Pierce vs Society of Sisters, 262 US 510| 1 June 1925 HELD:

Yes. Unconstitutional.
PLAINTIFFS / APPELLANTS:
Walter Pierce, Governor of Oregon A state law that requires all children in the first eight grades to attend
Isaac H. Van Winkle, Attorney General of Oregon public rather than private or parochial schools violates the 14th
Amendment due process guarantee of "personal liberty." Implicit in this
DEFENDANT / APPELLEE: liberty is the right of parents to choose the kind of education they want
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary for their children (Witt, Elder)
Hill Military Academy
 “The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
PONENTE: McReynolds, J. Union repose excludes any general power of the state to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
FACTS: only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture
 On November 7, 1922, the voters in Oregon passed a Compulsory him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
Education Act initiative, effective September 1, 1926. It was aimed at to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”
creating a common American culture by filtering views that may negatively  While the court noted that, as corporations, the appellees could “not
influence the established norms of American society. That is why all claim for themselves the liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment
children between the ages of eight and sixteen were required to attend guarantees,” they still had business and property that was entitled to
public school. protection against arbitrary, unreasonable, and unlawful interference.

 Meanwhile, children who were mentally disabled, lived three miles from
the nearest road and had already completed the eighth grade were
excluded from attending school. Incompliance of the parents entails a fine
and 30-day stay in jail. The initiative also targeted parochial schools,
specifically Catholic schools, because the thought was that such parochial
schools hindered assimilation.
The court affirmed the order enjoining appellant public officials from enforcing
an act that required children to attend public schools in appellee private
primary schools' actions contesting the constitutionality of the law. The
legislation unreasonably interfered with parental rights and appellees'
business interests. An injunction was an appropriate remedy to prevent the
present threat of irreparable harm to appellees.

 The Society of Sisters was an Oregon corporation, organized in 1880, with

power to care for orphans, educate and instruct the youth, establish and
*Cited as with relation to Section 12 of Article II which states that “The State
maintain academies or schools, and acquire necessary real and personal
recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family
property. Since the Society worked mostly with bereaved and
as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
disadvantaged children they challenged the fairness of the Act.
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of youth for civic efficiency and the
 Provisions of the Compulsory Education Act was conflicting with the right
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.”
of parents to choose schools where their children will receive appropriate
mental and religious training, the right of the child to influence the parents'
choice of a school, and the right of schools and teachers to engage in a
useful business or profession, and is accordingly repugnant to the
Constitution and void. Furthermore, if not acted upon, the corporation's
business operations and property value will be impaired and diminished,
respectively.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Act unreasonably interfered with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control

Tanada vs. Angara, G.R. 118295, May 2, 1997
Summary:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to the World
Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are supposed to give
preference to Filipino workers and economy and on the ground that it infringes
legislative and judicial power. The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored
nation” and national treatment, require that nationals and other member
countries are placed in the same footing in terms of products and services.
However, the Court brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is
constitutional. Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and
Patrimony) should be read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the
general welfare). Also, Section 10 is self-executing only to “rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” but not every
aspect of trade and commerce.
There are balancing provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to ratify
the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesn’t rule out foreign
competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering into
treaties.
Facts:
 This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of
the World Trade Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos
signed the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said
treaty.
 Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference in
Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the establishment
of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and International
Trade Organization.
 However, the ITO failed to materialize. Instead, there was the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the
GATT that the WTO was then established.
 The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including the
reduction of tariff and barriers.
 Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self -reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give
preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of
Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
 It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity provisions”
of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries
on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of
the “Filipino First” policy of the Constitution. They allegedly render
meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
Issue: Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide
trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global
economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized?
Ruling and Ratio:
[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine
Senate of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]
NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating
into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.
There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.
[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange
with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection
of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are
unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It
did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the
Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of
foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either.In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.
[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does
not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international
community.” As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor
of this constitutional policy:
 Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that
is keenly aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its
most basic needs. It does not mean autarky or economic seclusion;
rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international community.
Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the
national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities.
 The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade
without discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they
are rules of equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from
envisioning a trade policy based on “equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law
encourages industries that are “competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade
environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries that
can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and
 Filipino enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally.
And given a free trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in
Hongkong have demonstrated the Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against
the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx xxx xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State
to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to
protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced
goods. But it is equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and
legislative guides — are not in themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a “trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the
promotion of industries “which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,”
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross”
arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise.
It is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may
even agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike
down Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse
of discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave
abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join
the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter
that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193314, June 25, 2013
RESOLUTION | CJ Sereno
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 8 March 2013, filed by
Edwin Elim Tumpag and Rodolfo Y. Estrellada (private respondents) and the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013, filed by Svetlana P. Jalosjos (petitioner) in connection with
the Decision of the Court promulgated on 26 February 2013.
Private respondents come before this Court on the sole issue of who between the vice-mayor and
the second placer shall assume office pursuant to the final determination of petitioner's ineligibility
to run for office and the lifting of the 07 September 20 1 0 Status Quo Order.
Petitioner, on the other hand, questions the Decision, by raising the following arguments:
1. This Court erred in concluding that there are inconsistencies in the Joint Affidavit of the
witnesses presented by petitioner.
2. Petitioner’s stay in Brgy. Punta Miray should be considered in determining the one-year
residency requirement in the same municipality.
3. Petitioner’s registration as a voter presupposes she has stayed in the municipality at
least six months prior to the registration.
4. Petitioner’s certificate of candidacy (COC) should not be cancelled, absent any finding
of a deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.
5. COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction to decide on the question of the qualification of
petitioner after she was proclaimed as winner.
We deny the motion of petitioner and grant the partial motion for reconsideration of private
respondents.
The claim of actual and physical residence in Brgy. Tugas since 2008 is contradicted by the
statements that petitioner was staying in Mrs. Lourdes Yap’s house while her residential unit was
being constructed; and that by December 2009, the construction was still ongoing.
Petitioner questions the inconsistencies noted by the court in the affidavit of her witnesses who,
while claiming that they personally know her to have been an actual and physical resident of Brgy.
Tugas since 2008, declared in the same affidavit that while her house was being constructed, she
used to stay at the residence of Mrs. Lourdes Yap (Mrs. Yap) in Brgy. Punta Miray.
The declaration of petitioner’s witnesses that they know petitioner to be "an actual and physical
resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008" contradicts their statements that (1) they have "started the
construction of the residential house of the owner and other infrastructures of the resort since
January 2009"; (2) "until the present (meaning until December 2009 when they executed their
affidavit), the construction and development projects are still on-going"; and (3) "at times when
Ms. Jalosjos is in Baliangao, she used to stay in the house of Mrs. Lourdes Yap at Sitio Balas
Diut, Brgy. Punta Miray, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, while her residential house was still being
constructed."
Petitioner asserts that there are no inconsistencies in the statements of her witnesses, and that
the statements are in fact consistent with her claim that she had been residing in Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental for at least one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. She argues as follows:
x x x the fact that some of these witnesses knew that petitioner lived in the house of Mrs. Lourdes
Yap in a different barangay, particularly Brgy. Punta Miray, is not at all inconsistent or contradictory
with petitioner’s assertion and the witnesses’ statements that petitioner resides in Brgy. Tugas,
because petitioner obviously needed a place to stay while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being
constructed. This does not negate the fact that petitioner was establishing her residence in Brgy.
Tugas since the latter part of 2008, or at the very latest during the first few months (sic) of January
2009.1
Her assertion that she "was establishing her residence in Brgy. Tugas since the latter part of 2008,
or at the very latest during the first few months [sic] of January 2009" shows that she herself cannot
pinpoint the particular date when she established her legal residence in Brgy. Tugas. This fact is
contradictory to the declaration of the witnesses that "we have personal knowledge that Ms.
Svetlana P. Jalosjos has been an actual and physical resident of Sunrise Tugas, Baliangao,
Misamis Occidental, after she bought the properties thereat from the Heirs of Agapita Yap, Jr. on
9 December 2008."
To be an actual and physical resident of a locality, one must have a dwelling place where one
resides no matter how modest and regardless of ownership. The mere purchase of a parcel of
land does not make it one’s residence. The fact that the residential structure where petitioner
intends to reside was still under construction on the lot she purchased means that she has not yet
established actual and physical residence in the barangay, contrary to the declaration of her
witnesses that she has been an actual and physical resident of Brgy. Tugas since 2008.
Petitioner wants this Court to believe that the ongoing construction referred to by her witnesses in
their joint affidavit does not refer to the residential structure, but to the other structures in the resort
that petitioner was then establishing. She does not assert, however, that her residential unit had
already been completed by that time. In fact, she has failed to present any proof as to when her
claimed residential unit was completed, or when she transferred to the unit.
It must be pointed out that the second statement in paragraph 1 of the Joint Affidavit states: "We
have started the construction of the residential house of the owner and the other infrastructures of
the resort since January, 2009." This was immediately followed by paragraph 2 which reads:
2. Until the present, the construction and development projects are still ongoing. To establish the
fact of the on-going construction work, we are attaching herewith as part hereof, pictures we have
taken on December 20 and 29, 2009 marked Annexes "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", and "6" hereof,
respectively.2
Without any qualification as to what is being referred to by the construction and development
projects in paragraph 2, it follows that it refers to the "construction of the residential house of the
owner and the other infrastructures of the resort" found in the prior statement.
In the affidavit, there is no mention whatsoever of completion of the residential house as of 30
December 2009. Neither has any occupancy permit been presented by petitioner to definitely
establish the date she started occupying what she claims to be her residential unit in the resort.
Petitioner takes pains to present photographs of other structures in the resort, but fails to present
any photograph of a completed residential structure, which is more relevant in proving her claimed
residence in Brgy. Tugas. If the residential unit was already completed by December 2009, her
witnesses could have easily testified to that fact and presented photographs of the structure.
This absence of any photograph proving the alleged residence of petitioner in the resort bolsters
the court’s conclusion that at the time the witnesses signed their affidavits in December 2009, or
six months prior to the May 2010 elections, her residential unit had not yet been built.
A temporary stay in a stranger’s house cannot amount to residence.
Petitioner wants this Court to credit her stay in Mrs. Yap’s house as proof that she had been a
resident of the Municipality of Baliangao for more than one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections.
In her words:
7. More importantly, if this Honorable Court would consider the circumstance that petitioner was
staying in Brgy. Punta Miray as true so as to render the statements of her witnesses inconsistent,
then such a consideration should not have led this Honorable Court to the conclusion that
petitioner was not a resident of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental since Brgy. Punta Miray is located
in the municipality of Baliangao like Brgy. Tugas. In other words, the fact that petitioner was staying
in a house in Brgy. Punta Miray while her residence in Brgy. Tugas was being constructed during
the early part of 2009 would STILL LEAD to the conclusion that petitioner has been residing in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for at least one (1) year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections since
Brgy. Punta Miray is a part of Baliangao.3 (Emphasis in the original and underscoring omitted)
Petitioner relies on Mitra v. COMELEC4 and Sabili v. COMELEC5 in claiming that "the series of
events whereby petitioner first had her residence constructed ... after she purchased in 2008 the
property where her residence was eventually established, and while she lived in another barangay
of the same municipality, and then eventually moved in to her residence in Brgy. Tugas amounted
to an ‘incremental process’ of transferring residence."
Petitioner’s case must be differentiated from Mitra in that petitioner therein presented not only the
notarized lease contract over the property where he claimed to be residing, but also "a residence
certificate ... and an identification card of the House of Representatives showing Aborlan as his
residence."6
In Sabili, the Court declared that "the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioner’s
common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible
petitioner’s allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area." 7
Petitioner’s stay in the house of Mrs. Yap in Brgy. Punta Miray, on the other hand, was only a
temporary and intermittent stay that does not amount to residence. It was never the intention of
petitioner to reside in that barangay, as she only stayed there at times when she was in Baliangao
while her house was being constructed.8 Her temporary stay in Brgy. Punta Miray cannot be
counted as residence in Baliangao.
Petitioner failed to show by what right she stayed in Mrs. Yap’s house. Except for the declarations
of her witnesses that she stayed there while her residential unit in the resort was being built, she
presented no other evidence to show any basis of her right to stay in that particular house as a
resident.
Approval of voter registration does not presuppose six-month residency in the place prior to
registration.
It appears on record that petitioner, in filing her application for registration as a voter on 7 May
2009, claimed "that she has been a resident of Brgy. Tugas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for
six (6) months prior to the filing of the said registration." 9 For her claim to be true, she must have
resided in Brgy. Tugas on or before 8 November 2008. The records, however, show that she
purchased property in Brgy. Tugas only on December 2008. Thus, her claim that she had been a
resident of Brgy. Tugas for at least six (6) months prior to her application for registration as a voter
on 7 May 2009 is an utter falsity.
The approval of the registration of petitioner as a voter does not and cannot carry with it an
affirmation of the falsehood and misrepresentation as to the period of her residence in Brgy.
Tugas. At best, the approval of her registration as a voter carries a presumption that the registrant
will be able to meet the six-month residency requirement for the elections in which the registrant
intends to vote.10 It does not prove that the registrant has resided in the locality for more than one
year prior to the elections.
Representation that one is qualified to run for public office when proven false constitutes a
deliberate attempt to deceive the electorate.
Petitioner contends that the Court erred in upholding the cancellation of her COC despite the
glaring absence of any finding made by the respondent COMELEC in its assailed Resolution that
petitioner committed a false material representation in said COC.
The finding of the COMELEC that petitioner lacks the one year residency requirement to run for
local elective position in the municipality of Baliangao directly contradicts her sworn declaration
that she is eligible to run for public office. The fact that petitioner failed to prove that she has been
a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the elections reveals the falsity of her
assertion in her COC that she is qualified to run for a local elective position. This false material
representation justifies the cancellation of her COC.
When the candidate’s claim of eligibility is proven false, as when the candidate failed to
substantiate meeting the required residency in the locality, the representation of eligibility in the
COC constitutes a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide the fact" 11 of ineligibility.
COMELEC is not ousted of jurisdiction to decide a petition for cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy after the winner is proclaimed.
The COMELEC, in its Resolution dated 19 August 2010, citing Aquino v. COMELEC,12 has amply
discussed this matter, thus:
Petitioner’s contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established
the winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically
divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis in law, because
even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of
R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates. Section
6 states:
SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted.
If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed
to continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining
the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings
against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is
strong" seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to
disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646
allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on
ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.1âwphi1 – The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate
of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881. 13

The cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of an ineligible candidate who has assumed office
renders the officer a de facto officer.

This Court has ruled in Aratea v. COMELEC14 and Jalosjos, Jr. v. COMELEC15 that the
cancellation of the COC based on an ineligibility that existed at the time of its filing means that the
candidate was never a valid candidate from the very beginning. 16

On the question of who should assume the post vacated by the ineligible candidate, this Court
amply explained in Jalosjos, Jr. that:

Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-
placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations where the certificate of
candidacy of the first placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to be cancelled
because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the filing
of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All
votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all
votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one
day or more after the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because
the certificate of candidacy is void from the very beginning. 17 x x x. (Citations omitted)

There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who
already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.

The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code18 cannot apply in instances
when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de
facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Local Government Code.
There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the
legal right to assume the position.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated 08 March
2013 is hereby GRANTED. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration dated 27 March 2013 is hereby
DENIED with FINALITY. AGNE V. YAP, SR. is hereby declared the duly elected Mayor of the
Municipality of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental in the 10 May 2010 elections. This resolution is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
Caballero v. COMELEC, won over private respondent.8 Private respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer
Proclamation.9
G.R. No. 209286, September 23, 2014| Peralta, J.
On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.
Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order
seeking to set aside the Resolution1 dated November 6, 2013 of the Commission on Elections On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc
(COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed in toto the Resolution2 dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by the COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.
First Division canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.
On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation.10
Petitioner3 and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.4 were both candidates for the
mayoralty position of the Municipality of Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's
elections. Private respondent filed a Petition5 to deny due course to or cancellation of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for
certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen
and a non-resident thereof. In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution11 of the May 3, 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed by the En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of
petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all votes in
During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and
not properly served with a copy of the petition and the petition was served by registered mail not proclamation of private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13,
in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a copy of the 2013 elections.
petition during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum
controverting private respondent's substantial allegations in his petition. On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of
Execution.12 Private respondent took his Oath of Office13 on December 20, 2013.
Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:
Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act
of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR IMPORT OF
Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with Section 5(2) PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523
of RA No. 9225.6 He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.
becoming a Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for
him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria, THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ABANDONED
California, and finally in Canada. HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR
"GREENER PASTURE."
On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN
material misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP,
Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS
resolution reads:c PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
LAW ON RESIDENCY.14chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to
GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby
CANCELLED.7chanrobleslaw Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel
his COC with the Office of the Municipal Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was
not personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the petition to him by
The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by petitioner as he registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode
was already given a copy of the petition and also in consonance with the Commission's of service was resorted to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4,
constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It found paragraphs (1)15 and (4),16 Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by
that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
of Allegiance to the Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to certificate of candidacy should have been denied outright. We are not convinced.
comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office,
i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the settled rule,
requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover,
naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4, Rule
Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove 1 of their Rules of Procedure.
that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for elective office
in said locality which he failed to do. Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition
of all matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be
Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that petitioner suspended by the Commission.
Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without
concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any
case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired.17
In Hayudini v. COMELEC,18 we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of respondent's
petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's COC despite its failure to comply with Sections
2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523,
i.e., pertaining to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient explanation as to why his
petition was not served personally on petitioner, respectively, and held that:cralawlawlibrary
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that
the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere technical
objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose
right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared,
not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved
by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action.
This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro
v. Commission on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction,
as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be
straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The
COMELEC has the power to liberally interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest
of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending before it. This liberality
is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives -
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving
just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding
brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with
public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival
candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real
choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means
within its command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader. 19chanrobleslaw
Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes
at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC,
pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with public
interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's
s ratiocination in accepting the petition, to wit:
This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the procedure for filing
a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which
requires service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also
consider the efforts exerted by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being
made aware that such service is necessary. We should also take note of the impossibility for
petitioner to personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in Canada at the
time of its filing as shown in respondent's travel records.
The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter an opportunity
to answer the allegations contained in the petition even prior to the service of summons by the
Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during the conference
held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations
against him. He even filed a Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For
all intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of due process which is the
very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.
Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to substantive
considerations "through a liberal construction aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding,
When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in
order, x x unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants the
relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of [P]rocedure, consistent with the ruling of the Supreme
Court in several cases.20chanrobleslaw
Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born
and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had
paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had exercised his right
of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to
Uyugan, Batanes during his vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost.
Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be
elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common
welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a
substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in canceling his COC. We are not persuaded.
RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of the law.21 The law does not provide for residency requirement
for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current residence of the concerned
natural-born Filipino.22
RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence. 23 This is only logical and consistent
with the general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish residence either
in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.24 However, when a natural-
born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines
becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:cralawlawlibrary
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides, among
others, for the qualifications of an elective local official. Section 39 thereof states:
SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case of a member of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day
of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place
where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the Election Day.
Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for
at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling"
or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence, 25 that is, "the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found
at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."26 A domicile of
origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It
consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.27
Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could
be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada
and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC28 we ruled that naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's
case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship.29 Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines and
transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.
The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under
RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?
In Japzon v. COMELEC, 30 wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA
No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the
said place was put in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:
[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had
no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in
the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new
domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made
it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. 31chanrobleslaw
Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically
make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a
Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new
domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.
The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was
able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year immediately preceding the
May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue
of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established
his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled
with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13,
2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative
bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of
discretion has marred such factual determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of grave
abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not
review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of
evidence.33
Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan,
Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of elections as required under Section
39 of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May
13, 2013 local elections is a substantial compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v.
Commission on Elections,34 we held:
x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government
those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the
qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one
of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not
even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would
substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.35chanrobleslaw
Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a resident of
Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, thus, a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in relation to
Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to COCs,
to wit:
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for
said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities,
highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which
he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election
purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal
orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed
voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the
certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that
the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed
by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run for the elective
post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. 36 We concluded that material representation
contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective
office as provided for in the Local Government Code. 37 Furthermore, aside from the requirement
of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. 38 We, therefore, find no grave
abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material
misrepresentation.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3, 2013 of the
COMELEC First Division and the Resolution dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc
and are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949)
Facts:
 In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order
to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was
approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege
speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the
petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked
out with his followers.
 Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
o The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made
it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the
remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order
not to paralyze the functions of the Senate.
o Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent
be designated to preside over the session which suggestion was
carried unanimously.
o The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the
Chair.
 Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator
Arranz, because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as
Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.
 Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able
to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the
complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for
approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
 The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding,
asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the
respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been
validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the
majority required of the 24-member Senate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines Senate and oust respondent.
Rulings:
In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
1. The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case.
The court will be against the doctrine of separation of powers.
1. In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the
controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to
elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor
taken over, by the judiciary.
2. The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the
presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as
the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators
want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
— not in the Supreme Court.
2. Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
1. Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority
required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the
beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view
of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
 2. When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall
constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a
difference between a majority of “the House”, the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the
members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
3. The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.
1. The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful
President of the Senate, since the office depends exclusively upon
the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about
tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by
that majority.
2. At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order
to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here
about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve
senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all
their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the

ground as it involved a political question. The Supreme Court should abstain
in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers,
change or reinstate them.
Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. 187 SCRA 377 (1990)
Facts:
 Congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in representatives from
diverse political parties Petitioner Anna Dominique Coseteng was the only
candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
 A year later, the “Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino” or LDP was organized
as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House committees,
including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments,
had to be reorganized. Petitioner Coseteng then wrote a letter to Speaker
Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of KAIBA, she be
appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and House
Electoral Tribunal.
 On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, revised the House
majority membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform with
the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A. Daza, LP, with Rep.
Luis C. Singson, LDP, however, Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained
as the 12th member representing the House minority.
 On February 1, 1989, Coseteng and her party, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs praying that the Supreme Court declare as null
and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero, Cuenco,
Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and
Singson, as members of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them
from acting as such and to enjoin also the other respondents from
recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the
theory that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional
mandate of proportional representation
Issue:
 WON the question raised is political.
 WON the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments
were chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. Holding/
Held:
1. No, it is not. The “political question” issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
where this Court ruled that “the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner
of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution” is justiciable, and, “even if the question were political in
nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution,
which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government.”
2. Yes, petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads: “Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve
Senators, and twelve Members of the House of Representatives elected by
each House on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except
in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it
within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987
Constitution.) The composition of the House membership in the Commission
on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in the House. They
represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).
Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments
would equal 9.6 members, which may be rounded out to ten (10) members
from the LDP. The remaining two seats were apportioned to the LP
(respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition
party in the House. There is no doubt that this apportionment of the House
membership in the Commission on Appointments was done “on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein.” There is no merit in
the petitioner’s contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective
political parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by their
respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected by the House (not by
their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution. The validity
of their election to the Commission on Appointments-eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority-is unassailable.
Lidasan vs. Comelec, 21 SCRA 479 (1967)

FACTS:

Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled

"An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,"
was passed. Lidasan came to know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum
just mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and
that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko,Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of Cotabato and
not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted
in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precints for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then
filed that RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional because it did not
clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.

ISSUE:

Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in

another province - Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted upon the
constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill?

HELD:

The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to
perceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full
impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and
Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the
prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh
against the constitutionality of RA 4790
Pimentel v. Joint Com., G.R. No. 163783. June 22, 2004
RESOLUTION
Nature of Action: Petition for Prohibition Petitioner:
1. Sen. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued
existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass
the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May
10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June
11, 2004.
2. He prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint
Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings
pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
3. With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress,
all its pending matters and proceedings terminate upon its expiration
(citing Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution). Respondent: 1. the
precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support
the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee.
ISSUE
Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President upon its adjournment sine
die is null and void.
HELD Supreme Court: The instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
1. The Petition has no basis under the Constitution.
2. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire
upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on
June 11, 2004. Section 15, Art. VI of the Constitution does not pertain to
the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions.
3. The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a
close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004,
but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as being the
National Board of Canvassers. 4. The joint public session cannot adjourn
sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated task
Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated JUN 22 2004.
G. R. No. 163783 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress
to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and Vice-President in the May 10,
2004 Elections.)
RESOLUTION
By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the
Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity
and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the
votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10,
2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June 11,
2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further
proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on
Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the
Twelfth Congress of its last regular session, [its] term ... terminated and
expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the term 2001
to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all
pending matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ...
Congress." To advance this view, he relies on "legislative procedure,
precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress."
Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all
questions regarding the regularity, validity or constitutionality of the canvassing
of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded national
elections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to
its power and duty "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under
Section 5 of the same Article.
After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by
petitioner as well as those presented in the Comments filed by the Solicitor
General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the petition has
absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure,
precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress"
is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the
Senate, of which he is an incumbent member.� This section clearly provides
that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary
or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance
with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for
respondent Joint Committee and that of the Office of the Solicitor General, the
precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the
move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the
observations of former Senate President Jovito Salonga.
Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress
adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee
finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-
President.[1]cralaw Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress
convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on
even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as
President and Vice-President, respectively.[2]cralaw
Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of
Congress adjourned sine dieon May 25, 1998. The Joint Committee completed
the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on May 27,
1998.[3]cralaw The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on
May 29, 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph
Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and
Vice-President, respectively.[4]cralaw
As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the
Joint Committee of Congress [a]re [i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional
[f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress [o]f
[t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday
of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until
thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special
session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth
Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the
regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to
the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the
mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session
(subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that
"[t]he term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence,
unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that
"[t]he Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for
a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently,
there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth
Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have
"passed out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close
upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this
does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National
Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of
Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected
President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine dieuntil it has
accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of
canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its
membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has
accomplished its purposes. (Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA
1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389 [1934]
and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to
canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President,
its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint
Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and
canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal
impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and
transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses
of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a
special session.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Vitug, J., on official leave; Ynares-Santiago and Austria-Martinez, JJ., on
leave.
Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158988, July 6, 2005
EN BANC
Facts:
 This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of
the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit
the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to
the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence in accordance with
Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 The Rome Statute established the International Criminal Court which
“shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most
serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to
the national criminal jurisdictions.” Its jurisdiction covers the crime of
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of
aggression as defined in the Statute. The Statute was opened for
signature by all states in Rome on July 17, 1998 and had remained open
for signature until December 31, 2000 at the United Nations Headquarters
in New York. The Philippines signed the Statute on December 28, 2000
through Charge d’ Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the Philippine Mission to
the United Nations. Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states.
 Petitioners filed the instant petition to compel the respondents — the Office
of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs — to
transmit the signed text of the treaty to the Senate of the Philippines for
ratification.
 It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both
domestic law and international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it
is the duty of the executive department to transmit the signed copy of the
Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its discretion with
respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the
Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty
law and customary international law.
 Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining
the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they
have made their intention clear not to become parties to the treaty.
Issue: W/N the executive department has no duty to transmit the Rome
Statute to the Senate for concurrence; or
Whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed
by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the
signature of the President.
Held:
In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is
regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the
country’s sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of
foreign policy, the President acts as the country’s mouthpiece with respect to
international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal
with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole
authority to negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter
into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the
concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty
entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides
that “no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” The 1935
and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to
the treaties entered into by the executive.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is
vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of
the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President
to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its
ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty
which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which
cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has
no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance
of his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus
prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction to compel the
executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome
Statute to the Senate.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.