CASES

OPOSA v. FACTORAN (representative parties)

This is a class suit brought by 44 children, through their parents, claiming

that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as well as those
generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed against
the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in the
country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber
license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. The petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel
the TLAs and to stop issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of
humankind-- the natural law—and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-
preservation and perpetuation." The case was dismissed in the lower court,
invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it was brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.

The children had standing to sue.

The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the
legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational
responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an
obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In
this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future
generations. Also, the Court said, the law on non- impairment of contracts
must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the interest
of public welfare.
CEREZO v. TUAZON (indispensable parties)

 Bus owner claims lack of jurisdiction because summons were not

served to bus driver.
 A passenger bus collided with a tricycle somewhere in Pampanga.
 The tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo, as owner of the bus line, and her husband Attorney Juan
Cerezo.
 However, the summons issued by the trial court was returned unserved
as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati.
 The trial court issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses at
their address in Camiling, Tarlac.
 Mrs. Cerezon brings this present petition lack of jurisdiction. Mrs.
Cerezo asserts that the trial court could not validly render judgment
since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda – the bus driver.
 Mrs. Cerezo points out that there was no service of summons on
Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a
separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.

 Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In

his complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, without exercising due
care and diligence in the supervision and management of her
employees and buses, hired Foronda as her driver.
 Foronda is not an indispensable party to the case. An indispensable
party is one whose interest is affected by the courts action in the
litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible.
However, Mrs. Cerezos liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-
delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct.
 The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. The action against
the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a
prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in
the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against the
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action;
the action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action.
IN RE: DONA PAZ (class suits)

complaint characterized the action thereby instituted as a "class suit",

prosecuted by the twenty-seven (27) named plaintiffs in their behalf and in
presentation of the approximately 4,000 persons . . . (who also) are all close
relatives and legal heirs of the passengers of the Doña Paz"

not the rule governing class suits under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court that in truth is involved in the proceedings at bar, but that concerning
permissive joinder of parties

(a) the subject matter in controversy is of common or general interest

to many persons, and
(b) Those persons are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring
them all before the court.

The rule is that for a class suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the
parties be so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all
before the court.
MATHAY v. CONSOLIDATED BANK (class suits)

 Plaintiffs Mathay and other former stockholders of Consolidated Mines,

Inc. (CMI) filed a complaint denominated as a class suit.
 The complaint alleged that plaintiffs and other CMI subscribing
stockholders were entitled to subscribe to the capital stock of the
defendant bank but that they were denied, through the unlawful acts and
manipulation of defendant bank, the right to subscribe in proportion to
their equities. The complaint further alleged that the individual
defendants who were members of the Board of Directors acquired
stockholdings in excess of what they were lawfully entitled to. Hence,
plaintiffs prayed that these subscriptions, to the extent that plaintiffs were
deprived of their right to subscribe, be annulled and transferred to the
latter and other CMI subscribing stockholders.

An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as

such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class quit depends upon
the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class
action should allege the existence of the necessary facts,
The complaint in the instant case did not state the number of said CMI
subscribing stockholders so that the trial court could not infer, much less
make sure, that the parties actually before it were numerous and
representative, so that the interests of the parties concerned might be fully
protected, and that it was impracticable to bring such a large number of
parties before the court.
HINOG v. MELICOR (failure to substitute deceased)

the court emphasized that the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the
protection of the right of every party to due process. It is to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit
through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.

Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings

and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires no
jurisdiction over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on
whom the trial and the judgment would be binding.
Dacoycoy v. IAC (waiver of improper venue)
 Petitioner Jesus Dacoycoy filed, before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, a
complaint against private respondent Rufino De Guzman for the
annulment of 2 deeds of sale involving a parcel of rice land located in
Barrio Estanza, Lingayen, Pangasinan, the surrender of the produce
thereof, and damages due to the latter’s refusal to have said deeds set
aside upon petitioner's demand.
 Before summons could be served on De Guzman, the RTC issued an order
requiring counsel for the petitioner to confer with respondent judge on the
matter of venue. After said conference, the trial court dismissed the
complaint on the ground of improper venue. It found, based on the
allegations in the complaint, that petitioner's action is a real action as it
sought not only the annulment of the deeds of sale but also the recovery
of ownership of the subject property, which is outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner then lodged an appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the order of dismissal of his
complaint.

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner's complaint by respondent trial court

on the ground of improper venue is plain error, obviously attributable to its
inability to distinguish between jurisdiction and venue. Trial Court cannot pre-
empt defendant’s right to question the venue.
PAGIC v. Sweet Lines (Negative Pregnant)
A total of 7,000 bags of low density polyethylene were shipped from Baton
Rouge, LA to Manila on board SS Vishva Yash, a vessel belonging to the
Shipping Corporation of India (SCI).
From Manila, the cargoes were shipped to Davao on board MV Sweet Love, a
vessel owned by Sweet Lines.
The consignee was Far East Bank with arrival notice to Tagum Plastics, Inc.
(“Tagum Plastics”), Tagum, Davao City.
The cargoes were insured by Far East Bank with the Philippine American
General Insurance Co (“Philamgen”).
After the shipments were discharged, it was discovered that there were
damages, losses and shortages on the cargo covered by the bills of lading.
Philamgen and Tagum Plastics commenced a suit against Sweet Lines Inc.
(SLI), Davao Arrastre, SCI Line and FE Zuellig to recover the cost of damaged
shipment. Philamgen argued, among others, that SLI failed to adduce any
evidence in support of its defense of prescription and that the bills of lading
said to contain the shortened periods for filing and for instituting an action
against the carrier were never offered in evidence.

Even granting that petitioners' averment in their reply amounts to a denial, it

has the procedural earmarks of what in the law on pleadings is called a
negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.
It is in effect an admission of the averment it is directed to. Thus, while
petitioners objected to the validity of such agreement for being contrary to
public policy, the existence of the bills of lading and said stipulations were
nevertheless impliedly admitted by them. Petitioners' failure to specifically
deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the
instruments in question amounts to an admission. Judicial admissions, verbal
or written, made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial
or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, no evidence being
required to prove the same, and cannot be contradicted unless shown to
have been made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made. Moreover, when the due execution and genuineness of an instrument
are deemed admitted because of the adverse party's failure to make a
specific verified denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented
formally in evidence for it may be considered an admitted fact.
CARPIO v. RURAL BANK (filing fees and cnfs)

Carpio filed a Complaint for annulment of foreclosure sale and damages)

against the Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, Inc. Respondent bank filed
its Answer with Counterclaim, denying specifically the material allegations of
the complaint, and praying for damages. Carpio filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim on the ground that respondent banks counterclaim was not
accompanied by a certification against forum shopping.

A certificate of non-forum shopping is NOT required for the filing of

compulsory counterclaims. It bears stressing that the Section 5, Rule 7
distinctly provides that the required certification against forum shopping is
intended to cover an initiatory pleading, meaning an incipient application of
a party asserting a claim for relief. Certainly, respondent bank’s Answer with
Counterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners
complaint that initiates the civil action. In other words, the rule requiring
such certification does not contemplate a defendants/respondents claim for
relief that is derived only from, or is necessarily connected with, the main
action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by the plaintiff to comply with such
requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, not the dismissal of respondents counterclaim.
SARMIENTO v. SAN JUAN (counterclaim need not be answered)

Private respondent Belfast Surety & Insurance Co. Inc. (“Belfast”) filed a civil
action against Sarmiento for indemnification under an Indemnity Agreement
executed by them in connection with a bail bond. Sarmiento filed an answer
with compulsory counterclaim. Thereafter, upon motion from Belfast, the
judge scheduled the pre-trial. At the scheduled pre-trial, only Belfast’s
counsel appeared. Sarmiento was declared as “non-suited” and the court
allowed Belfast to present its evidence ex parte. Upon the denial of
Sarmiento’s motion for reconsideration, he filed a case for certiorari against
the judge, alleging in part that the pre-trial was premature inasmuch as
Belfast did not file an answer to Sarmiento’s counterclaim.

The requirement that the pre-trial shall be scheduled "after the last pleading
has been filed" is intended to fully apprise the court and the parties of all the
issues in the case before the pre-trial is conducted.

There are, however, recognized exceptions to the rule, making the failure to
answer a pleading of claim as a ground for a default declaration, such as the
failure to answer a complaint in intervention, or a compulsory counterclaim
so intimately related to the complaint such that to answer to same would
merely require a repetition of the allegations contained in the complaint.
PAL v. FASAP (cnfs for corporation)

FASAP filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension, and
illegal dismissal against PAL before the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC. The NLRC
ruled in favor of FASAP. The NLRC modified the arbiter’s decision by setting
aside the finding that PAL was guilty of unfair labor practice, but affirming
the rest of the decision.
Subsequently, PAL filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, it was
accompanied by a Certification of Non-forum shopping executed by Cesar R.
Lamberte and Susan Del Carmen, Vice-President Human Resources and
Assistant Vice-President Cabin Services of PAL, respectively, who are not
parties to the case.

These provisions require it to be executed by the corresponding petitioner or

petitioners. As no distinction is made as to which party must execute the
certificate, this requirement is made to apply to both natural and juridical
entities. When the petitioner is a corporation, the certification should be
executed by a natural person. Furthermore, not just any person can be called
upon to execute the certification, although such a person may have personal
knowledge of the facts to be attested to. only individuals vested with
authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non- forum
shopping in behalf of a corporation.
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE v. RADSTOCK (Intervention)

Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) was granted

a franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North and
South Luzon Tollways and Metro Manila Expressway. CDCP Mining Corporation
(CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained loans from Marubeni
Corporation of Japan (Marubeni). CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans
when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still privately owned and managed.
In 1983, CDCP’s name was changed to Philippine National Construction
Corporation (PNCC) in order to reflect that the Government already owned
90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under private ownership.
Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid. On 20
October 2000 and 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board of Directors (PNCC
Board) passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni.
Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit
any liability for the Marubeni loans.
In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock Securities
Limited (Radstock), a foreign corporation. Radstock immediately sent a
notice and demand letter to PNCC.
The rule that the motion for intervention must be filed before the rendition of
judgment by the trial court is not absolute. The rule on intervention, like all
other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court
completely available for justice.
Unless STRADEC can show that RTC Branch 146 had already decided in its
favor, its legal interest is simply contingent and expectant.