LEGISLATURE
1 CITY OF DAVAO v RTC XII infant. Emiliano Militar reported to the Office of the Local
(GR 127383, August 2005)
FACTS: A notice for public auction was sent to the
GSIS Davao Branch scheduling the public bidding of its
properties located in Davao City. This is due to the non –
payment of realty taxes for 2 years. GSIS then received a
warrant and notice of levy on three parcels of land. GSIS then
filed a petition with the Davao City RTC claiming that they
are exempted from tax. The Local Government Code, sec. 234
and 534 withdrew real property tax from GOCCs. Section 33
of PD 1146 (GSIS Charter) mandated the exemption of GSIS
from taxes and set conditions in order for the exemption to be
withdrawn. The conditions are: a) Sec. 33 be expressly
repealed by law. GSIS contends that if it were the intention of
the legislature to repeal Sec. 33, it would have expressly done
so in the LGC. RTC ruled that GSIS retains its exemption
from all taxes, including real estate taxes.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT GSIS IS EXEMPT FROM
PAYING TAXES
RULING: NO. GSIS is not exempt from paying said taxes.
The Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in PD 1146
since it imposes restrictions on the competency of Congress to
enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. A law
cannot impose conditions as to how or when it can be
repealed. What PD 1146 does is limit the legislative power of
Congress.
2 GSIS v CITY TREASURER OF MANILA
(GR 186242, December 2009)
FACTS: GSIS owns 2 parcels of land, the Katigbak property
and the Concepcion – Arroceros property. GSIS and the
Metropolitan Trial Court occupy the latter, while the former is
leased to the Manila Hotel Corporation. The City Treasurer of
Manila sent a letter to GSIS informing them of their unpaid
real property taxes due from 1992 to 2002 amounting to 54M
and 48M, respectively. The letter gave notice to GSIS that non
– payment of taxes would render the subject properties up for
auction. GSIS, however, argued that they are exempted from
all kinds of taxes. RTC ruled that GSIS is liable for delinquent
taxes.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT FULL TAX EXEMPTION IS
GRANTED TO GSIS
RULING: YES. GSIS is exempt from all kinds of taxes,
pursuant to the provisions of PD 1146, as amended by RA
8291. The SC ruled that other than the provisions, GSIS is an
instrumentality of the national government, hence, outside the
purviews of local taxation forces.
3 DAVID v SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
GRACE POE
(GR 221538, January 2016)
FACTS: Grace Poe’s biological parents are unknown.
She was abandoned outside of a parish church while still an
Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6,
1968. She was given the name Mary Grace Natividad
Contreras Militar. FPJ and Susan Roces filed for Adoption of
Grace Poe and it was granted. Senator Poe decided to run as
Senator in the 2013 Elections. Grace Poe ran for senator in the
2013 elections. She won and was declared as Senator – Elect.
David, a losing candidate, contested the election of Poe for
failing to comply with the citizenship and residency
requirements under the 1987 constitution. The Senate
Electoral Tribunal ruled that Grace Poe is a natural born
citizen and is thus qualified to hold office as Senator.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SET IS CORRECT IN
RULING THAT GRACE POE IS QUALIFIED
RULING: YES. The Senate Electoral Tribunal acted well
within the bounds of its constitutional competence when it
ruled that Senator Poe is a natural-born citizen qualified to sit
as Senator of the Republic. Senate Electoral Tribunal was only
asked to make a reasonable interpretation of the law while
needfully considering the established personal circumstances
of Senator Poe. It could not have asked the impossible of
Senator Poe, sending her on a proverbial fool's errand to
establish her parentage, when the controversy before it arose
because Senator Poe’s parentage was unknown and has
remained so throughout her life. It did not insist on burdening
Senator Poe’s with conclusively proving, within the course of
the few short months, the one thing that she has never been in
a position to know throughout her lifetime. In the process, it
avoided setting a damning precedent for all children with the
misfortune of having been abandoned by their biological
parents. Far from reducing them to inferior, second-class
citizens, the Senate Electoral Tribunal did justice to the
Constitution's aims of promoting and defending the well-being
of children, advancing human rights, and guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws and equal access to opportunities for
public service.
4 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v DANGEROUS DRUGS
BOARD
(GR 157870, November 2008)
FACTS: Section 36 of RA 9165, known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, requires mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office. COMELEC issued
Resolution 6486 prescribing the rules and regulations on the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-
election, filed a petition seeking to nullify Sec. 36(G) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution. Pimentel argues that the
Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and
COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No.
6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to
undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
1
LEGISLATURE
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be
certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the
Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT SEC 36 OF RA 9165 AND
RESOLUTION 6484 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING: YES. They are deemed unconstitutional. It is a
well established ruled that if a law violates any norm of the
constitution, it is to be understood as null and void.
COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate
for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right
of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
5 AQUINO III v COMELEC
(GR 189793, April 2010)
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9176 created an additional
legislative district for the province of Camarines Sur by
reconfiguring the existing first and second legislative districts
of the province. The said law originated from House Bill No.
4264 and was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo. To that effect, the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to create an
additional legislative district for the province. The Province of
Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative districts.
Senator Noynoy Aquino and Jesse Robredo seek for the
nullification of RA 9716, deeming it as unconstitutional.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of
two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. Petitioners claim that the reconfiguration
by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional. They rely on Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited
250,000 minimum population standards.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT A POPULATION OF 250,000
IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT IN THE
CREATION OF A LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT
RULING: NO. It is not an indispensable requirement. There
is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000
minimum population that must compose a legislative district.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase “each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand” from the phrase “or each province” point to no
other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is
only required for a city, but not for a province
6 ALDABA v COMELEC
(GR 188078, March 2010)
FACTS: The province of Bulacan was represented
through four legislative districts. When RA 9591 (Malolos
City Charter) was passed, it created a separate legislative
district for the city. The population of Malolos City was only
223k at the time that the legislative bills of RA 9591 were in
Congress. Regional Director Miranda of the NSO projected
that the population of Malolos would reach 250k before the
upcoming election. If this were true, Malolos would be
entitled to one district representative. Aldaba contended that
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the population
requirements set by the constitution
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT RA 9591 IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING: YES. It is to be deemed as unconstitutional for
violating the population requirement set by Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution, which states that each city must have at
least 250k citizens in order to constitute a legislative district.
The certification by Regional Director Miranda is without
legal effect, seeing as he has no basis and authority to issue
such. In any event, a city whose population has increased to
250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the
immediately following election after the attainment of the
250,000 population. Any population projection forming the
basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on
an official and credible source.
7 NAVARRO v ERMITA
(GR 180050, February 2010)
FACTS: Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this
petition for certiorari under Rule65 to nullify Republic Act
No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands for
being unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census
of Population, the population of the Province of Dinagat
Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted
by the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte which
yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with
average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of
P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of 802.12 square
kilometers as certified by the Bureau of Local Government
Finance. Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610,The Local
Government Code, a province may be created if it has an
average annual income of not less than P20 million based on
1991 constant prices as certified by the Department of
Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants
as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least
2,000 square kilometers as certified by the Lands Management
Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or
cities, which do not contribute to the income of the province.
2
LEGISLATURE
Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat
Islands was enacted into law and a plebiscite was held
subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative. With the approval of the people from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Province of
Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate
and distinct province. Respondents argued that exemption
from the land area requirement is germane to the purpose of
the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political
and territorial subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations
have the force and effect of law as long as they are germane to
the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991 (IRR) are valid.
RULING: NO. The rules and regulations cannot go beyond
the terms and provisions of the basic law. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the creation
of a province, including any exemption from such criteria,
must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRR
went beyond the criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the
Local Government Code when it added the italicized portion
“The land area requirement shall not apply where the
proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands. “
The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to
the purpose of the law as it already conflicts with the criteria
prescribed by the law in creating a territorial subdivision.
Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between
the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the
said law, the basic law prevails.
8 BAGABUYO v COMELEC
(GR 176970, December 2008)
FACTS: Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative
district. But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO
instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two legislative
districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed the validity
of the said law and he went immediately to the Supreme Court
to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the law in the
upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending that the
2nd district was created without a plebiscite which he averred
was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT a plebiscite is required in the
case at bar.
HELD: NO, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA
9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro
City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in
this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place;
and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan
de Oro’s territory, population and income classification;
hence, no plebiscite is required. What happened here, was a
reapportionment of a single legislative district into two
legislative districts. Reapportionment is the realignment or
change in legislative districts brought about by changes in
population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of
equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12
city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services only
250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
9 B.A.N.A.T. v COMELEC
(586 SCRA 210)
FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board
of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of
party list representatives provided by the Constitution; that
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold
votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution and with Section 12 of RA 7941 and should be
applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be
allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking; that the 3-seat
limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and that the
formula/procedure prescribed in the allocation of party- list
seats, Annex A of Comelec Res. 2847 shall be used for the
purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed,
which party-list groups are entitled to representative seats and
how many of their nominees shall seat. However, COMELEC
denied the same for being moot and academic. It announced
that it would determine the total number of seats of each
winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with
Veterans Federation Party v.COMELEC formula.
Subsequently, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the
COMELEC to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans
formula because the Veterans formula is violative of the
Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory.
2. Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 is constitutional.
3. Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in
Section 11(b) of RA 7941 in allocation of additional
seats is constitutional.
RULING
3
LEGISLATURE
1. NO. Neither the Constitution nor RA. 7941 mandates the
filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party- list
representatives found in the Constitution. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
However, we cannot allow the continued existence of
a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list
representatives from being filled. 
 candidates in legislative district elections can
2. YES. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents
any party from dominating the party-list elections.
3. NO. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold
only in relation to the distribution of the additional
seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and
prevents the attainment of the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold in the
distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall
consist of party-list representatives. 
 organizations that represent the "marginalized and
10 PAGLAUM v COMELEC
(GR 203766, April 2013)
FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were
disqualified by the Commission on Elections in the May 2013
party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not
being qualified as representatives for marginalized or
underrepresented sectors. Paglaum then filed a petition for
certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
RULING: NO. COMELEC merely followed the guidelines
set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. However,
cases were remanded back to the COMELEC because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the
coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new
parameters prescribed by this Court.
In determining who may participate in the party-list elections,
the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
4. Three different groups may participate in the party-list
system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral
parties or organizations. 
 ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PGBI
5. National parties or organizations and regional parties or
organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector. 

6. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system and
do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
A political party, whether major or not, that fields
participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
7. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well- defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are "marginalized and underrepresented" include
labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth. 

8. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized
and underrepresented" sector they represent. The
nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
9. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one
nominee who remains qualified.
11 PGBI v COMELEC
(GR 190529, April 2010)
FACTS: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the
COMELEC issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679
deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list
of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations
affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2%
of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007
elections. PGBI argued that according to the Minero ruling,
the parties were afforded due process while they were not.
COMELEC stated that the MINERO ruling is on point seeing
as they failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2001 and did not
participate in the 2004 elections.
SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO BE A PARTYLIST
4
LEGISLATURE
RULING: YES. PGBI should be allowed to be a registered
party list. The SC admitted that the Minero ruling was an
erroneous application of the law. Therefore, it would be unfair
to prejudice PGBI based on said erroneous application.
PGBI’s right to due process was likewise not violated, seeing
as they were afforded their right to be heard. Evidently seen
when they asked for reconsideration.
12 AMORES v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(GR 189600, June 2010)
FACTS: Amores seeks the disqualification of Joel
Villanueva as a nominee of the youth sector of the Citizen’s
Battle Against Corruption seeing as he was already 31 years of
age at the time of filing for certificates of nomination and
acceptance. Amores claims that Joel Villanueva is beyond the
age limit of 30, which is prescribed by RA 7941, the Party List
System Act. Villanueva argues that the age limit applies only
to those nominated during the first three congressional terms
after the ratification of the constitution.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JOEL VILLANUEVA MAY
STILL BE A NOMINEE FOR YOUTH SECTOR
RULING: NO. The states in unequivocal terms that a
nominee of the youth sector must at least be twenty-five (25)
but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election, so it must be that a candidate who is more than 30 on
election day is not qualified to be a youth sector nominee.
13 ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v COMELEC
(GR 190582, April 2010)
FACTS: Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals,
or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organizatio. COMELEC dismissed
the Petition on moral grounds citing certain biblical and
quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are
considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
Ang Ladlad now argues that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. They also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy,
freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws,
as well as constituted violations of the Philippines
international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT COMELEC CAN EXCLUDE
ANG LADLAD AS A PARTY LIST ON THE GROUNDS
OF IMMORALITY
RULING: YES, ANG LADLAD PARTY IS QUALIFIED.
Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) section 2
unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system
of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors, organizations, and parties become members of the
House of Representatives. The party-list system is NOT a tool
to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood
persons or group of persons but rather it is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized individuals whose
interest are also of the nations’.
The Court found that there has been no misrepresentation
regarding the membership of Ang Ladlad for it had been
represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization
with affiliates around the Philippines.
The Court also found that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. The
Philippine Constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not strict
but benevolent neutrality.
14 COALITION OF SENIOR CITIZENS v COMELEC
(GR 178678, April 2009)
FACTS: On May 2010, the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS
signed an agreement, entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which
contains the list of their candidates and terms on sharing of
their powers. It contained an agreement on who among the
candidates will serve the terms according to the power sharing
agreement. By virtue of the term-sharing agreement, the term
of Kho as member of the HR was cut short to 1 yr and 6 mos.
In line with this, Kho tendered his resignation to be effective
on December 31, 2011.
In the interim, COMELEC Resolution was promulgated on
February 21, 2012. Pertinently, Section 7 of Rule 4 thereof
provided that filing of vacancy as a result of term sharing
agreement among nominees of winning party-list
groups/organizations shall not be allowed. On March 12,
2012, the Board of Trustees of SENIOR CITIZENS issued
recalled the resignation of Kho and allowed him to continue to
represent the party-list. Despite of the recall of resignation,
COMELEC found the term-sharing agreement contrary to
public policy and hence resolved to CANCEL the registration
of SENIOR CITIZENS under the Party-List System of
Representation.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC can disqualify and cancel
the registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS
solely on account of its purported violation of the prohibition
against term-sharing.
RULING: NO. There was no indication that the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement, much less
succeeded in implementing, the term-sharing agreement.
Before this Court, the Arquiza Group and the Datol Group
insist on this fact of non-implementation of the agreement.
Thus, for all intents and purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold
his seat and served his term as a member of the House of
Representatives. Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement
was not actually implemented by the parties thereto, it appears
that SENIOR CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had
been unfairly and arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En
Banc. Verily, how can there be disobedience on the part of
5
LEGISLATURE
SENIOR CITIZENS when its nominees, in fact, desisted from
carrying out their agreement? Hence, there was no violation of
an election law, rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then,
the disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the
cancellation of its registration and accreditation have no legal
leg to stand on.
15 LOKIN v COMELEC
(GR 193808, June 2012)
FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a
duly registered party-list organization, manifested their intent
to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and
local elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from
which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the
elections, the list of nominees was amended: the nominations
of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were
withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel
Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second
seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on the original list, to
a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-
Gonzales. The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity
of the amendment of the list of nominees and the withdrawal
of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. The
COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official
second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of
office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC. Lokin filed a
petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to
proclaim him as the official second nominee of CIBAC.
Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its
nominees.
ISSUE: Whether the controversy on who has authority to file
the nomination in a party-list is an intra-corporate dispute,
exclusively cognizable by special commercial courts, and over
which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.
RULING: NO. COMELEC’s jurisdiction to settle the
struggle for leadership within the party is well established.
This singular power to rule upon questions of party identity
and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident
to its enforcement powers. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections that the COMELEC’s powers and
functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
"include the ascertainment of the identity of the political party
and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts." The Court
also declared in another case that the COMELEC’s power to
register political parties necessarily involved the determination
of the persons who must act on its behalf. Thus, the
COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a
proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.
16 SENERES v COMELEC
(GR 178678, April 2009)
FACTS: In 1999, private respondent Robles was elected
president and chairperson of BUHAY party-list. The
constitution of BUHAY provides for a three-year term for all
its party officers, without re-election. BUHAY participated in
the 2001 and 2004 elections, with Robles as its president. On
March 2007, Robles signed and filed a Certificate of
Nomination of BUHAY’s nominees for the 2007 elections.
Earlier, however, petitioner Hans Christian Seneres, holding
himself up as acting president and secretary-general of
BUHAY, also filed a Certificate of Nomination.
Seneres, in his Petition to Deny Due Course to Certificates of
Nomination, claims that the nominations made by Robles
were, for lack of authority, null and void owing to the
expiration of the latter’s term as party president.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ROBLES’ TERM AS
PRESIDENT HAS EXPIRED
RULING: NO. As a general rule, officers and directors of a
corporation hold over after the expiration of their terms until
such time as their successors are elected or appointed. The
voting members of BUHAY duly elected Robles as party
President in October 1999. And although his regular term as
such President expired in October 2002, no election was held
to replace him and the other original set of officers. Further,
the constitution and by-laws of BUHAY do not expressly or
impliedly prohibit a hold-over situation. As such, since no
successor was ever elected or qualified, Robles remained the
President of BUHAY in a “hold- over” capacity. By fiction of
law, the acts of such de facto officer are considered valid and
effective.
17 ABAYON v HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
(GR 189466, February 2010)
FACTS: Daryl Grace Abayon and Jovito Palparan were both
first nominees of Aangat Tayo party-list organization and
Bantayparty-list group respectively that won seats in the
House of Representatives in the 2007 elections. In two
separate petitions for quo warranto, respondents questioned
the eligibility of Abayon and Palparan and their respective
party-list groups. Abayon and Palparan both questioned the
jurisdiction of the HRET contending that it is the party-list
that was elected in the House of Representatives and not them
who were just its nominees. The HRET, on both petitions,
issued an order dismissing the petition against the party-list
groups for the reason that the issue of the qualification of the
party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
pursuant to the Party- List System Act. However, it defended
its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
Abayon and Palparan.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction
over the question of qualifications of
petitioner Abayon of Aangat Tayo, who took the seat at the
House of Representatives that won in the 2007 elections.
RULING: YES. Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List
System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to
6
LEGISLATURE
determine which parties or organizations have the
qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections. Since
petitioners Abayon was not elected into office but was chosen
by her respective organization under their internal rules, the
House of electoral Tribunal (HRET ) has no jurisdiction to
inquire into and adjudicate her qualification as nominee. If at
all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the
COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as
nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. In the
case before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications
claim that she does not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that she ought to represent. The
Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a
“bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent.” It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning
of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him
or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
party-list organization. The Court holds HRET did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petition for
quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications
of petitioner Abayon.
18 ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS)
PARTY LIST v COMELEC
(GR 193256, March 2011)
FACTS: Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the
COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and
accreditation of ABC Party-List on the ground that it is a front
for a religious organization called Children of God
International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating
Daan; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group
under Section 6 (1) of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act.
The said petition was dismissed by the COMELEC Second
Division. The COMELEC en banc partially granted Mauricio's
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul
Proclamation and Suspend Its Effects. ABC then filed a
petition for certiorari questioning the said resolution of the
COMELEC en banc reinstating the petition for cancellation.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC en banc has jurisdiction to
cancel the registration and accreditation of ABC after its
proclamation.
RULING: YES. Based on Sec. 2 (5) of Art. IX-C of the
Constitution, the COMELEC has the authority to register
political parties, organizations or coalitions, and the authority
to cancel the registration of the same on legal grounds. The
said authority of the COMELEC is also reflected in Section 6
of R.A. No. 7941. It provides that the COMELEC may motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party,
refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or
coalition on the ground that it is a religious sect or
denomination, organization or association organized for
religious purposes. It is, therefore, clear that the COMELEC
has jurisdiction over the instant petition for cancellation of the
registration of the ABC Party-List.
In the case of the party-list nominees/representatives, it is the
HRET that has jurisdiction over contests relating to their
qualifications. Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives, but it
is the party-list nominee/ representative who sits as a member
of the House of Representatives.
19 SENATE v ERMITA
(GR 169777, April 2006)
FACTS: The senate committee invited officials of the
Executive Department to appear as resource speakers in a
public hearing on the North Rail Project. A day before the said
hearing, the President issued EO 464, which mandates that all
heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress. Ermita then
contacted the Senate, stating that the executive and AFP
officials cannot attend because the President has not yet given
her consent. Despite this, some AFP officials still chose to
attend and was faced by a court marshall. They then argue that
EO 464 should be declared null and void for violating the
power of inquiry vested in Congress.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EO 464 CONTRAVENES
POWER OF INQUIRY VESTED IN CONGRESS
RULING: YES. EO 464 violates the congress’ power of
inquiry. The congress undoubtedly has a right to information
from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds information, it
must assert and state the reason why. For them to invoke
executive privilege, the information being withheld must be
done so in order to protect public interest.
20 AVELINO v CUENCO
(GR L-2821, March 1949)
FACTS: Senator Lorenzo Tañada invoked his right to speak
on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino. He requested to do so on the
next session. On the next session day however, Avelino
delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon
insistent demand by Tañada, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad and other Senators, Avelino was forced to open
session. He however, together with his allies initiated all
dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Tañada from
delivering his piece. Avelino and his allies were blocking
motions being raised by Tañada et al and they even ruled
Tañada and Sanidad, among others, as being out of
order. Avelino’s camp then moved to adjourn the session due
to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested
the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just
banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and his
followers immediately followed him. Senator Tomas Cabili
then stood up, and asked that it be made of record — it was so
made — that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the
Avelino, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-
tempore Melencio Arranz and the remaining members of the
7
LEGISLATURE
Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate. Tañada was subsequently recognized
to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidad’s
Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate
President. This was unanimously approved and was even
recognized by the President of the Philippines the following
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then
filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him
as the rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the SC can take cognizance of
the case.
HELD: NO. By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot
take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the separation
of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the
constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor
taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case
because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose
their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the
petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the
Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall — not in the Supreme Court.
21 SANTIAGO V GUINGONA
(GR 134577, November 1998)
FACTS: The Senate of the Philippines convened for the first
regular session of the 11th congress. The agenda for the day
was the election of officers. Senator Marcelo Fernan and
Senator Francisco Tatad were nominated for the position of
Senate President. By a vote of 20 to 2, Sen. Fernan was
declared as Senate President. Senator Tatad manifested that,
with the agreement of Senator Miriam Santiago, the alleged
only other member of the minority, he was assuming the
position of Minority Leader. He explained that those who
voted for Fernan were the “majority” while those who voted
for him were the “minority”. Senator Flavier manifested that
the 7 senators belonging to the LAKAS NUCD UMDP Party,
also a minority, voted for Senator Guingona as Minority
Leader. By virtue of a letter signed by the 7 senators of
LAKAS NUCD UMDP stating that they elect Sen. Guingona
as minority leader, the Senate President formally recognized
him as the same. Santiago and Tatad then alleged that
Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Minority Leader, a position that rightfully
belonged to Tatad. Santiago and Tatad claim that Guingona
may not be minority leader, seeing as he voted for Fernan as
Senate President. Likewise, LAKAS NUCD cannot be part of
the minority because they also voted for Fernan.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTION WAS
VIOLATED BY PROCLAIMING GUINGONA AS
MINORITY LEADER.
RULING: NO. The constitution was not violated. Guingona
is lawfully holding the position of Minority Leader. While the
Constitution explicitly provides the manner of voting for the
Senate President, stating that he must be voted for by more
than half of all the members of Senate, it does not provide that
those who will not vote for him shall compromise the
“minority” and that this minority may elect their leader. There
is no law or regulation that states that the defeated candidate
will automatically be the minority leader. The Constitution is
dead silent on the manner of selecting the officers in both
chambers of congress. Additionally, the rules of the Senate do
not provide for the positions of Majority and Minority leaders.
Neither is there a clause describing the selection of the holders
thereof. These offices are existent due to tradition and long
practice. Further, it is not within the Court’s jurisdiction to
decide how the internal affairs of Congress will work. To do
so would constitute a breach of the separation of powers.
22 BAGUILAT JR., V. ALVAREZ
23 PEOPLE v JALOSLOS
FACTS: Romeo Jaloslos, a full-pledged member of
Congress is confined at the national penitentiary for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness. He filed a motion asking to be
allowed to discharge his full duties as Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite him having been convicted of a non-bailable offense.
His primary argument is that he was elected by the First
District of Zamboanga as their representative. reelection being
an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by
any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even
the police power of the State. He deems this as a covenant
with his constituents that are made possible by the intervention
of the state. Jaloslos also argues that his duty to attend
sessions is vested in Sec. 16, Article VI of the constitution.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT JALOSLOS IS ALLOWED
TO DISCHARGE DUTIES AS CONGRESSMAN
RULING: NO. Jaloslos is not allowed to discharge his duties
as congressman. Re-election to public office does not give
priority to another right or interest, including the Police Power
of the State. The immunity from arrest granted by the
Constitution does not also apply to him, seeing as it only
applies to civil cases and the duration of his penalty extends to
more than six years imprisonment. The performance of
legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The
duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are
multifarious. Jalosjos in only one of the 250 members of the
House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of
the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a
few of its members. The importance of a function depends on
the need for its exercise. Never has the call of a particular duty
lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those
others who are validly restrained by law.
24 TRILLANES v PIMENTEL SR.
(179817, June 2008)
8
LEGISLATURE
FACTS: On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily
armed soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the
resignation of the President and key national officials. After a
series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered that
evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood
Incident, petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with
coup d’état before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Four
years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in
the Senate. Before starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC
an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and
fulfill his functions as senator. The RTC however denied his
motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT TRILLANES IS ALLOWED
TO DISCHARGE DUTIES AS SENATOR
RULING: NO. The case against Trillanes is not
administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak
of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the
doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases.
Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge. It is opportune to wipe out the
lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints
articulated in the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence.
25 SANTIAGO V. SANDIGANGBAYAN
FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who
was the then Commissioner of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application
for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said
to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran counter
against Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). The legalization of such is also a violation of
Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of
disqualified aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were
allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal
cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information,
Francis Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against Santiago.
Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just
recovering from a car accident which was approved. In 1995,
a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the suspension
of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The
Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate President (Maceda) to
suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension
of a member of the Senate without violating the Constitution.
RULING and PRINCIPLE: YES. it is true that the
Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the
rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its
Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of
suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.”
But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public
officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid
information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or
as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he
shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but
if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings
have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks
under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the
above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is
imposed upon determination by the Senate or the Lower
House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is
quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of
RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive
measure, rescinding from the fact that the latter is not being
imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the
Senate.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan
did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive
suspension order.
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the
CID commissioner, can she still be suspended as a senator?
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the
public officer concerned must be suspended only in the office
where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he
has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the
word “office” would indicate that it applies to any office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can
she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the
merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability
9
LEGISLATURE
against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged, or (3)
whether or not his continuance in office could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records another evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of
the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings
against him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to
due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do
not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of
the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised
Rules on Criminal procedure.
26 POBRE V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO
“No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any
other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.”
FACTS: Antero Pobre filed an administrative complaint
against Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago regarding the
speech she delivered on the Senate floor. In the said speech,
she said the following:
"I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded.
And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit
on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots.
I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots."
In her comment, Senator Santiago, through counsel, does not
deny making the aforequoted statements.
However, she invoked parliamentary immunity contending
that it was delivered in the discharge of her duty as member of
Congress or its committee.
ISSUE: Whether Santiago can be subject to a disciplinary
action.
RULING: NO. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under theRules of
Court.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on
the provision of Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, which
provides: "A Senator or Member of the House of
Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof."
The Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the
forefront in upholding the institution of parliamentary
immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court
lost sight of the importance of the legislative and oversight
functions of the Congress that enable this representative body
to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate
and denounce anomalies, and talk about how the country and
its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their
functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides
of the statement uttered by the member of the Congress does
not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the
assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.
27 TRILLANES V. CASTILLO-MARRIGOMEN
28 PIMENTEL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE
WHOLE 644 SCRA 741
FACTS: On Sept. 15, 2008, Senator Pimentel called to
attention the double insertion of 200Million appropriated
separately for the construction of Carlos P. Garcia Ave and C-
5 Road which was said to cover the same stretch. Lacson
further stated that when he investigated on the double entry, it
led to Senator Villar, then Senate President.
On October 8, 2008 Senator Madrigal introduce P.S.
Resolution 706, which states that there was indeed double
entry of said project, with overwhelming evidence of abuse of
authority of the Senate President (Villar) to profit from such
project. It also stated that the acts of the Senate President are
indirect violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical
standards of Public Officers.Therefore it was resolved to direct
the Committee on Ethics and Privileges to investigate the
conduct of Senate President Villar.
On Nov. 17, 2008, Senator Enrile was elected Senate
President and the Ethics Committee was reorganized with the
Election of Lacson as Chairperson.
On Dec. 16, 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the
Minority was ready to name their representatives. After
consultation, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there
would be no members from the Minority in the Ethics
Committee
On Jan. 26, 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to the
Minority to nominate their representative to the Ethics
Committee.
Senator Pimentel stated that it is the stand of the Minority no
to nominate any of their members to the Ethics Committee.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate
Committee on the Ethics and Privileges.
10
LEGISLATURE
On April 20, 2009, Senator Villar on a privilege speech where
he stated that he would answer the accusations against him on
the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. Lacson
suggested, that since the Ethics Committee cannot act with
fairness on Sen. Villar's case, it should be undertaken by the
Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The
motion was approved with 10members voting in favor, none
against, and five abstentions. When the respondent Senate
Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings,
petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the
Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole, out
of which three amendments were adopted.
Sen. Pimentel raised an issue that there is a need to publish the
proposed amended Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole. But responded proceeded with the Preliminary Inquiry
on PS Resolution706. The preliminary conference was then
scheduled.
Petitioners contested the following:
1) Transfer of complaint against Sen. Villar from the Ethics
Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is violates
of Sen. Villar's constitutional right to equal protection.
2) The Rules adopted by the Senate Committeeof the Whole
for the investigation and complaint filed by Sen. Madrigal
against Sen.Villar is violative of Sen. Villar's right to due
process and of the majority quorum requirement of Art. VI,
Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution.
3) The Committee violated the due process clause of the
Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole in spite of its own
provision which requires its affectivity upon publication.
Respondents argue that the instant petition must be dismissed
for being premature, pointing out that petitioners failed to
observe the doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort. It
is within the power of the Congress to discipline its
members for disorderly behavior. More to that, the internal
rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion. With regard to
the publication of the Rules of Procedure, the Rules of the
Ethics Committee have already been duly published and
adopted, which allowed the adoption of the supplementary
rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.
ISSUE: Whether publication of the rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
RULING: NO. The Constitution does not require publication
of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal
to the house or Senate, such rule need not to be publish,
unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before
the rules can take effect.
Constitutional Principle: The Congress or Senate is
responsible for its own housekeeping, including the adoption
of its internal rules and the discipline of its members for
disorderly behavior.
29 LIBAN v. GORDON
FACTS: Liban et. al, officers of the Board of Directors of the
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with this court a
petition to declare Richard Gordon as having forfeited his seat
in the senate when he accepted his Chairmanship in the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC). Petitioners cited
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
“No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
hold any other office or employment in the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have
been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the
term for which he was elected.”
In his comment, Gordon asserts that petitioners have no
standing in the case in three grounds:
a. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,
only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped
or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo
warranto in his own name – none of the petitioners are
entitled.
b. That even if the petition be treated as a taxpayer’s suit,
petitioners cannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question
in the absence of any claim that they suffered some actual
damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
act of respondent. Furthermore, taxpayers are only allowed to
sue if it is a claim of public money being diverted to improper
purpose.
c. That the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution does not apply to the case since
volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an
employment.
In Reply, Liban et al., maintained that the present petition is a
taxpayer’s suit questioning the unlawful disbursement of
funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his
salaries and other compensation as a Senator even if he is no
longer entitled to his office.
ISSUE:
1. W/N petitioners may legally institute this petition against
respondent.
11
LEGISLATURE
2. W/N PNRC is a government-owned or controlled
corporation;
3. W/N Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the
PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate; and
4. W/N respondent should be automatically removed as a
Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution.
RULING:
1. NO. Petitioners have no standing to file this petition.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an act which constitutes a ground for the
forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for
quo warranto, specifically under Section 1 (b), Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court. The person instituting quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise action may
be dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do
not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of the respondent.
Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present
petition.
2. NO. PNRC is a private organization performing public
functions. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation. The
PNRC has to be autonomous, neutral, and independent. To
ensure this, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by the
government. The reason for this is fundamental: to be
accepted by warring belligerents as neutral workers during
international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers
must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed
conflict. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will treat
PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the
wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict
areas. While PNRC claims to be a private corporation, the
Philippine Constitution prohibits the creation of such unless it
is created by general law, or it allowed for itself to be owned
and controlled by the government. This prohibition is an effect
of the lessons learned by the legislators from Philippine
history wherein some, who has held power, created private
corporations for the purpose of benefiting themselves.
3. NO. The President does not appoint the chairman of the
PNRC. Neither does the head of any department, agency,
commission nor board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Certainly,
he is also not under the Judiciary nor the Legislature. Thus, the
PNRC Chairman is not an official nor employee of the
Philippine government, to whom Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution applies.
4. NO. It is declared that the office of the Chairman of the
PNRC is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation, hence, he
cannot be charged for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
30 BONDOC V. PINEDA
“To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to
hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be
shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.”
FACTS: Marciano Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) were rival candidates for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of the province of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner in the elections,
thus, Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The Tribunal issued a decision in
favor of Bondoc. One of the members of the HRET was
Congressman Juanito Camasura, JR. of LDP. He revealed to
his party that he voted for Bondoc in the said HRET case.
Thus, LDP expelled him from the political party. The LDP
informed the House of Representatives about Cong.
Camasura’s expulsion. The House of Representatives then
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election
of Cong. Camasura to the HRET. This resulted to the
cancellation of the promulgation of the election contest
between Bondoc and Pineda. Hence, Bondoc filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE: Whether the House of Representatives can validly
remove Congressman Camasura from the HRET.
RULING: NO. The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17
of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives. The tribunal was created to function
as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are
politicians. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the
House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction
to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be
shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
“Disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not
valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having
cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on
the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots
and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Furthermore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be
terminated except for a just cause. Since the expulsion of
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by
the House of Representatives was not for a lawful and valid
12
LEGISLATURE
cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's disposition
of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the
Tribunal's decision in his favor, the action of the House of
Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional
mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created
the House Electoral Tribunal to be the “sole judge” of the
election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
31.1 REYES V. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS
“To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a
valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.”
FACTS: In 2012, Joseph Tan filed a petition to deny due
course or to cancel the COC of Regina Reyes before the
COMELEC citing material misrepresentations contained
therein such as her citizenship, civil status, and residence.
The COMELEC First Division cancelled her COC on the
ground that she is not a Filipino citizen and she did not meet
the one-year residency requirement making her ineligible to
run as representative of the lone district of Marinduque. The
COMELEC en banc denied her motion for reconsideration.
Four days after the election, Regina Reyes was proclaimed
winner. However, on June 5, 2013, the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc became final and executory. She took her
oath of office on the same day. Petitioner has yet to assume
office, the term of which officially starts at noon of June 30,
2013. Reyes filed this present petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC has jurisdiction over Reyes
who has been proclaimed and who has already taken her oath
of office for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives.
RULING: YES. The COMELEC retains jurisdiction for the
reason that the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, as stated in Sec. 17, Art. VI of the 1987
Constitution.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives,
there must be a concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a
valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office. Here, Reyes cannot be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet
assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been said, the term
of office of a Member of the House of Representatives begins
only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election." Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.
31.2 REYES V. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013, Perez, J.
“The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
House of Representatives.”
FACTS: In 2012, Joseph Tan filed a petition to deny due
course or to cancel the COC of Regina Reyes before the
COMELEC citing material misrepresentations contained
therein such as her citizenship, civil status, and residence.
The COMELEC First Division cancelled her COC on the
ground that she is not a Filipino citizen and she did not meet
the one-year residency requirement making her ineligible to
run as representative of the lone district of Marinduque. The
COMELEC en banc denied her motion for reconsideration.
Four days after the election, Regina Reyes was proclaimed
winner. However, on June 5, 2013, the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc became final and executory. She took her
oath of office on the same day. Petitioner has yet to assume
office, the term of which officially starts at noon of June 30,
2013.
ISSUE: Whether the jurisdiction to pass upon the
qualifications of Reyes is lodged with the HRET.
RULING: NO. Reyes, therefore, is in error when she posits
that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive jurisdiction
over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives. That the HRET is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
the Members of the House of Representatives is a written
constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to
petitioner because she is not a Member of the House at
present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as
the rightful winner in the election for such membership.
Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable
determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation, was
correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully
litigated in the COMELEC and was finally decided by the
COMELEC. On and after May 14, 2013, there was nothing
left for the COMELEC to do to decide the case. The decision
sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding
petitioner's ineligibility as a candidate for Representative of
Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to Reyes'
proclamation.
32 VELASCO V. BELMONTE, JR.
FACTS: Joseph Socorro Tan (Tan), a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to
deny due course or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC)
of Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes) as candidate as
Representative of Marinduque. Tan alleged that Reyes made
several material misrepresentations in her COC, docketed as
SPA No. 13-053 (DC). COMELEC First Division granted
Tan’s petition and cancelled Reyes’s COC.
13
LEGISLATURE
Reyes file a motion for reconsideration and has pending
resolution during the national elections held on May 13, 2013.
The day after, COMELEC En Banc affirmed the resolution of
COMELEC First Division and denied the motion of Reyes for
lack of merit. Provincial Election Supervisor of Marinduque
received the resolution through Executive Assistant Rossini
M. Oscadin on May 15, 2013. Likewise, Reyes’s counsel
received a copy of the same on May 16, 2013. On May 18,
2013, Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) proclaimed
Reyes as Representative of Marinduque.
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) filed an Election Protest
Ad Cautelam against Reyes in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) docketed as HRET Case No. 13-
028, entitled "Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco v. Regina Ongsiako
Reyes." COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality in
SPA No. 13-053, declaring that the resolution on May 14,
2013 is final and executory.
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. administered the oath of office to Reyes
on June 7, 2013.
Reyes filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the May 14, 2013
Resolution of COMELEC En Banc and the Certificate of
Finality. The Court dismissed the instant petition and held that
Reyes cannot assert that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction
over her since she is not yet considered a Member of the
House of Representatives.
Tan filed a Motion for Execution wherein he prayed that: the
immediate execution of the proclamation of LORD ALLN
JAY Q. VELASCO as representative of Marinduque during
the May 2013 National and Local Elections. COMELEC En
Banc granted Tan’s motion for execution and directing the
reconstitution of a new PBOC and proclamation by the new
Board of Velasco as duly elected Representative of
Marinduque. Director Ester Villaflor-Roxas was directed to
submit before the New Provincial Board of Canvassers
(NPBOC) a certified true copy of the votes of Velasco in the
2013 National and Local Elections.
On July 22, 2013, 16th Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines formally convened in a joint session. On the same
day, Reyes was recognized as elected Representative of
Marinduque. She took her oath before Speaker Belmonte
along with the rest of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
On December 5, 2013 and January 20, 2014, Velasco sent two
letters to Reyes demanding that she vacate the office of
Representative of Marinduque. On December 10, 2013,
Velasco wrote a letter to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. requesting that
he be allowed to assume the position of Representative of
Marinduque. On December 11, 2013, Velasco filed a Motion
for Issuance of a Writ of Execution praying that: writ of
execution be personally served and delivered by the
Commision’s bailiff to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. to proclaim him
as the Representative of Marinduque.
On February 4, 2014, Velasco wrote another letter to Speaker
Belmonte, Jr. reiterating the above-mentioned request but to
no avail. On February 6, 2014, Velasco also wrote a letter to
Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap reiterating his earlier requests to delete
the name of Reyes from the Roll of Members and register his
name in her place as the duly elected Representative of the
Lone District of Marinduque. However, Velasco relates that
his efforts proved futile. He alleges that despite all letters and
requests to Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap,
they refused to recognize him as the duly elected
Representative of the Lone District of Marinduque. Likewise,
in the face of numerous written demands for Reyes to vacate
the position and office of the Representative of the Lone
District of Marinduque, she continues to discharge the duties
of said position.
ISSUE: Whether or not Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen.
Barua-Yap be compelled to recognize Velasco as the
representative of Marinduque.
RULING: Speaker Belmonte and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap are
compelled to recognize Velasco as the representative of
Marinduque since COMELEC En Banc decided on that
matter. It is their ministerial duty to execute a mandate from a
legal authority.
33 TY-DELGADO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS: In 2008, Philip Pichay was convicted of four counts
of libel. In 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Member of the House of Representatives for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Sur for the 2013
elections. Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado filed a petition for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code against Pichay, on the ground that Pichay was convicted
of libel, a crime involving moral turpitude. Ty-Delgado argued
that even though Pichay paid the fine, the five-year period
barring him to be a candidate had yet to lapse. The
COMELEC dismissed the petition because of lack of
jurisdiction. When Pichay was proclaimed as the winner, Ty-
Delgado filed a petition for quo warranto before the HRET
reiterating Pichay's ineligibility. However, the HRET
concluded that the circumstances surrounding Pichay's
conviction for libel showed that the crime did not involve
moral turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pichay is disqualified to become a
member of the House of Representatives.
RULING: YES. A sentence by final judgment for a crime
involving moral turpitude is a ground for disqualification
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. Libel is listed
as one of the crimes involving moral turpitude. In the present
case, Pichay admits his conviction for four counts of libel. In
Tulfo v. People of the Philippines (587 Phil. 64, 2008), the
Court found Pichay liable for publishing the four defamatory
articles, which are libelous per se, with reckless disregard of
whether they were false or not. Considering his ineligibility
14
LEGISLATURE
due to his disqualification under Section 12, which became
final on June 1, 2009, Pichay made a false material
representation as to his eligibility when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for the 2013 elections. Pichay's disqualification
under Sec. 12 is a material fact involving the eligibility of a
candidate under Secs. 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The HRET committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
disqualify Pichay for his conviction for libel, a crime
involving moral turpitude. Hence, Pichay is ineligible to hold
and serve the office of Member of the House of
Representatives and Mary Elizabeth Ty-Delgado is declared
the winner for the position.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE: A sentence by final
judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for
disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
34 PIMENTEL, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS: On 03 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took
effect and election on 1998 was held in accordance to this.
Proclaimed winners were fourteen party-list representatives
from thirteen organizations. This was assailed by Senator
Pimentel. He contend that party-list representatives should
conform with Article 6 Section 17 – 18 of the 1987
Constitiution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Party-list System Act should be null
and void?
RULING: Petition dismissed. The Constitution expressly
grants to the House of Representatives the prerogative, within
constitutionally defined limits to choose from among its
members those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in Electoral Tribunal.
35 TAÑADA, JR. V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATITVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
FACTS: Wigberto Tanada filed twin petitions before the
COMELEC to cancel the COC of Alvin John Tanada for false
representations and to declare him as a nuisance candidate.
They were both candidates for the position of Congress
Representative. A COMELEC division denied both his
petitions, but on reconsideration, the COMELEC en banc on
April 13, 2013 granted to cancel the COC of Alvin John for
false representations. The petition to declare him as nuisance
candidate however was denied. Wigberto again sought
reconsideration of the denial of his petition on the basis of a
newly discovered evidence. Comes election day and the name
of Alvin John remained in the ballots, whichafter Angelica
Tan was the winning candidate, and Wigberto only second.
Wigberto filed before the PBOC a petition to correct manifest
mistakes concerning the cancelled candidacy of Alvin John
and a motion to consolidate Alvin John’s votes with the votes
he garnered. The PBOC denied the motion to consolidate the
votes because Alvin John was not a nuisance candidate. PBOC
then proclaimed Angelica as the winner.
On May 21, 2013, Wigberto filed a supplemental petition
before the COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Tan,
which was granted and affirmed by the COMELEC en banc.
However, Angelica had by then taken her oath and assumed
office past noon time of June 30, 2013, thereby rendering the
adverse resolution on her proclamation moot.
On May 27, 2013, before the SC, Wigberto filed a certiorari
assailing the April 25, 2013 COMELEC en banc’s ruling
declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate and an election
protest claiming that fraud has been perpetrated. The SC,
noting that the proclaimed candidate has already assumed
office, dismissed the election protest and directed Wigberto to
file the protest before the proper tribunal which is the HRET.
The certiorari was also dismissed for being filed beyond the 5-
day reglementary period. Before the HRET, the election
protest was dismissed for being insufficient in form and
substance and for lack of jurisdiction over John Alvin who
was not a member of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES:
1. Are the votes for Alvin John should be credited in favor of
Wigberto as a result of the cancellation of Alvin John’s
candidacy
2. the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC
en banc’s ruling is proper
3. Does SC has jurisdiction to resolve issues on the conduct of
canvassing after the proclamation of a winning candidate
RULING:
1. NO, the votes cast for Alvin John whose COC was
cancelled are stray votes only. A COC cancelled on ground of
false representations under Sec 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, unlike in being a nuisance candidate in Sec 69, does not
have the effect of crediting the votes in favor of another
candidate.
2. NO, the motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.
Rule 13 Sec 1(d) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
specifically prohibits the filing of a motion for reconsideration
of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases. Consequently, when a COMELEC en
banc ruling become final and executory, it precludes a party
from raising again in any other forum the nuisance candidacy
as an issue.
3. NO, The SC no longer has jurisdiction over questions
involving the elections, returns and qualifications of
candidates who have already assumed their office as members
of House of Representatives. Issues concerning the conduct of
15
LEGISLATURE
the canvass and the resulting proclamation of candidates are
matters which fall under the scope of the terms “election” and
“returns” and hence, properly fall under the HRET’s sole
jurisdiction.
36 HARLIN C. ABAYON VS HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND
RAUL DAZA
FACTS: Abayon and Daza were contenders for the position
of Representative in the 1st District of Northern Samar.
Abayon emerged as winner and Daza placed as second. Daza
filed his Election Protest stating that there was a massive fraud,
vote-buying, intimidation, employment of illegal and
fraudulent devices and schemes before, during and after the
elections benefitting Abayon and that there was also terrorism
committed by the latter. Abayon filed his Verified Answer as
well as his Counter-Protest saying that votes obtained by Daza
were questionable in view of frauds and anomalies committed
by the latter. HRET found both protests to be sufficient in
form and substance. Revision proceedings were conducted and
thereafter, the votes increased. Daza moved for the withdrawal
of his cause of action and prayed that the validity and
legitimacy of his separate and distinct cause of action for the
annulment of election results on the ground of terrorism ben
upheld. HRET granted Daza’s petition. Thereafter, Daza
prayed that Abayon’s Counter-Protest be dismissed to which it
was granted. Abayon moved for reconsideration but was
denied. HRET proceeded with the reception of evidences with
regard to the issue of terrorism. HRET decided the election
protest in favor of Daza and declared him winner. The HRET
annulled the election results in 5 clustered precinct because of
massive terrorism. As a result, the HRET deducted the votes
and Daza turned out to be the winner. The HRET found that
Daza had adduced convincing evidence to establish that fear
was instilled in the minds of hundreds of resident-voters.
ISSUE:
a.) WON the HRET had jurisdiction to annul the elections in
the contested precincts in the municipalities of Lavazares and
Victroria;
b.) WON the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in
annulling the elections on the ground of terrorism;
HELD:
a.)YES. To the Court’s mind, the HRET had jurisdiction to
deterrmine whether there was terrorism in the contested
precincts as it is an exclusive jurisdiction granted to them by
the Constitution. In the event that it proved there was indeed a
terrorism, it could annul the election results to remain faithful
to its Constitutional mandate. It does so only to determine who
among the candidates garnered a majority of the legal votes
cast.
b.)YES. A protestant alleging terrorism must in an election
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the will
of the majority has been muted by violence, intimidation or
threats. The circumstances in the case does not warrant the
nullification of the election in the concerned clustered
precincts. Daza’s evidence is utterly weak, unclear and
unconvincing. Hence, Abayon should be reinstated as a duly
elected Representative of the said legislative district.
37 DAZA V.SINGSON
FACTS: Herein petitioner Raul A. Daza was chosen and
listed as representative of the Liberal Party in the Commission
on Appointments(CA).
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) was reorganized. Twenty four (24) members of the
Liberal Party resigned and joined the LDP. Based on this, the
House of Representative revised its representation in the CA
by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving
this to the LDP member Luis C. Singson.
The petitioner argued that he cannot be removed from CA
because his election thereto is permanent. He further
contended that LDP is not a duly registered political party and
has not yet attained political stability because it was just
established recently.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the question raised by the petitioner
is political in nature.
2. Whether or not the LDP is not entitled to a seat in the
Commission on Appointments because it does not suffice the
qualification of being a political party.
HELD:
1. NO. It is because what is involved in the case at bar is the
legality, not the wisdom of the act of the House of
Representative in removing the petitioner from the CA. Even
if the question were political in nature, it would still come
within the Courts power of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
2. NO. In the first place, the Commission on Election has
already approved the petition of the LDP for registration as
political party.
Furthermore, the petitioner’s contention that LDP must prove
its permanence and must exist in a longer period of time in not
tenable. It is because even the Liberal Party in 1946 election is
only four (4) months old, yet no question was raised as to its
right to be represented in the Commission.
16
LEGISLATURE
38 .1 GUINGONA, JR. VS GONZALES
214 SCRA 789 (1992)
FACTS: Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., in his behalf and in
behalf of Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats
(LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President Neptali
Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments, from recognizing the membership of Senators
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto L. Tañada, in the Commission
on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed
compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of
proportional representation, and that it is the right of the
minority political parties in the Senate, consistent with the
Constitution, to combine their fractional representation in the
Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein,
and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be
additionally nominated and elected thereto.
The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary
arrangement and, inspite of the objections of Senators
Guingona and Osmeña, to enable the Commission on
Appointments to be organized by the election of its members,
it was approved. The elected members consisted of eight LDP,
one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides
for the creation of a Commission on Appointments and the
allocation of its membership, as follows: There shall be a
Commission of Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve senators and twelve
members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
house on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties or organizations registered under the party list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission
shall not vote except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act
on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days
of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall
rule by a majority of all the members.
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional
representation of the various political parties with elected
senator in the Senate, each of these political parties is entitled
to a fractional membership in the Commission on
Appointments as stated in the first paragraph of this decision.
Each political party has a claim to an extra half seat.
The election of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator
Tañada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDP
majority is precisely questioned by the petitioners because,
according to them, it unduly increased the membership of
LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in the Commission and reduced
the membership of the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC
correspondingly.
ISSUE: Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and
Wigberto E. Tañada as members of the Commission on
Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section
18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: NO. It is an established fact to which all the parties
agree that the mathematical representation of each of the
political parties represented in the Senate. It is also a fact
accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
representation of each of the political parties. The problem is
what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a
fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect
Senator Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latter's
representation in the Commission on Appointments to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the
Commission be based on the proportional representation of the
political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of
one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. To
disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding
together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an
added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to
the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the
rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a
majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will
on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section
18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the
Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party
can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule.
RULING: We declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo
and Senator Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission
on Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the
rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a
writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said
respondents Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist
from assuming, occupying and discharging the functions of
members of the Commission on Appointments; and ordering
the respondent Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his
capacity as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments, to desist from recognizing the membership of
the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting
them from sitting and participating as members of said
Commission.
17
LEGISLATURE
38. 2 GUINGONA, JR. VS GONZALES
219 SCRA 326 (1993)
FACTS: Motions for a reconsideration of our decision dated
October 20, 1992 was separately filed by respondent Senator
Wigberto E. Tañada on October 27, 1992 and respondents
Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto
Romulo on October 30, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is mandatory to fill up twelve (12)
seats in the Commission on Appointments
HELD: NO. We have declared that the Constitution does not
require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to
the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it
can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect
12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of
Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional
representation of the political parties in the membership of the
Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12
members to constitute its membership is merely an indication
of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution.
The act of filing up the membership thereof cannot disregard
the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even
if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like
the case at bar.
The respondents' contention that the use of the word "shall" in
Section 18 indicating the composition of the Commission on
Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory,
omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that (they shall
be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional
representation. The Constitution does not require the election
and presence of twelve Senators and twelve Representatives in
order that the Commission may function. In implementing
these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13)
members is necessary to constitute a quorum, "Provided
however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the
quorum should come from either house". 14 Even if the
composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it
can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long
as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full
complement fixed by the Constitution.
RULING: For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration
are DENIED with FINALITY.
39 WATKINS V. UNITED STATES
354 US 178, 1 L Ed 2d 1273, 77 S Ct 1173 (1957)
DOCTRINE: “There are several sources that can outline the
"question under inquiry" in such a way that the rules against
vagueness are satisfied. The authorizing resolution, the
remarks of the chairman or members of the committee, or even
the nature of the proceedings themselves, might sometimes
make the topic clear. This case demonstrates, however, that
these sources often leave the matter in grave doubt.
Equally mindful are we of the indispensable function, in the
exercise of that power, of congressional investigations. The
conclusions we have reached in this case will not prevent the
Congress, through its committees, from obtaining any
information it needs for the proper fulfillment of its role in our
scheme of government. The legislature is free to determine the
kinds of data that should be collected. It is only those
investigations that are conducted by use of compulsory
process that give rise to a need to protect the rights of
individuals against illegal encroachment. That protection can
be readily achieved through procedures which prevent the
separation of power from responsibility and which provide the
constitutional requisites of fairness for witnesses. A measure
of added care on the part of the House and the Senate in
authorizing the use of compulsory process and by their
committees in exercising that power
The Supreme Court has placed fundamental restrictions on a
Congressional investigatory power that in recent years has
been asserted as all but limitless”
FACTS: John Thomas Watkins, a labor union official
from Rock Island, Illinois, was convicted of contempt of
Congress, a misdemeanor under 2 U.S. Code Section 192
(refusal of witness to testify or produce papers), for failing to
answer questions posed by members of Congress during a
hearing held by a subcommittee of the House of
Representatives Committee on Un-American Activities on
April 29, 1954.
Watkins was born in July 1910 and ended his formal
education in the eighth grade. At the time of his testimony he
had four children and was working on behalf of the United
Auto Workers (UAW) to unionize workers at a division
of Firestone Tire and Rubber in Illinois. The UAW
underwrote his legal expenses.
Watkins was asked to name people he knew to be members of
the Communist Party. Watkins told the subcommittee that he
did not wish to answer such questions and that they were
outside the scope of the subjects on which he was summoned
to testify and of the committee's jurisdiction. He said:
I am not going to plead the fifth amendment, but I refuse to
answer certain questions that I believe are outside the proper
scope of your committee's activities. I will answer any
questions which this committee puts to me about myself. I will
also answer questions about those persons whom I knew to be
members of the Communist Party and whom I believe still are.
I will not, however, answer any questions with respect to
others with whom I associated in the past. I do not believe that
any law in this country requires me to testify about persons
who may in the past have been Communist Party members or
otherwise engaged in Communist Party activity but who to my
best knowledge and belief have long since removed themselves
from the Communist movement.
I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work of
this committee nor do I believe that this committee has the
18
LEGISLATURE
right to undertake the public exposure of persons because of
their past activities. I may be wrong, and the committee may
have this power, but until and unless a court of law so holds
and directs me to answer, I most firmly refuse to discuss the
political activities of my past associates.
His conviction carried a fine of $100 and a one-year
suspended prison sentence. Watkins first won a 3–2 decision
on appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia but then lost, 6–2, when that court heard the case en
banc. The Supreme Court heard arguments on March 7, 1957
and announced its decision on June 17, 1957.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not John Thomas Watkins should be
charged with contempt for refusing to answer a
congressional question pertinent to the question
under inquiry.
2. Whether it was within the witness right to refuse an
answer during a session of congressional
investigation or inquiry in aid of legislation.
HELD: NO to issue # 1 and YESto issue #2.
The Supreme Court decided 6-1 to overturn Watkins'
conviction. Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote for the
majority. Warren noted that it is an offense for a witness to
refuse to answer any question "pertinent to the question under
inquiry" in testifying before a Congressional committee, but
he wrote that the Court was unable to ascertain the nature of
the Congressional inquiry with reasonable precision:
There are several sources that can outline the "question under
inquiry" in such a way that the rules against vagueness are
satisfied. The authorizing resolution, the remarks of the
chairman or members of the committee, or even the nature of
the proceedings themselves, might sometimes make the topic
clear. This case demonstrates, however, that these sources
often leave the matter in grave doubt.
Petitioner was not accorded a fair opportunity to determine
whether he was within his rights in refusing to answer, and his
conviction was invalid under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.
40 BENGZON, JR. V. SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE
FACTS: It was alleged that Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez
and his wife together with the Marcoses unlawfully and
unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino
people. That they obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law
Office and Ricardo Lopa – Cory’s brother in law, among
others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in
the country including MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell
Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege
speech alleging that Lopa took over various government
owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to
investigate on the matter. The motion was referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue
Ribbon Committee. After committee hearing, Lopa refused to
testify before the committee for it may unduly prejudice a
pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused
invoking his right to due process. Lopa however sent a letter
to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his
allegations are baseless and malicious.
Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senate’s privilege
hour upon which he insisted to have an inquiry regarding the
matter. The SBRC rejected Lopa’s and Bengzon’s plea.
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to
subpoena them and require their attendance and testimony in
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction
and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damage,
prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for prohibition with a prayer
for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against
the SBRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be
granted.
RULING: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The
speech of Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated
legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known
as “The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.” In other words,
the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon
Committee was to find out whether or not the relatives of Cory,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the
alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy
to the Lopa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended
legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by the
SBRC is not really “in aid of legislation” because it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since
the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the
relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act”, a matter that appears more within the province
of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court
may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case.
DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the
power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof
provides:
"The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of
19
LEGISLATURE
legislation in accordance wish its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected."
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its
exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the
Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must
be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows
then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not
to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is
specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of
any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any
and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.
41 STANDARD CHARTER BANK VS. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKS
FACTS: Because of the privilege speech delivered by
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding the sale of
unregistered foreign securities by the Standard Chartered
Bank (SCB) Philippines which is a violation of the
Securities Regulation Code, the respondent Senate
Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and Currencies
conducted an investigation, in aid of legislation, of the
subject matter of the speech. Petitioners, who are the
officials of SCB, filed a petition for prohibition against
respondent to enjoin the members thereof from
compelling the petitioners to testify before any hearing to
be conducted by the respondent. Petitioners contended
that the respondent has no jurisdiction to conduct the
inquiry because its subject matter was already the subject
matter of the civil and criminal cases against the SCB
pending before the CA and the trial courts.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent may conduct the subject
inquiry, in aid of legislation, and compel the petitioners
to testify, despite the pendency of cases involving the same
subject matter of the inquiry.
RULING: YES. The mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial
body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely
easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through
the convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative
inquiry is an essential component, cannot be made
subordinate to a criminal or an administrative investigation.
As succinctly stated in the landmark case Arnault v.
Nazareno, “[t]he power of inquiry with process to enforce
it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate
wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended
to affect or change; and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
possess it.”
The exercise by Congress or by any of its committees of
the power to punish contempt is based on the principle of
self-preservation. Such power is sui generis, as it attaches
not to the discharge of legislative functions per se, but to
the sovereign character of the legislature as one of the
three independent and coordinate branches of government.
It is axiomatic that the power of legislative investigation
includes the power to compel the attendance of witnesses.
Corollary to the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses is the power to ensure that said witnesses would
be available to testify in the legislative investigation.
PRINCIPLE: The mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-judicial
body should not automatically bar the conduct of
legislative investigation.
42 ROMERO II V. ESTRADA
FACTS: Petitioners Romero II and other members of the
Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were invited on an
investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the
Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation will aid the
Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act
8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.
ISSUE: Whether the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice
to the subject raised at hand?
HELD: YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;
The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the
legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be
had to others who possess it. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
43.1 NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS
20
LEGISLATURE
“The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation extends even to executive officials and the only way
for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive
privilege.”
FACTS: Petitioner Romulo Neri, as the former Director of
NEDA, was invited by the respondent Senate Committees to
appear and testify on matters involving the controversial ZTE-
NBN deal. Neri testified that he was offered a bribe to accept
the deal, but did not accept such as instructed by the President.
When he was further asked on the details of the matters he
discussed with the President about the NBN Project, Neri,
invoking executive privilege, refused to answer particularly
three questions: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed
up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him to
approve.
When called again to testify in another hearing, Neri refused
upon orders of the President, invoking executive privilege.
Thus, he was arrested for contempt of the Senate.
ISSUE: Whether the communications elicited by the subject
three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege.
RULING: YES. The communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a quintessential
and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can
be considered a close advisor, being a member of President
Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is broad. This is based on the proposition that a
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change. Inevitably, adjunct
thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power,
broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that
it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly
published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. The
power extends even to executive officials and the only way for
them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive
privilege.
43.2 ROMULO L. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, et al.
“The presumption of executive privilege can only be
overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of
the information covered by the privilege.”
FACTS: Respondent Senate Committees filed a motion for
reconsideration of the March 25, 2008 Decision of the Court
wherein the Senate cited in contempt Romulo Neri for his
refusal to answer three specific questions involving the
controversial ZTE-NBN deal. The Court held that the
communications elicited by the three questions are covered by
the presidential communications privilege; hence, the
contempt order issued by respondents was void.
Respondents now contend that the information elicited by the
three questions are necessary in the discharge of their
legislative functions.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical to
the exercise of their functions.
RULING: NO. The Court recognizes respondent Committees’
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation.
However, the Court cannot uphold the view that when a
constitutionally guaranteed privilege or right is validly
invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative
investigation, the legislative purpose of respondent
Committees’ questions can be sufficiently supported by the
expedient of mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which
their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The
jurisprudential test laid down by the Court in past decisions on
executive privilege is that the presumption of privilege can
only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for
disclosure of the information covered by executive privilege.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts
the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to overturn
the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the
information to be elicited by the answers to the three (3)
questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft
legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion that
the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to
legislate and a broad and nonspecific reference to pending
Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills
could not be determined without the said information sought
by the three (3) questions.
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to
trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. While
it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential
culpability of high government officials, including the
President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a
task for the Senate to perform. The role of the Legislature is to
make laws, not to determine anyone’s guilt of a crime or
wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the
Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate,
neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
21
LEGISLATURE
44 GARCILLANO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC
ORDER AND SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS
FACTS: Petitioners in G.R. No. 179275 seek to disallow the
Senate to continue with the conduct of the questioned
legislative inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes
containing the wiretapped communication of then President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner
Virgilio Garcillano, without duly published rules of procedure,
in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published
in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006.
With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced
on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication
of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the
constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules
have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page,
invoking R.A. No. 8792.
ISSUE: Whether or not the invocation by the respondents of
the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of
valid publication through the internet is a substantial
compliance of the constitutional requirement of publication.
RULING: NO.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides that [t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or
any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended
to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an
electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written
document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the
law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees,
therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its
unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these
consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have
caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so
only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
45 BALAG V. SENATE
46 TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY OF FINANCE
FACTS: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale,
barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or exchange of services. It is equivalent to 10% of the
gross selling price or gross value in money of goods or
properties sold, bartered or exchanged or of the gross receipts
from the sale or exchange of services.
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
It was challenged for alleged constitutional infirmities
(defects), among others:
“Law did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representative as required by Section 24, Article VI – they
contended that to be considered as having originated in the
HOR, it should retain the essence of the House Bill.”
ISSUE: Whether or not there are constitutional defects in RA
7716, since it did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representative as required by Sec. 24, Article VI.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the Senate is
empowered by the Constitution to concur with amendments
and propose amendments, even substitute the entire bill as a
whole.
A bill originating in the HOR may undergo such extensive
changes in the Senate that the result maybe rewriting of the
whole; As a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill may be
produced AND to insist that a revenue statute must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny
the Senate’s power not only.
47 ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS
FACTS: In 1964, Antonio Villegas (then Mayor of Manila)
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices
of the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act No. 4065. He
likewise issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five
members of the city police force who had been assigned to
22
LEGISLATURE
then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga (assigned under authority
of RA 4065).
Astorga reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He
then filed a petition for “Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction” to compel Villegas et al and the members of the
municipal board to comply with the provisions of RA 4065
(filed with the SC). In his defense, Villegas denied recognition
of RA 4065 (An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties
of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila) because the said law
was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said
“law” passed the 3rd reading in the lower house as House Bill
No. 9266, it was sent to the Senate which referred it to the
Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by then Senator Roxas. Some minor
amendments were made before the bill was referred back to
the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations,
Sen. Tolentino made significant amendments which were
subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent
back to the lower house and was thereafter approved by the
latter. The bill was sent to the President for approval and it
became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy
signed by the Senate President, sent to the lower house for
approval and sent to the President for signing was the wrong
version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments
thereto. It was not the version as amended by Tolentino and as
validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact, the Senate
president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and
invalidated their signatures that they affixed on the said law.
Astorga maintains that the RA is still valid and binding and
that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not
invalidate the statute. Astorga further maintains that the
attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive
proof of a bill’s due enactment.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4065 was validly enacted.
HELD: NO. The journal of the proceedings of each House of
Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it.
While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal
can be looked upon in this case. The SC is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the
President was the same text passed by both Houses of
Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this
case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the
Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not
asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but
only to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore
did not become law. As done by both the President of the
Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their
signatures therein, the SC also declares that the bill intended to
be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
48 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION V.
ENRIQUEZ
FACTS: The General Appropriation Bill of 1994 was passed
and approved by both Houses of Congress. It presented the bill
to the president for the exercise of his veto power.
One of the special provisions vetoed by the President is with
respect to the realignment of operating expenses. Whereas
each member of Congress is allotted for his own operating
expenditures, a proportionate share of the appropriation for the
house which he belongs. If he does not spend for one item of
expense, the questioned provision allows him to transfer his
allocation in said item of expense. Petitioners assail the special
provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his
allocations for operational expenses to any other expense
categorically claiming that this practice is prohibited by
Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution.
They argue that the Senate President and Speaker of the House,
not the individual member of Congress, are the ones
authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Another special provision vetoed by the President is on the
appropriation for debt service. It provides “Use of funds. The
appropriation authorized therein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foregoing and domestic indebtedness;
provided, that any payment in excess of the amount therein
appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President
with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines;
provided further, that in no case shall this fund be used to pay
for the liabilities of the Central Bank of Liquidators.”
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the special
provision on the appropriations for debt service without
vetoing the entire amount of P86B for said purpose.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund,
the President vetoed the new provision authorizing the Chief
of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and
gratuity funds. According to the President, the grant retirement
and separation benefits should be covered by direct
appropriation specially approved for the purpose pursuant to
Section 29 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he
stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25 of Article VI of the Constitution. On
the contrary, petitioners claim that said provision is a
condition or limitation, which is intertwined with the item of
appropriation that it could not be separated therefrom.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are
tenable.
23
LEGISLATURE
HELD: Petitioner’s contentions are without merit. Under the
special provisions applicable to the Congress of the
Philippines, the members of the Congress only determine the
necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotment for
their operating expenses. They are in the best position to do so
because they are the one who know whether there are savings
available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in
other items of their operating expenses that need augmentation.
However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House as the case may be who shall approve the realignment.
Before giving their stamp of approval, those two officials will
have to see to it that: (1) the funds to be aligned or transferred
are actually savings in the items of expenditures from which
the same are to be taken and to the transfer on realignment is
for the purpose of augmenting the items of expenditure to
which said transfer or realignment is to be made.
It is readily apparent that the special provision applicable to
the appropriation for debt service in so far as it refers to funds
in excess of the appropriation for debt service in so far as it
refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill,
is an “inappropriate provision” referring to the funds other
than P68B appropriated in the GAAA of 1994.
The veto power while exercised by the President is actually a
part of the legislative process. Hence, found in Article VI
rather than Article VII. As the constitution is explicit that the
provision with the Congress can include in an appropriate to
which it relates, “it follows that any provision which does not
relate to any particular item or which it extends in its operation
beyond an item of appropriation is considered an inappropriate
provision which be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be
included in the category of inappropriate provision are
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended
to amend other laws because clearly those kinds of laws have
no place in an appropriation bill.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph, one of the special
provision of the item on debt services including the provisos
that the appropriation authorized in said item shall be used for
the payment of one principal and interest of foreign and
domestic indebtedness and that in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of
Liquidators. These provisos are germane to and have direct
connection with the item of debt service. Inherent in the power
of the appropriation is the power to specify how the money
shall be spent. Said provisos are appropriate provisions hence,
cannot be vetoed separately. The SC is sustaining the veto of
the Special Provision of the item on debt service can only be
with respect to the proviso therein requiring that any payment
in excess of the amount therein, appropriated shall be the
subject to the approval of the President of the Philippines with
the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines.
The special provision which allows the Chief of Staff to use
savings to augment the pension fund for the AFP being
managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Section 25 and Section 29 of Article VI
of the Constitution.
49 GONZALES V. MACARAIG
FACTS: Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16
FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded
her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she
cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire
bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power
to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be
legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers;
and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5]
of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations
Bill.
RULING: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
“item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of
his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the
executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section
16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of
the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be
treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto
power.
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE:
Article 6 Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution has 2 parts
1) President generally can veto the entire bill as exercise of
her power and president shall have the power to veto any
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue of tariff
bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.
2) General provisions made in an appropriations bill shall
ultimately refer to a specific appropriation for it to take effect;
Section 55 did not refer to any appropriations involved in the
entire bill. Similarly, the contents of this section is concerned
on Appropriation Disapproved and/or reduced by Congress
that is not included on the face of the bill.
50 PASCUAL V. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
COMMUNICATIONS
24
LEGISLATURE
FACTS: The sum of 85,000 pesos was appropriated by
Congress for the construction of a feeder road running through
a private subdivision and over a property owned by a private
individual. Subsequently, the feeder road is donated to the
government.
ISSUE: Is the appropriation valid?
RULING: The Supreme Court annulled this item, observing
that the property sought to be improved with public funds was
private in nature at the time the appropriation was made. The
circumstance that the roads were later donated to the
government did not cure the basic defect of the appropriation
as it was null and void ab initio.
51 GUINGONA, JR. V. CARAGUE
FACTS: PD 1177 is being assailed on its constitutionality. It
is argued that the automatic reappropriation law for servicing
foreign debts is invalid because it does not appropriate a fixed
amount and is therefore an undue delegation of legislative
power
ISSUE: Whether or not PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: YES. The amount is fixed by the parameters of the
law itself which requires the simple act of looking into the
books of the Treasure.
52 BENGZON V. DRILON
FACTS: RA 910 was enacted to provide the retirement
pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of
Appeals who have rendered at least 20 years of service either
in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in
both, having attained the age of 70 years or who resign by
reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The
retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural
life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his
retirement or resignation. Identical retirement benefits were
also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions
under RA. 1568, as amended by RA 3595. Subsequently,
President Marcos signed PD 578 which extended similar
retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces
giving them also the automatic readjustment features of RA
1797 and RA 3595. However, PD 644 was issued, repealing
Section 3-A of RA 1797 and RA 3595 (amending RA 1568
and PD 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension
of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions
and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to
the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under PD 1638 the automatic readjustment of
the retirement pension of officers and enlisted men was
subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later decree PD
1909 was also issued providing for the automatic readjustment
of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who have
retired prior to September 10, 1979. While the adjustment of
the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who
number in the tens of thousands was restored, that of the
retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the
members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions,
Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the re-enactment of the
repealed provisions of RA 1797 and RA 3595. Congress was
under the impression that PD 644 became law after it was
published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the
explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No.
740, the legislature saw the need to re-enact RA 1797 and
3595 to restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the
retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme
Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions
adequate old age pensions even during the time when the
purchasing power of the peso has been diminished
substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. President
Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11,
1990 on the ground that according to her "it would erode the
very foundation of the Government's collective effort to
adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on
standardization of compensation as articulated in RA 6758
known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant
distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement
benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential
treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service
servants." Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court
of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez,
Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition
asking this Court for a readjustment of their monthly pensions
in accordance with RA. 1797. They reasoned out that PD 644
repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there
was no valid publication. PD 644 appeared for the first time
only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74,
No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but published only on
September 5, 1983. Since PD 644 has no binding force and
effect of law, it therefore did not repeal RA 1797. The Court
acted favorably on the request. Pursuant to the above
resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations
Bill for Fiscal Year 1992 certain appropriations for the
Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension
rates due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the attempt of the President to use the
veto power to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to
deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797
trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to
the Judiciary.
HELD: YES. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman must have the independence end
flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties.
The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner
25
LEGISLATURE
the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the
funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of
the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court,
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far
limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree
with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to
be a meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the
General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the
Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly
repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief
Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds
appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including
the use of any savings from any particular item to cover
deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld.
Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must
enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in
the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware
of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free
53 BELGICA v OCHOA
(GR 208566, November 2013)
FACTS: The pork barrel system is the lump sum,
discretionary funds given to members of congress for the
fulfillment of their projects, amounting to 70M for
representatives and 200M for Senators and the Vice President.
The allocation of which is based on the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). The President has his own pork
barrel from the Malampaya funds, from the Malampaya Gas
Project and the Presidential Social fund, derived from earnings
of PAGCOR. In 2013, The NBI probed into allegations that
the government has been defrauded of more or less P10
Billion over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from
the pork barrel of lawmakers and government agencies for
ghost projects. The investigations was induced by six sworn
affidavits of whistle-blowers who declared that JLN
Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had been helping lawmakers
in funnelling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it
appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was
then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al. In line with
this, Greco Belgica and others filed petitions questioning the
constitutionality of both the Presidential and Congressional
pork barrel system. Belgica argued that the Malampaya Fund
and the PAGCOR funds are unconstitutional because they are
not from any appropriation of a particular legislation.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDENTIAL AND
CONGRESSIONAL PORK BARREL IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
RULING:
Congressional Pork Barrel:
YES. The Congressional Pork Barrel is unconstitutional. It
violates the following:
a) Separation of Powers
• While the budgeting power lies with Congress, the
implementation of the GAA lies with the executive branch.
What happens in the Pork Barrel System is that the legislators
themselves decide which project their funds are allocated to, a
clear act of implementing the law. Thus, encroaching on the
powers of the executive
b) Non – delegation of Legislative Power
• The PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to
identify the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is
a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power.
The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress
(in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged
in the individual members.
c) Principle of Checks and Balances
• The President has the power to veto items in the GAA which
he may deem to be inappropriate. However, this power is
being impaired, seeing as the legislator can identify which
project he will appropriate his funds to after the GAA is
approved. Therefore, the President cannot possibly veto the
appropriation made, if it is done after the approval of the GAA
Presidential Pork Barrel
NO. The presidential pork barrel is constitutional. Belgica
argued that the Malampaya Fund and the PAGCOR funds are
not from any appropriation of a particular legislation. This is
not the case seeing as Section 8 of PD 910 (Malampaya fund)
stated that all fees collected from certain energy – related
ventures shall form part of a special fund which shall be used
to finance further energy resource development which the
President may direct and PD 1869, which amended
PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation. PD 1869,
Section 12 provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall
be allocated to a general fund (Presidential Social Fund),
which shall be used for government infrastructure projects.
54 ARAULLO V. AQUINO III
FACTS: Consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of
the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP), National
26
LEGISLATURE
Budget Circular (NBC) No. 541, and related issuances of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) implementing
the DAP.
The controversy stemmed from a privilege speech delivered
by Senator Jinggoy Estrada to reveal that some Senators,
including himself, had been allotted an additional P50 Million
each as “incentive” for voting in favor of the impeachment of
Chief Justice Renato Corona.
In response, DBM Secretary Florencio Abad issued a public
statement explaining that the funds released to the Senators
had been part of the DAP, a program designed by the DBM to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. He
clarified that the funds had been released to the Senators based
on their letters of request for funding and that the DAP
releases had been sourced from savings generated by the
Government, and from unprogrammed funds.
Petitioners allege that the DAP, being actually an
appropriation that sets aside public funds for public use,
should require an enabling law for its validity. However,
Congress never enacted a law to establish the DAP nor to
authorize release of public funds to implement the DAP. Thus,
it is contended that DAP contravenes Section 29(1) of Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that “[n]o money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law”
The OSG posits, however, that no law was necessary for the
adoption and implementation of the DAP because of its being
neither a fund nor an appropriation, but a program or an
administrative system of prioritizing spending; and that the
adoption of the DAP was by virtue of the authority of the
President as the Chief Executive to ensure that laws were
faithfully executed
The DBM also cited as legal bases for the DAP’s use of
savings (a) Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which granted to the President the authority to augment an
item for his office in the general appropriations law (b)
various sections of EO 292 (Administrative Code of 1987);
and (c) the General Appropriations Acts of 2011, 2012 and
2013, particularly their provisions on the use of savings.
ISSUES:
A. Whether or not the DAP violates Sec. 29, Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution, which provides: “No money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.”
B. Whether or not the DAP, NBC 541, and all other executive
issuances implementing DAP violate Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the
1987 Constitution
HELD:
A. NO. DAP was not an appropriation measure. Hence, no
appropriation law was required to adopt or implement it. DAP
was only a program or an administrative system of prioritizing
spending the adoption of which was by virtue of the authority
of the President to ensure laws are properly executed. It is the
Executive playing its role as the main actor during the Budget
Execution Stage under its constitutional mandate to faithfully
execute laws including GAAs. Congress did not need to
legislate to adopt or implement DAP. Thus Executive did not
usurp the power vested in Congress under Section 29(1)
Article VI of the Constitution.
B. YES, they violated Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution.
There are three requisites set out in Sec. 25(5), Art VI:
(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within their
respective offices.
This requisite is not met. GAA of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid
(faithful to the Constitution) provisions to authorize transfer of
funds under the DAP, hence the transfers were
unconstitutional. Section 25(5) is not a self-executing
provision and must have a law implementing it. A reading of
the 2011 and 2012 GAAs show that its provisions were
textually unfaithful to the Constitution for not carrying the
phrase “for their respective offices” and literally allowed the
transfer of funds from savings to augment any item in the
GAAs even if the item belonged to another office and thus
contravene the Constitution.
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations of their respective offices.
The OSG represents that “savings” meant “appropriate
balances” – the difference between the appropriation
authorized by Congress (the Program Amount in the GAA)
and the actual amount allotted for the appropriation. This
requisite is not met. The Court says these items have not yet
ripened into categories of items from which savings can be
generated. They haven’t reached the agency to which they
were allotted to under the GAA.
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices.
This requisite is not met as some of the savings pooled under
DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any
appropriation in the pertinent GAA. This means that the
executive seemed to be specifying the PAPs where the money
shall be spent – which is the power of the purse that resides in
congress alone. An example was the Disaster Risk, Exposure,
Assessment and Mitigation (DREAM) Project under the
DOST which when broken down did not have an item for
personnel services and capital outlays, only for MOOE. Aside
27
LEGISLATURE
from transferring funds to the DREAM project exceeding by
almost 300%, DAP allotted funds for personnel services and
capital outlays which Congress did not appropriate for in the
first place. Proof of non-compliance to this requisite is the
cross border augmentations from savings which are clearly
prohibited by the constitution. Sec, 25(5), Art. VI only allows
augmentation within the respective offices stated therein.
55 ABAKADA GROUP PARTY LIST V. PURISIMA
“Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress
which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations
before they take effect.”
FACTS: Abakada is seeking for prohibition in implementing
RA 9335 or the Attrition Act of 2005 which was enacted to
optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of
the BIR and Customs. It provides for a system of rewards and
sanctions to the employees of the agencies for them to exceed
their revenue target. Abakada claims that by establishing such
system, the law turns officials and employees of the two
agencies into mercenaries and bounty hunters as they will do
their best only in consideration of such rewards. Furthermore,
Abakada assails the creation of a congressional oversight
committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers for it permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of such law.
ISSUE: Whether the joint congressional committee is valid
and constitutional.
RULING: NO. Congressional oversight is not
unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither necessarily
constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to
implement laws nor undermines the constitutional separation
of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It may in fact
even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch. However, to
forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond
the legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes two basic and
related constraints on Congress. It may not vest itself, any of
its committees or its members with either executive or judicial
power. And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedures" specified under the Constitution including the
procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this
should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following: (1)
Scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of appropriation
and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it, its
power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be
heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and (2)
investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws
pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. Any action or step beyond that will undermine
the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class. Legislative veto is a
statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative
agency to present the proposed implementing rules and
regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to
approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
As such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional
oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than
through scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers. It
radically changes the design or structure of the Constitution's
diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in
enforcing, applying or implementing its own laws.
56 CORPUS OF CAMILO L. SABIO V.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, ET AL.
G.R. NO. 174340 17 OCTOBER 2006,
FACTS: Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator
Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior
commitment, and at the same time invoked Section 4(b) of EO
No. 1: “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters
within its official cognizance.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits
power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members
or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding.
RULING and CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE: NO.
Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the
power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of
investigatory power to the committees and it means that the
mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively
perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees.
It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained
more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court’s
high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that “the
power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for
investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is co-extensive
with the power to legislate.”
28
LEGISLATURE
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is
directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section
4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress’
power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in
the Constitution is any provision granting such
exemption. The Congress’ power of inquiry, being
broad, encompasses everything that concerns the
administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends “to government agencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.” PCGG
belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not
within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or
establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional
principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or
its basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the
Constitution because it is inconsistent with the constitutional
provisions on the Congress’ power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the
policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of
access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to
the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any
constitutional basis.
HELD: The petition is granted and the decision of the
Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.
RULING: The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to
the people regarding legislation because of the event in
February 1986. The new Constitution became “less trusting of
public officials.”
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend
the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides
“amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least 12% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of
the registered voter therein.”
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative
and referendum.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735
entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.”
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide
for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body.

57 GARCIA V. COMISSION ON ELECTIONS Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of
initiative, namely:
FACTS: On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the 1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the
Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Constitution
Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national
30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of legislation
initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They
solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a
resolution.
regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law,
resolution or ordinance.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the
Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local
a letter dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local
initiatives, which is “the power of local initiative shall not be
initiative and/or referendum.
exercised more than once a year.”
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local
initiative because its subject is “merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.”

ISSUE: Whether or not, the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,

Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the
petition be set aside?

29