Reyes v CA
and asked for the dismissal of the case, moral damages and
G.R. No. 96492 | November 26, 1992 | J. Nocon
Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio
Mananghaya question the respondent Court’s decision, which
affirmed with modification the agrarian court’s decision, which
ordered them and the other defendants therein to, among
others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to
private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.
Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of
farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga. Devoted to the
production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by
now deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina
dela Cruz.
Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded
him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that Olympio, in
conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter
Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy
and stealth, from entering and working on the subject
premises; and that until the filing of the instant case,
defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus
violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for
judgment for the recovery of possession and damages with a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the
tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant
Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots
attorney’s fees.
Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the
farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment
of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government,
as his defenses.
Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable
Held:
No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA
served as basis in arriving at their findings of fact. The
Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again
because settled is the rule that only questions of law may be
raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in
the instant case.
In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more
than substantial evidence. Substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an
ordinarily civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by
stressing that there is contrary evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is
entitled to belief.
G.R. No. 101527
REGALADO, J.:
This original petition for certiorari seeks to annul the
decision[1] of the National Labor Relations Commission
(hereafter, respondent commission), dated June 28, 1991,
finding that herein private respondent Angie Mendoza was
illegally dismissed and awarding her three years backwages
and separation pay.
We quote the undisputed facts as found by respondent
commission:
"Appellant Angie Mendoza had been employed with appellee
since 1977. She rose from the ranks from the position of
secretary to the Finishing Department Head to secretary to the
Executive Vice President, and later to personnel manager up
to March 7, 1986. Her latest salary was P6,190.00. In the latter
part of 1986, a new management group took over appellee.
Appellant, who was on leave, found out about the changes
and consequently wrote the widow of the former president of
appellee, to wit:
xxx
'Dear Mrs. Salazar:
'In compliance with my verbal promise and in abiding by the
company rules and regulations, the undersigned reported to
your goodself on March 7, the expiration of an approved one
month vacation leave.
'It is sad to know that during my absence, major changes took
place in ITM. There was a take-over of new management,
appointment and reorganization of new officers and other key
positions have been effected. Needless to say, the position of
the undersigned as Personnel Manager was also filled up by a
newcomer.
'In view of the above circumstances, I deem it proper and wise
to cease my employment; but with equivalent separation pay
from the company. I am happy to announce that I am one of
the pioneer employees, having employed (sic) in 1971 as
secretary to then Finishing Dept. Head. Being an experienced
and competent secretary, after two months I rose to the
position of secretary to the Exec. Vice President. In January
1975, I was appointed to succeed and execute the duties and
responsibilities of the resigned Personnel Manager and at
same time as secretary to the executives of the company.
During the period June 1984 to June 1985, I was appointed in
the concurrent capacity as Personnel Manager of Grand
Alliance Mills, sister company of ITM.

'For fifteen years of stay, I could proudly say that I dedicated
one-third of my life in serving the company honestly and
efficiently, my employment records can fully vouch for that.
'I sincerely hope that you will merit this request with your usual
kind consideration and immediate attention.'
Respectfully yours,
Angie S. Mendoza"
"On June 6, 1986, the instant complaint for illegal dismissal
was filed. Complainant alleged that she was dismissed without
sufficient grounds after 14 years of service.
"In its defense, respondent averred that complainant
voluntarily resigned and if she was terminated such
termination was due to valid and just grounds. Being a
managerial employee she could be terminated for loss of trust
and confidence."[2]
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective position
papers. Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss[3] alleging that:
(1) private respondent's position paper is unverified and
should be stricken off the record; and (2) complainant failed to
appear despite notice, thereby depriving petitioner of its right
to cross-examine her. In an order[4] dated May 25, 1988, the
labor arbiter dismissed the complaint without prejudice, on the
ground that complainant's absence deprived herein petitioner
of the opportunity to cross-examine her.
On appeal, respondent commission reversed the labor arbiter
in a decision[5] dated October 28, 1988, holding that under
Article 221 of the Labor Code, respondent commission and the
labor arbiter have the authority to decide cases based on
position papers and documents submitted by the parties
without resorting to technical rules of evidence; and that herein
petitioner was not denied due process because on the basis of
the records of the case, an, intelligent decision could be
arrived at without resorting to a formal hearing. Petitioner went
to this Court on a petition for certiorari, entitled "Imperial
Textile Mills, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations, et. al.,"
docketed as G.R. No. 86663, which was however dismissed in
our resolution[6] of February 15, 1989.
The case was thereafter remanded to the labor arbiter who
subsequently rendered a decision[7] on April 10, 1990
declaring the dismissal of complainant as legally effected on
the ground that she resigned voluntarily and that her dismissal
was for a valid cause, that is, loss of trust and confidence. On
appeal, respondent commission rendered its questioned
decision reversing the findings of the labor arbiter and holding
that herein private respondent was illegally dismissed, thus:
"Was appellant illegally dismissed? We believe so. The letter
dated March 31, 1986 clearly stated that she was asking for
separation pay because she found out that she had already
been replaced during her leave of absence. x x x Appellant's
resignation and request for separation pay was prompted
solely by her removal as indicated in her letter. In short,
complainant was forced to resign.
"If it was loss of confidence that prompted appellee to remove
appellant, appellee had the burden of proving it. Appellee had
not adduced an iota of evidence that would account for the
alleged 'loss of confidence.'
"Considering, however, that complainant appears to have
sought employment elsewhere in lieu of reinstatement, an
award of separation pay and three years backwages,
consistent with the rulings of the Supreme Court, is but
proper."[8]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution[9] dated August 16, 1991, hence the instant petition.
1. Petitioner inceptively asserts that it was denied due process
when it was not given the opportunity to cross-examine herein
private respondent during the hearing before the labor arbiter.
It is a basic rule that it is not the denial of the right to be heard
but the deprivation of the opportunity to be heard which
constitutes a violation of the due process clause. As held
in Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc., et al. vs. Achacoso, etc., et
al.,[10] and subsequently reiterated in Bautista, et al. vs.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al.:[11] "Equally
unmeritorious is petitioners' allegation that they were denied
due process because the decision was rendered without a
formal hearing. The essence of due process is simply an
opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of."
There was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due
process as petitioner was given the opportunity to present its
case through a motion to dismiss and a position paper filed
with the labor arbiter.
2. It is contended that while the decisions of respondent
commission may be rendered based on position papers, such
rule is not applicable to the case at bar where the position
paper submitted by the private respondent is not verified. The
contention is without merit.
First, the issue on the admissibility of the unverified position
paper has been passed upon by this Court in its disposition of
the aforementioned petition in G.R. No. 86663 which upheld
the decision of respondent commission, reversing the order of
dismissal of the labor arbiter on the ground that the case could
be resolved on the basis of the position papers submitted by
the parties. In effect, it was there held by necessary implication
that the unverified position paper submitted by herein private
respondent is deemed sufficient. Besides, even the labor
arbiter in his order dated May 25, 1988 admits that the
unverified position paper is a mere procedural infirmity which
does not affect the merits of the case.[12]
Second, well-settled is the rule that procedural technicalities
do not strictly apply to proceedings before labor arbiters for
they may avail themselves of all reasonable means to speedily
ascertain the facts of a controversy.[13]
3. Petitioner claims that the findings of respondent commission
to the effect that the former failed to adduce an iota of
evidence that would account for the alleged "loss of
confidence" is erroneous. Petitioner raised in its position paper
filed before the labor arbiter the following facts which allegedly
constitute the basis for the loss of trust and confidence, to wit:
"Complainant, during the trying times of new management
take over, beset by shaky industrial relations, culminating in
mass action, despite requests by new managers was nowhere
to be found. If she was interested to maintain her position, she
could have at least reported to the company and brief the new
managers of the existing personnel problems. This, she opted
not to do, in fact her 'leave of absence' (was placed under
quote as there is nothing on record that she was granted a one
month leave of absence), ended March 7, 1986, it was only on
March 31, 1986 that she wrote the letter opting for
resignation."[14]
Although loss of confidence is a valid cause to terminate an
employee, it must nonetheless rest on an actual breach of duty
committed by the employee and not on the employer's
caprices.[15] The burden of proof rests upon the employer to
establish that the dismissal is for cause[16] in view of the
security of tenure that employees enjoy under the Constitution
and the Labor Code.[17] The failure of the employer to do so
would mean that the dismissal is not justified.[18] It is likewise
essential that there be substantial evidence to support a
charge of loss of confidence. The employer's evidence must
clearly and convincingly establish the facts upon which the
loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to
rest.[19]
In the case at bar, the facts relied upon by petitioner barely,
establish any basis for the alleged loss of confidence. As it is,
the same is, at most, a mere allegation.
In addition, we have ruled that to constitute a valid dismissal,
two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for any
of the causes provided for under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, and (2) only after the employee has been notified in
writing and given the opportunity to be heard and defend
himself as required under Sections 2 and 5, Rule XIV, Book V
of the Implementing Rules.[20] In the case at bar, petitioner
categorically stated in its position paper that "(t)here was never
any official communication from the new management group
of the company addressed to the complainant, that her
services were terminated,"[21] and yet it does not deny that it
had appointed a replacement for private respondent even
before she wrote her aforequoted letter of March 31, 1986.
4. Finally, petitioner asserts that findings of fact of the labor
arbiter should be accorded respect and finality. Besides, the
decision of the labor arbiter had become final considering that
the appeal made by private respondent with respondent
commission was filed out of time. Records show that the
decision of the labor arbiter was received by private
respondent on May 2, 1990, whereas the appeal was filed with
respondent commission only on May 17, 1990, which is
already beyond the 10-day reglementary period provided in
the Labor Code.
While it is true that factual findings of the labor arbiter are
usually binding on this Court, such situation does not obtain in
this case. As we have earlier declared, the alleged loss of
confidence was never sufficiently proven by herein petitioner.

It appears that the appeal with respondent commission was
indeed filed late. The general rule is that the perfection of an
appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Failure to conform to
the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final
and unappealable.[22]
We also note, in passing, that contrary to the Solicitor
General's allegation that petitioner failed to raise the issue of
timeliness of appeal before the respondent commission and is,
therefore, deemed to have waived its right to question the
same, herein petitioner did raise this issue albeit belatedly, in
its reply to private respondent's memorandum of appeal.[23]
Nevertheless, in some instances, this Court has disregarded
such unintended lapses so as to give due course to appeals
filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong
and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice
and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.[24] We are of the
opinion and so hold that in consideration of the merits of this
case, substantial justice could be rightfully invoked by way of
an exception. This is one such case where we are convinced
that substance should prevail over and not be sacrificed for
form.
5. Petitioner asseverates that since private respondent is
already employed elsewhere, respondent commission erred in
awarding separation pay and three years backwages. We
disagree.
In the case of Torillo vs. Leogardo, Jr., etc., et. al.,[25] we held:
"Backwages and reinstatement are two reliefs given to an
illegally dismissed employee. They are separate and distinct
from each other. However, in the event that reinstatement is
no longer possible, separation pay is awarded to the
employee. Thus, the award of separation pay is in lieu of
reinstatement and not of backwages. In other words, an
illegally dismissed employee is entitled to (1) either reinstate-
ment, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable and (2) backwages."
The payment of backwages is one of the reliefs which an
illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the
National Labor Relation Commission to render in his favor as a
consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer.
The award thereof is not private compensation or damages but
is in furtherance and effectuation of the public objectives of the
Labor Code. Even though the practical effect is the enrichment
of the individual, the award of backwages is not in redress of a
private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command upon
the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the
Labor Code,[26] such as the dismissal of an employee due to
the unlawful act of the employer or the latter's bad
faith.[27] Hence, we have ruled that where the ground of loss of
confidence has neither been established nor sufficient basis
thereof presented, the finding that respondent employee was
illegally dismissed was well taken and said employee,
although not reinstated, was awarded three years
backwages.[28]
With respect to the award of separation pay, we declared
in Santos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et.
al.,[29] that where the decision ordering the reinstatement of the
employee may no longer be enforced, or is no longer feasible
because of the strained relations between the parties, the
employee may be awarded separation pay as an alternative to
reinstatement. Such a situation obtains in this case and
considering further the confidential nature of private
respondent's position, we find no reason why the foregoing
doctrine should not here apply.
WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been
committed by respondent commission, the present petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON.
DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.1 Bigamy carries with it the
imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an
afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15)
years.2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents . . .3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems
impliedly admitted.4 At least, it is not expressly denied. Thus
the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for
bigamy is already time-barred, which hinges on whether its
discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the
offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from
the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage
was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule
on constructive notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992,
petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting
marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while
his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and
subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that
his criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by
prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the
motion to quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the
motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of
Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the
assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that
since the second marriage contract was duly registered with
the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,7such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the
subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was
registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only
in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment
of the bigamous marriage" as declared by the appellate court,
insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our
Lady of Nativity Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the
moment of registration the marriage contract was open to
inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the
prescriptive period does not begin from the commission of the
crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was
in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice
in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual
and legal circumstances so warrant,8 we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the
crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being
more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly
explains —
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive
notice should be applied in the case at bar, principally citing in
support of his stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA
597); and People v.Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive
notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy
as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy
from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a
bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where
the offender is not known to be still a married person, in order
to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction
involving any right or interest therein is made in the Register of
Deeds of the place where the said property is located.
Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of
the transactions involving the said property can easily be
made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous
marriage, verification by the offended person or the authorities
of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage
may be entered into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner
wherein constructive notice was applied, involved therein were
land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not
property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy
that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the
accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of
bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost
absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open
and made of public record by its registration, the offender
however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating
authority and those concerned the existence of his previous
subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still
a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate
spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still
a married person. And such a place may be anywhere, under
which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is
rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy
should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their
agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by
the offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy
were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the
prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost
be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would
encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished
and protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice
will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the
marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various
local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no
second or even third marriage has been contracted without the
knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a
task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to all
persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien,
attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register of
Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it
relates lies from the time of such registering, filing or entering,
there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to
413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that
there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule
to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no
concealment at all because his marriage contract with Ms.
Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all
and sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his
argument because why did he indicate in the marriage
contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true
status as a married man? Or for that matter, why did he not
simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in
Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The
answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or minister would
knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this
would subject him to punishment under the Marriage
Law.10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his
duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the
probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local
civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple
expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the
local civil registry, he has set into motion the running of the
fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by
petitioner, in all likelihood we would be playing right into the
hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract
of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other
similar documents without due regard for the stability of
marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of
which is a primary concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned
decision of the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERE
34. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans vs. Desierto, 363 SCRA 489 (2001)
Student: G-one T. Paisones
Professor: Atty. Cisco Franz S. Maclang
Facts:
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Fact
Finding Committee, and representing the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed a sworn
complaint, for violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Office of the
Ombudsman against the directors and officials of BUSCO,
namely: respondents Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Jose Ma. Ozamis,
Carlos O. Fortich, Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Jose L. Africa, Julio H.
Ozamis, and Miguel V. Gonzales; and the concerned
members of the Board of Directors of the PNB.
After considering the evidence adduced, the Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint of the PCGG on August 28, 1998 on
the ground that "there is no sufficient evidence against
respondents, both public and private, so as to make them
liable for criminal prosecution in court for violation of the Anti-
Graft Law xxx." In other words, there was no probable cause.
Issue:
WONthe Ombudsman committed grave abuse of
discretion in the determination of whether or not probable
cause exists against the respondents.
Held:
 No.
Ratio:
In any event, there is no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the Ombudsman in his determination of whether
or not probable cause exists against the respondents. This
Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has
discretion to determine whether a criminal case, given its facts
and circumstances, should be filed or not. It is basically his
call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith should he find it
to be insufficient in form and substance or, should he find it
otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with
the investigation if, in his view, the complaint is in due and
proper form and substance.
CITY OF MANILA V. GERARDO GARCIA
G.R. No. L-26053 February 21, 1967
FACTS
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one
compact area in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens
Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants
entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and
consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again
without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the
necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru
the years to the present.
Few years thereafter, defendants were given written permits
— each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy specific areas in
the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their
occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not
contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this school's
expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's
directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each
of defendants to vacate and remove his construction or
improvement on the premises. This was followed by the City
Treasurer's demand on each defendant for the payment of the
amount due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate.
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the
premises. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE
Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the
premises for school purposes.
RULING
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los
Santos Elementary School. The defendants were wrong in
insisting that they have acquired the legal status of tenants.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials
thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their
homes were erected without city pemits, thus, illegal. In a
language familiar to all, defendants are squatters.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were
issued when the effects of the war had simmered down and
when these defendants could have very well adjusted
themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to,
located permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers
that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions
are as illegal, without permits.
The houses and constructions planted by defendants on the
premises clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for
school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of
the fact that housing school children in the elementary grades
has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish
interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good.
The public purpose of constructing the school building annex
is paramount.
G.R. No. 85423 May 6, 1991
JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA,
JR., respondents.
Facts:
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting
of about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato,
Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo
Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial,
judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant
was required to vacate the disputed lot.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in
arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took
cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked
by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial
court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot,
it considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.
Issue: Whether or not the evidence presented is already offered
evidence?
Held: No.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as
follows:
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is
offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit
does not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were
marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the
purpose of identifying them at that time. They were not by such
marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific
Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles, 3 "At the trial on the merits, the party may
decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance
its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the
latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor
can they be given any evidentiary value."
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no
reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena's testimony in
a case it had previously heard which was closely connected with
the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases
pending before them, of the contents of the records of other
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending b before the same
judge.
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in
the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing
party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the
case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of
the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted
as part of the record of the case then pending." These conditions
have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner
was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No.
1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then
pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never
taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving
him no opportunity to counteract.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, as we have held in many cases. However, that rule is
also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known
exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the
petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest have possessed the
disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this
uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become
weighty and compelling evidence of the petitioner's ownership.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits
"A", "B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence
and therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably
to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on
the evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial
notice thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner,
in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and
should not have been sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the
lower court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the
disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our
adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence
supporting the petitioner's contrary contentions that should have
persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the private
respondent. It is so ordered.
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA LEUENBERGER and
FRANCISCO SOLIVA, respondents.
Enrique I. Soriano, Jr. for private respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision * of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on September 29,
1969 in CA-G.R. No. 35036-R (Rollo, p. 11) setting aside the
decision ** of the Court of First Intance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, dated September 24, 1964 which dismissed the
complaint for recovery of possession in Civil Case No. 181-S
and declared the cemetery site on Lot No. 76 in Victorias as
property of the municipality of Victorias (Record on Appeal, p.
9).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby set aside and another is hereby rendered:
(1) Ordering the defendant municipality and/or thru its
appropriate officials to return and deliver the possession of the
portion of Lot 76 used as cemetery or burial site of the plaintiff-
appellant.
(2) Ordering defendant municipality to pay the plaintiff-
appellant the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963 until the
possession of said land is actually delivered.
Lot No. 76 containing an area of 208,157 sq. meters forms a
part of Cadastral Lot No. 140 (Rollo, p. 11), a 27.2460 ha.
sugar land located in Bo. Madaniog, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, in the name of the deceased Gonzalo Ditching
under Tax Declaration No. 3429 of Negros Occidental for the
year 1941 (Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits, p. 22). He was
survived by his widow Simeona Jingeo Vda. de Ditching and a
daughter, Isabel, who died in 1928 (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 7)
leaving one off-spring, respondent Norma Leuenberger, who
was then only six months old (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 34).
Respondent Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Soliva,
inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother,
Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (not from her predeceased
mother Isabel Ditching). In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot
No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the ground of a
certain high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision.
(TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 24).
In 1963, she had the remaining 21 ha. or 208.157 sq. m.
relocated by a surveyor upon request of lessee Ramon Jover
who complained of being prohibited by municipal officials from
cultivating the land. It was then that she discovered that the
parcel of land, more or less 4 ha. or 33,747 sq.m. used by
Petitioner Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery from 1934,
is within her property which is now Identified as Lot 76 and
covered by TCT No. 34546 (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 7-9; Exh.
"4," Folder of Exhibits, p. 23 and Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits,
p. 1).
On May 20, 1963, Respondent wrote the Mayor of Victorias
regarding her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals
and requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied
by Petitioner (Exh. "G, Folder of Exhibits, p. 15). When the
Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the land she asked to be
shown the papers concerning the sale but was referred by the
Mayor to the municipal treasurer who refused to show the
same (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 32-33).
On January 11, 1964, Respondents filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch 1, for
recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the
municipal cemetery (Record on Appeal, p. 1). In its answer,
petitioner Municipality, by way of special defense, alleged
ownership of the lot, subject of the complaint, having bought it
from Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching sometime in 1934
(Record on Appeal, p. 7). The lower court decided in favor of
the Municipality. On appeal Respondent appellate Court set
aside the decision of the lower court (Record on AppeaL p. 9);
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
This petition was filed with the Court on November 6, 1969
(Rollo, p. 2), the Record on Appeal on December 19, 1969
(Rollo, p. 80). On January 5, 1970, the Court gave due course
to the petition (Rollo, p. 84).
The Brief for the Petitioner was filed on April 1, 1970 (Rollo, p.
88), the Brief for Respondents was filed on May 18, 1970
(Rollo, p. 92).
On July 8, 1970, the Court resolved to consider the case
submitted for decision without Petitioner's Reply Brief,
Petitioner having failed to file the brief within the period which
expired on June 10, 1970 (Rollo. p. 99).
On motion of counsel for the Respondents (Rollo, p. 104), the
Court resolved on June 30, 1972 to allow respondent
Francisco Soliva to continue the appeal in behalf of the estate
of respondent Norma Leuenberger who died on January 25,
1972, Respondent Francisco Soliva having been appointed
special administrator in Special Proceedings No. 84-V of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Rollo, p. 110).
In their brief, petitioner raised the following errors of
respondent Court of Appeals: (Brief for the Petitioner, p. 1-3);
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA LEUENBERGER and
FRANCISCO SOLIVA, respondents.
Enrique I. Soriano, Jr. for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision * of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on September 29,
1969 in CA-G.R. No. 35036-R (Rollo, p. 11) setting aside the
decision ** of the Court of First Intance of Negros Occidental,
Branch I, dated September 24, 1964 which dismissed the
complaint for recovery of possession in Civil Case No. 181-S
and declared the cemetery site on Lot No. 76 in Victorias as
property of the municipality of Victorias (Record on Appeal, p.
9).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as
follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower
court is hereby set aside and another is hereby rendered:
(1) Ordering the defendant municipality and/or thru its
appropriate officials to return and deliver the possession of the
portion of Lot 76 used as cemetery or burial site of the plaintiff-
appellant.
(2) Ordering defendant municipality to pay the plaintiff-
appellant the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963 until the
possession of said land is actually delivered.
Lot No. 76 containing an area of 208,157 sq. meters forms a
part of Cadastral Lot No. 140 (Rollo, p. 11), a 27.2460 ha.
sugar land located in Bo. Madaniog, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, in the name of the deceased Gonzalo Ditching
under Tax Declaration No. 3429 of Negros Occidental for the
year 1941 (Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits, p. 22). He was
survived by his widow Simeona Jingeo Vda. de Ditching and a
daughter, Isabel, who died in 1928 (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 7)
leaving one off-spring, respondent Norma Leuenberger, who
was then only six months old (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 34).
Respondent Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Soliva,
inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother,
Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching (not from her predeceased
mother Isabel Ditching). In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot
No. 140, about 3 ha., to the municipality for the ground of a
certain high school and had 4 ha. converted into a subdivision.
(TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 24).
In 1963, she had the remaining 21 ha. or 208.157 sq. m.
relocated by a surveyor upon request of lessee Ramon Jover
who complained of being prohibited by municipal officials from
cultivating the land. It was then that she discovered that the
parcel of land, more or less 4 ha. or 33,747 sq.m. used by
Petitioner Municipality of Victorias, as a cemetery from 1934,
is within her property which is now Identified as Lot 76 and
covered by TCT No. 34546 (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 7-9; Exh.
"4," Folder of Exhibits, p. 23 and Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits,
p. 1).
On May 20, 1963, Respondent wrote the Mayor of Victorias
regarding her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals
and requesting delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied
by Petitioner (Exh. "G, Folder of Exhibits, p. 15). When the
Mayor replied that Petitioner bought the land she asked to be
shown the papers concerning the sale but was referred by the
Mayor to the municipal treasurer who refused to show the
same (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 32-33).
On January 11, 1964, Respondents filed a complaint in the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch 1, for
recovery of possession of the parcel of land occupied by the
municipal cemetery (Record on Appeal, p. 1). In its answer,
petitioner Municipality, by way of special defense, alleged
ownership of the lot, subject of the complaint, having bought it
from Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching sometime in 1934
(Record on Appeal, p. 7). The lower court decided in favor of
the Municipality. On appeal Respondent appellate Court set
aside the decision of the lower court (Record on AppeaL p. 9);
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
This petition was filed with the Court on November 6, 1969
(Rollo, p. 2), the Record on Appeal on December 19, 1969
(Rollo, p. 80). On January 5, 1970, the Court gave due course
to the petition (Rollo, p. 84).
The Brief for the Petitioner was filed on April 1, 1970 (Rollo, p.
88), the Brief for Respondents was filed on May 18, 1970
(Rollo, p. 92).
On July 8, 1970, the Court resolved to consider the case
submitted for decision without Petitioner's Reply Brief,
Petitioner having failed to file the brief within the period which
expired on June 10, 1970 (Rollo. p. 99).
On motion of counsel for the Respondents (Rollo, p. 104), the
Court resolved on June 30, 1972 to allow respondent
Francisco Soliva to continue the appeal in behalf of the estate
of respondent Norma Leuenberger who died on January 25,
1972, Respondent Francisco Soliva having been appointed
special administrator in Special Proceedings No. 84-V of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental (Rollo, p. 110).
In their brief, petitioner raised the following errors of
respondent Court of Appeals: (Brief for the Petitioner, p. 1-3);
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
FACTS:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the
Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and
Detectives Pablo R. Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de
la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and
Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga
St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and
Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the
store waiting for any pusher to approach. The other members
of the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three
men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-
appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang
umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then
and there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and
two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas
and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant
and took from him the marked money, as well as eight more
rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-
Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by
Detective Marvin Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to
remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional
rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz,
Singayan and Pajilan. Microscopic, chemical and
chromotographic examination was performed on the
confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist
of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that
the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as an
exhibit.

ISSUES:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite lack of
evidence to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the
accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the
P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
RULING:
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses and to listen to their respective
testimonies, gave more credence to the statements of the
arresting officers. Applying the presumption that they had
performed their duties in a regular manner, it rejected
Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been
manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient
evidence of his charges, let alone his admission that he had
no quarrel with the peace officers whom he had met only on
the day of his arrest.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the
prosecution has overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused-appellant with proof beyond
reasonable doubt of his guilt. He must therefore suffer the
penalty prescribed by law for those who would visit the
scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant
invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission by
the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked P10.00
bill.:This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission
of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A) which,
according to the appellant, is excluded under the best
evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy. Apparently,
appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an
ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of
secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned
therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the
document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as
to whether or not such document was actually executed, or
exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its
execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and
testimonial evidence is admissible.
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the
prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence
and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a
xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of
accounting for the original.
BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA,
HEIRS OF EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by
GLICERIA PAPA-FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V. AGUILAR,
respondents.
G.R. No. 83377
February 9, 1993
Facts:
Marcosa Bernabe owned a parcel of land in Bulacan. His
children are Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia, Maria (
Petitioners), and Leona-married to Mariano
Aguilar(Respondents)
Basilio and Felipe mortgaged the parcel of land to Atty.
Bordador.
When the mortgage matured, spouses Maria and Mariano
Aguilar redeemed the property and in turn Marcosa Bernabe
sold the same to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute
sale and was registered at the Registry of Deeds in Bulacan.
Since then, the spouses paid the taxes of the land.
Marcosa Bernabe died.
On 1980, petitioners demanded to respondents that as
children of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of the
property and demanded the partition thereof. They claimed
that the respondents had resold the property to their father
Bernabe.
Petitioners filed a case of Reconveyance against respondent
spouses.
The evidence presented by the plaintiff are the following:
• Exhibit A- A xerox copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed
by the respondents selling, transferring, and conveying the
parcel of land in favor of Marcos Bernabe.
• Testimony of the notary public before whom it was
acknowledged
• Testimony of Luis who was present during its execution
• Testimony of the representatives of the offices of the National
Archives and the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan regarding the
loss of the original document.
Issue:
Whether petitioners have satisfactorily proven the loss of the
original deed of sale so as to allow the presentation of the
secondary evidence (xeroxed copy).
Ruling:
No. Although the petitioners established the existence of the
alleged document, however it failed to establish the facts and
circumstances surrounding the loss or destruction of the same.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original
documents were actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the
introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent must
establish the former existence of the instrument. The correct
order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss;
contents although this order may be changed if necessary in
the discretion of the court.
Loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its
loss, or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the
court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by
the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has
been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation
which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is
indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for
before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or
multiplicates are parts of the writing itself to be proved, no
excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded
as established until it appears that all of its parts are
unavailable.
In the instance case petitioner Luis even claimed during the
trial that an original of the document existed and was
submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Malolos for
registration. The appellees, therefore, should have asked the
office to produce it in court and if it could not be produced for
one reason or another should have called the Register of
Deeds or his representative to explain why. That they failed to
do. The loss or destruction of the original of the document in
question has not, therefore, been established. Hence,
secondary evidence of it is inadmissible.
Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of anyone. This petitioners failed to do.
Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out
of four or five original copies.
Agustin v CA
Facts:
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel Agustin, for
support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City
RTC.
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe,
after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite
Arnel’s insistence on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their
child out of wedlock, Martin. The baby’s birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the
pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fe’s
repeated requests for Martin’s support despite his adequate
financial capacity and even suggested to have the child
committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the
child.
On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin
at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel
sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fe’s leg. This
incident was reported to the police. Several months later, Fe
was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for
support.
Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all
the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing,
which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination and moving to dismiss the complaint
for lack of cause of action.
The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of
the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
thus this petition.
Issue:
W/N the respondent court erred in denying the petitioner’s
MTD
W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA
paternity testing and was a form of unreasonable search
Held:
1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioner’s motion to
dismiss because the private respondents’ complaint on its face
showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiff’s
primary right and the defendant’s corresponding primary duty,
and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant,
by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The
cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the
complaint but by the facts alleged.
2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the
proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to
privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common
good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by
proper safeguards that enhance public service and the
common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of
searches and seizures, and the infringement of privacy of
communication where the constitutional right to privacy has
been critically at issue. Petitioner’s case involves neither and,
as already stated, his argument that his right against self-
incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water.
Ramirez v CA
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez
in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent,
Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly
vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile and furious
mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging
that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal,
private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC
for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit
and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the
RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void and denied
the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of
the parties in the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit and
Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication
by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as
to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute
ought to be a party other than or different from those involved
in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize
all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”. Consequently,
as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, “even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator” under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover,
supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by
third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of
the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private communication”
in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private
conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
“communication” to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-
verbal, written or expressive communications of “meanings or
thoughts” which are likely to include the emotionally-charged
exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter’s office. Any
doubts about the legislative body’s meaning of the phrase
“private communication” are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms “conversation” and “communication” were
interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the Bill.
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in
representation of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and
TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and
EMMANUEL JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for plaintiff-appellant.
Cecilio P. Luminarias for defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order
of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental,
presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not
as yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not
on a motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata that the
cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court
may take judicial notice of such previous case decided by him
resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge Gorospe
answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus
called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to
real property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio,
on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion
to dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment. This
was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case,
besides being clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to
or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by the same
plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now
deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest
are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case
No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7,
1958 for 'Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real
Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio
alias Mening Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same
property and practically the same parties as defendants are
the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or
forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said
Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as the
instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as
could be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated
December 6, 1965]."1 There was an opposition on the part of
plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior
judgment or res judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it
must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then
alleged that there was nothing in the complaint from which
such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on September 26,
1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on
the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under
date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's
cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court
finds to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's
complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias
Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from
whom they have derived their rights, in an order dated
December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the
new Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of
land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case
No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's
previous dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an
adjudication upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and
may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action
against the same parties over the same issues and the same
subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So ordered]"2 Hence, this
appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be
sustained. It is in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement
cannot be raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground
does not appear on the face of the complaint. What
immediately calls attention in the rather sketchy and in
conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is that
there was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by
Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal the same
plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of
defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the
deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest. There
was no denial either of the property involved being the same
and of the finality of the decsion in the previous case which
would show that appellant's claim was devoid of any support in
law. It would be therefore futile for the court to continue with
the case as there had been such a prior judgment certainly
binding on appellant. What then was there for the lower court
to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was
essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome was
predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach
if the Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding
distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even
to appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court
certainly could take judicial notice of the finality of a judgment
in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided
by it. That was all that was done by the lower court in
decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not
contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief
Justice Moran is relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken
judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not
the case pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous
ruling is applicable in the case under consideration."3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration.
Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under
the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served
the cause of justice better, not to mention the avoidance of
needless expense on his part and the vexation to which
appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the
matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would not have
been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It has,
ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a
1910 decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship
at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice
according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel,
should ever keep such an imperative of our legal system in
mind.5
SPS. RONALD HUTCHISON and VALENTINE NAVALLE-
HUTCHISON, petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE M.
BUSCAS, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar concerns a boundary dispute involving 6,471
square meters of land in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga.
Petitioner spouses RONALD and VALENTINE HUTCHISON
seek the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated February 19, 2003, holding that
respondent ENRIQUE M. BUSCAS is entitled to the
possession of the disputed area.
The records show that on October 1, 1987, petitioner spouses
purchased from V.A. Development Enterprises, Inc. a 76,207-
sq. m. land (designated as Lot No. 7216) in San Juan, Lubao,
Pampanga. They occupied the land after a title was issued in
their names.
On August 22, 1989, one Juanita Arrastia, the owner of a lot
adjacent to that of petitioner spouses, sold a portion of her
land to respondent. The transaction, covering 7,581 sq. m.
(designated as Lot No. 7047-A), was evidenced by a Quitclaim
Deed in favor of respondent. Respondent occupied 1,100 sq.
m. of his land. However, he failed to register the portion of the
lot in his name and title to the property remained in Arrastias
name.
On January 10, 1995, respondent commissioned geodetic
engineer Narciso Manansala to survey his property.
Manansala prepared a sketch/subdivision plan of respondents
lot. His survey revealed that 6,471 sq. m. thereof was
occupied by petitioner spouses.
Respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner spouses to
vacate the encroached area. Petitioner spouses refused and
insisted that it was part of their land. Thus, respondent filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer (Civil Case No. 1329) against
petitioner spouses before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Lubao, Pampanga. After trial, the MTC ruled in favor of
respondent. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) dismissed the case. It ruled that MTC had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter as it is a boundary dispute
and the proper action should have been an accion
reinvindicatoria before the RTC.
Consequently, respondent filed a case for accion
reinvindicatoria against petitioner spouses with the RTC of
Guagua, Pampanga.[1] At the trial, respondent adduced in
evidence the Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the
disputed area. He likewise testified on the survey conducted
by Manansala. Another geodetic engineer, Angelito H. Nicdao,
testified that in the unlawful detainer case earlier filed by the
respondent, he was directed by the MTC judge hearing the
case to conduct a verification survey of the parties lots. In
compliance with the order, he surveyed the two (2) lots using
the title of petitioner spouses and the records of the Bureau of
Lands.[2]His survey revealed that petitioner spouses
encroached on 6,471 sq. m. of the adjacent land claimed by
respondent. Respondent offered in evidence the verification
plan and report of Nicdao relative to his survey.
On the part of petitioner spouses, petitioner Valentine
Hutchison testified that she purchased Lot No. 7216 in Lubao,
Pampanga, covering an area of 76,207 sq. m., and title thereto
was duly issued in her name and that of her spouse.
After trial, the RTC dismissed[3] the complaint for lack of merit.
It ruled that respondents Quitclaim Deed was not sufficient
proof of ownership; that respondent failed to clearly identify the
property claimed as it was only marked with an X sign, and;
that petitioner spouses, as registered owners, are entitled to
possession of the disputed lot.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court. [4] It ruled that respondent is entitled to possession
of the disputed area as he was able to prove his claim of
ownership and the identity of the subject land.
Hence, this appeal where petitioner spouses assign the
following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
THAT THE RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED THE
PROPERTY HE SEEKS TO RECOVER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE TITLE OF THE
RESPONDENT TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS THE
QUITCLAIM DEED OVER A PORTION OF LAND.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL
CONCLUSION THAT THE RESPONDENT STRENGTHENED
HIS TITLE BY THE SURVEY HE CAUSED TO BE
PREPARED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
OF LAW THAT THE RESPONDENT PROVED BY A
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE THAT HIS PROPERTY
WAS ENCROACHED UPON BY THE PETITIONERS.
V second, his title thereto. In the case at bar, we find
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION
OF LAW THAT THE RESPONDENT IS DECLARED OWNER
OF THE 6,471 SQUARE-METERS DISPUTED LOT, AND
THE PETITIONERS ARE THUS ORDERED TO VACATE THE
SAME.
Petitioner spouses contend that there was a gross
misapprehension of facts by the Court of Appeals and its legal
conclusions were contrary to law and jurisprudence. They
assert that respondent failed to identify the portion of land he
was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. They allege
that: (a) respondents identification of his 7,581 sq. m. property
with a mere X mark on the Annex A of the Quirclaim Deed is
insufficient as the attached Annex A was not presented at the
trial, and; (b) the surveys conducted by the geodetic engineers
cannot be used to identify respondents lot as they were based
on the records of the Bureau of Lands and not on the
document of title of respondent.
We find for the petitioner spouses.
In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact
and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proving it.[5] This evidentiary rule is based on the
principle that the suitor who relies upon the existence of a fact
should be called upon to prove it.[6]
Article 434 of the New Civil Code[7] provides that to
successfully maintain an action to recover the ownership of a
real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed, and;
that respondent failed to establish these two (2) legal
requirements.
The first requisite: the identity of the land. In an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better
right to the property must first fix the identity of the land he is
claiming by describing the location, area and boundaries
thereof.[8] Anent the second requisite, i.e., the claimants title
over the disputed area, the rule is that a party can claim a right
of ownership only over the parcel of land that was the object of
the deed.[9] Respondent sought to prove these legal requisites
by anchoring his claim on the Quitclaim Deed over a portion of
land which was executed by Arrastia in his favor. However, a
cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed shows that the subject
land was described, thus:
x x x a portion of that property situated at San Juan, Lubao,
Pampanga which portion subject of this sale consists of 7,581
square meters more or less, as indicated particularly in the
herein attached plan marked as Annex A and made an integral
part hereof, and the subject property with an X sign.
Thus, the Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area
sold, i.e., 7,581 sq. m. of Arrastias land. Annex A of the Deed,
where the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and
where the specific portion of the property sold to respondent
was marked, was not presented by respondent at the trial. As
the Deed itself failed to mention the metes and bounds of the
land subject of the sale, it cannot be successfully used by
respondent to identify the area he was claiming and prove his
ownership thereof. Indeed, the presentation of the Annex A is
essential as what defines a piece of land is not the size
mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries thereof which
enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.[10]
Neither can the surveys of the lots of petitioner spouses and
respondent prove the identity of the contested area and
respondents ownership thereof. The records show that when
geodetic engineers Manansala and Nicdao surveyed the
lands, they merely relied on the self-serving statement of
respondent that he owns the portion of the lot adjacent to
petitioner spouses. They were not shown the Deed of
Quitclaim and its Annex A or any other document of title which
described the specific portion of the land allegedly conveyed to
respondent.[11] Thus, the surveys cannot be given evidentiary
weight to prove the identity of the land sold to respondent and
his ownership thereof.
Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the
contents of the document are the facts in issue, the best
evidence is the instrument itself.[12] In the case at bar, the
identity of the land claimed and respondents ownership thereof
are the very facts in issue. The best evidence to prove these
facts is the Quitclaim Deed and its Annex A where respondent
derives his title and where the land from which he purchased a
part was described with particularity, indicating the metes and
bounds thereof. Respondents failure to adduce in evidence
Annex A of the Quitclaim Deed or produce secondary
evidence, after proof of its loss, destruction or
unavailability,[13] is fatal to his cause.
Finally, it bears stress that in an action to recover real
property, the settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the
strength of his title, not on the weakness of the defendants
title.[14] This requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is
possible that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true
owner of the property in dispute,[15] and second, the burden of
proof lies on the party who substantially asserts the affirmative
of an issue for he who relies upon the existence of a fact
should be called upon to prove that fact.[16] In the case at bar,
as respondent failed to prove his title to and identity of the
contested land, there exists no legal ground upon which to turn
over the possession of the disputed area to him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated
February 19, 2003, is hereby reversed and set aside. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga,
dismissing the complaint for accion reinvindicatoria in Civil
Case No. G-3183, is reinstated. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ebreo v Ebreo
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of
Sale sufficiently prove conveyance of title to a property? This
is the issue presented to Us in the present petition.
The factual antecedents of this case are narrated herein:
A Complaint dated 04 January 1994, docketed as Civil Case
No. 4132 for Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and
Damages, was filed by Gil Ebreo, represented by his Attorney-
in-
Fact Felixberto Ebreo, Flaviano Ebreo and Homobono Cueto a
gainst petitioners Felino Ebreo, Spouses Antonio Ebreo and
Evelyn P. Beraa-Ebreo,
Ignacio Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Batangas City, Branch 7.
From plaintiffs account in their complaint, Felipe Ebreo died
intestate in 1926 leaving behind as heirs his five children,
Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio,
and Felipa.[1] Subsequently, Felipa died leaving behind her
heirs, Genoveva, Homobono and Eleuteria all
surnamed Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991 without any
issue. Defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and
Evelyn Beraa are the son and daughter-in-law, respectively, of
defendant Felino, one of the five children of Felipe Ebreo.
Felipe Ebreo left to his children an untitled parcel of land
situated in Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, more
particularly described as follows:
Isang palagay na lupang palayanin o linangin ipinamumuwis s
a ilalim ng Tax Declaration No. 39949 S-
1953, na ang mga karatig sa Ilaya ay Prudencia Coz, sa Silan
gan ay Pablo Cantro at
Santiago Banaag, sa ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa Kanluran ay
Marcos at Fortunato Banaag may luwang na 31,781
metros kuwadrados humigit kumulang at
may balor amiliorada na halagang P950.00, lalong kilala sa Lo
te 9046 ng sukat katastro dito sa Batangas.[2]
Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe, Lot
No. 9046 was subdivided into six lots identified as Lots A, B,
C, D, E and F.[3]
On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of Felipe Ebreo, through
themselves and their representatives, executed and signed a
document
entitled, Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa[4] where
they extrajudiciallypartitioned the above-described property
except the portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed upon
by these heirs, Lot No. 9046-F, with an area of 13,799 square
meters, shall remain under the co-ownership of
Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs
of Felipa Ebreo. However, plaintiffs were surprised to discover
that Lot 9046-F was declared for taxation purposes in the
name of defendant Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs recitals,
they alleged that they never sold, ceded, conveyed or
transferred their rights, share and co-ownership over Lot 9046-
F.
Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after
the execution of the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by
and among the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was
sold by the heirs to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the
corresponding Real Property Tax Declaration was transferred
in the name of Santiago Puyo as owner. However, the deed of
sale evidencing this transaction was never presented.
As narrated by the defendants, Tax Declaration No.
39241,[5] beginning in the year 1969 covering Lot 9046-F was
under the names of the heirs of Felipe Ebreo. Thereafter, upon
the sale of the lot by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo, Tax Declaration No. 39241 was cancelled and
a new one, Tax Declaration No. 48221[6] dated 15 January
1973, was issued in the name of Santiago Puyo. On this tax
declaration, the alleged sale of Lot 9046-F by the Heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was annotated. Soon, Tax
Declaration No. 48221 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No.
4042[7] for the year 1974, still in the name of
Santiago Puyo. Upon the sale by Santiago Puyo of Lot 9046-
F to Antonio Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax Declaration No. 4042
was cancelled and a new one, Tax Declaration No.
50669,[8] for the year 1977, was issued in the name of
Antonio Ebreo. This Tax Declaration was later on revised and
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 075-534 upon the marriage
of defendant Antonio Ebreo to defendant Evelyn Beraa. From
1977 up to 1994, defendants-spouses Antonio Ebreo and
Evelyn Beraa religiously paid the taxes due on the land.[9]
Defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of
Lot No. 9046-F by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo was executed and ratified sometime in 1968
before Attorney Doroteo M. Chavez of Batangas City. From
1968 to 1976, Mr. Santiago Puyo possessed said lot
peacefully, continuously, publicly and in the concept of
owner. As stated earlier, on 23 July 1976, Lot No. 9046-F was
sold by Santiago Puyo by way of Absolute Sale, to defendant
Antonio Ebreo. The Deed of Absolute Sale
or Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa[10] was duly executed and ratified
before one Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.
After due proceedings, a decision[11] dated 18 August 1997,
was rendered by the RTC which disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered
as follows:
(1) Ordering the parties-in-interest (heirs of
Felipe Ebreo and/or their representatives) to partition Lot No.
9046-F among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance under Sec. 2, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and in default thereof, the partition shall be
conducted in accordance with Sec. 3, et. seq., of the same
Rule.
(2) Ordering the dismissal of the Counterclaim of the
defendants.
(3) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, for and as attorneys fee.
(4) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
costs of suit.[12]
Defendants- appellants appealed the decision of the RTC to
the Court of Appeals. In a decision[13] dated 27 February 2003,
the Court of Appeals denied the appeal for lack of merit and
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals held:
The main issue in this case is whether or not a valid transfer of
Lot No. 9046-F was effected which conveyed ownership of the
property to Santiago Puyo. The defendant-appellants rely on
the Deed of Sale supposedly executed by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo. However, defendant-
appellants failed to produce the alleged Deed of Sale in
violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
xxxx
The best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence,
operates as a rule of exclusion, that is, secondary
(or substitutionary) evidence cannot inceptively be introduced
as the original writing itself must be produced in court, except
in the four instances mentioned in Section 3. (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, Seventh Revised
Edition, p. 555). Defendant-appellants miserably failed to
prove that their case is included among the exceptions to the
Rule.
The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the
Deed of Sale cannot be given credence. In fact, it was
contradicted by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners. His
claim that it was borrowed by Eleuteria Cueto and never
returned to him was also refuted by Eleuteria Cueto. Not only
are the testimonies of Felino Ebreo and his son
Antonio Ebreo self-serving, they are also uncorroborated by
independent witnesses. Defendant-appellants did not even
look for a copy of the deed of sale on the notarial registry of communicated to the other co-owners. (Trinidad v. Court of
Atty. Chavez, the notary public who allegedly notarized the Appeals, 289 SCRA 188).[14]
deed of sale. Neither did they look for a copy in the archives of
the Court where it should have been submitted as required by
the notarial law. In the words of the trial court, the decisive
documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and
conspicuously unproven. The controversial deed of sale not The motion for reconsideration of the defendants-appellants
having been produced as required by the rules of evidence, was denied in the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 22
the trial court was correct in ruling that Santiago Puyo acquired September 2003.[15]
no rights whatsoever to Lot No. 9046-F.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Since there was no valid transfer of the ownership of the
subject lot from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, the
subsequent transfer thereof to Antonio Ebreo is ineffectual. It
The following issues are submitted for resolution in this
is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is
petition:
selling (Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 78). Moreover,
the fact that the tax declarations for said lot were issued in the
name of Antonio Ebreo is of no moment for they are not
conclusive proof of ownership. It must be remembered that a 1) Whether or not the annotation of the Deed of Sale
tax declaration may be issued to any claimant even if it is not appearing in Tax Declaration No. 48221 is a sufficient proof of
supported by any deed. transfer in line with the doctrine of presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.

Neither can defendant-appellants open, adverse, notorious

and continuous possession of the land for several years
amount to ownership for they are co-owners of the land as
evidenced by the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi Ng Lupa.A co-
owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
2) Whether or not entries in official records are
admissible in evidence to establish the fact of valid transfer of
Lot No. 9046-F that effectively conveyed ownership of the
property from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo.[16]

After a painstaking review of the records, we find the petition
bereft of merit. First, it is important to re-state the general rule
that the findings of the trial court which are factual in nature,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals deserve to
be respected and affirmed by this court provided they are
supported by substantial evidence on record, as in the case at
bench.[17]
As recounted by defendants, now petitioners, Antonio and
Evelyn Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo initially to Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 or
1968 as evidenced by a deed of sale executed and ratified
before Atty. Doroteo Chavez
in Batangas City. Santiago Puyo caused the transfer of the tax
declaration in his name and caused the sale to be annotated
therein. Only this annotation in the tax declaration was offered
as proof of the sale. Santiago Puyo took possession, cultivated
the land, exercised uninterrupted ownership and paid real
estate taxes thereon for a period of eight years.
uninterrupted possession until the Complaint for
Partition, Reconveyance and Damages was filed by the
respondents.
On the basis of the above narrations, petitioners insist that
there was a valid transfer of the lot from the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, and thereafter from
Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress this claim of sale by the
heirs to Santiago Puyo, petitioners presented the testimony of
Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessors Office of Batangas City
who testified on the annotation in Tax Declaration No.
48221. The annotation reads:
Deed of sale
D.V. P2,500.00
Doc. on file
Doc. No. 312

Page No. 17

Petitioners went on further to state that the Deed of Sale from Book No. VI
the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo could not be
Series of 1967[18]
presented because the copy on file with the Office of the City
Assessor was lost in the fire which occurred in 23 May
1979 that gutted the building housing their office. From then
on, petitioners advance that they have paid the real estate
taxes on the land and were in open, continous and
The testimony of Pajilan went on as follows:

Q I am showing to you a tax declaration No. 32941 in the
name of Gil Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio, Genoveva, Eleuteria Cueto which is already marked
as Exhibit 10 for the defendants in this case and Exhibit F for
the plaintiff, will you please examine the same and identify it?
A Witness is examining the document. I think this tax
declaration is an owners copy, Sir.
Q But this tax declaration was issued by your office, the City
Assessor of Batangas?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you inform before this Honorable Court, if this tax
declaration was still existing in your office or a copy thereof?
A This tax declaration could not be found because our office
was burned on May 29, 1979, it could not be found anymore,
Sir.
Q You are also required by this Honorable Court to bring a
copy of the tax declaration No. 48221, do you have copy of the
same?
A I have copy of that tax declaration, Sir.
Q Will you please produce the same?
Witness is producing a copy of tax declaration No. 32941 in
the name of Santiago Puyo.
A Can you explain how this tax declaration was placed in the
name of Santiago Puyo?
Q Previously this tax declaration was owned by
Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio Ebreo and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono Cueto
under PD 32941 this tax declaration is under 48221 in the
name of Santiago Puyo and this was transferred by a virtue of
Deed of Sale annotated in the tax declaration and in the Deed
of Sale and purchase value was there: 2,500.00 document
docketed No. 312, Page 17, Book No. 6, Series of
1967, Doroteo de Chavez, the Notary Public, Sir.
Q Can you explain why this annotation was placed or written in
this tax declaration No. 48221?
A This was placed under Tax Declaration No. 48221 because
the office of the City Assessor transferred the tax declaration
and annotated the instrument used in the transfer of the tax
declaration, Sir.
Q Do you have copy of that document which is the basis of the
transfer?
A We could not be located (sic) because as I have said earlier
our office was burned on May 23, 1979, Sir.
Q So what does this phrase Deed of Sale, what do you mean
by that?
A I placed that, that is the title of the instrument used in the
transfer of this tax declaration, Sir.[19]
It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan, an employee of the City
Assessors Office of Batangas City[20] who testified regarding
Tax Declaration No. 48221 dated 15 January 1973 on which
was annotated the alleged sale between the heirs of
Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, was employed in the said
office only in the year 1978. Thus, he did not make nor did he
witness the causing of the annotation as he was not yet
employed in the said office at that time. Likewise, he was
neither present when the deed of sale was executed nor did
he personally see the said deed of sale. For these reasons,
the testimony of Pajilan is inconclusive.
Petitioners next argue that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the
name of Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of regularity in
its issuance. It is a good time as any to re-state that this rule is
a mere presumption, not absolute nor inflexible and applies
only in the absence of proof to the contrary.[21] Besides, the
mere fact that the disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of the petitioners does not
necessarily prove ownership. In the same manner, neither
does the payment of taxes conclusively prove ownership of the
land paid for.[22] It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership.[23]
Petitioners also presented the testimony of Felino Ebreo,
father of petitioner Antonio Ebreo, who testified that the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot 9046 F to Santiago Puyo.[24] When
queried on the whereabouts of the document of
sale, Felino alleged that it was borrowed by his
niece Eleuteria Cueto who is the daughter of one of the
heirs, Felipa Ebreo.[25] According to Felino, Eleuteria refused to
return the document and even got angry when he tried to
demand its return.[26] From Felinos account,[27] there are three
copies of the missing deed of sale. Lamentably, petitioners
failed to present any one of them.
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion Aguado, step-daughter

of Santiago Puyo, who testified that her stepfather
Santiago Puyo bought the subject lot from
the Ebreo heirs.[28] Similar
to Pajilanstestimony, Aguados testimony cannot be given
much weight in view of the fact that save for her bare
allegations that Lot 9046-F was purchased by her stepfather
Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise present when the deed
was executed. In her testimony she merely stated that her
stepfather paid taxes for his real estate properties but could
not state with specificity if the payment was made for Lot
9056-F.[29]
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a

To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo and public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Asuncion Aguado are at most secondary evidence; hence,
they are inadmissible considering that the petitioners,
as offerors of the Deed of Sale, thereof failed to prove any of
the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and to establish conditions for their admissibility.[30] Even Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to
if they are admitted, they have no probative value.[31] This rule adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
provides: original of a deed or document, the party has to prove with the
requisite quantum of evidence, the loss or destruction or
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions.
unavailability of all the copies of the original of the said deed or
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
document. As former Supreme Court Chief Justice Manuel V.
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
Moran declared:
itself except in the following cases:

Where there are two or more originals, it must appear that all
of them have been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced
before secondary evidence can be given of any one. For
example, a lease was executed in duplicate, one being
retained by the lessor and the other by the lessee. Either copy
was, therefore, an original, and could have been introduced as
evidence of the contract without the production of the
other. One of these originals could not be found. The non-
production of the other was not accounted for it was held that
under these circumstances, the rule is that no secondary
evidence of the contents of either is admissible until it is shown
that originals must be accounted for before secondary
evidence can be given of any one.
Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the original of the deed,
the offeror is mandated to prove the following:
(a) the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and
destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and
(c) unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the
part of the offeror.[32]
On this score, the factual findings of the trial court are worth
repeating. It held:
The pivotal document of sale allegedly executed by the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo and chiefly relied
upon by defendant Antonio Ebreo as the derivative basis of his
ownership is sadly missing and remains a phantom in the
dark. The testimonies of Felino Ebreo, Asuncion Aguado and
Antonio Ebreo to prove by way of recollection of witnesses that
Lot 9046-F was sold to Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967
for P2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized before deceased
Atty. Doroteo Chavez merits scant consideration. They were
the verbal say-so of interested parties and attributed acts to a
party whose lips had been sealed by death. Quite evidently,
their testimony should be taken cum grano salis with a grain of
salt.
Both the testimonies of Asuncion Aguado and
Antonio Ebreo lacked the legal underpinning needed to prove
the deed of sale. Their testimonies were not recollection of
witnesses who saw the execution and delivery of the
document. According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the contents of the
lost writing may be proved, inter alia, by the recollection of
witnesses. As matters stand, however, Aguados testimony
relates not to the execution of the document but to what her
father (Santiago Puyo) did with the property after it was
already acquired. (t.s.n. pp. 4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995)
Similarly, Antonio Ebreos testimony does not refer to the
execution and delivery of the deed of sale but of having
allegedly seen said document when he purchased the lot from
Santiago Puyo. He testified that when I bought it from
Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the Tax Declaration in the
name of Santiago Puyo as well as the deed of sale between
my father and his brothers and Santiago Puyo. (t.s.n. pp. 13-
14, Direct, Aug. 16, 1995). In fine, they were not witnesses to
the execution and delivery of the document of sale to qualify
their testimonies under the phrase recollection of witnesses.
Neither does the testimony of Felino Ebreo evoke faith and
confidence. His salutary recollection of the missing document
failed to instill credulity. For one, it was uncorroborated by any
of the parties to the alleged deed of sale. In fact, such sale
was directly controverted by his supposed co-sellers and co-
owners Gil and Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp. 7-8, Direct, July 18,
1994; t.s.n. pp. 22-23, Cross, Sept. 29, 1994) Then too, it
appears rather unusual for the heirs to retain Lot 9046-F in co-
ownership in their partition agreement of 1967 and sell the
said Lot that very same year (1967) if not on the same
occasion. Felino Ebreo did not give the exact date of the
supposed sale to Santiago Puyo except to say that it was sold
in 1967. The Court got the impression, though, that it was on
the same occasion as the partition agreement. (t.s.n. pp. 6-7,
14-16, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) More important, his humanistic
bias to favor his son Antonio Ebreo and his natural interest to
defend his actuations leading to the issuance of the Tax Decl.
50669 (Exh. 2) which he signed caution us to accept his
testimony with great care. He does not have the cold neutrality
of a disinterested party. He was covetous of gain. The
Tax Decl. No. 50669 that transferred in 1976 the property in
the name of Antonio Ebreo was signed
by Felino Ebreo himself (Exh. 2). This illustrated a dialectical
connection between him and his favored son
Antonio Ebreo. Finally, Felino Ebreos claim that he could not
produce it because it was borrowed by his
niece Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to him was squarely
refuted by said Eleuteria Cueto when she testified in rebuttal
for the plaintiffs. (t.s.n. pp. 9, 12-13, Direct, Feb. 28,
1995) (See testimony of Eleuteria Cueto in rebuttal on July 17,
1997)
While many things have been said about the crucial deed of
sale, the decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive
phantom and conspicuously unproven. The ownership of
Santiago Puyo becomes moreover doubtful because while the
alleged sale was executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in 1967
yet the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of
Santiago Puyo was issued only in 1973 (Exh. 9) or 1974 (Exh.
4) as far as the record of this case can reveal.The issuance of
a new tax declaration in the name of the sunrise owner (Puyo)
which was late by six (6) or seven (7) years naturally cast a
slur on the veracity of the sale.
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. 48221 (Exhs. 9 and 9-
A) detailing the particulars of the alleged deed of sale in favor
of Santiago Puyo is patently suspicious and a
very very poor ersatz for the primary document. While the sale
allegedly took place in 1967, said deed was annotated on Exh.
9 which however only begins with the year 1973. Moreover,
while the alleged sale took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No.
32941 (Exh. 10) that was issued on Feb. 7, 1968 still carried
the names of Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio,
all EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono,
all CUETO and not the name of Santiago Puyo. There even
appears thereon the annotation that the 1968 tax was paid on
Jan. 29, 1968 with no mention of Santiago Puyo despite his
having allegedly acquired the property the year before (1967).
Riveting further its attention to the typewritten entry on Exh. 9,
the Court finds it rather strange that such an entry appears on
the Tax Declaration. Firstly, it is not a widely accepted practice
to make such annotation. Secondly, there is more than meets
the eye in the conspicuous presence of this annotation only on
this particular Tax Declaration (Exh. 9). All other tax
declarations in this case do not have similar entry to identify
the documentary basis for the issuance of the latest tax
declaration. Thirdly, not even Tax Decl. Nos. 50669 and 075-
534 (Exhs. 2 and 3) of Antonio Ebreo carry such annotation to
indicate that he acquired the property by virtue of Doc. No. 70,
Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976 of
the Notarial Register of Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza. The
pregnant suspicion lurks that the alleged particulars of the
document of sale from Santiago Puyo to Antonio Ebreo were
belatedly annotated.
As icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo categorically stated it
was Felino Ebreo who authored the transfer. He testified on
cross-examination that it was his eldest
brother Felino Ebreo who was the caretaker of the lot and in-
charge of the payment of taxes. It was his brother Felino who
sold the subject lot known as Lot No. 9046-F in favor of his
son Antonio Ebreo. (t.s.n. pp. 16-17, Cross, July 18, 1994) The
evidence tended to show that indeed it was FelinoEbreo who
had the opportunity to cause the transfer as it was he (Felino)
who took possession of the lot and acted as its overseer.
(t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Direct, Nov. 17, 1994)
The alleged document of sale executed between
Santiago Puyo and Antonio Ebreo denominated
as Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Exh. 1), was ineffectual for the
purpose of transferring ownership of disputed Lot No. 9046-F
to said Antonio Ebreo because the alleged vendor
Santiago Puyo has not, as heretofore explained, acquired it
from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo as the transaction has no
supporting document of sale. It is self-evident that the seller
cannot transfer more than what he has or as oftenly stated
hyperbolically, the river cannot rise above its source.
Moreover, Clerk of Court Jose C. Corales certified that
the Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15,
Book No. I, Series of 1976) despite diligent efforts could not be
found in the old CFI vault located at
the Capitol Building, Batangas City. (Exh. E Rebuttal)
The fact that tax declarations for Lot [No.] 9046-F were issued
in the name of defendant Antonio Ebreo (Exhs. 2 and 3) and
that he paid the taxes for the land (Exh. 8) provides no
evidentiary value that he was the owner thereof. The existence
of the tax declarations and payment of taxes did not
transmogrify his possession into ownership. Tax declarations
are not sufficient evidence to prove possession in the concept
of owners. (Martinez, D., Summary of 1990 Supreme Court
Rulings, Part. II, p. 734) Tax receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.[33]
In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed
of Sale in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer
of property and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed
of Sale, it was incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in
evidence the original or a copy of the deed consistent with
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the absence of
the said document, the exhortations of petitioners regarding
the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DENIED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 27 February 2003 affirming in toto the decision
of the trial court dated 18 August 1997 is
likewise AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
Cruz vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 79962 December 10, 1990
Facts: The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only
P20,000.00 had been paid, leaving a balance of P10,000.00;
that in August 1982, he and the defendant agreed that the
latter would grant him an exclusive right to purchase the
harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange for
certain loan accommodations; that pursuant thereto, Salonga
delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250.00, evidenced
by four receipts and an additional P4,000.00, the receipt of
which had been lost; and that Cruz failed to comply with his
part of the agreement by refusing to deliver the alleged harvest
of the fishpond and the amount of his indebtedness. Cruz
denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of
special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several
hectares of a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut and that
sometime in May 1982, he entered into an agreement with
Salonga whereby the latter would purchase (pakyaw) fish in
certain areas of the fishpond from May 1982 to August 15,
1982. They also agreed that immediately thereafter, Salonga
would sublease (bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of
one year. Cruz admitted having received on May 4, 1982, the
amount of P35,000.00 and on several occasions from August
15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, an aggregate amount of
P15,250.00. He contended however, that these amounts were
received by him not as loans but as consideration for their
“pakyaw” agreement and payment for the sublease of the
fishpond. He added that it was the private respondent who
owed him money since Salonga still had unpaid rentals for the
10-month period that he actually occupied the fishpond. Cruz
also claimed that Salonga owed him an additional P4,000.00
arising from another purchase of fish from other areas of his
leased fishpond.
Issue: Whether or not Parol evidence rule will apply.
Held: No. Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the terms of
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be
considered as containing all such terms, and therefore, there
can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing, except in the following cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the
validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term
“agreement” includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the
parties have reduced their agreement to writing they have
made such writing the only repository and memorial of the
truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived or abandoned.
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Section
7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document
embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not
contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the
fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from the
private respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not and could
have not been intended by the parties to be the sole memorial
of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not
even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At
most, Exhibit D can only be considered a casual memorandum
of a transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment
of the receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the
private respondent’s satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as
Wigmore observed is not covered by the parol evidence rule.
PIONEER SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL P.
SANTOS, respondents.
Ynson and Associates for petitioner.
Florante Calingo for private respondent.
PADILLA, J.:
This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 26670, promulgated
on 30 April 19921 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 142, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil
Case No. 10311, ordering, among other things, delivery to
therein defendant (herein private respondent) of the motor
vehicle, subject of the complaint for delivery of personal
property filed by petitioner against private respondent Manuel
F. Santos.
Respondent appellate court summarized the facts of the case
as follows:
PLAINTIFF Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank acquired
ownership over a motor vehicle by virtue of a Deed of Sale
(Exhibit 'B'), executed by and between Finasia Investment and
Finance Corporation and the plaintiff bank. Said motor vehicle
is specifically described as follows: make: Toyota Corolla;
type: 4-door Sedan; Motor No.: 4K-1489878; Serial
No. KE70-9101485; Plate No. PBZ-784; Model 1982; and
color: Mint Green.
SUBSEQUENTLY, defendant Manuel Santos, in his capacity
as manager of plaintiff bank's General Services Department,
was given the privilege to use and possess the
aforementioned vehicle coterminous with his employment. In a
regular board meeting of plaintiff Pioneer Savings and Loan
Bank held on June 28, 1984 at its principal office, the Board
unanimously passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1984,
authorizing any two among the President, Arturo G. Eudela,
and the two First Vice Presidents namely: Francisco
Pangilinan and Antonio M. Siojo, to jointly sign any deed or
contract involving the sale, transfer or conveyance of bank's
assets or properties, pursuant to the recommendation of the
Executive Committee (Exhibit 'C'). Pursuant to said authority,
the plaintiff bank, through its President, Arturo Eudela and
First Vice President, Atty. Francisco S. Pangilinan, for a
consideration of P40,000.00 in cash actually received from
defendant Manuel Santos in the presence of Noel Pineda, a
bank employee, sold, transferred and conveyed unto the
defendant the afore-described motor vehicle, free from all liens
and encumbrances. Said document of sale is duly notarized. 2
Sometime in August 1984, respondent Santos ceased to be
employed with petitioner bank. He took the car with him. On 12
April 1985, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent
Santos for recovery of the motor vehicle, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of replevin. Upon posting of a replevin bond
by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142,
issued an order of seizure and the subject car was thus
delivered to petitioner.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of
respondent Santos, the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
Premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment in
favor of the defendant, ordering the plaintiff:
1. to deliver to the defendant the subject motor vehicle
complete with its battery and the four tire replacement.
2. to pay the defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. to pay the defendant the sum of P10,000.00 as and for
attorney's fees;
4. to pay the defendant P2,000.00 as litigation expenses.
Should the motor vehicle no longer be available, or in
defendant's estimation already in a determinated or
dilapidated condition, the defendent has the option to refuse to
accept the motor vehicle, in which case the plaintiff shall pay
to the defendant the sum of P40,000.00 with interest at the
rate of 12% per annum from June 14, 1985 until fully paid.
Cost against the plaintiff. 3
As aforestated, this decision was affirmed in toto by
respondent Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court.
In this petition, the main contention of the petitioner is that
there was actually no consideration in the sale of the motor
vehicle to respondent Santos. The petitioner alleges that the
deed of sale merely served as security for the time deposit
placements of private respondent's relatives with the petitioner
bank which was then undergoing financial difficulties and was
under consideration for closure by the Central Bank of the
Philippines. Petitioner avers that the "underlying agreement," a
special arrangement between petitioner and respondent
Santos was that in the event private respondent's relatives
failed to recover their time deposits due to the bank's closure,
then private respondent could keep the car as recompense.
According to petitioner, the relatives of private respondent
were able to recover their time deposit placements, through
the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC) after petitioner
bank was placed under receivership by the Central Bank of the
Philippines so that there was no further reason for respondent
Santos to keep the vehicle in question. Furthermore, petitioner
assails the validity of the deed of sale for not having been duly
notarized because the signatories thereto (the two [2] officers
of the bank) never appeared before the notary public who
notarized the document.
It is further contended by petitioner that respondent Court of
Appeals and the trial court should not have discarded the
testimonies of tho two (2) officers of petitioner bank, namely,
Messrs. Eudela and Pangilinan, who clearly denied having
received payment of P40,000.00 from respondent Santos, and
which testimonies were supported by the bank's records that
did not reflect any entry at all of the said amount of
P40,000.00.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The core issue in this appeal is whether or not the deed of sale
of the vehicle to respondent Santos may be proved or altered
by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule.
In De la Rama vs. Ledesma,4 this Court held:
It is a well accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or
contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid
instrument. (American Factors (Phil.) Inc. vs. Murphy Tire
Corporation, et al. [C.A.] 49 O.G. 189.)
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to
explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional
contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in
the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek
and Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384.)
We find merit in the private respondent's contention that
petitioner failed to produce any instrument or written document
which would prove that the deed of sale in question was only a
security for the time deposit placements of respondent's
relatives in the petitioner bank. The two (2) main witnesses for
the petitioner, namely, Messrs. Eudela and Pangilinan, were
not mere employees of the bank. They were bank officers; one
being a lawyer (Pangilinan), and supposed to be steeped in
legal and banking knowledge and practices. As such, they
were expected to know the consequences of their act of
signing a document which outrightly transferred ownership
over the subject vehicle in favor of respondent Santos. They
could have incorporated in the deed of sale (if such was the
intention or agreement of the parties) a stipulation that transfer
of ownership and registration of the vehicle in Santos' name
were conditioned on the failure of his relatives to recover their
time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No such stipulation
was incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright
and unconditional transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle to
respondent Santos.
Lastly, we see neither reason nor basis for resolving whether
or not the deed of sale was duly notarized as this question is
being raised in this appeal for the first time. It is settled
doctrine that questions not raised in the lower court cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal.5
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with costs against petitioner.
Inciong v CA
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, Branch 18,[1] which disposed of Civil Case
No. 10507 for collection of a sum of money and damages, as
follows:
"WHEREFORE, defendant BALDOMERO L. INCIONG, JR. is
adjudged solidarily liable and ordered to pay to the plaintiff
Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City, the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),with
interest thereon from May 5, 1983 at 16% per annum until fully
paid; and 6% per annum on the total amount due, as
liquidated damages or penalty from May 5, 1983 until fully
paid; plus 10% of the total amount due for expenses of
litigation and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The counterclaim, as well as the cross claim, are dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the
amount of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe
and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding
themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent
Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City
branch. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983.
Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their
obligation. Consequently, on November 14, 1983 and on June
8, 1984, private respondent sent petitioner telegrams
demanding payment thereof.[2] On December 11, 1984 private
respondent also sent by registered mail a final letter of
demand to Rene C. Naybe. Since both obligors did not
respond to the demands made, private respondent filed on
January 24, 1986 a complaint for collection of the sum of
P50,000.00 against the three obligors.
On November 25, 1986, the complaint was dismissed for
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the case. However, on
January 9, 1987, the lower court reconsidered the dismissal
order and required the sheriff to serve the summonses. On
January 27, 1987, the lower court dismissed the case against
defendant Pantanosas as prayed for by the private respondent
herein. Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to petitioner
was served as the sheriff learned that defendant Naybe had
gone to Saudi Arabia.
In his answer, petitioner alleged that sometime in January
1983, he was approached by his friend, Rudy Campos, who
told him that he was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager
of private respondent in Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata
logs operation business. Campos also intimated to him that
Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would
contribute a chainsaw to the venture. He added that, although
Naybe had no money to buy the equipment Pio Tio had
assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make with
private respondent. Campos then persuaded petitioner to act
as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Petitioner allegedly acceded
but with the understanding that he would only be a co-maker
for the loan of P5,000.00.
Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank
promissory note were brought to him by Campos at his
office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he
indicated that he bound himself only for the amount of
P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and
misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of
P50,000.00.
In the aforementioned decision of the lower court, it noted that
the typewritten figure "P50,000-" clearly appears directly below
the admitted signature of the petitioner in the promissory
note.[3] Hence, the latter's uncorroborated testimony on his
limited liability cannot prevail over the presumed regularity and
fairness of the transaction, under Sec. 5 (q) of Rule 131. The
lower court added that it was "rather odd" for petitioner to have
indicated in a copy and not in the original, of the promissory
note, his supposed obligation in the amount of P5,000.00
only. Finally, the lower court held that even granting that said
limited amount had actually been agreed upon, the same
would have been merely collateral between him and Naybe
and, therefore, not binding upon the private respondent as
creditor-bank.
The lower court also noted that petitioner was a holder of a
Bachelor of Laws degree and a labor consultant who was
supposed to take due care of his concerns, and that, on the
witness stand, Pio Tio denied having participated in the
alleged business venture although he knew for a fact that the
falcata logs operation was encouraged by the bank for its
export potential.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals
which, in its decision of August 31, 1990, affirmed that of the
lower court. His motion for reconsideration of the said decision
having been denied, he filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari.
On February 6,1991, the Court denied the petition for failure of
petitioner to comply with the Rules of Court and paragraph 2 of
Circular No. 1-88, and to sufficiently show that respondent
court had committed any reversible error in its questioned
decision.[4] His motion for the reconsideration of the denial of
his petition was likewise denied with finality in the Resolution
of April 24, 1991.[5] Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for
leave to file a second motion for reconsideration which, in the
Resolution of May 27, 1991, the Court denied. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the entry of judgment in this
case.[6]
Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a motion for
clarification. In the latter motion, he asserted that he had
attached Registry Receipt No. 3268 to page 14 of the petition
in compliance with Circular No. 1-88.Thus, on August 7,1991,
the Court granted his prayer that his petition be given due
course and reinstated the same.[7]
Nonetheless, we find the petition unmeritorious.
Annexed to the petition is a copy of an affidavit executed on
May 3, 1988, or after the rendition of the decision of the lower
court, by Gregorio Pantanosas, Jr., an MTCC judge and
petitioner's co-maker in the promissory note. It supports
petitioner's allegation that they were induced to sign the
promissory note on the belief that it was only for P5,000.00,
adding that it was Campos who caused the amount of the loan
to be increased to P50,000.00.
The affidavit is clearly intended to buttress petitioner's
contention in the instant petition that the Court of Appeals
should have declared the promissory note null and void on the
following grounds: (a) the promissory note was signed in the
office of Judge Pantanosas, outside the premises of the bank;
(b) the loan was incurred for the purpose of buying a second-
hand chainsaw which cost only P5,000.00; (c) even a new
chainsaw would cost only P27,500.00; (d) the loan was not
approved by the board or credit committee which was the
practice, at it exceeded P5,000.00; (e) the loan had no
collateral; (f) petitioner and Judge Pantanosas were not
present at the time the loan was released in contravention of
the bank practice, and (g) notices of default are sent
simultaneously and separately but no notice was validly sent
to him.[8] Finally, petitioner contends that in signing the
promissory note, his consent was vitiated by fraud as, contrary
to their agreement that the loan was only for the amount of
P5,000. 00, the promissory note stated the amount of
P50,000.00.
The above-stated points are clearly factual. Petitioner is to be
reminded of the basic rule that this Court is not a trier of
facts. Having lost the chance to fully ventilate his factual
claims below, petitioner may no longer be accorded the same
opportunity in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the court below. Had he presented Judge Pantanosas'
affidavit before the lower court, it would have strengthened his
claim that the promissory note did not reflect the correct
amount of the loan.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the
promissory note "is not a public deed with the formalities
prescribed by law but x x x a mere commercial paper which
does not bear the signature of x x x attesting witnesses," parol
evidence may "overcome" the contents of the promissory
note.[9] The first paragraph of the parol evidence rule[10] states:
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed
upon and there can be, between the parties and their
successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement."
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be
a public document.
What is required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is
in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is so
much more certain and accurate than that which rests in
fleeting memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties
have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit
weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show
that the parties intended a different contract from that
expressed in the writing signed by them."[11] Thus, for the parol
evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any
particular form, or be signed by both parties.[12] As a general
rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are
not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic
evidence.[13]
By alleging fraud in his answer,[14] petitioner was actually in the
right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers
agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a
parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and
moving cause of the written contract, it may be shown by parol
evidence.[15] However, fraud must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not
even being adequate.[16] Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud
must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Petitioner also argues that the dismissal of the complaint
against Naybe, the principal debtor, and against Pantanosas,
his co-maker, constituted a release of his obligation, especially
because the dismissal of the case against Pantanosas was
upon the motion of private respondent itself. He cites as basis
for his argument, Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides
that:
"The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released
from their obligation whenever by some act of the creditor,
they cannot be subrogated to the rights, mortgages, and
preferences of the latter."
It is to be noted, however, that petitioner signed the
promissory note as a solidary co-maker and not as a
guarantor. This is patent even from the first sentence of the
promissory note which states as follows:
"Ninety one (91) days after date, for value received, I/we,
JOINTLY and SEVERALLY promise to pay to the PHILIPPINE
BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS at its office in the City of
Cagayan de Oro, Philippines the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND
ONLY (P50,000. 00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, together with
interest x x x at the rate of SIXTEEN (16) per cent per annum
until fully paid."
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is
entitled to demand the whole obligation.[17] On the other hand,
Article 2047 of the Civil Code states:
"By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to
the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in
case the latter should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the
provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be
observed, In such a case the contract is called a suretyship."
(Italics supplied.)
While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal
debtor, the liability of a guarantor is different from that of a
solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains:
"A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal
debtor under the provisions of the second paragraph does not
become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There
is a difference between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in
solidum (surety). The later, outside of the liability he assumes
to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has
been exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and
benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a
solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed
upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, title I, Book IV of the Civil
Code."[18]
proceeded against for the entire obligation.[20]The choice is left
to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will
enforce collection.[21] Consequently, the dismissal of the case
against Judge Pontanosas may not be deemed as having
discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards Naybe,
suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over
him. Petitioner, therefore, may only have recourse against his
co-makers, as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code states

the law on joint and several obligations. Under Art. 1207
thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and the
same obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is joint
so that each of the debtors is liable only for a proportionate
part of the debt. There is a solidarity liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or
when the nature of the obligation so requires.[19]

Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly

states that the three signatories therein are jointly and
severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be