Platinum Group Metals
Corporation,37 the Court stated –

Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a disagreement
between the parties as to some provisions of the contract between them, which needs the
interpretation and the application of that particular knowledge and expertise possessed by
members of that Panel. It is not proper when one of the parties repudiates the existence or
validity of such contract or agreement on the ground of fraud or oppression as in this case.
The validity of the contract cannot be subject of arbitration proceedings. Allegations of fraud
and duress in the execution of a contract are matters within the jurisdiction of the ordinary
courts of law. These questions are legal in nature and require the application and
interpretation of laws and jurisprudence which is necessarily a judicial function. 38(Emphasis
supplied in the former and ours in the latter)

Consequently, resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.

The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to
attach judicial affidavits. As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be
verified, contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn certification of
non-forum shopping. There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial
affidavits, albeit not prohibited. It is only if the evidence of the petitioner would consist of
testimony of witnesses that it would be the time that judicial affidavits (affidavits of
witnesses in the question and answer form) must be attached to the petition/complaint.39

Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect such
that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners to
furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents. It should be remembered that "courts are
not enslaved by technicalities, and they have the prerogative to relax compliance with
procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both
the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties’ right to an opportunity to be
heard."40

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated September 16, 2011 and
Resolution dated October 18, 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Branch
53, dismissing Civil Case No. 2011-8338 are NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE. The Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon is DIRECTED to transfer the case to the
Regional Trial Court of Irosin, Branch 55, for further proceedings with dispatch. Petitioner G.R. No. 207257. February 3, 2015.*
Maricris D. Dolot is also ORDERED to furnish the respondents with a copy of the petition
HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
and its annexes within ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision and to submit its
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR), petitioner, vs. HON. TEODORO A. CASIÑO,
Compliance with the RTC of Irosin. HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. RAFAEL V. MARIANO, HON. EMERENCIANA A. DE JESUS,
CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR., HON. ROLEN C. PAULINO, HON. EDUARDO PIANO, HON. JAMES
DE LOS REYES, HON. AQUILINO Y. CORTEZ, JR., HON. SARAH LUGERNA LIPUMANO-GARCIA,
NORAIDA VELARMINO, BIANCA CHRISTINE GAMBOA ESPINOS, CHARO SIMONS, GREGORIO
LLORCA MAGDARAOG, RUBELH PERALTA, ALEX CORPUS HERMOSO, RODOLFO SAMBAJON,
REV. FR. GERARDO GREGORIO P. JORGE, CARLITO A. BALOY, OFELIA D. PABLO, MARIO
ESQUILLO, ELLE LATINAZO, EVANGELINE Q. RODRIGUEZ, JOHN CARLO DELOS REYES,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; The Rules on the Writ of
Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), was
issued by the Court pursuant to its power to promulgate rules for the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular, the individual’s right to a balanced and
healthful ecology.—The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan, which is Part III of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, was issued by the Court pursuant to its power to
promulgate rules for the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, in particular,
the individual’s right to a balanced and healthful ecology. Section 1 of Rule 7 provides:
Section 1. Nature of the writ.—The writ is a remedy available to a natural or juridical
person, entity authorized by law, people’s organization, nongovernmental organization, or
any public interest group accredited by or registered with any government agency, on behalf
of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of such magnitude as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is categorized as a special civil action and
was, thus, conceptualized as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief
from threatened or actual violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of a magnitude or degree of damage that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.—The writ is categorized as a special civil action and was, thus, conceptualized
as an extraordinary remedy, which aims to provide judicial relief from threatened or actual
violation/s of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of a magnitude or
degree of damage that transcends political and territorial boundaries. It is intended “to
provide a stronger defense for environmental rights through judicial efforts where
institutional arrangements of enforcement, implementation and legislation have fallen
short” and seeks “to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological
threats.” Under Section 1 of Rule 7, the following requisites must be present to avail of this
extraordinary remedy: (1) there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; (2) the actual or threatened violation arises from
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or private individual or entity;
and (3) the actual or threatened violation involves or will lead to an environmental damage
of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. Expectedly, the Rules do not define the exact nature or degree of
environmental damage but only that it must be sufficiently grave, in terms of the territorial
scope of such damage, so as to call for the grant of this extraordinary remedy. The gravity of
environmental damage sufficient to grant the writ is, thus, to be decided on a case-to-case
basis.
Same; Same; Same; The writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries.—As earlier noted, the writ of kalikasan is principally predicated on an actual or
threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology, which
involves environmental damage of a magnitude that transcends political and territorial
boundaries. A party, therefore, who invokes the writ based on alleged defects or
irregularities in the issuance of an ECC must not only allege and prove such defects or
irregularities, but must also provide a causal link or, at least, a reasonable connection
between the defects or irregularities in the issuance of an ECC and the actual or threatened
violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology of the magnitude
contemplated under the Rules. Otherwise, the petition should be dismissed outright and the
action refiled before the proper forum with due regard to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. This must be so if we are to preserve the noble and laudable
purposes of the writ against those who seek to abuse it.
Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Due to the extreme
urgency of the matter at hand, the present case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.—Be that as it may, we shall resolve both the issues proper in a
writ of kalikasan case and those which are not, commingled as it were here, because of the
exceptional character of this case. We take judicial notice of the looming power crisis that
our nation faces. Thus, the resolution of all the issues in this case is of utmost urgency and
necessity in order to finally determine the fate of the project center of this controversy. If we
were to resolve only the issues proper in a writ of kalikasan case and dismiss those not
proper therefor, that will leave such unresolved issues open to another round of protracted
litigation. In any case, we find the records sufficient to resolve all the issues presented
herein. We also rule that, due to the extreme urgency of the matter at hand, the present
case is an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As we have
often ruled, in exceptional cases, we can suspend the rules of procedure in order to achieve
substantial justice, and to address urgent and paramount State interests vital to the life of
our nation.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the parties to raise, on
appeal, questions of fact — and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court — because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances surrounding the issuance
of a writ of kalikasan.—It is worth noting that the Rules on the Writ of Kalikasan allow the
parties to raise, on appeal, questions of fact — and, thus, constitutes an exception to Rule 45
of the Rules of Court — because of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances
surrounding the issuance of a writ of kalikasan. Thus, we shall review both questions of
law and fact in resolving the issues presented in this case.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court (SC) sustains the appellate court’s findings
that the Casiño Group failed to establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will
be caused by the construction and operation of the power plant.—In upholding the evidence
and arguments of RP Energy, relative to the lack of proof as to the alleged significant
environmental damage that will be caused by the project, the appellate court relied mainly
on the testimonies of experts, which we find to be in accord with judicial precedents. Thus,
we ruled in one case: Although courts are not ordinarily bound by testimonies of experts,
they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the
facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within
the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness,
his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of the reasoning by which he has
supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side for whom he testifies, the fact
that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matters
about which he testifies, and any other matters which serve to illuminate his statements.
The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court
in view of all the facts and circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly
fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effects. (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058) The
problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to
the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of
an abuse of that discretion. Hence, we sustain the appellate court’s findings that the Casiño
Group failed to establish the alleged grave environmental damage which will be caused by
the construction and operation of the power plant.
Same; Same; Same; The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases liberally provide
the courts with means and methods to obtain sufficient information in order to adequately
protect or safeguard the right to a healthful and balanced ecology.—The Rules of Procedure
for Environmental Cases liberally provide the courts with means and methods to obtain
sufficient information in order to adequately protect or safeguard the right to a healthful
and balanced ecology. In Section 6(l) of Rule 3 (Pre-Trial), when there is a failure to settle,
the judge shall, among others, determine the necessity of engaging the services of a
qualified expert as a friend of the court (amicus curiae). While, in Section 12 of Rule 7 (Writ
of Kalikasan), a party may avail of discovery measures: (1) ocular inspection and (2)
production or inspection of documents or things. The liberality of the Rules in gathering and
even compelling information, specifically with regard to the Writ of Kalikasan, is explained
in this wise: [T]he writ of kalikasan was refashioned as a tool to bridge the gap between
allegation and proof by providing a remedy for would-be environmental litigants to compel
the production of information within the custody of the government. The writ would
effectively serve as a remedy for the enforcement of the right to information about the
environment. The scope of the fact-finding power could be: (1) anything related to the
issuance, grant of a government permit issued or information controlled by the government
or private entity and (2) [i]nformation contained in documents such as environmental
compliance certificate (ECC) and other government records. In addition, the [w]rit may also
be employed to compel the production of information, subject to constitutional limitations.
This function is analogous to a discovery measure, and may be availed of upon application
for the writ.
Same; Same; Same; In environmental cases, the power to appoint friends of the court
in order to shed light on matters requiring special technical expertise as well as the power to
order ocular inspections and production of documents or things evince the main thrust of,
and the spirit behind, the Rules to allow the court sufficient leeway in acquiring the
necessary information to rule on the issues presented for its resolution, to the end that the
right to a healthful and balanced ecology may be adequately protected.—In environmental
cases, the power to appoint friends of the court in order to shed light on matters requiring
special technical expertise as well as the power to order ocular inspections and production of
documents or things evince the main thrust of, and the spirit behind, the Rules to allow the
court sufficient leeway in acquiring the necessary information to rule on the issues
presented for its resolution, to the end that the right to a healthful and balanced ecology
may be adequately protected. To draw a parallel, in the protection of the constitutional
rights of an accused, when life or liberty is at stake, the testimonies of witnesses may be
compelled as an attribute of the Due Process Clause. Here, where the right to a healthful
and balanced ecology of a substantial magnitude is at stake, should we not tread the path of
caution and prudence by compelling the testimonies of these alleged experts?
Procedural Rules and Technicalities; A court has the power to suspend its rules of
procedure in order to attain substantial justice so that it has the discretion, in exceptional
cases, to take into consideration matters not originally within the scope of the issues raised in
the pleadings or set during the preliminary conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of
justice.—A court has the power to suspend its rules of procedure in order to attain
substantial justice so that it has the discretion, in exceptional cases, to take into
consideration matters not originally within the scope of the issues raised in the pleadings or
set during the preliminary conference, in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In the
case at bar, the importance of the signature cannot be seriously doubted because it goes into
the consent and commitment of the project proponent to comply with the conditions of the
ECC, which is vital to the protection of the right to a balanced and healthful ecology of those
who may be affected by the project.
Environmental Compliance Certificate; The laws governing the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151 and PD 1586, do not
specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of Accountability has the effect of
invalidating the ECC.—The laws governing the ECC, i.e., Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1151
and PD 1586, do not specifically state that the lack of signature in the Statement of
Accountability has the effect of invalidating the ECC. Unlike in wills or donations, where
failure to comply with the specific form prescribed by law leads to its nullity, the applicable
laws here are silent with respect to the necessity of a signature in the Statement of
Accountability and the effect of the lack thereof. This is, of course, understandable because
the Statement of Accountability is a mere offshoot of the rule-making powers of the DENR
relative to the implementation of PD 1151 and PD 1586. To determine, therefore, the effect
of the lack of signature, we must look at the significance thereof under the Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) Rules of the DENR and the surrounding circumstances of this
case.
Same; While the signature is necessary for the validity of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), the particular circumstances of this case show that the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc. (RP Energy) were not properly apprised of the issue of lack of signature in order
for them to present controverting evidence and arguments on this point, as the matter only
developed during the course of the proceedings upon clarificatory questions from the
appellate court.—In sum, we rule that the appellate court erred when it invalidated the
ECC on the ground of lack of signature of Mr. Aboitiz in the ECC’s Statement of
Accountability relative to the copy of the ECC submitted by RP Energy to the appellate
court. While the signature is necessary for the validity of the ECC, the particular
circumstances of this case show that the DENR and RP Energy were not properly apprised
of the issue of lack of signature in order for them to present controverting evidence and
arguments on this point, as the matter only developed during the course of the proceedings
upon clarificatory questions from the appellate court. Consequently, RP Energy cannot be
faulted for submitting the certified true copy of the ECC only after it learned that the ECC
had been invalidated on the ground of lack of signature in the January 30, 2013 Decision of
the appellate court.
“License” and “Permit,” Distinguished.—The IPRA Law and its implementing rules do
not define the terms “license” and “permit” so that resort to their plain or ordinary meaning
in relation to the intendment of the law is appropriate. A “license” has been defined as “a
governmental permission to perform a particular act (such as getting married), conduct a
particular business or occupation, operate machinery or vehicles after proving capacity and
ability to do so safely, or use property for a certain purpose” while a “permit” has been
defined as “a license or other document given by an authorized public official or agency
(building inspector, department of motor vehicles) to allow a person or business to perform
certain acts.”
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; Ancestral Domain; Even if
the indigenous community does not actually reside on the proposed lease site, the government
agency would still be required to obtain the Certificate of Non-Overlap (CNO) precisely to
rule out the possibility that the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain.—
Even if the indigenous community does not actually reside on the proposed lease site, the
government agency would still be required to obtain the CNO precisely to rule out the
possibility that the proposed lease site encroaches upon an ancestral domain. The reason for
this is that an ancestral domain does not only cover the lands actually occupied by an
indigenous community, but all areas where they have a claim of ownership, through time
immemorial use, such as hunting, burial or worship grounds and to which they have
traditional access for their subsistence and other traditional activities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; That the project site was formerly used as the firing range
of the U.S. Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a present or future claim of
ancestral domain may be made over the aforesaid site.—That the project site was formerly
used as the firing range of the U.S. Armed Forces does not preclude the possibility that a
present or future claim of ancestral domain may be made over the aforesaid site. The
concept of an ancestral domain indicates that, even if the use of an area was interrupted by
the occupation of foreign forces, it may still be validly claimed to be an ancestral domain.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority; Jurisdiction; The Supreme Court (SC) finds that
the power to approve or disapprove projects within the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ)
is one such power over which the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority’s (SBMA’s) authority
prevails over the Local Government Unit’s (LGU’s) autonomy.—In the case at bar, we find
that the power to approve or disapprove projects within the SSEZ is one such power over
which the SBMA’s authority prevails over the LGU’s autonomy. Hence, there is no need for
the SBMA to secure the approval of the concerned sanggunians prior to the implementation
of the subject project. This interpretation is based on the broad grant of powers to the SBMA
over all administrative matters relating to the SSEZ under Section 13 of RA 7227, as
aforediscussed. Equally important, under Section 14, other than those involving defense and
security, the SBMA’s decision prevails in case of conflict between the SBMA and the LGUs
in all matters concerning the SSEZ.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; In exceptional cases, a writ of
kalikasan may be availed of to challenge defects in the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC).—In general, the proper procedure to question a defect in an ECC is to
follow the appeal process provided in DAO 2003-30 and the Revised Manual. After
complying with the proper administrative appeal process, recourse may be made to the
courts in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. However,
as earlier discussed, in exceptional cases, a writ of kalikasan may be availed of to challenge
defects in the ECC provided that (1) the defects are causally linked or reasonably
connected to an environmental damage of the nature and magnitude contemplated under
the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan, and (2) the case does not violate, or falls under an exception
to, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and/or primary jurisdiction.
Velasco, Jr., J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; View that the special civil action for a
writ of kalikasan under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC for brevity) is, I
submit, the best available and proper remedy for petitioners Casiño, et al.—The special civil action for a
writ of kalikasan under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC for brevity) is, I
submit, the best available and proper remedy for petitioners Casino, et al. As distinguished from other
available remedies in the ordinary rules of court, the writ of kalikasan is designed for a narrow but
special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to
provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one’s constitutional right to a
healthful and balanced ecology. As a matter of fact, by explicit directive from the Court, the RPEC are
SPECIAL RULES crafted precisely to govern environmental cases. On the other hand, the “remedies that
can contribute to the protection of communities and their environment” alluded to in Justice Leonen’s
dissent clearly form part of the Rules of Court which by express provision of the special rules for
environmental cases “shall apply in a suppletory manner” under Section 2 of Rule 22. Suppletory means
“supplying deficiencies.” It is apparent that there is no vacuum in the special rules on the legal remedy
on unlawful acts or omission concerning environmental damage since precisely Rule 7 on the writ
of kalikasan encompasses all conceivable situations of this nature.
Same; Same; Same; View on the Requisites for the Proper Availment of the Kalikasan Writ.—
Availment of the kalikasan writ would, therefore, be proper if the following requisites concur in a given
case: 1. that there is an actual or threatened violation of the constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; 2. the actual or threatened violation is due to an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or private individual or entity; 3. the situation in the ground involves an
environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces.
Same; Same; Same; View that in proceedings involving enforcement or violation of environmental
laws, where arbitrariness or caprice is ascribed to a public official, the sharper weapon to correct the
wrong would be a suit for the issuance of the kalikasan writ.—Anent Justice Leonen’s argument that
there are other “remedies that can contribute to the protection of communities and their environment”
other than Rule 7 of RPEC, doubtless referring to a Rule 65 petition, allow me to state in disagreement
that there are instances when the act or omission of a public official or employee complained of will
ultimately result in the infringement of the basic right to a healthful and balanced ecology. And said
unlawful act or omission would invariably constitute grave abuse of discretion which, ordinarily, could be
addressed by the corrective hand of certiorari under Rule 65. In those cases, a petition for writ
of kalikasan would still be the superior remedy as in the present controversy, crafted as it were precisely
to address and meet head-on such situations. Put a bit differently, in proceedings involving enforcement
or violation of environmental laws, where arbitrariness or caprice is ascribed to a public official, the
sharper weapon to correct the wrong would be a suit for the issuance of the kalikasan writ.
Same; Same; Same; View that the advent of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC to be sure brought about
significant changes in the procedural rules that apply to environmental cases.—The advent of A.M. No.
09-6-8-SC to be sure brought about significant changes in the procedural rules that apply to
environmental cases. The differences on eight (8) areas between a Rule 65 certiorari petition and Rule
7 kalikasan petition may be stated as follows: 1. Subject matter. Since its subject matter is any
“unlawful act or omission,” a Rule 7 kalikasan petition is broad enough to correct any act taken without
or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
which is the subject matter of a Rule 65 certiorari petition. Any form of abuse of discretion as long as it
constitutes an unlawful act or omission involving the environment can be subject of a Rule
7 kalikasan petition. A Rule 65 petition, on the other hand, requires the abuse of discretion to be “grave.”
Ergo, a subject matter which mordinarily cannot properly be subject of a certiorari petition can be the
subject of a kalikasan petition. 2. Who may file. Rule 7 has liberalized the rule on locus standi, such
that availment of the writ of kalikasan is open to a broad range of suitors, to include even an entity
authorized by law, people’s organization or any public interest group accredited by or registered with any
government agency, on behalf of persons whose right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or
threatened to be violated. Rule 65 allows only the aggrieved person to be the petitioner. 3. Respondent.
The respondent in a Rule 65 petition is only the government or its officers, unlike in a kalikasan petition
where the respondent may be a private individual or entity. 4. Exemption from docket fees.
The kalikasan petition is exempt from docket fees, unlike in a Rule 65 petition. Rule 7 of RPEC has pared
down the usually burdensome litigation expenses. 5. Venue. The certiorari petition can be filed with (a)
the RTC exercising jurisdiction over the territory where the act was committed; (b) the Court of Appeals;
and (c) the Supreme Court. Given the magnitude of the damage, the kalikasan petition can be filed
directly with the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The direct filing of a kalikasan petition will
prune case delay. 6. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. This doctrine generally applies to
a certiorari petition, unlike in a kalikasan petition. 7. Period to file. An aggrieved party has 60 days
from notice of judgment or denial of a motion for reconsideration to file a certiorari petition, while
a kalikasan petition is not subject to such limiting time lines. 8. Discovery measures. In
a certiorari petition, discovery measures are not available unlike in a kalikasan petition. Resort to these
measures will abbreviate proceedings. It is clear as day that a kalikasan petition provides more ample
advantages to a suitor than a Rule 65 petition for certiorari.
Same; Same; Same; View that each organism, inclusive of the human of the species, reacts
differently to a foreign body or a pollutant, thus, the need to address each environmental case on a case-to-
case basis.—To require that there should be no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within
the population represented or those that are yet to be born would likewise effectively remove the rule on
citizens suits from our Environmental Rules or render it superfluous. No party could possibly prove, and
no court could calculate, whether there is a possibility that other countervailing interests exist in a given
situation. We should not lose sight of the fact that the impact of an activity to the environment, to our
flora and fauna, and to the health of each and every citizen will never become an absolute certainty such
that it can be predicted or calculated without error, especially if we are talking about generations yet
unborn where we would obviously not have a basis for said determination. Each organism, inclusive of
the human of the species, reacts differently to a foreign body or a pollutant, thus, the need to address
each environmental case on a case-to-case basis. Too, making sure that there are no countervailing
interests in existence, especially those of populations yet unborn, would only cause delays in the
resolution of an environmental case as this is a gargantuan, if not well-nigh impossible, task.
Same; Same; Same; Res Judicata; View that the rule on res judicata should not likewise be applied
to environmental cases with the same degree of rigidity observed in ordinary civil cases, contrary to the
dissent’s contention.—The rule on res judicata should not likewise be applied to environmental cases with
the same degree of rigidity observed in ordinary civil cases, contrary to the dissent’s contention. Suffice it
to state that the highly dynamic, generally unpredictable, and unique nature of environmental cases
precludes Us from applying the said principle in environmental cases.
Same; Same; Same; View that the imposition of the suggested conditions would virtually render
the provisions on citizen’s suit a pure jargon, a useless rule, in short.—The true and full extent of an
environmental damage is difficult to fully comprehend, much so to predict. Considering the dynamics of
nature, where every aspect thereof is interlinked, directly or indirectly, it can be said that a negative
impact on the environment, though at times may appear minuscule at one point, may cause a serious
imbalance to our environs in the long run. And it is not always that this imbalance immediately surfaces.
In some instances, it may take years before we realize that the deterioration is already serious and
possibly irreparable, just as what happened to the Manila Bay where decades of neglect, if not sheer
citizen and bureaucratic neglect, ultimately resulted in the severe pollution of the Bay. To my mind, the
imposition of the suggested conditions would virtually render the provisions on citizen’s suit a pure
jargon, a useless rule, in short.
Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Writ of Kalikasan; View that a writ of kalikasan is not the
proper remedy for proposed projects whose environmental compliance certificates (ECC) are yet to be
issued or may still be questioned through the proper administrative and legal review processes.—A Writ
of Kalikasan is an extraordinary and equitable writ that lies only to prevent an actual or imminent
threat “of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities
or provinces.” It is not the proper remedy to stop a project that has not yet been built. It is not the proper
remedy for proposed projects whose environmental compliance certificates (ECC) are yet to be issued or
may still be questioned through the proper administrative and legal review processes. In other words, the
petition for a Writ of Kalikasan does not subsume and is not a replacement for all remedies that can
contribute to the protection of communities and their environment.
Same; Same; Same; View that compliance with Sections 26and 27 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) and the provisions of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) is not a matter that relates to
environmental protection directly.—Compliance with Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code
and the provisions of the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) is not a matter that relates to
environmental protection directly. The absence of compliance with these laws forms causes of action that
cannot also be brought through a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan. This case highlights the
dangers of abuse of the extraordinary remedy of the Writ of Kalikasan. Petitioners were not able to move
forward with substantial evidence. Their attempt to present technical evidence and expert opinion was so
woefully inadequate that they put at great risk the remedies of those who they purported to represent in
this suit inclusive of generations yet unborn.
Same; Same; Same; Real Party-in-Interest; View that an action may be dismissed on the ground of
lack of cause of action if the person who instituted it is not the real party-in-interest.—A person cannot
invoke the court’s jurisdiction if he or she has no right or interest to protect. He or she who invokes the
court’s jurisdiction must be the “owner of the right sought to be enforced.” In other words, he or she must
have a cause of action. An action may be dismissed on the ground of lack of cause of action if the person
who instituted it is not the real party-in-interest. The term “interest” under the Rules of Court must refer
to a material interest that is not merely a curiosity about or an “interest in the question involved.” The
interest must be present and substantial. It is not a mere expectancy or a future, contingent interest. A
person who is not a real party-in-interest may institute an action if he or she is suing as representative of
a real party-in-interest. When an action is prosecuted or defended by a representative, that
representative is not and does not become the real party-in-interest. The person represented is deemed
the real party-in-interest. The representative remains to be a third party to the action instituted on
behalf of another.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen’s Suits; View that in citizen’s suits filed under the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), the real parties-in-interest are the minors and the generations
yet unborn.—The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s suit. A citizen’s
suit under this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law
on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons
who are not real parties-in-interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party-in-interest. In citizen’s
suits filed under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, the real parties-in-interest are the
minors and the generations yet unborn. Section 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
provides: SEC. 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws.
Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of
the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once
in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said
order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that in citizen’s suits, persons who may have no interest in
the case may file suits for others.—In citizen’s suits, persons who may have no interest in the case may
file suits for others. Uninterested persons will argue for the persons they represent, and the court will
decide based on their evidence and arguments. Any decision by the court will be binding upon the
beneficiaries, which in this case are the minors and the future generations. The court’s decision will
be res judicata upon them and conclusive upon the issues presented. Thus, minors and future
generations will be barred from litigating their interests in the future, however different it is from what
was approximated for them by the persons who alleged to represent them. This may weaken our future
generations’ ability to decide and argue for themselves based on the circumstances and concerns that are
actually present in their time. Expanding the scope of who may be real parties-in-interest in
environmental cases to include minors and generations yet unborn “opened a dangerous practice of
binding parties who are yet incapable of making choices for themselves, either due to minority or the
sheer fact that they do not yet exist.”
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court’s (SC’s) ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA
792 (1993), should, therefore, be abandoned or at least should be limited.—This court’s ruling
in Oposa should, therefore, be abandoned or at least should be limited to situations when: (1) “There is a
clear legal basis for the representative suit; (2) There are actual concerns based squarely upon an
existing legal right; (3) There is no possibility of any countervailing interests existing within the
population represented or those that are yet to be born; and (4) There is an absolute necessity for such
standing because there is a threat or catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is
necessary.”
Same; Same; Same; “Representative Suits” and “Class Suits,” Distinguished.—Representative
suits are different from class suits. Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 12.Class
suit.—When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons
so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be
sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or
defend for the benefit of all. Any party-in-interest shall have the right to protect his individual interest.
Thus, class suits may be filed when the following are present: a) When the subject matter of the
controversy is of common or general interest to many persons; b) When such persons are so numerous
that it is impracticable to join them all as parties; and c) When such persons are sufficiently numerous as
to represent and protect fully the interests of all concerned. A class suit is a representative suit insofar as
the persons who institute it represent the entire class of persons who have the same interest or who
suffered the same injury. However, unlike representative suits, the persons instituting a class suit are
not suing merely as representatives. They themselves are real parties-in-interest directly injured by the
acts or omissions complained of. There is a common cause of action in a class. The group collectively —
not individually — enjoys the right sought to be enforced.
Same; Evidence; Expert Opinions; View that with the tools of science as their guide, courts should
also examine the internal and external coherence of the hypothesis presented by the experts, recognize their
assumptions, and examine whether the conclusions of cause and effect are based on reasonable inferences
from scientifically sound experimentation.—Expert opinions are presumed valid though such presumption
is disputable. In the proper actions, courts may evaluate the expert’s credibility. Credibility, when it
comes to environmental cases, is not limited to good reputation within their scientific community. With
the tools of science as their guide, courts should also examine the internal and external coherence of the
hypothesis presented by the experts, recognize their assumptions, and examine whether the conclusions
of cause and effect are based on reasonable inferences from scientifically sound experimentation.
Refereed academic scientific publications may assist to evaluate claims made by expert witnesses. With
the tools present within the scientific community, those whose positions based on hysteria or
unsupported professional opinion will become obvious.
Same; Writ of Kalikasan; View that the standing of the parties filing a Petition for the Issuance of
a Writ of Kalikasan may be granted when there is adequate showing that: (a) the suing party has a direct
and substantial interest; (b) there is a cogent legal basis for the allegations and arguments; and (c) the
person suing has sufficient knowledge and is capable of presenting all the facts that are involved including
the scientific basis.—In my view, the standing of the parties filing a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Kalikasan may be granted when there is adequate showing that: (a) the suing party has a direct and
substantial interest; (b) there is a cogent legal basis for the allegations and arguments; and (c) the person
suing has sufficient knowledge and is capable of presenting all the facts that are involved including the
scientific basis.
Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; View that it is only after this exhaustion of
administrative remedies which embeds the possibility of recruiting technical advice that judicial review
can be had of the legally cogent standards and processes that were used.—A Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Kalikasanis not the proper remedy to raise this defect in courts. ECCs issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration with the Office
of the Secretary. The Office of the Secretary may inform himself or herself of the science necessary to
evaluate the grant or denial of an ECC by commissioning scientific advisers or creating a technical panel
of experts. The same can be done at the level of the Office of the President where the actions of the Office
of the Secretary of the DENR may be questioned. It is only after this exhaustion of administrative
remedies which embeds the possibility of recruiting technical advice that judicial review can be had of the
legally cogent standards and processes that were used.
Same; Same; View that a Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan filed directly with this court raising
issues relating to the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) or compliance with the Environmental
Impact Assessment Process (EIAP) denies the parties the benefit of a fuller technical and scientific review
of the premises and conditions imposed on a proposed project.—A Petition for a Writ of Kalikasan filed
directly with this court raising issues relating to the Environmental Compliance Certificate or
compliance with the Environmental Impact Assessment Process denies the parties the benefit of a fuller
technical and scientific review of the premises and conditions imposed on a proposed project. If given due
course, this remedy prematurely compels the court to exercise its power to review the standards used
without exhausting all the administrative forums that will allow the parties to bring forward their best
science. Rather than finding the cogent and reasonable balance to protect our ecologies, courts will only
rely on our own best guess of cause and effect. We substitute our judgment for the science of
environmental protection prematurely.
Same; Same; View that on December 14, 1981, the President of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 2146 declaring fossil-fueled power plants as environmentally-critical projects. This
placed fossil-fueled power plants among the projects that require an environmental impact statement prior
to the issuance of an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).—Based on the required
environmental impact statement under Presidential Decree No. 1151, Presidential Decree No. 1586 was
promulgated establishing the Environmental Impact Statement System. Under this system, the
President may proclaim certain projects as environmentally critical. An environmentally critical project
is a “project or program that has high potential for significant negative environmental impact.” Proposals
for environmentally critical projects require an environmental impact statement. On December 14, 1981,
the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 2146 declaring fossil-fueled power plants as
environmentally-critical projects. This placed fossil-fueled power plants among the projects that require
an environmental impact statement prior to the issuance of an ECC.
Environmental Compliance Certificate; View that the issuance of an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) without a corresponding environmental impact statement is not valid.—The issuance of
an ECC without a corresponding environmental impact statement is not valid. Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1151 specifically requires the filing of environmental impact statements for every action that
significantly affects environmental quality. Presidential Decree No. 1586, the law being implemented by
the IRR, recognizes and is enacted based on this requirement. Presidential Decree Nos. 1151 and 1586 do
not authorize the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to allow exemptions to this
requirement in the guise of amended project specifications. The only exception to the environmental
impact statement requirement is when the project is not declared as environmentally critical, as provided
later in Presidential Decree No. 1586.
Environmental Impact Statement; View that an environmental impact statement is a document of
scientific opinion that serves as an application for an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).—An
environmental impact statement is a document of scientific opinion “that serves as an application for an
ECC. It is a comprehensive study of the significant impacts of a project on the environment.” It is
predictive to an acceptable degree of certainty. It is an assurance that the proponent has understood all
of the environmental impacts and that the measures it proposed to mitigate are both effective and
efficient.
Same; View that to interpret the rules in a manner that would give the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) the discretion whether to require or not to require an environmental
impact statement renders the rules void.—To interpret the rules in a manner that would give the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources the discretion whether to require or not to require an
environmental impact statement renders the rules void. As an administrative agency, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources’ power to promulgate rules is limited by the provisions of the law it
implements. It has no power to modify the law, or reduce or expand its provisions. The provisions of the
law prevail if there is inconsistency between the law and the rules promulgated by the administrative
agency.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judicial Review; View that judicial review of administrative
findings or decisions is justified if the conclusions are not supported by the required standard of
evidence.—Judicial review of administrative findings or decisions is justified if the conclusions are not
supported by the required standard of evidence. It is also justified in the following instances as
enumerated in Atlas Consolidated Mining v. Factoran, Jr., 154 SCRA 49 (1987): . . . findings of fact in
such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but review is justified when
there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud, collusion or arbitrary action in the
administrative proceeding. . . where the procedure which led to factual findings is irregular; when
palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is
manifest.
Environmental Impact Statement; View that an environmental impact statement is a
comprehensive assessment of the possible environmental effects of a project.—An environmental impact
statement is a comprehensive assessment of the possible environmental effects of a project. The study
and its conclusions are based on project’s components, features, and design. Design changes may alter
conclusions. It may also have an effect on the cumulative impact of the project as a whole. Design
changes may also have an effect on the results of an environmental impact assessment. For these
reasons, the amended ECCs issued without a corresponding environmental impact statement is void. A
new ECC should be issued based on an environmental impact statement that covers the new design
proposed by RP Energy.
Remedial Law; Writ of Kalikasan; View that a Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to
question the irregularities in the issuance of an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC).—A Writ
of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to question the irregularities in the issuance of an ECC. Casiño, et
al. should have first exhausted administrative remedies in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President before it could file a Petition for certiorari with our courts.
Essentially, it could not have been an issue ripe for litigation in a remanded Petition for Issuance of a
Writ of Kalikasan. Thus, the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in acting on the
nullification of the ECC. More so, it is improper for us to make any declaration on the validity of the
amended ECCs in this action.
Local Government Units; View that although Section 26 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
requires “prior consultation” with local government units (LGUs), organizations, and sectors, it does not
state that such consultation is a requisite for the issuance of an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC).—Local government consent under Sections 26 and 27 of the Local Government Code is not a
requisite for the issuance of an ECC. The issuance of an ECC and the consent requirement under the
Local Government Code involve different considerations. The Department of Environment and Natural
Resources issues an ECC in accordance with Presidential Decree Nos. 1151 and 1586. It is issued after a
proposed project’s projected environmental impact is sufficiently assessed and found to be in accordance
with the applicable environmental standards. A Department of Environment and Natural Resources’
valid finding that the project complies with environmental standards under the law may result in the
issuance of the ECC. In other words, an ECC is issued solely for environmental considerations. Although
Section 26 of the Local Government Code requires “prior consultation” with local government units,
organizations, and sectors, it does not state that such consultation is a requisite for the issuance of an
ECC. Section 27 of the Local Government Code provides instead that consultation, together with the
consent of the local government is a requisite for the implementation of the project. This shows that the
issuance of the ECC is independent from the consultation and consent requirements under the Local
Government Code.
Same; View that aside from the law or ordinance creating them, a local government unit (LGU)
cannot be created without the “approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units
directly affected.”—It is our basic policy to ensure the local autonomy of our local government units.
Under the Constitution, these local government units include only provinces, cities,
municipalities, barangays, and the autonomous regions of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Provinces, cities, municipalities, and political subdivisions are created by law based on indicators such as
income, population, and land area. Barangays are created through ordinances. Aside from the law or
ordinance creating them, a local government unit cannot be created without the “approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”
Same; Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority; View that Section 14 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7227
cannot be interpreted so as to grant the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) the prerogative to
supplant the powers of the local government units (LGUs).—Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7227 cannot be
interpreted so as to grant the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority the prerogative to supplant the powers of
the local government units. Local autonomy ensures that local government units can fully develop as self-
reliant communities. The evolution of their capabilities to respond to the needs of their communities is
constitutionally guaranteed. In its implementation and as a statutory policy, national agencies must
consult the local government units regarding projects or programs to be implemented in their
jurisdictions.

Environmental Impact Assessments; Environmental Impact Statements; View that before an

environmentally critical project can be implemented or prior to an activity in an environmentally critical
area, the law requires that the proponents undergo environmental impact assessments and produce
environmental impact statements.—The state’s duty to “protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature” can be accomplished in
many ways. Before an environmentally critical project can be implemented or prior to an activity in an
environmentally critical area, the law requires that the proponents undergo environmental impact
assessments and produce environmental impact statements. On this basis, the proponents must secure
an ECC which may outline the conditions under which the activity or project with ecological impact can
be undertaken. Prior to a national government project, local government units, representing communities
affected, can weigh in and ensure that the proponents take into consideration all local concerns including
mitigating and remedial measures for any future ecological damage. Should a project be ongoing, our
legal order is not lacking in causes of actions that could result in preventive injunctions or damages
arising from all sorts of environmental torts.

Remedial Law; Writ of Kalikasan; View that the Writ of Kalikasan is a highly prerogative writ that
issues only when there is a showing of actual or imminent threat and when there is such inaction on the
part of the relevant administrative bodies that will make an environmental catastrophe inevitable.—The
function of the extraordinary and equitable remedy of a Writ of Kalikasanshould not supplant other
available remedies and the nature of the forums that they provide. The Writ of Kalikasan is a highly
prerogative writ that issues only when there is a showing of actual or imminent threat and when there is
such inaction on the part of the relevant administrative bodies that will make an environmental
catastrophe inevitable. It is not a remedy that is availing when there is no actual threat or when
imminence of danger is not demonstrable. The Writ of Kalikasan thus is not an excuse to invoke judicial
remedies when there still remain administrative forums to properly address the common concern to
protect and advance ecological rights. After all, we cannot presume that only the Supreme Court can
conscientiously fulfill the ecological duties required of the entire state.
PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Leland R. Villadolid, Jr., Arnold M. Corporal and Lancaster L. Uy for petitioner Redondo Peninsula
Energy, Inc.
James Mark Terry L. Ridon for Hon. Teodoro A. Casiño, et al.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

G.R. No. 206510. September 16, 2014.*

MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO, D.D., Vicar Apostolic of Puerto Princesa, MOST REV. DEOGRACIAS S.
IÑIGUEZ, JR., Bishop-Emeritus of Caloocan, FRANCES Q. QUIMPO, CLEMENTE G. BAUTISTA, JR.,
Kalikasan-PNE, MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, RENATO M. REYES, JR., Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan, HON. NERI JAVIER COLMENARES, Bayan Muna Party-list, ROLAND G. SIMBULAN,
PH.D., Junk VFA Movement, TERESITA R. PEREZ, PH.D., HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, Kabataan
Party-list, PETER SJ. GONZALES, Pamalakaya, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG, PH.D., Agham, ELMER C.
LABOG, Kilusang Mayo Uno, JOAN MAY E. SALVADOR, Gabriela, JOSE ENRIQUE A. AFRICA,
THERESA A. CONCEPCION, MARY JOAN A. GUAN, NESTOR T. BAGUINON, PH.D., A. EDSEL F.
TUPAZ, petitioners, vs. SCOTT H. SWIFT, in his capacity as Commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, MARK A.
RICE, in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian, PRESIDENT BENIGNO S. AQUINO
III, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, HON. ALBERT F.
DEL ROSARIO, Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, HON. PAQUITO OCHOA, JR., Executive
Secretary, Office of the President, HON. VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN, Secretary, Department of National
Defense, HON. RAMON JESUS P. PAJE, Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
VICE ADMIRAL JOSE LUIS M. ALANO, Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command, Armed Forces of
the Philippines, ADMIRAL RODOLFO D. ISORENA, Commandant, Philippine Coast Guard,
COMMODORE ENRICO EFREN EVANGELISTA, Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan, MAJOR GEN.
VIRGILIO O. DOMINGO, Commandant of Armed Forces of the Philippines Command and LT. GEN.
TERRY G. ROBLING, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercise Co-Director,
respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi is “a
right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”—Locus standi is “a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal
and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.”
However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for
nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public
interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental
importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.
Constitutional Law; Balance and Healthful Ecology; In the landmark case of Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993),the Supreme Court (SC) recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.”—In the landmark case of Oposa
v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications. Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suit; On the novel element in the class suit filed
by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have
legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations.—On the novel element in the class suit
filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens
have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in
representation of their own and future generations. Thus: Petitioners minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in
ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding
generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right,
as hereinafter expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.” Nature means
the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter
alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to say, every generation
has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their
right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Constitutional Law; State Immunity from Suit; This traditional rule of State
immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State without the
former’s consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary
acts (jure gestionis).—This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without the former’s consent or waiver has evolved
into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (jure
imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). Under the restrictive
rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Same; International Law; International Law of the Sea; Words and Phrases; The
international law of the sea is generally defined as “a body of treaty rules and customary
norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the exercise of
jurisdiction over maritime regimes.—The international law of the sea is generally defined as
“a body of treaty rules and customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation
of its resources, and the exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of
public international law, regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the
oceans.” The UNCLOS is a multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December
10, 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into
force on November 16, 1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
Same; Same; Same; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) gives to the coastal State sovereign
rights in varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2)
territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the
vessel is located.—The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to
balance State sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas
(mare liberum). The freedom to use the world’s marine waters is one of the oldest customary
principles of international law. The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in
varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2)
territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the
vessel is located.
Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; Visiting Forces Agreement; Writ of
Kalikasan; The waiver of State immunity under the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)
pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present
petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan.—The VFA is an agreement which defines the
treatment of United States troops and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote
“common security interests” between the US and the Philippines in the region. It provides
for the guidelines to govern such visits of military personnel, and further defines the rights
of the United States and the Philippine government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction,
movement of vessel and aircraft, importation and exportation of equipment, materials and
supplies. The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper
considering that it is the VFA which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew
navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement. As it is, the
waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact,
it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately: SEC.
17. Institution of separate actions.—The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ
of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative
actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) to US personnel who
may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and
beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.—In any case, it is our considered
view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of
the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS
Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State
immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of
damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a
separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same
violation of an environmental law.
Same; Same; Foreign Relations; It is settled that “the conduct of the foreign relations
of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative — ‘the
political’ — departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”—A
rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also a
major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens’ suit under
the Rules, viz.: RULE 5 SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.—If warranted, the court may
grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or
rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of attorney’s fees, costs of suit and other
litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or
restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to
contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court. In the
light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these
issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security
interests under the VFA. It is settled that “[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative — ‘the
political’ — departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.”
SERENO, CJ., Concurring Opinion:
Constitutional Law; International Law; Visiting Forces Agreement; Treaties; View that acts done
pursuant to the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) take the nature of governmental acts, since both the
United States and Philippine governments recognize the VFA as a treaty with corresponding obligations,
and the presence of these two Naval Officers and the warship in Philippine waters fell under this legal
regime.—In this case, the two Naval Officers were acting pursuant to their function as the commanding
officers of a warship, traversing Philippine waters under the authority of the Visiting Forces Agreement
(VFA). While the events beg the question of what the warship was doing in that area, when it should
have been headed towards Indonesia, its presence in Philippine waters is not wholly unexplainable. The
VFA is a treaty, and it has been affirmed as valid by this Court inBayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449
(2000), and affirmed in Lim v. Executive Secretary, 380 SCRA 739 (2002), and Nicolas v. Romulo, 578
SCRA 438 (2009). It has, in the past, been used to justify the presence of United States Armed Forces in
the Philippines. In this respect therefore, acts done pursuant to the VFA take the nature of governmental
acts, since both the United States and Philippine governments recognize the VFA as a treaty with
corresponding obligations, and the presence of these two Naval Officers and the warship in Philippine
waters fell under this legal regime.
Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; View that under the regime of international law, there is
an added dimension to sovereign immunity exceptions: the tort exception.—Under the regime of
international law, there is an added dimension to sovereign immunity exceptions: the tort exception.
Whether this has evolved into a customary norm is still debatable; what is important to emphasize is
that while some states have enacted legislation to allow the piercing of sovereign immunity in tortuous
actions, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 of the United States (FSIA) contains such
privilege. Specifically, the FSIA contains exceptions for (1) waiver; (2) commercial activity; (3)
expropriation; (4) property rights acquired through succession or donation; (5) damages for personal
injury or death or damage to or loss of property; (6) enforcement of an arbitration agreement; (7) torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support to such an act,
if the state sponsors terrorism; and (8) maritime lien in a suit for admiralty based on commercial activity.
Same; Same; Same; View that immunity, unlike in other jurisdictions, is determined not by the
courts of law but by the executive branches.—In Vinuya v. Romulo, 619 SCRA 533 (2010), we stated that
“the question whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches.” Immunity then, unlike in other jurisdictions,
is determined not by the courts of law but by the executive branches.
Same; Same; Same; View that the basic concept of state immunity is that no state may be subjected
to the jurisdiction of another state without its consent.—The basic concept of state immunity is that no
state may be subjected to the jurisdiction of another state without its consent. According to Professor Ian
Brownlie, it is “a procedural bar (not a substantive defence) based on the status and functions of the state
or official in question.” Furthermore, its applicability depends on the law and procedural rules of the
forum state.
Same; Same; Same; Writ of Kalikasan; View that should the Court issue the Writ, it could possibly
entail international responsibility for breaching the jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign state.—No
exception exists in Philippine or international law that would remove the immunity of the United States
in order to place it under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts. The Writ of Kalikasan is a compulsory
writ, and its issuance initiates a legal process that would circumvent the internationally established
rules of immunity. Should the Court issue the Writ, it could possibly entail international responsibility
for breaching the jurisdictional immunity of a sovereign state.
LEONEN, J., Concurring Opinion:
Writ of Kalikasan; View that the writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing legal remedy to be
wielded like a political tool.—The writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing legal remedy to be wielded
like a political tool. It is both an extraordinary and equitable remedy which assists to prevent
environmental catastrophes. It does not replace other legal remedies similarly motivated by concern for
the environment and the community’s ecological welfare. Certainly, when the petition itself alleges that
remedial and preventive remedies have occurred, the functions of the writ cease to exist. In case of
disagreement, parties need to exhaust the political and administrative arena. Only when a concrete cause
of action arises out of facts that can be proven with substantial evidence may the proper legal action be
entertained.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Class Suits; Citizen’s Suits; View Citizen’s suits are procedural
devices that allow a genuine cause of action to be judicially considered in spite of the social costs or
negative externalities of such initiatives. This should be clearly distinguished in our rules and in
jurisprudence from class suits that purport to represent the whole population and unborn generations.—
Citizen’s suits are suits brought by parties suffering direct and substantial injuries; although in the
environmental field, these injuries may be shared with others. It is different from class suits brought as
representative suits under Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993). In my view, there is need to review
this doctrine insofar as it allows a nonrepresentative group to universally represent a whole population
as well as an unborn generation binding them to causes of actions, arguments, and reliefs which they did
not choose. Generations yet unborn suffer from the legal inability to assert against false or unwanted
representation. Citizen’s suits are procedural devices that allow a genuine cause of action to be judicially
considered in spite of the social costs or negative externalities of such initiatives. This should be clearly
distinguished in our rules and in jurisprudence from class suits that purport to represent the whole
population and unborn generations. The former is in keeping with the required constitutional protection
for our people. The latter is dangerous and should be used only in very extraordinary or rare situations.
It may be jurisprudentially inappropriate.
Constitutional Law; International Law; State Immunity from Suit; View that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is understood as a basic right extended to states by other states on the basis of respect
for sovereignty and independence.—The doctrine of sovereign immunity evolves out of the theory and
practice of sovereignty and the principle par in parem non habet jurisdictionem. Its particular contours as
an international norm have evolved far beyond the form it took when the theory of absolute sovereignty
was current. Contemporarily, it is understood as a basic right extended to states by other states on the
basis of respect for sovereignty and independence. There appears to be a consensus among states that
sovereign immunity as a concept is legally binding. However, there remains to be a lack of international
agreement as to how it is to be invoked and the extent of immunity in some cases.
Same; Same; Same; View that this doctrine of relative jurisdictional immunity (sovereign
immunity) of states and their agents becomes binding in our jurisdiction as international law
only through Section 2 of Article II or Section 21 of Article VII of the Constitution.—This doctrine of
relative jurisdictional immunity (sovereign immunity) of states and their agents becomes binding in our
jurisdiction as international law only through Section 2 of Article II or Section 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution. Article XVII, Section 3 of the Constitution is a limitation on suits against our state. It is not
the textual anchor for determining the extent of jurisdictional immunities that should be accorded to
other states or their agents. International law may have evolved further than the usual distinction
between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis. Indications of state practice even of public respondents
show that jurisdictional immunity for foreign states may not apply to certain violations of jus
cogens rules of international customary law. There can be tort exemptions provided by statute and,
therefore, the state practice of an agent’s sovereign being sued in our courts.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; Environmental Cases; View that the “environmental”
nature of this petition, based upon the alleged violation of the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act, by itself
does not and should not automatically render the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases applicable;
This means that even in environmental cases, Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, or 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure should still also apply.—The “environmental” nature of this petition, based upon the alleged
violation of the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act, by itself does not and should not automatically render
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases applicable. At best, it must be reconciled with rules on
parties as contained in the Rules of Court. This is to preclude a situation where the interpretation of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases results in a ruling inconsistent or contrary to established
legal concepts. It is my position that unless the remedy sought will serve the purpose of preventing an
environmental catastrophe, the traditional procedural route should be taken. This means that even in
environmental cases, Rule 3, Sections 2, 3, or 12 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure should still also
apply.
Same; Same; Real Party-in-Interest; View that a real party-in-interest is a litigant whose right or
interest stands to benefit or get injured by the judgment of the case.—A real party-in-interest is a litigant
whose right or interest stands to benefit or get injured by the judgment of the case. The interest referred
to must be material interest, founded upon a legal right sought to be enforced. They bring a suit because
the act or omission of another has caused them to directly suffer its consequences. Simply put, a real
party-in-interest has a cause of action based upon an existing legal right-duty correlative.
Same; Same; Representatives; Environmental Cases; View that in environmental cases, Section 3 of
Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure may be used to bring a suit, provided that two (2) elements
concur: a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party whose right has been violated, resulting in
some form of damage, and b) the representative authorized by law or the Rules of Court to represent the
victim.—A “representative” is not the party who will actually benefit or suffer from the judgment of the
case. The rule requires that the beneficiary be identified as he or she is deemed the real party-in-interest.
This means that acting in a representative capacity does not turn into a real party-in-interest someone
who is otherwise an outsider to the cause of action. This rule enumerates who may act as representatives,
including those acting in a fiduciary capacity. While not an exhaustive list, it does set a limit by allowing
only those who are “authorized by law or these Rules.” In environmental cases, this section may be used
to bring a suit, provided that two elements concur: a) the suit is brought on behalf of an identified party
whose right has been violated, resulting in some form of damage, and b) the representative authorized by
law or the Rules of Court to represent the victim.
Same; Same; Citizen’s Suits; View that a citizen’s suit that seeks to enforce environmental rights
and obligations may be brought by any Filipino who is acting as a representative of others, including
minors or generations yet unborn.—A citizen’s suit that seeks to enforce environmental rights and
obligations may be brought by any Filipino who is acting as a representative of others, including minors
or generations yet unborn. As representatives, it is not necessary for petitioners to establish that they
directly suffered from the grounding of the USS Guardian and the subsequent salvage operations.
However, it is imperative for them to indicate with certainty the injured parties on whose behalf they
bring the suit. Furthermore, the interest of those they represent must be based upon concrete legal
rights. It is not sufficient to draw out a perceived interest from a general, nebulous idea of a potential
“injury.”
Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; View that since environmental cases necessarily involve
the balancing of different types and degrees of interests, allowing anyone from the present generation to
represent others who are yet unborn poses three (3) possible dangers.—“Minors and generations yet
unborn” is a category of real party in interest that was first established in Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA
792 (1993). In Oposa v. Factoran, this court ruled that the representatives derived their personality to
file a suit on behalf of succeeding generations from “intergenerational responsibility.” The case mirrored
through jurisprudence the general moral duty of the present generation to ensure the full enjoyment of a
balanced and healthful ecology by the succeeding generations. Since environmental cases necessarily
involve the balancing of different types and degrees of interests, allowing anyone from the present
generation to represent others who are yet unborn poses three possible dangers. First, they run the risk
of foreclosing arguments of others who are unable to take part in the suit, putting into question its
representativeness. Second, varying interests may potentially result in arguments that are bordering on
political issues, the resolutions of which do not fall upon this court. Third, automatically allowing a class
or citizen’s suit on behalf of “minors and generations yet unborn” may result in the oversimplification of
what may be a complex issue, especially in light of the impossibility of determining future generation’s
true interests on the matter.
Same; Same; Res Judicata; View that the doctrine of res judicata bars parties to litigate an issue
more than once, and this is strictly applied because “the maintenance of public order, the repose of society .
. . require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as
irrefragable legal truth.”—Res judicata renders conclusive between the parties and their privies a ruling
on their rights, not just for the present action, but in all subsequent suits. This pertains to all points and
matters judicially tried by a competent court. The doctrine bars parties to litigate an issue more than
once, and this is strictly applied because “the maintenance of public order, the repose of society . . .
require that what has been definitely determined by competent tribunals shall be accepted as
irrefragable legal truth.”
Same; Same; Same; View that considering the effect of res judicata, the ruling in Oposa v.
Factoran has opened a dangerous practice of binding parties who are yet incapable of making choices for
themselves, either due to minority or the sheer fact that they do not yet exist.—Considering the effect of res
judicata, the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran has opened a dangerous practice of binding parties who are yet
incapable of making choices for themselves, either due to minority or the sheer fact that they do not yet
exist. Once res judicata sets in, the impleaded minors and generations yet unborn will be unable to bring
a suit to relitigate their interest.
Same; Same; Class Suits; View that in a class suit, petitioners necessarily bring the suit in two
capacities: first, as persons directly injured by the act or omission complained of; and second, as
representatives of an entire class who have suffered the same injury.—In a class suit, petitioners
necessarily bring the suit in two capacities: first, as persons directly injured by the act or omission
complained of; and second, as representatives of an entire class who have suffered the same injury. In
order to fully protect all those concerned, petitioners must show that they belong in the same universe as
those they seek to represent. More importantly, they must establish that, in that universe, they can
intervene on behalf of the rest.
Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; View that not all environmental cases need to be
brought as class suits.—Not all environmental cases need to be brought as class suits. There is no
procedural requirement that majority of those affected must file a suit in order that an injunctive writ or
a writ of kalikasan can be issued. It is sufficient that the party has suffered its own direct and
substantial interest, its legal basis is cogent, and it has the capability to move forward to present the
facts and, if necessary, the scientific basis for its analysis for some of these cases to be given due course.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Wvil prorit of Kalikasan; View that the writ of kalikasan is a remedy
that covers environmental damages the magnitude of which transcends both political and territorial
boundaries.—The writ of kalikasan is a remedy that covers environmental damages the magnitude of
which transcends both political and territorial boundaries. It specifically provides that the prejudice to
life, health, or property caused by an unlawful act or omission of a public official, public employee, or a
private individual or entity must be felt in at least two cities or provinces. The petition for its issuance
may be filed on behalf of those whose right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, provided that
the group or organization which seeks to represent is duly accredited.
 Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Temporary Environmental Protection Order; View that a
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) is an order which either directs or enjoins a person or
government agency to perform or refrain from a certain act, for the purpose of protecting, preserving,
and/or rehabilitating the environment.—A TEPO is an order which either directs or enjoins a person or
government agency to perform or refrain from a certain act, for the purpose of protecting, preserving,
and/or rehabilitating the environment. The crucial elements in its issuance are the presence of “extreme
urgency” and “grave injustice and irreparable injury” to the applicant. Petitioners hinge the basis for this
prayer on the salvage operations conducted immediately after the incident. The remedy is no longer
available considering that all activities to remove the grounded USS Guardian have been concluded.
Furthermore, the Notice to Mariners No. 011-2013 issued by the Philippine Coast Guard on January 29,
2013 effectively set the metes and bounds of the damaged area. This notice also prohibited “leisure trips
to Tubbataha” and advised “all watercrafts transitting the vicinity to take precautionary measures.”
Constitutional Law; International Law; State Immunity from Suit; View that immunity does not
necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should the case have been brought in a timely manner,
with the proper remedy, and in the proper court.—It is my position that doctrine on relative jurisdictional
immunity of foreign states or otherwise referred to as sovereign immunity should be further refined. I
am of the view that immunity does not necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should
the case have been brought in a timely manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper
court. Those who have directly and actually committed culpable acts or acts resulting from
gross negligence resulting in the grounding of a foreign warship in violation of our laws
defining a tortious act or one that protects the environment which implement binding
international obligations cannot claim sovereign immunity. Some clarification may be necessary
to map the contours of relative jurisdictional immunity of foreign states otherwise known as the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity can be understood either as a domestic or an
international concept.
Same; Same; Same; View that there appears to be a consensus among states that sovereign
immunity as a concept is legally binding.—Under international law, sovereign immunity remains to be
an abstract concept. On a basic level, it is understood as a basic right extended to states by other states
on the basis of respect for sovereignty and independence. There appears to be a consensus among states
that sovereign immunity as a concept is legally binding. Nevertheless, legal scholars observe that there
remains to be a lack of agreement as to how it is to be invoked or exercised in actual cases. Finke
presents: States accept sovereign immunity as a legally binding concept, but only on a very abstract
level. They agree on the general idea of immunity, but disagree on the extent to which they
actually must grant immunity in a specific case.
Same; Same; Same; European Convention on State Immunity; Words and Phrases; View that in
the Council of Europe’s explanatory report, sovereign immunity is defined as “a concept of international
law, which has developed out of the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one
State is not subject to the jurisdiction of another State.”—The European Convention on State Immunity is
a treaty established through the Council of Europe on May 16, 1972. In the Council of Europe’s
explanatory report, sovereign immunity is defined as “a concept of international law, which has
developed out of the principle par in parem non habet imperium, by virtue of which one State is not
subject to the jurisdiction of another State.” The treaty arose out of the need to address cases where
states become involved in areas of private law: For many years State immunity has occupied the
attention of eminent jurists. It is also the object of abundant case law. The development of
international relations and the increasing intervention of States in spheres belonging to
private law have posed the problem still more acutely by increasing the number of disputes
opposing individuals and foreign States. There are, at present, two theories, that of absolute State
immunity which is the logical consequence of the principle stated above and that of relative State
immunity which is tending to predominate on account of the requirement of modern
conditions. According to this latter theory, the State enjoys immunity for acts jure imperii but
not for acts jure gestionis, that is to say when it acts in the same way as a private person in
relations governed by private law. This divergence of opinion causes difficulties in international
relations. States whose courts and administrative authorities apply the theory of absolute State
immunity are led to call for the same treatment abroad.
Same; Same; Visiting Forces Agreement; View that the extent of the Visiting Forces Agreement’s
(VFA’s) categorization as between the Philippine and United States government — either as a “treaty”/
“executive agreement” or as a matter subject to international comity — remains vague.—In sum, the extent
of the VFA’s categorization as between the Philippine and United States government — either as a
“treaty”/“executive agreement” or as a matter subject to international comity — remains vague.
Nevertheless, it is certain that the United States have made a political commitment to recognize the
provisions and execute their obligations under the VFA. This includes respecting jurisdictional issues in
cases involving an offense committed by a US military personnel.
Same; Same; State Immunity from Suit; There appears to be a general recognition that foreign
states are to be afforded immunity on account of equality of states, but the “practice” lacks uniformity.—
There appears to be a general recognition that foreign states are to be afforded immunity on account of
equality of states, but the “practice” lacks uniformity. Finke points out that the doctrine as exercised by
different states suffers from “substantial disagreement on detail and substance.” The inconsistencies in
state practice render the possibility of invoking international comity even more problematic.
Same; Same; Same; View that the International Court of Justice’s position that sovereign
immunity remains applicable even if the action is based upon violations of international law should be
limited only to acts during armed conflict.—In sum, the International Court of Justice’s position that
sovereign immunity remains applicable even if the action is based upon violations of international law
should be limited only to acts during armed conflict. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v.
Italy)also referred to actions commited during World War II and especially referred to the situation of
international law at that time. The majority reflected the attitude that sovereign immunity is a
customary norm. It, however, recognizes that uniformity in state practice is far from the consensus
required to articulate specific rules pertaining to other circumstances — such as transgressions of foreign
warships of domestic legislation while granted innocent passage. It impliedly accepted that states
enjoyed wide latitude to specify their own norms.
Same; Same; Same; View that as a principle of international law, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is deemed automatically incorporated in our domestic legal system as per Article II, Section 2 of
the Constitution.—Sovereign immunity is a doctrine recognized by states under the international law
system. However, its characterization as a principle is more appropriate in that “the extent to which
foreign states are awarded immunity differs from state to state.” This appears to be an accepted
arrangement in light of the different state immunity laws all over the world. As it stands, states are
allowed to draw the line in the application of sovereign immunity in cases involving foreign states and
their agents. As a principle of international law, it is deemed automatically incorporated in our domestic
legal system as per Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Considering this leeway, along with the
urgency and importance of the case at hand, the Philippines is, therefore, free to provide guidelines
consistent with international law, domestic legislation, and existing jurisprudence.
Same; Same; Same; View that tortious acts or crimes committed while discharging official
functions are also not covered by sovereign immunity.—Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713 (1990),
evolved the doctrine further as it stated that “[the] rational for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.” Tortious acts or crimes
committed while discharging official functions are also not covered by sovereign immunity. Quoting the
ruling in Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 (1991), this court held American naval officers
personally liable for damages in Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357 (1992), to wit:. . . The petitioners,
however, were negligent because under their direction they issued the publication without deleting the
name “Auring.” Such act or omission is ultra vires and cannot be part of official duty. It was a tortious act
which ridiculed the private respondent.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Philippines has no law on the application of sovereign immunity
in cases of damages and/or violations of domestic law involving agents of a foreign state.—As it stands,
the Philippines has no law on the application of sovereign immunity in cases of damages and/or violations
of domestic law involving agents of a foreign state. But our jurisprudence does have openings to hold
those who have committed an act ultra vires responsible in our domestic courts.
Same; Same; Same; View that immunity does not necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents
should the case have been brought in a timely manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper court.—
Considering the flexibility in international law and the doctrines that we have evolved so far, I am of the
view that immunity does not necessarily apply to all the foreign respondents should the case
have been brought in a timely manner, with the proper remedy, and in the proper court. Those
who have directly and actually committed culpable acts or acts resulting from gross negligence
resulting in the grounding of a foreign warship in violation of our laws defining a tortious act
or one that protects the environment which implement binding international obligations
cannot claim sovereign immunity.
PETITION for issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
 Anthony Edsel Conrad F. Tupaz and National Union of People’s Lawyers for
petitioners.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the issuance of
a Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) under Rule 7 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC,
otherwise known as the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (Rules), involving
violations of environmental laws and regulations in relation to the grounding of the US
military ship USS Guardian over the Tubbataha Reefs.
Factual Background
The name "Tubbataha" came from the Samal (seafaring people of southern Philippines)
language which means "long reef exposed at low tide." Tubbataha is composed of two huge
coral atolls - the north atoll and the south atoll - and the Jessie Beazley Reef, a smaller coral
structure about 20 kilometers north of the atolls. The reefs of Tubbataha and Jessie Beazley
are considered part of Cagayancillo, a remote island municipality of Palawan.1
In 1988, Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by virtue of Proclamation No. 306
issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on August 11, 1988. Located in the middle of Central
Sulu Sea, 150 kilometers southeast of Puerto Princesa City, Tubbataha lies at the heart of
the Coral Triangle, the global center of marine biodiversity.
In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site. It was recognized as one of the
Philippines' oldest ecosystems, containing excellent examples of pristine reefs and a high
diversity of marine life. The 97,030-hectare protected marine park is also an important
habitat for internationally threatened and endangered marine species. UNESCO cited
Tubbataha's outstanding universal value as an important and significant natural habitat
for in situ conservation of biological diversity; an example representing significant on-going
ecological and biological processes; and an area of exceptional natural beauty and aesthetic
importance.2
On April 6, 2010, Congress passed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10067, 3 otherwise known as the
"Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009" "to ensure the protection and
conservation of the globally significant economic, biological, sociocultural, educational and
scientific values of the Tubbataha Reefs into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and
future generations." Under the "no-take" policy, entry into the waters of TRNP is strictly
regulated and many human activities are prohibited and penalized or fined, including
fishing, gathering, destroying and disturbing the resources within the TRNP. The law
likewise created the Tubbataha Protected Area Management Board (TPAMB) which shall be
the sole policy-making and permit-granting body of the TRNP.
The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In
December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the
port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew
liberty."4 On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on
January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.1âwphi1
On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the
ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80
miles east-southeast of Palawan. No cine was injured in the incident, and there have been
no reports of leaking fuel or oil.
On January 20, 2013, U.S. 7th Fleet Commander, Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed
regret for the incident in a press statement.5 Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines
Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) on February
4, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and assured Foreign Affairs Secretazy
Albert F. del Rosario that the United States will provide appropriate compensation for
damage to the reef caused by the ship."6 By March 30, 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team
had finished removing the last piece of the grounded ship from the coral reef.
On April 1 7, 2013, the above-named petitioners on their behalf and in representation of
their respective sector/organization and others, including minors or generations yet unborn,
filed the present petition agairtst Scott H. Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7th
Fleet, Mark A. Rice in his capacity as Commanding Officer of the USS Guardian and Lt.
Gen. Terry G. Robling, US Marine Corps Forces, Pacific and Balikatan 2013 Exercises Co-
Director ("US respondents"); President Benigno S. Aquino III in his capacity as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), DF A Secretary Albert
F. Del Rosario, Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, Jr., Secretary Voltaire T. Gazmin
(Department of National Defense), Secretary Jesus P. Paje (Department of Environment
and Natural Resources), Vice-Admiral Jose Luis M. Alano (Philippine Navy Flag Officer in
Command, AFP), Admiral Rodolfo D. Isorena (Philippine Coast Guard Commandant),
Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista (Philippine Coast Guard-Palawan), and Major
General Virgilio 0. Domingo (AFP Commandant), collectively the "Philippine respondents."
The Petition
Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros
Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology. They also seek a directive from
this Court for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in
violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
Specifically, petitioners cite the following violations committed by US respondents under
R.A. No. 10067: unauthorized entry (Section 19); non-payment of conservation fees (Section
21 ); obstruction of law enforcement officer (Section 30); damages to the reef (Section 20);
and destroying and disturbing resources (Section 26[g]). Furthermore, petitioners assail
certain provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) which they want this Court to
nullify for being unconstitutional.
The numerous reliefs sought in this case are set forth in the final prayer of the petition, to
wit: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Petitioners respectfully pray that the
Honorable Court: 1. Immediately issue upon the filing of this petition a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and/or a Writ of Kalikasan, which shall, in
particular,
a. Order Respondents and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist all operations over
the Guardian grounding incident;
b. Initially demarcating the metes and bounds of the damaged area as well as an additional buffer
zone;
c. Order Respondents to stop all port calls and war games under 'Balikatan' because of the absence of
clear guidelines, duties, and liability schemes for breaches of those duties, and require Respondents
to assume responsibility for prior and future environmental damage in general, and environmental
damage under the Visiting Forces Agreement in particular.
d. Temporarily define and describe allowable activities of ecotourism, diving, recreation, and limited
commercial activities by fisherfolk and indigenous communities near or around the TRNP but away
from the damaged site and an additional buffer zone;
2. After summary hearing, issue a Resolution extending the TEPO until further orders of the Court;
3. After due proceedings, render a Decision which shall include, without limitation:
a. Order Respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, following the dispositive portion of Nicolas v.
Romulo, "to forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for the appropriate
agreement on [environmental guidelines and environmental accountability] under Philippine
authorities as provided in Art. V[] of the VFA ... "
b. Direct Respondents and appropriate agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal
proceedings against erring officers and individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such
proceedings public;
c. Declare that Philippine authorities may exercise primary and exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
erring U.S. personnel under the circumstances of this case;
d. Require Respondents to pay just and reasonable compensation in the settlement of all meritorious
claims for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reef on terms and conditions no less severe than those
applicable to other States, and damages for personal injury or death, if such had been the case;
e. Direct Respondents to cooperate in providing for the attendance of witnesses and in the collection
and production of evidence, including seizure and delivery of objects connected with the offenses
related to the grounding of the Guardian;
f. Require the authorities of the Philippines and the United States to notify each other of the
disposition of all cases, wherever heard, related to the grounding of the Guardian;
g. Restrain Respondents from proceeding with any purported restoration, repair, salvage or post
salvage plan or plans, including cleanup plans covering the damaged area of the Tubbataha Reef
absent a just settlement approved by the Honorable Court;
h. Require Respondents to engage in stakeholder and LOU consultations in accordance with the
Local Government Code and R.A. 10067;
i. Require Respondent US officials and their representatives to place a deposit to the TRNP Trust
Fund defined under Section 17 of RA 10067 as a bona .fide gesture towards full reparations;
j. Direct Respondents to undertake measures to rehabilitate the areas affected by the grounding of
the Guardian in light of Respondents' experience in the Port Royale grounding in 2009, among other
similar grounding incidents;
k. Require Respondents to regularly publish on a quarterly basis and in the name of transparency
and accountability such environmental damage assessment, valuation, and valuation methods, in all
stages of negotiation;
l. Convene a multisectoral technical working group to provide scientific and technical support to the
TPAMB;
m. Order the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources to review the Visiting Forces Agreement and the Mutual
Defense Treaty to consider whether their provisions allow for the exercise of erga omnes rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology and for damages which follow from any violation of those rights;
n. Narrowly tailor the provisions of the Visiting Forces Agreement for purposes of protecting the
damaged areas of TRNP;
o. Declare the grant of immunity found in Article V ("Criminal Jurisdiction") and Article VI of the
Visiting Forces Agreement unconstitutional for violating equal protection and/or for violating the
preemptory norm of nondiscrimination incorporated as part of the law of the land under Section 2,
Article II, of the Philippine Constitution;
p. Allow for continuing discovery measures;
q. Supervise marine wildlife rehabilitation in the Tubbataha Reefs in all other respects; and
4. Provide just and equitable environmental rehabilitation measures and such other reliefs as are
just and equitable under the premises.7 (Underscoring supplied.)
Since only the Philippine respondents filed their comment8 to the petition, petitioners also
filed a motion for early resolution and motion to proceed ex parte against the US
respondents.9
Respondents' Consolidated Comment
In their consolidated comment with opposition to the application for a TEPO and ocular
inspection and production orders, respondents assert that: ( 1) the grounds relied upon for
the issuance of a TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage
operations on the USS Guardian were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in
form and substance; (3) the petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the
Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America; and ( 4) the determination of
the extent of responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha
Reefs rests exdusively with the executive branch.
The Court's Ruling
As a preliminary matter, there is no dispute on the legal standing of petitioners to file the
present petition.
Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question."10 Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls
for more than just a generalized grievance."11 However, the rule on standing is a procedural
matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject
matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest.12
In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,13 we recognized the "public right" of citizens
to "a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is
solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law." We declared that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other
civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational
implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment.14
On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court
ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.
Thus:
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their
generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in
behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational
responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present a:: well as future generations. Needless to say, every
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full
1:njoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. 15 (Emphasis
supplied.)
The liberalization of standing first enunciated in Oposa, insofar as it refers to minors and
generations yet unborn, is now enshrined in the Rules which allows the filing of a citizen
suit in environmental cases. The provision on citizen suits in the Rules "collapses the
traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards
of nature."16
Having settled the issue of locus standi, we shall address the more fundamental question of
whether this Court has jurisdiction over the US respondents who did not submit any
pleading or manifestation in this case.
The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or
non-suability of the State,17is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution
which states:
Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,18 we discussed the principle of state immunity
from suit, as follows:
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now · expressed in Article XVI,
Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that we have adopted as part of the law of our land under Article II,
Section 2. x x x.
Even without such affirmation, we would still be bound by the generally accepted principles
of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this doctrine, as accepted by
the majority of states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized
state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its
admission to such society, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these
principles in its relations with other states.
As applied to the local state, the doctrine of state immunity is based on the justification
given by Justice Holmes that ''there can be no legal right against the authority which makes
the law on which the right depends." [Kawanakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349] There are
other practical reasons for the enforcement of the doctrine. In the case of the foreign state
sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the added inhibition is expressed in the
maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. A contrary disposition would, in the language of a celebrated
case, "unduly vex the peace of nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]
While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is
also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such
officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same,. such
as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the
suit must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally
impleaded. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff, 16 SCRA 120] In such a situation, the state may move
to dismiss the comp.taint on the ground that it has been filed without its
consent.19 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the American Constitution, the doctrine is expressed in the Eleventh Amendment
which reads:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
In the case of Minucher v. Court of Appeals,20 we further expounded on the immunity of
foreign states from the jurisdiction of local courts, as follows:
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing
rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal immunity of a
foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach
not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the
state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit arc those of a foreign
government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign
sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in
effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non habet
imperium -that all states are soverr~ign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one
another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would
rec 1uire the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must
be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally
impleaded.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same case we also mentioned that in the case of diplomatic immunity, the privilege is
not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing
legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction.22
In United States of America v. Judge Guinto,23 one of the consolidated cases therein
involved a Filipino employed at Clark Air Base who was arrested following a buy-bust
operation conducted by two officers of the US Air Force, and was eventually dismissed from
his employment when he was charged in court for violation of R.A. No. 6425. In a complaint
for damages filed by the said employee against the military officers, the latter moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the suit was against the US Government which had not
given its consent. The RTC denied the motion but on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed before this Court, we reversed the RTC and dismissed the complaint. We held that
petitioners US military officers were acting in the exercise of their official functions when
they conducted the buy-bust operation against the complainant and thereafter testified
against him at his trial. It follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United
States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which has
not given its consent to be sued.
This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive
doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperil") from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the restrictive rule of State
immunity, State immunity extends only to acts Jure imperii. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. 24
In Shauf v. Court of Appeals,25 we discussed the limitations of the State immunity principle,
thus:
It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such
for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by
JustiGe Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et
al. : "Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials
or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection
of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from
suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a
State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act
for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under
an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a
suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent." The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
xxxx
The aforecited authorities are clear on the matter. They state that the doctrine of immunity
from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his
private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the
officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official acts without
authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction.26 (Emphasis supplied.) In this case, the US respondents were sued
in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and
supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in
the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they
we:re performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of
respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.
During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that
the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of
R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the
ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He
explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in
cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding
passage through the latter's internal waters and the territorial sea.
According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a
matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the "traditional uses of the oceans" as codified in UNCLOS, as can be gleaned from
previous declarations by former Presidents Reagan and Clinton, and the US judiciary in the
case of United States v. Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, Ltd.27
The international law of the sea is generally defined as "a body of treaty rules arid
customary norms governing the uses of the sea, the exploitation of its resources, and the
exercise of jurisdiction over maritime regimes. It is a branch of public international law,
regulating the relations of states with respect to the uses of the oceans."28 The UNCLOS is a
multilateral treaty which was opened for signature on December 10, 1982 at Montego Bay,
Jamaica. It was ratified by the Philippines in 1984 but came into force on November 16,
1994 upon the submission of the 60th ratification.
The UNCLOS is a product of international negotiation that seeks to balance State
sovereignty (mare clausum) and the principle of freedom of the high seas (mare
liberum).29 The freedom to use the world's marine waters is one of the oldest customary
principles of international law.30 The UNCLOS gives to the coastal State sovereign rights in
varying degrees over the different zones of the sea which are: 1) internal waters, 2)
territorial sea, 3) contiguous zone, 4) exclusive economic zone, and 5) the high seas. It also
gives coastal States more or less jurisdiction over foreign vessels depending on where the
vessel is located.31
Insofar as the internal waters and territorial sea is concerned, the Coastal State exercises
sovereignty, subject to the UNCLOS and other rules of international law. Such sovereignty
extends to the air space over the territorial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil. 32
In the case of warships,33 as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign
immunity subject to the following exceptions:
Article 30
Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.
Article 31
Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship
or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for
non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules
of international law.
Article 32
Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes
With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in
this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for
non-commercial purposes. (Emphasis supplied.) A foreign warship's unauthorized entry into
our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the
above provisions may apply. But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the
UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?
An overwhelming majority - over 80% -- of nation states are now members of UNCLOS, but
despite this the US, the world's leading maritime power, has not ratified it.
While the Reagan administration was instrumental in UNCLOS' negotiation and drafting,
the U.S. delegation ultimately voted against and refrained from signing it due to concerns
over deep seabed mining technology transfer provisions contained in Part XI. In a
remarkable, multilateral effort to induce U.S. membership, the bulk of UNCLOS member
states cooperated over the succeeding decade to revise the objection.able provisions. The
revisions satisfied the Clinton administration, which signed the revised Part XI
implementing agreement in 1994. In the fall of 1994, President Clinton transmitted
UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement to the Senate requesting its advice and
consent. Despite consistent support from President Clinton, each of his successors, and an
ideologically diverse array of stakeholders, the Senate has since withheld the consent
required for the President to internationally bind the United States to UNCLOS.
While UNCLOS cleared the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) during the 108th
and 110th Congresses, its progress continues to be hamstrung by significant pockets of
political ambivalence over U.S. participation in international institutions. Most recently,
111 th Congress SFRC Chairman Senator John Kerry included "voting out" UNCLOS for
full Senate consideration among his highest priorities. This did not occur, and no Senate
action has been taken on UNCLOS by the 112th Congress.34
Justice Carpio invited our attention to the policy statement given by President Reagan on
March 10, 1983 that the US will "recognize the rights of the other , states in the waters off
their coasts, as reflected in the convention [UNCLOS], so long as the rights and freedom of
the United States and others under international law are recognized by such coastal states",
and President Clinton's reiteration of the US policy "to act in a manner consistent with its
[UNCLOS] provisions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other
countries to do likewise." Since Article 31 relates to the "traditional uses of the oceans," and
"if under its policy, the US 'recognize[s] the rights of the other states in the waters off their
coasts,"' Justice Carpio postulates that "there is more reason to expect it to recognize the
rights of other states in their internal waters, such as the Sulu Sea in this case."
As to the non-ratification by the US, Justice Carpio emphasizes that "the US' refusal to join
the UN CLOS was centered on its disagreement with UN CLOS' regime of deep seabed
mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by
mankind," pointing out that such "has nothing to do with its [the US'] acceptance of
customary international rules on navigation."
It may be mentioned that even the US Navy Judge Advocate General's Corps publicly
endorses the ratification of the UNCLOS, as shown by the following statement posted on its
official website:
The Convention is in the national interest of the United States because it establishes stable
maritime zones, including a maximum outer limit for territorial seas; codifies innocent
passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage rights; works against
"jurisdictiomtl creep" by preventing coastal nations from expanding their own maritime
zones; and reaffirms sovereign immunity of warships, auxiliaries anJ government aircraft.
xxxx
Economically, accession to the Convention would support our national interests by
enhancing the ability of the US to assert its sovereign rights over the resources of one of the
largest continental shelves in the world. Further, it is the Law of the Sea Convention that
first established the concept of a maritime Exclusive Economic Zone out to 200 nautical
miles, and recognized the rights of coastal states to conserve and manage the natural
resources in this Zone.35
We fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not
mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear "international
responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time
ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country's efforts to
preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the
damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we
comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to
comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect
and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197, viz:
Article 197
Cooperation on a global or regional basis
States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating
international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with
this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into
account characteristic regional features.
In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal
States while navigating the.latter's territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave
the territorial '::;ea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State,
and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel
operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.
Petitioners argue that there is a waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA. Likewise,
they invoke federal statutes in the US under which agencies of the US have statutorily
waived their immunity to any action. Even under the common law tort claims, petitioners
asseverate that the US respondents are liable for negligence, trespass and nuisance.
We are not persuaded.
The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops and
personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests" between the US
and the Philippines in the region. It provides for the guidelines to govern such visits of
military personnel, and further defines the rights of the United States and the Philippine
government in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, movement of vessel and aircraft,
importation and exportation of equipment, materials and supplies. 36 The invocation of US
federal tort laws and even common law is thus improper considering that it is the VF A
which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters
in pursuance of the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal
case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed
separately:
SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.-The filing of a petition for the issuance of the writ
of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or administrative
actions.
In any case, it is our considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VF A to US personnel who may be found responsible
for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. We also find it unnecessary at this point to determine
whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot
grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules
allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A.
No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action
charging the same violation of an environmental law.37
Section 15, Rule 7 enumerates the reliefs which may be granted in a petition for issuance of
a writ of Kalikasan, to wit:
SEC. 15. Judgment.-Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or neglecting the
performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in environmental destruction or
damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, govemment agency, private person or entity to protect,
preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or entity to monitor
strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person or entity to make
periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology or to
the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, except the award of
damages to individual petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with respondents (Philippine officials) in asserting that this petition has become
moot in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already
been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as the
directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef stn icture and
marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are
entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the removal of the USS Guardian
from the coral reef. However, we are mindful of the fact that the US and Philippine
governments both expressed readiness to negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation
for the damage caused by the USS Guardian. The US Embassy has also declared it is closely
coordinating with local scientists and experts in assessing the extent of the damage and
appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
Exploring avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not proscribed by the Rules. As
can be gleaned from the following provisions, mediation and settlement are available for the
consideration of the parties, and which dispute resolution methods are encouraged by the
court, to wit:
RULE3
xxxx
SEC. 3. Referral to mediation.-At the start of the pre-trial conference, the court shall inquire
from the parties if they have settled the dispute; otherwise, the court shall immediately
refer the parties or their counsel, if authorized by their clients, to the Philippine Mediation
Center (PMC) unit for purposes of mediation. If not available, the court shall refer the case
to the clerk of court or legal researcher for mediation.
Mediation must be conducted within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt
of notice of referral to mediation.
The mediation report must be submitted within ten (10) days from the expiration of the 30-
day period.
SEC. 4. Preliminary conference.-If mediation fails, the court will schedule the continuance
of the pre-trial. Before the scheduled date of continuance, the court may refer the case to the
branch clerk of court for a preliminary conference for the following purposes:
(a) To assist the parties in reaching a settlement;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Pre-trial conference; consent decree.-The judge shall put the parties and their
counsels under oath, and they shall remain under oath in all pre-trial conferences.
The judge shall exert best efforts to persuade the parties to arrive at a settlement of the
dispute. The judge may issue a consent decree approving the agreement between the parties
in accordance with law, morals, public order and public policy to protect the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology.
xxxx
SEC. 10. Efforts to settle.- The court shall endeavor to make the parties to agree to
compromise or settle in accordance with law at any stage of the proceedings before rendition
of judgment. (Underscoring supplied.)
The Court takes judicial notice of a similar incident in 2009 when a guided-missile cruiser,
the USS Port Royal, ran aground about half a mile off the Honolulu Airport Reef Runway
and remained stuck for four days. After spending $6.5 million restoring the coral reef, the
US government was reported to have paid the State of Hawaii $8.5 million in settlement
over coral reef damage caused by the grounding.38
To underscore that the US government is prepared to pay appropriate compensation for the
damage caused by the USS Guardian grounding, the US Embassy in the Philippines has
announced the formation of a US interdisciplinary scientific team which will "initiate
discussions with the Government of the Philippines to review coral reef rehabilitation
options in Tubbataha, based on assessments by Philippine-based marine scientists." The US
team intends to "help assess damage and remediation options, in coordination with the
Tubbataha Management Office, appropriate Philippine government entities, non-
governmental organizations, and scientific experts from Philippine universities."39
A rehabilitation or restoration program to be implemented at the cost of the violator is also
a major relief that may be obtained under a judgment rendered in a citizens' suit under the
Rules, viz:
RULES
SECTION 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit.-If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff
proper reliefs which shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the
environment and the payment of attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses.
It may also require the violator to submit a program of rehabilitation or restoration of the
environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the violator, or to contribute to a special
trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.1âwphi1
In the light of the foregoing, the Court defers to the Executive Branch on the matter of
compensation and rehabilitation measures through diplomatic channels. Resolution of these
issues impinges on our relations with another State in the context of common security
interests under the VFA. It is settled that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative-"the political"
--departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of
this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."40
On the other hand, we cannot grant the additional reliefs prayed for in the petition to order
a review of the VFA and to nullify certain immunity provisions thereof.
As held in BAYAN (Bagong Alyansang Makabayan) v. Exec. Sec. Zamora,41 the VFA was
duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the
United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the United
States government. The VF A being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required
as a matter of international law to abide by its terms and provisions.42 The present petition
under the Rules is not the proper remedy to assail the constitutionality of its provisions.
WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan is
hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180771. April 21, 2015.*
RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON
STRAIT, e.g., TOOTHED WHALES, DOLPHINS, PORPOISES, AND OTHER CETACEAN
SPECIES, joined in and represented herein by Human Beings Gloria Estenzo Ramos and
Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio, in their capacity as Legal Guardians of the Lesser Life-Forms and
as Responsible Stewards of God’s Creations, petitioners, vs. SECRETARY ANGELO
REYES, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE), SECRETARY
JOSE L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), LEONARDO R. SIBBALUCA, DENR Regional Director-Region
VII and in his capacity as Chairperson of the Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management
Board, Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR), DIRECTOR MALCOLM J.
SARMIENTO, JR., BFAR Regional Director for Region VII ANDRES M. BOJOS, JAPAN
PETROLEUM EXPLORATION CO., LTD. (JAPEX), as represented by its Philippine Agent,
SUPPLY OILFIELD SERVICES, INC., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; Citizen Suits; Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases; The Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases,which allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file
an action before our courts for violations of our environmental laws.—It had been suggested
by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only natural and juridical
persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for persons, who cannot
show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring actions in representation
of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many environmental cases have been
dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she would be directly injured or
affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our jurisdiction, locus standi in
environmental cases has been given a more liberalized approach. While developments in
Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not progressed as far as Justice Douglas’s
paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the current trend moves towards
simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in environmental cases. Recently,
the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which
allow for a “citizen suit,” and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action before our courts
for violations of our environmental laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmental Cases; Even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Supreme Court (SC) had already
taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases.—Even before
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, this Court had already
taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa v.
Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
generations yet unborn “based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.” Furthermore, we said that the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. In light of the foregoing, the
need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our
Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our
environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in
the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards,
Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals, are therefore
declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Same; Same; Same; Unwilling Co-petitioners; Impleading the former President as an
unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office,
is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holders time, also demands undivided attention.”—Section 10, Rule
3 of the Rules of Court provides: Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff.—If the consent of any party
who should be joined as plaintiff can not be obtained, he may be made a defendant and the
reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint. Under the foregoing rule, when the consent
of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a
party defendant to the case. This will put the unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the
Court, which can properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling party’s
name cannot be simply included in a petition, without his or her knowledge and consent, as
such would be a denial of due process. Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners
Stewards for including former President Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient
to implead her as an unwilling co-petitioner. Impleading the former President as an
unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she made in the performance of the functions of her office,
is contrary to the public policy against embroiling the President in suits, “to assure the
exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from
requiring all of the office holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.” Therefore,
former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the petitioners in this
suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Service Contracts; In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1
(2004), the Supreme Court (SC) held that the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the
1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se.—This Court has previously
settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1 (2004), we held that the
deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on
them per se. In fact, in that decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the
members of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on
paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as
understood in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize
the abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.
Natural Resources; Oil Explorations; Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972;
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972.—The disposition, exploration, development,
exploitation, and utilization of indigenous petroleum in the Philippines are governed by
Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was
enacted by then President Ferdinand Marcos to promote the discovery and production of
indigenous petroleum through the utilization of government and/or local or foreign private
resources to yield the maximum benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the
Philippine Government. Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, Presidential Decree No. 87,
although enacted in 1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a
valid law unless otherwise repealed.
Statutory Construction; In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the
Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible,
that construction should be preferred.—In cases where the statute seems to be in conflict
with the Constitution, but a construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also
possible, that construction should be preferred. This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission
on Elections, 319 SCRA 283 (1999), expounding on this point, pronounced: It is a basic
precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the
Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its
construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. x x x.
(Citation omitted) Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners’ contention that SC-46 is
prohibited on the ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform
terms, conditions, and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and
extraction.
Constitutional Law; Presidency; Oil Explorations; Natural Resources; Paragraph 4,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into
any service contract for the exploration of petroleum.—Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution requires that the President himself enter into any service contract for
the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by
the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said
constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents have neither shown nor alleged
that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of such contract. Public
respondents’ implied argument that based on the “alter ego principle,” their acts are also
that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v. Torres, 290
SCRA 279 (1998), we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency and its limit in this wise: Under this doctrine, which recognizes
the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief
Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies
of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Same; Balanced and Healthful Ecology; National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992; Natural Resources; True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect
and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature,” Congress enacted the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act) to secure the perpetual existence of all native plants and
animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated protected
areas.—True to the constitutional policy that the “State shall protect and advance the right
of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature,” Congress enacted the NIPAS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a
holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly
remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems,
whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine. It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to
preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible. The following categories of
protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act: a. Strict nature reserve; b. Natural
park; c. Natural monument; d. Wildlife sanctuary; e. Protected landscapes and seascapes; f.
Resource reserve; g. Natural biotic areas; and h. Other categories established by law,
conventions or international agreements which the Philippine Government is a signatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 4 of the National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (NIPAS Act), a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and protected against human exploitation.—Under Section 4 of the NIPAS Act,
a protected arearefers to portions of land and water, set aside due to their unique physical
and biological significance, managed to enhance biological diversity and protected against
human exploitation. The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside
and declared a protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIPAS Act
defines a Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by the
harmonious interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment
through recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this
areas; thus a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the
permanent preservation of its natural conditions. Consistent with this endeavor is the
requirement that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking
any activity outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA
system is obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIPAS Act shall be
implemented.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Environmentally Critical Area; Environmental Impact
Statement System; The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) prohibits any
person, partnership or corporation from undertaking or operating any declared
environmentally critical project or areas without first securing an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative.—The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in
1978 under Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or
corporation from undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or
areas without first securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. Pursuant to the EISS, which called for the proper management of
environmentally critical areas, Proclamation No. 2146 was enacted, identifying the areas
and types of projects to be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the
EISS, while DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an
environmentally critical area as “an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that
significant environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or
programs are located, developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which is “any
activity, regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the
environment,” is undertaken in it, such project must undergo an Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages on the
environment.—DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical
area as “an area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant
environmental impacts are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are
located, developed, or implemented in it”; thus, before a project, which is “any activity,
regardless of scale or magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,” is
undertaken in it, such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely
impacts of all its stages on the environment. An EIA is described in detail as follows: h.
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) — process that involves evaluating and predicting
the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment during
construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these
consequences to protect the environment and the community’s welfare. The process is
undertaken by, among others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review
Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.
Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; Service Contracts; Oil Explorations; While
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract
for petroleum exploration and extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization
of this energy resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a National Integrated Protected Areas System (NIPAS)
area.—SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the
possible energy resources in the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties’ rights and
obligations relating to extraction and petroleum production should oil in commercial
quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as
the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by
Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. Since there is no such law
specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no
energy resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected
seascape.
Leonen, J., Concurring Opinion:
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; View that in our jurisdiction,
persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as having standing to
sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties-in-interest. The same cannot
be said about animals.—In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law
and the Rules of Court as having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly
represented as real parties-in-interest. The same cannot be said about animals. Animals
play an important role in households, communities, and the environment. While we, as
humans, may feel the need to nurture and protect them, we cannot go as far as saying we
represent their best interests and can, therefore, speak for them before the courts. As
humans, we cannot be so arrogant as to argue that we know the suffering of animals and
that we know what remedy they need in the face of an injury.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Citizen Suits; View that a citizen suit allows any Filipino
to act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws
before Philippine courts.—What may be argued as being parallel to this concept of
guardianship is the principle of human stewardship over the environment in a citizen suit
under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. A citizen suit allows any Filipino to
act as a representative of a party who has enforceable rights under environmental laws
before Philippine courts, and is defined in Section 5: SEC. 5. Citizen suit.—Any Filipino
citizen in representation of others, including minors or generations yet unborn, may file an
action to enforce rights or obligations under environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen
suit, the court shall issue an order which shall contain a brief description of the cause of
action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring all interested parties to manifest their interest to
intervene in the case within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish
the order once in a newspaper of a general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all
affected barangays copies of said order.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Real Party-in-Interest; View that extending the
application of “real party-in-interest” to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in
general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based
on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right.—The danger in
invoking Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993), to justify all kinds of environmental
claims lies in its potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights.
Extending the application of “real party-in-interest” to the Resident Marine Mammals, or
animals in general, through a judicial pronouncement will potentially result in allowing
petitions based on mere concern rather than an actual enforcement of a right. It is
impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are. At best, humans can only
surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions invoking a right and seeking
legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork, and representatives have
the responsibility to ensure that they bring “reasonably cogent, rational, scientific, well-
founded arguments” on behalf of those they represent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that no person may implead any other person
as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent.—No person may implead any
other person as a co-plaintiff or co-petitioner without his or her consent. In our jurisdiction,
only when there is a party that should have been a necessary party but was unwilling to
join would there be an allegation as to why that party has been omitted. In Rule 3, Section 9
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SEC. 9.Nonjoinder of necessary parties to be
pleaded.—Whenever in any pleading in which a claim is asserted a necessary party is not
joined, the pleader shall set forth his name, if known, and shall state why he is omitted.
Should the court find the reason for the omission unmeritorious, it may order the inclusion
of the omitted necessary party if jurisdiction over his person may be obtained. The failure to
comply with the order for his inclusion, without justifiable cause, shall be deemed a waiver
of the claim against such party. The noninclusion of a necessary party does not prevent the
court from proceeding in the action, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without
prejudice to the rights of such necessary party. A party who should have been a plaintiff or
petitioner but whose consent cannot be obtained should be impleaded as a defendant in the
nature of an unwilling co-plaintiff under Rule 3, Section 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Same; Same; Same; Unwilling Co-petitioners; View that petitioners should not take it
upon themselves to simply implead any party who does not consent as a petitioner.—The
reason for this rule is plain: Indispensable party plaintiffs who should be part of the action
but who do not consent should be put within the jurisdiction of the court through summons
or other court processes. Petitioners should not take it upon themselves to simply implead
any party who does not consent as a petitioner. This places the unwilling co-petitioner at the
risk of being denied due process. Besides, Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
cannot be a party to this suit. As a coequal constitutional department, we cannot assume
that the President needs to enforce policy directions by suing his or her alter egos. The
procedural situation caused by petitioners may have gained public attention, but its legal
absurdity borders on the contemptuous. The Former President’s name should be stricken
out of the title of this case.
Constitutional Law; Natural Resources; National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992; View that Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46) is illegal because it violates Republic
Act (RA) No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992 (NIPAS
Act), and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1234, which declared Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape. It is unconstitutional because it violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII,
Section 2 of the Constitution.—SC-46 is illegal because it violates Republic Act No. 7586 or
the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992, and Presidential Decree No.
1234, which declared Tañon Strait as a protected seascape. It is unconstitutional because it
violates the fourth paragraph of Article XII, Section 2 of the Constitution.
Same; Same; Oil Explorations; View that fully foreign-owned corporations may
participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only through
either financial agreements or technical ones.—I agree that fully foreign-owned corporations
may participate in the exploration, development, and use of natural resources, but only
through either financial agreements or technical ones. This is the clear import of the words
“either financial or technical assistance agreements.” This is also the clear result if we
compare the 1987 constitutional provision with the versions in the 1973 and 1935
Constitution.
Same; Same; Service Contracts; View that the deletion of service contracts from the
enumeration of the kind of agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned
corporations for exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no
longer allowed by the Constitution.—The deletion of service contracts from the enumeration
of the kind of agreements the President may enter into with foreign-owned corporations for
exploration and utilization of resources means that service contracts are no longer allowed
by the Constitution. Pursuant to Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution, this
inconsistency renders the law invalid and ineffective. SC-46 suffers from the lack of a
special law allowing its activities. The Main Opinion emphasizes an important point, which
is that SC-46 did not merely involve exploratory activities, but also provided the rights and
obligations of the parties should it be discovered that there is oil in commercial quantities in
the area. The Tañon Strait being a protected seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234
requires that the exploitation and utilization of energy resources from that area are
explicitly covered by a law passed by Congress specifically for that purpose, pursuant to
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act
of 1992.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Locus Standi; View that former President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) was not the signatory to Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46),
contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section 2 for service contracts
involving the exploration of petroleum.—Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was not
the signatory to SC-46, contrary to the requirement set by paragraph 4 of Article XII,
Section 2 for service contracts involving the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 was entered
into by then Department of Energy Secretary Vicente S. Perez, Jr., on behalf of the
government. I agree with the Main Opinion that in cases where the Constitution or law
requires the President to act personally on the matter, the duty cannot be delegated to
another public official. La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, 445 SCRA 1
(2004),highlights the importance of the President’s involvement, being one of the
constitutional safeguards against abuse and corruption, as not mere formality.
Constitutional Law; View that Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), was executed and
implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section
2. It is, therefore, null and void.—Public respondents also failed to show that Congress was
subsequently informed of the execution and existence of SC-46. The reporting requirement
is an equally important requisite to the validity of any service contract involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of Philippine petroleum. Public respondents’
failure to report to Congress about SC-46 effectively took away any opportunity for the
legislative branch to scrutinize its terms and conditions. In sum, SC-46 was executed and
implemented absent all the requirements provided under paragraph 4 of Article XII, Section
2. It is, therefore, null and void.
Same; View that Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), aside from not having complied
with the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of environmental laws
protecting Tañon Strait.—I am of the view that SC-46, aside from not having complied with
the 1987 Constitution, is also null and void for being violative of environmental laws
protecting Tañon Strait. In particular, SC-46 was implemented despite falling short of the
requirements of the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992. As a protected
seascape under Presidential Decree No. 1234, Tañon Strait is covered by the National
Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992.
Same; Natural Resources; Oil Explorations; National Integrated Protected Areas
System Act of 1992 (R.A. No. 7586); View that in projects involving the exploration or
utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
(NIPAS Act) additionally requires that a program be approved by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), which shall be publicly accessible.—In
projects involving the exploration or utilization of energy resources, the National Integrated
Protected Areas System Act of 1992 additionally requires that a program be approved by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, which shall be publicly accessible. The
program shall also be submitted to the President, who in turn will recommend the program
to Congress. Furthermore, Congress must enact a law specifically allowing the exploitation
of energy resources found within a protected area such as Tañon Strait.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and Injunction.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before Us are two consolidated Petitions filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
concerning Service Contract No. 46 (SC-46), which allowed the exploration, development,
and exploitation of petroleum resources within Tañon Strait, a narrow passage of water
situated between the islands of Negros and Cebu.2
The Petition docketed as G.R. No. 180771 is an original Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus,
and Injunction, which seeks to enjoin respondents from implementing SC-46 and to have it
nullified for willful and gross violation of the 1987 Constitution and certain international
and municipal laws.3
Likewise, the Petition docketed as G.R. No. 181527 is an original Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, which seeks to nullify the Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) issued by the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VII in connection with
SC-46; to prohibit respondents from implementing SC-46; and to compel public respondents
to provide petitioners access to the pertinent documents involving the Tañon Strait Oil
Exploration Project.4
ANTECEDENT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals"
in the petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species,
which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria Estenzo
Ramos (Ramos) and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio (Eisma-Osorio) as their legal guardians and as
friends (to be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek
the protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration and
undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others.5
Petitioners in G.R. No. 181527 are the Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center
(FIDEC), a non-stock, non-profit, non-governmental organization, established for the
welfare of the marginal fisherfolk in Region VII; and Cerilo D. Engarcial (Engarcial), Ramon
Yanong (Yanong) and Francisco Labid (Labid), in their personal capacities and as
representatives of the subsistence fisherfolk of the municipalities of Aloguinsan and
Pinamungajan, Cebu.
Named as respondents in both petitions are the late Angelo T. Reyes, as then Secretary of
the Department of Energy (DOE); Jose L. Atienza, as then Secretary of the DENR;
Leonardo R. Sibbaluca, as then DENRRegional Director for Region VII and Chairman of the
Tañon Strait Protected Seascape Management Board; Japan Petroleum Exploration Co.,
Ltd. (JAPEX), a company organized and existing under the laws of Japan with a Philippine
branch office; and Supply Oilfield Services, Inc. (SOS), as the alleged Philippine agent of
JAPEX.
In G.R. No. 181527, the following were impleaded as additional public respondents: Alan C.
Arranguez (Arranguez) and Antonio Labios (Labios), in their capacities as then Director of
the EMB, Region VII and then Regional Director of the DOE, Region VII, respectively. 6
On June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered into
a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-I 02 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX. This contract
involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait. The studies included
surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic and magnetic data. JAPEX,
assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite surveys, as well as oil and gas On May 26, 2008, the FIDEC manifested20 that they were adopting in toto the Opposition to
sampling in Tañon Strait.7 Strike with Motion to Implead filed by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
in G.R. No. 180771.
On December 21, 2004, DOE and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the
exploration, development, and production of petroleum resources in a block covering On June 19, 2008, public respondents filed their Manifestation21 that they were not
approximately 2,850 square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait. 8 objecting to SOS's Motion to Strike as it was not JAPEX's resident agent. JAPEX during all
this time, did not file any comment at all.
From May 9 to 18, 2005, JAPEX conducted seismic surveys in and around the Tañon Strait.
A multi-channel sub-bottom profiling covering approximately 751 kilometers was also done Thus, on February 7, 2012, this Court, in an effort to ensure that all the parties were given
to determine the area's underwater composition.9 ample chance and opportunity to answer the issues herein, issued a Resolution directing the
Court's process servicing unit to again serve the parties with a copy of the September 23,
2008 Resolution of the Court, which gave due course to the petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771
JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of the project.
and 181527, and which required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The
Since the well was to be drilled in the marine waters of Aloguinsan and Pinamungajan,
February 7, 2012 Resolution22 reads as follows:
where the Tañon Strait was declared a protected seascape in 1988, 10 JAPEX agreed to
comply with the Environmental Impact Assessment requirements pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1586, entitled "Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, G.R. No. 180771 (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait, e.g.,
Including Other Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes."11 Toothed Whales, Dolphins, Porpoises and Other Cetacean Species, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo
Reyes, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Energy, et al.) and G.R. No. 181527
(Central Visayas Fisherfolk Development Center, et al. vs. Hon. Angelo Reyes, et al.). - The
On January 31, 2007, the Protected Area Management Board12 of the Tañon Strait (PAMB-
Court Resolved to direct the Process Servicing Unit to RE-SEND the resolution dated
Tañon Strait) issued Resolution No. 2007-001,13 wherein it adopted the Initial
September 23, 2008 to the following parties and counsel, together with this resolution:
Environmental Examination (IEE) commissioned by JAPEX, and favorably recommended
the approval of JAPEX's application for an ECC.
Atty. Aristeo O. Carino 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the DOE and JAPEX Counsel for Respondent Supply 146 Valero Street
Oilfield Services, Inc. Salcedo Village, Makati City
for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14 Months later, on November
16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a depth of 3,150 meters, near
JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 20th Floor Pearlbank Centre
Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province.15 This drilling lasted until February 8, 146 Valero Street
2008.16 Salcedo Village, Makati City

JAPEX Philippines Ltd. 19th Floor Pearlbank Centre

It was in view of the foregoing state of affairs that petitioners applied to this Court for c/o Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. 146 Valero Street
redress, via two separate original petitions both dated December 1 7, 2007, wherein they Nicolas-Suchianco Salcedo Village, Makati City
commonly seek that respondents be enjoined from implementing SC-46 for, among others,
violation of the 1987 Constitution. Atty. Maria Farah Z.G. Suite 2404 Discovery Centre
Nicolas-Suchianco 25 ADB Avenue
Resident Agent of JAPEX Ortigas Center, Pasig City
Philippines Ltd.
On March 31, 2008, SOS filed a Motion to Strike 17 its name as a respondent on the ground
that it is not the Philippine agent of JAPEX. In support of its motion, it submitted the
branch office application of JAPEX,18 wherein the latter's resident agent was clearly
identified. SOS claimed that it had acted as a mere logistics contractor for JAPEX in its oil This Resolution was personally served to the above parties, at the above addresses on
and gas exploration activities in the Philippines. February 23, 2012. On March 20, 2012, JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. (JAPEX PH), by way of
special appearance, filed a Motion to Admit23 its Motion for Clarification,24 wherein JAPEX
PH requested to be clarified as to whether or not it should deem the February 7, 2012
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards opposed SOS' s motion on the ground Resolution as this Court's Order of its inclusion in the case, as it has not been impleaded. It
that it was premature, it was pro-forma, and it was patently dilatory. They claimed that also alleged that JAPEX PH had already stopped exploration activities in the Taft. on Strait
SOS admitted that "it is in law a (sic) privy to JAPEX" since it did the drilling and other way back in 2008, rendering this case moot.
exploration activities in Tañon Strait under the instructions of its principal, JAPEX. They
argued that it would be premature to drop SOS as a party as JAPEX had not yet been joined
in the case; and that it was "convenient" for SOS to ask the Court to simply drop its name On March 22, 2012, JAPEX PH, also by special appearance, filed a Motion for Extension of
from the parties when what it should have done was to either notify or ask JAPEX to join it Time25 to file its Memorandum. It stated that since it received the February 7, 2012
in its motion to enable proper substitution. At this juncture, petitioners Resident Marine Resolution on February 23, 2012, it had until March 22, 2012 to file its Memorandum.
Mammals and Stewards also asked the Court to" implead JAPEX Philippines as a JAPEX PH then asked for an additional thirty days, supposedly to give this Court some
corespondent or as a substitute for its parent company, JAPEX.19 time to consider its Motion for Clarification.

On April 8, 2008, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 180771 and G.R. No. 181527.
On April 24, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution26 granting JAPEX PH's Motion to Admit
its Motion for Clarification. This Court, addressing JAPEX PH's Motion for Clarification,
held:
With regard to its Motion for Clarification (By Special Appearance) dated March 19, 2012,
this Court considers JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. as a real party-in-interest in these cases.
Under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Contrary to JAPEX Philippines, Ltd. 's allegation that it is a completely
distinct corporation, which should not be confused with JAPEX Company, Ltd., JAPEX
Philippines, Ltd. is a mere branch office, established by JAPEX Company, Ltd. for the
purpose of carrying out the latter's business transactions here in the Philippines. Thus,
JAPEX Philippines, Ltd., has no separate personality from its mother foreign corporation,
the party impleaded in this case.
Moreover, Section 128 of the Corporation Code provides for the responsibilities and duties of
a resident agent of a foreign corporation:
SECTION 128. Resident agent; service of process. - The Securities and Exchange
Commission shall require as a condition precedent to the issuance of the license to transact
business in the Philippines by any foreign corporation that such corporation file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission a written power of attorney designating some person
who must be a resident of the Philippines, on whom any summons and other legal processes
may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings against such corporation, and
consenting that service upon such resident agent shall be admitted and held as valid as if
served upon the duly authorized officers of the foreign corporation at its home office. Any
such foreign corporation shall likewise execute and file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission an agreement or stipulation, executed by the proper authorities of said
corporation, in form and substance as follows:
"The (name of foreign corporation) does hereby stipulate and agree, in consideration of its
being granted by the Securities and Exchange Commission a license to transact business in
the Philippines, that if at any time said corporation shall cease to transact business in the
Philippines, or shall be without any resident agent in the Philippines on whom any
summons or other legal processes may be served, then in any action or proceeding arising
out of any business or transaction which occurred in the Philippines, service of any
summons or other legal process may be made upon the Securities and Exchange
Commission and that such service shall have the same force and effect as if made upon the
duly-authorized officers of the corporation at its home office."
Whenever such service of summons or other process shall be made upon the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the Commission shall, within ten (10) days thereafter, transmit by
mail a copy of such summons or other legal process to the corporation at its home or
principal office. The sending of such copy by the Commission shall be a necessary part of
and shall complete such service. All expenses incurred by the Commission for such service
shall be paid in advance by the party at whose instance the service is made.
In case of a change of address of the resident agent, it shall be his or its duty to immediately
notify in writing the Securities and Exchange Commission of the new address.
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the function of a resident agent is to receive
summons or legal processes that may be served in all actions or other legal proceedings
against the foreign corporation. These cases have been prosecuted in the name of JAPEX
Company, Ltd., and JAPEX Philippines Ltd., as its branch office and resident agent, had
been receiving the various resolutions from this Court, as evidenced by Registry Return
Cards signed by its representatives.
And in the interest of justice, this Court resolved to grant JAPEX PH's motion for extension
of time to file its memorandum, and was given until April 21, 2012, as prayed for, within
which to comply with the submission.27
Without filing its Memorandum, JAPEX PH, on May 14, 2012, filed a motion, asking this
Court for an additional thirty days to file its Memorandum, to be counted from May 8, 2012.
It justified its request by claiming that this Court's April 24, 2012 Resolution was issued
past its requested deadline for filing, which was on April 21, 2012.28
On June 19, 2012, this Court denied JAPEX PH's second request for additional time to file
its Memorandum and dispensed with such filing.
Since petitioners had already filed their respective memoranda,29 and public respondents
had earlier filed a Manifestation30 that they were adopting their Comment dated March 31,
2008 as their memorandum, this Court submitted the case for decision.
Petitioners.' Allegations
Protesting the adverse ecological impact of JAPEX's oil exploration activities in the Tañon
Strait, petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards aver that a study made after
the seismic survey showed that the fish catch was reduced drastically by 50 to 70 percent.
They claim that before the seismic survey, the average harvest per day would be from 15 to
20 kilos; but after the activity, the fisherfolk could only catch an average of 1 to 2 kilos a
day. They attribute this "reduced fish catch" to the destruction of the ''payao," also known as
the "fish aggregating device" or "artificial reef."31 Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards also impute the incidences of "fish kill"32observed by some of the local
fisherfolk to the seismic survey. And they further allege that the ECC obtained by private
respondent JAPEX is invalid because public consultations and discussions with the affected
stakeholders, a pre-requisite to the issuance of the ECC, were not held prior to the ECC's
issuance.
In its separate petition, petitioner FIDEC confirms petitioners Resident Marine Mammals
and Stewards' allegations of reduced fish catch and lack of public consultations or
discussions with the fisherfolk and other stakeholders prior to the issuance of the ECC.
Moreover, it alleges that during the seismic surveys and drilling, it was barred from
entering and fishing within a 7-kilometer radius from the point where the oilrig was located,
an area greater than the 1.5-kilometer radius "exclusion zone" stated in the IEE. 33 It also
agrees in the allegation that public respondents DENR and EMB abused their discretion
when they issued an ECC to public respondent DOE and private respondent JAPEX without
ensuring the strict compliance with the procedural and substantive requirements under the
Environmental Impact Assessment system, the Fisheries Code, and their implementing
rules and regulations.34It further claims that despite several requests for copies of all the
documents pertaining to the project in Tañon Strait, only copies of the P AMB-Tañon Strait
Resolution and the ECC were given to the fisherfolk.35
Public Respondents' Counter-Allegations
Public respondents, through the Solicitor General, contend that petitioners Resident Marine V. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENTS MAY BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO
Mammals and Stewards have no legal standing to file the present petition; that SC-46 does FURNISH PETITIONERS WITH COPIES OF THE DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE TAÑON
STRAIT OIL EXPLORATION PROJECT.38
not violate the 1987 Constitution and the various laws cited in the petitions; that the ECC
was issued in accordance with existing laws and regulations; that public respondents may
not be compelled by mandamus to furnish petitioners copies of all documents relating to SC- In these consolidated petitions, this Court has determined that the various issues raised by
46; and that all the petitioners failed to show that they are entitled to injunctive relief. They the petitioners may be condensed into two primary issues:
further contend that the issues raised in these petitions have been rendered moot and
academic by the fact that SC-46 had been mutually terminated by the parties thereto
I. Procedural Issue: Locus Standi of the Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards,
effective June 21, 2008.36
petitioners in G.R. No. 180771; and

ISSUES
II. Main Issue: Legality of Service Contract No. 46.

The following are the issues posited by petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards
DISCUSSION
in G.R. No. 180771:

I. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STAND! TO FILE THE INSTANT
PETITION;
II. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 IS VIOLA T[IVE] OF THE 1987
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES;
At the outset, this Court makes clear that the "'moot and academic principle' is not a
magical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case." Courts
have decided cases otherwise moot and academic under the following exceptions:
1) There is a grave violation of the Constitution;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE ON-GOING EXPLORATION AND PROPOSED EXPLOITATION 2) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved;
FOR OIL AND NATURAL GAS AT, AROUND, AND UNDERNEATH THE MARINE WATERS OF
THE TAÑON STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE
3) The constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
COMMITMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND INSTRUMENTS; AND
the bar, and the public; and

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE

4) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review.39
CERTIFICATE (ECC) IN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREAS AND HABITATS OF MARINE
WILDLIFE AND ENDANGERED SPECIES IS LEGAL AND PROPER.37
In this case, despite the termination of SC-46, this Court deems it necessary to resolve these
Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 181527, petitioner FIDEC presented the following issues for our consolidated petitions as almost all of the foregoing exceptions are present in this case. Both
consideration: petitioners allege that SC-46 is violative of the Constitution, the environmental and
livelihood issues raised undoubtedly affect the public's interest, and the respondents'
contested actions are capable of repetition.
I. WHETHER OR NOT SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 EXECUTED BETWEEN RESPONDENTS
DOE AND JAPEX SHOULD BE NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE FOR BEING IN DIRECT
VIOLATION OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION AND Procedural Issues
APPLICABLE LAWS;

Locus Standi of Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE OFF-SHORE OIL EXPLORAT[I]ON CONTEMPLATED UNDER
SERVICE CONTRACT NO. 46 ·IS LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE WITHOUT A LAW BEING DULY
PASSED EXPRESSLY FOR THE PURPOSE;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE OIL EXPLORATION BEING CONDUCTED WITHIN THE TAÑON
STRAIT PROTECTED SEASCAPE VIOLATES THE RIGHTS AND LEGAL PROTECTION
GRANTED TO PETITIONERS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE LAWS.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
CERTIFICATE (ECC) FOR SUCH AN ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL PROJECT INSIDE AN
ENVIRONMENTALLY CRITICAL AREA SUCH AS THE TAÑON STRAIT PROTECTED
SEASCAPE CONFORMED TO LAW AND EXISTING RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
MATTER.
The Resident Marine Mammals, through the Stewards, "claim" that they have the legal
standing to file this action since they stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
this suit.40 Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.,41 they also assert their right to sue for the faithful
performance of international and municipal environmental laws created in their favor and
for their benefit. In this regard, they propound that they have the right to demand that they
be accorded the benefits granted to them in multilateral international instruments that the
Philippine Government had signed, under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.42
For their part, the Stewards contend that there should be no question of their right to
represent the Resident Marine Mammals as they have stakes in the case as forerunners of a
campaign to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait and as stewards
of the environment since the primary steward, the Government, had failed in its duty to
protect the environment pursuant to the public trust doctrine.43
Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards also aver that this Court may lower
the benchmark in locus standi as an exercise of epistolary jurisdiction. 44
In opposition, public respondents argue that the Resident Marine Mammals have no
standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires parties to an action to be
either natural or juridical persons, viz.:
Section 1. Who may be parties, plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons,
or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer
to the claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-
party plaintiff. The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the
defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
The public respondents also contest the applicability of Oposa, pointing out that the
petitioners therein were all natural persons, albeit some of them were still unborn. 45
As regards the Stewards, the public respondents likewise challenge their claim of legal
standing on the ground that they are representing animals, which cannot be parties to an
action. Moreover, the public respondents argue that the Stewards are not the real parties-
in-interest for their failure to show how they stand to be benefited or injured by the decision
in this case.46 Invoking the alter ego principle in political law, the public respondents claim
that absent any proof that former President Arroyo had disapproved of their acts in entering
into and implementing SC-46, such acts remain to be her own.47
The public respondents contend that since petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and
Stewards' petition was not brought in the name of a real party-in-interest, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.48
The issue of whether or not animals or even inanimate objects should be given legal
standing in actions before courts of law is not new in the field o f animal rights and
environmental law. Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals and Stewards cited the 1972
United States case Sierra Club v. Rogers C.B. Morton,49 wherein Justice William 0. Douglas,
dissenting to the conventional thought on legal standing, opined:
The critical question of "standing" would be simplified and also put neatly in focus if we
fashioned a federal rule that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, defaced,
or invaded by roads and bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage. x x x.
Inanimate objects are sometimes parties in litigation. A ship has a legal personality, a
fiction found useful for maritime purposes. The corporation sole - a creature of ecclesiastical
law - is an acceptable adversary and large fortunes ride on its cases. The ordinary
corporation is a "person" for purposes of the adjudicatory processes, whether it represents
proprietary, spiritual, aesthetic, or charitable causes.
So it should be as respects valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges,
groves of trees, swampland, or even air that feels the destructive pressures of modem
technology and modem life. The river, for example, is the living symbol of all the life it
sustains or nourishes-fish, aquatic insects, water ouzels, otter, fisher, deer, elk, bear, and all
other animals, including man, who are dependent on it or who enjoy it for its sight, its
sound, or its life. The river as plaintiff speaks for the ecological unit of life that is part of it.
Those people who have a meaningful relation to that body of water-whether it be a
fisherman, a canoeist, a zoologist, or a logger-must be able to speak for the values which the
river represents and which are threatened with destruction.50 (Citations omitted.)
The primary reason animal rights advocates and environmentalists seek to give animals
and inanimate objects standing is due to the need to comply with the strict requirements in
bringing a suit to court. Our own 1997 Rules of Court demand that parties to a suit be
either natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law. It further necessitates the
action to be brought in the name of the real party-in-interest, even if filed by a
representative, viz.:
Rule 3
Parties to Civil Actions
Section 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff' may refer to the claiming party,
the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.)-party plaintiff. The term "defendant"
may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim, the cross-defendant, or the
third (fourth, etc.)-party defendant.
Sec. 2. Parties in interest. - A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by
law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Sec. 3. Representatives as parties. - Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a
representative or someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be included in the title of
the case and shall be deemed to be the real party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an
express trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized by law or these Rules. An
agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things belonging to the principal.
It had been suggested by animal rights advocates and environmentalists that not only
natural and juridical persons should be given legal standing because of the difficulty for
persons, who cannot show that they by themselves are real parties-in-interests, to bring
actions in representation of these animals or inanimate objects. For this reason, many
environmental cases have been dismissed for failure of the petitioner to show that he/she
would be directly injured or affected by the outcome of the case. However, in our
jurisdiction, locus standi in environmental cases has been given a more liberalized
approach. While developments in Philippine legal theory and jurisprudence have not
progressed as far as Justice Douglas's paradigm of legal standing for inanimate objects, the
current trend moves towards simplification of procedures and facilitating court access in
environmental cases.
Recently, the Court passed the landmark Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases,51 which allow for a "citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen to file an action
before our courts for violations of our environmental laws:
SEC. 5. Citizen suit. - Any Filipino citizen in representation of others, including minors or
generations yet unborn, may file an action to enforce rights or obligations under
environmental laws. Upon the filing of a citizen suit, the court shall issue an order which
shall contain a brief description of the cause of action and the reliefs prayed for, requiring
all interested parties to manifest their interest to intervene in the case within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof. The plaintiff may publish the order once in a newspaper of a
general circulation in the Philippines or furnish all affected barangays copies of said order.
Citizen suits filed under R.A. No. 8749 and R.A. No. 9003 shall be governed by their
respective provisions.52(Emphasis ours.)
Explaining the rationale for this rule, the Court, in the Annotations to the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases, commented:
Citizen suit. To further encourage the protection of the environment, the Rules enable litigants enforcing
environmental rights to file their cases as citizen suits. This provision liberalizes standing for all cases
filed enforcing environmental laws and collapses the traditional rule on personal and direct interest, on
the principle that humans are stewards of nature. The terminology of the text reflects the doctrine first
enunciated in Oposa v. Factoran, insofar as it refers to minors and generations yet unborn.53 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted.) Although this petition was filed in 2007, years before the effectivity of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, it has been consistently held that rules of procedure "may
be retroactively applied to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and will not
violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, inasmuch as there is no vested
rights in rules of procedure."54
Elucidating on this doctrine, the Court, in Systems Factors Corporation v. National Labor
Relations Commission55held that:
Remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or
take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already
existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against
retroactive operation of statutes. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental · Cases became effective,
this Court had already taken a permissive position on the issue of locus standi in
environmental cases. In Oposa, we allowed the suit to be brought in the name of generations
yet unborn "based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned."56 Furthermore, we said that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the
correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.57
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has
been eliminated by our Rules, which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards are
joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean
species. The Stewards, Ramos and Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there
may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident Marine Mammals,
are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
Impleading Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as an Unwilling Co-Petitioner
Petitioners Stewards in G.R. No. 180771 impleaded as an unwilling co-petitioner former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for the following reasons, which we quote:
Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, also of legal age, Filipino and resident of
Malacailang Palace, Manila Philippines. Steward Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo happens to be
the incumbent President of the Philippine Islands. She is personally impleaded in this suit
as an unwilling co-petitioner by reason of her express declaration and undertaking under
the recently signed ASEAN Charter to protect Your Petitioners' habitat, among others. She
is meantime dominated as an unwilling co-petitioner due to lack of material time in seeking
her signature and imprimatur hereof and due to possible legal complications that may
hereafter arise by reason of her official relations with public respondents under the alter ego
principle in political law.58 This is incorrect.
Section 10, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 10. Unwilling co-plaintiff. - If the consent of any party who should be joined as plaintiff can not be
obtained, he may be made a defendant and the reason therefor shall be stated in the complaint.
Under the foregoing rule, when the consent of a party who should be joined as a plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant to the case. This will put the
unwilling party under the jurisdiction of the Court, which can properly implead him or her
through its processes. The unwilling party's name cannot be simply included in a petition,
without his or her knowledge and consent, as such would be a denial of due process.
Moreover, the reason cited by the petitioners Stewards for including former President
Macapagal-Arroyo in their petition, is not sufficient to implead her as an unwilling co-
petitioner. Impleading the former President as an unwilling co-petitioner, for an act she
made in the performance of the functions of her office, is contrary to the public policy
against embroiling the President in suits, "to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also
demands undivided attention."59
Therefore, former President Macapagal-Arroyo cannot be impleaded as one of the
petitioners in this suit. Thus, her name is stricken off the title of this case.
Main Issue:
Legality of Service Contract No. 46 Service Contract No. 46 vis-à-vis Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution
Petitioners maintain that SC-46 transgresses the Jura Regalia Provision or paragraph 1,
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution because JAPEX is 100% Japanese-
owned.60 Furthermore, the FIDEC asserts that SC-46 cannot be considered as a technical
and financial assistance agreement validly executed under paragraph 4 of the same
provision.61 The petitioners claim that La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v.
Ramos62 laid down the guidelines for a valid service contract, one of which is that there
must exist a general law for oil exploration before a service contract may be entered into by
the Government. The petitioners posit that the service contract in La Bugal is presumed to
have complied with the requisites of (a) legislative enactment of a general law after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution (such as Republic Act No. 7942, or the Philippine Mining
Law of 1995, governing mining contracts) and (b) presidential notification. The petitioners
thus allege that the ruling in La Bugal, which involved mining contracts under Republic Act
No. 7942, does not apply in this case.63 The petitioners also argue that Presidential Decree
No. 87 or the Oil Exploration and Development Act of 1972 cannot legally justify SC-46 as it
is deemed to have been repealed by the 1987 Constitution and subsequent laws, which
enunciate new policies concerning the environment.64 In addition, petitioners in G.R. No.
180771 claim that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
mandate the exclusive use and enjoyment by the Filipinos of our natural resources, 65 and
paragraph 4 does not speak of service contracts but of FTAAs or Financial Technical decision, we quoted in length, portions of the deliberations of the members of the
Assistance Agreements.66 Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph 4, Section
2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood in the 1973
Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent
The public respondents again controvert the petitioners' claims and asseverate that SC-46
during the martial law regime, to wit: Summation of the
does not violate Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. They hold that SC-46 does
not fall under the coverage of paragraph 1 but instead, under paragraph 4 of Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution on FTAAs. They also insist that paragraphs 2 and 3, ConCom Deliberations
which refer to the grant of exclusive fishing right to Filipinos, are not applicable to SC-46 as
the contract does not grant exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX nor does it otherwise impinge
At this point, we sum up the matters established, based on a careful reading of the Con Com
on the FIDEC's right to preferential use of communal marine and fishing resources. 67
deliberations, as follows:

Ruling of the Court

In their deliberations on what was to become paragraph 4, the framers used the term
service contracts in referring to agreements x x x involving either technical or financial
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 assistance.
Constitution
They spoke of service contracts as the concept was understood in the 1973 Constitution.
The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution, which reads as follows:
It was obvious from their discussions that they were not about to ban or eradicate service
contracts.
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
Instead, they were plainly crafting provisions to put in place safeguards that would
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the marital law regime. In brief, they
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
were going to permit service contracts with foreign corporations as contractors, but with
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
safety measures to prevent abuses, as an exception to the general norm established in the
supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter
first paragraph of Section 2 of Article XII. This provision reserves or limits to Filipino
into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
citizens -- and corporations at least 60 percent of which is owned by such citizens -- the
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources.
citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial This provision was prompted by the perceived insufficiency of Filipino capital and the felt
uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and need for foreign investments in the EDU of minerals and petroleum resources.
limit of the grant.
The framers for the most part debated about the sort of safeguards that would be considered
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, adequate and reasonable. But some of them, having more "radical" leanings, wanted to ban
and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino service contracts altogether; for them, the provision would permit aliens to exploit and
citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by benefit from the nation's natural resources, which they felt should be reserved only for
Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen Filipinos.
and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
In the explanation of their votes, the individual commissioners were heard by the entire
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either body. They sounded off their individual opinions, openly enunciated their philosophies, and
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of supported or attacked the provisions with fervor. Everyone's viewpoint was heard.
minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions
provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of In the final voting, the Article on the National Economy and Patrimony -- including
the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local paragraph 4 allowing service contracts with foreign corporations as an exception to the
scientific and technical resources. general norm in paragraph 1 of Section 2 of the same article --was resoundingly approved by
a vote of 32 to 7, with 2 abstentions.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with
this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphases ours.) Agreements Involving Technical Or Financial Assistance Are Service Contracts with
Safeguards
This Court has previously settled the issue of whether service contracts are still allowed
under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, we held that the deletion of the words "service
contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, in that
From the foregoing, we are impelled to conclude that the phrase agreements involving
either technical or financial assistance, referred to in paragraph 4, are in fact service
contracts. But unlike those of the 1973 variety, the new ones are between foreign
corporations acting as contractors on the one hand; and on the other, the government as
principal or "owner" of the works. In the new service contracts, the foreign contractors
provide capital, technology and technical know-how, and managerial expertise in the
creation and operation of large-scale mining/extractive enterprises; and the government,
through its agencies (DENR, MGB), actively exercises control and supervision over the
entire operation.68
In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, we established that paragraph 4,
with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII. The
following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La Bugal:
Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils. The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are
these requirements:
(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set standard or
uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain uniformity in provisions
and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the country.
(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an agreement
is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different
levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.
(3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give
that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely
objections, if any.69
Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, this Court finds that SC-46 is indeed null and
void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.
1. The General Law on Oil Exploration
The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, and utilization of indigenous
petroleum in the Philippines are governed by Presidential Decree No. 87 or the Oil
Exploration and Development Act of 1972. This was enacted by then President Ferdinand
Marcos to promote the discovery and production of indigenous petroleum through the
utilization of government and/or local or foreign private resources to yield the maximum
benefit to the Filipino people and the revenues to the Philippine Government. 70
Contrary to the petitioners' argument, Presidential Decree No. 87, although enacted in
1972, before the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, remains to be a valid law unless
otherwise repealed, to wit:
ARTICLE XVIII - TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions,
and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed, or revoked.
If there were any intention to repeal Presidential Decree No. 87, it would have been done
expressly by Congress. For instance, Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as the
Local Government Code of 1991, expressly repealed a number of laws, including a specific
provision in Presidential Decree No. 87, viz.:
SECTION 534. Repealing Clause. - (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
"Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319
(1988) are hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions,
memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3,
a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree
No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as
amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential
Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force
and effect.
(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16 and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Section 12 of
Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as
amended, and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and
administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions
of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court could not simply assume that while Presidential Decree No. 87 had not yet been
expressly repealed, it had been impliedly repealed. As we held in Villareña v. The
Commission on Audit,71 "[i]mplied repeals are not lightly presumed." It is a settled rule that
when laws are in conflict with one another, every effort must be exerted to reconcile them.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcopper Mining Corporation, 72 we said:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface,
before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim,
interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts
must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to
harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. (Citation omitted.)
Moreover, in cases where the statute seems to be in conflict with the Constitution, but a
construction that it is in harmony with the Constitution is also possible, that construction
should be preferred.73 This Court, in Pangandaman v. Commission on
Elections74 expounding on this point, pronounced:
It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law
determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit
and intent. x x x. (Citation omitted.)
Consequently, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that SC-46 is prohibited on the
ground that there is no general law prescribing the standard or uniform terms, conditions,
and requirements for service contracts involving oil exploration and extraction.
But note must be made at this point that while Presidential Decree No. 87 may serve as the
general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and extraction may be
authorized, as will be discussed below, the exploitation and utilization of this energy
resource in the present case may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since
the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS75 area.
2. President was not the signatory to SC-46 and the same was not submitted to Congress
While the Court finds that Presidential Decree No. 87 is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of a general law, the absence of the two other conditions, that the President be
a signatory to SC-46, and that Congress be notified of such contract, renders it null and
void.
As SC-46 was executed in 2004, its terms should have conformed not only to the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 87, but also to those of the 1987 Constitution. The Civil Code
provides: ARTICLE 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. (Italics ours.)
In Heirs of San Miguel v. Court of Appeals,76 this Court held that:
It is basic that the law is deemed written into every contract. Although a contract is the law
between the parties, the provisions of positive law which regulate contracts are deemed
written therein and shall limit and govern the relations between the parties. x x x.
(Citations omitted.) Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires
that the President himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum.
SC-46 appeared to have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then
Secretary, Vicente S. Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover,
public respondents have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified
of the execution of such contract.
Public respondents' implied argument that based on the "alter ego principle," their acts are
also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo's, cannot apply in this case. In Joson v.
Torres,77 we explained the concept of the alter ego principle or the doctrine of qualified
political agency and its limit in this wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of
the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through
the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Emphasis ours, citation
omitted.)
While the requirements in executing service contracts in paragraph 4, Section 2 of Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution seem like mere formalities, they, in reality, take on a much
bigger role. As we have explained in La Bugal, they are the safeguards put in place by the
framers of the Constitution to "eliminate or minimize the abuses prevalent during the
martial law regime."78 Thus, they are not just mere formalities, which will only render a
contract unenforceable but not void, if not complied with. They are requirements placed, not
just in an ordinary statute, but in the fundamental law, the non-observance of which will
nullify the contract. Elucidating on the concept of a "constitution," this Court, in Manila
Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System,79 held:
A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration of a
nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from
which it emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation. It prescribes the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the
different departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is
that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority administered. Under the
doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm of the
constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without
any force and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and
supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. (Emphasis
ours.)
As this Court has held in La Bugal, our Constitution requires that the President himself be
the signatory of service agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving the
exploration, development, and utilization of our minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils.
This power cannot be taken lightly.
In this case, the public respondents have failed to show that the President had any
participation in SC-46. Their argument that their acts are actually the acts of then
President Macapagal-Arroyo, absent proof of her disapproval, must fail as the requirement
that the President herself enter into these kinds of contracts is embodied not just in any
ordinary statute, but in the Constitution itself. These service contracts involving the
exploitation, development, and utilization of our natural resources are of paramount
interest to the present and future generations. Hence, safeguards were put in place to
insure that the guidelines set by law are meticulously observed and likewise to eradicate the
corruption that may easily penetrate departments and agencies by ensuring that the
President has authorized or approved of these service contracts herself.
Even under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 87, it is required that the Petroleum
Board, now the DOE, obtain the President's approval for the execution of any contract under
said statute, as shown in the following provision:
SECTION 5. Execution of contract authorized in this Act. -Every contract herein authorized
shall, subject to the approval of the President, be executed by the Petroleum Board created
in this Act, after due public notice pre-qualification and public bidding or concluded through
negotiations. In case bids are requested or if requested no bid is submitted or the bids
submitted are rejected by the Petroleum Board for being disadvantageous to the
Government, the contract may be concluded through negotiation.
In opening contract areas and in selecting the best offer for petroleum operations, any of the
following alternative procedures may be resorted to by the Petroleum Board, subject to prior
approval of the President[.]
Even if we were inclined to relax the requirement in La Bugal to harmonize the 1987
Constitution with the aforementioned provision of Presidential Decree No. 87, it must be
shown that the government agency or subordinate official has been authorized by the
President to enter into such service contract for the government. Otherwise, it should be at
least shown that the President subsequently approved of such contract explicitly. None of
these circumstances is evident in the case at bar.
Service Contract No. 46 vis-a-vis Other Laws
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 claim that SC-46 violates Section 27 of Republic Act. No.
9147 or the Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection Act, which bans all marine
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas deposits. They also aver that Section 14 of
Republic Act No. 7586 or the National Integrated Protected Areas System Act of 1992
(NIPAS Act), which allows the exploration of protected areas for the purpose of information-
gathering, has been repealed by Section 27 of Republic Act No. 914 7. The said petitioners
further claim that SC-46 is anathema to Republic Act No. 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998, which protects the rights of the fisherfolk in the preferential use of municipal
waters, with the exception being limited only to research and survey activities.80
The FIDEC, for its part, argues that to avail of the exceptions under Section 14 of the NIP
AS Act, the gathering of information must be in accordance with a DENR-approved
program, and the exploitation and utilization of energy resources must be pursuant to a
general law passed by Congress expressly for that purpose. Since there is neither a DENR
approved program nor a general law passed by Congress, the seismic surveys and oil
drilling operations were all done illegally.81 The FIDEC likewise contends that SC-46
infringes on its right to the preferential use of the communal fishing waters as it is denied
free access within the prohibited zone, in violation not only of the Fisheries Code but also of
the 1987 Constitutional provisions on subsistence fisherfolk and social
justice.82 Furthermore, the FIDEC believes that the provisions in Presidential Decree No.
87, which allow offshore drilling even in municipal waters, should be deemed to have been
rendered inoperative by the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550 and Republic Act No. 7160,
which reiterate the social justice provisions of the Constitution. 83
The public respondents invoke the rules on statutory construction and argue that Section 14
of the NIP AS Act is a more particular provision and cannot be deemed to have been
repealed by the more general prohibition in Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147. They aver
that Section 14, under which SC-46 falls, should instead be regarded as an exemption to
Section 27.84 Addressing the claim of petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 that there was a
violation of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 9147, the public respondents assert that what the
section prohibits is the exploration of minerals, which as defined in the Philippine Mining
Act of 1995, exclude energy materials such as coal, petroleum, natural gas, radioactive
materials and geothennal energy. Thus, since SC-46 involves oil and gas exploration,
Section 27 does not apply.85
The public respondents defend the validity of SC-46 and insist that it does not grant
exclusive fishing rights to JAPEX; hence, it does not violate the rule on preferential use of
municipal waters. Moreover, they allege that JAPEX has not banned fishing in the project
area, contrary to the FIDEC's claim. The public respondents also contest the attribution of
the declining fish catch to the seismic surveys and aver that the allegation is unfounded.
They claim that according to the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources' fish catch data,
the reduced fish catch started in the 1970s due to destructive fishing practices.86
Ruling of the Court
On the legality of Service Contract No. 46
vis-a-vis Other Laws
Although we have already established above that SC-46 is null and void for being violative
of the 1987 Constitution, it is our duty to still rule on the legality of SC-46 vis-a-vis other
pertinent laws, to serve as a guide for the Government when executing service contracts
involving not only the Tafion Strait, but also other similar areas. While the petitioners
allege that SC-46 is in violation of several laws, including international ones, their
arguments focus primarily on the protected status of the Tañon Strait, thus this Court will
concentrate on those laws that pertain particularly to the Tañon Strait as a protected
seascape.
The Tañon Strait is a narrow passage of water bounded by the islands of Cebu in the East
and Negros in the West. It harbors a rich biodiversity of marine life, including endangered
species of dolphins and whales. For this reason, former President Fidel V. Ramos declared
the Tañon Strait as a protected seascape in 1998 by virtue of Proclamation No. 1234 -
Declaring the Tañon Strait situated in the Provinces of Cebu, Negros Occidental and Negros
Oriental as a Protected Area pursuant to the NIP AS Act and shall be known as Tañon
Strait Protected Seascape. During former President Joseph E. Estrada's time, he also
constituted the Tañon Strait Commission via Executive Order No. 76 to ensure the optimum
and sustained use of the resources in that area without threatening its marine life. He
followed this with Executive Order No. 177,87 wherein he included the mayor of Negros
Occidental Municipality/City as a member of the Tañon Strait Commission, to represent the
LGUs concerned. This Commission, however, was subsequently abolished in 2002 by then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, via Executive Order No. 72.88
True to the constitutional policy that the "State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature,"89 Congress enacted the NIP AS Act to secure the perpetual existence of all native
plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of integrated
protected areas. These areas possess common ecological values that were incorporated into a
holistic plan representative of our natural heritage. The system encompasses outstandingly
remarkable areas and biologically important public lands that are habitats of rare and
endangered species of plants and animals, biogeographic zones and related ecosystems,
whether terrestrial, wetland, or marine.90 It classifies and administers all the designated
protected areas to maintain essential ecological processes and life-support systems, to
preserve genetic diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources found therein, and to
maintain their natural conditions to the greatest extent possible.91 The following categories
of protected areas were established under the NIPAS Act:
a. Strict nature reserve;
b. Natural park;
 c. Natural monument;
d. Wildlife sanctuary;
e. Protected landscapes and seascapes;
f. Resource reserve;
g. Natural biotic areas; and
h. Other categories established by law, conventions or international agreements which the
Philippine Government is a signatory.92
Under Section 4 of the NIP AS Act, a protected area refers to portions of land and water, set
aside due to their unique physical and biological significance, managed to enhance biological
diversity and protected against human exploitation.
The Tañon Strait, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1234, was set aside and declared a
protected area under the category of Protected Seascape. The NIP AS Act defines a
Protected Seascape to be an area of national significance characterized by the harmonious
interaction of man and land while providing opportunities for public enjoyment through
recreation and tourism within the normal lifestyle and economic activity of this areas; 93 thus
a management plan for each area must be designed to protect and enhance the permanent
preservation of its natural conditions.94 Consistent with this endeavor is the requirement
that an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be made prior to undertaking any activity
outside the scope of the management plan. Unless an ECC under the EIA system is
obtained, no activity inconsistent with the goals of the NIP AS Act shall be implemented. 95
The Environmental Impact Statement System (EISS) was established in 1978 under
Presidential Decree No. 1586. It prohibits any person, partnership or corporation from
undertaking or operating any declared environmentally critical project or areas without first
securing an ECC issued by the President or his duly authorized representative. 96Pursuant
to the EISS, which called for the proper management of environmentally critical
areas,97 Proclamation No. 214698 was enacted, identifying the areas and types of projects to
be considered as environmentally critical and within the scope of the EISS, while DENR
Administrative Order No. 2003-30 provided for its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).
DENR Administrative Order No. 2003-30 defines an environmentally critical area as "an
area delineated as environmentally sensitive such that significant environmental impacts
are expected if certain types of proposed projects or programs are located, developed, or
implemented in it";99 thus, before a project, which is "any activity, regardless of scale or
magnitude, which may have significant impact on the environment,"100 is undertaken in it,
such project must undergo an EIA to evaluate and predict the likely impacts of all its stages
on the environment.101An EIA is described in detail as follows:
h. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) - process that involves evaluating and
predicting the likely impacts of a project (including cumulative impacts) on the environment
during construction, commissioning, operation and abandonment. It also includes designing
appropriate preventive, mitigating and enhancement measures addressing these
consequences to protect the environment and the community's welfare. The process is
undertaken by, among others, the project proponent and/or EIA Consultant, EMB, a Review
Committee, affected communities and other stakeholders.102
Under Proclamation No. 2146, the Tañon Strait is an environmentally critical area, having
been declared as a protected area in 1998; therefore, any activity outside the scope of its
management plan may only be implemented pursuant to an ECC secured after undergoing
an EIA to determine the effects of such activity on its ecological system.
The public respondents argue that they had complied with the procedures in obtaining an
ECC103 and that SC-46 falls under the exceptions in Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, due to the
following reasons:
1) The Tañon Strait is not a strict nature reserve or natural park;
2) Exploration is only for the purpose of gathering information on possible energy
resources; and 3) Measures are undertaken to ensure that the exploration is being
done with the least damage to surrounding areas.104
We do not agree with the arguments raised by the public respondents.
Sections 12 and 14 of the NIPAS Act read:
SECTION 12. Environmental Impact Assessment. - Proposals for activities which are
outside the scope of the management plan for protected areas shall be subject to an
environmental impact assessment as required by law before they are adopted, and the
results thereof shall be taken into consideration in the decision-making process.
No actual implementation of such activities shall be allowed without the required
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) under the Philippine Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) system. In instances where such activities are allowed to be undertaken,
the proponent shall plan and carry them out in such manner as will minimize any adverse
effects and the preventive and remedial action when appropriate. The proponent shall be
liable for any damage due to lack of caution or indiscretion.
SECTION 14. Survey for Energy Resources. - Consistent with the policies declared in
Section 2 hereof, protected areas, except strict nature reserves and natural parks, may be
subjected to exploration only for the purpose of gathering information on energy resources
and only if such activity is carried out with the least damage to surrounding areas. Surveys
shall be conducted only in accordance with a program approved by the DENR, and the
result of such surveys shall be made available to the public and submitted to the President
for recommendation to Congress. Any exploitation and utilization of energy resources found
within NIP AS areas shall be allowed only through a law passed by Congress.
It is true that the restrictions found under the NIP AS Act are not without exceptions.
However, while an exploration done for the purpose of surveying for energy resources is
allowed under Section 14 of the NIP AS Act, this does not mean that it is exempt from the
requirement to undergo an EIA under Section 12. In Sotto v. Sotto, 105 this Court explained
why a statute should be construed as a whole:
A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general
purpose and intent. Consequently each part or section should be construed in connection
with every other part or section and so as to produce a harmonious whole. It is not proper to
confine the attention to the one section to be construed. It is always an unsafe way of
construing a statute or contract to divide it by a process of etymological dissection, into
separate words, and then apply to each, thus separated from its context, some particular
definition given by lexicographers, and then reconstruct the instrument upon the basis of
these definitions. An instrument must always be construed as a whole, and the particular
meaning to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context,
the nature of the subject treated of and the purpose or intention of the parties who executed
the contract, or of the body which enacted or framed the statute or constitution. x x x.
Surveying for energy resources under Section 14 is not an exemption from complying with
the EIA requirement in Section 12; instead, Section 14 provides for additional requisites
before any exploration for energy resources may be done in protected areas.
The rationale for such additional requirements are incorporated m Section 2 of the NIP AS
Act, to wit:
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy - Cognizant of the profound impact of man's activities on
all components of the natural environment particularly the effect of increasing population,
resource exploitation and industrial advancement and recognizing the critical importance of
protecting and maintaining the natural biological and physical diversities of the
environment notably on areas with biologically unique features to sustain human life and
development, as well as plant and animal life, it is hereby declared the policy of the State to
secure for the Filipino people of present and future generations the perpetual existence of
all native plants and animals through the establishment of a comprehensive system of
integrated protected areas within the classification of national park as provided for in the
Constitution.
It is hereby recognized that these areas, although distinct in features, possess common
ecological values that may be incorporated into a holistic plan representative of our natural
heritage; that effective administration of this area is possible only through cooperation
among national government, local government and concerned private organizations; that
the use and enjoyment of these protected areas must be consistent with the principles of
biological diversity and sustainable development.
To this end, there is hereby established a National Integrated Protected Areas System
(NIPAS), which shall encompass outstandingly remarkable areas and biologically important
public lands that are habitats of rare and endangered species of plants and animals,
biogeographic zones and related ecosystems, whether terrestrial, wetland or marine, all of
which shall be designated as "protected areas."
The public respondents themselves admitted that JAPEX only started to secure an ECC
prior to the second sub-phase of SC-46, which required the drilling of an oil exploration well.
This means that when the seismic surveys were done in the Tañon Strait, no such
environmental impact evaluation was done. Unless seismic surveys are part of the
management plan of the Tañon Strait, such surveys were done in violation of Section 12 of
the NIPAS Act and Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1586, which provides:
Section 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally Critical Areas and Projects. - The
President of the Philippines may, on his own initiative or upon recommendation of the
National Environmental Protection Council, by proclamation declare certain projects,
undertakings or areas in the country as environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or
area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the
President or his duly authorized representative. For the proper management of said critical
project or area, the President may by his proclamation reorganize such government offices,
agencies, institutions, corporations or instrumentalities including the re-alignment of
government personnel, and their specific functions and responsibilities.
For the same purpose as above, the Ministry of Human Settlements shall: (a) prepare the
proper land or water use pattern for said critical project(s) or area(s); (b) establish ambient
environmental quality standards; (c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or
protective measures against calamitous factors such as earthquakes, floods, water erosion
and others, and (d) perform such other functions as may be directed by the President from
time to time.
The respondents' subsequent compliance with the EISS for the second sub-phase of SC-46
cannot and will not cure this violation. The following penalties are provided for under
Presidential Decree No. 1586 and the NIPAS Act.
Section 9 of Presidential Decree No. 1586 provides for the penalty involving violations of the
ECC requirement:
Section 9. Penalty for Violation. - Any person, corporation or partnership found violating
Section 4 of this Decree, or the terms and conditions in the issuance of the Environmental
Compliance Certificate, or of the standards, rules and regulations issued by the National
Environmental Protection Council pursuant to this Decree shall be punished by the
suspension or cancellation of his/its certificates and/or a fine in an amount not to exceed
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) for every violation thereof, at the discretion of the
National Environmental Protection Council. (Emphasis supplied.)
Violations of the NIP AS Act entails the following fines and/or imprisonment under Section
21:
SECTION 21. Penalties. - Whoever violates this Act or any rules and regulations issued by the
Department pursuant to this Act or whoever is found guilty by a competent court of justice of any of the
offenses in the preceding section shall be fined in the amount of not less than Five thousand pesos
(₱5,000) nor more than Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000), exclusive of the value of the thing
damaged or imprisonment for not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years, or both, as
determined by the court: Provided, that, if the area requires rehabilitation or restoration as determined
by the court, the offender shall be required to restore or compensate for the restoration to the damages:
Provided, further, that court shall order the eviction of the offender from the land and the forfeiture in
favor of the Government of all minerals, timber or any species collected or removed including all
equipment, devices and firearms used in connection therewith, and any construction or improvement
made thereon by the offender. If the offender is an association or corporation, the president or manager
shall be directly responsible for the act of his employees and laborers: Provided, finally, that the DENR
may impose administrative fines and penalties consistent with this Act. (Emphases supplied.) Moreover,
SC-46 was not executed for the mere purpose of gathering information on the possible energy resources in
the Tañon Strait as it also provides for the parties' rights and obligations relating to extraction and
petroleum production should oil in commercial quantities be found to exist in the area. While Presidential
Decree No. 87 may serve as the general law upon which a service contract for petroleum exploration and
extraction may be authorized, the exploitation and utilization of this energy resource in the present case
may be allowed only through a law passed by Congress, since the Tañon Strait is a NIPAS area. 106Since
there is no such law specifically allowing oil exploration and/or extraction in the Tañon Strait, no energy
resource exploitation and utilization may be done in said protected seascape.
In view of the foregoing premises and conclusions, it is no longer necessary to discuss the
other issues raised in these consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 180771 and 181527 are GRANTED, Service
Contract No. 46 is hereby declared NULL AND VOID for violating the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 7586, and Presidential Decree No. 1586.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 194239. June 16, 2015.*
WEST TOWER CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION, on behalf of the Residents of West
Tower Condominium and in representation of Barangay Bangkal, and others, including
minors and generations yet unborn, petitioners, vs. FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION, FIRST GEN CORPORATION and their RESPECTIVE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS, JOHN DOES, and RICHARD DOES, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; Words and Phrases;
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.—As defined, a real party-
in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Generally, every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest. In other words, the action must be
brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.
Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of
the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially ordained that every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. In the case at bar,
there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the condominium unit
owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their units at the wee
hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium’s electrical power was shut
down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still not return to their
condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of West Tower are real
parties-in-interest. There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the
common interest of its unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and
pursue the instant petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA
4726, otherwise known as The Condominium Act, it is empowered to pursue actions in
behalf of its members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation is the management
body of West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the
condominium unit owners or users.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Kalikasan; The filing of a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan under Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule
clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.—Anent
the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines, Kilusang
Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women’s Business Council of the Philippines, Inc., Junior
Chambers International Philippines, Inc.-San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati Ayala
Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as petitioners in
the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present controversy in the
adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution. This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of kalikasanunder Sec. 1, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases does not require that a petitioner be directly affected by an
environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows juridical persons to file the petition on
behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated,
or threatened with violation. Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished
copies of all the submissions to the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the
results of the evaluations and tests conducted on the WOPL.
Department of Energy; Jurisdiction; The Department of Energy (DOE) is empowered
by Sec. 12(b)(1), Republic Act (RA) No. 7638 to formulate and implement policies for the
efficient and economical “distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal, natural
gas.”—The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC’s proper implementation and
compliance with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various tests conducted on the
pipeline. The DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(1), RA 7638 to formulate and implement
policies for the efficient and economical “distribution, transportation, and storage of
petroleum, coal, natural gas.” Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical
knowledge and special expertise with respect to practices in the transportation of oil
through pipelines.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; In a host of cases, this Court held that when the
adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an
administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative
body equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise.—It is notable that
the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and proficiency available within its
offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent bureaus of the other
administrative agencies: the ITDI of the DOST, which is mandated to undertake technical
services including standards, analytical and calibration services; the MIRDC, also of the
DOST, which is the sole government entity directly supporting the metals and engineering
industry; the EMB of the DENR, the agency mandated to implement, among others, RA
6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990) and RA
9275 (Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the DPWH, which is mandated
to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects of projects of government
agencies. The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore,
be availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate
resumption of the WOPL’s operation. In a host of cases, this Court held that when the
adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an
administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative
body equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise. Hence, the
courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize the
findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that demand “the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.”
Same; Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; Precautionary Principle; Section
1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the
Precautionary Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall
apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.”—Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M.
No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, on the Precautionary
Principle, provides that “[w]hen there is lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a
causal link between human activity and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it.” According to the dissent, the
directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations, justified by the application
of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We apply the precautionary
principle in deciding the issue on the WOPL’s structural integrity. The precautionary
principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the human activity sought to
be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the environment, cannot be established
with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting
the existence of a leak or the presence of defects in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case
at bar, is different from determining whether the spillage of hazardous materials into the
surroundings will cause environmental damage or will harm human health or that of other
organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum leak and the harm that it caused to the
environment and to the residents of the affected areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
Same; Any delay in the reopening of the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL) System, if said
delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is commercially viable, is better than
hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive check on its structural integrity when
experience shows that there were and may still be flaws in the pipeline.—Any delay in the
reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making sure that the pipeline is
commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening without an extensive
check on its structural integrity when experience shows that there were and may still be
flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to oversee the supply and
distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even recommended the
checking of the patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this regard, the Court
deems it best to take the necessary safeguards, which are not similar to applying the
precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to prevent a similar incident from
happening in the future.
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases; Special Trust Fund; A reading of the
petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the prayer is for the
creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly outside the limited
purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, which
is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has presumably already suffered.—A
reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the
prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly
outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has
presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of
the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view
that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners’
prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without
prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by
petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
Same; Damages; Writ of Kalikasan; In a petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Supreme
Court (SC) cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec.
15(e) of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.—On the last issue of the liability of
FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the CA found FGC not liable under
the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil case (Civil Case No. 11-256,
RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint (Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless
Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati City) filed against them, the
individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable in their individual
capacities. The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual
directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Court
cannot grant the award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and
criminal complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to
ventilate and determine the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of
corporate powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of
the dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL
in Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on
the part of the FPIC and FGC officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil
and criminal cases now pending against them.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources; Jurisdiction; Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is the government agency tasked to implement
the state policy of “maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment” and to “promulgate rules and regulations for the control of water,
air, and land pollution.”—The CA’s resolution on petitioners’ September 9, 2011
Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan
in Barangay Bangkal by directing the Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health to
submit its evaluation of the said plan prepared by CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to
strictly comply with the stipulations embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to
get a certification from the DENR of its compliance thereto is well-taken. DENR is the
government agency tasked to implement the state policy of “maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment” and to “promulgate
rules and regulations for the control of water, air, and land pollution.” It is indubitable that
the DENR has jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation
of Barangay Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.
Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:
Writ of Kalikasan; View that the Writ of Kalikasan has served its functions and, therefore, is
functus officio. The leaks have been found and remedied.—The Writ of Kalikasan has served its functions
and, therefore, is functus officio. The leaks have been found and remedied. The various administrative
agencies have identified the next steps that should ensure a viable level of risk that is sufficiently
precautionary. In other words, they have shown that they know what to do to prevent future leaks. The
rest should be left for them to execute.
Political Law; Separation of Powers; View that the principle of separation of powers is implied in
the division of powers in the Constitution among the three (3) government branches: the executive, the
legislative, and the judiciary.—The principle of separation of powers is implied in the division of powers
in the Constitution among the three (3) government branches: the executive, the legislative, and the
judiciary. “The principle presupposes mutual respect by and between the executive, legislative[,] and
judicial departments of the government and calls for them to be left alone to discharge their duties as
they see fit.” “The executive power [is] vested in the President of the Philippines.” The President has the
duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. The President has the power of control over “all the
executive departments, bureaus, and offices” including, among others, the Department of Energy, the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Department of Science and Technology, and the
Department of Public Works and Highways. The Constitution vests legislative power in the Congress.
The Congress enacts laws. Meanwhile, judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and other courts.
Judicial power refers to the “duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
[that] are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether . . . there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.” Essentially, the judiciary’s power is to interpret the law with
finality. The powers specifically vested by the Constitution in each branch may not be legally taken nor
exercised by the other branches. Each government branch has exclusive authority to exercise the powers
granted to it. Any encroachment of powers is ultra vires; it is void.
Administrative Agencies; Quasi-Judicial Powers; View that administrative agencies determine
facts as a necessary incident to their exercise of quasi-judicial powers or to assist them in discharging their
executive functions. Quasi-judicial powers refer to the authority of administrative agencies to determine
the rights of parties under its jurisdiction through adjudication.—Administrative agencies determine
facts as a necessary incident to their exercise of quasi-judicial powers or to assist them in discharging
their executive functions. Quasi-judicial powers refer to the authority of administrative agencies to
determine the rights of parties under its jurisdiction through adjudication. Registration, issuance of
franchises, permits and licenses, and determination of administrative liabilities are instances that
require an agency’s exercise of quasi-judicial power. These acts require administrative determination of
facts, based on which the parties’ rights shall be ascertained and official action shall be made.
Same; View that in principle, findings of fact by administrative agencies are not disturbed by this
court when supported by substantial evidence, “even if not overwhelming or preponderant.”—Because of
the administrative agencies’ specialized knowledge in their fields, we often defer to their findings of fact.
Thus, in principle, findings of fact by administrative agencies are not disturbed by this court when
supported by substantial evidence, “even if not overwhelming or preponderant.” This Rule, however,
admits a few exceptions: First, when an administrative proceeding is attended by fraud, collusion,
arbitrary action, mistake of law, or a denial of due process; Second, when there are irregularities in the
procedure that has led to factual findings; Third, when there are palpable errors committed; and Lastly,
when there is manifest grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness. If the actions of an
administrative agency are made under these circumstances, judicial review is justified even if the actions
are supported by substantial evidence.
Environmental Laws; View that environmental laws protect nature and the environment from
degradation while taking into account people’s needs and general welfare.—The purpose of our
environmental laws is to maintain or create conditions that are conducive to a harmonious relationship
between man and nature. Environmental laws protect nature and the environment from degradation
while taking into account people’s needs and general welfare. Sections 1 and 2 of the Presidential Decree
No. 1151, otherwise known as the Philippine Environmental Policy, embody the purpose of our
environmental laws.
Same; Temporary Environment Protection Orders; View that speculations may be sufficient causes
for the grant of either a temporary environmental protection order (TEPO) or a permanent environmental
protection order (PEPO), regardless of the extent of losses and risks resulting from it.—Under the Rules,
the precautionary principle shall be applied in resolving environmental cases when the causal link
between human activity and an environmental effect cannot be established with certainty. Based on this
principle, an uncertain scientific plausibility of serious and irreversible damage to the environment
justifies actions to avoid the threat of damage. Avoidance of threat or damage, as in this case, usually
comes in the form of inhibition of action or activity. Strict application of the precautionary principle
means that the mere presence of uncertainty renders the degree of scientific plausibility for
environmental damage irrelevant. Speculations may be sufficient causes for the grant of either a
temporary environmental protection order or a permanent environmental protection order, regardless of
the extent of losses and risks resulting from it.
Same; Same; View that the delay in lifting the temporary environmental protection order (TEPO)
despite evidence that prove that the pipeline is free from leaks, as well as the order to repeat respondent
First Philippine Industrial Corporation’s (FPIC’s) procedures, will unnecessarily force not only respondent
but also the concerned agencies to spend much needed resources that may be used for other public
purposes.—The delay in lifting the temporary environmental protection order despite evidence that prove
that the pipeline is free from leaks, as well as the order to repeat respondent First Philippine Industrial
Corporation’s procedures, will unnecessarily force not only respondent but also the concerned agencies to
spend much needed resources that may be used for other public purposes. In effect, other equally
important tasks or projects are deprived of the agencies’ resources and attention. This may likewise cause
unintended drawbacks that we may not yet realize. In the end, the inhibition of pipeline activities may in
itself be a plausible and equally harmful threat to the general welfare compared to the threat posed by
the pipeline. Permitting the increase of air pollution and unnecessary use of public resources may be
inconsistent with the precautionary principle that the majority tried to apply in resolving the case.
PETITION for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before the Court is the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan filed following the
leak in the oil pipeline owned by First Philippine Industrial Corporation (FPIC) in Makati
City. The Facts
Respondent FPI C operates two pipelines since 1969, viz: ( 1) the White Oil Pipeline (WOPL)
System, which covers a 117-kilometer stretch from Batangas to the Pandacan Terminal in
Manila and transports diesel, gasoline, jet fuel and kerosene; and (b) the Black Oil Pipeline
(BOPL) System which extends 105 kilometers and transports bunker fuel from Batangas to
a depot in Sucat, Parañaque. These systems transport nearly 60% of the petroleum
requirements of Metro Manila and parts of the provinces of Bulacan, Laguna, and Rizal.
The two pipelines were supposedly designed to provide more than double the standard
safety allowance against leakage, considering that they are made out of heavy duty steel
that can withstand more than twice the current operating pressure and are buried at a
minimum depth of 1.5 meters, which is deeper than the US Department of Transportation
standard of 0.9 meters. In May 2010, however, a leakage from one of the pipelines was
suspected after the residents of West Tower Condominium (West Tower) started to smell
gas within the condominium. A search made on July 10, 2010 within the condominium
premises led to the discovery of a fuel leak from the wall of its Basement 2. Owing to its
inability to control the flow, West Tower's management reported the matter to the Police
Department of Makati City, which in turn called the city's Bureau of Fire Protection.
What started as a two-drum leak at the initial stages became a 15-20 drum a day affair.
Eventually, the sump pit of the condominium was ordered shut down by the City of Makati
to prevent the discharge of contaminated water into the drainage system of Barangay
Bangkal. Eventually, the fumes compelled the residents of West Tower to abandon their
respective units on July 23, 2010 and the condo's power was shut down.
Petitioner FPIC initially disowned any leak from its oil pipeline. Thus, the residents of West
Tower shouldered the expenses of hauling the waste water from its basement, which
eventually required the setting up of a treatment plant in the area to separate fuel from the
waste water. On October 28, 2010, the University of the Philippines-National Institute of
Geological Sciences (UP-NIGS), which the City of Makati invited to determine the source of
the fuel, found a leak in FPIC's WOPL about 86 meters from West Tower.
A day after, or on October 29, 2010, FPIC admitted that indeed the source of the fuel leak is
the WOPL, which was already closed since October 24, 2010, but denied liability by placing
blame on the construction activities on the roads surrounding West Tower.
On November 15, 2010, West Tower Condominium Corporation (West Tower Corp.)
interposed the present Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan on behalf of the
residents of West Tower and in representation of the surrounding communities in Barangay
Bangkal, Makati City. West Tower Corp. also alleged that it is joined by the civil society and
several people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and public interest groups
who have expressed their intent to join the suit because of the magnitude of the
environmental issues involved.1
In their petition, petitioners prayed that respondents FPIC and its board of directors and
officers, and First Gen Corporation (FGC) and its board of directors and officers be directed
to: (1) permanently cease and desist from committing acts of negligence in the performance
of their functions as a common carrier; (2) continue to check the structural integrity of the
whole 117-kilometer pipeline and to replace the same; (3) make periodic reports on their
findings with regard to the 117-kilometer pipeline and their replacement of the same; (4)
rehabilitate and restore the environment, especially Barangay Bangkal and West Tower, at
least to what it was before the signs of the leak became manifest; and (5) to open a special
trust fund to answer for similar and future contingencies in the future. Furthermore,
petitioners pray that respondents be prohibited from opening the pipeline and allowing the
use thereof until the same has been thoroughly checked and replaced, and be temporarily
restrained from operating the pipeline until the final resolution of the case.
To bolster their petition, petitioners argued that FPIC's omission or failure to timely
replace. its pipelines and to observe extraordinary diligence caused the petroleum spill in
the City of Makati. Thus, for petitioners, the continued use of the now 4 7-year old pipeline
would not only be a hazard or a threat to the lives, health, and property of those who live or
sojourn in all the municipalities in which the pipeline is laid, but would also affect the rights
of the generations yet unborn to live in a balanced and "healthful ecology," guaranteed
under Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
On November 19, 2010, the Court issued the Writ of Kalikasan2 with a Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) requiring respondents FPIC, FGC, and the
members of their Boards of Directors to file their respective verified returns. The TEPO
enjoined FPIC and FGC to: (a) cease and desist from operating the WOPL until further
orders; (b) check the structural integrity of the whole span of the 11 7-kilometer WOPL
while implementing sufficient measures to prevent and avert any untoward incident that
may result from any leak of the pipeline; and ( c) make a report thereon within 60 days from
receipt thereof.
In compliance with the writ, FPIC directors Edgar Chua, Dennis Javier, Dennis Gamab and
Willie Sarmiento submitted a Joint Return3 praying for the dismissal of the petition and the
denial of the privilege of the Writ of Kalikasan. They alleged that: petitioners had no legal
capacity to institute the petition; there is no allegation that the environmental damage
affected the inhabitants of two (2) or more cities or provinces; and the continued operation of
the pipeline should be allowed in the interest of maintaining adequate petroleum supply to
the public.
On February 9, 2011, petitioners filed, and the Court eventually granted, their Motion to
Set the Case for Preliminary Conference and Hearing7 pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 7 of the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
On April 15, 2011, the Court conducted an ocular inspection of the WOPL in the vicinity of
West Tower to determine the veracity of the claim that there were two (2) additional leaks
on FPIC's pipeline. Results of the ocular inspection belied the claim.
In the meantime, petitioners also filed civil and criminal complaints against respondents
arising from the same incident or leakage from the WOPL.8

Respondents FPIC and its directors and officers, other than the aforementioned four ( 4)
Since after the Court's issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan and the TEPO on November 19,
directors, also filed a Verified Return4 claiming that not all requirements for the issuance of
2010, FPIC has ceased operations on both the WOPL and the BOPL. On May 31, 2011,
the Writ of Kalikasan are present and there is no showing that West Tower Corp. was
however, the Court, answering a query of the DOE, clarified and confirmed that what is
authorized by all those it claimed to represent. They further averred that the petition
covered by the Writ of Kalikasan and TEPO is only the WOPL System of FPIC; thus, FPIC
contains no allegation that respondents FPIC directors and officers acted in such a manner
can resume operation of its BOPL System.9
as to allow the piercing of the corporate veil.

Meanwhile, on January 18, 201-1, FGC and the members of its Board of Directors and
Officers filed a Joint Compliance5 submitting the report required by the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO. They contended that they neither own nor operate the pipelines, adding
that it is impossible for them to report on the structural integrity of the pipelines, much less
to cease and desist from operating them as they have no capability, power, control or
responsibility over the pipelines. They, thus, prayed that the directives of the Writ of
Kalikasan/TEPO be considered as sufficiently performed, as to them.
On January 21, 2011, FPIC, in compliance with the writ, submitted its 4-page "Report on
Pipeline Integrity Check and Preventive Maintenance Program."6 In gist, FPIC reported the
following: (I) For the structural integrity of the 117-kilometer pipeline, (a) the DOE engaged
the services of UP-NIGS to do borehole testing on 81 pre-identified critical areas of the
WQPL in eight cities and municipalities-all the boreholes showed negative presence of
petroleum vapors; (b) pressure tests were conducted after the repair of the leak and results
showed negative leaks and the DOE's pipeline expert, Societe General de Surveillance, New
Zealand, has developed a pressure test protocol requiring a 24-hour operation of running a
scraper pig through the pipeline to eliminate air gap; (c) In-Line Inspection Test, was
conducted by NDT through MFL and ultrasonic. The NDT later cleared the WOPL from any
damage or corrosion.
(II) For preventive maintenance measures, (a) Cathodic Protection Systems are installed
involving the use of anode materials and the introduction of electric current in the pipeline
to enhance prevention of corrosion; (b) Regular Scraper Runs through the pipeline to
maintain cleanliness and integrity of the pipelines' internal surface; (c) Daily Patrols every
two hours of the pipeline route to deter unauthorized diggings in the vicinity of the pipeline
segments; ( d) Regular coordination meetings with DPWH, MMDA and utility companies to
monitor projects that might involve digging or excavation in the vicinity of the pipeline
segments; (e) Installation of Security Warning Signs along the pipeline route with toll free
number which can be called in the event of an accident or emergency; (f) Emergency
Response Procedure of the ERT is activated by a call-out procedure; (g) Maintenance of
Emergency Equipment and Repair Kit which are always on standby; and, (h) Remotely
controlled Isolation Valves are in place to shut the pipeline when necessary.
On July 7, 2011, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion10 assailing the Court's May 31, 2011
Resolution, praying for the conduct of oral argument on the issue of reopening the BOPL
System. This was followed, on September 9, 2011, by a Manifestation (Re: Current
Developments) with Omnibus Motion11 wherein petitioners invoked the precautionary
principle12 and asserted that the possibility of a leak in the BOPL System leading to
catastrophic environmental damage is enough reason to order the closure of its operation.
They likewise alleged that the entities contracted by FPIC to clean and remediate the
environment are illegally discharging waste water, which had not undergone proper
treatment, into the Parañaque River. Petitioners, thus, prayed that respondents be directed
to comply with environmental laws in rehabilitating the surroundings affected by the oil
leak and to submit a copy of their work plan and monthly reports on the progress thereof. To
these omnibus motions, respondents were directed to file their respective comments.
On September 28, 2011, respondent FPIC filed an Urgent Motion for Leave (To Undertake
"Bangkal Realignment" Project)13 in order to reduce stress on the WOPL System. FPIC
sought to construct a new realigned segment to replace the old pipe segment under the
Magallanes Interchange, which covers the portion that leaked. Petitioners were directed to
file their comment on FPIC's motion.
Report and Recommendation of the Court of Appeals
To expedite the resolution of the controversy, the Court remanded the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA). By this Court's Resolution dated November 22, 2011,14 the appellate court
was required to conduct hearings and, thereafter, submit a report and recommendation
within 30 days after the receipt of the parties' memoranda.
On March 21, 2012, the preliminary conference was continued before the CA wherein the
parties made admissions and stipulations of facts and defined the issues for resolution. In
view of the technical nature of the case, the CA also appointed15 several amici curiae,16 but
only four (4) filed their reports.17
On December 26, 2012, the CA Former 11th Division submitted to the Court its well-crafted
and exhaustive 156-page Report and Recommendation18 dated December 21, 2012 (CA
Report). Some highlights of the Report:
1. Anent petitioners' June 28, 2011 Omnibus Motion assailing the reopening of the BOPL System,
the CA directed respondent FPIC to submit the appropriate certification from the DOE as to the safe
commercial operation of the BOPL; otherwise, the operation of the BOPL must also be enjoined.
2. On petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current Developments) with Omnibus
Motion, the CA directed the Inter-Agency Committee on Health to submit its evaluation of the
remediation plan prepared by CH2M Hill Philippines, Inc. for FPIC. Further, the appellate court
directed FPIC to strictly comply with the stipulations contained in the permits issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) for its remediation activities in
Barangay Bangkal, Makati City. The DENR was in turn directed by the CA to:
(a) monitor compliance by respondent FPIC with applicable environmental laws and regulations
and conditions set forth in the permits issued;
(b) conduct independent analysis of end-products of the Multi-Phase Extraction System;
(c) conduct regular consultative meetings with the City of Makati, residents of Barangay
Bangkal and other stakeholders concerning the remediation activities; and,
(d) evaluate the viability of the recommendation of amicus Dr. Benjamin R. De Jesus, Jr. to
include the use of surfactants and oxygen-releasing compounds (ORCs) in the middle and
terminal portions of the remediation plan.
3. Respondent's September 27, 2011 Urgent Motion for Leave (To Undertake "Bangkal Realignment"
Project) was denied.
4. With regard to the March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation (Re: List of Amici Curiae and
Recent Possible Leak in the Pipeline) filed by petitioners, the CA found that the existence of another
possible leak alleged by petitioners was not established. Nonetheless, to prevent such event, the CA
ordered FPIC to: (i) review, adopt and strictly observe appropriate safety and precautionary
measures; (ii) closely monitor the conduct of its maintenance and repair works; and (iii) submit to the
DOE regular monthly reports on the structural integrity and safe commercial operation of the
pipeline.
5. As to the merits of the case, the CA submitted the following recommendations:
(a) That the people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and public interest groups
that indicated their intention to join the petition and submitted proof of juridical personality
(namely: the Catholic Bishop's Conference of the Philippines; Kilusang Makabansang
Ekonomiya, Inc.; Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc.; Junior Chambers
International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter; Zonta Club of Makati Ayala Foundations;
and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation) be allowed to be formally impleaded
as petitioners.
(b) That respondent FPIC be ordered to submit a certification from the DOE Secretary that the
WOPL is already safe for commercial operation. The certification should take into consideration
the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection system to be used in monitoring the
entire pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The certification must also consider the
necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves. In case of failure of
respondent FPIC to submit the required certification from the DOE Secretary within sixty (60)
days from notice of the Honorable Supreme Court's approval of this recommendation, the TEPO
must be made permanent.
(c) That petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for similar
contingencies in the future be denied for lack of sufficient basis.
d) That respondent FGC be not held solidarily liable under the TEPO.
(e) That without prejudice to the outcome of the civil and criminal cases filed against
respondents, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be not held liable in their
individual capacities.
On January 11, 2013, petitioners filed their Motion for Partial Reconsideration 19 of the CA's
Report praying that (a) instead of the DOE, the required certification should be issued by
the DOST-Metal Industry Research and Development Center; (b) a trust fund be created to
answer for future contingencies; and ( c) the directors and officers of FPIC and FGC be held
accountable.
On January 25, 2013, FPIC filed its Compliance (Re: Department of Energy Certification on
the Black Oil Pipeline)20and submitted the required DOE Certification21 issued on January
22, 2013 by DOE Secretary Carlos Jericho L. Petilla (Secretary Petilla). On March 14, 2013,
petitioners countered with a Manifestation with Motion22 asserting that FPIC's certification
is not compliant with the CA's requirement. Hence, petitioners moved that the certification
should be disregarded, the 30-day period be deemed to have lapsed, and FPIC be
permanently enjoined from operating the BOPL.
On July 30, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution adopting the recommendation of the CA in
its Report and Recommendation that FPIC be ordered to secure a certification from the
DOE Secretary before the WOPL may resume its operations. The pertinent portion of said
Resolution reads:
[FPIC] is hereby ORDERED to submit a certification from the DOE Secretary that the
pipeline is already safe for commercial operation. The certification should take into
consideration the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection system to be used in
monitoring the entire pipeline's mass input versus mass output. The certification must also
consider the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing patches and sleeves x x x.23
The DOE Secretary is DIRECTED to consult the [DOST] regarding the adoption of the
appropriate leak detection system and the necessity of replacing the pipes with existing
patches and sleeves.
On October 2, 2013, petitioners, in a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Clarification, emphasized that the CA found FPIC's tests and maintenance program to be
insufficient and inconclusive to establish the WOPL' s structural integrity for continued
commercial operation.24 Furthermore, petitioners point out that the DOE is biased and
incapable of determining the WOPL's structural integrity.
Respondents, for their part, maintain that the DOE has the technical competence and
expertise to assess the structural integrity of the WOPL and to certify the system's safety
for commercial operation.25 Respondents further allege that the DOE is the agency
empowered to regulate the transportation and distribution of petroleum products, and to
regulate and monitor downstream oil industry activities, including "product distribution"
through pipelines.26
In compliance with the Court's July 30, 2013 Resolution, the DOE Secretary issued on
October 25, 2013 a Certification,27 attesting that the WOPL is safe to resume commercial
operations, subject to monitoring or inspection requirements, and imposing several
conditions that FPIC must comply with. The Certification, in its entirety, reads:
This is to certify that based on the Pipeline Integrity Management Systems (PIMS) being
implemented by [FPIC] for its [WOPL] facility, the same is safe to resume commercial
operations. This certification is being issued after consultation with the [DOST] and on the
basis of the following considerations, to wit:
1. DOE noted the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection system to be used in monitoring
the pipeline's mass input versus mass output, as well as the other measures of leak detection and
prevention adopted by the latter;
2. DOE further noted that FPIC has already undertaken realignment and reinforcement works on
the current pipeline to remove majority of the patches. FPIC has likewise presented substantial and
adequate documentation showing that the remaining patches and sleeves are safe, and that the use
of such is recognized by the industry and complies with existing standards;
3. DOE finally noted the results of various tests and inspections done on the pipeline as indicated in
the Manifestation submitted by ,the DOE on March 31, 2012, in the civil case docketed as CA GR SP
No. 00008 and entitled West Tower Condominium, et al. [v.] First Philippine Industrial Corporation,
et al.
This certification is being issued subject to the condition that FPIC will submit itself to
regular monitoring and validation by the Oil Industry Management Bureau (OIMB) of the
implementation of its PIMS, particularly on the following: (a) mass or volume input versus
mass or volume output loss/gain accounting; (b) results of borehole monitoring, (c)
inspection of the pipeline cathodic protection and (d) pressure test.
Further, FPIC shall submit itself to any test or inspection that the DOE and DOST may
deem appropriate for purposes of monitoring the operations of the WOPL facility.
The Court is fully cognizant of the WOPL' s value in commerce and the adverse effects of a
prolonged closure thereof. Nevertheless, there is a need to balance the necessity of the
immediate reopening of the WOPL with the more important need to ensure that it is sound
for continued operation, since the substances it carries pose a significant hazard to the
surrounding population and to the environment.28 A cursory review of the most recent oil
pipeline tragedies around the world will readily show that extreme caution should be
exercised in the monitoring and operation of these common carriers:
(1) On August 1, 2014, a series of powerful explosions from underground pipeline systems ripped up
the streets of Kaohsiung, Taiwan, killing at least 28 people and injuring 299 more. Further, 23 ,600,
2,268 and 6,000 households were left without gas, power and water, respectively, in the 2-3 square
kilometer blast area.29
(2) On November 22, 2013, an oil pipeline leaked, caught fire, and exploded in Qingdao, Shangdao
Province in China, killing 55 people and injuring more than a hundred more. 30
(3) On September 14, 2011, a fuel pipeline exploded in Kenya's capital city, Nairobi, reducing bodies
to dust and flattening homes. At least 7 5 people died in the explosion, while more than a hundred
people were injured.31
(4) In September 2010, a natural gas pipeline ruptured and set off a fireball, killing eight (8) people
and leveling 3 8 homes in San Bruno, California in the United States. 32
(5) On July 30, 2004, a rupture of an underground natural gas pipeline buried six (6) meters in
Ghislenghien, Belgium resulted in 24 deaths and over 120 injuries. 33
On April 29 and 30, 2014, the DOE organized a dialogue between said government agencies
and the FPIC. There it was stated that during the dialogue, "the division heads and a high
profile team from FPIC, both from operation and management made presentations and
answered questions on pipeline pumping operation and product delivery, and a detailed
explanation of the FPIC PIMS' control measures, condition monitoring measures, and
emergency measures, as well as its various activities and projects implemented since 2010
such as pipeline replacement and realignment in Pandacan and Bangkal, inspection and
reinforcement of all patches in the WOPL, inspection and reinforcement of a number of
reported dents in the WOPL, conduct of successful leak tests, and installation of boreholes
that are gas-tested on a weekly basis, and the safety systems that go with the daily pipeline
operation and maintenance and project execution."34
On August 5, 2014, Secretary Carlos Jericho L. Petilla of the DOE submitted a
letter35 recommending activities and timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations,
to wit:
A. Preparatory to the Test Run
I. FPIC Tasks:
a. Continue submission of monitoring charts, data/reading, accomplishment reports, and
project status for all related activities/works. Respond to comments and prepare for site
inspection.
b. Continue gas testing along the right-of-way using the monitoring wells or boreholes.
Prepare for inspection of right-of-way and observation of gas testing activities on monitoring
wells and boreholes.
c. Expound on the selection of borehole location. For example, identify those located in
pipeline bends, bodies of water, residential areas, repaired portions of the pipelines, dents and
welded joints.
d. Continue submitting status report relating to "Project Mojica" (an ongoing pipeline segment
realignment activity undertaken by FPIC to give way to a flood control project of MMDA in
the vicinity of Mojica St. and Pres. Osmeña Highway in Makati City). Prepare for site
inspection.
II. Inter-agency undertaking:
a. Conduct onsite inspection of right-of-way
b. Review/check remaining 22 patches that were already inspected and reinforced with
Clockspring sleeves.
i. Determine location of sleeves.
ii. Review of procedures on repair of sleeves.
iii. Random visual inspection of areas easily accessible.
c. Cathodic protection's onsite inspection on rectifier to check readings
i. Old readings
ii. Current Readings
iii. Segment covered
iv. Criteria for prioritization for corrective action
d. Observe and witness the running/operation of the cleaning pig.
e. Check and validate all calibration certificate of instruments
i. Instrument verification and calibration.
B. Actual Test Run (to be undertaken both by FPIC and inter-agency)
a. Perform Cleaning Pig Run
i. Witness launching and receiving of the cleaning pig.
ii. Handling of the residuals after cleaning.
b. Demonstrate Various Pressure Tests (already being conducted by FPIC)
i. Blocked-in pressure test (Leak Test, not in operation)
ii. In-operation (hourly reading)
c. Continue Current Gas Monitoring (boreholes)
i. Ocular inspection of selected areas
d. Demonstrate mass or volume balance computation during WOPL test run (already being
implemented in the BOPL)
i. 30 days baseline data generation
ii. 30 days computational analysis and monitoring
C. Commissioning or Return to Commercial Operation
I. FPIC Tasks:
a. Continue implementation of the PIMS. Review recommendations from DOE.
b. Continue monthly reporting of operations and maintenance activities with DOE.
c. Continue reporting and coordination with DOE and other government agencies for
implementation of projects.36
Secretary Petilla also recounted to the Court in his August 5, 2014 letter that the DOE,
together with the DPWH and the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA),
observed the different milestones of the realignment project being undertaken by FPIC in
support of the MMDA Flood Control Project and stated that the new line segment as laid
was coated with corrosion protection prior to the backfilling of the excavated portion.
On February 3, 2015, the Court required the parties to submit their comment on Sec.
Petilla's letter within ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution. On various dates,
respondents First Gen Corporation, FPIC, and petitioner West Tower filed their respective
comments37 in compliance with the Court's resolution. The intervenors were unable to
comply with the Court's directive; hence, they are deemed to have waived their right to file
their respective comments. The Issues
Having received the October 25, 2013 Certification and the August 5, 2014 Letter from the
DOE on the state of the WOPL, as well as the parties' comments thereon, the following
issues defined by the parties during the March 21, 2012 preliminary conference are now ripe
for adjudication:
1. Whether petitioner West Tower Corp. has the legal capacity to represent the
other petitioners and whether the other petitioners, apart from the residents of
West Tower and Barangay Bangkal, are real parties-in-interest;
2. Whether a Permanent Environmental Protection Order should be issued to
direct the respondents to perform or to desist from performing acts in order to
protect, preserve, and rehabilitate the affected environment;
3. Whether a special trust fund should be opened by respondents to answer for
future similar contingencies; and
4. Whether FGC and the directors and officers of respondents FPIC and FGC may
be held liable under the environmental protection order.38
The Court's Ruling
We adopt, with modifications, the recommendations of the CA and discuss the foregoing
issues in seriatim.
I.
Petitioners as Real Parties-in-Interest
On the procedural aspect, We agree with the CA that petitioners who are affected residents
of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal have the requisite concern to be real parties-in-
interest to pursue the instant petition.
Residents of West Tower and Barangay Bangkal
As defined, a real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. 39 Generally, every action
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real parties-in-interest.40 In other words,
the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right
sought to be enforced.41 Alternatively, one who has no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff-in-action for it is jurisprudentially
ordained that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest.42
In the case at bar, there can be no quibble that the oil leak from the WOPL affected all the
condominium unit owners and residents of West Tower as, in fact, all had to evacuate their
units at the wee hours in the morning of July 23, 2010, when the condominium's electrical
power was shut down. Until now, the unit owners and residents of West Tower could still
not return to their condominium units. Thus, there is no gainsaying that the residents of
West Tower are real parties-in-interest.
There can also be no denying that West Tower Corp. represents the common interest of its
unit owners and residents, and has the legal standing to file and pursue the instant
petition. While a condominium corporation has limited powers under RA 4 726, otherwise
known as The Condominium Act,43 it is empowered to pursue actions in behalf of its
members. In the instant case, the condominium corporation .is the management body of
West Tower and deals with everything that may affect some or all of the condominium unit
owners or users.
It is of no moment that only five residents of West Tower signed their acquiescence to the
filing of the petition for the issuance of the Writ of Kalikasan, as the merits of such petition
is, as aptly put by the CA, not measured by the number of persons who signified their assent
thereto, but on the existence of a prima facie case of a massive environmental disaster.
Moreover, the fact that no board resolution was submitted by West Tower Corp. authorizing
Manuel Dy Chuaunsu, Jr. to sign the Verification and Certification of Non-forum Shopping
is irrelevant. The records show that petitioners submitted a notarized Secretary's
Certificate44 attesting that the authority of Chuaunsu to represent the condominium
corporation in filing the petition is from the resolution of the total membership of West
Tower Corp. issued during their November 9, 2010 meeting with the requisite quorum. It is,
thus, clear that it was not the Board of West Tower Corp. which granted Chuaunsu the
authority but the full membership of the condominium corporation itself.
As to the residents of Barangay Bangkal, they are similarly situated with the unit owners
and residents of West Tower and are real parties-in-interest to the instant case, i.e., if they
so wish to join the petitioners.
Organizations that indicated their intention to join the petition
and submitted proof of juridical personality
Anent the propriety of including the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines,
Kilusang Makabansang Ekonomiya, Inc., Women's Business Council of the Philippines, Inc.,
Junior Chambers International Philippines, Inc. - San Juan Chapter, Zonta Club of Makati
Ayala Foundations, and the Consolidated Mansions Condominium Corporation, as
petitioners in the case, the Court already granted their intervention in the present
controversy in the adverted July 30, 2013 Resolution.
This is so considering that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
under Sec. 1, Rule 745 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases does not require
that a petitioner be directly affected by an environmental disaster. The rule clearly allows
juridical persons to file the petition on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with violation.
Thus, as parties to the case, they are entitled to be furnished copies of all the submissions to
the Court, including the periodic reports of FPIC and the results of the evaluations and tests
conducted on the WOPL.
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We proceed to the bone of contention in the
pending motions. Suffice it to state in the outset that as regards the substantive issues
presented, the Court, likewise, concurs with the other recommendations of the CA, with a
few modifications.
II.
Propriety of Converting the TEPO to PEPO or its Lifting in light of the
DOE Certification of the WOPL's Commercial Viability
To recall, petitioners' persistent plea is for the conversion of the November 19, 2010 TEPO
into a Permanent Environmental Protection Order (PEPO) pursuant to Sec. 3, 46 Rule 5 of
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. For its part, respondent FPIC asserts that
regular testing, as well as the measures that are already in place, will sufficiently address
any concern of oil leaks from the WOPL.
With respect to leak detection, FPIC claims that it has in place the following systems: (a)
regular cleaning scraper runs, which are done quarterly; (b) pipeline integrity gauge (PIG)
tests/Intelligent PIG, now known as in-line inspections (ILI), which is done every five years;
(c) pressure monitoring valves; and ( d) 24-hour patrols. Additionally, FPIC asserted that it
also undertook the following: (a) monitoring of wells and borehole testing/vapor tests; (b)
leak tightness test, also known as segment pressure test; (c) pressure-controlled test; (d)
inspection and reinforcement of patches; (e) inspection and reinforcement of dents; and (f)
Pandacan segment replacement.47Furthermore, in August 2010, with the oil leak hogging
the headlines, FPIC hired NDT Middle East FZE (NDT) to conduct ILI inspections through
magnetic flux leakage (MFL) and ultrasonic tests to, respectively, detect wall thinning of
the pipeline and check it for cracks.
The CA, however, observed that all of these tests and measures are inconclusive and
insufficient for purposes of leak detection and pipeline integrity maintenance. Hence,
considering the necessary caution and level of assurance required to ensure that the WOPL
system is free from leaks and is safe for commercial operation, the CA recommended that
FPIC obtain from the DOE a certification that the WOPL is already safe for commercial
operation. This certification, according to the CA, was to be issued with due consideration of
the adoption by FPIC of the appropriate leak detection systems to monitor sufficiently the
entire WOPL and the need to replace portions of the pipes with existing patches and
sleeves. Sans the required certification, use of the WOPL shall remain abated.
The Court found this recommendation of the appellate court proper. Hence, We required
FPIC to obtain the adverted DOE Certification in Our July 30, 2013 Resolution. We deemed
it proper to require said certification from the DOE considering that the core issue of this
case requires the specialized knowledge and special expertise of the DOE and various other
administrative agencies. On October 25, 2013, the DOE submitted the certification pursuant
to the July 30, 2013 Resolution of the Court. Later, however, on August 5, 2014, DOE
Secretary Carlos Jericho I. Petilla submitted a letter recommending certain activities and
the timetable for the resumption of the WOPL operations after conducting a dialogue
between the concerned government agencies and FPIC.
After a perusal of the recommendations of the DOE and the submissions of the parties, the
Court adopts the activities and measures prescribed in the DOE letter dated August 5, 2014
to be complied with by FPIC as conditions for the resumption of the commercial operations
of the WOPL. The DOE should, therefore, proceed with the implementation of the tests
proposed in the said August 5, 2014 letter. Thereafter, if it is satisfied that the results
warrant the immediate reopening of the WOPL, the DOE shall issue an order allowing
FPIC to resume the operation of the WOPL. On the other hand, should the probe result in a
finding that the pipeline is no longer safe for continued use and that its condition is
irremediable, or that it already exceeded its serviceable life, among others, the closure of the
WOPL may be ordered.
The DOE is specially equipped to consider FPIC's proper implementation and compliance
with its PIMS and to evaluate the result of the various tests conducted on the pipeline. The
DOE is empowered by Sec. 12(b)(l), RA 7638 to formulate and implement policies for the
efficient and economical "distribution, transportation, and storage of petroleum, coal,
natural gas."48 Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the DOE possesses technical knowledge and
special expertise with respect to practices in the transportation of oil through pipelines.
Moreover, it is notable that the DOE did not only limit itself to the knowledge and
proficiency available within its offices, it has also rallied around the assistance of pertinent
bureaus of the other administrative agencies: the ITDI49of the DOST, which is mandated to
undertake technical services including standards, analytical and calibration services; the
MIRDC,50 also of the DOST, which is the sole government entity directly supporting the
metals and engineering industry;51 the EMB52 of the DENR, the agency mandated to
implement, among others, RA 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste
Control Act of 1990) and RA 9275 (Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004); and the BOD of the
DPWH, which is mandated to conduct, supervise, and review the technical design aspects of
projects of government agencies.53
The specialized knowledge and expertise of the foregoing agencies must, therefore, be
availed of to arrive at a judicious decision on the propriety of allowing the immediate
resumption of the WOPL's operation. In a host of cases, this Court held that when the
adjudication of a controversy requires the resolution of issues within the expertise of an
administrative body, such issues must be investigated and resolved by the administrative
body equipped with the specialized knowledge and the technical expertise. 54 Hence, the
courts, although they may have jurisdiction and power to decide cases, can utilize the
findings and recommendations of the administrative agency on questions that demand "the
exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact."55
Justice Leonen, in his dissent, is of the view that the petition should be denied and the
TEPO immediately lifted in light of the DOE's issuance of a certification attesting to the
safety of the WOPL for continued commercial operations, thereby rendering the instant
petition moot and academic, seeking, as it does, the checking of the pipeline's structural
integrity. According to his dissent, the writ of kalikasan issued by the Court has already
served its functions and, therefore, is functus officio. Moreover, he argues that directing the
DOE and FPIC to repeat their previous procedures is tantamount to doubting the agency's
performance of its statutorily-mandated tasks, over which they have the necessary
expertise, and implies that said DOE certification is improper, a breach, allegedly, of the
principle of separation of powers.
He also contends that the majority ordered the repetition of the procedures and tests
already conducted on the WOPL because of the fear and uncertainty on its safeness despite
the finding of the DOE in favor of its reopening, taking into consideration the occurrence of
numerous pipeline incidents worldwide. The dissent argues that the precautionary principle
should not be so strictly applied as to unjustifiably deprive the public of the benefits of the
activity to be inhibited, and to unduly create other risks.
The dissent's contentions that the case is already moot and academic, that the writ of
kalikasan has already served its function, and that the delay in the lifting of the TEPO may
do more harm than good are anchored on the mistaken premise that the precautionary
principle was applied in order to justify the order to the DOE and the FPIC for the conduct
of the various tests anew. The following reasons easily debunk these arguments:
1. The precautionary principle is not applicable to the instant case;
2. The DOE certification is not an absolute attestation as to the WOPL's structural
integrity and in fact imposes several conditions for FPIC's compliance;
3. The DOE itself, in consultation with FPIC and the other concerned agencies,
proposed the activities to be conducted preparatory to the reopening of the
pipeline; and
4 . There are no conclusive findings yet on the WOPL's structural integrity.
Section 1, Rule 20 of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,
on the Precautionary Principle, provides that "[ w ]hen there is lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect,
the court shall apply the precautionary principle in resolving the case before it."
According to the dissent, the directive for the repetition of the tests is based on speculations,
justified by the application of said principle. This, however, is not the case. Nowhere did We
apply the precautionary principle in deciding the issue on the WOPL's structural integrity.
The precautionary principle only applies when the link between the cause, that is the
human activity sought to be inhibited, and the effect, that is the damage to the
environment, cannot be established with full scientific certainty. Here, however, such
absence of a link is not an issue. Detecting the existence of a leak or the presence of defects
in the WOPL, which is the issue in the case at bar, is different from determining whether
the spillage of hazardous materials into the surroundings will cause environmental damage
or will harm human health or that of other organisms. As a matter of fact, the petroleum
leak and the harm that it caused to the environment and to the residents of the affected
areas is not even questioned by FPIC.
It must be stressed that what is in issue in the instant petition is the WOPL's compliance
with pipeline structure standards so as to make it fit for its purpose, a question of fact that
is to be determined on the basis of the evidence presented by the parties on the WOPL's
actual state. Hence, Our consideration of the numerous findings and recommendations of
the CA, the DOE, and the amici curiae on the WOPL' s present structure, and not the cited
pipeline incidents as the dissent propounds.
Consider also the fact that it is the DOE itself that imposed several conditions upon FPIC
for the resumption of the operations of the WOPL. This, coupled with the submission by the
DOE of its proposed activities and timetable, is a clear and unequivocal message coming
from the DOE that the WOPL's soundness for resumption of and continued commercial
operations is not yet fully determined. And it is only after an extensive determination by the
DOE of the pipeline's actual physical state through its proposed activities, and not merely
through a short-form integrity audit,56that the factual issue on the WOPL's viability can be
settled. The issue, therefore, on the pipeline's structural integrity has not yet been rendered
moot and remains to be subject to this Court's resolution. Consequently, We cannot say that
the DOE's issuance of the certification adverted to equates to the writ of kalikasan being
functus officio at this point.
The dissent is correct in emphasizing that We defer to the findings of fact of administrative
agencies considering their specialized knowledge in their field. And We, as a matter of fact,
acceded to the DOE' s conclusions on the necessity of the conduct of the various activities
and tests enumerated in Sec. Petilla's letter to this Court dated August 5, 2014. Hence, Our
directive for the DOE to immediately commence the activities enumerated in said Letter, to
determine the pipeline's reliability, and to order its reopening should the DOE find that
such is proper.
The dissent also loses sight of the fact that the petition not only seeks the checking of the
WOPL's structural integrity, but also prays for the rehabilitation of the areas affected by
the leak, the creation of a special trust fund, the imposition of liability upon the directors of
FPIC, among others. These issues, undoubtedly, are matters that are not addressed by the
DOE certification alone. Furthermore, these are issues that no longer relate to the WOPL' s
structure but to its maintenance and operations, as well as to the residues of the incident. It
will, thus, be improper for Us to simply dismiss the petition on the basis solely of the alleged
resolution of only one of several issues, which purportedly renders the issue on the WOPL' s
soundness moot, without disposing of the other issues presented.
Lastly, any delay in the reopening of the WOPL, if said delay is for the purpose of making
sure that the pipeline is commercially viable, is better than hastily allowing its reopening
without an extensive check on its structural integrity when experience shows that there
were and may still be flaws in the pipeline. Even the DOE, the agency tasked to oversee the
supply and distribution of petroleum in the country, is well aware of this and even
recommended the checking of the patched portions of the pipeline, among others. In this
regard, the Court deems it best to take the necessary safeguards, which are not similar to
applying the precautionary principle as previously explained, in order to prevent a similar
incident from happening in the future.
III.
Propriety of the Creation of a Special Trust Fund
Anent petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund, We note that under Sec. 1,
Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, a trust fund is limited solely for
the purpose of rehabilitating or restoring the environment. Said proviso pertinently
provides:
SEC. 1. Reliefs in a citizen suit. - If warranted, the court may grant to the plaintiff proper reliefs which
shall include the protection, preservation or rehabilitation of the environment and the payment of
attorney's fees, costs of suit and other litigation expenses. It may also require the violator to submit a
program of rehabilitation or restoration of the environment, the costs of which shall be borne by the
violator, or to contribute to a special trust fund for that purpose subject to the control of the court.
(emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, Sec. 15( e ), Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases
expressly prohibits the grant of damages to petitioners in a petition for the issuance of a
writ of kalikasan, viz:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the writ of
kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
xxxx
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
A reading of the petition and the motion for partial reconsideration readily reveals that the
prayer is for the creation of a trust fund for similar future contingencies. This is clearly
outside the limited purpose of a special trust fund under the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases, which is to rehabilitate or restore the environment that has
presumably already suffered. Hence, the Court affirms with concurrence the observation of
the appellate court that the prayer is but a claim for damages, which is prohibited by the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases. As such, the Court is of the considered view
that the creation of a special trust fund is misplaced. The present ruling on petitioners'
prayer for the creation of a special trust fund in the instant recourse, however, is without
prejudice to the judgment/s that may be rendered in the civil and/or criminal cases filed by
petitioners arising from the same incident if the payment of damages is found warranted.
IV.
Liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective Directors and Officers
On the last issue of the liability of FPIC, FGC and their respective directors and officers, the
CA found FGC not liable under the TEPO and, without prejudice to the outcome of the civil
case (Civil Case No. 11-256, RTC, Branch 58 in Makati City) and criminal complaint
(Complaint-Affidavit for Reckless Imprudence, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Makati
City) filed against them, the individual directors and officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable
in their individual capacities.
The Court will refrain from ruling on the finding of the CA that the individual directors and
officers of FPIC and FGC are not liable due to the explicit rule in the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental cases that in a petition for a writ of kalikasan, the Court cannot grant the
award of damages to individual petitioners under Rule 7, Sec. 15(e) of the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases. As duly noted by the CA, the civil case and criminal
complaint filed by petitioners against respondents are the proper proceedings to ventilate
and determine the individual liability of respondents, if any, on their exercise of corporate
powers and the management of FPIC relative to the dire environmental impact of the
dumping of petroleum products stemming from the leak in the WOPL in Barangay Bangkal,
Makati City.
Hence, the Court will not rule on the alleged liability on the part of the FPIC and FGC
officials which can, however, be properly resolved in the civil and criminal cases now
pending against them.
Other Matters
The CA's resolution on petitioners' September 9, 2011 Manifestation (Re: Current
Developments) with Omnibus Motion on the remediation plan in Barangay Bangkal by
directing the Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health to submit its evaluation of
the said plan prepared by CH2M Philippines, Inc., for FPIC to strictly comply with the
stipulations embodied in the permits issued by the DENR, and to get a certification from the
DENR of its compliance thereto is well taken. DENR is the government agency tasked to
implement the state policy of "maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment"57 and to "promulgate rules and regulations for
the control of water, air, and land pollution."58 It is indubitable that the DENR has
jurisdiction in overseeing and supervising the environmental remediation of Barangay
Bangkal, which is adversely affected by the leak in the WOPL in 2010.
With regard to petitioners' March 29, 2012 Supplemental Manifestation about a recent
possible leak in the pipeline, the CA appropriately found no additional leak. However, due
to the devastating effect on the environs in Barangay Bangkal due to the 2010 leak, the
Court finds it fitting that the pipeline be closely and regularly monitored to obviate another
catastrophic event which will prejudice the health of the affected people, and to preserve
and protect the environment not only for the present but also for the future generations to
come.
Petitioner's January 10, 2013 Motion for Partial Recommendation of the CA' s Report need
not be discussed and given consideration. As the CA' s Report contains but the appellate
court's recommendation on how the issues should be resolved, and not the adjudication by
this Court, there is nothing for the appellate court to reconsider.
As to petitioner's October 2, 2013 Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification,
the matters contained therein have been considered in the foregoing discussion of the
primary issues of this case. With all these, We need not belabor the other arguments raised
by the parties.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Clarification is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' recommendations, embodied in its December 21, 2012
Report and Recommendation, are hereby ADOPTED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
I. The Department of Energy (DOE) is hereby ORDERED to oversee the strict
implementation of the following activities:
A. Preparatory to the Test Run of the entire stretch of the WOPL:
 1) FPIC shall perform the following:
a. Continue submission of monitoring charts, data/reading, accomplishment reports, and
project status for all related activities/works. Respond to comments and prepare for site
inspection.
b. Continue gas testing along the right-of-way using the monitoring wells or boreholes.
Prepare for inspection of right-of-way and observation of gas testing activities on monitoring
wells and boreholes.
c. Explain the process of the selection of borehole location and identify those located in
pipeline bends, bodies of water, highways, residential areas, repaired portions of the pipelines,
dents and welded joints, as well other notable factors, circumstances, or exposure to stresses.
d. Set up additional boreholes and monitoring wells sufficient to cover the entire stretch of the
WOPL, the number and location of which shall be determined by the DOE.
e. Continue submitting status report to the concerned government agency/ies relating to
"Project Mojica," or the on-going pipeline segment realignment activity being undertaken by
FPIC to give way to a flood control project of the MMDA in the vicinity of Mojica St. and Pres.
Osmeña Highway, and prepare for site inspection.
2) The DOE shall perform the following undertakings:
a. Conduct onsite inspection of the pipeline right-of-way, the area around the WOPL and the
equipment installed underground or aboveground.
b. Review and check the condition of the 22 patches reinforced with Clockspring sleeves by
performing the following:
i. Determine the location of the sleeves
ii. Review the procedure for the repair of the sleeves
iii. Inspect the areas where the affected portions of the WOPL are located and which are
easily accessible.
c. Inspect onsite the cathodic protection rectifier to check the following:
i. old and current readings
ii. the segment/s covered by the cathodic protection system
iii. review the criteria for prioritization of corrective action.
d. Observe and witness the running/operation of the intelligent and cleaning pigs.
e. Check and calibrate the instruments that will be used for the actual tests on the pipeline, and
validate the calibration certificates of these instruments.
B. During the Actual Test Run:
1) FPIC shall perform the following:
a. Perform Cleaning Pig run and witness the launching and receiving of the intelligent and
cleaning pigs.
b. Demonstrate and observe the various pressure and leakage tests, including the following:
i. "Blocked-in pressure test" or the pressure test conducted while all the WOPL's openings
are blocked or closed off; and
ii. "In-operation test" or the hourly monitoring of pressure rating after the pipeline is filled
with dyed water and pressurized at a specified rate.
c. Continue, inspect, and oversee the current gas monitoring system, or the monitoring of
gas flow from the boreholes and monitoring wells of the WOPL.
d. Check the mass or volume balance computation during WOPL test run by conducting:
i. 30 days baseline data generation
ii. Computational analysis and monitoring of the data generated.
2. continued close monitoring of all the boreholes and monitoring wells of the WOPL pipeline;
3. regular periodic testing and maintenance based on its PIMS; and
4. the auditing of the pipeline's mass input versus mass output;
b. submit to the DOE, within ten (10) days of each succeeding month, monthly reports on its
compliance with the above directives and any other conditions that the DOE may impose, the results
of the monitoring, tests, and audit, as well as any and all activities undertaken on the WOPL or in
connection with its operation. The concerned government agencies, namely: the Industrial
Technology Development Institute (ITDI) and the Metals Industry Research and Development
Center (MIRDC), both under the Department of Science and Technology (DOST), the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), the
Bureau of Design (BOD) of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), the University
of the Philippines - National Institute of Geological Science (UP-NI GS) and University of the
Philippines - Institute of Civil Engineering (UP-ICE), the petitioners, intervenors and this Court
shall likewise be furnished by FPIC with the monthly reports. This shall include, but shall not be
limited to: realignment, repairs, and maintenance works; and
c. continue coordination with the concerned government agencies for the implementation of its
projects.1âwphi1
IV. Respondent FPIC is also DIRECTED to undertake and continue the remediation,
rehabilitation and restoration of the affected Barangay Bangkal environment until full
restoration of the affected area to its condition prior to the leakage is achieved. For this
purpose, respondent FPIC must strictly comply with the measures, directives and permits
issued by the DENR for its remediation activities in Barangay Bangkal, including but not
limited to, the Wastewater Discharge Permit and Permit to Operate. The DENR has the
authority to oversee and supervise the aforesaid activities on said affected barangay.
V. The Inter-Agency Committee on Environmental Health under the City Government of
Makati shall SUBMIT to the DENR its evaluation of the Remediation Plan prepared by
CH2M Hill Philippines, Inc. within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.
VI. Petitioners' prayer for the creation of a special trust fund to answer for similar
contingencies in the future is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

II. After FPIC has undertaken the activities prescribed in the preceding paragraph 1, the
DOE shall determine if the activities and the results of the test run warrant the re-opening
of the WOPL. In the event that the DOE is satisfied that the WOPL is safe for continued
commercial operations, it shall issue an order allowing FPIC to resume the operations of the
pipeline.

III. Once the WOPL is re-opened, the DOE shall see to it that FPIC strictly complies with
the following directives:

a. Continue implementation of its Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS), as reviewed by the
DOE, which shall include, but shall not be limited to:

1. the conduct of daily patrols on the entire stretch of the WOPL, every two hours;