TRIAL AND APPELLATE ADVOCACY to the State which is the source of any asserted
INLAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS right to ownership of land. 3 Accordingly, public
2016
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PD NO.
1529)
PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA NO. 141)
SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’
PROTECTIVE DECREE (PD 957)
(Based on Agcaoili, “Property Registration
Decree and Related Laws
(Land Titles and Deeds)” and “Reviewer in
Property Registration
(With Sample MCQs and Suggested
Answers)”1
JUSTICE OSWALDO D.
AGCAOILI2
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (PD NO.
1529)
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of
whatever classification and other natural
resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong
1 waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
Published by Rex Book Store. See also: Agcaoili, “Law on
Natural Resources and Environmental Law Developments”,
with a Foreword by Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor,
Philippine Judicial Academy..
2
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili finished law at the University of
Sto. Tomas. He obtained a degree in Management at the Asian
Institute of Management. A former Chief of Legislative and
Research Section, Bureau of Lands, he was appointed
Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General in 1975, and
Assistant Solicitor General in 1984. In 1995, he was
appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He was
Chairman of the 13th Division upon his retirement from the
court. Justice Agcaoili is a Professor of the Philippine Judicial
Academy (PHILJA). He is a Professorial Lecturer of the UP
Institute for the Administration of Justice (UP-IAJ). He
teaches law at UST, UP and PLM. He is an Appellate Court
Mediator and Maritime Voluntary Arbitrator. A
delegate/participant in several international conferences, he
wrote a paper entitled “Environmental Protection: The
Convergence of Law and Policy” which he read during the
20th Biennial Conference on the Law of the World held in
Dublin, Ireland in October 2001. Described by Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno as “isa sa mga eksperto sa mga karapatan sa
lupa (one of our experts on land rights),” Justice Agcaoili is
the author of three books: “Property Registration Decree and
Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds),” “Law on Natural
Resources and Environmental Law Developments,” and
“Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Proceedings.”
(Tel.: 922-0232, 552-9636, 0920-9506384; E-mail:
oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com)
lands not shown to have been reclassified or
released as alienable agricultural land or
alienated to a private person by the State remain
part of the inalienable public domain. 4 Property of
the public domain is beyond the commerce of
man and not susceptible of private appropriation
and acquisitive prescription. Occupation thereof
in the concept of owner no matter how long
cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as
a title.5
The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of
the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.6
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions,7 embodies the principle of
State ownership of lands and all other natural
resources as provided in Sec. 2, Art. XII, to wit:
All lands of the public domain,
other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and
other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural
resources shall not be alienated.
ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND
ANCESTRAL LANDS
In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and
3
Republic v. Sin, GR No. 157485, March 26, 2014; Republic
v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014;
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Secretary
of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. 172775, Oct. , 2008; Arbias v.
Republic, GR No. 173808, Sept. 17, 2008; Alcantara v.
DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008; Buenaventura v.
Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007;Republic v. Candy
Maker, Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006; Pagkatipunan v.
Court of Appeals, GR No. 129862, March 21, 2002.
4
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000,
September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91, 101-102.
5
Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22,
2006, 492 SCRA 272, 291.
6
Valiao v. Republic, supra.
7
Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570,
Sept. 27, 2006.
 2
8 
Natural Resources, petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership
over lands of the public domain and all other
natural resources therein, by recognizing the
right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural
Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to
their ancestral domains and ancestral lands on
the basis of native title. After due deliberation on
the petition, the Supreme Court voted as follows:
seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition
while seven (7) others voted to grant the
petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to
7) and the necessary majority was not obtained,
the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same.
Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and
the validity of the law, deemed upheld.
Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the
petition, stated that the Regalian theory does not
negate native title to lands held in private
ownership since time immemorial, adverting to
the landmark case of Cariño v. Insular
Government,9  where the United States Supreme
Court, through Justice Holmes, declared:
It might, perhaps, be proper and
sufficient to say that when, as far back
as testimony or memory goes, the
land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it
will be presumed to have been held in
the same way from before the Spanish
conquest, and never to have been
public land.
The rights of ICCs/IPs may be acquired in
two modes: (a) by native title over both ancestral
lands and domains; or (b) by Torrens title under
the Public Land Act and Property Registration
Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.
THE TORRENS SYSTEM
OF REGISTRATION
The government has adopted the Torrens
system as the most effective measure to
guarantee the integrity of land titles and to
protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized. 10 The
government is required to issue an official
8 18
G.R. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000.
9
212 U.S., 449; 53 Law Ed., 594.
certificate of title to attest to the fact that the
person named in the certificate is the owner of
the property therein described, subject to such
liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or
what the law warrants or reserves.11 The
objective is to obviate possible conflicts of title by
giving the public the right to rely upon the face of
the Torrens certificate and to dispense, as a rule,
with the necessity of inquiring further. The
Torrens system gives the registered owner
complete peace of mind and security in his
ownership.12
PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION
The real purpose of the Torrens System of
land registration is to quiet title to land and stop
forever any question as to its legality. Once a
title is registered the owner may rest secure
without the necessity of waiting in the portals of
the court, or sitting on the mirador de su casa, to
avoid the possibility of losing his land. Indeed,
titles over lands under the Torrens system should
be given stability for on it greatly depends the
stability of the country's economy. Interest
reipublicae ut sit finis litium.13 The Torrens
system aims to decree land titles that shall be
final, irrevocable, and indisputable, 14  and to
relieve the land of the burden of known as well as
unknown claims.15 However, the Torrens system
does not furnish a shield for fraud, 16 nor permit
one to enrich himself at the expense of others, 17
otherwise, its acceptability is impaired. 18
REGISTRATION NOT A MODE
OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP
10
Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No.
175485, July 27, 2011; Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1997, 230 SCRA 550.
11
Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006,
485 SCRA 424..
12
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27,
December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 874.
13
Republic v. Agunoy, GR No. 155394, Feb. 17, 2005; see
also Legarda v. Saleeby, GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil.
590, 31 Phil. 590; Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731,
Jan. 11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9; National Grains Authority v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-68741, Jan. 28, 1988,
157 SCRA 388.
14
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, GR No.
14167, Aug. 14, 1919, 39 Phil. 996.
15
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra.
16
Rodriguez v. Lim, GR No. 135817, Nov. 30, 2006, 459
SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 125585,
June 8, 2005.
17
Ibid.
Ermac v. Ermac, GR No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA
291.
 3
Registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. It is only a means of confirming the
fact of its existence with notice to the world at
large. Certificates of title are not a source of
right. The mere possession of a title does not
make one the true owner of the property. Thus,
the mere fact that respondent has the titles of
the disputed properties in her name does not
necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her
the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title
likewise does not apply to respondent. A
certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,
and that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible.
However, there are well-defined exceptions to
this rule, as when the transferee is not a holder
in good faith and did not acquire the subject
properties for a valuable consideration. 19
Registration does not vest title. It is
merely a procedure to confirm and secure
evidence of his ownership over a particular
property. Our land registration laws do not give
the holder any better title than what he actually
has.20 A certificate of title merely confirms or
records title already existing and vested. 21 The
purpose of land registration under the Torrens
System is not the acquisition of land but only the
registration of title which applicant already
possesses over the land.22
DISTINCTION BETWEEN “TITLE”
AND “CERTIFICATE OF TITLE”
Title is generally defined as the lawful
cause or ground of possessing that which is ours.
It is that which is the foundation of ownership of
property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may
be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just
cause of exclusive possession, or which is the
foundation of ownership of property. Certificate
of title, on the other hand, is a mere evidence of
ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.
Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title
may be an Original Certificate of Title, which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of
19
Ventura v. Abuda, GR No. 202932, Oct. 23,2013, citing
Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009, 580
SCRA 175.
20
Solid Estate Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA630.
21
Tiro v. Phil. Estates Corporation, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26,
2008, 563 SCA 309; Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings
and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
22
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del rio, GR No. l-43105,
Aug. 31,1984.
registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title,
issued subsequent to the original registration.23
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
UPON REGISTRATION
Sec. 52 of PD No. 1529 provides:
SECTION 52. Constructive notice
upon registration. — Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land to which it relates
lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such
registering, filing, or entering.
Registration in the public registry is notice
to the whole world. Every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall
be, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of
the Register of Deeds of the province or city
where the land to which it relates lies,
constructive notice to all persons from the time of
such registering, filing or entering.24 A deed or
other voluntary instrument involving registered
land shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind
the land but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority
of the Register of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act
to convey or affect the land insofar as third
persons are concerned.25
In case of conflict between a vendee and an
attaching creditor, an attaching creditor who
registers the order of attachment and the sale of
the property to him as the highest bidder
acquires a valid title to the property as against a
vendee who had previously bought the same
property from the same owner but who failed to
register his deed of sale.26
23
Castillo v. Escutin, GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581
SCRA 258.
24
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Valdez, GR No. 171531, Jan. 30,
2009; MWSS v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 126000, Oct. 7,
1998.
25
Marasigan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-
69303, July 23, 1987, 152 SCRA 253; Campillo v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. L-56483, May 29, 1984, 129 SCRA 512.
26
Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Vilbar v.
Opinion, GR No. 176043, Jan. 15, 2014
 4
REGISTRATION OF LANDS:
GOVERNING LAWS
PD No. 1529, or the “Property
Registration Decree,” issued on June 11, 1978,
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property. It governs registration of
lands under the Torrens system as well as
unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.
27
CA No. 141, or the “Public Land Act,”
approved November 7, 1936, remains as the law
governing the classification and disposition of
lands of the public domain other than timber and
mineral lands, and privately owned lands which
reverted to the State.28 Under the Public Land
Act, there is a presumption that the land applied
for belongs to the state, and that the occupants
and possessors can only claim an interest in the
land by virtue of their imperfect title or
continuous, open, and notorious possession
thereof for a period prescribed by law.29
Act No. 2259, or the Cadastral Act, issued
on February 11, 1913, is an act providing for
special compulsory proceedings for the
settlement and adjudication of titles to lands.
RA No. 8371, or the “The Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act” (IPRA) was enacted on
October 29, 1997. The law allows indigenous
peoples to obtain recognition of their right of
ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral
domains by virtue of native title.
JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURTS IN LAND REGISTRATION CASES
Under Sec. 2 of PD No 1529, it is provided
that “Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Courts) shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of titles to
lands, including improvements and interest
therein and over all petitions filed after original
registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.”
Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the
aforesaid provision has simplified registration
proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial
courts the authority to act not only on
27
Sectary of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. Oct. 8, 32008.
28
Ibid.
29
Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 141325, July 31, 2006.
applications for original registration but also over
all petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions,
contentious and non-contentious, arising upon
such applications or petitions.30 In Lozada v.
Bracewell,31 (April 2, 2014), the Court stressed:
It should be pointed out, however,
that with the passage of PD 1529, the
distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the
limited jurisdiction conferred upon it as
a cadastral court was eliminated.
RTCs now have the power to hear
and determine all questions, even
contentious and substantial ones,
arising from applications for original
registration of titles to lands and
petitions filed after such
registration. (Emphasis supplied)
JURISDICTION OF FIRST LEVEL COURTS
IN CADASTRAL OR LAND REGISTRATION
CASES
Pursuant to Sec. 34 of BP Blg. 129, 32
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be
assigned by the Supreme Court to hear and
determine cadastral or land registration cases
covering:
(a) lots where there is no controversy or
opposition, or
(b) contested lots the value of which does
not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
Such value shall be ascertained by the
affidavit of the claimant or by agreement of the
respective claimants if there are more than one,
or from the corresponding tax declaration of the
real property.
Decisions of first level courts shall be
appealable in the same manner as decisions of
Regional Trial Courts.
All petitions or motions after original
registration shall be filed and entitled in the
30
Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986..
31
GR No. 179155.
32
Judiciary Reorganization Act, dated Aug. 14, 1981, as
amended by RA No. 7691. See also SC Circular No. 6-93,
dated November 15, 1995.
 5
original case in which the decree of registration
was entered.33
REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529
IS A PROCEEDING IN REM
Judicial proceedings for the registration of
lands shall be in rem and shall be based on the
generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.34 Being in rem, such proceedings
require constructive seizure of the land as against
all persons, including the state, who have rights
to or interests in the property.35 Constructive
seizure of the land is made through publication,
posting and service of notice. 36 The purpose of
publication is to (a) confer jurisdiction upon the
court over the res, and (b) apprise the whole
world of the pending registration case so that
they may assert their rights or interests in the
land applied for.
CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS
Pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution:
Lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. Agricultural lands of the public
domain may be further classified by
law according to the uses which they
may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied)
The classification of lands of the public
domain is an exclusive prerogative of the
executive department of the government and in
the absence of such classification, the lands
remain as unclassified until it is released
therefrom and rendered open to disposition. No
land of the public domain eighteen per cent
(18%) in slope or over shall be classified as
alienable and disposable.37
33
Secs. 2 and 108, PD No. 1529; Office of the Court
Administrator v. Matas, Adm. Mater RTJ-92-836, Aug. 2,
1995, 247 SCRA 9.
34
Sec. 2, BP Blg. 129; Esconde v. Barlongay, GR No. 67583,
July 31,1987.
35
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, GR No.
102858, July 28, 1997.
36
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529; Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Ribaya, GR No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 223.
37
Sec. 15, PD No. 705 (Forestry Code).
The President, through a presidential
proclamation or executive order, can classify or
reclassify land to be included or excluded from
the public domain. The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
Secretary is likewise empowered by law to
approve a land classification and declare such
land as alienable and disposable. 38 Since 1919,
courts were no longer free to determine the
classification of lands from the facts of each case,
except those that have already became private
lands.39
Alienable and disposable (A and D) lands
of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a)
patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified
as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of
the Civil Code, without limitation; and (b) lands
of the public domain, or the public lands as
provided by the Constitution, but with the
limitation that the lands must only be
agricultural. Consequently, lands classified as
forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are
not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless
they are reclassified as agricultural.40
The classification of lands of the public
domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification
and secondary classification. The primary
classification comprises agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks as
categorized in Section 3, Article XII of the
Constitution. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.41
Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the
uses which they may be devoted.42 This
classification is referred to as secondary
classification. Sec. 9 of the Public Land Act (CA
No. 141) provides:
SEC. 9. For the purpose of their
administration and disposition, the
lands of the public domain alienable or
open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to
which such lands are destined, as
follows:
38
Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
39
Sec. of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. 167707, Oct. 8, 2008.
40
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, Sept. 3, 2013 (Res.
on motion for reconsideration)
41
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
42
Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
 6
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive
purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or
other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for town-sites
and for public and quasi-public uses.
On the other hand, Section 20 (a) of RA
No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991,43 states:
(a) A city or municipality may,
through an ordinance passed by the
sanggunian after conducting public
hearings for the purpose, authorize the
reclassification of agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their
utilization or disposition in the
following cases: (1) when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and
sound for agricultural purposes as
determined by the Department of
Agriculture or (2) where the land shall
have substantially greater economic
value for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes, as determined by
the sanggunian concerned: x x x
But while the government has the
prerogative to classify lands of the public domain,
Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic 44 stresses
that the primary right of a private individual who
possessed and cultivated the land in good faith
much prior to such classification must be
recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-
events which could not have been anticipated.
NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES
Property of the public domain is beyond
the commerce of man and not susceptible of
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription.
Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and
be registered as a title. To prove that the land
subject of an application for registration is
alienable, the applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government,
43
See: Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Amante, GR
No.112526, March 16, 2005.
44
Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570,
Sept. 27, 2006.
such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.45
Specifically, the following are not capable
of alienation or disposition for titling purposes:
Lands intended for public use and for
public service
Property is either of public dominion or of
private ownership.46  Art. 420 of the Civil Code
provides that the following are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use,
such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads and
others of similar character;
(1) Those which belong to the
State, without being for public use,
and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the
national wealth.47 
Rivers, lakes and lagoons
Art. 502 adds to the above
enumeration, the following:
(1) Rivers and their natural beds;
(2) Continuous or intermittent
waters of springs and brooks running
in their natural beds and the beds
themselves;
(3) Waters rising continuously or
intermittently on lands of public
dominion;
(4) Lakes and lagoons formed by
Nature on public lands and their beds;
xxx
All other property of the State, which is
not of the character mentioned above, is
patrimonial property.48  Property of public
dominion, when no longer needed for public use
or for public service, shall form part of the
45
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011.
46
Art. 419, Civil Code.
47
Art. 420, ibid.
48
Art. 421, ibid.
 7
patrimonial property of the State.49
If land sought to be registered forms part
of the bed of a navigable stream, creek or river,
the decree or title to it in the name of the
respondents would not give them any right or
title to it. Navigable rivers cannot be
appropriated and registered under the Torrens
system.50 In Cachopero v. Celestial,51 it was held
that a dried-up creek bed is property of public
dominion.52
Lakes and lagoons formed by Nature on
public lands and their beds are likewise
inalienable.53 Under Art. 74 of the Law of Waters
of 1866, "the natural bed or basin of lakes,
ponds, or pools, is the ground covered by their
waters when at their highest ordinary depth." 54
The banks of rivers and streams and the
shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest
areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in
this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.55
In the case of residential subdivisions, the
allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of
a stream, shall be considered as forming part of
the open space requirement under PD No. 1216.
Open spaces are "for public use and are,
therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and
that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds
and recreational use shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable."56
Forest lands
Forest lands are inalienable and
possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
convert the same into private property. Courts
49
Art. 422, ibid.
50
Republic v. Sioson, GR No. L-13687, Nov. 29, 1963.
51
GR No. 146754, March 21, 2012; 459 Phil. 903 (2003).
52
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14,
2011.
53
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Del Rio, GR No. L-43105,
Aug. 31, 1984.
54
Ibid.
55
Art. 51, ibid.
56
Pilar Development Corporation v. Dumadag, GR No.
194336, March 11, 2013.
are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within
the forest zone.57 The subsequent release of
forest lands as A and D lands does not validate a
previous grant.58 In Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry,59 the Court stated:
A forested area classified as forest
land of the public domain does not
lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped
it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually
be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. ‘Forest lands’ do not have to
be on mountains or in out of the way
places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other
trees growing in brackish or sea water
may also be classified as forest land.
The classification is descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not
have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the
land classified as ‘forest’ is released in
an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are not deemed contracts within the
purview of the due process of law. They may be
validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded
by the Chief Executive when national interests so
require.60
Mineral lands
Mineral land means any area where
mineral resources are found. 61 Mineral resources,
on the other hand, means any concentration of
mineral/rocks with potential economic value.62
The ownership of mineral resources is provided in
RA No. 7942, known as the Philippine Mining Act
of 1995, viz.:
57
Collado v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002;
Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 75672, April 19,
1989.
58
Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 295 SCRA 296.
59
GR No. L-27873, Nov. 29, 1983.
60
Oposa v. Factoran, GR No. 101083, July 30, 1993.
61
Sec. 3(ac), RANo. 7942 (Philippine Mining Act of 1995)
62
Sec. 4(aj) and (an), DENR Administrative Order No. 95-936,
as amended.
 8
SEC. 4. Ownership of Mineral
Resources. — Mineral resources are
owned by the State and the
exploration, development, and
processing thereof shall be under its
full control and supervision. The State
may directly undertake such activities
or it may enter into mineral
agreements with contractors.
The State shall recognize and
protect the rights of the indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral
lands as provided for by the
Constitution.
Justice Panganiban in La Bugal-B’laan
Association v. Ramos63 stressed that:
All mineral resources are owned by
the State. Their exploration,
development and utilization (EDU)
must always be subject to the full
control and supervision of the State.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la
Rosa,64 the Court, through Justice Cruz, held that
“(t)he Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all
natural wealth that may be found in the bowels
of the earth even if the land where the discovery
is made be private.” It added:
The rule simply reserves to the
State all minerals that may be found in
public and even private land devoted
to "agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential or (for) any purpose other
than mining." Thus, if a person is the
owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give him the
right to extract or utilize the said
minerals without the permission of the
State to which such minerals belong. x
x x Once minerals are discovered in
the land, whatever the use to which it
is being devoted at the time, such use
may be discontinued by the State to
enable it to extract the minerals
therein in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not
be used by any private party, including
the registered owner thereof, for any
63
GR No. 127882, Dec. 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
64
GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228.
other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken
therein. For the loss sustained by such
owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws
or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.
Possession of mineral land, no matter how
long, does not confer possessory rights. 65  Thus, a
certificate of title is void when it covers property
of public domain classified as mineral lands. Any
title issued over non-disposable lots, even in the
hands of alleged innocent purchaser for value,
shall be cancelled.66
Foreshore and reclaimed lands
The term “foreshore land” has been
invariably defined as “that strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that
is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of
the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the
sea which is alternately covered by the ordinary
flow of the tides.”67 The Philippine Fisheries Code
defines foreshore land as a string of land
margining a body of water; the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at
the seaward margin of a low tide terrace and the
upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually
marked by a beach scarp or berm.68
Foreshore lands are inalienable unless
reclaimed by the government and classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain. 69 In
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real
Estate Corporation,70 the Court held that
foreshore lands – or “that strip of land that lies
between the high and low water marks and that
is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of
the tide” or “that part of the land adjacent to the
sea which is alternately covered and left dry by
the ordinary flow of the tides” - belong to the
public domain intended for public use. The
controversy in this case involved lots which are
now part of the Cultural Center of the Philippines
(CCP). On March 5, 1962, the government
65
Atok-Big Wedge Mining Co. v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
88883, Jan. 18, 1991. 193 SCRA 71.
66
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co. v. Dumyung, GR No. L-
31666, April 20, 1979, 89 SCRA 532.
67
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate
Corporation, GR Nos. 103882 and 105276, Nov. 25, 1998, 299
SCRA 199.
68
Sec. 4(46), RA No. 8550.
69
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, GR No. 133250, Nov.
11, 2003.
70
GR No. 103882, Nov. 25, 1998.
 9
through the Solicitor General sought to nullify the
reclamation agreement between Pasay City and
Republic Real Estate Corporation on grounds that
there were no “foreshore lands” in Pasay City
which could only be the subject of lawful
reclamation under the then prevailing law, RA
No. 1899; that the area was already reserved as
a national park, hence beyond the commerce of
men; and that the agreement was executed
without any public bidding. The Supreme Court,
in a decision penned by Justice Purisima,
sustained the government’s action and nullified
the reclamation agreement as being ultra vires
and contrary to law. It held that the reclamation
involved “submerged areas” or “all sea” and not
"foreshore lands" as allowed by said law. The
land is now occupied by the Cultural Center of
the Philippines.
In a separate opinion, Justice Puno cited
the importance of the CCP as the only venue of
arts and culture in the Philippines and, in elegant
prose, intoned:
The CCP Complex is the only area
in the Philippines that is fully devoted
to the growth and propagation of arts
and culture. It is the only venue in the
country where artists, Filipino and
foreign alike, may express their art in
its various forms, be it in music,
dance, theater, or in the visual arts
such as painting, sculpture and
installation art or in literature such as
prose, poetry and the indigenous oral
and written literary forms. The
theaters and facilities of the Complex
have been utilized for the staging of
cultural presentations and for the
conduct of lectures and
demonstrations by renowned visiting
artists. The wide open spaces of the
Complex are the only open spaces in
Metropolitan Manila that have been
used to accommodate huge crowds in
cultural, artistic and even religious
events. The CCP has indeed emerged
as a dynamic force in the promotion of
the country's artistic and cultural
heritage and the development of new
and modern art forms. Through the
years, it has helped raise the Filipino
consciousness to our nationhood, and
in the process, inculcated love for our
country.
Lands reclaimed by the government by
dredging, filling, or other means are inalienable.
In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,71 the Court
held that only when actually reclaimed from the
sea can submerged areas be classified as public
agricultural lands. Once reclaimed and
transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these
lands as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition. Thereafter, the government may
declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be
considered alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain.
Mangroves swamps
Mangrove swamps or manglares are
forestal and not alienable agricultural land. 72  In
Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources,73  it was held “that the Bureau of
Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of
swamplands or mangrove lands forming part of
the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest lands.” This was reaffirmed in
Director of Forestry v. Villareal74  where the Court
categorically declared that mangrove swamps
form part of the public forests and, therefore, not
subject to disposition until and unless they are
first released as forest land and classified as
alienable agricultural land. The Fisheries Code
makes it unlawful for any person to convert
mangroves into fishponds or for any other
purposes.
Watersheds
Watersheds may be defined as "an area
drained by a river and its tributaries and enclosed
by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds." Watersheds generally are
outside the commerce of man. 75 The Constitution
expressly mandates the conservation and proper
utilization of natural resources, which includes
the country’s watershed. In Sta. Rosa Realty
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,76
the Court recognized that:
x x x The most important product
71
GR No. 133250, May 6, 2003.
72
Director of Forestry v. Villareal, GR No. L-32266, Feb. 27,
1989, 170 SCRA 598.
73
GR No. L-36847, July 20, 1983, 151 SCRA 88; see also
Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. 74957, June
30, 1987, 151 SCRA 679.
74
Supra.
75
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001.
76
GR No. 112526, Oct. 12, 2001; see also Collado v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 107764, Oct. 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 343.
 10
of a watershed is water which is one of
the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of
watershed ensures an adequate supply
of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only
damage property but also cause loss
of lives. Protection of watersheds is an
‘intergenerational’ responsibility that
needs to be answered now.
In Tan v. Director of Forestry,77  the
Supreme Court reiterated the basic policy of
conserving the national patrimony, as
exemplified by the government’s withdrawal from
entry, sale or settlement of forest reserves for
watershed, soil protection and timber production
purposes.
Military or naval reservation
Land inside a military or naval reservation
cannot be registered.78 To segregate portions of
the public domain as a military reservation, there
is need of a presidential proclamation to that
effect. In Republic v. Southside Homeowners
Association, Inc.,79 it was held that a military
reservation, like the Fort Bonifacio Military
Reservation, or any part thereof is not open to
private appropriation or disposition unless it is
first reclassified and declared as disposable and
alienable public land, even if incidentally it is
devoted for a purpose other than as a military
camp or for defense.
operations are not allowed in old growth or virgin
forests, proclaimed watershed forest reserves,
wilderness area, mangrove forests, mossy
forests, national parks, provincial/municipal
forests, parks, greenbelts, game refuge and bird
sanctuaries as defined by law in areas expressly
prohibited under the NIPAS and other laws.
National park refers to a forest reservation
essentially of natural wilderness character which
has been withdrawn from settlement, occupancy
or any form of exploitation. 80 National parks,81
protected areas and nature reserves82 are
inalienable.
WHO MAY APPLY FOR REGISTRATION
Under Sec. 14, PD No. 1529, the
following may apply for registration:
(1) Those who by themselves or
their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by
prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.

Protected areas (3) Those who have acquired

ownership of private lands or
RA No. 7586 provides for the abandoned river beds by right
establishment and management of a national of accession or acquired under
integrated protected areas system referred to as existing laws;
the “National Integrated Protected Areas System
Act of 1992). NIPAS is the classification and (4) Those who have acquired
administration of all designated protected areas ownership of land in any other
to maintain essential ecological processes and manner provided for by law.
life-support systems, to preserve genetic
diversity, to ensure sustainable use of resources Under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 (Public
found therein, and to maintain their natural Land Act), it is provided as follows:
conditions to the greatest extent possible. The
illegal possession or sale of rights of portions Those who by themselves or
thereof is prohibited under the NIPAS Act. through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in the open, continuous,
Pursuant to Section 19 of RA No. 7942, or exclusive and notorious possession
the Philippine Mining Act of 1955, mining
80
RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System
77
GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302. Act of 1992.
78 81
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. GR Palomo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 95608, Jan. 21, 1997.
82
No. 156951, Sept. 2, 2006. RA No. 7586, National Integrated Protected Areas System
79
GR No. 156951, Sept. 22, 2006. Act of 1992
 11
and occupation of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
prior thereto may apply for the
confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title.
Sec. 14(1) deals with possession and
occupation in the concept of an owner while Sec.
14 (2) involves prescription as a mode of
acquiring ownership.83
There is no substantial difference between
Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 and Sec. 48(b) of CA
No. 141. In both, the applicant must show that
(1) the land is alienable and disposable (A and D)
public agricultural land; and (2) he has been in
open, continuous exclusive and notorious
possession thereof under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or prior thereto. 84
Both refer to original registration proceedings,
are against the whole world, and the decree of
registration for both is conclusive and final.
ACQUISITION OF A & D LAND BY
POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION SINCE
JUNE 12, 1945 OR PRIOR THERETO
Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 provides that
“those who by themselves or their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier” may
apply for registration.
Sec. 14(1) refers to the judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles to
public land acquired under Sec. 48(b) of CA
No.141, as amended by PD No. 1073. Under Sec.
14(1), applicants for registration of title must
sufficiently establish first, that the subject land
forms part of the disposable and alienable lands
of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and
third, that such possession and occupation is
83
Republic v. Joson, GR No. 163767, March 10, 2014.
84
Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation, GR No.
170724, Jan. 29, 2007; Reyes v. Republic, GR No. 141924,
Jan. 23, 2007; Republic v. Manna Properties, GR No. 146527,
Jan. 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 247..
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.”85
Possession should be in the concept of an
owner, open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious. Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine;
continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and
not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when
the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it
to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it
is so conspicuous that it is generally known and
talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.86
In the landmark case of Malabanan v.
Republic,87 the Court en banc reiterated that the
law does not require that the land subject of
registration should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession,
or since June 12, 1945. It is sufficient that the
land is already declared as alienable and
disposable land at the time the application for
registration is filed so as to entitle the possessor
to registration.
To prove that the land subject of the
application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order;
an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or statute. The applicant may secure a
certification from the government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable, but the
certification must show that the DENR Secretary
had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by
85
Republic v Zuburban Realty, GR No, 164408, Marc 24,
2014March 24, 2014; Republic v. Remnan Enterprises, Inc.,
GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014; Campos v. Republic, GR No.
184371, March 5, 2014; Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 186639,
Feb. 5, 2014;.Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No.174626, Oct. 23,
2013; Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011;
Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.
86
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development
Corporation, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012, citing. Heirs of
Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068,
Sept. 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
87
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172, reiterated
in the Court’s resolution dated Sept. 3, 2013; see also Republic
v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA
438; Republic v. Rizalvo, GR No. 172011, March 7, 2011.
 12
the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also
present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declared by
the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.88
Since the effectivity of PD No. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, it must be shown that
possession and occupation of the land started on
June 12, 1945 or earlier. A mere showing of
possession and occupation for thirty (30) years
or more is no longer sufficient.89
Originally, Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141
provided for the possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain since July 26, 1934.
This was superseded by RA No. 1942, dated June
22, 1957, which provided for a simple 30-year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant
for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The
law, however, has been amended by PD No.
1073, approved on January 25, 1977 but became
effective on May 9, 1977,90 which now requires
possession since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.91
But PD No. 1073 cannot impair vested
rights of applicants who had complied with
the 30-year possession required under the RA
No. 1942. A vested right is "some right or
interest in the property which has become fixed
and established, and is no longer open to doubt
or controversy."92
Thus, in Republic v. Remman Enterprises,
Inc.,93 (Feb. 19, 2014), the Court held that an
applicant who, by himself or his predecessors-in-
interest, has been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership for 30 years prior to the issuance of
PD No. 1073 (issued on January 25, 1977 but
88
Gaerlan v. Republic, GR No. 192717, March 12, 2014;
Republic v. Heirs of Sin, GR No. 157485,
89
Campos v. Republic, GR No. 184371, March 5, 2014.
90
Fortuna v. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014.
91
Republic v. Remman Enterprises, Inc., GR No. 199310, Feb.
19, 2014; Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008;
Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap, GR No. 173775, Oct. 8, 2008; Republic v.
Sarmiento, GR No. 169397, March 13, 2007; Republic v.
Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183;
Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA 359. See also RA No. 6940,
dated March 28, 1990.
92
Benguet Consolidated Mining v. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711 (1956)
citing Balboa v. Farrales, 51 Phil. 498 (1928) and 16 C.J.S.
214-215.
93
Supra.
effective only on May 9, 1977), or at least since
May 8, 1947, may apply for judicial confirmation
of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec.
48(b) of the Public Land Act.
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND
BY PRESCRIPTION
Sec. 14(2) provides that those who “those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws”
may apply for registration. As Sec. 14(2)
categorically provides, only private properties
may be acquired thru prescription and under Art.
420 and 421 of the Civil Code, only those
properties, which are not for public use, public
service or intended for the development of
national wealth, are considered private.94
In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty
Development Corporation,95 it was held that Sec.
14(2) of public, PD No. 1529 must be considered
in relation to the rule on prescription under the
Civil Code as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. Possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable public land for the
periods provided under the Civil Code do not
automatically convert said property into private
property or release it from the public domain.
There must be an express declaration that the
property is no longer intended for public service
or development of national wealth. 96 Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.97 But the period of possession
preceding the classification of the property as
patrimonial cannot be considered in determining
the completion of the prescriptive period.98
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a
person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial
property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless
of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. 99
94
Republic v. Cortez, GR No. 186639, Feb. 5, 2014
95
GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012.
96
Malabanan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 179987, April 29,
2009.
97
Republic v. Aboitiz, GR No. 174626, Oct. 23, 2013.
Republic v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012.
98
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development
Corporation, supra.
99
Id.
 13
Open, continuous and exclusive
possession of land classified as A and D land for
at least thirty years segregates the land from the
public domain and ipso jure converts the same to
private property.100
(Note: In Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-
Crisologo v. Rañon, 101 the Court ruled that a
mere notice of adverse claim did not constitute
an effective interruption of possession. In Heirs
of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, 102
which also cited the Rañon. the Court stated that
the acts of declaring again the property for tax
purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of
title in one's name cannot defeat another's right
of ownership acquired through acquisitive
prescription. In the same vein, a protest filed
before an administrative agency and even the
decision resulting from it cannot effectively toll
the running of the period of acquisitive
prescription. Only in cases filed before the courts
may judicial summons be issued and, thus,
interrupt possession.103)
Distinction between Sec. 14(1) and Sec.
14(2): Under Sec. 14(1), there must be proof
showing that the land had already been classified
as alienable and disposable at the time the
application is filed. Under Sec. 14(2), there
must be proof that the land had already been
converted to patrimonial property (no longer
intended for public service or the development of
the national wealth) at the start of
possession.104
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND BY
RIGHT OF ACCESSION OR ACCRETION
Sec. 14(3) of PD No. 1529 states that “those
who have acquired ownership of private lands or
abandoned river beds by right of accession or
acquired under existing laws” may also apply for
registration.
Under Art. 420, paragraph 1105 and Art. 502,
100
Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007;
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 56; See Arts. 1127
and 1134, Civil Code.
101
G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
102
Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R.
No. 175763, April 11, 2012. citing Heirs of Marcelina
Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5,
2007, 532 SCRA 391, 406-407.
103
Virtucio v. Alegarbes, GR No. 187451, Aug. 29, 2012.
104
Republic v. Zuburban Realty, GR No. 164408, March 24,
2014.
105
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
paragraph 1106 of the Civil Code, rivers and their
natural beds are property of public dominion.
River beds which are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters ipso
facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost.107 However, the owners of the lands
adjoining the old bed shall have the right to
acquire the same by paying the value thereof,
which value shall not exceed the value of the
area occupied by the new bed.
By law, accretion — the gradual and
imperceptible deposit made through the effects of
the current of the water — belongs to the owner
of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where
it forms.108 The drying up of the river is not
accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs
to the State as property of public dominion, not
to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the
ownership in some other person.109 In Cachopero
v. Celestial,110 it was held that a dried-up creek
bed is property of public dominion.111
Art. 457 of the Civil Code requires that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; that it be
made through the effects of the current of the
water; and that the land where accretion takes
placep is adjacent to the banks of rivers.112
However, the accretion does not automatically
become registered land just because the lot
which receives such accretion is covered by a
Torrens title. There must be a separate action
for the registration thereof.113
Alluvial formation along the seashore is
part of the public domain and is not open to
acquisition by adverse possession, unless
subsequently declared as no longer needed for
coast guard service, for public use or for special
industries.114
1) Those intended for public use, such as roads,
canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the
State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar
character; . . . .
106
Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:
1) Rivers and their natural beds; . . . .
107
Art. 461, Civil Code.
108
Art. 457, id.
109
Republic v. Santos, GR No. 160453, Nov. 12, 2012.
110
GR No. 146754, March 21, 2012; 459 Phil. 903 (2003).
111
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14,
2011.
112
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
113
Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524.
114
Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335.
 14
ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND IN hectare in the case of rural
ANY MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW lands.118

Sec. 14(4) provides that “those who have  For business (investment) or other
acquired ownership of land in any other manner purposes:
provided for by law” may also apply for
registration. This is illustrated where, for o 5,000 square meters if urban
instance, a land grant has been made by a
land, or 3 hectares if rural
Presidential proclamation or legislative act
land.119
pursuant to which the grantee may apply for the
registration of the land and bring it under the
But where a Filipino citizen naturalized as
operation of the Torrens system.
a citizen in a foreign country has “reacquired” his
In Republic, rep. by the Mindanao Medical
Philippine citizenship under the terms of RA No.
Center v. Court of Appeals,115 the trial court
9225, dated August 29, 2003, otherwise known
ordered the registration of Lot No. 1176-B-2
as the “Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition
situated in Davao City, which was reserved by a
Act of 2003,” the area limitation under RA No.
Presidential proclamation for medical site
7042 may no longer apply since the law
purposes in 1956, in favor of petitioner Mindanao
expressly grants him the same right, as any
Medical Center. The court held that the
Filipino citizen, to “enjoy full civil and political
proclamation legally effected a land grant to the
rights” upon the re-acquisition of his Filipino
Mindanao Medical Center validly sufficient for
citizenship.
initial registration under the Property Registration
Decree. Such grant is constitutive of a “fee
Private land may be transferred only to
simple” title or absolute title in favor of the
individuals or entities “qualified to acquire or hold
grantee.
lands of the public domain.” Only Filipino citizens
or corporations at least 60% of the capital of
ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS MAY ACQUIRE
which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
acquire or hold lands of the public domain. The
fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos
On the basis of their capacity “to acquire
from acquiring or holding title to private lands,
or hold lands of the public domain,” the following
except only by way of legal succession or if the
may acquire private lands:
acquisition was made by a former natural-born
citizen.120 Aliens, however, may lease private
(1) Filipino citizens;
lands.121
(2) Filipino corporations and association
The constitutional ban against foreigners
as defined in Section 2, Article XII of
applies only to ownership of Philippine land and
the Constitution; and, by exception,
not to the improvements built thereon. A contract
that violates the Constitution and the law is null
(3) Aliens but only be hereditary
and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations
succession;116 and
and produces no legal effect at all. The law will
not aid either party to an illegal contract or
(4) A natural-born citizen of the
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds
Philippines who has lost his citizenship
them. The provision on unjust enrichment does
may be a transferee of private lands
not apply if the action is proscribed by the
subject to limitations provided by
Constitution.122
law.117

Area limitations: 118

BP Blg. 185, dated March 16, 1982.
119
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer Primer, 2000
 For residence ed., 515; Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution; RA No. 7042, as
amended by RA No. 8179.
120
o 1,000 square meters in the Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009.
121
case of urban lands or one Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341;
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461; Philippine Bank
115
GR No. L-40912, Sept. 30, 1976, 73 SCRA 146. of Commerce v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.
116 122
Sec. 7, Art. XII, Constitution Beumer v. Amores, GR No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012, citing
117
Sec. 8, ibid. cases.
 15
CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND IS
DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF ITS
ACQUISITION, NOT REGISTRATION
The time to determine whether a person
acquiring land is qualified is the time the right to
own it is acquired. Thus, in Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Lapina,123 it was held that a
naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a
natural-born Filipino, acquired land from a vendor
who had already complied with the requirements
of registration prior to the purchase, can validly
register his title to the land even if at the time of
the filing of his application he was already an
alien. He already had a vested right to the
land.124
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISQUALIFIED
FROM ACQUIRING PUBLIC LANDS
A private corporation may not hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.125 But the
rule does not apply where at the time the
corporation acquired the land, the same was
already private land as when it was possessed by
its predecessor in the manner and for such length
of time as to entitle the latter to registration. If
the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation
have been in possession of the land in question
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may
rightfully apply for confirmation of title to the
land. That vested right has to be respected.
Alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-
interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion
of said period, ipso jure.126
PUBLICATION, MAILING AND POSTING
Within five days from the filing of the
application for registration, the court shall issue
an order setting the date and hour of initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than 45 days
nor later than 90 days from date of the order. 127
The public is given notice of the initial hearing by
(a) publication once in the Official Gazette and
once in a newspaper of general circulation; (b)
mailing of the notice to persons named in the
123
GR No. 108998, Aug. 24, 1994, 235 SCRA 567.
124
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapiña, 235 SCRA 567.
125
Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
126
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146
SCRA 509.
127
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529.
application for registration and also to relevant
government officials, and (c) posting of the
notice on a conspicuous place on the land itself
and on the bulletin board of the city or
municipality where the land is situated. 128
Publication in the OG shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.129 However, publication of the notice
in a newspaper of general circulation remains an
indispensable requirement consistent with
procedural due process.130
If amendment of the application is made
to include additional area, a new publication of
the amended application must be made, but not
when the amendment consists in the exclusion of
a portion form the area originally applied for.131
OPPOSITION
Any person, whether named in the notice
or not, may appear and file and opposition, based
on right of dominion or some other real right, to
the application for registration.132 But the
absence of opposition does not justify outright
registration. Since the presumption is that all
lands belong to the State, the applicant has the
burden of proving his imperfect right or fee
simple title to the land applied for.133 The failure
of the government to file an opposition, despite
receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right to
appeal a decision adjudicating the land as private
property.134
IDENTITY OF THE LAND
As required by Sec. 17 of PD No. 1529,
the application for registration must be
accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly
approved by the Director of Lands (now Regional
Technical Director, Lands Management Bureau),
together with the applicant’s muniments of title.
No plan or survey may be admitted in land
registration proceedings until approved by the
Director of Lands.
In Director of Lands v. Reyes,135 the Court
declared that the submission of the tracing cloth
plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory
128
Id.
129
Sec. 24, PD No. 1529.
130
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302; Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, 27 SCRA 276.
131
Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.
132
Sec. 27 PD No. 1529.
133
Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227.
134
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
135
GR No.L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
 16
character. But in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,136  the Court
considered the submission of a white print copy
of the plan as sufficient to identify the land. The
Court was more categorical in Director of Lands
v. Intermediate Appellate Court and Espartinez 137  for is indeed classified as A and D is “within the
when it stated that “the presentation of the
tracing cloth plan required x x x may now be
dispensed with where there is a survey plan the
correctness of which had not been overcome by
clear, strong and convincing evidence.”
EVIDENCE OF CLASSIFICATION OF
LAND AS “A” AND “D”
In Gaerlan v. Republic, 138
(March 12,
2014), the Court reiterated that to prove that the
land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may secure a certification from the
government that the lands applied for are
alienable and disposable, but the certification
must show that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the
application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by
the PENRO or CENRO. The applicant must also
present a copy of the original classification of the
land into alienable and disposable, as declared by
the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the
President.
The Court, citing Republic v. TA.N
Properties, Inc.,139 further clarified that an
application for original registration of title over a
parcel of land must be accompanied by a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records in order to
establish that the land is indeed alienable and
disposable. In Gaerlan, the Court held that a
CENRO or PENRO certification cannot be
considered prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein since he is not the officer “having
legal custody of the record.”
136
GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586.
137
GR No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 98.
138
GR No. 192717.
139
G.R. No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 477
Note, however, that in DENR
Memorandum No. 564, dated Nov. 15, 2012, the
DENR clarified that the issuance of the
certification and the certified copy of the
approved LC Map to prove that the area applied
competence and jurisdiction of the CENRO.” In
fact, under DENR Adm. Order (DAO) No. 20,
dated May 30, 1988, as amended by DAO No. 38
(1990), the PENRO is authorized to issue
certificates of land classification for areas over 50
hectares, and CENROS for areas below 50
hectares.
The case of Republic v. Joson,140 reiterates
that the applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the
public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary
and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. The mere
certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO does
not suffice for the purpose. To the same effect
are the recent cases of Republic v. San Mateo,141
and Republic v. Castuera.142
(But in Llanes v. Republic,143 the Court
held: “To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must conclusively establish the
existence of a positive act of the government
such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order, or an administrative action,
investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator or a legislative act or statute. A
certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating
that the land subject of an application is found to
be within the alienable and disposable site per a
land classification project map is sufficient
evidence to show the real character of the land
subject of the application.” Note that the
corrected certification was admitted although
presented only during the appeal, in the interest
of substantial justice).
140
GR No. 163767, March 10, 2014; see also Republic v.
Remnan Enterprises, GR No. 199310, Feb. 19, 2014.
141
GR No. 203560, Nov. 10, 2014.
142
GR No. 203384, Jan. 14, 2015.
143
GR No. 177947, Nov. 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269.
 17
In Victoria v. Republic,144 the subject
property was covered by a cadastral survey of
Taguig conducted by the government. The Court
held: “Such surveys are carried out precisely to
encourage landowners and help them get titles to
the lands covered by such survey. It does not
make sense to raise an objection after such a
survey that the lands covered by it are
inalienable land of the public domain, like a
public forest. This is the City of Taguig in the
middle of the metropolis.”
That there are building structures,
residential houses and even government
buildings existing and standing on the area does
not prove that the land is no longer considered
and classified as forest land.145
EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION
Under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 and Sec.
14(1) of PD No. 1529, the reckoning point of
possession is June 12, 1945.146 It is only
necessary that the land is already classified as A
and D land at the time of the filing of the
application for registration.147
Possession must be open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 148
Acts of a possessory character by virtue of a
license or mere tolerance on the part of the real
owner are not sufficient.149 Mere casual
cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing
of livestock without substantial enclosures or
other permanent improvements do not constitute
exclusive and notorious possession under claim of
ownership150
TAX DECLARATIONS AND TAX
RECEIPTS CORROBORATIVE PROOF
OF POSSESSION
144
GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.
145
Chang v. Republic, GR No. 171726, Feb. 23, 2011.
146
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, GR No. 158449, Oct. 22,
2004, 441 SCRA 188..
147
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009,
587 SCRA 172.
148
Sec. 14(1), PD No. 1529; Sec. 48(b), CA No. 141, as
amended; Campos v. Republic, GR No. 184371, March 5,
201Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Republic
v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183
149
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, GR No.
L-4641, March 13, 1911, 19 Phil.32.
150
Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA
734; Director of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
Tax declarations and payment of taxes are
not conclusive proof of ownership but have
strong probative value when accompanied by
proof of actual possession or supported by other
effective proof.151 Declaring land for taxation
purposes and visiting it every once in a while do
not constitutes acts of possession.152 Tax
declarations are not evidence of the right of
possession unless supported by the other
effective proof. But they constitute proof that
the holder has claim of the title over the
property.153
Payment of taxes is on an annual basis.
Delayed declaration of property for tax purposes
negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession in the concept of
owner.154 Hence, payment in one a lump sum to
cover all past taxes is “irregular” and affects the
validity of the applicant’s claim of ownership. 155
But mere failure of the owner to pay taxes does
not warrant a conclusion that there was
abandonment of the property.156
SPANISH TITLES NO LONGER
VALID PROOF OF OWNERSHIP
Spanish titles are no longer admissible as
proof of ownership. The so-called Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136 is inexistent.157 In a case,
TCT No. 451423-A was traced back to Titulo de
Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate
Estate of the late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban v. Court of Appeals, was already
declared null and void, and from which no rights
could therefore be derived.158
JUDGMENT; DECREE OF REGISTRATION
Within 15 days from entry of judgment,
the court shall issue an order directing the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of
151
Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008;
Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, id.
152
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209
SCRA 214.
153
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820;
Masagana v. Argamora, 109 SCRA 53; Director of lands v.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
154
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
155
Republic v. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140.
156
Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.
157
PD No. 892, dated Aug. 16, 1976; Santiago v. SBMA, GR
No. 156888, Nov. 20, 2006; Quezon Province v. Marte, GR
No. 139274, Oct. 23, 2001; Intestate Estate of Don Mariano
San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733; Director of
Land v. Rivas, 141 SCRA 329.
158
De la Rosa v. Valdez, GR No. 159101, July 27, 2011.
 18
registration and certificate of title. 159 There is no
period within which to issue the decree.160
Adjudication of ownership includes the
delivery of possession if the defeated party has
not shown any right to possess the land
independently of her rejected claim of
ownership.161
While the judgment becomes final 15 days
from receipt of notice of the judgment (as to the
government, period of appeal shall be reckoned
from receipt of the decision by the Solicitor
General who represents the government in all
registration proceedings),162 the court
nevertheless retains jurisdiction over the case
until after the expiration of one year from the
issuance of the decree of registration; 163 hence,
the case may still be reopened and the decision
set aside when granted.164 As held in Francisco
v. Rojas,165 the adjudication of land in a cadastral
or land registration proceeding does not become
final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after
the expiration of one (1) year from the entry of
the final decree of registration. The title is not yet
finally adjudicated and the decision in the
registration proceeding continues to be under the
control and sound discretion of the court. Until
then the court rendering the decree may, after
hearing, set aside the decision or decree and
adjudicate the land to another person.
Execution pending appeal is not applicable
in a land registration proceeding and the
certificate of title thereby issued is null and void.
A Torrens title issued on the basis of a judgment
that is not final is a nullity, as is violative of the
explicit provisions of the Property Registration
Decree which requires that a decree shall be
issued only after the decision adjudicating the
title becomes final and executory, and it is on the
basis of said decree that the Register of Deeds
concerned issues the corresponding certificate of
title.166
A land registration court has no
jurisdiction to order the registration of land
already decreed in the name of another in an
159
Sec. 30, PD No. 1529)
160
Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012.
161
Pascual v. Daqioag, GR No. 162063, March 31, 2014.
162
Sec. 1 (e), PD No. 478; Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.
163
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503.
164
Cayanan v. De los Santos, 21CRA 1348.
165
166
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR
No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing cases.
earlier land registration case. A second decree for
the same land would be null and void.167
In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,168
the Court held that a judicial declaration that a
parcel of land is public, does not preclude even
the same applicant from subsequently seeking a
judicial confirmation of his title to the same land,
provided he thereafter complies with the
provisions of Section 48169 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public
lands remain alienable and disposable.170
WRIT OF POSSESSION
The writ may be issued not only against
the person defeated in the registration case but
also against any one adversely occupying the
land during the proceedings up to the issuance of
the decree.171 The writ does not lie against a
person who entered the land after the issuance of
the decree and who was not a party in the case.
He can only be proceeded against in a separate
action for ejectment or reivindicatory action. 172
The writ is imprescriptible. A writ of demolition is
but a compliment of the writ of possession 173 and
167
Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., GR
No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011, citing Laburada v. Land
Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, 287
SCRA 333, 343-344, citing Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103558,
November 17, 1992, 215 SCRA 783, 788.
168
G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-47847, July 31,
1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433.
169
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).
170
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011
171
Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 491.
172
Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399.
173
Gawaran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 154;
Lucero v. Leot, 25 SCRA 687.
 19
may be issued by a special order of the court.
Mandamus is a proper remedy to compel the
issuance of a writ of possession.174
JURISDICTION: REAL ACTIONS
Section 19 of BP Blg. 129 confers
exclusive jurisdiction on Regional Trial Courts (1)
in all civil actions in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;
and (2) in all civil actions which involve the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry
into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings,
original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
On the other hand, Section 33 of BP Blg.
29 provides that Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve
title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of
the property or interest therein does not
exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or,
in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses and costs.
An action for reconveyance or to remove a
cloud on one's title involves the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest
therein, hence, exclusive original jurisdiction over
such action pertains to the RTC, unless the
assessed value of the property does not exceed
P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila), in
which instance the MTC having territorial
jurisdiction would have exclusive original
jurisdiction. Determinative of which regular court
had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the
complaint (on the assessed value of the property)
and the principal relief thereby sought.175
174
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523,
March 9, 2011.
175
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011, citing
Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico Sevilla, G.R. No.
174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.
When the dispossession or unlawful
deprivation has lasted more than one year, one
may avail himself of accion publiciana to
determine the better right of possession, or
possession de jure, of realty independently of
title. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is
an action to recover ownership which necessarily
includes recovery of possession. While an accion
reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an
ejectment case, such judgment constitutes a bar
to the institution of the accion publiciana.176
REMEDIES CONSEQUENT TO
FRAUDULENT OR IRREGULAR
REGISTRATION
The aggrieved party has a number of
remedies to question the validity of the decision.
These include the remedies of new trial or
reconsideration under Rule 37 of the Rules of
Court, relief from judgment under Rule 38, or
appeal to the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court
pursuant to Sec. 33, PD No. 1529.
Under the property Registration Decree,
the remedies consequent to fraudulent or
irregular registration are: review of decree under
Sec. 32; reconveyance under Secs. 53 and 96;
damages under Sec. 32; claim against the
Assurance Fund under Sec. 95; reversion under
Sec. 101, CA No. 141; cancellation of title;
quieting of title; annulment of judgment under
Rule 47; and criminal prosecution under the
Revised Penal Code and other special laws.
 Petition for review of decree. (Sec.
32, PD No. 1529)
In Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia,177 the
Supreme Court, citing Agcaoili, “Property
Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land
Titles and Deeds)”, stressed that courts may
reopen proceedings already closed by final
decision or decree when an application for review
is filed by the party aggrieved within one year
from the issuance of the decree of registration.
However, the basis of the action must be
anchored solely on actual fraud.
The petition may be filed at any time after
the rendition of the court’s decision and before
the expiration of one year from the entry of the
final decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera
v. Moran,178  there can be no possible reason for
176
Viray v. Usi, GR No. 192486, Nov. 21, 2012, citing cases.
177
GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, per Justice Peralta.
178
GR No. 24568, March 2, 1926, 48 Phil. 836.

requiring the complaining party to wait until the
final decree is entered before urging his claim of
fraud. A petition taken under Sec. 32 of PD No.
1529 is effectively a review of the land
registration court’s ruling. As such, case law
instructs that for “as long as a final decree has
not been entered by the [LRA] and the period of
one (1) year has not elapsed from the date of
entry of such decree, the title is not finally
adjudicated and the decision in the registration
proceeding continues to be under the control and
sound discretion of the court rendering it.”179
The adjudication of land in a registration
or cadastral case does not become final and
incontrovertible until the expiration of one year
from entry of the final decree, and that as long
as the final decree is not issued and the period of
one year within which it may be reviewed has not
elapsed, the decision remains under the control
and sound discretion of the court rendering the
decree, which court after hearing, may even set
aside said decision or decree and adjudicate the
land to another.180
The rule on the incontrovertibility and
indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one year
from entry of the decree of registration is equally
applicable to titles acquired through homestead
or free patents.181 The date of issuance of the
patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of
the decree in ordinary registration cases.
A Torrens title becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from the issuance of
the final decree and is generally conclusive
evidence of the ownership.182 The rule on the
inconvertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens
title after one year from entry of the decree of
registration is equally applicable to title acquired
through homestead or free patents. 183 Only
extrinsic or collateral, as distinguished form
intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a
judgment.
To avail of a petition for review,
following requisites must be satisfied: (a)
petitioner must have an estate or interest in
land; (b) he must show actual fraud in
procurement of the decree of registration; (c)
179
Lozada v. Bracewell, GR No. 179155, April 2, 2014.
180
Director of Lands v. Busuego, GR No. L-19090, Dec. 28,
1964, cited in Lozada v. Bracewell, supra. April 2, 2014.
181
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273,
July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
182
Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88 (1992)
183
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273,
July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
20
petition must be filed within one (1) year from
the issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Authority; and (d) the property has
not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for
value.184
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the successful party in a litigation which is
committed outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or
witnesses, whereby said defeated party is
prevented from presenting fully and fairly his side
of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud
refers to acts of a party in a litigation during the
trial, such as the use of forged instruments or
perjured testimony, which did not affect the
presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair
and just determination of the case.
The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court or
from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is
one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of
the court. Nonetheless, extrinsic fraud shall not
be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could
have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or
petition for relief.185
 Reconveyance. (Sec. 96 PD No.
1529)
The remedy of one who has established
his ownership over a property but which property
has been wrongfully or erroneously registered
through fraud or mistake in another's name is,
after the lapse of one year from the date of
issuance of the questioned decree, not to set
aside the decree, it having become
incontrovertible and no longer open to review,
but to institute an ordinary action in the ordinary
court of justice for reconveyance. Proof of actual
fraud is not required as it may be filed even when
no fraud intervened such as when there is
mistake in including the land for registration.186
the
the If the property, however, has already
the passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser
the for value, the remedy is to file an action for
the damages from the person who allegedly
registered the property through fraud, or if he
had become insolvent or if the action is barred by
184
Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181
SCRA 431.
185
Pinusukan Foodhouse v. Far East Bank and Trust Co., GR
No. 159926. Jan. 20, 2014.
186
Francisco v. Rojas, GR No. 167120, April 23, 2014.
 21
prescription, to file an action for recovery against
the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95 of PD No.
1529 (the Property Registration Decree) within a
period of six years from the time the right to
bring such action accrues.187 An action for
reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy
granted to the rightful landowner, whose land
was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the
name of another, to compel the registered owner
to transfer or reconvey the land to him.188
An action for reconveyance is an action in
personam available to a person whose property
has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens
system in another's name. It is filed as an
ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice
and not with the land registration court. A notice
of lis pendens may be annotated on the
certificate of title immediately upon the
institution of the action in court.189
As held in Medizabel v. Apao,190 the
essence of an action for reconveyance is that the
certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible.
What is sought is the transfer of the property, in
this case its title, which has been wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name,
to its rightful owner or to one with a better right.
The mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under
co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate or that the registrant may only be a
trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title.191
Reconveyance does not aim to reopen
proceedings but only to transfer or reconvey the
land from registered owner to the rightful
owner.192 Reconveyance is available in case of
registration of property procured by fraud
187
Roxas v. Garcia, GR No. 146208, Aug. 12, 2004.
188
Leoveras v. Valdez, GR No. 169985, June 15, 2011.
189
Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011, citing
cases.
190
G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608.
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011;
Roque v. Aguado, GR No. 193787, April 7, 2013.
191
Pineda v. Court of Appeals. 456 Phil. 732, 748 (2003),
citing Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 556, 561-
562 (1998).
192
Bautista-Borja v. Bautista, GR No. 136197, Dec. 10, 2008;
Daclag v. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, July 28, 2008; Esconde
v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603; Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA
356.
thereby creating a constructive trust between the
parties.193
Requisites of an action for reconveyance
To warrant reconveyance, the following
requisites must concur:
(a) the action must be brought in the
name of a person claiming ownership
or dominical right over the land
registered in the name of the
defendant;
(b) the registration of the land in the
name of the defendant was procured
through fraud or other illegal means;
(c) the property has not yet passed to an
innocent purchaser for value; and
(d) the action is filed after the certificate
of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years
from the discovery of the fraud, 194 or
not later than 10 years in the case of
an implied trust.195
Art. 434 of the Civil Code provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the
ownership of a real property, the person who
claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and
second, his title thereto.196
A petition for review and action for reconveyance
are no longer available if the property has
already been transferred to an innocent
purchaser for value.197
Note: There are kinds of actions to
recover possession of real property: Actions to
recover possession of real property:
193
Huang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 198525, September 13,
1994.
194
Balbin v. Medalla, GR No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981, 108
SCRA 666, which held that: “An action for reconveyance of
real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute
of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed
within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.”
195
New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168800,
April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, citing Walstrom v. Mapa, GR
No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Kionisala v. Dacut,
GR No. 147379, Feb. 27, 2002, 378 SCRA 206.
196
Fierro v. Seguiran, GR No. 152141, Aug. 8, 2011, citing
Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257 (2005).
197
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011; Heirs of
Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, GR No. 158121,
December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.
 22
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct
causes of action, namely, forcible entry and
unlawful detainer.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to
recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year.
It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the
better right of possession of realty independently
of title.
Accion reivindicatoria is an action to
recover ownership also brought in the proper
regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.198
Prescription of action
An action for reconveyance may be barred
by prescription or laches.
(1)Action based on fraud - four years
(2)Action based on implied trust - ten
years
(3) Action based on a void contract
– imprescriptible
(4)Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in
possession – imprescriptible
An action for reconveyance based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten
(10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property, or the instrument affecting the
same is inscribed in accordance with law,
inasmuch as it is what binds the land and
operates constructive notice to the world.
Repudiation of said trust is not a condition
precedent to the running of the prescriptive
period. 199
The 10-year prescriptive period applies
only when the reconveyance is based on fraud
which makes a contract voidable (and that the
aggrieved party is not in possession of the land
whose title is to be actually reconveyed). It does
not apply to an action to nullify a contract which
is void ab initio. Art. 1410 of the Civil Code
categorically states that an action for the
198
Suarez v. Emboy, GR No. 187944, March 12, 2014.
199
Cabacungan v. Laigo, GR No. 175073, Aug. 15, 2011;
Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 641 (2004).
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does
not prescribe.200
But prescription does not run against the
plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land
because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is questioned
before initiating an action to vindicate his right.201
Where a court of equity finds that the
position of the parties has to change that
equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing
injustice, or that the intervening rights of third
persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired,
it will not exert its equitable powers in order to
save one from the consequences of his own
neglect.202  Failure to take steps to assert any
rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the
date of registration of title is fatal to the private
respondent's cause of action on the ground of
laches.203
 Cancellation of title
In contrast to an action for reversion
which is filed by the government, through the
Solicitor general, an action for cancellation is
initiated by a private party usually in a case
where there are two titles issued to different
persons for the same lot. When one of two titles
is held to be superior over the other, one should
be declared null and void and ordered cancelled.
Where two certificates of title are issued to
different persons for the same land, the earlier in
date must prevail, and in case of successive
registration, the person holding under prior
certificate is entitled to the land as against the
person who relies on the second certificate.
While an action for cancellation of title is
usually brought by the aggrieved private party,
the government, although it may have no
proprietary interest in the property, is also vested
with personality to bring actions for the
cancellation of erroneously issued titles to protect
public interest, preserve the integrity of the
Torrens system, and safeguard the Assurance
Fund as well.
Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds
for cancellation of patent and annulment of title,
should never be presumed. It must be proved by
200
Abalols v.Dimakuta, GR No. 164693, March 23, 2011.
201
Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.
202
Lucas v. Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956, 100
Phil. 277.
203
Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731, Jan. 11, 1990.
 23
clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence not being adequate.
Fraud is a question of fact which must be
proved.204
 Action for damages. (Sec. 32, PD
No. 1529)
An action for reconveyance is not feasible
where the property has already passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value. But
the interested party can file an action for
damages against the person responsible for
depriving him of his right or interest in the
property. This action may be filed against the
applicant or person responsible for the fraud. 205
The action should be brought within 10 years
from the date of the issuance of the questioned
certificate of title pursuant to Art. 1144 of the
Civil Code.206
 Action for compensation from the
Assurance Fund. (Sec. 95, PD No.
1529)
The Assurance Fund is intended to relieve
innocent persons from the harshness of the
doctrine that a certificate is conclusive evidence
of an indefeasible title to land. 207 The requisites
for recovery from the Assurance Fund are: (a) a
person sustains loss or damage, or is deprived by
any estate or interest in land; (b) on account of
the bringing of land under the Torrens system;
(c) through fraud, error, omission, mistake or
misdescription in the certificate of entry in the
registration book; (d) without negligence on his
part, and (e) is barred from bringing an action for
recovery of the land.208 It is a condition sine qua
non that the person who brings the action for
damages against the Assurance Fund be the
registered owner and, as the holders of transfer
certificates of title, that they be innocent
purchasers in good faith and for value. 209 But as
between two persons both of whom are in good
faith and both innocent of any negligence, the
law must protect and prefer the lawful holder of
204
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011
205
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9)
206
Castillo v. Madrigal, GR No. 62650, June 27, 1991.
207
De Guzman v. National Treasurer, GR No. 143281, Aug. 3,
2000.
208
Sec. 95, PD No. 1529; Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 107967, March 1, 1994; Eduarte v. Court of Appeals,
GR No. 105944, Feb. 9, 1996; Veloso v. Court of Appeals, GR
No. 102737, Aug. 21, 1996.
209
Eagle Realty Corporation v. Republic, GR No. 151424, July
4, 2008.
registered title over the transferee of a vendor
bereft of any transmissible rights.210
The action must be brought within 6 years
from the time the right to bring the action first
occurred.211
The title issued to an innocent purchaser
and for value cannot be revoked on the basis that
the deed of sale was falsified, if he had no
knowledge of the fraud committed. The remedy
of the person prejudiced is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused or employed
the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an
action against the Treasurer of the Philippines
may be filed for recovery of damages against the
Assurance Fund.212
But in Treasurer of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals,213 respondent spouses bought a
parcel of land from a person identifying himself
as Lawaan Lopez. Later, the real Lawaan Lopez
appeared and petitioned the court to declare the
sale null and void, which was granted.
Respondents subsequently brought an action for
damages against the Assurance Fund. The Court
held that since respondents are neither the
registered owners nor innocent purchasers, they
are not entitled to recover from the Assurance
Fund.
 Reversion. (Sec. 101, CA No. 141)
Reversion is an action where the ultimate
relief sought is to revert the land back to the
government under the Regalian doctrine.
Considering that the land subject of the action
originated from a grant by the government, its
cancellation is a matter between the grantor and
the grantee.214 The action is instituted by the
government, through the Solicitor General, in all
cases where lands of public domain are held in
violation of the Constitution215 or were
216
fraudulently obtained. The mistake or error of
the officials or agents of the Lands Management
Bureau cannot be invoked against the
210
Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78728, Dec. 8, 1988.
211
Sec. 102, PD No. 1529.
212
Tiro v. Phil. Estates Corporaion, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26,
2008.
213
GR No. L-42805, Aug.31,1987; see also Baltazar v. Court
of Appeals, GR No.78728, Dec. 8, 1988.
214
Reublic v. Mangatora, GR No. 170375, July 7, 2010.
215
Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III, EO No. 292.
216
Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, GR No. 167320, Jan. 30, 2007.
 24
government with regard to property of the public
domain.217
In Yujuico v. Republic,218 the Court, citing
Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and
Rrelated Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), described
reversion as an action which seeks to restore
public land fraudulently awarded and disposed of
to private individuals or corporations to the mass
of public domain. But the Court in related cases
has also allowed the resort by the Government to
actions for reversion to cancel titles that were
void for reasons other than fraud, i.e., violation
by the grantee of a patent of the conditions
imposed by law,219 and lack of jurisdiction of the
Director of Lands to grant a patent covering
inalienable forest land220 or portion of a river,
even when such grant was made through mere
oversight.221 In Republic v. Guerrero,222 the Court
gave a more general statement that the remedy
of reversion can be availed of "only in cases of
fraudulent or unlawful inclusion of the land in
patents or certificates of title." 223
The RTC may properly take cognizance of
reversion suits which do not call for an
annulment of judgment of the RTC acting as a
land registration court. Actions for cancellation of
title and reversion, like the present case, belong
to the class of cases that "involve the title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest
therein" and where the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the
jurisdiction of the RTC.224
 Annulment of Judgment. (Rule 47,
Rules of Court)
A petition for annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders of Regional
Trial Court for which the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, etc. are no longer available
must be based on (a) extrinsic fraud, (b) lack of
217
Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 123586, Aug. 12,
2004, 479 Phil. 870 (2004);
218
GR No. 168661, Oct. 26, 2007, 537 SCRA 513.
219
Republic v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 79582, April 10,
1989, 171 SCRA 721.Republic v. Court of Appeals
andAlpuerto, GR No. L-45202, Sept. 11, 1980.
220
Republic v. De la Cruz, 160-A Phil. 374, 381-382 (1975).
221
Republic v. Roxas, GR No. 157988, Dec. 11, 2013;
Morandarte v. Court of Appeals, supra.
222
GR No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424.
223
Lozano v. Tabayag, GR No. 189647, Feb. 6, 2012.
224
Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, GR No.
192975, Nov. 12, 2012.
jurisdiction225 and (c) lack of due process. 226 A
petition for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud must be filed within four (4) years
from its discovery; and if based on lack of
jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or
estoppel.227
Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for
annulment of judgment refers to either lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending
party or over the subject matter of the claim.228
Where the questioned judgment is
annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic fraud
or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside
and considered void.229 Annulment of judgment is
a remedy in law independent of the case where
the judgment sought to be annulled was
rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment
of judgment may be availed of even if the
judgment to be annulled had already been fully
executed or implemented.230
In Yujuico v. Republic,231 the Court ruled
that the action of the government for reversion
on the ground that the land was part of the
Manila Bay was improperly filed with the RTC as
the action should have been filed with the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court governing annulment of judgments of
RTCs.
But in Republic v. Ronman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila,232 the Court upheld the
propriety of the OSG’s filing of a complaint for
cancellation of title and reversion with the RTC
since the land claimed by respondent was not the
subject of an adjudication by the court in a
registration case, hence Rule 47 on annulment of
judgments is not applicable.
An ordinary civil action for declaration of
nullity of free patents and certificates of title is
not the same as an action for reversion. The
difference between them lies in the allegations as
to the character of ownership of the realty whose
225
Rule 47. Rules of Court.
226
Diona v. Balangue, GR No. 173559, Jan. 7, 2013.
227
Section 3, id.; Galicia v. Manliquez, GR No. 155785, April
13, 2007.
228
Alcazar v. Arante, GR No. 177042, Dec. 10, 2012.
229
RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 7; Bulawan v. Aquende,
GR No. 182819, June 22, 2011.
230
Bulawan v. Aquende, GR No.182819, June 22, 2011.
231
GR No. 168861, Oct. 26, 2007, citing Agcaoili, “Property
Registration Decree and Related Laws.” See also NHA v.
Baello, GR No. 143230, Aug. 20, 2004.
232
Supra.
 25
title is sought to be nullified. In an action for
reversion, the pertinent allegations in the
complaint would admit State ownership of the
disputed land. On the other hand, a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of free patent and
certificate of title would require allegations of the
plaintiff's ownership of the contested lot prior to
the issuance of such free patent and certificate of
title as well as the defendant's fraud or mistake
in successfully obtaining title over the land
claimed by plaintiff. In such a case, the nullity
arises strictly not from the fraud or deceit but
from the fact that the land is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands to bestow and
whatever patent or certificate of title obtained
therefor is consequently void ab initio. The real
party in interest is not the State but the plaintiff
who alleges a pre-existing right of ownership
over the land in question.233
Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds
for cancellation of patent and annulment of title,
should never be presumed, but must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence, with mere
preponderance of evidence not being adequate.
Fraud is a question of fact which must be
proved.234
PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH
An innocent purchaser for value is one
who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest
in it, and who pays a full and fair price at the
time of the purchase or before receiving any
notice of another person’s claim.235
Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that
“in no case shall such (petition for review) be
entertained by the court where an innocent
purchaser for value has acquired the land or an
interest therein, whose rights may be
prejudiced.”
A person dealing with registered property
need not go beyond, but only has to rely on, the
title. He is charged with notice only of such
burdens and claims which are annotated on the
title, for registration is the operative act that
binds the property.236  It is enough that he had
examined the latest certificate of title or that
233
Galang v. Reyes, GR No. 184746, Aug. 15, 2012.
234
Ibid.
235
Rosales v. Burgos, GR No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577
SCRA 264.
236
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78775, May 31,
1988, 161 SCRA 710.
which was issued in the name of his immediate
transferor. The purchaser is not bound by the
original certificate but only by the certificate of
title of the person from whom he had purchased
the property.237
In a series of transfers, it is enough that
the buyer examines the latest certificate of title
and need not scrutinize each and every title that
preceded it.238 But a purchaser cannot close his
eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man
on his guard and still claim that he acted in good
faith.239 The rule of caveat emptor requires the
purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of
the vendor and one who buys without checking
the vendor’s title takes all the risks and losses
consequent to such failure.
Art. 1544 of the Civil Code provides that,
as regards immovable property, ownership shall
belong to the person acquiring it who in good
faith first recorded the sale in the Registry of
Property.
In Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation,
the adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens
were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979
and December 10, 1979, respectively; the real
estate mortgage over the subject property was
registered by respondent only on March 14,
1980. The Court stated that the prior registration
of a lien created a preference. Even a subsequent
registration of the prior mortgage will not
diminish this preference, which retroacts to the
date of the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens and the adverse claim.
The maxim prior est in tempore, potior
est in jure (he who is first in time is preferred in
right) is followed in land registration. 240 Thus, it
has been held in a case that Mahinay’s notice of
lis pendens having been registered ahead of
Sorensen's real estate mortgage, the notice of
lis pendens takes precedence over the real estate
mortgage. The claim of Sorensen that the
owner's copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain
any adverse annotation at the time the owners
transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the
nature of involuntary registration, the annotation
of the notice of lis pendens on the original copy
of TCT No. 117531 on file with the Registry of
237
Guaranteed Homes, Inc. v. Valdez, GR No. 171531, Jan. 30,
2009.
238
Tajonera v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 467.
239
Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.
240
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358 (1980) citing
Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682 (1942).
 26
Deeds is sufficient to bind third parties. It affects
the whole world even if the owner's copy does
not contain the same annotation.241
The phrase “innocent purchaser for value”
in Section 32 of the Property Registration Decree
includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other
encumbrancer for value.242 But unlike private
individuals, banks are expected to exercise
greater care and prudence in their dealings,
including those involving registered lands. A
banking institution is expected to exercise due
diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract.243
In St. Dominic Corporation v.
Intermediate Appellate Court,244 the Court, held
that where a Torrens title was issued as a result
of regular land registration proceedings and was
in the name of the mortgagor when given as a
security for a bank loan, the subsequent
declaration of said title as null and void is not a
ground for nullifying the mortgage rights of the
bank which had acted in good faith.
A mortgagee has a right to rely in
good faith on the certificate of title of the
mortgagor of the property offered as security,
and in the absence of any sign that might
arouse suspicion, the mortgagee has no
obligation to undertake further investigation.
But where the mortgagee does not directly
deal with the registered owner of real
property, the law requires that a higher
degree of prudence be exercised by the
mortgagee.245
In Mahinay v. Gako,246 the Court ruled
that when a mortgagee relies upon what appears
on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in
all good faith on the basis of the title in the name
of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that
the latter's title was defective, being thus an
innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or
lien upon the land mortgaged must be respected
and protected.247
241
Mahinay v. Gako, GR No. 15338, Nov. 28, 2011, citing Yu
v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897 (1995).
242
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 91383, May 31,
1991..
243
PNB v. Jumanoy, GR No. 169901, Aug. 3, 2011.
244
GR No. 70623, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 577.
245
Arguelles v. Malarayat Rural Bank, GR No. 200468, March
19, 2014.
246
Supra.
247
Id., citing Penullar v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil.
127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands v. Abache, 73
Phil. 606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494
In Blanco v. Esquierdo,248 it was held that
the right or lien of an innocent mortgagee for
value upon the land mortgaged must be
respected and protected, even if the mortgagor
obtained his title thereto thru fraud. In this case,
upon a complaint filed by the legal heirs of
Maximiano, the trial court ordered the
cancellation of TCT No. T-6582 for having been
secured through fraud, and also the cancellation
of DBP’s mortgage. The only question is whether
the bank is an innocent purchaser for value. The
Court answered in the affirmative. The bank was
not a party to the fraud. The certificate of title
was in the name of Fructuosa at the time of the
mortgage. Hence, the bank had the right to rely
on what appeared in the certificate and was
under no obligation to look beyond the certificate
and investigate. The remedy of the persons
prejudiced is to bring an action for damages
against those who caused the fraud, and if the
latter are insolvent, an action may be filed for
recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.
The issue of the buyer's good or bad
faith is relevant only where the subject of the
sale is registered land, and the purchaser is
buying the same from the registered owner
whose title to the land is clean. In such case, the
purchaser who relies on the clean title of the
registered owner is protected if he is a purchaser
in good faith for value.249 But a mortgage
executed by an authorized agent who signed in
his own name without indicating that he acted for
and on behalf of his principal binds only the
agent and not the principal.250
RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY
Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 1544. If the same thing
should have been sold to different
vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may
have first taken possession thereof in
good faith, if it should be movable
property.
Should it be immovable property,
the ownership shall belong to the
(1960).
248
GR No. L-15182,Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.
249
Sabitsana v. Muertegui, GR No. 181359, Aug. 5, 2013.
250
Bucton v. Rural Bank of El Salvador, GR No. 179625, Feb.
24, 2014.
 27
person acquiring it who in good faith
first recorded it in the Registry of
Property.
Should there be no inscription, the
ownership shall pertain to the person
who in good faith was first in
possession; and, in the absence
thereof, to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good
faith.
Between two buyers of the same
immovable property registered under the Torrens
system, the law gives ownership priority to: (a)
the first registrant in good faith; (b) then, the
first possessor in good faith; and (c) finally, the
buyer who in good faith presents the oldest title.
This provision, however, does not apply if the
property is not registered under the Torrens
system.251 Based on this provision, the overriding
consideration to determine ownership of an
immovable property is the good or bad faith not
of the seller, but of the buyer; specifically, to
determine who first registered the sale with the
Registry of Property (Registry of Deeds) in good
faith.252 As against the registered owners and the
holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the
former who has a better right to possess. 253 A
person cannot claim good faith if he was aware
that there were occupants in the subject property
other than the seller.254
The circumstances which must concur in
order to determine the applicability of Article
1544 are:
(a) The two (or more) sales
transactions in issue must pertain to
exactly the same subject matter, and
must be valid sales transactions;
(b) The two (or more) buyers at
odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each represent
conflicting interests; and
(c) The two (or more) buyers at
odds over the rightful ownership of the
subject matter must each have bought
from the same seller.255
251
Abrigo v. De Vera, GR No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432
SCRA 544.
252
Cabigas v. Limbaco, GR No. 175291, July 27, 2011
253
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
254
Alfaro v. Dumalagan, GR No. 186622, Jan 22, 2014.
255
Roque v. Aguado, GR No. 193787, April 7, 2013.
In Remalante v. Tibe,256 the Court ruled
that the civil law provision on double sale is not
applicable where there is only one valid sale, the
previous sale having been found to be fraudulent.
Likewise, in Espiritu and Espiritu v.
Valerio,257 where the same parcel of land was
purportedly sold to two different parties, the
Court held that despite the fact that one deed of
sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544
of the Civil Code will not apply where said deed is
found to be a forgery, the result of this being that
the right of the other vendee should prevail. 258
The rule that where two certificates purport to
include the same land, the earlier in date
prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or
irregularity tainting the process of registration. 259
On the other hand, while the execution of a
public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the contract, it only
gives rise to a prima facie presumption of
delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of
the vendee to take actual possession of the land
sold.260
Moreover, it is an established principle
that no one can give what one does not have —
nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can
sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell,
and the buyer can acquire no more than what the
seller can transfer legally. In a number of cases,
an action for reconveyance has been treated as
an action to quiet title.261
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Art. 160 of the New Civil Code provides all
property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved
that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to
the wife. It is not necessary to prove that the
properties were acquired with funds of the
partnership. As long as the properties were
acquired by the parties during the marriage, they
are presumed to be conjugal in nature. In fact,
even when the manner in which the properties
were acquired does not appear, the presumption
256
GR No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138.
257
GR No. L-18018, Dec 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69.
258
Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., GR No. 171008, Sept. 13,
2007, 533 SCRA 350.
259
Mathay v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 15788, Sept. 17, 1988,
295 SCRA 556.
260
Beatingo v. Gasis, GR No. 179641, Feb. 9, 2011.
261
Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, Aug. 4, 2010, and cases
cited therein.
 28
will still apply, and the properties will still be
considered conjugal. The presumption of the
conjugal nature of the properties acquired during
the marriage subsists in the absence of clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome
the same.
Under the Civil Code, although the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership, he cannot alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without
his wife's consent, subject only to certain
exceptions specified in the law. A sale of real
property of the conjugal partnership made by the
husband without the consent of his wife is
voidable. The action for annulment must be
brought during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife.262
In Dewara v. Lamela,263 the subject
property was acquired by spouses Elenita and
Eduardo during their marriage, before the
enactment of the Family Code. The issue is
whether the property is the
paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the
conjugal property of spouses Elenita and
Eduardo, and whether the same may be subject
to levy and execution sale to answer for the civil
liability adjudged against Eduardo in a criminal
case for serious physical injuries. The Court held:
All property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or
to the wife.264 Registration in the
name of the husband or the wife alone
does not destroy this presumption. 265
The separation-in-fact between the
husband and the wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal
partnership. The lot retains its
conjugal nature.266 Moreover, the
presumption of conjugal ownership
applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does
not appear. The use of the conjugal
funds is not an essential requirement
for the presumption to arise. However,
it does not necessarily follow that it
262
Ayuste v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 118784, Sept. 2, 1999.
263
GR No. 179010, April 11, 2011.
264
CIVIL CODE, Art. 160; Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No.
159889, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 197, 203.
265
Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968).
266
CIVIL CODE, Art. 178; Villanueva v. Chiong, supra, at
202.
may automatically be levied upon in
an execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of
one of the spouses. Before debts and
obligations may be charged against
the conjugal partnership, it must be
shown that the same were contracted
for, or the debts and obligations
should have redounded to, the benefit
of the conjugal partnership. Fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed upon
the husband or the wife, as a rule,
may not be charged to the
partnership. However, if the spouse
who is bound should have no exclusive
property or if the property should be
insufficient, the fines and indemnities
may be enforced upon the partnership
assets only after the responsibilities
enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil
Code have been covered.
Q. Evidence showed that Esteban acquired
ownership over the Vitas property prior to his
marriage to Socorro, but the certificate of title in
the name of "Esteban Abletes, of legal age,
married to Socorro Torres," was issued only after
the celebration of the marriage. Is the property
conjugal?
A. The property is owned by Esteban
alone. The phrase "married to Socorro Torres" is
merely descriptive of his civil status, and does
not show that Socorro co-owned the property. 267
Q. The subject property was acquired in
1968 during Ros and Aguete's marriage. Ros
mortgaged the property in 1974. Is the debt
chargeable to the conjugal partnership?
A. No. As held by the Court: 268
The husband cannot alienate or
encumber any conjugal real property
without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife. Should the
husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.269 Article 173 of the Civil
Code allows Aguete to question Ros'
encumbrance of the subject property.
267
Ventura v. Abuda, GR No. 202932, Oct. 23, 2013; Salas v.
Aguila, GR No. 202370, Sept. 23, 2013.
268
Ros v. PNB, GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.
269
Vera-Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, July 14, 2004,
434 SCRA 534 citing Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v.
Spouses Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, Aug. 28, 2000, 410 SCRA
97.
 29
However, the same article does not
guarantee that the courts will declare
the annulment of the contract.
Annulment will be declared only upon
a finding that the wife did not give her
consent. In the present case, we follow
the conclusion of the appellate court
and rule that Aguete gave her consent
to Ros' encumbrance of the subject
property. Debts contracted by the
husband for and in the exercise of the
industry or profession by which he
contributes to the support of the
family cannot be deemed to be his
exclusive and private debts. For this
reason, we rule that Ros' loan from
PNB redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt
is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. 270
Art. 88 of the Family Code (EO No. 209,
July 6, 1987) provides that absolute community
of property between spouses shall commence at
the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Article 96 further provides that the
administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by
the wife for proper remedy, which must be
availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision. In the
event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the
powers of disposition or encumbrance which must
have the authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. Art. 111 of the Family
Code, as amended, provides that either spouse
may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise
dispose of his or her exclusive property.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal
property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by
Art. 124 of the same Code that now treats such a
disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b)
in case of one spouse's inability, the authority of
the court.271 The particular provision in the New
270
GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.
271
Ravina v. Villa Abrille, GR No. 160708, Oct. 16, 2009.
Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul
the alienation or encumbrance was not carried
over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that
alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void. Hence, just
like the rule in absolute community of property, if
the husband, without knowledge and consent of
the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is
void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife, thereby
resulting in a disagreement, such sale is
annullable at the instance of the wife who is
given five (5) years from the date the contract
implementing the decision of the husband to
institute the case.272
Q. What is the effect of an agreement to
lease a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino
wife without the consent of her British husband?
A. The alien husband has no right to
nullify the agreement. Being an alien, he is
absolutely prohibited from acquiring private and
public lands in the Philippines. This is true even if
he provided the funds for the acquisition of the
land. No reimbursement for his expenses can be
allowed; and no declaration can be made that the
subject property was part of the
conjugal/community property of the spouses.273
Q. Is the husband, who was not a party to
the suit but whose conjugal property is being
executed on account of the other spouse being
the judgment obligor, considered a "stranger?"
A. There is no dispute that the contested
property is conjugal in nature. Unlike in the
system of absolute community where liabilities
incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or
quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of
gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no
duty to make advance payments for the liability
of the debtor-spouse.274
Q. Is the absolute community of property
of spouses Lilibeth Sunga Chan with her husband
Norberto Chan answerable for the liability of
Lilibeth Chan under a judgment?
272
Ibid.
273
Matthews v. Taylor, GR No. 164584, June 22, 2009.
274
Buado v.Court of Appeals, GR No. 145222, April 2, 2009.
 30
A. Since spouses Sunga-Chan and
Norberto were married on February 4, 1992, or
after the effectivity of the Family Code on August
3, 1988, their absolute community property may
be held liable for the obligations contracted by
either spouse pursuant to Art. 94 of said Code.275
Q. Is respondent, an alien, entitled to
reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property?
A. Pursuant to Section 7, Article XII of the
Constitution, aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, are disqualified from acquiring
lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also
disqualified from acquiring private lands.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional
prohibition. He declared that he had the Antipolo
property titled in the name of his Filipino wife
because of said prohibition. His attempt at
subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.276
A FORGED DEED MAY BE THE
ROOT OF A VALID TITLE
Generally, a forged or fraudulent deed is a
nullity and conveys no title. 277 Verily, when the
instrument presented is forged, even if
accompanied by the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title, the registered owner does not thereby
lose his title, and neither does the assignee
in the forged deed acquire any right or title
to the property.278
But a fraudulent or forged document of
sale may become the root of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred
from the name of the true owner to the name of
the forger or the name indicated by the forger,
and while it remained that way, the land was
subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.279
Even if the procurement of a certificate of
title was tainted with fraud and
misrepresentation, such defective title may be
the source of a completely legal and valid
275
Sunga-Chan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 164401, June 25,
2008.
276
Muller v.Muller, GR No. 149615, Aug. 29, 2006.
277
Sec. 53, PD No. 1529.
278
Sarili v. Lagrosa, GR No. 193517, Jan. 15, 2014.
279
Muñoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011; Solivel v.
Francisco, GR No. 51450, Feb. 10, 1989, 170 SCRA 218;
Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-64159, Sept.
10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489; Director of Lands v. Addison, GR
No. 23148, March 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 19.
title in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.280
In Repubic v. Agunoy,281 the Court held:
Here, it bears stressing that, by
petitioner's own judicial admission, the
lots in dispute are no longer part of
the public domain, and there are
numerous third, fourth, fifth and more
parties holding Torrens titles in their
favor and enjoying the presumption of
good faith. This brings to mind what
we have reechoed in Pino vs. Court of
Appeals and the cases therein cited:
“[E]ven on the supposition that the
sale was void, the general rule that the
direct result of a previous illegal
contract cannot be valid (on the theory
that the spring cannot rise higher than
its source) cannot apply here for We
are confronted with the functionings of
the Torrens System of Registration.
The doctrine to follow is simple
enough: a fraudulent or forged
document of sale may become the
ROOT of a valid title if the certificate of
title has already been transferred from
the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name
indicated by the forger.”
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
A certificate of title is conclusive of
ownership. It enjoys the presumption of validity.
Registration does not vest title: It is not a mode
of acquiring ownership.282 It does not give any
person any better title than what he lawfully
has.283 Registration is merely a system of
registration of titles to lands. 284 A certificate of
title is an indefeasible title and is conclusive as to
the ownership of the registrant, 285 the identity of
the land,286 and its location.287As against the
registered owners and the holder of an
280
Sarili v. Lagrosa, GR No. 193517, Jan. 15, 2014.
281
GR No. 155394, Feb. 17, 2005, citing cases.
282
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172; Cabrera v.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339; Avila v. Tapucar, 201 SCRA
148.
283
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590. Duque-Rosario v. Banco
Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7,
2011.
284
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366.
285
Tan v. Bantegui, GR No. 154027, Oct. 24, 2005.
286
Demasiado v. Velasco, 71 SCRA 105.
287
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626.
 31
unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who
has a better right to possess.288
While certificates of title are indefeasible,
unassailable and binding against the whole world,
including the government itself, they do not
create or vest title. They merely confirm or
record title already existing and vested. They
cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true
owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the
commission of fraud; neither do they permit one
to enrich himself at the expense of other.289
If two certificates of title purport to
include the same land, whether wholly or partly,
the better approach is to trace the original
certificates from which the certificates of title
were derived. Should there be only one common
original certificate of title, the transfer certificate
issued on an earlier date along the line must
prevail, absent any anomaly or irregularity
tainting the process of registration.290
An original certificate of title issued by
virtue of administrative proceeding is as
indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under
judicial proceedings. However, the indefeasibility
of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud
and misrepresentation.291
One who deals with property registered
under the Torrens system need not go beyond
the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the
certificate of title.292 He is charged with notice
only of such burdens and claims as are annotated
on the title.293
288
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
289
Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig, GR No. 166838, June 15,
2011, citing De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
492 Phil. 643 (2005).
290
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR
No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing Degollacion v. Register of
Deeds of Cavite, G.R. No. 161433, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA
108, 115 and Mathay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115788,
September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 556.
291
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011.
292
Sec. 44, PD 1529; Casimiro Development Corporation v.
Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011; Sandoval v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283;
Santos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13,
1990, 189 SCRA 550; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
L-78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710; Bailon-Casilao v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78178, April 15, 1988, 160
SCRA 738; Director of Lands v. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, 487
(1935); Quimson v. Suarez, 45 Phil. 901 (1924).
293
Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92310, Sept. 3, 1992, 213 SCRA
563; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
CONVEYANCE AND OTHER DEALINGS
BY REGISTERED OWNER
The general rule in dealing with registered
land is set forth in Sec. 51 of PD No. 1529:
Section 51. Conveyance and
other dealings by registered owner. —
An owner of registered land may
convey, mortgage, lease, charge or
otherwise deal with the same in
accordance with existing laws. He may
use such forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instruments
as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument, except a will purporting to
convey or affect registered land shall
take effect as a conveyance or bind
the land, but shall operate only as a
contract between the parties and as
evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the
operative act to convey or affect the
land insofar as third persons are
concerned, and in all cases under this
Decree, the registration shall be made
in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or city where the land
lies.
No voluntary instrument shall be
registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the
owner's duplicate certificate is presented with
such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in the law (PD 1529) or upon order
of the court, for cause shown.294
From the standpoint of third parties, a
property registered under the Torrens system
remains, for all legal purposes, the property of
the person in whose name it is registered,
notwithstanding the execution of any deed of
conveyance, unless the corresponding deed is
registered. Simply put, if a sale is not registered,
it is binding only between the seller and the
buyer, but it does not affect innocent third
persons.295
DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY
AND INVOLUNTARY REGISTRATION
294
Sec. 53, PD 1529.
295
Bulaong v. Gonzales, GR No. 156318, Sept. 5, 2011.
 32
As a rule, the order of entries in the
Primary Entry Book determines the priority in
registration.296 Sec. 56 of PD No. 1529 states:
Section 56. Primary Entry
Book; fees; certified copies. — Each
Register of Deeds shall keep a primary
entry book in which, upon payment of
the entry fee, he shall enter, in the
order of their reception, all
instruments including copies of writs
and processes filed with him relating
to registered land. He shall, as a
preliminary process in registration,
note in such book the date, hour and
minute of reception of all instruments,
in the order in which they were
received. They shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted, and
the memorandum of each instrument,
when made on the certificate of title to
which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national
government as well as the provincial
and city governments shall be exempt
from the payment of such fees in
advance in order to be entitled to
entry and registration.
A voluntary instrument is a willful act of
the registered owner of the land to be affected by
registration, while an involuntary instrument is
one pertaining to a transaction affecting lands in
which the registered owner’s cooperation is not
needed and which transaction may even be done
against his will.297
For the registration of a voluntary
instrument, it is necessary not only to register
the deed, instrument or assignment, mortgage,
or lease in the entry book of the register of
deeds, but a memorandum thereof must also be
made on the owner’s duplicate and on its
original. The mere entry by the register of deeds
in the entry or diary book, without the
presentation of the owner’s duplicate certificate
of title for corresponding annotation of the
conveyance, does not have the effect of a
conveyance of the property. On the other hand,
for the registration of an involuntary instrument,
the law does not require the presentation of the
owner’s duplicate certificate of title and considers
the annotation of such instrument upon the entry
296
Id.
297
Auto Group v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 157553, Sept. 8,
2004.
book, as sufficient to affect the real estate to
which it relates.298
In Saberon v. Ventanilla,299 (April 21,
2014) the Court gave the distinction for the
registration of a voluntary and involuntary
instrument as follows:
In cases of voluntary registration
of documents, an innocent purchaser
for value of registered land becomes
the registered owner, and, in
contemplation of law the holder of a
certificate of title, the moment he
presents and files a duly notarized and
valid deed of sale and the same is
entered in the day book and at the
same time he surrenders or presents
the owner's duplicate certificate of title
covering the land sold and pays the
registration fees, because what
remains to be done lies not within his
power to perform. The Register of
Deeds is duty bound to perform it.17
In cases of involuntary registration, an
entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons even if
the owner's duplicate certificate of title
is not presented to the register of
deeds. Therefore, in the registration
of an attachment, levy upon
execution, notice of lis pendens, and
the like, the entry thereof in the day
book is a sufficient notice to all
persons of such adverse claim.
To the same effect is Bulaong v.
Gonzales300 which held that in voluntary
registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and
the like, if the owner's duplicate certificate be not
surrendered and presented or if no payment of
registration fees be made within fifteen (15)
days, entry in the day book of the deed of sale
does not operate to convey and affect the land
sold. In involuntary registration, such as an
attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and
the like, entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons even without the
corresponding annotation on the certificate of
titles.301
REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT
TO PRESCRIPTION
298
Ibid.
299
GR No. 192669.
300
Supra.
301
Bulaong v Gonzales, supra.
 33
No title to registered land in derogation of
the title of the registered owner shall be acquired
by prescription or adverse possession. 302 Thus,
the right to recover possession of registered land
is imprescriptible because possession is a mere
consequence of ownership.303 Prescription is
unavailing not only against the titled owner but
also against his heirs.304 But ownership may be
lost through laches305 which is failure or neglect
to assert a right for an unreasonable length of
time.306
CERTIFICATE NOT SUBJECT
TO COLLATERAL ATTACK
A certificate of title is not subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified,
or cancelled except in a direct proceeding. 307
Thus, in a complaint for recovery of possession,
defendant cannot raise in the action the validity
of plaintiff’s title.308 There must be a direct attack
on the title via a separate action; but a direct
attack may be made in a counterclaim or third-
party complaint.309
What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. 310 The
certificate referred to is that document issued by
the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In
contrast, the title referred to by law means
ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document.311 The prohibition
against collateral attack does not apply to
spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles
do not enjoy indefeasibility.312
AMENDMENT OR ALTERATION
302
Sec. 47, PD No. 1529.
303
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011, citing
Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 107 (1985).
304
Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251; Guinoo v. Court of
Appeals, 97 Phil. 235.
305
Fernando v. Acuna, supra, citing cases. See also Lucas v.
Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277.
306
Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339.
307
Sec. 48, PD No. 1529; Tapuroc v. Loquellano, GR No.
152007, Jan. 22, 2007.
308
Gaiterio v. Almeria, GR No. 181812, June 8, 2011; Ybañez
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743.
309
Leyson v. Bontuyan, GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005;
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011.
310
Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July
15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547.
311
Lacbayan v. Samoy, GR No. 165427, March 21, 2011.
312
(Oliveros v. San Miguel Corporation, GR No. 173531, Feb.
1, 2012.
OF CERTIFICATES
The proceeding for the amendment and
alteration of a certificate of title under Sec. 108
of PD No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances or
situations, namely: (a) when registered interests
of any description, whether vested, contingent,
expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and
ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or
been created which do not appear upon the
certificate; (c) when any error, omission or
mistake was made in entering a certificate or any
memorandum thereon or on any duplicate
certificate; (d) when the name of any person on
the certificate has been changed; (e) when the
registered owner has been married, or,
registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or
creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when a
corporation, which owned registered land and has
been dissolved, has not conveyed the same
within three years after its dissolution; and (g)
when there is reasonable ground for the
amendment or alteration of title.313
All petitions or motions filed under Sec.
108, PD No. 1529, as well as under any other
provision of the Decree after original registration,
shall be filed and entitled in the original case in
which the decree or registration was entered. The
rule aims to prevent confusion and to avoid
difficulty in tracing the origin of entries in the
registry.314 But the court has no authority to
reopen the judgment or decree of registration,
and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the
court which shall impair the title or other interest
of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in
good faith, or his heirs and assigns without his or
their written consent.315
Under Sec. 2 of PD No. 1529, it is now
provided that "Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts) shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all applications for original
registration of titles to lands, including
improvements and interest therein and over all
petitions filed after original registration of title,
with power to hear and determine all questions
arising upon such applications or petitions." The
above provision has eliminated the distinction
between the general jurisdiction vested in the
regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting
313
Paz v. Republic, GR No. 157367, Nov. 23, 2011.
314
Life Homes Realty v. Court of Appeas, GR No. 120827,
Feb. 15, 2007.
315
Sec. 108, PD No. 1529.
 34
merely as a cadastral court. Aimed at avoiding
multiplicity of suits the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the
regional trial courts the authority to act not only
on applications for original registration but also
over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or
petitions.316
REPLACEMENT OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE
Sec. 109, PD No. 1529, governs the
procedure for the replacement of a lost or
destroyed owner’s duplicate certificate of title.
Where the owner’s duplicate copy is not in fact
lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is
unwarranted as the court has no jurisdiction over
the petition.317
Unlike in a petition for reconstitution,
there is no requirement for the publication of the
petition for replacement of lost or destroyed
certificate under Sec. 109 of PD No. 1529. A
petition for replacement of a lost duplicate
certificate of title shall be filed with the regional
trial court of the place where the land lies, and
this is true even if the title was issued pursuant
to a public land patent registered in accordance
with Section 103 of the Decree.318
RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE
The reconstitution of a certificate of title
denotes restoration in the original form and
condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of land.
The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to
have, after observing the procedures prescribed
by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same
way it has been when the loss or destruction
occurred.319 The lost or destroyed document
referred to is the one that is in the custody of the
Register of Deeds. When reconstitution is
ordered, this document is replaced with a new
one — the reconstituted title — that basically
reproduces the original. After the reconstitution,
316
Ligon v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 107751, June 1, 1995.
317
Camitan vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128099, Dec. 20,
2006.
318
Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, A.M. No. RTJ-
92-836. Aug. 2, 1995.
319
Republic v. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009,
586 SCRA 600, 614.
the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the
reconstituted title.320
Reconstitution denotes restoration of the
certificate of title allegedly lost or destroyed in its
original form and conditions: it does not pass
upon the question of ownership. 321 Thus, if a
certificate of title covering land was decreed in
the name of “Antonio Ompad and Dionisia Icong,”
the reconstituted certificate of title should
likewise be in the name of the decreed owners as
they appeared in the lost or destroyed certificate
of title.322
For an order of reconstitution to issue, the
following elements must be present:
(1) the certificate of title has been lost or
destroyed;
(2) the petitioner is the registered owner
or has an interest therein; and
(3) the certificate of title is in force at the
time it was lost or destroyed.323
The only persons who can file the petition
for reconstitution of a lost certificate are the
registered owner, his assigns or persons in
interest in the property.324
Judicial reconstitution of title partakes of a
land registration proceeding, hence, notice of the
proceedings must be done in the manner set
forth by the law. The jurisdictional requirements
of (a) publication, (b) posting, and (c) service of
notice are mandatory. Reconstitution is governed
by RA No. 26 in relation to Sec. 110 of PD No.
1529. Sec. 12 of RA No. 26 describes the
requirements for a petition for reconstitution
while Sec. 13 prescribes the requirements for a
notice of hearing of the petition. Non-compliance
with the requirements deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution. 325
The requirements of Secs. 2 and 3, RA No.
26 are almost identical. The enumerated
320
Republic v. Vergel de Dios, GR No. 170459, Feb. 9, 2011.
321
Republic v. Santua, GR No. 155703, Sept. 8, 2008; Layos v.
Fil-Estate Golf and Development Corporation, GR No.
150470, Aug. 6, 2008; Pinote vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12.
322
Bunagan v. Court of First Instance of Cebu, GR No. L-
29073, April 18, 1980, 97 SCRA 72.
323
Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development Corporation, GR
No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008.
324
Ungay Malobago Mines, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 187892,
Jan. 14, 2015.
325
Castillo v. Republic, GR No. 182980, June 22, 2011.
 35
requirements are documents from official sources
which recognize the ownership of the owner and
his predecessors-in-interest. The phrase “any
other document” in paragraph (f) of Secs. 2 and
3 refers to documents similar to those
enumerated.326
Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions
for reconstitution of allegedly lost or destroyed
titles over lands that are already covered by duly
issued subsisting titles in the names of their duly
registered owners.327
Administrative reconstitution is also
governed by RA No, 26, as amended by RA No.
6732, dated July 17, 1989. Administrative
reconstitution of lost or destroyed certificates of
title may be availed of only in case of substantial
loss or destruction of land titles due to fire, flood
or other force majeure as determined by the
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority,
and on the further condition that:
(a) the number of certificates of title
lost or damaged should be at least ten percent
(10%) of the total number in the possession of
the office of the Register of Deeds; but
(b) in no case shall the number of
certificates be less than five hundred (500).
The absence of opposition from
government agencies is of no controlling
significance because the State cannot be
estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents, hence, the Republic is not
barred from assailing the decision granting the
petition for reconstitution if the same has no
merit.328
It has been held that should a petition for
reconstitution be denied for lack of sufficient
basis, the petitioner is not entirely left without a
remedy. He may still file an application for
confirmation of his title under relevant laws if he
is, in fact, the lawful owner of land.329
ADVERSE CLAIM
An adverse claim is registered by filing
with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition
starting the basis of the right claimed. 330 The duty
326
Republic v. Lagramada, GR No. 150741, June 12, 2008;
Republic v. Santua, supra.;
327
Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008.
328
Republic v. Lorenzo, GR No. 172338, Dec. 10, 2012.
329
Angat v. Republic, supra.
330
Sec. 70, PD No. 1529.
of the Register of Deeds to record the same on
the title of ministerial.331 The notice of adverse
claim is to apprise third person that there is
controversy over the ownership of the land, such
that any transaction regarding the land is subject
to the outcome of the dispute. 332 The annotation
of an adverse claim over registered land under
Sec. 70 of PD No. 1529333 requires a claim on the
title of the disputed land. The existence of an
easement of subjacent and lateral support need
not be annotated at the back of the title of the
servient estate.334
An adverse claim is not ipso facto
cancelled upon the lapse of the thirty days from
its registration. There must be a petition for the
purpose to afford the adverse claimant an
331
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79.
332
Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Arrazola
v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279; Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
333
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 provides:
Section 70. Adverse claim. — Whoever claims any
part or interest in registered land adverse to the registered
owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original
registration, may, if no other provision is made in this Decree
for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting
forth fully his alleged right or interest, and how or under
whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of
title of the registered owner, the name of the registered owner,
and a description of the land in which the right or interest is
claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall
state the adverse claimant's residence, and a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim on the certificate of
title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty
days from the date of registration. After the lapse of said
period, the annotation of adverse claim may be canceled upon
filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest:
Provided, however, that after cancellation, no second adverse
claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the
same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in
interest may file a petition in the Court of First Instance where
the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim,
and the court shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment
as may be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged
to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered
canceled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing,
shall find that the adverse claim thus registered was frivolous,
it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one
thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, in its
discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may
withdraw his adverse claim by filing with the Register of
Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
334
Castro v. Monsod, GR No. 183719, Feb. 2, 2011.
 36
opportunity to be heard.335 Parties with liens
annotated on the certificate of title are entitled to
notice in an action for cancellation of their
liens.336
NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS
A notice of lis pendens is an
announcement to the whole world that a
particular real property is in litigation, serving as
a warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk, or that he
gambles on the result of the litigation over the
said property.337 The title obtained by the
transferee pendente lite affords him no special
protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a
purchaser in good faith and cannot acquire better
rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest.338
Thus, one who buys land where there is a
pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the
right of a purchaser in good faith; neither can he
have acquired better rights than those of his
predecessor in interest.339
A notice of lis pendens should contain (1)
a statement of the institution of the action or
proceeding; (2) the court where the same is
pending; (3) the date of its institution; (4) a
reference to the number of the certificate of title;
and (5) an adequate description of the land
affected and its registered owner.340 The notice is
not a lien or encumbrance on the property, but
simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those
dealing with the property that it is under
litigation.341 The litigation must involve the title
to, or the use or occupation of, a specific
property. It does not apply where the object of
the suit is money judgment, or proceedings for
the probate of will or administration of the estate
of a deceased person, levy on execution or
preliminary attachments.342 A notice of lis
335
Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals, supra; see also Duque-
Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR
No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011
336
Crisologo v. Omelio, GR No. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, Oct.
3, 2012.
337
Dela Merced v. GSIS, GR No. 167140, Nov. 23, 2011.
338
Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-902 (1995).
339
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25,
1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing Constantino v. Espiritu,
No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco
v. Aquino, No. L-30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1,
15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207.
340
Sec. 76, PD No. 1529.
341
Republic v. Ravelo, GR No. 165114, Aug. 6, 2008.
342
Biglang-awa vs. Constantino, 109 Phil. 168.
pendens subjects the interest of the transferee to
the results of the pending suit.
CONSULTA
Sec. 117 of PD No. 1529 provides:
SEC. 117. Procedure. — When
the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken
or memorandum to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or
other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in
interest does not agree with the action
taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the
question shall be submitted to the
Commissioner of Land Registration by
the Register of Deeds, or by the party
in interest thru the Register of Deeds.
xxx
The Commissioner of Land
Registration, considering the consulta
and the records certified to him after
notice to the parties and hearing, shall
enter an order prescribing the step to
be taken or memorandum to be made.
His resolution or ruling in consultas
shall be conclusive and binding upon
all Registers of Deeds, provided, that
the party in interest who disagrees
with the final resolution, ruling or
order of the Commissioner relative to
consultas may appeal to the Court of
Appeals within the period and in the
manner provided in Republic Act No.
5434.
It is the ministerial duty of the Register of
Deeds to register documents presented to him for
registration.343 If the Register of Deeds is in
doubt as to the registrability of the document,
the remedy is to elevate the matter to the LRA
via en consulta. The same procedure may be
availed of by the interested party. 344 Appeal from
the LRA decision may be taken to the Court of
Appeals.345
The case of Alfonso v. Office of the
President346 stresses the duty of the Register of
343
Sec. 10, PD No. 1529.
344
Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152.
345
Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA
88.
346
GR No. 150091, April 2, 2007.
 37
Deeds, when in doubt as to the proper action to
be taken on any instrument presented to him for
registration, to elevate the matter to the LRA
Administrator for resolution, via consulta,
pursuant to Sec. 117 of PD No.1529, viz:
It may not be amiss to mention that
even Justice Agcaoili, in his dissent to
the assailed CA Decision, observed
petitioner's failure to take precautionary
measures, thus:
‘Considering the notoriety of the
Maysilo estate as the "mother of all
land titling scams," the irregularity
attending the issuance of the titles could
have been avoided had petitioner
exercised a little more due care and
circumspection before she affixed her
signature [on the Rivera titles]. The fact
that the Maysilo estate has spawned
conflicting claims of ownership which
invariably reached the courts, a fact
which petitioner cannot ignore on
account of her long exposure and
experience as a register of deeds,
should have impelled petitioner to be
more prudent even to the extent of
deliberately holding action on the papers
submitted to her relative to the estate
until she shall have fully satisfied herself
that everything was above board. x x x
If petitioner had made further
investigation (in the light of her previous
certifications and the notoriety of the
Maysilo estate as a potential breeding
ground of titling irregularities) and, thus,
made a timely discovery of the error in
the questioned entry, but still was in
doubt on how to proceed, she could
have easily referred the matter to
the LRA Administrator en consulta
as authorized by Section 117 of PD
No. 1529.’
MORTGAGES AND LEASES
The requisites of a mortgage are: (a) it is
constituted to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation; (b) the mortgagor is the absolute
owner of the property, and (c) the mortgagor has
the free disposal thereof.
Under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, one of
the essential requisites of the contract of
mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the
absolute owner of the property to be mortgaged;
otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and
void. However, an exception to this rule is the
doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this
doctrine, even if the mortgagor is not the owner
of the mortgaged property, the mortgage
contract and any foreclosure sale arising
therefrom are given effect by reason of public
policy. This principle is based on the rule that all
persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens certificate of title, as buyers or
mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. This is the same
rule that underlies the principle of "innocent
purchasers for value." Hence, even if the
mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does
not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property,
the mortgagee in good faith is, nonetheless,
entitled to protection.347
An absolutely simulated contract of sale is
void ab initio and transfers no ownership right.
The purported buyer, not being the owner,
cannot validly mortgage the subject property.
Consequently, neither does the buyer at the
foreclosure sale acquire any title thereto.348
Mortgages over non-disposable lands do not
acquire protection under the law. A certificate of
title is void when it covers property of public
domain classified as forest or timber or mineral
land.349
A mortgage lien is a right in rem which
follows the property – whoever its owner may be.
If the mortgagor sells the property, the buyer
must respect the mortgage, if registered, or if he
knows of its existence.350 The phrase “innocent
purchaser for value” includes an innocent lessee,
mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value. 351
The subsequent nullification of the mortgagor’s
title will not nullify the mortgage. 352 The remedy
of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused the fraud,
and if the latter are insolvent, an action against
the Treasurer of the Philippines may be filed for
recovery of damages against the Assurance
Fund.353
347
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
348
Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, now Union Bank of
the Philippines, GR No. 147788, March 19, 2002.
349
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Republic, GR No. 150824,
Feb. 4, 2008, 543 SCRA 453; See also De la Cruz v. Court of
Appeals, GR No.120652, Feb. 11, 1998, 349 Phil. 898.
350
Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 693.
351
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 710.
352
Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 587;
Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494; Penullar v. Philippine
National Bank, 120 SCRA 171.
353
Blanco v. Esquierdo, GR No. L-15182, Dec. 29, 1960, 110
 38
HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE
REQUIRED OF BANKING OR
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The general rule that a mortgagee need
not look beyond the title does not apply to banks
and other financial institutions as greater care
and due diligence is required of them.354 Imbued
with public interest, they "are expected to be
more cautious than ordinary individuals."355
In a case,356 the Court held that unlike
private individuals, a bank is expected to exercise
greater care and prudence in its dealings,
including those involving registered lands. A
banking institution is expected to exercise due
diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract. The ascertainment of the status or
condition of a property offered to it as security
for a loan must be a standard and indispensable
part of its operations.357
FORECLOSURE OF MORTAGE
When the principal obligation becomes
due and the debtor fails to perform his obligation,
the creditor may foreclose on the mortgage for
the purpose of alienating the (mortgaged)
property to satisfy his credit.358
The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure
of real estate mortgage is governed by Act No.
3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. The
purchaser at the public auction sale of an
extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek
possession thereof in accordance with Section 7
of said Act.359
Unlike in an ordinary sale, inadequacy of
the price at a forced sale is immaterial and does
not nullify the sale. It is also not required that
the bid should at least be equal to the market
Phil. 494.
354
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., v. Pascual, G.R. No.
163744, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 246, 261.
355
Alano v. Planter’s Development Bank, GR No. 171628,
June 13, 2011. Philippine National Bank v. Corpuz, G.R. No.
180945, February 12, 2010, 612 SCRA 493, 496; Gonzales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 187.
356
Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil. 225, 239
(2002).
357
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, supra.
358
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Doyon, GR No.
167238, March 25, 2009.
359
China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, GR No. 164919,
July 4, 2008.
value of the foreclosed property or the
outstanding obligation of the mortgage debtor. 360
If "the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to
cover the debt in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage, the mortgagee is entitled to claim the
deficiency from the debtor.361
Where the mortgagee is a banking
institution, the determination of the redemption
price for the foreclosed property is governed by
Section 78 of the General Banking Act. There
must be an unequivocal tender of payment for
the full amount of the repurchase price.362 The
only instance when this rule may be construed
liberally, i.e., allow the non-simultaneous tender
of payment, is if a judicial action is instituted by
the redemptioner.363
REDEMPTION AND CONSOLIDATION
OF OWNERSHIP
If the foreclosed property is registered,
the mortgagor has one year within which to
redeem the property from and after registration
of sale with the Register of Deeds.364
After the expiration of the period of redemption,
the purchaser at the foreclosure sale or anyone
claiming under him may petition the court for the
entry of a new certificate to him. But before the
entry of a new certificate of title, the registered
owner may pursue all legal and equitable
remedies to impeach or annul such
proceedings.365
The rule on redemption is liberally
construed in favor of the original owner of the
property. The policy of the law is to aid rather
than to defeat him in the exercise of his right of
redemption. The general rule in redemption is
that it is not sufficient that a person offering to
redeem manifests his desire to do so. The
statement of intention must be accompanied by
an actual and simultaneous tender of payment.
The redemption price should either be fully
360
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Avenido, GR No. 175816,
Dec. 7, 2011.
361
Id.
362
Allied Banking Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 167420,
June 5, 2009; Quisumbing v. PNB, GR No. 178242, Jan. 20,
2009.
363
Quisumbing v. PNB, supra.
364
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 370
Phil. 837, 847 (1999); BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v.
Avenido, GR No. 175816, Dec. 7, 2011.
365
Sec. 75, PD 1529; Reyes v. Tang Soat Ing, GR No. 185620,
Dec. 14, 2011
 39
offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in
court.366
Upon the expiration of the redemption
period of one year from the registration of the
sale, the right of the purchaser to the possession
of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. 367
He is entitled to possession following the
consolidation of ownership in his name.368 The
writ of possession becomes a matter of right and
its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. 369
The trial court has no discretion on this
matter."370
May persons to whom several mortgaged
lands were transferred without the knowledge
and consent of the creditor redeem only several
parcels if all the lands were sold together for a
single price at the foreclosure sale? In several
early cases decided by the Court, the right of the
mortgagor or redemptioner to redeem one or
some of the foreclosed properties was
recognized.371
ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF
POSSESSION MINISTERIAL
Under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, a writ of
possession may be issued either (a) within the
one-year period, upon the filing of a bond, or (b)
after the lapse of the redemption period, without
need of a bond.372
The proceeding for the issuance of the
writ is ex parte and is ministerial duty of the
court,373 unless a third party is actually holding
the property adversely to the judgment debtor,374
or where the bid price is unjustifiably higher than
366
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
367
Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco, GR No. 183211, June
5, 2009.
368
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523,
March 9, 2011; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, GR
No. 174988, Dec. 10, 2008.
369
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, supra.
370
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Bance, G.R. No.
167280, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 507, 515-516. Emphasis
supplied.
371
Yap v. Dy, GR No. 171868, July 27, 2011.
372
Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation,
465 SCRA 287.
373
Sueno v. Land Bank of the Philippines, GR No. 174711,
Sept. 17, 2008.
374
Glapuno v. Gapultos, 132 SCRA 429; China Banking
Corporation v. Lozada, supra.
the real amount of the obligation.375
The issuance of the writ may not be
stayed by a pending action for annulment of the
mortgage or the foreclosure itself, without
prejudice, of course, to the eventual outcome of
the pending annulment case.376 The order of the
RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession
is final which can only be questioned on
appeal.377
PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA NO. 141)
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
 Regalian doctrine – all lands and all other
natural resources are owned by the State
 No public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or
implied from the government. It is
indispensable that there be a showing of a
title from the State.
 Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been
officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which
have not been reserved for public or
quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the
government, nor in any manner become
private property.
 Land remains unclassified land until it is
released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.
 The classification of public lands is a
function of the executive branch of
government.
 For purposes of their administration and
disposition, lands of the public domain
which are alienable or open to disposition
may be further classified as: (a)
agricultural, (b) residential, commercial,
industrial, or for similar productive
purposes, (c) educational, charitable, or
other similar purposes, and (d)
reservations for townsites and for public
and quasi-public uses.
375
Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441; Marquez v.
Alindog, GR No. 184045, Jan. 22, 2014.
376
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, GR No. 174988,
Dec. 10, 2008.
377
San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus
Development Corporation, GR No. 168088, April 4, 2007.

MODES OF DISPOSITION
1. For homestead settlement;
2. By sale;
3. By lease
4. By confirmation of imperfect
incomplete title
(a) By judicial legalization
(b) By administrative
legalization (free patent)
 Homestead - any citizen of the
Philippines over the age of eighteen years,
or the head of a family, may enter a
homestead of not exceeding twelve
hectares of agricultural land of the public
domain. The applicant must have
cultivated and improved at least one-fifth
of the land continuously since the
approval of the application and resided for
at least one year in the municipality in
which the land is located.
 When a homesteader has complied
with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a tract of
public land, he acquires a vested
interest therein, and is to be regarded
as the equitable owner thereof.
 The execution and delivery of the
patent, after the right to a particular
parcel of land has become complete,
are the mere ministerial acts of the
officer charged with that duty.
 Free patent - Any natural-born citizen of
the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than 12 hectares and who, for at
least 30 years, has continuously occupied
and cultivated, by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest a tract of
agricultural public land, and who shall
have paid the real estate tax thereon shall
be entitled to have a free patent issued to
him for such tract of land not to exceed
twelve 12 hectares.
 RA No. 10023, dated March 9, 2010,
authorizes issuance of free patent
titles to zoned residential lands.
Residence requirement: 10 years.
40
Requirements:
 Survey plan and technical
description
 Affidavit of two 2 persons who are
or residents of the barangay that the
applicant has actually resided on,
and actually possessed and
occupied, the land applied for,
under a bona fide claim of
ownership, for at least 10 years,
and has complied with the other
requirements prescribed by the
Act.
 Provided, that in highly urbanized
cities, the land should not exceed
two hundred (200) square meters;
in other cities, it should not exceed
five hundred (500) square meters;
in first class and second class
municipalities, it should not exceed
seven hundred fifty (750) square
meters; and in all other
municipalities, it should not exceed
one thousand (1,000) square
meters: Provided, further, that the
land applied for is not needed for
public service and/or public use.
 Sales patent - Any citizen of the
Philippines of lawful age or the head of a
family may purchase any tract of public
agricultural land not to exceed twelve
hectares which shall be sold thru sealed
bidding. The land shall be awarded to the
highest bidder, but the applicant may
equal the highest bid.
 The purchaser shall have not less
than one-fifth of the land cultivated
within five years from the date of
the award, and pays the full
purchase price.
 Direct sale - RA No. 730 permits the
direct sale of public lands for residential
purposes to qualified applicants.
 The applicant must: (a) be a
Filipino citizen of legal age; (b) not
the owner of a home lot in the
municipality or city in which he
resides; (c) have established in
good faith his residence on a parcel
of public land which is not needed

for public service; and (d) have
constructed his house and actually
resided therein.
TITLE INDEFEASIBLE
 A certificate of title issued pursuant to a
public land patent partakes of the nature
of a certificate of title issued through
judicial proceeding. It becomes
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one
year from the date of the order for
issuance of the patent, hence, prescription
cannot operate against the registered
owner.
 If the land covered by a free patent was a
private land, the Director of Lands has no
jurisdiction over it. Such free patent and
the subsequent certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto are a nullity.378 The
aggrieved party may initiate an action for
cancellation of such title.379
CONTINUING AUTHORITY
TO INVESTIGATE
 But the Regional Director has continuing
authority to conduct an investigation to
determine whether or not fraud attended
the issuance of the patent.
 The Solicitor General may bring an action
for cancellation of title obtained through
fraud and for the reversion of the land to
the State.
 Action is not barred by prescription.
PROHIBITED ALIENATIONS
 Homestead - may not be sold or
encumbered within 5 years from the
issuance of the patent, and for a term of
20 years thereafter without the consent of
the DENR Secretary.
 Land covered by a free patent – may not
be sold within 5 years from the issuance
of the patent.
 Prohibition against alienation
mandatory.
378
Agne v. Director of Lands, G.R. Nos. 40399 & 72255,
February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 793, 803.
379
Pabaus v. Yutiamco, GR No. 164356, July 27, 2011
41
Policy of the law:
 To conserve the land which a grantee has
acquired under the Public Land Act for him
and his heirs as a reward for his labor in
cleaning and cultivating it
 To give the patentee a place where to live
with his family so he may become a happy
citizen and useful member of society
EFFECT OF A VOID CONVEYANCE
 It shall produce the effect of annulling and
cancelling the title and cause the
reversion of the property and
improvements to the State.
 Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or
legal heirs, within a period of five years
from the date of the conveyance.
 The five-year period of redemption of
homestead sold at extrajudicial
foreclosure runs after the expiration of
the one-year period of repurchase allowed
in an extrajudicial foreclosure.
 Query: Where the patentee sold the land
during the prohibited period, may he
recover the property from the vendee?
Yes, consistent the with the fundamental
policy to afford the patentee a piece of
land for his home and cultivation.
(Binayug v. Ugaddan, GR No. 181623,
Dec. 5, 2012)
SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM BUYERS'
PROTECTIVE DECREE
(PD NO. 957)
DEFINITION OF TERMS
 Subdivision project - a registered parcel of
land registered partitioned for residential
purposes into individual lots and offered to
the public for sale, in cash or in
installment terms. It shall include all
is residential, commercial, industrial and
recreational areas as well as open spaces
and other community and public areas in
the project.
 42
 Condominium unit - a part of the
condominium project intended for any
type of independent use or ownership,
including one or more rooms or spaces
located in one or more floors (or part of
parts of floors) in a building or buildings
and such accessories as may be appended
thereto.
 Developer - the person who develops or
improves the subdivision project or
condominium project for and in behalf of
the owner thereof.
JURISDICTION OF THE HLURB
 Unsound real estate business practices;
 Claims involving refund and any other
claims filed by subdivision lot
condominium unit buyer against the
project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
 Cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed
by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
 HLURB has jurisdiction over cases for
collection of unpaid installments and
claims for damages.
 No jurisdiction over cases filed by
subdivision owners or developers against
lot or unit buyers
 Court, not HLURB, has jurisdiction over
issues involving ownership or possession
of property.
SUMMARY OF CASES WHERE
HLURB HAS JURISDICTION
 For a determination of the rights of the
parties under a contract to sell a
subdivision lot;
 For the delivery of title against the
subdivision owner;
 For the refund of reservation fees for the
purchase of a subdivision lot;
 For specific performance filed by a lot
buyer against the seller of a subdivision
lot;
 For the annulment of the mortgage
constituted by the project owner without
the buyer’s consent, the mortgage
foreclosure sale, and the condominium
certificate of title issued to the highest
bidder at the said foreclosure sale;
 For the collection of the balance of the
unpaid purchase price of a subdivision lot
filed by the developer of a subdivision
against the lot buyer; and
 For incidental claims for damages.
LICENSE TO SELL
 The owner or dealer must have a license
to sell the project within two weeks from
the registration of such project.
 However, the absence of a license to sell
the subdivision lots does not render the
sale thereof void. The absence of the
license to sell only subjects the
condominium developer and its officers
civilly and criminally liable.
EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
 Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the
partition of land among co-owners and co-
heirs.
 Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the
original purchaser and any subsequent
sale of the same lot.
 Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium
unit by or for the account of a mortgagee
in the ordinary course of business when
necessary to liquidate a bona fide debt.
FOREIGNERS MAY PURCHASE
 Under RA No. 4726, foreign nationals can
own Philippine real estate through the
purchase of condominium units or
townhouses up to not more than 40% of
the total and outstanding capital stock of
a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.
 The land is owned by the condominium
corporation and the unit owner is simply a
member in this condominium corporation.
DEALERS AND BROKERS
 43
 No real estate dealer, broker or salesman
shall engage in the business of selling
subdivision lots or condominium units
unless he has registered himself with the
Board.
 Applicant must be of good repute and has
complied with the applicable rules of the
Authority
REGISTRATION
 All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and
other similar instruments relative to the
sale or conveyance of the subdivision lots
and condominium units, whether or not
the purchase price is paid in full, shall be
registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the
property is situated.
MORTGAGES
 No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be
made by the owner or developer without
prior written approval of the Board. Such
approval shall not be granted unless it is
shown that the proceeds of the mortgage
loan shall be used for the development of
the condominium or subdivision project
and effective measures have been
provided to ensure such utilization.
 The mortgage of a subdivision lot or a
condominium unit is void if executed by a
property developer without the prior
written approval of the HLURB. That an
encumbrance has been constituted over
an entire property, of which the subject
lot or unit is merely a part, does not affect
the invalidity of the lien over the specific
portion at issue. The fact that the lot had
no separate TCT did not make it less of a
"subdivision lot" entitled to the protection
of PD 957.380
 “The circumstance that DBP and ADC
executed the mortgage contract prior to
the selling of the subdivided portions of
the property to Capulong is immaterial
considering that when DBP granted the
loan to ADC, it already knew that the loan
was to be used for realty development.
DBP should have considered that it was
dealing with a property subject of a real
380
Far East Bank and Trust Co, v, Marquez, GR No. 147964,
April 14, 2004.
estate development project. x x x DBP
cannot be deemed to be an innocent
mortgagee.”381
 The essence of the government's
socialized housing program is to preserve
the beneficiary's ownerships for a
reasonable length of time, at least within
five years from the time he acquired it
free from any encumbrance.382
ADVERTISEMENTS
 Advertisements by the owner or developer
must not mislead or deceive the public.
 A subdivision owner was held in breach
when it failed to deliver a “closed-circuit
TV monitor through which residents from
their apartments can see their guests” as
advertised. (BPI v. ALS Management, GR
No. 151821, April 14, 2004)
TIME OF COMPLETION
 Petitioner may be held liable in damages
for any delay in the construction.
 A request for extension of time to
complete development of a subdivision or
condominium project may be granted only
where non-completion of the project is
caused by fortuitous events or legal
ordersand with written notice to lot or
unit buyers.
DESISTANCE OR NON-PAYMENT OF
AMORTIZATIONS
 Buyer need not give prior notice before
desisting from further paying
amortizations.
 Buyer may not be ousted for non-payment
due to the failure of the subdivision owner
to put up the required improvements.
 Failure to develop a subdivision may
justify non-payment of amortizations by a
lot buyer.
 Failure of seller to deliver the
condominium unit entitles buyer to cancel
contract.
THE MACEDA LAW
381
DBP v. Capulong, GR No. 181790, Jan. 30, 2009.
382
Lalicon v. NHA, GR No. 185440, July 13, 2011.
 44
 Buyer is entitled to the following rights in
case he defaults in the payment of
succeeding installments:
 Grace Period –– to pay, without
additional interest, the unpaid
installments due within the total grace
period earned by him which is fixed at the
rate of one month grace period for every
year of installment payments made:
Provided, That this right shall be exercised
by the buyer only once in every five years
of the life of the contract and its
extensions, if any; and
 Refund of “Cash Surrender Value”
— if the contract is cancelled, the seller
shall refund to the buyer the cash
surrender value of the payments on the
property equivalent to fifty percent of the
total payments made and, after five years
of installments, an additional five percent
every year but not to exceed ninety per
cent of the total payments made;
Provided, That the actual cancellation of
the contract shall take place after thirty
days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or the demand for
rescission of the contract by a notarial act
and upon full payment of the cash
surrender value to the buyer.
ISSUANCE OF TITLE
 The owner or developer shall deliver the
title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon
full payment of the lot or unit.
 Even with a valid mortgage over the lot,
the seller is still bound to redeem said
mortgage without any cost to the buyer
apart from the balance of the purchase
price and registration fees.
ROADS, ALLEYS, OPEN SPACES
 The owner as developer of a subdivision
shall provide adequate roads, alleys and
sidewalks, and for subdivision projects
one hectare or more, reserve 30% of the
gross area for open space exclusively for
parks, playgrounds and recreational use.
 These areas shall be non-alienable public
lands, and non-buildable.
 The roads, alleys, sidewalks and
playgrounds shall be donated by the
owner or developer to the city or
municipality and it shall be mandatory for
the local government to accept; provided,
however, that the parks and playgrounds
may be donated to the Homeowners
Association of the project with the consent
of the city or municipality concerned.
VISITORIAL POWERS
 The Board, through its duly authorized
representative may, at any time, make an
examination into the business affairs,
administration, and condition of any
person, corporation, partnership,
cooperative, or association engaged in the
business of selling subdivision lots and
condominium units.
 It may deputize the Philippine
Constabulary or any law enforcement
agency in the execution of its final orders,
rulings or decisions.
TAKEOVER DEVELOPMENT
 The Board may take over or cause the
development and completion of the
subdivision or condominium project at the
expenses of the owner or developer who
has refused or failed to develop or
complete the development of the project.
 It may demand, collect and receive from
the buyers the installment payments due
on the lots for the development of the
subdivision.
ADMINISTRATIVE FINES
 The Board may prescribe and impose fines
not exceeding ten thousand pesos for
violations of the provisions of the Decree
or of any rule or regulation thereunder.
Fines shall be payable to the Board and
enforceable through writs of execution in
accordance with the provisions of the
Rules of Court.
 HLURB is without jurisdiction to determine
criminal liability.
JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI
 45

Philippine Judicial Academy

Supreme Court

552-9636, 922-0232, 0920-9506384

Email: oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com

Reference:

1. AGCAOILI, “Property Registration

Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles
and Deeds)” 2011 ed., (with a
foreword by Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno), cited by the Supreme Court as
“one of the recognized textbooks on
property registration” in Eland
Philippines Inc. v. Garcia, GR No.
173289, Feb. 17, 2010.

2. AGCAOILI, “Law on Natural

Resources and Environmental Law
Developments” (with a Foreword by
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor,
Philippine Judicial Academy, Supreme
Court). This includes the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases
covering, among others, Consent
Decree, SLAPP, TEPO, Writs of
Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus,
Precautionary Principle, etc.

3. AGCAOILI, “Reviewer in Property

Registration and Related Laws (With
Sample MCQs and Suggested
Answers)

Published and
Distributed by REX
Book Store