ARTICLE VI:

Rights may be waived.

Unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs,
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law

Case Digest:

Gatchalian vs. Delim (1991)

Facts:

1. The petitioner Reynalda gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent’s mini-bus when the
vehicle bumped a cement pot, went off the road, and fell into a ditch, causing injury to several
passengers, including the petitioner.
2. While injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Delim, wife of respondent, visited them
and paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses and at the same time had them sign (including
the petitioner) an already prepared Joint Affidavit which stated that as passengers of the mini-bus
which met the said accident, they are no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and owner because it was an accident and the said driver and owner have gone to the
extent of helping them to be treated upon their injuries.
3. Notwithstanding such document, petitioner filed with then Court of First Instance of La Union an
action to recover compensatory and moral damages.
4. In defense, respondent averred that petitioner had already been paid and moreover had waived any
right to institute any action against him (private respondent) and his driver, when petitioner
Gatchalian signed the Joint affidavit.

Trial Court: Dismissed the complaint on the ground that petitioner relinquished any right of action
CA: reversed the trial court’s conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed denying petitioner’s
claim for damages
Issue: Whether or not there had been a valid waiver (NO)
Held:
The Court agreed with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her
cause of action had been made by the petitioner.
No. The terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in “clear and
unequivocal” terms.1 For a waiver to be valid and effective, it must in the first place be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally
pertains to him.
Moreover, considering the circumstance under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner
Gatchalian who was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident while having been in the hospital for
only three days, there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint
Affidavit

1 Precedent: the degree of Explicitness in the waiver the Court required in the case Yepes and Susaya v. Samar Express
Transit. “That we hereby manifest our desire to waive any and all claims against the operator of the Samar Express
Transit” is not the same as making an actual waiver of their right, that is, necessarily clear and unequivocal.
 Finally, to uphold a supposed waiver of right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary
diligence, exacted by the law from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. We
believe such a purported waiver is offensive to public policy.
Finally, because what is involved here is the liability of a common carrier for injuries sustained by
passengers in respect of whose safety a common carrier must exercise extraordinary diligence, we must
construe any such purported waiver most strictly against the common carrier. For a waiver to be valid and
effective, it must not be contrary to law, morals, public policy or good customs

Thomson vs Court of Appeals (Oct, 28, 1998)

Facts:
1. Marsh Thomson acquired propriety shares in the Manila Polo Club (MPC) transferred to him
by then president of American Chambers of Commerce of the Philippines, Inc. (AmCham),
2. When petitioner (Thomson) notified private-respondent(AmCham)that he will no longer be
available as Executive-VP after his contract of employment, the latter asked the
petitioner(Thompson) to stay for another six months.
3. The Petitioner indicated his acceptance of this consultancy arrangement with a counter
proposal : that is, retention of the MPC shares or P110,000. (Oct, 8, 1989)
4. Prior to this consultancy arrangement and the petitioner’s counter-proposal, (Sept, 29, 1989),
the private respondent (AmCham) executed a Release and Quitclaim2 stating that
“AMCHAM… do hereby release,waive, abandon, and discharge MARSH THOMSON from
any and all existing claims that the AMCHAM may have against MARSH THOMSON.
5. The quitclaim, expressed in general terms, did not mention specifically the MPC share
6. Private respondent rejected counter proposal
7. Both parties parted ways in disagreement and some degree of bitterness, the moment the
petitioner(Thompson) decided to keep the shares/membership in MPC for himself
8. AMCHAM filed a complaint against Thomson that Makati RTC order Thompson to return the
MPC share to AMCHAM and transfer said shares to the nominee of AMCHAM

RTC: ownership of MPC is in favor of THOMSON3

CA: Reverse RTC and transfer MPC share to AmCham

Hence, Thomson’s petition to review on Certiorari the CA decision contending that (the relevant
issue) : CA erred in ruling that the Quitclaim executed by Amcham was superseded by the contractual
agreement entered into by the two parties wherein Thomson acknowledged that AmCham owned the MPC
share.

2 Quitclaim- a formal renunciation or relinquishing of a claim

3 Ratio: By-Laws of Manila Polo Club prohibits artificial persons, such as corporations, to be club members.
Issue: W/N the Quitclaim executed by AmCham was a valid waiver (of their legal rights on the
said MPC shares)

Held: NO.
RATIO:

I. Waiver must be couched clear and unequivocal terms

The quitclaim executed by private respondent does not clearly show the intent to include therein the
ownership over the MPC share.
Settled is the rule that a waiver to be valid and effective must, in the first place, be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or
benefit which legally pertains to him.
If we apply the standard rule that waiver must be cast in clear and unequivocal terms, then
clearly the general terms of the cited release and quitclaim indicates merely a clearance from general
accountability, not specifically a waiver of AmCham’s beneficial ownership of the disputed shares.
More over

II. On the Possibility of an Implied Waiver

Condition for implied waiver: The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly
and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntary relinquish the particular right
that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible

On this case: Considering the terms of the quitclaim executed by the president of AmCham, the tenor
of the document does not lead to the purported conclusion that he intended to renounce private
respondent’s beneficial title over its share in the Manila Polo Club.
 People vs. Jabinal
Facts:
 In September 5 1964, Jose Jabinal y Carmen, was accused of possessing Illegal Possession of
Firearm and Ammunition with a revolver Cal. 22, RG-8 German made with 1 live ammunition and 4
empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess them.
 The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to
be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as
Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent
from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the
authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
 The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decisions in People v.
Macarandang and People v. Lucero.

RTC: He is convicted because he is criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on
the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed
and abandoned in People v. Mapa

 In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it
was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license
or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said
firearm and ammunition.
 In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the
firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the battalion
commander and must be deemed incident to or necessarily included in the duty and power of said
military commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader.
 In MAPA, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We
sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground: Secret agent has no provision that
exempts him from the possession of firearms.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine in Mapa is applicable to convict the accused

RULING: NO.
 Appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent
by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in
People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). The decision in People v. Mapa reversing
the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967.
 The Mapa case in 1967 cannot be applied to the crime committed in 1964, when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
 TING v VELEZ-TING
FACTS:
 Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.
They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child.
 On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that
Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
 Carmens allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family car
twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer
had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular financial
support to his family.
 Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a respectable person,
as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of
their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both presented expert
witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim

RTC: Null and void. The trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who
prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits
find root in a personality defect existing even before his marriage to Carmen.
CA:
 At first, CA rendered a Decision reversing the trial court's ruling. That no proof was adduced to support
the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since
Dr. Oñate's conclusion was based only on theories and not on established fact, contrary to the
guidelines set forth in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.
 Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC. CA Denied. But Carmen filed a
petition for certiorari.The CA decided to reconsider its previous ruling of RTC. Benjamin filed a petition
for certiorari in the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set forth
under the Santos and Molina cases?

RULING: NO. Respondent's argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should not
be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively
in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in accordance therewith
under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

RATIO: Molino case. Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological
incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as
well because, with respect to psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with
another. it is logical and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage

The parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing
the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party's alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert
opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a
petition for nullity of marriage.