PART I: Tax Laws

· How are tax refunds construed?

1.La Carlota Sugar Central v. Jimenez

GR L-12436, 31 May 1961 (2 SCRA 295)

En Banc, Dizon (p): 10 concurring, 1 took no part.

Facts:

1. Sometime in September, 1955 La Carlota Sugar Central, which

was under the
administration of Elizalde, imported 500 short tons of ammonium
sulphate and 350
short tons of ammonium phosphate.

2. When the fertilizers arrived in the Philippines, the Central Bank

imposed 17% exchange tax from the Central in accordance with the
provisions of Republic Act 601. On 18 November 1955 the Central
filed, through the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, a
petition for the refund of the P20,872.09 paid (the 17% tax),
claiming that it had imported the fertilizers mentioned heretofore
upon request and for the exclusive use of 5 haciendas owned and
managed by Elizalde, and therefore the importation was exempt
from the 17% exchange tax in accordance with Section 2, RA 601,
as amended by RA 1375.

3. On 2 July 1956, the Auditor of the Central Bank denied the

petition. The Central
requested the Auditor to reconsider his ruling, but after a re-
examination of all pertinent papers the reconsideration was denied.

4. The Central then appealed to the Auditor General of the

Philippines. On 18 January 1957, the Auditor General affirmed the
ruling of the Auditor of the Central Bank upon the ground that the
importation of the fertilizers does not fall within the scope of the
exempting provisions of Section 2 of RA 601, as amended by RA
1375; and thus affirming the decision of the Auditor, Central Bank of
the Philippines. The Central and Elizalde filed the petition for review
in the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether upon the importation of the fertilizers are covered by

the
exemption (provided by Section 1 and 2 of Republic Act No. 601, as
amended by
Republic Acts 1175, 1197 and 1375).

Held:
1. The law is, therefore, clear that imported fertilizers are exempt
from the
payment of the 17% tax only if the same were imported by planters
or farmers
directly or through their cooperatives.

2. The exemption covers exclusively fertilizers imported by planters

or farmers directly or through their cooperatives. The word
“directly” has been interpreted to mean “without anything
intervening”.

3. Consequently, an importation of fertilizers made by a farmer or

planter through an
agent, other than his cooperative, is not imported directly as
required by the exemption.

4. When the issue is whether or not the exemption from a

tax imposed by law is
applicable, the rule is that the exempting provision is to be
construed liberally in
favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption
from tax liability, the
result being that statutory provisions for the refund of taxes
are strictly construed in favor of the State and against the
taxpayer.

5. Exempting from the 17% tax all fertilizers imported by planters or

farmers through any agent other than their cooperatives, this would
be rendering useless the only exception expressly established in the
case of fertilizers imported by planters or farmers through their
cooperatives.

2.Applied Food Ingredients Company, Inc.

v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Keywords/Memory tags: Applied Food. Applied. Nagmadali mag

APPLY sa CTA ng appeal e wala pa namang 120 days for which the
BIR has to make decision...

G.R. No. 184266, 11 November 2013, 24 NOV [SERENO, CJ.]

FACTS

1. Petitioner is a Value-Added Tax (VAT) taxpayer engaged in the

importation and exportation business, as a pure buy-sell
trader. Petitioner alleged that from September 1998 to
December 31, 2000, it paid an aggregate sum of input taxes
for its importation of food ingredients.
 2. Subsequently, these imported food ingredients were exported
between the periods of April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000,
from which the petitioner was able to generate export sales
amounting to P114,577,937.24. The aforestated export sales
which transpired from April 1, 2000 to December 31, 2000
were “zero-rated” sales, pursuant to Section 106(A (2)(a)(1) of
the NIRC of 1997.Petitioner alleged that the accumulated input
taxes for the period of September 1, 1998 to December 31,
2000 have not been applied against any output tax.
3. On March 26, 2002 and June 28, 2002, petitioner filed
two separate applications for the issuance of tax credit
certificates. On July 24, 2002, in view of respondent’s
inaction, petitioner elevated the case before this Court by way
of a Petition for Review, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6513.
Trial ensued and the CTA First Division rendered a Decision on
13 June 2007. It denied petitioner’s claim for failure to comply
with the invoicing requirements prescribed under Section 113
in relation to Section 237 of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC) of 1997 and Section 4.108-1 of Revenue
Regulations No. 7-95.On appeal, the CTA En Banc likewise
denied the claim of petitioner citing violation of the invoicing
requirements.

ISSUE

Is the petitioner entitled to the issuance of a tax certificate or refund

representing creditable input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales?

HELD

NO.

1. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR) had one hundred

twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents in support of the application within which to decide
on the administrative claim.
2. Counting 120 days from 26 March 2002, the CIR had until 24
July 2002 within which to decide on the claim of petitioner for
an input VAT refund attributable to the its zero-rated sales for
the period April to September 2000.
3. On the other hand, the CIR had until 26 October 2002 within
which to decide on petitioner’s claim for refund filed on 28
June 2002, or for the period covering October to December
2000.
4. In this case, the judicial claim of petitioner was filed on 24 July
2002. Petitioner clearly failed to observe the mandatory 120-
day waiting period
 5. Consequently, the premature filing of its claim for
refund/credit of input VAT before the CTA warranted a
dismissal, inasmuch as no jurisdiction was acquired by the
CTA.
6. In accordance with the ruling in San Roque and considering
that petitioner’s judicial claim was filed on 24 July 2002, when
the 120+30 day mandatory periods were already in the law
and BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 had not yet been issued,
petitioner does not have an excuse for not observing the 120+
30 day period.
7. Failure of petitioner to observe the mandatory 120-day
period is fatal to its claim and rendered the CTA devoid
of jurisdiction over the judicial claim.

PART II: Who has the burden of proof in tax cases?

3a. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court

Of Appeals, Court of Tax Appeals and
Ateneo de Manila University
(This is shorter version, see the longer one after this...So there are two, number
3s here...)
Case No. 74
G.R. No. 115349 (April 18, 1997)
Chapter VII, Page 300, Footnote No. 81

FACTS:
1. Private Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution with
auxiliary units and branches all over the Philippines, one of which is the
Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which is engaged in social sciences
studies of Philippine society and culture.
2. In 1983, Petitioner issued a demand letter regarding the institution’s tax
liabilities. Petitioner contended that private Respondent was an
independent contractor” within the purview of Sec. 205 of the Tax Code,
and was conducting studies for a fee, and therefore subject to 3%
contractor’s tax.

ISSUE:
W/N Private Respondent, through its auxiliary unit or branch, the IPC, performing
the work of an independent contractor and, thus subject to 3% contractor’s tax
levied by Sec. 205 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

HELD:

No.

1. The research activity of the IPC was done in pursuance of maintaining private
Respondent’s university status and not in the course of an independent business
of
selling such research with profit in mind.
2. There was no evidence that the IPC ever sold its services for a fee to anyone or
was ever engaged in business apart from the academic purposes of the university.
Petitioner erred in applying the principles of tax exemption without first applying a
strict interpretation of the tax laws.

3b. CIR v. CA and Ateneo De Manila University

GR 115349, 18 April 1997 (271 SCRA 605)

Third Division, Panganiban (p): 4 concurring

Facts:

1. Private respondent, the Ateneo de Manila University, is a non-

stock,
non-profit educational institution with auxiliary units and branches
all over the Philippines.

2. One auxiliary unit is the Institute of Philippine Culture (IPC), which

has no legal personality separate and distinct from that of private
respondent.

3. The IPC is a Philippine unit engaged in social science studies of

Philippine society and culture. Occasionally, it accepts sponsorships
for its research activities from international organizations, private
foundations and government agencies.

4. On 8 July 1983, private respondent received from Commissioner

of Internal Revenue (CIR) a demand letter dated 3 June 1983,
assessing private respondent the sum of P174,043.97 for alleged
deficiency contractor’s tax, and an assessment dated 27 June 1983
in the sum of P1,141,837 for alleged deficiency income tax, both for
the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978. Denying said tax liabilities,
private respondent sent petitioner a letter-protest and subsequently
filed with the latter a
memorandum contesting the validity of the assessments. On 17
March 1988, petitioner rendered a letter-decision canceling the
assessment for deficiency income tax but modifying the assessment
for deficiency contractor’s tax by increasing the amount due to
P193,475.55. Unsatisfied, private respondent requested for a
reconsideration or reinvestigation of the modified assessment.

5. At the same time, it filed in the respondent court a petition for

review of the said letter-decision of the petitioner. While the petition
was pending before the respondent court, petitioner issued a final
decision dated 3 August 1988 reducing the assessment for
deficiency contractor’s tax from P193,475.55 to P46,516.41,
exclusive of surcharge and interest. On 12 July 1993, the respondent
court set aside respondent’s decision, and canceling the deficiency
contractor’s tax assessment in the amount of P46,516.41 exclusive
of surcharge and interest for the fiscal year ended 31 March 1978.
No pronouncement as to cost.

6. On 27 April 1994, Court of Appeals, in CA-GR SP 31790, affirmed

the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Not in accord with said
decision, petitioner came to Supreme Court via a petition for review.

Issues:

I. Whether the private respondent has the burden of proof in the tax
case.
II. Whether the private respondent is taxable as an independent
contractor.

Held:

1. The Commissioner erred in applying the principles of tax

exemption without first applying the well-settled doctrine of strict
interpretation in the imposition of
taxes.

2. It is obviously both illogical and impractical to determine who are

exempted without first determining who are covered by the
aforesaid provision.

3. The Commissioner should have determined first if private

respondent was covered by Section 205, applying the rule of strict
interpretation of laws imposing taxes and other burdens on the
populace, before asking Ateneo to prove its exemption therefrom,
following the rule of construction where “the tax exemptions are to
be strictly construed against the taxpayer”

4. The doctrine in the interpretation of tax laws is that a statute will

not be construed as imposing a tax unless it does so clearly,
expressly, and unambiguously. Tax cannot be imposed without clear
and express words for that purpose.

5. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring adherence to the letter

in construing statutes applies with peculiar strictness to tax laws
and the provisions of a taxing act are not to be extended by
implication.”

6. In case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed most strongly

against the government and in favor of the subjects or citizens
because burdens are not to be imposed nor presumed to be
imposed beyond what statutes
expressly and clearly import.
7. In the present case, Ateneo’s Institute of Philippine Culture never
sold its services for a fee to anyone or was ever engaged in a
business apart from and independently of the academic purposes of
the university. Funds received by the Ateneo de Manila University
are technically not a fee. They may however fall as gifts or
donations which are “tax-exempt” as shown by private respondent’s
compliance with the requirement of Section 123 of the National
Internal Revenue Code providing for the exemption of such gifts to
an educational institution.

8. The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the
private respondent is not a contractor selling its services for
a fee but an academic institution conducting these
researches pursuant to its commitments to education and,
ultimately, to public service. For the institute to have tenaciously
continued operating for so long despite its accumulation of
significant losses, we can only agree with both the Court of Tax
Appeals and the Court of Appeals that “education and not profit is
motive for undertaking the research projects.

4. Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos

Case No. 157

G.R. No. L-120082 (September 11, 1996)
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85

FACTS:
Respondent Cesa, OIC, Office of the Treasurer of the City of Cebu,
demanded payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land
belonging to the Petitioner, who objected to such demand claiming
in its favor Sec. 14 of RA 6958
which exempt it from payment of realty taxes.

Respondent City of Cebu alleges that as an LGU and a political

subdivision, it
has the power to impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its
jurisdiction. Such
power is guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by
the LGC. While it
may be true that under its Charter the Petitioner was exempt from
the payment of
realty taxes, this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC.

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioner is a “taxable” person.

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a “taxable person”

under its
Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property
taxes. The grant
of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the
legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes,
except real property tax.
Even if the Petitioner was originally not a taxable person for
purposes of real
property tax, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, it had already
become, a taxable
person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last
paragraph of Sec. 234 of
exemptions from the payment of real property taxes.

Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood
of the
nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and
statutes granting tax
exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the
taxpayers and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority. Else wise stated, taxation is the rule,
exemption therefore is the exception.

5. DIAGEO PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE

G.R. No. 183553 : November 12, 2012Second Division685 SCRA 168

FACTS

Petitioner Diageo Philippines, Inc. (Diageo) is primarily engaged in

the business of importing, exporting, manufacturing, marketing,
distributing, buying and selling, by wholesale, all kinds of beverages
and liquors. Ï‚It is registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) as an excise tax taxpayer. Diageo purchased raw alcohol from
its supplier for use in the manufacture of its beverage and liquor
products. The supplier imported the raw alcohol and paid the related
excise taxes thereon before the same were sold to the petitioner.
The purchase price for the raw alcohol included, among others, the
excise taxes paid by the supplier. Diageo filed with the BIR
applications for tax refund/issuance of tax credit certificates
corresponding to the excise taxes which its supplier paid but passed
on to it as part of the purchase price of the subject raw alcohol
invoking Section 130(D) of the Tax Code. CIR, CTA and CTA en banc
ruled that Diageo is not the proper party to claim a refund but the
supplier.
ISSUE

W/N Diageo has the legal personality to file a claim for refund or tax
credit for the excise taxes paid by its supplier on the raw alcohol it
purchased and used in the manufacture of its exported goods.

HELD

No. Diageo has no legal personality to file the claim. Excise taxes
partake of the nature of indirect taxes. Excise taxes imposed under
Title VI of the Tax Code are taxes on property which are imposed on
"goods manufactured or produced in the Philippines for domestic
sales or consumption or for any other disposition and to things
imported."Though excise taxes are paid by the manufacturer or
producer before removal of domestic products from the place of
production or by the owner or importer before the release of
imported articles from the customs house, the same partake of the
nature of indirect taxes when it is passed on to the subsequent
purchaser. Indirect taxes are defined as those wherein the liability
for the payment of the tax falls on one person but the burden
thereof can be shifted to another person. When the seller passes on
the tax to his buyer, he, in effect, shifts the tax burden, not the
liability to pay it, to the purchaser as part of the price of goods sold
or services rendered. Accordingly, when the excise taxes paid by the
supplier were passed on to Diageo, what was shifted is not the tax
per se but an additional cost of the goods sold. Thus, the supplier
remains the statutory taxpayer even if Diageo, the purchaser,
actually shoulders the burden of tax. The statutory taxpayer is the
proper party to claim refund of indirect taxes.

PART III: Tax Sales construed

6. Serfino v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 145

G.R. No. 40858 (September 15, 1987)
Chapter VIII, Page 345, Footnote No. 75
FACTS:

A parcel of land, consisting of 21.1676 hectares situated in Sagay, Negros

Occidental, was patented in the name of Pacifico Casamayor, under Homestead
Patent No. 44139. Upon registration of said patent, OCT No. 1839 was issued by
said
office in the name of Pacifico Casamayor. In 1945, Casamayor sold the land in
favor
of Nemesia Baltazar. Apparently, OCT No. 1839 was lost during the war and upon
the
petition of Baltazar, the CFI of Negros ordered its reconstitution in the name of
Casamayor. On the same day, TCT No. 57-N was issued in the name of Nemesia
Baltazar but after the cancellation of OCT No. 14-R. In 1951, Baltazar sold the
property to Respondent Lopez Sugar Central, which did not present the
documents
for registration until December 1964 to the Office of Registry of Deeds. Said office
refused registration upon its discovery that the same property was covered by
another certificate of title, TCT No. 28985, in the name of Petitioner.

ISSUE:
W/N the purchase by Respondent Lopez Sugar Central of the lot in question
was null and void from the beginning.

HELD:
No, applying Sec. 118 of C.A. No. 141, which prohibits the alienation of
homestead lots to private individuals within 5 years from the date of the issuance
of
the patent, and not Sec. 121 which governs sale to corporations. Since the grant
was
more than 5 years before, the transfer to Nemesia Baltazar was valid and legal.

7. Tan v. Bantigue – G.R. No. 154027, October 24, 2005

Abcdefghijklmnop

PART IV: Labor Laws

· Rule on the construction of Labor Laws

8. Manahan v. Employee’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 79
G.R. No. L-44899 (April 22, 1981)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
FACTS:
Nazario Manahan, Jr., died of Enteric Fever while he was employed as a
teacher in the Las Pinas Municipal High School. The claimant, the widow of the
deceased, filed a claim in the GSIS for she contends that the death of her husband
was due to his occupation. However, GSIS denied such claim. Claimant filed for a
Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health prior
to
his employment and that the ailment of the deceased is attributable to his
employment. Again she was denied by the GSIS. She then appealed her case to
the Employees Compensation Commission which also denied her claim.
ISSUE:
W/N the widow of the deceased is entitled to claim benefits.
HELD:
Yes. The findings of the commission indicated that the deceased was in
perfect health prior to his employment as a teacher and that in the course of his
employment, he was treated for Epigastric pain- and ulcer-like symptoms. This
was
supported by his medical records and a medical certificate issued by Dr. Bernabe.
Epigastric pain is a symptom of Ulcer and Ulcer is a common complication of
Enteric
Fever.
Pursuant to the doctrine of Corales v. ECC, the provisions of the Workmen’s
Compensation Act shall be applied, thus the presumption of compensability
should
be in favor of the claimant. Moreover, it is well settled that in case of doubt, the
case
should be resolved in favor of the worker and that Labor laws should be liberally
construed to give relief to the worker and his dependents.
 9. Villavert v. Employee’s Compensation Commission

Case No. 313

G.R. No. L-48605 (December 14, 1981)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
FACTS:
The Petitioner is the mother of the late Marcelino Villavert, who died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic, employed as a code verifier in the Philippine
Constabulary.
She filed a claim for income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. 626, as
amended, with the GSIS. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on the ground
that
acute hemorrhagic pancreatic is not an occupational disease and that Petitioner
had failed to show that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment
of
Marcelino and the nature of his employment. The Petitioner appealed to the ECC
which affirmed the denial.
ISSUE:
W/N the ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the claim of
the Petitioner.
HELD:
From the foregoing facts of record, it is clear that Marcelino died of acute
hemorrhagic pancreatic which was directly caused or at least aggravated by the
duties he performed as coder verifier, computer operator and clerk typist of the
Philippine Constabulary. There is no evidence at all that Marcelino had a “bout of
alcoholic intoxication” shortly before he died. Neither is there a showing that he
used
drugs. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of this Code, including
its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of the labor.

10.Del Rosario & Sons v. National Labor Relations Commission

Case No. 36
No. L-64204 (May 31, 1985)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 124
FACTS:
Petitioner, a logging company, entered into a contract of services with
Calmar Security Agency to supply the Petitioner with security guards. The security
guards, herein Respondents, filed a complaint for underpayment of salary against
the Petitioner and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter found the security
agency
to be liable for the underpayment and dismissed the case against the logging
company.
The security agency appealed the case to the NLRC. The latter allowed the
appeal even though there were formal defects in the procedure by which the
appeal was made. It was not under oath and the appeal fee was paid late.
ISSUE:
W/N the formal defects of the appeal of the security agency should
invalidate the appeal.
HELD:
No. According to Art. 221 of the Labor Code, “in any proceeding before the
Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts
of
law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of the Code
that
the Commission and the Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case and proceed all in the interest of justice.” The lack
of verification could have easily been corrected by making an oath and even
 though the payment was late, it was still paid.

11. Opinaldo v. Ravina

G.R. No. 196573 : OCTOBER 16, 2013

VICTORINO OPINALDO, Petitioner, v. NARCISA RAVINA, Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Narcisa Ravina (Ravina) is the general manager and sole proprietor of St.
Louisse Security Agency (the Agency). Petitioner Victorino Opinaldo (Opinaldo) is a security
guard who had worked for the Agency until his alleged illegal dismissal by respondent on
December 22, 2006. The Agency hired the services of petitioner on October 5, 2005, with a
daily salary of P176.66 and detailed to PAIJR Furniture Accessories (PAIJR) in Mandaue City.

The owner of PAIJR sent a written complaint to respondent stating that one of the two
guards assigned SG Opinaldo and SGT. Sosmenia be relieved; and that he chose Opinaldo
be detailed/assigned at PAIJR for the reason that he is no longer physically fit to perform his
duties and responsibilities as a company guard because of his health condition.

Acceding to PAIJR request, respondent relieved petitioner from his work. Respondent also
required petitioner to submit a medical certificated to prove that he is physically and
mentally fit for work as security guard. On September 6, 2006, respondent reassigned
petitioner to Gomez Construction, after working for a period of two weeks and upon receipt
of his salary, petitioner ceased to report for work.

On November 7, 2006, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent with the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for underpayment of salary and nonpayment of other
labor standard benefits. The parties agreed to settle and reached a compromise
agreement. However, after almost 4 weeks, petitioner claims that when he asked
respondent to sign an SSS Sickness Notification which he was going to use in order to avail
of the discounted fees for a medical check-up, respondent allegedly refused and informed
him that he was no longer an employee of the Agency. Hence, petitioner filed a complaint
for Illegal Dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter held the Agency liable for illegal dismissal. Respondent appealed to the
NLRC which, however, affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondent elevated the
case to the CA on a Petition for Certiorari. The CA reversed and set aside the decision and
resolution of the NLRC. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was
denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed?

HELD: Petitioner was illegally dismissed.

LABOR LAW: illegal dismissal

What behooves the Court is the lack of evidence on record which establishes that
respondent informed petitioner that his failure to submit the required medical certificate
will result in his lack of work assignment.It is a basic principle of labor protection in this
jurisdiction that a worker cannot be deprived of his job without satisfying the requirements
of due process. Labor is property and the right to make it available is next in importance to
the rights of life and liberty. As enshrined under the Bill of Rights, no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The due process
requirement in the deprivation of one employment is transcendental that it limits the
exercise of the management prerogative of the employer to control and regulate the affairs
of the business.In the case at bar, all that respondent employer needed to prove was that
petitioner employee was notified that his failure to submit the required medical certificate
will result in his lack of work assignment and eventually the termination of his employment
as a security guard.There is no iota of evidence in the records, save for the bare allegations
of respondent, that petitioner was notified of such consequence for non-submission.

Respondent did not properly exercise her management prerogative when she withheld
petitioner employment without due process.Respondent failed to prove that she has
notified petitioner that her continuous refusal to provide him any work assignment was due
to his non-submission of the medical certificate.Had respondent exercised the rules of fair
play, petitioner would have had the option of complying or not complying with the medical
certificate requirement having full knowledge of the consequences of his actions.

LABOR LAW: motions for reconsideration under the NLRC rules of procedure

Time and again, we have ruled and it has become doctrine that the perfection of an appeal
within the statutory or reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional.Failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and
executory and deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much
less to entertain the appeal. In labor cases, the underlying purpose of this principle is to
prevent needless delay, a circumstance which would allow the employer to wear out the
efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to
settle for less than what is due him.

In the case at bar, the applicable rule on the perfection of an appeal from the decision of
the NLRC is Section 15, Rule VII of the 2005 Revised Rules of Procedure of the National
Labor Relations Commission:

Section 15. Motions for Reconsideration. Motion for reconsideration of any decision,
resolution or order of the Commission shall not be entertained except when based on
palpable or patent errors; provided that the motion is under oath and filed within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of decision, resolution or order, with proof of service that a copy
of the same has been furnished, within the reglementary period, the adverse party; and
provided further, that only one such motion from the same party shall be entertained.

We are not, however, unmindful that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of
procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor cases.

The subject motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision was filed on June 25, 2009. The
evidence on record shows that the decision of the NLRC dated April 24, 2009 was received
by respondent herself on June 17, 2009.The same decision was, however, earlier received
on June 8, 2009 by respondent former counsel who allegedly did not inform respondent of
the receipt of such decision until respondent went to his office on June 23, 2009 to get the
files of the case.If we follow a strict construction of the ten-day rule under the 2005
Revised Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission and consider notice
to respondent former counsel as notice to respondent herself, the expiration of the period
to file a motion for reconsideration should have been on June 18, 2009.The NLRC, however,
chose a liberal application of its rules: it decided the motion on the merits. Nevertheless, it
denied reconsideration.

We cannot uphold the stand of petitioner that the petition for certiorari before the CA was
filed out of time, and at the same time rule that the NLRC acted in the proper exercise of its
jurisdiction when it liberally applied its rules and resolved the motion for reconsideration on
the merits.

Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.

PART V: Rule in the interpretation of insurance provisions

12. De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.

Case No. 156

G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192
FACTS:
Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy
underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest
participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on
the
left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the
rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial,
left.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance
company
for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant company set
up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a
boxing
contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance.
ISSUE:
W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or
disability caused by accidental means.”
HELD:
The terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in insurance contracts, have
not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their
ordinary and common acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is
performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen
happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death.
The
failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match
or
other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not
intend

to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death.

13. De la Cruz v. Capital Insurance

GR L-21574, 30 June 1966 (17 SCRA 559)

En Banc, Barrera (p): 8 concurring

Facts: Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance

policy. In
connection with the celebration of the New Year, the insured, a non-
professional boxer, participated in a boxing contest. In the course of
his bout with another person, likewise a non-professional, of the
same height, weight and size, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his
opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo
to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The insured died
with the cause of death reported as hemorrhage intracranial, left.
The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the policy on the ground
that the death of the insured in a boxing contest, was not accidental
and, therefore, not covered by the insurance.

Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured and beneficiary under

the policy, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of
indemnity under the insurance policy. Denied, De la Cruz instituted
the action in the CFI Pangasinan (Civ. Case No. U-265) for specific
performance. Defendant insurer set up the defense that the death of
the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not
accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance. After due
hearing, the court rendered the decision in favor of the plaintiff;
ordering the insurance company to indemnify plaintiff for the death
of the latter’s son, to pay the burial expenses, and attorney’s fees.
Hence, the appeal.

Issue: Whether the death of the insured is covered by the policy.

Held: The terms “accident” and “accidental” have not acquired any
technical
meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and
common
acceptation. The terms mean that which happen by chance or
fortuitously, without intention and design, and which is unexpected,
unusual, and unforeseen.

An accident is an event that takes place without one’s foresight or

expectation: an event that proceeds from an unknown cause, or is
an unusual effect of a known cause and, therefore, not expected.
There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some
additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening
occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death.

Where the death or injury is not the natural or probable result of the
insured’s
voluntary act, which produces the injury, the resulting death is
within the
protection of policies insuring against the death or injury from
accident. In the
present case, while the participation of the insured in the boxing
contest is
voluntary, if without the unintentional slipping of the deceased,
perhaps he could not have received that blow in the head and would
not have died. Further, death or disablement resulting from
engagement in boxing contests was not declared outside of the
protection of the insurance contract (What was included was death
or disablement consequent upon the Insured engaging in football,
hunting, pigsticking, steeplechasing, polo-playing, racing of any
kind, mountaineering, or motorcycling). Failure of the defendant
insurance company to include death resulting from a boxing match
or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads inevitably to the
conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from liability
for such death.

The Supreme Court affirmed the appealed decision, with costs

against appellant.

PART VI: Ambiguous provision interpreted against insurer

14. Qua Chee Gan v. Law Union and Rock Insurance

GR L-4611, 17 December 1955 (52 OG 1982)
First Division, Reyes JBL (p): 7 concurring.
Facts: Before WWII, Qua Chee Gan, a merchant of Albay, owned 4
warehouses in
Tabaco, Albay used for the storage of stocks of copra and of
hemp in which he
dealt extensively. They had been, with their contents, insured
with the Insurance
Company since 1937, and the lose made payable to the
Philippine National Bank as
mortgage of the hemp and copra, to the extent of its interest. On
21 July 1940, fire
of undetermined origin that broke out and lasted almost one
week, gutted and
completely destroyed Bodegas Nos. 1, 3 and 4, with the
merchandise stored
therein. Plaintiff-appellee informed the insurer by telegram on the
same date. The
insurance Company resisted payment, claiming violation of
warranties and
conditions, filing of fraudulent claims, and that the fire had been
deliberately
caused by the insured or by other persons in connivance with
him. Qua Chee Gan,
his brother Qua Chee Pao, and some employees of his were
indicted and tried in
1940 for the crime of arson but were acquitted by the trial court
in a final decision
on 9 July 1941.
With the civil case, Qua Chee Gan instituted the action in 1940
with the Court of
First Instance of Albay, seeking to recover the proceeds of certain
fire insurance
policies totalling P370,000, issued by the Law Union & Rock
Insurance Co., Ltd.,
through its agent, Warner, Barnes & Co., Ltd., upon certain
bodegas and
merchandise of the insured that were burned on 21 June 1940.
The records of the
original case were destroyed during the liberation of the region,
and were
reconstituted in 1946. After a trial that lasted several years, the
CFI rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the insurance company
to pay Qua Chee
Gan the sum of P146,394.48 (1st cause of action), P150,000
(2nd), P5,000 (3rd),
P15,000 (4th) , and P40,000 (5th), each bearing 80% interest per
annum in
accordance with Section 91 (b) of the Insurance Act from 26
September 1940, until
each is paid, with costs against the defendant. It also dismissed
the complaint in
intervention of PNB without costs. The Insurance Company
appealed directly to the
Supreme Court. It contends that a warranty in a fire insurance
policy prohibited the
storage in the premises of oils (animal and/or vegetable and/or
mineral and their
liquid products having a flash point below 300 degrees
Fahrenheit. Gasoline, which
has a flash point below 300 degrees Fahrenheit was stored
therein.
Issue: Whether gasoline may be construed as oil to warrant the
forfeiture of claims
under the insurance policy.
Held: The Hemp Warranty provisions relied upon by the insurer
speaks of “oils
(animal and/or vegetable and/or mineral and/or their liquid
products having a flash
point below 300° Fahrenheit”, and is decidedly ambiguous and
uncertain; for in
ordinary parlance, “Oils” mean “lubricants” and not gasoline or
kerosene. By reason
of the exclusive control of the insurance company over the terms
and phraseology
of the contract, the ambiguity must be held strictly against the
insurer and liberally
in favor of the insured, specially to avoid a forfeiture. There is no
reason why the
prohibition of keeping gasoline in the premises could not be
expressed clearly and
unmistakably, in the language and terms that the general public
can readily
understand, without resort to obscure esoteric expression. If the
company
intended to rely upon a condition of that character, it ought to
have been plainly
expressed in the policy. Still, it is well settled that the keeping of
inflammable oils
on the premises, though prohibited by the policy, does not void it
if such keeping is incidental to the business and according to the
weight of authority, even though
there are printed prohibitions against keeping certain articles on
the insured
premises the policy will not be avoided by a violation of these
prohibitions, if the
 prohibited articles are necessary or in customary use in carrying
on the trade or
business conducted on the premises. In the present case, no
gasoline was stored in
the burned bodegas, and that “Bodega No. 2” which was not
burned and where the
gasoline was found, stood isolated from the other insured
bodegas.

The Supreme Court found no reversible error in the judgment

appealed from, thus
affirming it; with costs against the appellant.

PART VII: Corporate Law

· Rule on the Interpretation on Corporate Law provisions?

Home Insurance Company v. Eastern Shipping Lines

Case No. 125
G.R. No. 34382 (July 20, 1983)
Chapter III, Page 91, Footnote No.64
FACTS:
Plaintiff Company instituted two cases of recovery of damages against
Defendant Company. The Petitioner Company claimed for reimbursement with
regard to the amounts of insurance paid to the consignees due to losses suffered
by
the cargoes and goods shipped. In this regard, the lower court dismissed the two
cases on the ground that the Plaintiff failed to provide its legal capacity to sue.
ISSUE:
W/N the lower court is correct in holding that the Plaintiff lacks legal capacity
to sue which resulted in the dismissal of the two cases.
HELD:
Yes. The law on the matter is that a suing foreign company, such as Plaintiff
Company, must, in order to be capacitated to sue in the Philippine jurisdiction,
prove
legal capacity by establishing either that its transaction upon which the complaint
was based was an isolated one or that is was duly licensed or authorized by law to
transact in the Philippines. Otherwise, no cause of action accrues in favor of the
Plaintiff as it has no legal right to seek relief from the court. In the case at bar, the
insurance contracts between the Plaintiff and the Defendant were executed long
before the Plaintiff secured its license to transact business in the Philippines.
Therefore,
said insurance contracts were void from the beginning as the purpose was
contrary
to public policy.

PART VIII: Naturalization Laws

· Rule on the construction of Naturalization laws

16. Co v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 24
G.R. No. L-12150 (May 26, 1960)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76
FACTS:
Petitioner filed his petition for naturalization in the trial court. The court
ordered that a certificate of naturalization be issued to Petitioner after the lapse of
two years from the date the decision became final and all the requisites provided
for
in RA 503 were met. The government appealed the decision contending that from
the evidence itself introduced by Petitioner it would appear that he failed to
comply
with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to
become a
Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the
principles
underlying the constitution, but rather stated that he believes in democracy upon
cross-examination. It is contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with
the
requirement of the law that one must believe in the principles underlying our
constitution.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding that Petitioner had all the qualifications for
naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the law.
HELD:
Yes. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, Petitioner did not
necessarily refer to those principles embodied in our constitution which are
referred
to in the law. He has also failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner in his relation with our government as evidenced by his failure to register
his
family with the Bureau of Immigration and to file his income tax return.
Considering
that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor
of
the government and against the applicant," the Supreme Court held that the trial
court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.

17. Lee Cho v. Republic of the Philippines

Case No. 72
G.R. No. L-12408 (December 28, 1959)
Chapter VII, Page 299, Footnote No. 76
FACTS:
Before an applicant may apply for Philippine citizenship, the law requires that
he file a declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen one year prior to the
filing of application unless he is exempt from complying with said requirement.
The
law exempts one from filing a declaration of intention in two cases: (a) if he is
born in
the Philippines and has received primary and secondary education in any school
recognized by the government; and (b) if he has continuously resided in the
Philippines for a period of 30 years or more provided that he has given primary
and
secondary education to all his children either in a public school or private schools
recognized by the government. In the instant case, Petitioner has not filed any
declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen because, as he claims, he has
resided continuously in the Philippines for a period of more than 30 years and has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in private schools
recognized by the government.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioner has complied with the requirement of the law regarding his
duty to afford primary and secondary education to all his children.
HELD:
No. The government disputes that Petitioner has failed to give such education
to his daughters Angelita and Lourdes. The reason that Angelita was not able to
complete her studies because she got married is not only unsatisfactory but
betrays
the sincerity of Petitioner in embracing our citizenship. It was further shown that
in
spite of Lourdes’s alleged sickness, she continued her studies in a Chinese school
which strictly employed a Chinese curriculum. Considering that the provisions of
the
Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that its laudable and
nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfilled, the Supreme Court concluded that
Petitioner has failed to qualify to become a Filipino citizen and so his petition
should
be denied.

PART IX: Agrarian Reform Laws

· Rule on the construction of Agrarian Reform Laws

18. Guerrero v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 54
G.R. No. L-44570 (May 30,1986)
Chapter VII, Page 310, Footnote No. 126
FACTS:
Apolonio Benitez was hired by the Petitioners to work in their plantation. He
was allowed for that purpose to put up a hut within the plantation. He shared 1/3
of
the proceeds with his coconut-related responsibilities. Afterwards, the Petitioners
and
Benitez executed an agreement allowing Benitez to continue working as tenant;
the
Agricultural Tenancy Act would govern their relationship. Later the Petitioners
ordered
Benitez out. Benitez sued in the Court of Agrarian Relations, which ordered his
reinstatement. The Petitioners appealed to the CA, which affirmed the Court of
Agrarian Reform’s decision. The Petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court.
Pending appeal, the Code of Agrarian Reforms was passed repealing the
Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Petitioners then claimed that since the basis of the
suit
was a share tenancy agreement, the decisions lost their validity.
ISSUE:
W/N share tenancy ended.
HELD:
No. An agreement is not abrogated by the subsequent repeal of the law.
The phasing out of share tenancy was never intended to mean a reversion of
tenants
into farmhands or hired laborers with no rights. The Agricultural Tenancy Act and
Agricultural Land Reform Code have not been entirely repealed by the Code of
Agrarian Reform. But assuming that they were, the rule that the repeal of a
statute
defeats all actions pending under the repealed statute has the exception when
vested rights are affected and obligations of contract are impaired.

PART X: Rule on the construction of the provision of the Rules of Court

19. Bello v. Court of Appeals

Case No. 15
G. R. L-38161 (March 29, 1974)
FACTS:
Petitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should
have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to
dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3)
directing
the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the
proper court. The Court of First Instance still ordered the dismissal of the appeal.
Petitioners then filed their petition for prohibition and mandamus to prohibit the
execution of judgment and elevate the appeal to Respondent Court. They
dismissed
the petition. Although Respondent Court recognized that the Court of First
Instance
may have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to Respondent Court, it
held
that Petitioners did not implead the Court of First Instance as “principal party
respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even on the assumption
that
Petitioners can be said to deserve some equities”.
ISSUE:
W/N the case should be elevated to Respondent Court despite finality of
judicial decision.
HELD:
Yes. The Court of First Instance acted with grave abuse of discretion. The
Supreme Court cautions against narrowly interpreting a statute, defeating its
purpose
and stressed that “it is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes as to
avoid
such a deplorable result of injustice or absurdity”. The provision should also be
taken
within the context and spirit of Rule 50, Sec. 3 as an analogous provision. The
Supreme Court finds no reason as to why the court cannot act in all fairness and
justice to be bound by the same rule.

PART XI: Expropriation of Laws

20. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, et al.

Case No. 61
G.R. No. L-14355 (October 31, 1919)
Chapter VII, Page 297, Footnote No. 64
FACTS:
Appellant presented a petition in the CFI of Manila praying that certain lands,
be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement – the
extension of Rizal Avenue. Appellee denied that it was either necessary or
expedient
that the parcels of land be expropriated for street purposes.
ISSUE:
W/N in expropriation proceedings by the Appellant, the courts may inquire
into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation.
HELD:
In our opinion, when the legislature conferred upon the courts of the
Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon trial whether the right exists for the
exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts should inquire into, and
hear
proof upon, those questions (of necessity).
It is alleged, and not denied, that the cemetery in question may be used by
the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the
definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, the petition of the Plaintiff must be denied, for the reason
that
the Plaintiff has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property.
Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question,
the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the
cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered
to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the Plaintiff.

PART XII: Election Laws

21. Villanueva v. COMELEC

Case No. 170
No. L – 54718 (December 4, 1986)
FACTS:
On January 25, 1980, Petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy for Vice Mayor
of Dolores for the January 30 elections in substitution for his companion Mendoza
who withdrew candidacy without oath upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in
the
election but Respondent Board disregarded all his votes and proclaimed
Respondent
Candidate as the winner on the presumption that Petitioner’s candidacy was not
duly approved by Respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for the annulment of the
proclamation but was dismissed by Respondent Commission on the grounds that
Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal effect, and that assuming it was
effective, Petitioner’s candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw
after
January 4.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner should be disqualified on the ground of formal or technical
defects.
HELD:
No. The fact that Mendoza’s withdrawal was not sworn is a technicality, which
should not be used to frustrate the people’s will in favor of Petitioner as the
substitute
candidate. Also, his withdrawal right on the very same day that he filed his
candidacy should be considered as having been made substantially and in truth
after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by Respondent
Commission. The spirit of the law rather than its literal reading should have
guided
Respondent Commission in resolving the issue of last-minute withdrawal and
substitution of other persons as candidates.

PART XIII: Rule on interpretation of Wills

22. In re: Testate Estate of Tampoy
Case No. 61
G.R. No. L-14322 (February 25, 1960)
Chapter VII, Page 309, Footnote No. 117
FACTS:
In the matter of Petition for Probate Proceedings before the CFI of Cebu, the
will consists of two pages and the last page had been duly signed by the testatrix
and the three testimonial witnesses who also signed the first page but the
testatrix
failed to sign the left margin of the first page.
The lower court denied the petition because the will was not executed in
accordance with law, citing Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.
ISSUE:
W/N the probate court (CFI) is correct in denying the petition for the
allowance of the will.
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the
will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the witnesses, and that
the
latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the presence of the
testator
and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation
clause.
This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity
of the
will. Thus, it has been held that “Statutes prescribing the formalities to be
observed in
the execution of wills are very strictly construed. A will must be executed in
accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these
requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts
cannot supply the defective execution of the will.” Accordingly, we cannot escape
the conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be
admitted to probate.