Crim Law 2 Cases

SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179035

Appellee,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO-MORALES.
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
JESUS PAYCANA, JR.,
Appellant. Promulgated:
April 16, 2008
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged[1] with the complex

crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant pleaded not guilty during the
arraignment.[2] Pre-trial ensued, in which appellant admitted that the
victim LilybethBalandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.[3]
Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense,

claiming that it was his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-
defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-
month pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.
The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim;
Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellants eldest daughter who personally witnessed
the whole gruesome incident; Barangay Tanod Juan Paraal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran,
who conducted the autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who
removed the fetus from the deceaseds body.
The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at

around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who worked as a butcher, came home from
the slaughter house carrying his
[4]
tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener. His wife was
preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home from his
work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times. [5] Tito,
whose house is at back of appellants house, heard his daughter shouting for help.
When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door and her feet were
trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back. Angelina told Tito
by the window that appellant had held her mothers neck and stabbed her. [6]
Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed
him first. According to him, they had an altercation on the evening of 25 November
2002because he saw a man coming out from the side of their house and when he
confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On the following morning,
he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things and was on
his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the
knife from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not aware of the
number of times he stabbed his wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood
was coming out of his wound.[7]
The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April 2005.[8] The case
was automatically appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 122 Section
3(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.[9] The appellate court denied
appellants appeal in a decision dated 30 May 2007.[10] Appellant filed a notice of
appeal
dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.[11]
The Court is not convinced by appellants assertion that the trial court erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.
Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial

[12]
court. In the absence of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts
or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion, the
court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better
position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason, therefore, exists for
this Court to disturb the trial courts finding that appellant did not act in self-defense.
Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused

who interposes self-defense admits the commission of the act complained of. The
burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong, clear
and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal
liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code[13] requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to
prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[14]
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of
self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, that can validly be invoked.[15] Appellants claim of self-defense was
belied by the eyewitness testimony of his own daughter Angelina, which was
corroborated by the testimony of hisfather-in-law Tito and the
medical findings. Angelinas testimony was very clear on how her father strangled
and stabbed her mother just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home. She
begged her father to stop, and even tried to grab her fathers hand but to no
avail.[16] Tito ran to appellants house as he heard his daughter Lilybeths screaming
for help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He
moved back as he saw appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the
window that appellant had held her mothers neck and stabbed her.[17]
Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellants wound,
testified on cross-examination that the injuries suffered by appellant were possibly
self-inflicted considering that they were mere superficial wounds.[18]
In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical
evidence in the case. Specifically, the number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all,
indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense but a determined
effort to kill his victim.[19] The victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to
multiple stab wounds.[20]
The Court agrees with the trial courts observation, thus:
Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father were it not
for the fact that she personally saw her father to be the aggressor and stab
her mother. Telling her grandfather immediately after the incident that
accused stabbed her mother is part of the res gestae hence, admissible as
evidence. Between the testimony of Angelica who positively identified
accused to have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her
mother and on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed the
victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former prevails.[21]
The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven
(7)-month pregnant wife.
Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide[22] is

committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or
a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the
victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between
the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. The testimony of the
accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission
against penal interest.[23]
As distinguished from infanticide,[24] the elements of unintentional

abortion[25] are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is
used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence
is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either
in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it
is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent
existence.[26] However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and
deliberately were alive at birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus
with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable.[27] In the present case, the unborn
fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.
The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 48[28] because by
a single act, that of stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of
parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex crime
is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its m
aximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances. Applying
the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the
most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant
to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.[29]
Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing

jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the offended party, or
his/her heirs in case of the formers death, without need of
further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the aforementioned
crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may
be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only
upon sufficient proof that the complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded if the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts
thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.[30] Hence, the civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are
also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as awarded by the trial
court.[31]
In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court correctly made
appellant account for P25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of relationship,
a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, in the crime of
parricide.[32]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127818. November 11, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO

NEPOMUCENO, JR, accused-appellant .
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Guillermo Nepomuceno, Jr. has interposed the instant appeal in regard to
the decision dated November 20, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
Region (Manila, Branch 46) which decreed:
Wherefore, the court hereby renders judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246
of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 for the death of
Grace Nepomuceno and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of Forty (40)
years of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum ofP50,000.00
with costs against him.
Pursuant to Article 921, paragraph (1) of the Civil Code, the court declares the
accused ineligible to inherit from his wife. The entire estate should go to his son,
Giordan Benitez Nepomuceno.
(pp. 20-21, Rollo)

The Information against accused-appellant charged:
That on or about May 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of one GRACE NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ, his wife, with whom he
was married in lawful wedlock, by then and there shooting her with a gun of unknown
caliber hitting her on the left hip, thereby inflicting upon the said GRACE
NEPOMUCENO Y BENITEZ gunshot wound which was necessarily fatal and which
was the direct and immediate cause of her death thereafter.
(p. 5, Rollo)
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued in due
course. Thereafter, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction now on appeal.
The prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Eden Ontog, SPO2 Rodolfo Rival,
Forensic Chemist Mary Ann Aranas, Medico-Legal Examiner Floresto Arizala, Monserrat De
Leon, Ballistic Expert Isabelo Silvestre, Jr. and Romeo Pabalan.
Eden Ontog declared that on May 2, 1994, she was the housemaid of the spouses Guillermo
Nepomuceno, Jr. and Grace Nepomuceno, having started as such since May 31, 1993. At around
11 o'clock onthe evening of May 2, 1994, accused-appellant, who was drunk, arrived and went to
their bedroom where Eden and her ward Giordan the one-year old son of the couple, were
sleeping. She was awakened by the loud voices of the spouses who were arguing. She saw
accused-appellant get a gun from a drawer, so she went out of the room because of fear. After a
few moments and while she was outside the room, she heard Grace Nepomuceno say: "Sige
patayin mo ako, patayin mo na kami ng anak ko." Then Eden heard a gunshot. She was so scared
that she went out of the house, reaching the door of the house of Barangay Chairman Congen
Leonardo which is 5 meters away. After ten minutes, she saw accused-appellant coming out of the
room. He told her to get a taxi so he could bring the wounded Grace to the hospital. She was left
behind in their room to take care of baby Giordan. She tried to call up Monserrat de Leon, the
sister of Grace in Pasig to inform her of the incident, but she could not get any connection (tsn,
July 27, 1994, pp. 4-17; 24-42).
Mary Ann T. Aranas, a chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation Chemistry Division,
declared that she conducted paraffin examination on both hands of the victim and those of accused-
appellant.She found the victim's hands negative of nitrates, but found accused-appellant's right
hand positive thereof. She gave the opinion that in view of the absence of nitrates on the hands of
the victim, it is probable that she did not fire a gun and that accused-appellant, being positive of
nitrates, did really fire a gun (tsn, August 31, 1994, pp. 17, 22; tsn, July 8, 1996, p. 6).
Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., the Medico~Legal Officer of the NBI who conducted a second-
post mortem examination of the victim on May 7, 1994 at the Capitol Memorial Chapels, found
that the victim died due to a gunshot wound, with the slug hitting the left internal iliac artery and
the small intestines and thereafter resting between the uterus and the sacrum of the victim. He
testified that taking into consideration the location of the wound, if the victim were in a sitting or
lying position, the trajectory of the slug was upward coming from right to left; and if the victim
were in a standing position, the muzzle of the gun should have pointed up. The witness declared
that the muzzle of the gun could not have been less that one foot from the victim. He opined that
grappling for possession of the gun was impossiblebecause the trajectory of the bullet was going
upwards and there were no smudges or signs of close firing. He believed that the victim could have
survived if the surgeons had operated immediately (tsn, July 23, 1996, pp. 15-30).
Monserrat de Leon, sister of the victim, declared that Grace would confide to her that accused-
appellant was jobless and that Grace had problems with the low income of the store she owned at
Zurbaran Mart as compared to her expenses. Accused-appellant would force sex on Grace
especially when he was drunk. Her sister had two miscarriages after their first child and it was
during one of these miscarriages that she saw accused-appellant carrying a gun in the Mary Chiles
Hospital where her sister was confined (tsn, August 12, 1996, pp. 3-28).
Upon the other hand, the defense presented accused~appellant himself as its lone witness. His
story was quoted by the trial court thus:
Two days before the incident on May 2, 1994, Grace, the deceased was very much
worried about the check (sic) she issued which was post dated May 2, 1994. She
would have no funds for the checks. She had been nagging him, displaying her
tantrums (nagdadabog) pestering him to do something to be able to fund the checks.
In the noon time of May 2, 1994, he left her spouse in their store and went to his
mother's house in San Andres Bukid, Manila. This day was the day after the accused-
appellant and his wife, and in-laws arrived from Batangas to attend a town fiesta.
He left the store to avoid further nagging, tantrums and pestering of his wife about his
inability to produce money to be able to fund the postdated checks (sic).
At about 11:00 P.M. after dropping at a friend's house, he decided to go home,

thinking his wife has already cooled off.
When his wife opened the door, she greeted the husband: 'You left in the store and
you room (roam) around, where you able to find money.' He replied, 'where would I
get money, do you expect me to hold up people?' (tsn, October 5, 1994, p. 18)
They had some arguments and Eden Ontog went out of their bedroom, and the
arguments continued. There was a point in the argument when the wife told the
accused thus: 'Wala akong silbi, bakit pa ako nag-asawa sa kanya.'
Because of these continued pestering and nagging of his wife he thought of

separation. Perhaps it would be better if he should end his life. He then took a gun
from their child's drawer. He sat on the bed holding that gun, engrossed in his thinking
what to do. The gun was pointed towards the floor of their room.
In that situation, his wife continued with his nagging and pestering. He just remained
silent.
And then Guillermo asked her wife: 'How come you do not treat me as a husband,
why do you treat me like this.'
It was at this point that Guillermo decided to end his life. Perhaps seriously, perhaps
just to scare his wife to stop all the pestering and tantrums. Surely not only a few
husbands would thought (sic) as what that Guillermo was thinking then, he felt
desperate. He wanted to finish his life. (p. 24, TSN, October 5, 1994)
It was during that time that their son, Jordan woke up, walked to the space between
them (husband and wife) and Nepomuceno block his son's way with his right knee. In
the process, he wanted to totally force Grace from taking possession and control of the
gun. He raised his arm holding the gun passing over the left leg of Grace.
The gun went off.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo)
Aggrieved by the decision of the trial court, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE KILLING WAS

ACCIDENTAL, AND THAT THE DECEASED WAS EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY.
II
ASSUMING THE ACCUSED IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT

ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE KILLING WAS RESULT OF SIMPLE
NEGLIGENCE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
(p. 5, Appellant's Brief.)

In support of the first assigned error, accused-appellant contends that he did not have the least
intention of killing his wife. He urges the Court to consider the circumstances attendant to the
killing, which, according to him negate all inferences and deductions, that he would kill his
wife. First, the deceased was hit in the upper leg, not in any vital organ. If he had the intention of
killing the deceased, he would have shot her at the most vital part of her body.
Secondly, the reaction of the deceased after she was hit was contrary to ordinary and usual
human behavior, if her husband really intended to kill her. The deceased just uttered, "Masakit
Papa", she did not curse nor mouth evil and harsh language against accused-appellant to show
hatred and anger.
Thirdly, if accused-appellant really intended to kill his wife, why did he call a taxi and bring
her to the hospital for immediate medical attention?
Fourthly, why should accused-appellant voluntarily surrender to the police, if the incident was
not accidental?
Accused-appellant claims exemption from criminal liability under Paragraph 4, Article 12 of
the Revised Penal Code because, according to him, the incident occurred when he tried to prevent
his wife from killing herself, and he and his wife grappled for possession of the gun.
After a painstaking review of the evidence and record of this case, the Court finds itself unable
to reach conclusions identical to those put forward by accused-appellant.
First, accused-appellant cannot invoke the benevolent provisions of Paragraph 4, Article 12
of the Revised Penal Code in order to be exempted from criminal liability arising from the death
of his wife, Grace Nepomuceno. Said provision pertinently states:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are
exempt from criminal liability:
xxx
xxx
xxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by
mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
At all events, accident to be exempting, presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here,
however, the act of accused-appellant of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the same not
being in self-defense, is unlawful -- it at least constitutes light threats (Article 285, par. 1, Revised
Penal Code). There is thus no room for the invocation of accident as a ground for
exemption (People vs. Reyta, Jr., 13 CAR (25) 1190; 1195 [1968]).
The gun which accused-appellant took from his child's drawer was not even licensed or
registered in his name as shown by the Certification of the Firearms and Explosives Office of the
Philippine National Police, hence, he could have been charged with illegal possession of a firearm.
Secondly, accused~appellant's claim that the shooting happened when he tried to prevent his
wife from killing herself and he and his wife grappled for the possession of the gun is belied by
the expert testimony of Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr. of the NBI who conducted a second post mortem
examination on the cadaver of Grace Nepomuceno. He declared:
Q. Now, is it possible Doctor, considering the location of the wound, the entrance wound and the
trajectory of the bullet upwards, would you say Doctor, that both parties, I mean the victim and the
assailant were grappling for the possession of said gun and it went off accidentally, is that possible,
Mr. Witness?
A. Well, I have to be convinced as to the grappling between the victim and the assailant, because if we
were to be re-construct of the scenario that the gun have been fired, the muzzle of the gun could
not have been closer than twelve (12) inches and considering that the gun was held by a hand, it
farther places the assailant farther from the victim and farther the victim is, from the assailant, then
the more impossible for the grappling for the gun. (tsn, July 23, 1996, pp. 19~20).
Thirdly, accused-appellant, testifying on the relative positions of the victim and himself when
the gun discharged, stated:
Q. Please tell the court your relative position and the victim when the gun actually went off?
A. When I was in the act of trying to dispossess Grace with that gun and I was trying to let my right
hand pass through my right side but because Grace was struggling, the butt of the gun hit a part of
her upper leg and it exploded.
Q. So when the gun actually fired, you were holding that gun, what part of your arm being held by
Grace?
A. Witness pointing the upper forearm and the lower portion of her upper arm."
(tsn, Oct. 5, 1994, p. 28.)
If Grace were holding the upper forearm and lower portion of the upper arm of accused-
appellant when the gun fired, then at least the hand of Grace that held the upper forearm of
appellant would have traces of nitrate considering its nearness to the exploding gun. However, in
the paraffin test conducted by the Forensic Chemistry Division of the National Bureau of
Investigation on Grace Nepomuceno's both hands, no traces of nitrates were found- while accused-
appellant's right hand was positive of nitrates. The absence of nitrates on the victim's hands is
convincing proof that she did not grapple with accused-appellant for the possession of the gun. It
also proves that she was shot at a distance.
The fact that the victim was not shot in the head, or in any vital part of her body does not
negate intent to kill. The Post Mortem findings on the cadaver of Grace Nepomuceno by Dr.
Arizala shows that the bullet entered "the left thigh, lateral aspect, upper third . . . directed slight
forwards, slightly upwards and from left to right initially involving the skin and subcutaneous
tissue, then taking an intramascular route into the pelvic cavity thru the left obturator foramen,
partially transecting the left internal iliac artery and the small intestines with the slug lodging just
underneath the uterus in front of the sacrum where it was recovered." The extent of the physical
injury inflicted on Grace, as above proved, manifests intention to extinguish life (People vs.
Dawandawan, 184 SCRA 264 [1994]). Moreover, Dr. Arizala likewise declared that the bullet
injured a vital organ of the victim (tsn, July 23, 1996, p. 9).
The fact that Grace, upon being shot, uttered, "Masakit, Papa" and did not use harsh language
against accused-appellant does not, in any way, negate intent to kill. The utterance of a victim
made immediately after sustaining serious injuries may be considered as pure emanations of the
incident or the incident speaking through the victim (People vs. Morin, 241 SCRA 709; 710
[1995]). Thus, by the word "Papa", Grace was in effect, saying that it was accused-appellant who
shot her.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the act of accused-appellant ordering Eden Ontog to
call a taxi in which he brought the wounded Grace to the hospital is "merely an indication or act
of repentance or contrition on the part of appellant" (Appellee's Brief, p. 71, Rollo).
Accused-appellant's voluntary surrender is not sufficient ground to exculpate him
from criminal liability. The law does not find unusual the voluntary surrender of criminal
offenders; it merely considers such act as a mitigating circumstance. Non-flight is not proof of
innocence (People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 [1996]).
Under the second assigned error, accused-appellant claims that even assuming that the killing
was not totally accidental, his acts would constitute only simple negligence. He asserts that he had
established that the gun went off while he was grappling with his wife for its possession. He was
preventing his wife from taking her own life. He might not have exercised the necessary due care
in wrestling for the gun that resulted in the injury of his wife, but he could be charged only with
parricide through simple negligence. So he says.
It has been held that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence (People vs. Oanis, et al., 74 Phil 257 (1943); People
vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil 232 [1922]). What qualifies an act of reckless or simple negligence or
imprudence is the lack of malice or criminal intent in the execution thereof (United States
vs. Maleza, 14 Phil 468, 471 [1909]). Otherwise stated, in criminal negligence, the injury caused
to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act done without malice
but with lack of foresight, or with carelessness or negligence, and which has harmed society or an
individual (People vs. Castillo, Jr., (275 SCRA 752 [1997]).
The argument of accused-appellant finds no support in the physical evidence. As already
discussed, if the version of grappling for the gun were to be believed, there should have been
nitrates on both hands of Grace. And if it was when accused-appellant placed the barrel of the gun
at the base of his head that Grace grabbed his hand holding the gun and in the struggle for its
possession his hand holding the gun was pushed down so that its butt hit the upper leg of Grace
causing it to fire, then the trajectory of the slug should be downwards, through the upper thigh of
Grace where it entered. Yet, the autopsy report of Dr. Arizala, Jr. showed the bullet entered the
left thigh of Grace directed slightly upwards and from left to right, taking an intramascular route
into the pelvic cavity, instead of a downward direction if accused-appellant's version were to be
believed.
Thus, over and above the testimony of accused-appellant, these physical evidence, the lack of
powder burns or nitrates on the hands of Grace and the trajectory of the bullet that entered her left
thigh being slightly upwards and from left to right instead of downwards, repudiate accused-
appellant's claim of simple negligence. Physical evidence is mute but an eloquent manifestation of
truth and rates high in our hierarchy of trustworthy evidence (People vs. Uycoqua, 246 SCRA 769
[1995]).
Lastly, accused-appellant, perhaps in desperation, resorts to the shotgun type of argument that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The argument is bereft of merit.
The prosecution has sufficiently established the elements of parricide by its evidence. These
elements are: (1) the death of the deceased; (2) that she was killed by the accused; and (3) that the
deceased was a legitimate ascendant or descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused (Article
246, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Embalido, 58 Phil 154 (1933)].
The first and third elements were stipulated during the pre~trial stage of the case, thus:
1. that the victim and the accused are legally married. Said civil marriage took place
on July 5, 1990;
xxx
5. that immediately after the shooting, the accused voluntarily and bodily carried the
victim into a taxicab and proceeded to UERM Hospital where she died on the
operating table." (Pre-Trial Order of July 11, 1994, Record, p. 6)
The only issue then is whether accused-appellant intentionally killed Grace Nepomuceno, his
legally wedded wife.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied heavily on the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. This Court finds no reason to do otherwise. It is a fundamental and settled
rule that the trial court's assessment in regard to the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the highest
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal, as the trial court was in a better position to
examine real evidence as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses (People
vs. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170 [1993]; People vs. Camaddo, 217 SCRA 162 [1993]; People
vs. Vallena (244 SCRA 685 [1995]).
The Court agrees with the conclusions of the trial court as they are founded on the dictum that
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be
credible in itself - such as the common experience of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except in conformity with our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous
and is outside of judicial cognizance (People vs. Escalante, 238 SCRA 554 [1994]).
Further, accused-appellant having admitted that he shot his wife, he has the burden of proof
of establishing the presence of any circumstance which may relieve him of responsibility, and to
prove justification he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of
that of the prosecution, for even if this be weak, it can not be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing (People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621 [1996). Unfortunately for accused-
appellant, he has miserably failed to discharge this task.
The trial court correctly appreciated the voluntary surrender of accused-appellant as a
mitigating circumstance, this fact having been stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial stage of
this case (Pre~Trial Order, Stipulation No. 10 Record, p. 17)
The penalty for the crime of parricide is reclusion perpetua to death; however, there being
one mitigating circumstance but no aggravating circumstance, the lower of the two indivisible
penalties should be imposed. The penalty cannot be further reduced by one degree as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not find application, the penalties involved being indivisible.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision convicting accused-appellant GUILLERMO
NEPOMUCENO, JR. of the crime of Parricide is hereby AFFIRMED with the slight modification
that his sentence shall be simply reclusion perpetua not "imprisonment of Forty (40) Years
of reclusion perpetua" as stated by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Martinez, J., no part, on official leave.
[Syllabus]
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 115686. December 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO

MALABAGO y VILLAESPIN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City,
Branch 10 which imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant, Pedro Malabago y
Villaespin, in Criminal Case No. 6598, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Pedro Malabago guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of PARRICIDE as defined and penalized under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code. With reluctance and a heavy heart therefore, inspired by the
personal feeling and view of the undersigned with respect to the wisdom of the
penalty of death for any crime, the court finds itself with no other alternative but to
impose the penalty provided for by the express mandate of the law which is now
restored under Republic Act No. 7659. The accused (Pedro Malabago y Villaespin) is
hereby sentenced to DEATH for the terrible crime he has committed and, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P50,000.00 conformable to the recent
jurisprudence on the matter (People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643).
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED
DIPOLOG CITY, Philippines, this 10th day of May 1994.
(Sgd.)
WILFREDO C. OCHOTORENA
Acting Presiding Judge 1
In an information dated January 7, 1994, accused-appellant was charged with the

crime of parricide committed as follows:
That in the evening, on or about the 5th day of January 1994, at Barangay Gulayon,
Dipolog City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously hack and strike with a bolo one Letecia
R. Malabago, his lawfully wedded wife, hitting the latter on her face and neck, which
caused the victims instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
victim, in the amount of P30,000.00 as death indemnity, and also moral and
exemplary damages in the amounts to be established during the trial. 2
The following facts were established by the prosecution: On January 5, 1994, at about
7:00 in the evening, Guillerma Romano, appellants mother-in-law, was tending her sari-
sari store in Barangay Gulayon, Dipolog City. The Store and its premises were lit by a
kerosene lamp and the fluorescent light from the adjoining house of Dodong
Opulentisima. Guillermas daugther. Letecia Romano Malabago, arrived and sat on one
of the benches outside the store. She had just come from selling some
jackfruit. Allandel, Letecias fourteen-year old son, appeared and sat on the bench facing
her. He listened to his mother and grandmother who were conversing. A few minutes
later, accused-appellant came and interrupted his wife and mother-in-laws
conversation. He and Letecia began arguing. Guillerma turned away but heard the
couples altercation over money and appellants jealousy of someone. Suddenly,
Guillerma heard a loud sound and she thought that appellant slapped Letecia on the
face. Letecia cried out Agay! Looking out the store window, Guillerma saw Letecias face
bloodied with a slash along her right ear. Appellant was facing Letecia, and with a bolo
in his hand, struck her again, this time hitting the lower left side of her face, from the lips
down to the neck. Letecia fell to the ground.Guillerma rushed towards her daughter and
shouted for help.3 She was lifeless.
Appellant fled to Dodong Opulentisimas house. Dodong Opulentisima later called the
police. They came, fetched appellant and brought him to their station. 4 On investigation,
the police found a bloodied bolo in the pineapple plantation near appellants house. 5
Letecia was found to have died of cardio-respiratory arrest; shock hemorrhage,
massive; hack wounds, multiple.6
Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime. He claimed that on January 5, 1994,
he was in the poblacion of Dipolog City. He alleged he did not know who hacked his wife
and had no means of finding the culprit because he was placed in jail after her killing. 7 He
claimed through his son, Allandel, as defense witness, that Guillerma testified against him
because she was against their marriage. He was then jobless.8 The proccedings show
that Guillerma, together with her husband, catalino, and appellants and Letecias three
children namely, Allandel, Aljun and Alex later signed as affidavit of desistance and
moved to dismiss the case against him.9
The trial court upheld the prosecution and on May 10, 1994 convicted accused-
appellant of parricide and sentenced him to death pursuant to republic Act No. 7659.
Before us appellant assigns the following errors:
I
The sentence of death imposed by the trial court on the appellant is an

unconstitutional penalty for being violative of fundamental human rights and
is, thus, null and void.
II
The judgment of conviction is null and void for having been rendered by a
trial court ousted of jurisdiction because of the grave violations of the
appellants rights to due process committed by no less that the presiding judge
himself as shown by his conduct at trial.
III
Assuming without conceding that the trial court was not ousted of jurisdiction,
it nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant of parricide
considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt as demonstrated by:
(a) The prosecutions failure to prove the legitimate marital relation between
appellant and the victim;
(b) The prosecutions failure to prove the fact and cause of death;
(c) The prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody over the alleged
instrument of death;
IV
it nevertheless gravely erred in convicting the appellant when it arbitrarily
and selectively gave full weight and credence only to Guillerma Romanos
inculpatory but inconsistent and inadmissible testimony and disregarded her
exculpatory statements.
V
it nevertheless gravely erred in peremptorily dismissing the appellants
defense of alibi as inherently weak.
VI
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in appreciating the existence of treachery as
an aggravating and qualifying circumstance.
VII
Assuming without conceding that the finding of parricide is correct, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in refusing to consider the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of the appellant, despite the
prosecutions failure to contradict and challenge the appellants claim of this
mitigator.
VIII
Assuming without conceding that it was not ousted of jurisdiction, the trial
court nevertheless gravely erred in awarding civil indemnity arising from the
death of Letecia Malabago considering that the prosecution failed to prove
said death as a fact during trial. 10
We affirm the trial courts findings with modification

The crime of parricide defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act 765911 states:
Art. 246. Parricide. -- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the
accused; (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the
accused.12
The key element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. 13 In the
case at parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship between the accused and
the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the absence of a marriage
certificate. However, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may be considered by the trial
court if such proof is not objected to.14
Guillerma Romano testified on direct examination that:
PROSECUTOR MAH:
Q On January 5, 1994 at about 7:00 in the evening, can you still recall where you were
at that particular time?
A I was in my store.
Q While you were in your store at that particular time and date, can you still remember if
there was an unusual incident [that] happened?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please tell us what that incident was about?
A At that moment, I heard a loud sound (paka).
Q Did you investigate what that loud sound [was] all about?
A I did not mind because they are husband and wife.
Q What was that loud sound about?
A I thought it was a slap on the face but she was nit by a bolo.
Q What was that incident about?
A There was an altercation between husband and wife.
Q After the altercation between husband and wife, what happened?
A I saw the hacking two times and I saw blood.
Q Who was hacked?
A My daugther Letecia was hacked by Pedro Malabago.
x x x x x x x x x.15
Guillerma Romanos testimony on direct examination affirmed the narration in her
affidavit taken the day after the incident. The affidavit was adopted by the prosecution as
its Exhibit A and it reads in part:
Q What is your purpose in coming to the Office of the Investigator of the Dipolog City
Police?
A To file a complaint against Pedro malabago y Villaespin, 42 years old and a resident
of Gulayon, Dipolog City,
Q What is your complaint against said person?
A He hacked to death my daughter who is his wife with the use of a bolo.
Q How many times did the suspect hack his wife, Letecia R. Malabago?
A Twice, hitting the victim on the right side of her face and on the neck resulting in her
instanteneous death.
Appellant did not object to Guillermas testimony and sworn statement that he and
Letecia were husband and wife.17 Appellant himelf corroborated Guillermas testimony, to
wit:
COURT: (to the witness)
Q You are Pedro Malabago, the accused herein?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is your relation to the late Letecia Romano Malabago?
A She was my wife, your honor.
Q You mean to say you were legally married to Letecia Romano Malabago?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who solemnized the marriages?
A Mayor Barinaga, your honor.
Q When?
A In the year 1970, your honor.
Q Who were the witnesses, could you still remember?
A I can only remember Sergio Vidal, your honor.
Q But then you were legally married by civil ceremony officiated by Mayor Barinaga?
A Yes, your honor.
The testimony of the accused that he was married to the deceased is an admission
against his penal interest. It is a confirmation of the semper praesumitur matrimonio and
the presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husbands and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.19
Appellant alleges that the prosecution failed to establish the fact and cause of
Letecias death because Dr. Dominador Celemin, the City Health Officer who signed the
death certificate, did not personally examine her cadaver.20 It is content that the consent
of the death certificate issued by Dr. Celemin is hearsay.21
Letecias death certificate is not the only proof of her death. Guillerma, in her affidavit,
stated that her daughter died as a result of the hack wounds. 22 Called also as a hostile
witness to the defense, she testified:
COURT
Q At the time, you actually saw the accused hacked (sic) the bolo to (sic) your daughter?
A Yes, you honor.
Q In fact, you witnessed the blood oozing on the face of your daughter?
A Yes, your honor.
Q In other words, you actually saw the accused herein hack the bolo to your daughter,
am I right?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And the cause of death of your daughter was hacking of Pedro Malabago?
A Yes, your honor.
Q I have observed a while ago while you were testifying, you were crying. Why?
A Because of worries that Pedro had done to my daughter.
Q You mean to say, you cried because your daughter was killed by her husband?
A Yes, your honor.
Appellant affirmed on cross examination that his wife died as a result of the hacking,
thus:
FISCAL MAH: (to the witness)
Q Mr. Witness, you know Letecia Malabago because she was your wife?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where is she now?
A She is already buried in the cemetery.
Q You mean to say she is already dead?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was the cause of her death?
A She was hacked, sir.
Q Hacked by whom?
A I do not know who hacked my wife.
Accused-appellant also claims that the trial court showed partiality to the prosecution
by unduly interfering in the presentation of evidence. By asking questions, the judge
allegedly elicited prejudicial admissions from witnesses without affording appellants
counsel the right to examine them on their answers to the court, in violation of appellants
constitutional right to due process and right against self-incrimination.25
The records disclosed that the questions the trial judge propounded were made
mainly to clarify what the prosecution and defense witnesses had testified on direct and
cross examinations. The essential elements of the crime of parricide like
appellantss marriage to Letecia, the cause of Letecias death and appellants participation
therein were facts already established by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. Using
his discretion, the trial judge questioned the witnesses to clear up obscurities in their
testimonies ans sworn statements.26 The wise use of such discretion cannot be assailed
as a specie of bias.
A judge is called upon to ascertain the truth of the controversy before him. He may
properly intervene in the presentation of evidence to expedite and prevent unnecessary
waste of time27 and clarify obscure and incomplete details after the witness had given
direct testimony.28 After all, the judge is the arbiter and he ought to satisfy himself as to
the respective merits of the claims of both parties in accord with the stringent demands
of due process.29 In the case at bar, the trial judge had strong reasons to question the
material witnesses who executed affidavits of desistance contradicting their previous
stance. If to the mind of the parties, the trial judge was unduly interfering in their
presentation of evidence, they were free to manifest their objection. They were likewise
free to ask redirect questions from their witness after interrogation by the trial court. In the
instant case, however, they never manifested that the questions of the trial judge had
traversed the allowable parameters. Even assuming that some of the questions were
incriminating, we cannot hold that the witnesses were compelled to incriminate
themselves. The records show they answered the questions of the court freely and
voluntarily and without any objection from their respective counsels.
The prosecution evidence is based solely on the testimony of Guillerma
Romano. Nonetheless, her testimony is clear, spontaneous and straightforward. Her
inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential and they are not incongruous with her
credibility.30 Her testimony was not eroded even when she was presented by the defense
as a hostile witness. She admittedly signed the affidavit of desistance for the sake of her
three grandchildren and this is understandable in light of the circumstances of the
case. Allandel and his brothers pled that she withdraw the complaint because they did
not want their father to be in prison.31 Deep in her heart, however, Guillerma wanted justice
for her daughter and thus, she testified for the prosecution.32 The fact that she objected to
her daughters marriage to appellant is too flimsy a reason to impel her to testify against
the father of her grandchildren.
We agree with the trial court that appellants defense of alibi is weak and
unconvincing. Appellant was positively identified as the one who hacked his wife to
death. Moreover, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime
on that fateful evening. The poblacion of Dipolog City is merely four kilometers from
Barangay Gulayon and this distance may be traversed within a few minutes by motorized
vehicle.33
Be that as it may, we find that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of treachery. For treachery to be present, two conditions must concur: (a)
the employment of means of execution which would ensure the safety of the offender
from defensive and rataliatory acts of the victim, giving the victim no opportunity to defend
himself; and (b) the means, method and manner of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the offender.34 It is true that appellant hacked his wife who was
then unarmed and had no opportunity to defend herself. However, the evidence does not
show that appellant deliberately and consciously employed this particular mode of attack
to ensure the killing of the victim.The unembroidered facts reveal that appellant hacked
his wife in the midst of a sudden, unscripted heated argument. This precludes the idea
that appellant priorly planned to kill his wife.Indeed, appellant was not carrying his bolo at
that time. The bolo was hanging in its usual place on one of the posts of the sari-sari
store.35 Treachery, to be appreciated, must spark an attack that is deliberate, sudden and
unexpected not where it is prefaced by an unforeseen heated argument with the victim
standing face to face with her assailant.36
The trial court also erred in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. In answer to questions by the trial court, appellant declared:
COURT: (to the witness)
xxxxxxxxx
Q Do you have suspects as to the alleged killers of your wife?
A I have no suspect, your honor.
Q Because you denied killing your wife, you did not surrender to the police authorities?
A I surrendered because I was accused of killing my wife.
Q Immediately after the incident?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was it placed in the police blotter that you surrendered?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you give the name of the person or police officer to whom you surrendered?
A I forgot the name, your honor.
Q Are you telling the truth?
A Yes, sir.
Appellant testified that he voluntarily surrendered to the police when they fetched him
at Dodong Opulentisimas house. The prosecution did not dispute appellants claim of
voluntarily surrender. Guillerma herself testified that without any resistance, appellant
went with the police when they fetched him at Dodongs house.38 Indeed, appellant did not
escape after Dodong Opulentisima called the police. Instead, he voluntarily placed
himself at the disposal of the police authorities.
In the absence of an aggravating circumstance39 and the presence of a mitigating
circumstance the penalty imposable to appellant is reclusion perpetua.40 Considering the
death of the victim, a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 must be awarded to her heirs.
In light of the above disquisitions, the Court need not resolve the alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended. Nonetheless, the Court expresses its
appreciation to the scholarly arguments of our amici curiae, Senator Arturo M. Tolentino
and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on the constitutional aspects of R.A. No. 7659, as
amended. Death not being the lis mota of the instant case, the Court has to await for more
appropriate case to pass upon the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7659, as amended.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is affirmed with the modification
that the penalty of death imposed by the Regional Trial court of Dipolog City, Branch 10
on accused-appellant Pedro Malabago y Villaespin in Criminal Case No. 6598 is reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., join Justice Padilla in his dissenting opinion.
Padilla J., see Dissenting Opinion.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 95262 January 4, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMMANUEL DESALISA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Roberto R. Barrales for accused-appellant.
NOCON, J.:
Circumstantial evidence has adequately established the identity of the killer in this case, destroyed
the presumption of innocence in his favor and fulfilled the test of moral certainty sufficient to convict.
Hanged by means of a rope, the victim, accused-appellant's legal wife, and the approximately five
month old fetus in her womb died as a consequence. Unfounded infidelity of the victim moved
accused-appellant to perpetrate the highly condemnable deed. As one proverb goes, "A tranquil
mind gives life to the body but jealousy rots the bones."
Accused-appellant Emmanuel Desalisa, a twenty four year old farmer, was charged with the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion in Criminal Case No. 1017 before the Regional
Trial Court of Sorsogon, Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 52. The information filed in said case reads,
as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October, 1983, in the (sic) sitio Pinaductan, barangay
San Juan, municipality of Bacon, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused moved by hatred and jealousy
with evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill armed with a sharp pointed instrument, assault, attack, and inflict
physical injuries on the vagina of one Norma Desalisa y Dioneda with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock and who was pregnant for about five (5) months, and
thereafter with the use of rope hang her to a jackfruit tree causing her death and that
of her fetus, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
That in the commission of the offense there exist the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and uninhabited place which facilitated the commission of the offense, and
evident premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered the plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued. On July 10, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the circumstancial (sic) evidence pointing to the guilt of the
accused, the Court finds accused Emmanuel Desalisa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for (sic) the crime of Parricide, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT (sic) and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Norma Desalisa y
Dioneda, the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as burial expenses and
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos as damages.
SO ORDERED.2
Hence, the present appeal.
The antecedent facts of this case, as culled from the records are, as follows:
Accused-appellant lived with his eighteen year old legal wife, Norma Desalisa, and two year old
daughter in a small nipa house on a hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. There are two
other houses in the neighborhood which are 150 meters away: the house of his parents-in-law and
the house of Carlito Dichoso. These cannot, however, be seen from the couple's house because of
the many fruit trees and shrubs prevalent in the area.
According to Paulina Dioneda, mother of Norma, on October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, she was informed by the mother of accused-appellant that accused-appellant and Norma
had an altercation. He slapped and boxed her on the stomach. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, Norma complained to her that accused-appellant manhandled her by slapping and
boxing her on the stomach when she told him not to go out of the house and get drunk because
during that time their child was sick; also, accused-appellant was jealous of a man. Even before
October 9, 1983, Norma used to tell her that she was being manhandled by accused-appellant.3
Vicente Dioneda, father of Norma, testified that on October 9, 1983, at around 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in
the evening, accused-appellant went to their house and left his child. On the following morning,
between 6:00 and 7:00 o'clock, he went to the house of accused-appellant and Norma. When he
arrived there, he noticed that the plates were scattered on the floor; the kettle with rice that was not
eaten was also on the floor; and the rope which was used to tie the other end of their hammock was
missing. He went out of the house. He saw the couple's pig and observed that it was hungry. He
thought of feeding it with coconut meat so he climbed a coconut tree which was nearby. While on the
third step of the trunk, he saw the back of the body of Norma. He went down the tree and called her.
Inasmuch as she did not answer him, he approached her and touched her back. However, her body
swayed. It was only then when he realized that she was hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree.
Her neck was tied with the missing rope of their hammock. Her bloody feet were approximately four
inches above the ground. Her dress was wet. He informed his wife immediately about the matter. He
and his wife proceeded to the house of Carlito Dichoso and requested the latter to fetch the
authorities. Accused-appellant often manhandled his daughter because he suspected her of having
a paramour and that the baby in her womb was not his. The last time he saw Norma alive was on
October 9, 1983, at around 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when she went to their house. He
corroborated the previous narration of Paulina Dioneda on this aspect. He saw accused-appellant at
the municipal building of Bacon on October 10, 1983. He asked accused-appellant why he killed
Norma. Accused-appellant did not answer him but just stooped down. 4
Carlito Dichoso, neighbor of accused-appellant, testified that at about 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the
evening of October 9, 1983, accused-appellant went to his house. It was raining during that time.
Accused-appellant borrowed a flashlight because he will be looking for his wife. After two and a half
hours, accused-appellant returned to Carlito's house. He sat on a bench. Carlito asked him whether
or not he found his wife but he did not answer. Carlito told him to look for his wife in the house of his
in-laws because she might be there. Again, he did not answer. Carlito also told him to look for his
wife in the nearby hut because perhaps the heavy downpour prevented her from proceeding home.
Accused-appellant remained sitting on the bench, leaning on the post. He uttered the following
words: "My wife is continuously possessed by devils." Carlito's wife then advised accused-appellant:
"You must be patient with your wife because she is pregnant." Accused-appellant did not answer
her. She then prepared a mat and a pillow for accused-appellant but the latter preferred to remain
sitting on the bench. During the time that it was raining hard, or about 3:30 o'clock in the morning of
the following day, accused-appellant was frightened because he fell down from the bench. He sat
again on the bench and Carlito noticed that he did not sleep anymore. At around 5:00 o'clock of the
same morning, accused-appellant opened the door and said: "If there is something that happened,
Manoy Carlito, what would I do?" Carlito was not able to ask him where he was going because he
already went down. At around 7:30 o'clock of the same morning, Carlito was informed by Vicente
and Paulina Dioneda that Norma is dead. Accused-appellant and his wife used to quarrel because of
jealousy. 5
Corporal Crisonogo Gillego, chief investigator and government prosecutor of the Bacon Integrated
National Police, testified that he was ordered by their station commander to investigate the case of a
woman who was hanged at San Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. He was accompanied by two members of
the Bacon INP and some barangay officials of San Juan. He saw the woman hanging from a jackfruit
tree branch, whom he later came to know as Norma Desalisa. A rope was tied around her neck. Her
feet were twelve inches above the ground. There were blood stains on the back of her dress and on
her panty. He suspected that it was not a suicide case because he noticed that the hair of Norma
was entangled with the knot of the rope. He opined that if a person is about to commit suicide, he
has to prepare the knot first in order to place it around his neck and then jump. Before Norma was
untied, pictures were taken of her. He also investigated the house of the couple and found that the
rope that was used in hanging Norma was the same as the rope tied to one end of their hammock.
Some things inside the house were not in proper places. He saw accused-appellant at the house of
the barangay captain. He asked him how the incident happened but he did not answer. He asked
him if he suspected somebody as the paramour of his wife. Accused-appellant answered that a
person whose surname is Ariate is courting his wife. He asked accused-appellant whether or not
they always quarrel. Accused-appellant answered that they quarrel sometimes. He noticed that
accused-appellant was trembling while he was asking those questions. He asked him why he was
not in his house. He answered that he was afraid the relatives of his wife might retaliate. Accused-
appellant was informed by his mother about the death of his wife. 6
Dr. Amelia Escarcha, resident physician of the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy
on the body of Norma and submitted the following report:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
External Findings:
Head & Neck: —
1. Rope embedded around the neck with knot

directing to the right lateral of the neck;
2. Contusion, 3 cm., post-auricular area; right;
3. Ligature mark on the anterior neck extending to the

submandibular area & infra-auricular area;
4. Tongue bitten right.
Abdomen:
5. Abdomen enlarged, at about 5 months size with

fetal parts on abdominal palpation.
Genitalia:
6. Scanty pubic hair
7. Parous vagina
8. Hematoma with contusion both labia
9. Punctured wound 1 cm. long & 2 cm. depth,

perineum with slight blood clot, non-perforating.
Internal Examination: —
1. Cervix soft, closed, no vaginal discharge
2. Uterus — pregnant to about 4-5 months in size.
Internal findings:
1. Lung — both lungs collapsed colored grayish.
2. Heart —- normal in size.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxation secondary to hanging.7
On the other hand, accused-appellant professes his innocence of the crime charged against him. He
speculates that his parents-in-law are harboring ill-feelings against him since his wife died. His
relationship with his wife has deteriorated as early as June 24, 1983, when she told him upon
coming home: "You nearly came upon the man." From that time on, they had no peace at home and
often quarrelled. He did not consider her anymore as his wife. But he suspects nobody of having
killed his wife, for he was of the impression that she probably committed suicide by hanging herself
as previously, she wanted to hang herself but was stopped by her uncle, "Tio Awe." His version of
the incident is, as follows: In the afternoon of October 9, 1983, his wife was in their house. When he
arrived in the evening of that day, he and his wife had an altercation because she suspected him of
having an affair with the daughter of Manoy Carlito. She told him to leave otherwise, she will leave.
So, he left and visited his farm. Upon returning at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening he found his
wife gone and their daughter crying alone. He carried her and proceeded to the house of his
parents-in-law to inquire whether or not his wife is there. Not finding her, he left the child in their care
and proceeded to the house of Carlito. He likewise did not find her there. He then borrowed Carlito's
flashlight to look for her. At that time, he was armed with a sharp bladed instrument. He looked for
her in the huts near their farm but she was not there. When it started to rain, he returned to the
house of Carlito to check whether or not his wife is already there, only to find out that it was not so.
Since it was raining hard, he stayed in the house of Carlito up to around 5:30 o'clock in the morning
of the following day, when he went home hoping to find his wife there. Still, there was no trace of his
wife. Searching around the premises, he saw his wife hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. He
was shocked and taken aback because he did not think that his wife would do such a thing. He knew
that she was dead because she was not moving. But the first thing he did was to go to the house of
his parents and informed them about the incident instead of running to her and cutting her down. His
mother went immediately to the police station, while he went to Dominador Baluyot, one of the peace
and order officers to inform him about the incident.8
Juan Don, a councilor, and Dominador Baluyot, a laborer, testified that there was no eyewitness to
the incident, They opined, however, that accused-appellant did not kill Norma.
In this appeal, accused-appellant imputes error on the part of the trial court for finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt despite evidence to the contrary.
Accused-appellant asseverates that the trial court erred in arriving at the conclusion that he was
motivated by jealousy in killing his wife. Not only is this not true but on the contrary, it was the victim
who was jealous. She previously tried to commit suicide but was fortunately prevented from doing so
by the timely intervention of her "Tio Awe". In fact, he spent the night in the house of Carlito Dichoso
which he would not have done if he were guilty. His first impulse, if he had killed his wife, is to go into
hiding to avoid arrest.
The Office of the Solicitor General supports the conviction of accused-appellant. The injuries
sustained by his wife belie his assertion that she committed suicide by hanging herself. His defense
of denial is one of the weakest defenses. The presence of motive and the attendant circumstances,
correctly led the trial court to believe that he killed his wife.
We uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
The quantum of proof necessary to establish accused-appellant's guilt, albeit based on

circumstantial evidence, is sufficient. There is more than one circumstance. The facts from which the
inference are derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.9 Thus, we quote as our own the ratiocination of the trial court:
MOTIVE:
There is not (sic) question (that) there was a serious quarrel between accused
Emmanuel Desalisa and his young wife deceased Norma Desalisa. The accused
admitted the existence of the quarrel to P/Cpl. Gillego, as was testified to by the
mother-in-law of the accused Paulina Dioneda and admitted by the accused when he
testified for and in his own behalf. . . . Likewise, accused admitted (that) one Aryate
was courting Norma and that when the matter was brought out to him, the accused
was trembling and very pale.
Paulina Dioneda testified, which was unrebutted nor denied by the accused, that on
October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, her daughter (deceased)
Norma accompanied by her mother-in-law (mother of the accused) told her she had
an altercation with her husband accused Emmanuel. Norma was, according to her,
slapped, boxed and manhandled by the accused. . . .
When the accused testified for and in his own behalf, he admitted that on October 9,
1983, or immediately prior to Norma's hideous hanging, Norma refused to allow him
to enter the house or she will be the one to leave the house. A statement coming
from a wife when told to a husband cannot be mistaken to anything less than a very
serious quarrel.
The quarrel between accused Emmanuel and deceased Norma prior to and
immediately before the fatal hanging when considered with the kind of quarrel the
couple were having, an affair with another man, culminating to his doubt having
fathered the child Norma was carrying at the time was doubtful (sic). Jealousy (sic) is
a motive as old as time.
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE CRIME:
The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime. The house where accused
Emmanuel and Norma live as pictured by both the witnesses for the prosecution and
the defense is up a hill and isolated. The whole neighborhood consists of only three
(3) houses. While it is true (that) from any of the three (3) houses, one cannot see
the other because of the fruit trees and shrubs that abound, their distance from each
other is only 150 meters. No one, definitely no one can go up the hill to visit or
whatever without being known to the neighbor. With such an arrangement, no one
can go up the hill to the house of the accused Emmanuel and Norma without their
neighbors, who are related to them, being aware of. Nowhere in the whole evidence,
where neither Norma's family nor accused Emmanuel Desalisa's family, directly or
indirectly, even suspected any stranger for having committed the crime. The accused
himself blamed that (sic) his wife Norma for having taken her own life. He never
pointed his accusing finger to anybody.
As early as 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 9, 1983, accused Emmanuel was
with Norma and their child in their house up the hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon.
They were all alone in that isolated house when he was not allowed, with threatening
voice, entry in his own house, or his wife will leave the house. What can be more
humiliating to a man aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to one's
very home? A man maybe able to swallow defeat to a woman's affection, even lose
the love of a wife, but to be scorned and refused entry to one's house by the very
woman who was unfaithful to his love, is something a man cannot take sitting down,
as the accused did take with his own hand the life of his young wife Norma.
The intensity of the hatred of the man who committed the dastardly act of hanging
Norma by the neck tied to the branch of a jackfruit tree is shown by the injury
suffered by the deceased. The injury on the head, the entangled hair of the deceased
to the noose of the rope, the proximity (six inches) of the noose that holds and
encircles the neck of the deceased to that of the branch of the jackfruit tree, the
contusion in the labia minora and punctured wound suffered by the deceased in her
genital area, could have only be done by a man whose manhood was trampled upon,
as accused Emmanuel Desalisa in his jealousy was prone to believe, and in his blind
jealousy not only snuffed the life of his wife by hanging but also tortured and
humiliated the deceased by abusing and inflicting injury to her private parts as a last
act of insult to humiliate her womanhood, as he was insulted and humiliated to (sic)
what he believe (sic) his unfaithful wife has committed against his honor.
Another point that is pointed, is, when the accused was at the house of his neighbor,
his Manoy Carlito Dichoso, after having left said house to look for his wife, he was
asked by Carlito if he found his wife. The accused did not answer the query. He just
sat on the bench and said, "his wife Norma is possessed by devils." When Carlito's
wife who was then present told him to be patient with his wife because she is
pregnant, again, the accused, did not answer. When the accused was at the police
headquarters of Bacon, and in the presence of many, was accused (sic) by his
father-in-law Vicente Dioneda, why he killed his daughter Norma. Again, the accused
did not answer. That when P/Cpl. Gillego was able to extract from him the
information that one Ariate was courting Norma, the accused was trembling and very
pale. These are actuations and circumstances pointing to a man bothered by a guilty
conscience. 10
The uncorroborated assertions of accused-appellant that it was the victim who was jealous of him
and that she has tried to commit suicide previously are nothing but self-serving statements which
cannot outweigh the prosecution's overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 11
There is ample evidence to support the finding that the hanging of the victim was homicidal 12 and not
suicidal, as claimed by accused-appellant. A day after the incident, Vicente Dioneda found scattered
plates and kettle with untouched rice on the floor of the house of accused-appellant 13 while Cpl.
Gillego found that some things in the house were not in proper places. 14 These are indicia or
previous struggle. There were blood stains on the victim's dress, 15 panty, 16 and feet. 17 On her
genitalia, the doctor found a punctured wound, 1 cm. long and 2 cm. deep, with slight blood clot
which could have been caused by any pointed object, sharp bolo or sharp pointed
instrument. 18Accused-appellant admitted during the cross-examination that he was armed with a
sharp bladed instrument while he was looking for his wife. 19 The doctor also found hematoma with
contusion on both labia of her genitalia, which could have been caused by a fist blow. 20 According to
the doctor, these injuries could not have been self-inflicted. 21
Although accused-appellant spent the night in the house of Carlito Dichoso and did not flee, this
circumstance standing alone is no brief on his innocence. There is no case law holding that non-
flight is conclusive proof of innocence. 22
What strikes the attention of this Court further is the testimony of accused-appellant that when he
saw his wife hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree, he went to the house of his parents and
informed them about the incident, 23 instead of bringing her down and determining if she was still
alive, and if so, to rush her to any doctor, clinic or hospital. He didn't even bother to let his parents-in-
law know of what happened to their daughter because according to him, he was confused. 24
We find it hard to believe in his excuse, considering that the house of his parents-in-law, is only 150
meters away from his house. 25 Furthermore, it goes without saying that his parents-in-law are the
more concerned persons than his parents with respect to the misfortune that befell their daughter.
Or, he could have proceeded to the house of Carlito Dichoso, which is likewise only 150 meters
away from his house. We view the course of action that he took as akin to seeking sanctuary in the
protective arms of his parents.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be appreciated against accused-
appellant absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed
before it was carried out. 26 Neither may be the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated
against him because there is no proof that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of, or that it
facilitated the commission of the crime. 27
However, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The uninhabitedness of a

place is determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether
or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help.
Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstruct the
view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any
assistance. 28 At any rate, in the imposition of the proper penalty we shall disregard the presence of
this aggravating circumstance, which we shall explain later.
We note that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of parricide only. This is an
error. The evidence on record has shown beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant has
committed the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion was caused by
the same violence that caused the death of the victim. It is unintentional because accused-appellant
must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. 29
In case of complex crimes, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be
imposed. 30 The maximum period of the penalty for parricide, the more serious crime, is
death. 31 However, by reason of Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the
imposition of the death penalty, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. 32 Being a single
indivisible penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. 33
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified. Accused-appellant is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity for the death of the victim
is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-50905 September 23, 1982
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO JUMAWAN alias "KIKO", CESARIO JUMAWAN alias "SARIO", MANUEL
JUMAWAN alias "OWEL" and PRESENTACION JUMAWAN-MAGNAYE alias "ESEN" accused-
appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976, and an affidavit
executed by Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal
Court of Sariaya, Quezon, on July 19, 1976, by Station Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr.
against Francisco Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for
the death of Rodolfo Magnaye.
The affidavit of Trinidad Alcantara clearly states that her son Rodolfo Magnaye was married to
Presentacion Jumawan albeit they had been living separately from each other. (During the trial
Presentacion admitted her marriage to Rodolfo. See t.s.n., pp. 811-812.) The Station Commander
can perhaps be excused for not accusing Presentacion of parricide but when the case was elevated
to the Court of First Instance of Quezon where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1408, the
Provincial Fiscal perpetuated the mistake by filing an information for murder against all the accused.
The information reads:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses CESARIO JUMAWAN alias 'Sario,'

MANUEL JUMAWAN alias 'Owel', FRANCISCO JUMAWAN alias 'Kiko' and
PRESENTACION JUMAWAN alias 'ESEN', of the crime of murder, defined and
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 19th day of June 1976, in the Municipality of Sariaya, Province
of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a bolo (gulukan), conspiring and confederating together
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation
and treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said bolo one Rodolfo
Magnaye alias 'Digo', thereby inflicting upon the latter a stab wound on the chest,
which directly caused his death.
After a long trial and 1,211 pages of stenographic transcript, the trial court rendered the following
judgment:
Wherefore, the Court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye,

Manuel Jumawan, and Francisco Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and punished under Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment and to indemnify jointly and severally the parents of the victim in the
amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos.
The case is now before this Court on appeal.
The brief of the appellants gives the following:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Accused:
Francisco Jumawan is the father of his co-accused, namely, Cesario Jumawan,

Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan.
Presentacion Jumawan was married to Rodolfo Magnaye.
Death of Rodolfo Magnaye:
As described by the lower court, '... when Rodolfo Magnaye did not return home in
(that) evening of 19 June 1976, his mother (Trinidad Alcantara) went to the public
market to look for him on the following day. She met four (4) children who told her
that they saw a man near the water. They accompanied her to the place and she
recognized the dead man as her son Rodolfo Magnaye. She then proceeded to the
police headquarters to report the matter. ...' (page 5, Judgment).
For the death of Rodolfo Magnaye, the accused stand charged of the crime of
MURDER.
The People's brief, on the other hand, merely reproduces the trial court's findings of facts as follows:
It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was
married on 26 January 1974 to Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the
above entitled criminal case. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal
home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye, on the
other hand, went and stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.
The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to

secure the signature of Rodolfo Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation
from his wife so that both he and his wife will be free to marry again but Rodolfo
Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document.
On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought

Rodolfo Magnaye and his mother to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for
the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to assist her daughter in securing a separation from
Rodolfo Magnaye but they were told by Sgt. Mortilla that it cannot be legally done.
Between 5:00 and 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 while Trinidad
Alcantara was in her house, her son Rodolfo Magnaye was dressing up and told her
that he was going to the public market because his wife asked him to fetch her. He
asked his mother to prepare food because they are going to talk about their lives. He
left home at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening.
At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of 19 June 1976 one Mr. Vicente Recepeda
came from the Aglipayan fiesta in Sariaya, Quezon and after eating at the Sariling
Atin eating place he went to the former BLTB station at Sariaya, Quezon. While he
was infront of the public market on the way to the former BLTB station he heard the
noise of pigs being butchered and being in the business of buying pigs and chicken
he went to the direction of [the] slaughter house to inquire about the prices of pigs
and chicken.
Before reaching the slaughter house he heard the noise (sic) of a person being
attacked by three (3) persons and a woman inside a store which was lighted. He saw
accused Francisco Jumawan holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye while accused
Manuel Jumawan was behind Rodolfo Magnaye with his arm around the neck of
Rodolfo Magnaye while Cesario Jumawan was infront of Rodolfo Magnaye with his
left hand holding the collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and in his right hand he was holding
a small pointed bolo with which he stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye below the right nipple.
At about 11:00 o'clock in that evening a certain Mr. Policarpio Trinidad who also
came from the Aglipayan fiesta in Sariaya, Quezon was waiting infront of a gasoline
station across the old station of the BLTB waiting for a ride home when he saw
Cesario Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan with Rodolfo Magnaye between them while
they were crossing the national highway towards the south to a road opposite the
Emil Welding Shop. They went on walking after crossing the highway. At that time
the head of Rodolfo Magnaye was bowed infront while his two (2) arms were on the
shoulder of Cesario and Manuel Jumawan. Rodolfo Magnaye was not walking.
At about 11:45 o'clock in the evening of 19 June 1976 Presentacion Jumawan-

Magnaye reported to Patrolman Marcial Baera and Patrolman Albufera that the store
of Bastiana (Sebastiana) Jumawan where she works is threatened to be robbed by
Rodolfo Magnaye. When asked by Patrolman Baera Presentacion Jumawan-
Magnaye denied being related to Rodolfo Magnaye. He went to investigate the
reported attempt to rob the store of Sebastiana Jumawan and he saw one of the
panels used to close the store was destroyed but nothing appears to have been
taken from the store.
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye and her companions Tita Dañez and Anabelle

Jumawan told Patrolman Baera that they will file charges against Rodolfo Magnaye.
Patrolman Baera entered the report of Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye in the police
record book.
When Rodolfo Magnaye did not return home in that evening of 19 June 1976, his
mother (Trinidad Alcantara) went to the public market to look for him on the following
day. She met four (4) children who told her that they saw a man near the water. They
accompanied her to the place and she recognized the dead man as her son Rodolfo
Magnaye. She then proceeded to the police headquarters to report the matter.
The two Patrolmen Baera and Albufera went to the place and they saw the dead man
without a shirt and wearing black pants with white shoes. They noticed a stab wound
on the lower portion of the right breast. The dead man was lying face up.
In the afternoon of the same day Patrolman Loreto Galeon went to the store of
Sebastiana Jumawan located at the public market of Sariaya to follow up the
investigation of the reported attempted robbery case against Magnaye. He asked the
storekeeper for permission to look at the wood panels which are used to close the
store. He found traces of blood in one of the wooden panels. He reported what he
saw to Sgt. Labitigan when he returned to the police headquarters.
The following day he was ordered by the chief of police to look again at the wooden
panel with traces of blood but he saw that the wooden panels were already planed
('kinatam') and the traces of blood could no longer be seen.
On 23 June 1976, Patrolman Rodrigo Cedonio was ordered to look for Tita Dañez in
Barrio Mamala Sariaya, Quezon because Tita Dañez was allegedly in the store at the
time of the alleged attempted robbery and at the time Rodolfo Magnaye was
allegedly killed.
Patrolman Cedonio was informed by the mother of Tita Dañez that she had not gone
to her home at barrio Mamala. She accompanied Patrolman Cedonio in trying to
locate Tita Danez. They first went to the store of Sebastiana Jumawan which turned
out to be closed on that day. They then went at Muntingbayan, Tayabas, Quezon
where they were able to find Tita Danez together with Francisco Jumawan,
Bienvenido Jumawan and Rosita Abratiga.
Mr. Cesario Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case and a
brother-in-law of the victim, set up the defense of alibi when he testified that between
3:00 and 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 he was at Barrio Sampaloc,
Sariaya, Quezon which is more or less three (3) kilometers away from the poblacion
of Sariaya, Quezon. He went home to Barrio Pili of the same town early in the
afternoon of the following day. He did not go anywhere else since 3:00 to 4:00
o'clock in the afternoon of 19 June 1976 up to and until he returned to Barrio Pili.
Mr. Manuel Jumawan, another accused in the above entitled criminal case who is
also a brother-in-law of the victim, likewise set up the defense of alibi when he
testified that on 19 June 1976 he was in his house at Barrio Pili, Sariaya, Quezon
which is about five (5) kilometers from the poblacion of Sariaya, Quezon. He went to
bed at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of 19 June 1976. He woke up at about 6:30
o'clock in the morning.
He further claims that he suffers from an abnormality of the left arm which he cannot
raise in a normal way and that he was suffering from said disability since childhood
when he fell from a cow continuously up to the present.
Said accused presented a medical certificate, Exhibit 7, issued by Dr. Concepcion

dela Merced, a radiologist of the National Orthopedic Hospital certifying to the fact
that Manuel Jumawan is negative for fracture dislocation and that he suffers from a
deformity of the proximal and left humerous probably from a previous fracture. There
is no showing that Manuel Jumawan is incapable of raising his left arm around the
neck of Rodolfo Magnaye whose actual height was not established by the evidence
nor was Dr. Concepcion dela Merced presented to testify on her findings.
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye claims that in the evening of 19 June 1976 she

was in the store of Sebastiana Jumawan together with Anabelle Jumawan and Tita
Dañez when she heard a person who wanted to enter the store. She shouted
'thieves' ('magnanakaw'). In response to her shouts several people arrived and
chased the person who wanted to enter the store. She then went to the house of
Sebastiana Jumawan where hats are being made and where her father Francisco
Jumawan was staying that night.
While she was in the house where her father was staying, their adjoining neighbor, a
certain Mateo Diamante informed her that the person being chased by several men
was Rodolfo Magnaye. She, however, did not talk with any of the person who chased
her husband nor does she know any of them. She then went with her father,
Francisco Jumawan, to report the matter to the police whom they met at the Filipina
Restaurant.
While Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye gave the name of Rodolfo Magnaye as the

suspect in the attempted robbery, she did not reveal to the investigating policemen
that he was her husband even if she was asked why they knew his name, neither did
she inform the police that her husband was chased by several persons nor did she
give the direction where her husband supposedly ran.
The two policemen, Patrolmen Baera and Albufera, actually went to the store of
Sebastiana Jumawan and after looking at the store, these two patrolmen told
Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye that because nothing happened they will continue
the investigation on the next day.
None of those who allegedly chased her husband that evening was even presented
as a witness.
Mr. Francisco Jumawan, who is the father of his three (3) other co-accused, likewise
set up the defense of alibi when he testified that in the evening of 19 June 1976 at
about 8:00 o'clock more or less he was alone in the house of Sebastiana Jumawan
situated near the former garage of the BLTB in Sariaya, Quezon and that he was
awakened only when his daughter Presentacion woke him up to ten him that
someone was trying to enter the store of Sebastiana Jumawan.
In a brief which is more noteworthy for legal rhetoric rather than a critical analysis of the evidence,
the appellants claim that the trial court committed the following errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FOCUSING OBJECTIVELY AND

IMPARTIALLY THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EVEN AS IT FOCUSED
SUBJECTIVELY AND UNFAIRLY ON SUPPOSED WEAKNESS OF THE
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE THAT THE ACCUSED ARE PRESUMED

INNOCENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND ARE ENTITLED TO A RIGHT TO A
DAY IN COURT CANNOT BE OVERTURNED BY THE DOCTRINE THAT
APPELLATE COURTS ARE NOT PRONE TO DISTURB THE FINDINGS OF THE
TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO THE CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING AND TAKING INTO SERIOUS
ACCOUNT THE FATAL WEAKNESSES OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION IN TERMS OF IMPROBABILITIES, GROSS INCONSISTENCIES
AND IRRECONCILABLE CONTRADICTIONS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT AND CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONIES OF THE STAR PROSECUTION WITNESS CONSIDERING THE
GLARING WEAKNESS THEREOF, EVEN AS THE LOWER COURT
CONVENIENTLY DENIED THE DEFENSE REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS ERRONEOUS APPROACH TO AND

APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI IN
THE CASE AT BAR. SPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS
NO POSITIVE IdENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED AND ALSO THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO EFFECTIVELY REBUT THE DEFENSES OF ALIBI
WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN EASY TO DO IF SUCH DEFENSES WERE REALLY
CONCOCTIONS.
The foregoing assignment of errors can be reduced to the simple proposition whether the evidence
against the accused, independent of their alibis, has overcome the presumption of innocence in their
favor and created a moral certainty as to their guilt.
Except for Vicente Recepeda and Policarpio Trinidad, the appellants do not question the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, the testimony of these witnesses deserves scrutiny.
Vicente Recepeda was 67 years old, jobless and a resident of Lucena City when he first testified on
April 29, 1977. He testified that on June 19, 1976, he went to Sariaya, Quezon, to attend the
Aglipayan fiesta; he arrived there at about 5:00 o'clock and thereafter did the following: listened to
the music and singing, went to the Aglipayan church and the "perya," ate at a restaurant, and walked
to the public market where there was a former BLTB station. While he was waiting for a trip to
Lucena, he heard the shriek of pigs being killed so he walked toward the butchers for the purpose of
asking the price of pigs since he was then engaged in the business of buying and selling pigs. In
fact, at one time Rodolfo Magnaye, the deceased, tied the feet of a pig which he had bought. He was
not able to talk to the butchers because an unusual event intervened which in his own words was:
Q. At about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of June 19, 1976, do you

remember where were you?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Where were you on that particular date and hour?
A. I was in the public market of Sariaya, Quezon, sir.
Q. While you were in the market of Sariaya, Quezon, on that

particular date and hour, do you remember if there was any unusual
incident that you witnessed?
A. There was, sir.
Q. What was that unusual incident that happened on that particular

place and hour?
A. I saw a person being attacked by three persons, sir.
Q. What else did you see there on that particular occasion, aside
from a person being attacked by three persons?
A. There was a woman who ordered the three persons to stab and kill
the person being attacked by these three persons, sir.
Q. Where in particular in the public market of Sariaya, Quezon did

you see this incident happen?
A. Inside the store within the public market of Sariaya, Quezon, sir.
Q. Did you recognize, or did you come to know these three persons
whom you said were inside the store within the public market of
Sariaya, Quezon at about 9:30 o'clock in the evening of June 19,
1976?
A. I recognize their faces, sir.
Q. Did you come to know their names later on?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What is the name of the woman whom you said was there on that
particular occasion?
A. Presentacion Jumawan, sir.
Q. If you will see that Presentacion Jumawan again, will you be able
to Identify her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you please look around the courtroom and point to

Presentacion Jumawan if she is here.
A. She is here sir.
Q. Please point her out to this Honorable Court.
A. That one sir.
ATTY. ALCALA:
May we respectfully ask if your honor please that the person pointed to by the
witness Identify herself.
COURT:
Ask the person to Identify herself.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Presentacion Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness your honor, Identified herself as

Presentacion Jumawan.
ATTY. ALCALA:
And what is the name of the person whom you said was being
attacked by the three men on that particular occasion inside the
store?
A. Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. And what are the names of the three persons attacking Rodolfo
Magnaye, will you please state it before this Honorable Court?
A. Yes, sir, one is Francisco Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and the

other one is Cesario Jumawan.
Q. That Francisco Jumawan whom you said was one of the persons
attacking Rodolfo Magnaye, on that particular occasion, will you be
able to recognize him if you will see him again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If this Francisco Jumawan is inside the courtroom, will you please

point him out before this Honorable Court?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please do so.
A. That one sir.
ATTY. ALCALA:
Your honor please may we ask that the person pointed to by the
witness Identify himself.
COURT:
Ask the Identity of the person pointed to by the witness.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Francisco Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness your honor Identify himself as

Francisco Jumawan.
Q. And that person whom you said the name as Manuel Jumawan
will you be able to recognize him if you will see him again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please look around the courtroom and point out to this Honorable
Court if Manuel Jumawan is here inside the courtroom.
A. Yes, sir, that one.
ATTY. ALCALA:
May we ask Your Honor that the person pointed to by the witness be
made to Identify himself.
COURT:
Ask the person pointed to by the witness to Identify himself.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?
A. Manuel Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness Your Honor Identified himself as

Manuel Jumawan.
Q. And that person whom you mentioned is named Cesario

Jumawan, will you be able to Identify him if you will him again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please look around the courtroom and point to this Honorable

Court the person whom you said is Cesario Jumawan.
That one sir.
ATTY. ALCALA:
May we request your honor that the person pointed to by the witness
Identify himself.
COURT:
Ask the person pointed to by the witness to Identify himself.
INTERPRETER:
What is your name?

A. Cesario Jumawan.
INTERPRETER:
The person pointed to by the witness Identify himself as Cesario

Jumawan Your Honor.
Q. On that occasion what was Francisco Jumawan doing at that time

you saw him?
A. He was standing besides Rodolfo Magnaye and holding his hands.
Q. Who was holding his hands?
A. Francisco Jumawan was holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye,

sir.
Q. How about Manuel Jumawan, what was he doing?
A. Manuel Jumawan was at the back of Rodolfo Magnaye with his

arm around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. How about Cesario Jumawan what was he doing on that particular

occasion?
A. He was in front of Rodolfo Magnaye, his left hand is holding the

collar of Rodolfo Magnaye and his right hand holding a bolo, sir.
Q. How about Presentacion Jumawan, what was she doing on that

particular occasion?
A. She was standing inside the store ordering the three persons to
stab and kill Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. What happened when Presentacion Jumawan give that order?
A. Rodolfo Magnaye was stabbed, sir.
Q. Who stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye on that occasion?
A. Cesario Jumawan, sir.
Q. At that time that Cesario Jumawan stabbed Rodolfo Magnaye on

that particular occasion, what were Francisco Jumawan and Manuel
Jumawan doing.?
A. Francisco Jumawan was holding the hands of Rodolfo Magnaye

with his arms around the neck of Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. What happened to Rodolfo Magnaye when he was stabbed by
Cesario Jumawan on that occasion?
A. He was hit by the stab, sir.
Q. Where was Rodolfo Magnaye hit by the stab of Cesario Jumawan

on that occasion?
A. Under the right nipple, sir. Below the right nipple.
Q. What did Rodolfo Magnaye do on that particular occasion after he

was hit?
A. He said, why did you stab me.
Q. What did you do after that?
A. I left, sir.
Q. While you were walking away did you hear anything?
.A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did you hear?
A. A voice of a woman shouting, thief, thief.
Q. What did you do when you heard the shout of a woman?
A. I hurriedly walked away, sir.
Q. Did you finally came to know what happened to Rodolfo Magnaye

as a result of that incident?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened to him?
A. He died, sir. (t.s.n., pp. 494-509.)
Policarpio Trinidad was 28 years old and a laborer at the time he first testified on June 27, 1977. He
testified that he knew Manuel Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan and Rodolfo Magnaye; that on June 19,
1976, at about 11:00 p.m., he was in Sariaya, Quezon, near the old station of the BLTB; and on that
occasion he saw the aforesaid persons thus:
Q. Will you please describe before this Honorable Court their position
when you saw them?
A. Their hands were on the shoulders of each other.

Q. And who was in the middle?
A. Rodolfo Magnaye, sir.
Q. Will you please tell this Honorable Court the appearance of

Rodolfo Magnaye when you saw him being in the middle of Cesario
Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan on that occasion?
A. His head falls and his two hands were on the shoulder of Cesario
Jumawan and Manuel Jumawan.
Q. Did you see where these persons were going on that particular
occasion when you said you saw them?
ATTY. CUARTOY
Objection Your Honor, that has already been answered, that they are
going out of the old BLTB station.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
A. They cross the highway, sir.
Q. In what particular place did they go when they cross the highway?
A.. They went to the road opposite the Emil Welding Shop, sir.
Q. Did you see on that particular occasion whether Rodolfo Magnaye

was walking?
A. He was not walking and he cannot step his feet, sir.
Q. When they went to that place, near the Emil Welding Shop, did
they go any further?
A. They proceeded walking, sir.
Q. Where did you go upon seeing them?
A. I went directly to my house, sir.
(t.s.n., pp. 628-631.)
The testimony of Vicente Recepeda linked to that of Trinidad Alcantara and Policarpio Trinidad
shows that the four appellants conspired and cooperated in the assassination of Rodolfo Magnaye.
The victim and his wife had a rendezvous in the evening of June 19, 1976, in order to discuss the
fate of their marriage. While it is not known if they actually conversed, the purpose of the rendezvous
was in fact accomplished; the marriage was terminated by the murder of the husband.
The report to the police by Presentacion that Rodolfo Magnaye had attempted to rob the store of
Sebastiana Jumawan was a crude diversionary tactic to enable Cesario and Manuel to transfer the
cadaver to another place.
The alibis of Francisco, Cesario and Manuela are for naught.
Francisco claimed that in the evening of June 19, 1976, he was in the house of Sebastiana
Jumawan, not in her store. Cesario said that while his residence was Barrio Pili, Sariaya, on the
night of June 19, 1976, he and his wife were in Barrio Sampaloc, Sariaya, visiting his brother
Benigno Jumawan and they did not return to Pili until the next day. Manuel said that on the night of
June 19, 1976, he was in his house at Barrio Pili.
These alibi cannot prevail for the following reasons: (a) Francisco, Cesario and Manuel were
positively Identified to be at the scene of the crime by Vicente Recepeda and Cesario and Manuel
were similarly Identified by Policarpio Trinidad; and (b) the places where they claimed to be were not
far from the scene of the crimeso that it was not impossible fro them to be there. Sebastiana
Jumawan's house where Francisco was supposed to be is within walking distance from the former's
store. Barrio Sampaloc, where Cesario claimed he was, is only about three kilometers from
the poblacion of Sariaya. Barrio Pili, where Manuel said he slept that night, is about five kilometers
from the same poblacion.
Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the
deceased is not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only
qualified by abuse of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be

assigned against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands
convicted of murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law
aggravate the crime. (Aquino, Penal Code, Vol. I. p. 406 [1976].)
The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary
votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the jugment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in toto. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133436. April 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. CONRADO
AYUMAN, appellant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional
[1]
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 97-1040
finding Conrado Ayuman, appellant, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. He was also
adjudged to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Information charging appellant with parricide reads:
That on or about April 22, 1997, in the City of Cagayan de Oro, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there
willfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and taking advantage of superior strength
and ascendancy over Sugar Ray Ayuman, his legitimate son, maul, maltreat and kill
the latter by slapping and hitting the latter on his head, stomach and other parts of the
latters young and tender body thereby inflicting upon the latter traumatic abdominal
injuries, which are fatal injuries and which caused the latters death shortly thereafter,
to the damage and prejudice of the said Sugar Ray Ayuman and his legal heirs.
Upon arraignment, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not

guilty to the crime charged.
The version of the prosecution was established through the testimonies of
Dr. Tammy Uy, Marino Jalalo, SPO1 Salome Catulong, Ederico Mariano,
Angelito Roluna, Grace Songcuya and SPO1 Medel Makalino.
On April 22, 1997 at around 10:15 in the morning, Ermita Ayuman,
appellants wife, rushed her five-year old son Sugar Ray to the Emergency
Room of the Northern Mindanao Medical Center (NMMC). When Ederico
Mariano, a nurse, took the childs vital signs, it appeared that he was dead on
arrival. Ederico then asked Ermita what happened to the child. She answered
that he was mauled by his father. Ermitas statement was noted in the
emergency room record. [2]
At about 10:45 in the morning of the same day, SPO1 Salome Catulong of
Police Precinct No. 1 of Cagayan de Oro City, received a phone call from the
NMMC informing her that a child died because he was assaulted by his
father. Being in charge of cases involving women and children, she immediately
proceeded to the hospital. Angelito Roluna, a newspaper reporter of the Sun
Star, was with her. Ermita refused to answer any query from SPO1 Catulong
regarding the death of her son. But when Roluna asked her what happened,
she told him that Sugar Ray was mauled by his father. This interview could
[3]
only be finished the following day when Ermita admitted to him that appellant
used to hurt the child every time the latter left the house or made mistake; that
before he died, appellant kicked him; and that the child informed her he was in
pain and vomiting. Roluna reported this interview in the Sun Star.
Also on that same day, April 22, 1997, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening,
SPO1 Catulong went to the Ayuman residence. That was the start of the wake
for Sugar Ray. When SPO1 Catulong interviewed Ermita, she stated that
appellant maltreated the boy in order to discipline him and that appellant started
to hit him at the age of four. Upon suggestion of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita agreed
that the body of the child be autopsied. [4]
On April 23, 1997, Dr. Tomas L. Uy of the NBI, Region 10, Cagayan de Oro
City, performed the autopsy on the body of Sugar Ray. Prior thereto, he learned
from Ermita that the child was maltreated by appellant in their house on April
22, 1997 at about 10:30 in the morning. [5]
Dr. Uys Autopsy Report contains the following findings:
Pallor, generalized. Rigor mortis, lower extremities. Livor mortis, generalized, back,
buttocks, posterior aspects of the neck and extremities. Areas of post-mortem greenish
discolorations of the abdomen and inferior aspects of the chest are noted.
ABRASIONS: 0.2X0.4 cms. And 0.3X0.6 cm., lower thoracic region of the back,
mid-aspect; 3X2 cms., right iliac region, lateral aspect.
HEMATOMAS, violaceous: 2.2X1 cms. Forehead, right side; 1.5X2 cms., 2.5X2
cms., 1.2X1.6 cms., and 3X0.8 cms., left side of the face; (page 2-A, record) 1.8X1.2
cms., right elbow region; 4X2.5 cms., dorsum of right hand; 2.4X1.2 cms., left
forearm, dorsal aspect, dista third; 2.5X2.2 cms., lower sternal region of the chest;
6X3 cms., epigastric region of the abdomen.
HEMATOMA, 6X2 cms., surface of the pericardium, anterior aspect, beneath the
sternum.
HEMATOMA, stomach, 5X2 cms., lesser curvature region, anterior aspect.
LACERATED WOUND, 1.5 cms. long, with irregular edges, right lobe of the liver,
medial aspect, overlying the gall bladder, surrounded by a HEMATOMA of 4X3 cms.
RUPTURE, small intestine, ileal region/portion; with irregular edges.

PERITONITIS, generalized, aero-purulent; with extensive intestinal and mesenteric
adhesions; serosal surfaces of the small and large intestines are markedly congested
and covered with patches of foul-smelling yellowish purulent exudates. Peritoneal
fluid is heavily contaminated with fecal matter.
Heart chambers, contain smell amount of dark fluid and clotted blood.
Stomach, contains about 1 tbsp. of yellowish-green bilous substance.
Brain, markedly congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Traumatic abdominal injuries.
On April 23, 1997, Sugar Ray was buried. Appellant was nowhere to be
found. Neither did he report for work from April 23 to May 21, 1997. During the [6]
burial, Ermita cried and shouted, Dong, forgive your father. Dong, dont leave
us. Afterwards, upon invitation of SPO1 Catulong, Ermita, with her two children,
went to the formers office and executed the following statement quoted as
follows:
01. Q - Do you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth in your statement
now?
A - Yes, I will swear.
02. Q - Please state your name, age, address and other personal circumstances?
A - I am Ermita Ayuman y Mayuela, 36 years of age, married, presently
residing at Pilgrim Compound, Del Pilar/ Magsaysay Street, Cagayan de Oro
City and originated from Manuikan, Zamboanga del Norte, a mother of 3
children, 2 girls and one boy.
03. Q - Why are you here at the police Station at OKK Police Precinct No. 1?
A - I am here to file a criminal complaint against my own husband PO3
Conrado Ayuman an active member of Cagayan de Oro Central Fire Station,
for killing our only son Sugar Ray Ayuman, 5 yrs. Old, Kinder 2 at Faith
Tabernacle situated at Del Pilar/Magsaysay, Cagayan de Oro City.
04. Q - When and where did this happen?
A - This happened on April 22, 1997 at 10:30 in the morning more or less from
our house at Del Pilar/Magsaysay going to Northern Mindanao Medical Center
but died on arrival at the hospital and the mauling which was done by his father
happened in our house and this the cause of the death of my son.
05. Q - Please narrate shortly the incident.
A - The father of Sugar Ray started mauling him when he was then 4 years
old until the age of 5. His father would kick, box, slap, and beat him even if he
just committed slight mistakes. If Sugar Ray would go out from our room to
watch TV at our neighbors place his father would be furious and would beat
him. And on Monday, April 21, 1997, at 10:00 a.m., more or less, my husband
came home from office to get something. He called Ray because that time
Ray went out from our room, and immediately slapped him and the head of
Ray bumped on the wall. He let Ray get inside our room, slapped him again
and I saw my husband kick Ray many times hitting his abdomen. I tried to stop
him but he would not listen and instead kicked Ray several times because as
what he said I must discipline my child because he is a boy. He easily gets
angry even for slightest mistakes.
06. Q - What else can you say?
A - In that afternoon at past 1:00 oclock of same day, he came home from his
work to get epoxy to repair his radio, and he saw Ray wiping his hands and
suddenly hit Rays head and said You will go out again as your mother is
sleeping. But that time I was not yet asleep and I heard everything that he said
to the child then looked for a chain but there was none; he saw a rope and tied
the neck of my son to the bed, so Ray could not go out and even told me not
to untie the knot until the child sleeps, then he left going back to his office.
07. Q - What other things happened?
A - The following day April 22, 1997 at 9:00 oclock in the morning my husband
was at home from a 24 hours duty before that day. He saw me wiping the
hands of Ray with wet face towel and asked me by saying Is Ray having
fever? Its because he is disobedient. He told the child to stand up by saying
stand up Ray. Ray then stood up and felt nauseated and was about to vomit
and told Ray Pretentious child hes just pretending to vomit. Ray lay down
again and I continued wiping him and massage him with sanitary balm as he
felt cold and was sweating and at that time seemed to have hard time
breathing. I could not determine his way of breathing, sometimes very fast,
and then my husband approached Ray and put his clenched fist on Rays face
and commanded Ray to squat then let Ray stand up and squat with open
hands in front his knees. I told him to stop Ray from squatting, then Ray lay
down again but rose up and vomited and I saw him vomit with blood and I was
so scared so I brought my child to Northern Mindanao Medical Center, and
while on our way on board motorela going to said hospital, Ray was able to
say Mang, maybe I will die now and I told him, You wont die Do because we
will go to the hospital. At that time I noticed Ray having hard time breathing
and upon arrival at the emergency room of said hospital the nurse touched his
pulse and declared that my son died on arrival. I could not believe that my son
was already dead and did not know what to do that time. I just embraced him
and kept on crying.
08. Q - Did your husband know at that time that Sugar Ray is already dead?
A - Yes, because he was informed by his sibling who accompanied us to the
hospital but my husband that time did not go with us to said hospital and as
what I knew from his sibling that he told his manong (my husband) that Sugar
Ray is already dead and his response was bury him and until now my husband
has not yet appeared.
09. Q - I have no more questions, do you have something more to add?
A - No more as of now.
10. Q - Will you sign your statement voluntarily without being coerced or intimidated
by anybody?
A - Yes, I will sign. (Affidavit as translated, pages 185-186, records).
(Signed) ERMITA
MAYUELA AYUMAN
(Af
fiant)[7]
Thereafter, SPO1 Catulong and Ermita proceeded to the office of Grace

Songcuya, Clerk of Court of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cagayan de Oro
City. Ermita subscribed and sworn to before Songcuya the truth of her
statement given before SPO1 Catulong.
However, on May 15, 1997, Ermita executed an affidavit retracting what she
stated in her sworn statements. Nonetheless, the City Prosecutor filed with the
court a quo the corresponding Information and eventually issued a warrant of
arrest against appellant. SPO1 Catulong arrested appellant at the Central Fire
Station, Cagayan de Oro City. [8]
Marino Jalalo, testified that he and appellants family are

neighbors. Appellant has three children, two girls and a boy. But he was
particularly violent to his son Sugar Ray. Every time the boy committed a
mistake, appellant would punish him inside a room. About 3 to 4 times a month,
appellant would hit the child with a belt or a stick and he could only cry. Once,
Marino heard the child gasping for breath as if he was being drowned by
appellant. At one time, the boy approached Marino and asked for something to
eat, saying Tatay, did you hear me a while ago? At that moment, Marino noticed
that the childs head was partly swollen. When asked what happened to him, the
child replied, My face was pushed down. In the same month and year, appellant
locked the child inside a room. Observing that Marino was around, the child
begged him for help. [9]
The defense presented as its witnesses appellant and his wife Ermita.
Appellant denied killing his son Sugar Ray. He testified that on April 22,
1997, when he came home at around 9:00 oclock in the morning, he saw his
son on bed. His wife was rubbing sanitary balm on him. While he was having
breakfast, he noticed that his son was pale, had fever and was vomiting. So he
told his wife to bring the child to the hospital. Initially, she was reluctant because
they had no money, but he insisted. On the same day, he went to Pagadian to
borrow money from his relatives. He returned home on April 27, 1992. Ermita
told him that Sugar Ray died because an unidentified person slapped and
kicked him at the Cogon market. At that time, his son was already buried. The
couple then went to the Office of the Prosecutor to tell the truth. [10]
On cross examination, appellant admitted he was strict with his children and
disciplined them in a military way. [11]
After hearing the case, the trial court rendered its Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Conrado Ayuman guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of parricide committed by killing his minor son, Sugar Ray
Ayuman, aggravated by treachery, lack of respect due to Sugar Rays tender age,
cruelty and abuse of confidence, and thereby hereby sentences him to death, to
indemnify the heirs of Sugar Ray Ayuman in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs of this case.
His custodian is hereby also ordered to ship him to the National Penitentiary
immediately, or without delay.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant now raises the following assignments of error:

I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT

NOTWITHSTANDING THE LACK OF EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DISMISSING THE AFFIDAVIT OF

DESISTANCE FILED BY THE COMPLAINANT AND IN DISREGARDING
HER TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT. [12]
Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove by evidence beyond

reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the crime charged. In fact, there is no
evidence directly pointing to him as the culprit. What the prosecution presented
are mere hearsay evidence and assumption. While SPO1 Catulong testified
that Ermita executed a sworn statement on September 22, 1997, however,
Ermita denied its veracity. Her affidavit of desistance tells all.
Appellant likewise maintains that the circumstantial evidence enumerated
by the trial court in its assailed Decision do not support any finding of parricide.
For his part, the Solicitor General, in the appellees brief, maintains that
Ermitas affidavit of recantation is an afterthought and exceedingly
unreliable. Moreover, the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court
sustains the conviction of appellant of the crime charged.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, defines and penalizes parricide as follows:
Article 246. Parricide. Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall
be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death.
The elements of the crime of parricide are: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother
or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of the accused or any of his
ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. The key element here is the
relationship of the offender with the victim. [13]
All the above elements were sufficiently proven by the prosecution,

specifically on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
In People vs. Almoguerra and Aton, we held:
[14]
Direct evidence of the commission of the crime charged is not the only matrix
wherefrom a court may draw its conclusions and findings of guilt. The rules on
evidence and case law sustain the conviction of appellants through circumstantial
evidence.
Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court on circumstantial evidence,
the following requisites must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance;
(2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
The following circumstances cited by the trial court led us to conclude that
the prosecution proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
killed his son, thus:
1. Appellant has the propensity in maltreating his son. He himself testified
that he disciplined the victim by inflicting on him serious corporal punishment
akin to the military approach;
[15]
2. Marino Jalalo, appellants neighbor, testified that whenever the victim

committed a mistake, appellant would bring him in a room and punish him. He
often heard the victim crying as he was being hit by appellant with a belt or a
stick. This happened about 3 to 4 times a month;
3. Appellant was at home on April 22, 1997 when Ermita rushed the victim
to the NMMC where he was declared dead on arrival;
4. Appellant immediately left after his son was rushed to the hospital by his
wife;
5. Ermita admitted to Ederico Mariano, the nurse then on duty when the
victim was rushed to the hospital, that the latter was mauled by his father. This
declaration was later entered in the NMMC emergency room record by the
same nurse;
6. Ermita, when interviewed by SPO1 Catulong and Angelito Roluna, a
newspaper reporter, also admitted to them that appellant has been maltreating
his son and mauled him before he died;
7. Dr. Tomas L. Uy who physically examined the victim found abrasions and
hematomas all over his body, as well as lacerated wound of the liver and
ruptured intestine, among others.According to Dr. Uy, Sugar Ray died of
traumatic abdominal injuries. To a layman, Dr. Uys findings readily show that
the child suffered violent blows on his body.
8. During the interment, Ermita shouted, Dong, forgive your father.
9. Although Ermita advised appellant that the victim was slapped and kicked
by an unidentified person at the Cogon market on April 21, 1997, however,
contrary to a fathers natural reaction, appellant failed to take any action to
defend a loved one or report the incident to the police;
10. Appellant did not return home immediately. In fact, he was not present
during the wake and the burial of his own son, conduct so unnatural for a father
like him.
The foregoing circumstances, when viewed in their entirety, are as
convincing as direct evidence and as such, negate appellants
innocence. Otherwise stated, the prosecution established beyond a shadow of
doubt, through circumstantial evidence, that appellant committed the crime of
parricide.
Here is a father who mercilessly abused his own son and refused to bring
him to the hospital, although on the verge of death, for prompt medical
treatment. Such a heartless conduct is condemnable and is extremely contrary
to human nature. Every father is expected to love his children and shower them
with acts of affection and tenderness. But appellant belongs to a different
breed. Indeed, he is a tyrant without mercy. His intense apathy to his dying
young son is beyond comprehension.
We have ruled that facts or circumstances which are not only consistent
with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute
evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct
evidence in its effect upon the court. [16]
But appellant discredits Ermitas sworn statement because she retracted. It

bears emphasis that mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not
necessarily vitiate the original testimony if credible, as in this case. We look with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously given in court. The rationale
for the rule is obvious: Affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from
witnesses, usually through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is exceedingly unreliable. There is always
the probability that it will later be repudiated. Thus, the trial court correctly
[17]
disregarded Ermitas affidavit of desistance. Obviously, she was influenced by

appellant to execute it. Moreover, if it were true that an unidentified person killed
their son, why did appellant fail to report the matter to the proper
authorities? There can be no other conclusion, therefore, than that Ermitas
affidavit of retraction is an afterthought, intended to exculpate appellant from
criminal liability.
Appellant, merely denied the commission of the crime and interposed the
defense of alibi. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable, unless corroborated by
disinterested witnesses. Since he was unable to substantiate his alibi with the
testimony of a credible witness, it is reduced to self-serving evidence
undeserving of any weight in law. [18]
In his desperate attempt to exculpate himself from any criminal liability,

appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove that he is the father of the
victim. While the prosecution failed to present to the trial court the victims
Certificate of Live Birth, however, both appellant and his wife Ermita admitted
during the hearing that the victim is their son. In People vs. Malabago, we [19]
ruled that oral evidence of the fact of filial relationship maybe considered. [20]
We now resolve the issue of whether the trial court imposed the correct
penalty. Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
5 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for parricide is composed of two indivisible
penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. In the case at bar, the trial court erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of confidence
and cruelty. Outright, we cannot consider these aggravating circumstances in
determining the proper penalty because they have not been alleged in the
Information. Also, there are no mitigating circumstances here.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the
commission of the crime, we impose upon the appellant the lesser penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
Regarding damages, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to the victims mother and sisters. When death occurs as a result of a
crime, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. We also
[21] [22]
award them exemplary damages in the sum of P25,000.00 considering that the
qualifying circumstance of relationship is present, this being a case of
parricide. In People vs. Catubig, we held that exemplary damages in the
[23] [24]
amount of P25,000.00 are recoverable if there is present an aggravating

circumstance (whether qualifying or ordinary) in the commission of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated March 4, 1998 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 97-1040, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that appellant
CONRADO AYUMAN is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and is ordered to pay the victims heirs P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 115987 August 23, 1995

vs.
FLORENTINO REOVEROS, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellant Florentino Reoveros was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, in Criminal Case No. 4039-B thereof. The accusatory portion of the
information alleges:
That on or about the 2nd day of June 1991, at Barangay Del Rosario, Municipality of
Buenavista, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Florentino Reoveros alias "Anoy", conspiring and
confederating together with two (2) other persons whose true names are still unknown and
whose physical descriptions were not given by available witnesses and who are still at large,
and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery, armed with
high powered firearms of unknown caliber, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said firearms one Cipriano Bulfa who, as a result
thereof, sustained gunshot wounds on different parts of his body which directly caused his
death.
That the accused attacked, assaulted and shot the victim suddenly and unexpectedly,
without giving the latter any opportunity to defend himself or to escape.1
Duly assisted by counsel, appellant entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. On May 19, 1994,
after trial on the merits, the lower court promulgated its judgment convicting appellant of the crime
charged, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused, Florentino Reoveros, of

the crime of murder, defined and punished under Art. 248(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and all the accessory
penalties, to pay the Heirs of Cipriano Bulfa, the amount of P10,000.00 for actual expenses,
P10,000.00 attorney's fees and litigation expenses, and indemnity of P50,000.00.2
Appellant has now come to us on appeal and, in his brief, he imputes to the trial court a lone
assignment of error, that is, that said court erred in convicting him.3
The pertinent confluence of facts which gave rise to this prosecution, as found by the trial court
based on and with references to the record, are concisely stated in appellee's brief 4 from which we
cull the material facts hereunder narrated.
On June 2, 1991, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, the deceased Cipriano Bulfa, together with his
wife, Marivic, and their six-month old baby, were about to retire at their house in Barangay Del
Rosario Buenavista, Quezon, when somebody called the nickname of the deceased, "Ka Pianing"
three times.
Marivic, who eventually turned out to be the only eyewitness, recognized the voice of the caller to be
that of appellant Florentino Reoveros, also known as "Ka Anoy," who was also a resident of the
same barangay.
The deceased did not answer the call. At the third call, Marivic got up, lighted and lifted
another gasera to illuminate those calling her husband who were facing the side door of the house,
and whom she could see through a small opening of about four inches on that door.
While peeping through the opening, the witness saw appellant Reoveros who was holding a long
gun with its muzzle pointing to the ground. He was in the company of two other persons, one of
whom was wearing a bonnet, while the other one was hatless and was standing a little farther
behind appellant. These two other men were not armed and she did not recognize them. Marivic
asked them what they wanted from her husband and they responded that they just wanted to talk to
him. She accordingly asked her husband to stand up and face the group who were calling him.
Thereafter, the victim got up, took a flashlight which he pointed towards the direction of the callers,
and asked them what they wanted. The latter answered that they wanted to talk to him. At this
juncture, the victim instead of going down to talk to them, retreated and sat just behind Marivic to
whom he whispered "Ka Anoy," "Ka Anoy."
Marivic then saw appellant go around the house towards the front door. He inserted the muzzle of
the gun into the slight opening thereof and then she heard four gunshots. She looked back and saw
her husband sprawled on the floor, apparently dead. Appellant and his companions then warned
Marivic against reporting the incident or else they would kill her, after which they left.
Marivic shouted for help and three persons responded to her call, namely, Rodel Soronicman and
her two aunts, Sonnylen Valonzo and Jocelyn Gonzales. Soon thereafter, Barangay Captain Vicente
Hermina and some members of the barangay council, including the father of
Marivic, Kagawad Manuel Gonzales, arrived. Hermina attended to the cadaver of the deceased.
Both Barangay Captain Hermina and Kagawad Gonzales asked Marivic if she knew who killed her
husband, but she was unable to answer their question because she was still confused and afraid.
The following morning, the corpse of the deceased was brought to the municipal building in
the poblacion of Buenavista where an autopsy was conducted by the Rural Health Officer; Dr.
Rosalita Villasanta.
Appellant did not testify, nor did he present any witness. The defense was based only on two main
arguments, firstly, that Marivic Bulfa's testimony is very doubtful, since it took her one month and a
half to report that it was appellant who killed her husband; and, secondly, that the prosecution was
unable to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt.5
The principal contention of appellant was that the lapse of one month and a half before witness
Marivic Bulfa reported the incident to the authorities and pinpointed Reoveros as the assailant
makes her testimony doubtful, unnatural unreasonable and improbable.6
The Court does not ascribe to the same view. In a large number of cases, it has been held that the
lapse of a considerable length of time before a witness comes forward to reveal the identity of the
assailant does not taint the credibility of the witness and his testimony. In the case of People
vs. Dominguez, et a1.,7 the Court explained the settled doctrine that delay on the part of the
witnesses in informing the authorities of what they know about the occurrence of a crime will not, by
itself, affect their credibility where such delay is satisfactorily explained. Likewise, in People
vs. Gamboa,8 the Court reiterated that delay on the part of the witnesses to immediately report the
identity of the offender to the police investigators does not effect their credibility, especially so when
the witnesses are related to the victim.
In the case at bar, the delay on the part of Marivic to report to the authorities that it was appellant
who killed her husband was explained in her testimony in this manner:
Q Can you tell us any reason why it took you several months to pass by
before you make (sic) up your mind to file a case for the death of your
husband?
A It was because of my fear that if I report that matter, they might retaliate,
relatives and other persons, so I thought of it carefully before filing a case. 9
Such overwhelming fear felt by witness Marivic Bulfa caused her to withhold the identity of appellant
when she was asked even by her own father as to who the assailant was. Such a reaction from the
witness is natural, spontaneous and logical, contrary to what appellant alleges. It is of common
human experience that people overcome by great fear, not only for their lives but also of those of
their loved ones, will choose to remain tight-lipped about an incident and suffer in silence, rather
than expose to risk their own safety and of those for whom they care.
As to the contention of appellant that the evidence presented by the prosecution is not sufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was the assailant of the deceased, our careful review and
assessment of the same convinces us that such defense should be rejected.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. The Court, after a thorough and conscientious evaluation of the forthright and categorical
testimony of witness Marivic Bulfa is fully convinced and morally certain that it is appellant Florentino
Reoveros who killed the deceased Cipriano Bulfa in the manner testified to by said witness.
Marivic Bulfa having positively and categorically identified appellant as the malefactor, this fact
negates the need for establishing the motive for the killing of the victim. Furthermore, in the absence
of any proof that her testimony is motivated by ill will or any other dubious cause, she falls within the
doctrine repeatedly laid down that the fact that the principal witness is the victim's wife even lends
credence to her testimony. Her natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter
her from implicating persons other than the culprits for otherwise the latter would thereby gain
immunity. 10 Consequently, that relationship does not, ipso facto, impair the credibility of the
witness. 11
The defense was completely unable to undermine or erode the reliability of Marivic's declarations in
court. During the cross-examination, she neither wavered nor equivocated in her contentions. The
main argument of the defense was on the supposed inconsistency between the verbal testimony of
Marivic, that it was the right hand of appellant holding the gun, and that of her demonstration in court
whereby, merely to show that appellant had a gun, she happened to use her left hand. 12 This alleged
inconsistency is so trivial that his Court cannot even consider it material to the purpose of her
testimony, which was simply to establish that appellant was carrying a gun. In fact, when queried on
the specific issue of which hand of the appellant held the gun, she remained steadfast and firm in
testifying that he held that gun with his right, and not with his left, hand. 13
On the alleged improbability that Marivic could have seen appellant shoot the deceased through the
small opening in the side door, appellant's theory is untenable. It was established by the prosecution
and uncontroverted by the defense that the witness lighted an additional gasera, aside from that
which was already lit and being used by them at the time, to enable her to clearly see the callers of
her husband. 14 Furthermore, the distance between the witness and appellant was only two meters,
making it easy for her to clearly see him and perceive his movements. 15
This was clearly explained in her testimony, as follows:
Atty. Trinidad:
Q From that position of the person holding the gun, he went to that
place in front of your front door, is that what you mean?
A Yes, sir, to that door where there is a slight opening.
Q So when you first saw the gunman holding the gun with his right
hand the shot has not yet been fired?
A Yes, sir.
Q It was only when he went around the front door with an opening
when the muzzle of the gun was inserted on the door, is that what
you mean?
A Yes, sir.
Q You are not then possibly and absolutely sure whether that person
holding that gun whom you saw in front of that open door is the very
same person who inserted the muzzle of the gun on the front door of
your house because you did not see the person go around?
A The person who shot my husband was the person who went
around the front door of our house, sir.
Q In spite of the fact that you were inside the house?
A Yes, sir, because the distance was just the corner and the place
was lighted. 16
All told, there is nothing in Marivic's testimony that could cast doubt on the correctness of the
conclusion of the court below that appellant shot and killed the deceased Cipriano Bulfa on
the night of June 2, 1991. The settled jurisprudential rule is that on the matter of credibility of
witnesses the findings of the trial court are given weight and the highest degree of respect by
the appellate court. 17
The prosecution having successfully discharged beyond reasonable doubt the onus
probandi imposed on it as to the guilt of appellant, it has consequently overcome the
disputable presumption of innocence in his favor. The affirmance of the conviction of
appellant by the trial court is accordingly inescapable.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Florentino

Reoveros guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-100204 March 28, 1994

vs.
AURELIO CABALHIN y DACLITAN, accused-appellant.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PADILLA, J.:
Accused Aurelio D. Cabalhin y Daclitan appeals from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73, dated 27 March 1991, finding him guilty of three(3) offenses, namely:
frustrated homicide, homicide, and parricide and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to three (3) years of prision correccional as maximum in
Criminal Case No. 3081(for frustrated homicide) imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) moths and
one (1) day of prision correccional minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor as
maximum in Criminal Case No. 3082 (for homicide); and reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No.
3094 (for parricide).
The records show that at about 3:30 in the afternoon of 22 February 1987, in Sitio Burol, Barangay
San Juan, Taytay, Rizal, the appellant stabbed, with the use of a 13-inch dagger, three (3) persons,
namely, Marianita Atison (appellant's wife), Flaviana and Rolito, both surnamed Saldivia (mother and
son).
Three (3) separate informations were filed against accused-appellant, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 3081, dated 25 May 1987, for: frustrated murder; and Criminal Case No. 3082, dated 26 May
1987, for: murder; and Criminal Case No. 3094, dated 25 May 1987, for: parricide, which
informations read as follows:
Crim. Case No. 3081
That on or about the 22nd day of February 1987, in the municipality of Taytay,
province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a deadly weapon (dagger), with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said deadly weapon one Flaviana Lacambra-
Saldivia on the right lower portion of the breast, . . . thus performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of his will,
that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Flaviana
Lacambra-Saldivia which prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW
Crim. Case No. 3082
That on or about the 22nd day of February 1987, in the Municipality of Taytay,
Province of Rizal, Philippines and within jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a dagger, with intent to kill, and by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said dagger on Rolito Saldivia y
Lacambra on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal stab
wounds which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Crim. Case No. 3094
That on or about the 22nd day of February 1987, in the municipality of Taytay,
province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with evident premeditation to kill his wife with whom he was united
in lawful wedlock, entered the house at Sitio Burol, Brgy. San Juan, Taytay, Rizal,
where she was then living separately, and said accused armed with a bladed
weapon suddenly and without warning and employing means which tended to ensure
its commission without danger to himself, did then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously, stab his wife, Marianita Atison, repeatedly, as a result of which the said
Marianita Atison met her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Criminal Case No. 3081 was originally assigned to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal Branch
73, while Criminal Case Nos. 3082 and 3094 were assigned to Branch 74 of the same court. The
latter two (2) cases were consolidated later with Criminal Case No. 3081, all three (3) cases having
arisen from the same incident.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. The three (3) cases were set
for trial. The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimonies of two (2) alleged eye-
witnesses to the commission of the crimes, namely: Robin Saldivia (brother of deceased victim
Rolito Saldivia) and Igmidio Ducay. A third witness was Romulo del Monte (a barangay tanod in
Barangay San Juan).
The testimony of Robin Saldivia is as follows:
. . . on February 22, 1987 at around 3:30 in the afternoon, he (Robin Saldivia) was in
their house in Sitio Burol, Taytay, Rizal. He was lying down with his brother Rolito
Saldivia who was sleeping on the floor. Their house had two bedrooms separated by
a sala. On the other bedroom, Marianita Atison or "Ka Nita" and his mother Flaviana
Lacambra Saldivia were talking while on the bed. All of a sudden, somebody forcibly
entered their house and so he got up and peeped behind the curtain. He saw the
accused drew a double-bladed instrument measuring about thirteen inches long from
his right side. Sensing danger, Robin Saldivia hid under their house the floor of which
was about 4 1/2 feet from the ground. While hiding under the house, he could see
the movement of the feet of the accused between the wooden slabs of the floor. Thru
these spaces, he saw the accused stabbed Marianita Atison or "Ka Nita," his mother
Flaviana Lacambra Saldivia and his brother Rolito or "Lito" Saldivia and blood even
dripped on him. After stabbing these three persons, the accused ran away. As a
result of this stabbing incident, Flaviana Saldivia sustained two stab wounds on the
breast while Marianita Atison and Rolito Saldivia died on the same day. 2
Igmidio Ducay testified as follows:
. . . on February 22, 1987 at around 3:30 P.M., he (Igmidio Ducay) was infront of the
house of Wenceslao Saldivia in Sitio Burol, Barangay San Juan, Taytay, Rizal. He
was playing "dama" with his friend Alberto Espino when a person carrying a bladed
instrument passed by. The bladed weapon or instrument has a length of 12 to 13
inches. This person suddenly entered the house of Wenceslao Saldivia by kicking
the door which was closed. Igmidio Ducay stood up and peeped through inside the
house. He saw the man suddenly stabbed Marianita Atison Cabalhin, an
acquaintance. After that, the man went down from the bedroom and suddenly
stabbed Lito who was sleeping face down (nakataob) on top of a table just below the
bedroom were Marianita Cabalhin was stabbed. He also saw the man kicked and
stabbed "Manang" or Flaviana Saldivia, wife of Wenceslao Saldivia.
Igmidio Ducay stated that he was about 4-5 meters away from the door where he
was peeping when Marianita Cabalhin, Rolito Saldivia and Flaviana Saldivia were
stabbed by the man whom he identified as the accused Aurelio Cabalhin. The door
was open and everything that was happening inside the house could be seen outside
because there was no room or partition. He saw the accused climbed the bed or
"papag" where Marianita Cabalhin and Flaviana Saldivia were sitting side by side
and the accused stabbed them while standing on the "papag." After stabbing
Marianita and Flaviana, the accused went down and proceeded to Rolito Saldivia,
who was sleeping on top of the table on the right side of the house and stabbed him
also. After Flaviana Saldivia was stabbed, Igmidio Ducay left the place and asked for
help. 3
Romulo del Monte, on the other hand, testified as follows:
1. That in that afternoon of 22 February 1987 after being informed about the stabbing
incident in the house of the Saldivias, he went to said house and saw Nita Cabalhin
and Lito Saldivia sprawled on the bed in one room of the house — Nita Cabalhin was
fully dressed while Lito Saldivia was wearing khaki pants but naked up (without T-
shirt); he did not see Wenceslao Saldivia (father of Lito Saldivia) in the house and did
not bother to ask who the author of the crime was.
2. Between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m. of that same day, he saw the accused Aurelio
Cabalhin coming out from an alley where the house of the Saldivias was located. The
accused had a white shoulder bag on his left shoulder, his right hand was inside the
bag and his pants were bloodied. Nobody told him that said person was Aurelio
Cabalhin but he was pointed to as the one who stabbed the victims. When Romulo
del Monte saw the accused coming out from an alley, he even greeted him — "O
brod, anong nangyari sa iyo at ganyan ka?" but the accused did not answer and he
just continued walking. The next time that he saw the accused was in court. (Romulo
del Monte gave a sworn statement dated 23 February 1987 in connection with this
case).4
Appellant admitted having stabbed Marianita Atison, Rolito Saldivia and Flaviana Saldivia, resulting
in the death of the first two victims (Marianita and Rolito), and in stab wounds on the breast of the
third victim (Flaviana). However, he declared that the stabbing incident occured as he caught his
wife Marianita and Rolito naked in bed and actually engaged in sexual intercourse. The evidence for
the defense consists of the testimony of the sole defense witness, appellant himself. His testimony is
as follows:
. . . He and Marianita Atison Cabalhin are husband and wife having been married on
November 23, 1972 in Calubian, Leyte (Exhibit "1"). After their marriage, they stayed
in the house of his in-laws in Guinduhaan, Wague, Leyte for more or less one year.
After that, they transferred to their own house in Wague, Leyte and stayed there for
more or less fifteen years. In 1985, they went to Manila where they worked as
caretaker of the house of Edgardo Co in Filinvest Subdivision for about seven
months. They left the employment of Edgardo Co . . . They transferred to Sucat,
Parañaque where he worked as laborer in a construction and his wife Marianita
Atison Cabalhin worked as housemaid.
xxx xxx xxx
After working as housemaid in New Alabang Village for more or less five months,
Marianita Atison Cabalhin transferred to Meralco Village, Taytay, Rizal where she
also worked as housemaid of Lola Waway. At that time, Aurelio Cabalhin was
working with Apex in San Pedro, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila and residing in Mangga
Site, Sucat, Parañaque. His wife Marianita Cabalhin who was working in Meralco
Village, Taytay, Rizal was going home to or staying with her sister Elevita Atison
Dagame in Sitio Burol, Barangay San Juan, Taytay, Rizal after her work. They
agreed that they would see each other every Sunday at Mangga Site, Sucat,
Parañaque. Aurelio Cabalhin had gone thrice to the house of his sister-in-law where
his wife was staying. On December 14, 1986, Aurelio Cabalhin went to Sitio Burol,
Barangay San Juan, Taytay, Rizal to find out the condition of his wife in the house of
Lola Waway. He saw his wife and she told him that her work was fine and she was in
good condition. He saw also his sister-in-law Elevita Dagame on that occasion.
On February 14, 1987, Elevita Dagame went to Sucat, Parañaque and asked the
accused Aurelio Cabalhin about his wife. Eleveta told him that his wife was no longer
working in the house of Lola Waway and she was not going home to their house
anymore. On February 17, 1987, the accused went to Meralco Village, Taytay, Rizal
and verified from Lola Waway if what Elevita Dagame told him was true. Lola Waway
told the accused that his wife was not working with her anymore since January 30.
Upon learning that, Aurelio Cabalhin asked the help of Elevita Dagame to gather
information regarding the whereabouts of his wife and went back to Sucat,
Parañaque.
On February 22, 1987, Aurelio Cabalhin returned to the house of Elevita Dagame in
Sitio Burol, Barangay San Juan, Taytay, Rizal, to get some informations about his
wife. When he arrived there at around 12:00 P.M., the only person in the house was
Jun Dagame who is the brother of Reynaldo Dagame, husband of Elevita. According
to Jun Dagame, Elevita went to Pasay. The accused talked with Jun Dagame and
their conversation lasted for about two hours.
Jun Dagame who was 14 years old, told the accused that his wife Marianita was in
the house of Wenceslao Saldivia and had a paramour. He wanted to know if what he
was told about his wife was true and so he went to the house of Wenceslao Saldivia
which was pointed to him by Jun Dagame who stayed at a distance of about 20
meters away from said house. He went near the door of the house of Wenceslao
Saldivia and saw Flaviana Saldivia. He asked her where his wife was and she
answered that Marianita Cabalhin was not there. The accused noticed that Flaviana
Saldivia became pale and trembled when he asked her about his wife and so he
entered the house and Flaviana Saldivia was behind him. He saw a room with curtain
and when he parted the curtain (hinawi ko po ang kurtina) he saw his wife lying with
a man on the bed. His wife was lying on her back with her legs apart while the man
was on top of her with his buttocks between the parted legs of his wife. The man and
his wife were engaged in sexual act. He boxed the legs of the man and when he
rolled over to the wall, he saw that his wife and the man were naked. Because of
anger, he lost control of himself. He saw a knife near the pillow and stabbed the
testicles of the man. His wife tried to stop him and he stabbed her also. After that, he
stabbed the man and his wife again and again. The accused testified that at the time
he was stabbing these two persons, he was already out of his mind because of
anger. He could not recall how many times he stabbed them but he was sure that all
the stab wounds were on the front portion of their bodies. He did not know what
happened to Flaviana Saldivia but on cross-examination, the accused declared that
when he stabbed the testicles of the man who he came to know as Lito Saldivia,
somebody behind him grabbed his shirt and he also stabbed that person but he does
not know if it was Flaviana Saldivia. After realizing that he had taken the law into his
hands, the accused left bringing the knife with him and walked towards the highway.
His pants were full of blood and he boarded a passenger jeep going to Crossing-
JRC. He alighted at Crossing — Mandaluyong and went to the outpost where there
was a policeman. He told the police that he was a criminal and he was brought to
Capt. Sebastian Davan at the Mandaluyong police headquarters. The accused told
Capt. Davan that he killed his wife and paramour. That evening, Capt. Davan brought
him to Taytay Police Station and he was incarcerated. . . . 5
On 27 March 1991, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty of the crimes of
frustrated homicide (as to Flaviana), homicide (as to Rolito) and parricide (as to Marianita), the
dispositive part of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Aurelio Cabalhin y Daclitan guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide in Crim. Case No. 3081,
homicide in Crim. Case No. 3082 and parricide in Crim. Case No. 3094, the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of 6 months of arresto mayor as
minimum to 3 years of prision correccional as maximum in Crim. Case No. 3081;
imprisonment of 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum in Crim. Case No. 3082 and reclusion
perpetua in Crim. Case No. 3094.
The accused shall be credited with the preventive imprisonment he has undergone
pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.
6127.6
In this appeal, appellant contends: (1) that he killed his wife Marianita and Rolito Saldivia under the
exceptional circumstances provided under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury,
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any kind, he shall be exempt from
punishment.
and (2) that the crime he committed against the person of the other victim, Flaviana Lacambra-
Saldivia was only serious physical injuries, not frustrated homicide.
We find no merit in the appeal.
As to the issue on the applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bench,
the principal question is whether or not appellant killed his wife Marianita and Rolito as he caught
them in the act of committing the sexual act, or immediately thereafter. The appellant contends that
in that fateful afternoon of 22 February 1987, he entered a room in the house of the Saldivia family
and saw that his wife was "lying on her back with her legs apart while the man was on top of her with
his buttocks between the parted legs of his wife." Both the prosecution and defense witnesses gave
different versions as to the actual location, position and condition of Marianita and Rolito at the time
appellant saw them — in short, whether they were engaged in the sexual act when allegedly caught
by the appellant in the afternoon of 22 February 1987.
It is noted that the trial court gave great weight to the testimony of the prosecution witness, Romulo
del Monte (the barangay tanod) whom the trial court believed to be an unbiased witness, and who
testified that when he saw Marianita and Rolito on that fateful afternoon of 22 February 1987,
Marianita was fully dressed while Rolito was wearing Khaki pants without T-shirt or naked up. The
trial court said:
The claim of the accused that he saw his wife lying on her back with her legs apart
while Rolito Saldivia was on top of her with his buttocks between her parted legs is
hard to believe if not unworthy of belief in view of his testimony that the two were
covered with blanket from their shoulders down to their feet when he first saw them
(pp. 26-27, t.s.n., 3/21/90). Considering that Marianita Cabalhin and Rolito Saldivia
were covered with blanket from shoulders to feet, it is impossible for the accused to
see their exact position which he described in detail and what they were doing. The
testimony of the accused that his wife and Rolito Saldivia were both naked while
engaged in the carnal act was belied by Barangay Tanod Romulo del Monte who
went to the scene of the crime minutes after the stabbing incident. Romulo del
Monte, an unbiased witness, declared that when he saw Nita Cabalhin and Lito
Saldivia bloodied and sprawled on the bed in one room of the house, Nita Cabalhin
was fully dressed while Lito Saldivia was wearing Khaki pants without T-shirt or
naked up (pp. 20-21, t.s.n., 6/7/88). It should be remembered that when this stabbing
incident happened, the only persons in the house of Wenceslao Saldivia were Robin
Saldivia, Rolito Saldivia, Flaviana Saldivia and Marianita Atison Cabalhin; Wenceslao
Saldivia was not at home as he was drinking and eating in the house of his friend
(pp. 3-4, t.s.n., 2/17/88): Robin Saldivia who was 13 years old, left their house after
the victims were stabbed to call and inform his father about the incident; Marianita
Atison Cabalhin died as a result of the stab wounds inflicted upon her; Rolito Saldivia
who was seriously wounded was then fighting for life as he died also on the same
day while Flaviana Saldivia was also wounded on her breast and in serious
condition. It is therefore, highly inconceivable and improbable that the victims Rolito
Saldivia and Marianita Cabalhin could still put in their clothes if indeed they were
naked.7
It is settled rule that the findings of fact of trial courts are given great on appeal because they are in a
better position to examine the real evidence, and observe the demeanor of the witnesses, and can
therefore discern if they are telling the truth or not.8 We therefore find no reversible error committed
by the trial court in appreciating the testimony of Romulo del Monte. Hence, as to the factual issue of
whether Marianita and Rolito were engaged in sexual intercourse when allegedly caught by
appellant, we will respect the factual finding made by the trial court as the same is supported by the
evidence on record.
Under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, the killing of the wife by the husband (or vice-versa) is
justified if the husband kills her while engaged in sexual intercourse with another man or immediately
thereafter. As to the strict application of Article 247, People vs. Wagas9 teaches that:
. . . The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful

wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does a man to chastise her,
even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so serve as that it
can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it
must be resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
Clearly in the present case, appellant failed to prove that he killed Marianita and Rolito while in the
act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Therefore, appellant can not invoke Article 247 to
be exempt from criminal liability. He is guilty of parricide under Article 246 of the Code, which
provides that any person who shall kill his or her spouse shall be punished by the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
As to the second argument, appellant contends that he is guilty only of serious physical injuries, not
frustrated homicide as he had then no intent to kill the victim, Flaviana.
In applying Article 249 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the essential element of intent to kill the victim
must be clearly established in order to convict one of the crime of homicide. The trial court ruled that
there was intent to kill on the part of the appellant, considering "the number and location of the stab
wounds inflicted upon the victim (Flaviana) — two stab wounds on the lower right breast, and the
weapon used by the accused which was a double bladed dagger measuring about 13 inches
including the handle."
Taking into consideration the number and location of the stab wounds sustained by Flaviana, this
Court believes, as aptly observed by the trial court, that there was intent to kill when appellant
attacked and wounded Flaviana. We, therefore uphold the ruling of the trial court finding appellant
guilty of frustrated homicide in having attacked Flaviana.
The trial court ruled that the appellant was entitled to two (2) mitigating circumstances; the first, for
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obsfuscation (as
provided for in Article 13, paragraph no. 6, of the Revised Penal Code) and, the second, for
voluntary surrender (Article 13, paragraph no. 7 of the same Code).
The records show that on 22 February 1987 appellant went to the house of the Saldivia family after
being informed that he would find there his wife (Marianita) together with her alleged paramour,
Rolito Saldivia. The stabbing incident happened, according to the trial court, because appellant
acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obsfuscation. The
evidence further discloses that after appellant stabbed the three (3) victims, he voluntarily went to
the Taytay Police Station on that same night of 22 February 1987 and surrendered to Police Captain
Davan.
We uphold the ruling of the trial court in appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances above-
cited.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Criminal Cases Nos. 3081, 3082, and
3094 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97961. September 5, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY TALISIC y

VILLAMOR, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The accused-appellant admits having killed his wife but insists that he did
so only after surprising her in the very act of sexual intercourse with another
man. However, he fails to substantiate the stringent elements required by law
to absolve him of criminal responsibility. His defense appears no more than an
amalgam of confusion, contradiction and concoction.
Statement of the Case
The foregoing sums up our ruling in this appeal from the Decision of the [1]
Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte, Branch 5, in Criminal Case
No. 1969, finding accused-appellant guilty of parricide.
Second Assistant City Fiscal Norma B. Siao charged accused-appellant in
an Information dated May 13, 1988, which reads as follows:
That on or about May 8, 1988, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived a deliberate
intent to kill his wife Janita Sapio Talisic, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife,
as a result of said attack, the said Janita Sapio Talisic died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
Arraigned on October 26, 1988, the accused, with the assistance of

Counsel de Oficio Daniel T. Bayron, pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial [2]
ensued in due course. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its Decision, which
disposed as follows:
The foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the inculpatory evidence of the
prosecution quite satisfying and sufficient to establish that the crime of parricide was
committed here and that the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
WHEREFORE, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua, and to indemnify for civil liability the heirs of the victim in the amount of
(P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED. [3]
In view of the penalty imposed, the accused appealed directly to this Court.
The Facts
Version of to the Prosecution
The facts as gathered from the testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses Dr.

Regino Gaite, Danilo Talisic and Victoria Sapyo Tautho are as follows:
Sixteen-year old Danilo Talisic testified that at dawn of May 8, 1988, his mother,
Janita Talisic, was stabbed to death with a chisel by his father Jimmy Talisic, who
afterwards displayed the bloodied weapon before their altar. Realizing that his mother
was already dead, Danilo decided to bring his younger sister to their grandfathers
house. They passed by the house of their aunt, Victoria Sapyo Tautho, a sister of the
[4]
deceased, and related to her the bizarre killing. The latter hurried to the house of the
deceased, arriving at six oclock that morning. She was aghast at the bludgeoned body
of her sister and the bloodstained chisel at the altar. In the meantime, Danilo also
[5]
related the killing to his paternal grandfather, Simon Talisic, who thereupon
proceeded to the house of his son, Accused-appellant Jimmy Talisic, and brought the
latter to the military camp at Tipanoy, Iligan City.[6]
Substantially corroborating Danilos testimony, Victoria Sagio Tautho stated that she
found her sisters lifeless body sprawled on the floor of their living room, as well as
the crimson-drenched chisel at the altar.
Dr. Regino Gaite examined the body of the deceased and issued the
necropsy report (Exhibit B). On the stand, he described the sixteen stab wounds
inflicted on the victim, as follows:
Q During the examination on the 16 stab wounds you have mentioned, will you please
tell this Honorable Court how deep was the penetration of these injuries on the dead
body of the victim?
A Some were four inches deep; some were two, depending on the site of the body.
Q I would like to call your attention to this document, and tell us how deep was the
penetration of the injuries Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5 and this No. 6, which is in the neck of the
victim?
A Four inches deep.
Q In your opinion, Doctor, these particular injuries numbered you have indicated, will
these be sufficient to cause the death of the victim?
A Numbers 2, three are in the external region; Nos. 4 and 5 are above the heart; then
No. 6 is in the carotid region, leftside.
Q What about the injuries on the left arm of the victim, Dr., how deep was the
penetration indicated, Nos. 10, on the left arm of the victim, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and
16?
A Two inches deep. [7]
According to him, these multiple wounds resulted in hemorrhage and shock

which ultimately caused the death of the victim. [8]
Version of the Defense
The defense presented only the testimony of Jimmy Talisic which is

summarized in the six-page Appellants Brief, dated November 4, 1991, as
[9]
follows:
Testifying for his defense, accused-appellant declared that between the hours of 3:00
and 4:00 in the early morning of May 8, 1988, she (sic) was requested by his wife to
fetch water from a well as they had earlier (planned) to go to the city together. As
requested, he then fetched water from a well about 200 meters away from their house
which took him about 30 minutes to do so. When he came back from the well and
while climbing up the stairs, he was surprised to see a man lying on top of his
wife. He tried to draw his bolo and stabbed the man who, however, was able to run
away. He tried to run after him but did not overtake him. He came back to their house
but only to be met by a stabbing thrust from his wife using a chisel. He was not hit as
he was able to parry the blow, thus prompting him to grab the chisel from his wife. He
lost his temper and stabbed her to death.
Issue
In his brief, appellant contends:
The trial court erred in not finding that accused-appellant had killed his wife under
exceptional circumstances and in not applying the provision of Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The crucial question in this appeal is whether the totality of the evidence
presented before the trial court justifies the application of Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.
The Courts Ruling
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Applicability of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code

At the outset, it must be underscored that appellant admits killing his
wife. This is clear from his testimony:
Q Can your recall where were you between the hours of 3:00 and 4:00 A.M. of May 8,
1988?
A Yes.
Q Where were you?
A I fetched water from the well.
Q Where is this well located?
A In the lower portion of my house.
Q How far is this well from your house?
A 200 meters.
Q Can you describe to the court the condition of the road going to that well where you
fetched water?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Please describe to the Honorable Court?
A It is rolling.
Q Were you able to fetch water from the well?
A Yes.
Q Now, will you please tell the Court why you fetch water at this early morning of
May 8, 1988?
A I fetched water because we were planning to go down early to the city.
Q You said we, who is your companion?
A My wife is my companion in going down to the City, so she requested me to fetch
water so she can take a bath.

Q Are you referring to the late Janita Sapio?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where (sic) you able to go back to your house after fetching water from the well?
A Yes.
Q When you reached your house, what did you discover if there was any?
A When I arrived home and climbed up the stairs, I put the plastic container of water,
and I saw a man lying on top of my wife. I drew my bolo and stabbed the man, but I
was not able to hit the man because he ran away.
Q What did you do after, when you said that the man who was lying on top of your
wife ran away?
A I ran after him.
Q Were you able to catch up with that man?
A. No, I was not able to catch up.
Q What did you do next?
A When I went back to my house, I was stabbed by my wife with a chisel because
there was a chisel placed on the wall.
Q What did you do when you were stabbed by your wife with [the] chisel?
A I was able to parry it and grabbed the chisel from her.
Q What did you do next after grabbing the chisel from your wife?
A I lost my temper because I was so mad, so I stabbed her because she was unfaithful
to our marriage because we were legally married.
Q Do you know who was that man you saw on top of your wife?
A. No, I was not able to recognize because it was dark. [10]
However, he argues that he killed his wife under the exceptional

circumstance provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any
legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
shall suffer the penalty of destierro. xxx.
An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. Article [11]
247 is an example of an absolutory cause. Explaining the rationale for this, the
Court held:
x x x. The vindication of a mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful

wife creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even
with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe that it can only
be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be
resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted
only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. [12]
Having admitted the killing, the accused must now bear the burden of
showing the applicability of Article 247. Accordingly, the defense must prove
the following:
1. That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his spouse (or his daughter,
under 18 years of age and living with him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person.
2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of them any
serious physical injury in the act or immediately thereafter.
3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse. [13]
We stress that the burden of proof to show the concurrence of all three
elements rests on the defense. Most critically, Appellant Jimmy Talisic must
prove that he caught his wife in flagrante delicto; that he killed her while she
was in the very act of voluntary sexual intercourse with another man or
immediately thereafter. Sadly for him, he has miserably failed to do so.
In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by this general rule:
x x x, when the question is raised as to whether to believe the version of the

prosecution or that of the defense, the trial courts choice is generally viewed as correct
and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having
had the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the witness
stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies, and therefore could better
discern if such witnesses were telling the truth; the trial court is thus in the best
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case, his assessment on credibility must be respected.
[14]
After a thorough review of the records of this case, we find no reason -- as

indeed appellant has failed to provide any -- to overturn the trial courts well-
reasoned ruling. Verily, the claim of the accused-appellant is thoroughly
unworthy of belief. He was unable to controvert the finding of the trial court as
follows:
The version of the accused that he caught the victim in flagrante delicto of adultery is
quite difficult to swallow hook, line and sinker. It is very unlikely for a wife in her
right senses to indulge in marital infidelity knowing that her husband is just around
the corner and would soon come back because he was just away for a short while to
fetch water. If there was tryst, the victim could have chosen to perpetrate the
adulterous act not in the living room of their very own house. The plausible place of
assignation would have been outside to avoid impending danger of being caught.
One thing more, it is very unlikely that after the victim was caught in flagrante, she
would just stay put, watch her husband run berserk, chasing her paramour with a
lethal weapon (bolo). The normal reaction of one in this kind of dreadful situation is
to swiftly flee from the scene while there is yet time.
This assertion of the accused is simply out of this world to contemplate. All the more
it became weird when he further said that the victim prepared to meet him with a
chisel since he was carrying a long bolo.
If the accused was attacked by the victim with a chisel, would he not use his bolo
since he was admittedly raging mad due to the victims infidelity? Why used [sic] a
chisel when the bolo in hand was more handy? [15]
We agree with these conclusions of the court a quo for they are manifestly
founded on the oft-repeated dictum that [e]vidence, to be believed, must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself
- such as the common experience of mankind can approve as probable under
the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance. [16]
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that appellant did indeed surprise his
wife in flagrante delicto, his account of subsequent events is implausible. It is
difficult to believe his story of how, upon catching sight of the infidelity, he
immediately drew his bolo and hacked but missed the other man who,
amazingly, had sufficient time to pull up his pants, button up, elude said attack
and escape unscathed. Further, his claim that he did not recognize the man or
even see his face is irreconcilable with his insistence that the color of the latters
short pants was yellow. His declarations as to the location of the alleged
paramours short pants are also conflicting. Worse, the defense of appellant is
belied by his own incredible and inconsistent testimony.
Appellants testimony quoted earlier, in which he admits killing his wife and
[17]
describes the circumstances attending the same, is clearly incompatible with

his further account, viz.:
Q After you fetched water from the well located 200 meters from your house, what
time did you reach your house?
A I estimated it around 30 minutes.
Q You said and I would like to refresh your memory that you fetched water between
the hours of 3:00 and 4:00 in the morning, please inform this Honorable Court, Jimmy
Talisic, whether upon reaching your house it was still dark or the sun was about to
rise?
A The surrounding is still dark.
Q By the way, Jimmy Talisic, is your house well-lighted?
A No, very small, kerosene lamp.
Q Now, you said also upon reaching your house you were confronted with a sight
wherein you saw a man lying on top of your wife, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q And that immediately you released the plastic container of the water and drew your
bolo and stabbed the man who was lying on top of your wife, is that correct?
A He immediately ran.
Q Now, Jimmy Talisic, will you please convince the Honorable Court whether the
person that you have seen on that particular time was a man or not?
A A man.
Q Did you recognize that person?
A No, I did not recognize him clearly.
Q That man on top of your wife was he naked or was he clothed?
A He was clothed; he wore short pants.
Q What was the color of the pants?
ATTY. BAYRON:
He cannot recognize, Your Honor.
FISCAL TABIMINA:
Precisely, Your Honor, we are trying to elicit something from this man.
COURT:
Answer.
WITNESS:
A Yellow.
FISCAL TABIMINA:
Could it be white...
ATTY. BAYRON:
Yellow, Your Honor.
COURT:
He said yellow.
FISCAL TABIMINA:
You were not able to catch up with him because he ran away, is that correct?
COURT:
Q What happened with the yellow pants of the man?
A He immediately put it up and jumped through the window and ran away.
Q But you said you immediately drew your bolo to stab him, how can he put up his
pants?
A My house is so wide that he was able to run when I drew my bolo.
Q Just be candid with the Court. This is in the interest of your children. You even
recognize the color of the pants as yellow therefore you saw what was the position of
the pants when you saw the man lying on top of your wife. Where were the pants
when you saw the man lying on top of your wife?
A It was at his side.
Q You mean to say that the pants were not on his legs?
A It was at his knee; inserted up to his knee.
Q Not at his side as you said earlier?
A Inserted up to his knees only.
Q But you said a while ago that the short pants was at the side of the man; which is
which, the pants were on his side or still on his knees?
A It was at his knees. [18]
As astutely and correctly observed by the trial court:
Looking at the face value of this testimony, is it possible for one caught in surprise,
attacked by an irate husband to yet put on his pants before fleeing away? Of course,
this version that the paramours pants was just on his side was changed when accused
sensed the futilelity (sic) of his lying. He said that the pants was still actually inserted
up to said paramours knees.
Again, let us take a hard look if there is a glimmer of truth to this later version. How
can a man with pants on his knees surprisingly caught in the act of
adultery, presto stood up and jumped out of the window to avoid impending attack
from an irate husband? Indeed, if there was such an intruder on that fateful dawn in
the home with the victim caught by surprise as aforestated, he could surely be killed
or at least wounded by the sudden attack of accused. Yes, if such a thing did not
happen it was so because there was none at all. x x x.[19]
The foregoing demonstrate that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code is
inapplicable to this case because appellant failed to prove the essential
requisite of having caught his wife and her alleged paramour in flagrante
delicto. Indeed, appellant succeeded only in demonstrating his utter lack of
credibility on the witness stand.
On the other hand, the records of this case clearly bolster the trial courts
conclusion that Appellant Jimmy Talisic did not catch his wife with another man
that fateful morning. Jimmys deep-seated suspicion of his wifes infidelity and
his resentment of her maltreatment of their children, coupled with his erratic and
turbulent temper, could explain why he killed her. The following portion of
Jimmys testimony sheds light on the matter:
Q After that, you immediately stabbed your wife?
A Yes.
Q How many times?
A I do not know because I lost my temper.
Q Could it be 10 times?
A I do not know how many times.
Q By the way, let us go back before May 8, 1988, did you have an idea whether your
wife had an affair with another man?
A I do not know it because I was always at the farm, and what I managed to look at is
farm activities.
Q Before that incident, am I correct that your wife was all along faithful to you and no
affair with another man?
ATTY. BAYRON:
Objection, Your Honor, he did not know whether his wife had an affair with another
man.
COURT:
Let him answer.
WITNESS:
Yes.
COURT:
Q In other words, you do not suspect your wife of infidelity?
A I was suspicious because when I sent her down to Iligan City and gave her money
when she come home the money left is too small.
FISCAL TABIMINA:
Q And because of that you are now changing your statement that you suspect your
wife to have an affair with another man?
A In my suspicion.
Q By the way, when your wife was still alive, how does your wife treat your children?
A She was so irritable with her treatment of our children.
Q Please explain why she was irritable with her treatment of your children?
A She easily gets angry. Whenever my children do some foolishness and bad actions,
immediately she would whip them. [20]
All in all, we find no ground to reverse or modify the well-reasoned rulings

of the trial court. Appellants uncorroborated, implausible and flimsy testimony
has not convinced us one whit that he caught his wife in the very act of voluntary
sexual intercourse with another man in the living room of their house while he
was momentarily away fetching water. In fact, he has not even convinced us
that such a man was in their house when he brutally killed his wife. A man
betrayed and aggrieved by his wifes brazen unfaithfulness would have
immediately surrendered to the authorities and confessed the truth, instead of
simply awaiting his father to bring him to the military camp. Incredible - that
about sums up appellants case.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the Decision of the trial
court convicting Jimmy Talisic y Villamor of parricide is hereby AFFIRMED in
toto. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the
accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the
new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue
the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he
wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the
crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with
an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot
wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also
caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the
different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which otherwise
would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of
murders as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately
the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila
reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their residence
in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the
morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to
fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning).
He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the bus
had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused,
then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived
at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the
act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife
pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a
PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was not
able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was
the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and
Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was
playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept.
24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock
and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and
abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct.
17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital
as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a
salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of
his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent
Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in
the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby sentenced to
death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000,
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's
wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been
deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect upon his acts.
Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco
Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if
not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining
death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article
247 reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing
shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the
daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to
the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There
is no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the
act of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate
outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his
spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of
them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.
The trial court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually
shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the
accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or
both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that
he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the
proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind
impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-
product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-
quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment — to
a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in
the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical
injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous
provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would otherwise be
criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or serious physical
injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere
banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused
than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries
other than serious are inflicted, the offender is exempted from punishment. In effect,
therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances mentioned therein, amount to
an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical injuries is
inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A
different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make
the exceptional circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal
liability integral elements of the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer
to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation
would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting
circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or
omissons . . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or
information, and a circumstance which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the
accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the offense charged-but a
matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the
General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons. There
can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it could
not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define
and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for
the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under the
circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for
his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a
punishable act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying
circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by
Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant
shot the victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the
accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we
disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a
rule, one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes
that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder
when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is
not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries
suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility.
Granting the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he
cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he
uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second
paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold
Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her
recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the
accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum
period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six
months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is
furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Paras, and Padilla JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO

OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty[2] of six
(6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6)
years one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,[3]and to pay
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus Esquierdo, and
to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T.
Oyanib.[4]
On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate informations charging accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:
Criminal Case No. 6012
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to
wit: a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting
upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:
Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident premeditation.[5]
Criminal Case No. 6018
That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, having conceived and (sic)
deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his
wife, as a result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.[6]
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities[7] and was immediately detained at the Iligan City Jail.[8]
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza
by reading the informations against him and translating them into the Visayan
dialect.[9] He pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a
joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib
(hereafter Tita) were married on February 3, 1979[10] and had two (2) children, Desilor
and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito
keeping custody of their two (2) children. Tita rented a room at the second floor of the
house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where her family
lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family
were watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A,
Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor rented
by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down,
Edgardo went upstairs to check.[11]
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor.
He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latters
stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito
what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors
brought Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the hospital.[12]
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City
Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the
evening of September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an information
regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan
City.[13]
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with
several stab wounds in different parts of the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long
pants. From the crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy
Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect
in the killing of Jesus and Tita.[14] The incident was recorded in the police blotter as
Entry No. 137138.[15]
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan
City examined the bodies of Jesus and Tita.[16] Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds,
and those inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were fatal. [17] The cause of
death was cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ
injury and multiple stab wound chest and abdomen.[18]
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the
left chest and right side of the abdomen. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest,
hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound.[19]
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita
decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody of their two (2)
children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyns house for
two (2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3,
G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented the second floor.[20] The rented space consisted
mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that if one enters
the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from the sala, directly
to the door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts
towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However, Tita was very reluctant to
reconcile with Manolito.[21] In fact, she was very open about her relationship with other
men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and
her paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy.
Tambacan, Iligan City.[22] Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about this. He censured
his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even
threatened to kill him.[23]
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed
Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High School. The letter mentioned that
his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the
school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the
next day, Manolito went to Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his
behalf.[24]
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of romance (kissing) coming
from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife
Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were
down to his knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately
stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 59 in height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness
of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of
this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing
Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head,
while at the same time shouting kill him Jake, kill him Jake.[25]
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell
down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm
with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left
breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near
the lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the
house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and inquired about what had
happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague,
Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he
used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the
following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora,
Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him
to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police authorities in Precinct
2, Nonocan, Iligan City.[26]
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wifes place, Manolito
said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from
his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they could live together. [27]
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The dispositive portion
reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and having
carefully observed the demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused
MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and
appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court
sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:
1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX
(6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as
Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and to pay the costs.
2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to indemnify heirs

of his wife P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.
It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty (40) years
limitation prescribed in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.
Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge[28]
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from
the joint decision of the trial court to the Supreme Court.[29]
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the
exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised
several errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the basic
issue of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code.[30] He questioned the trial courts appreciation of the facts and the
evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital pieces of physical evidence
material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of
Jesus. Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus pants were
wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing any underwear,
lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of
sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-
appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances contemplated in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article.[31]
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and an exempting cause. An
absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public
policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed.[32]
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting
circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be relieved of any criminal
liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following essential
elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them
or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has not promoted
or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse.[33] Accused must prove these elements by clear and
convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. The death caused must
be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon
his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife
must concur with her flagrant adultery.[34]
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial
fact that accused must convincingly prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the
witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the circumstances contemplated in
Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife
and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon
Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual
intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and
kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of
him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to the police when a call for him to surrender
was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse
the opportunity to avail himself of Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put
it in People v. Wagas:[35]
The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife
creates; the law is strict on this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with
death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as that it can only be
justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be
resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted
only during the sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court
sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months
of destierro.[36] He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one
hundred (100) kilometers from Iligan City.[37]
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 102984 June 30, 1993

vs.
RUBEN TAKBOBO, accused-appellant.
Domingo A. Uy for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
The nuptial vows which solemnly intone the matrimonial promise of love "(f)or better or for worse, for
richer or for poorer, in sickness and in health, till death do us part," are sometimes easier said than
done, for many a marital union figuratively ends on the reefs of matrimonial shoals. In the case now
before us for appellate review, the marriage literally ended under circumstances which the criminal
law, disdainful of romanticism, bluntly calls the felony of parricide.
Accused-appellant Ruben Takbobo, a middle-aged fisherman, was charged with the killing of his
wife in Criminal Case No. CBU-21961 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 8, in an
information which alleges that on or about 11:00 P.M. on March 25, 1991, in Barangay Guiwanon,
Ginatilan, Cebu, said appellant, who was the husband of Lucia Takbobo, hacked and stabbed the
latter with a knife and bolo, thereby inflicting upon her multiple fatal hack and stab wounds which
resulted in her instantaneous death.1
Appellant entered a plea of guilty at his arraignment,2 but, considering the gravity of the offense, the
lower court ordered both the prosecution and the defense to submit evidence in order to determine
the motive of appellant and the circumstances surrounding the killing of his wife,3 a course of
procedure repeatedly enjoined in our previous decisions and now enshrined in Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On October 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty as charged, imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
in the amount of P50,000.00, as well as to pay the costs.4
The evidence of record shows that appellant Ruben Takbobo and Lucia P. Takbobo were married in
1969. They had nine children, one of whom is already dead.5 The couple, together with their
youngest daughter, 6-year old Madilyn, and a nephew were residing at Barangay Guiwanon,
Ginatilan, Cebu when the fatal incident happened. The other Takbobo children were staying with a
certain David Manus since, according to the sworn statement of their daughter, Marybel, "they were
afraid of their father."6
On the night of March 25, 1991, at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, young Madilyn was
awakened by noise caused by a quarrel between her parents. She claimed that she thereafter
witnessed the entire incident that transpired. This is how she testified at the preliminary investigation
conducted by the 11th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malabuyoc-Ginatilan-Algeria:
COURT
Q Madilyn, do you know that if you will not tell the truth you will
commit a sin?
A Yes.
Q And now you are ready to tell the truth?
A Yes.
Q If you will not tell the truth you will commit a sin?
A Yes.
Q If you will commit a sin you will be in hell?
A Yes.
Q On March 25, 1991, can you still remember who was your
companion while you were sleeping?
A Dodong Gamay, Mama Lucia and Papa Ruben.
Q While you were sleeping were you able to wake up?
A Yes.
Q What was the reason why you woke up at that time?
A I cannot sleep anymore because it was noisy.
Q What was the reason that (sic) it was noisy (sic) at that time?
A They were quarreling.
Q What were they quarreling about?
A Because he was not able to pay at (sic) Danilo.
Q At that time that they were quarreling, what did your father get?
A A hunting (knife) and a bolo.
Q What did your father do with the hunting (knife) and the bolo?
A He hacked Mama at the feet.
Q What else?
A On the neck. (Witness pointing to her neck.)

Q What else?
A On the hands, on the armpit, on the breast and the other breast
was sliced.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In the following morning, what happened to your mother?
A She was already dead.
Q And on the following morning your father was no longer there?
A No more.
Q You said that your father stabbed your mother with a hunting
(knife), where did your father get the said hunting knife?
A From the cabinet.
Q And you saw your father g(e)t the hunting knife from the cabinet?
A Yes. 7
Shortly after the incident, appellant went to the police authorities and told them about the same. The
following day, March 26, 1991, he was investigated by Pfc. Alfredo Cavalina of the Office of the
Station Commander, Philippine National Police (PNP) at Ginatilan, Cebu for having killed his wife.
During that investigation, Reynaldo Singco, also a policeman, was then present and listening about
three (3) meters away from them, Singco, testifying for the prosecution, declared that he did not hear
appellant state the reason why he killed his wife, and neither did appellant mention that he came
from fishing that night.8
Appellant appears to have had a propensity for inexplicable resort to violence against the members
of his family. Irene Takbobo, a 16-year old daughter of appellant, testified before the trial court that
on one occasion before her mother's death, and apparently for no reason, one of her fingers was cut
and the third finger of her older sister was split by a bolo wielded by her father, thus: "Suddenly, he
hacked us and I was hit, and I was able to cover my head so it was my head he strike (sic) and I
parried, that is the reason why my finger was cut."9
Appellant, on the other hand, would like to impress upon the Court that he killed his wife because he
caught her sleeping with another man. This version of the defense is repeated in appellant's brief as
follows:
. . . At about 3:00 o'clock in the early morning of March 25, 1991 while he just arrived
home from a sea fishing activity, he was surprised when, upon opening their door, he
saw his wife sleeping with another man, who happened to be their neighbor, Cadiz
Catulong. He tried to kill him by stabbing him but his wife pushed the man who then
immediately jumped out of the window. As a result, his wife was hit by his thrust. He
then found out that his wife had no panty. He tried to look for Cadiz Catulong but
failed to find him. He immediately related the incident to the police though he was not
able to execute his affidavit as he was then very confused. 10
Correspondingly, in his aforesaid brief, the trial court's decision is impugned by appellant for not
having appreciated in his favor the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, voluntary
surrender and voluntary plea of guilty. 11
We have conducted a thorough and careful study of the records of this case and we find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the court below. Appellant admits the killing of his
wife but contends that his act was justified since he surprised his wife in a compromising situation
with a neighbor, one Cadiz Catulong. He would, therefore, avail of the specific extenuating
circumstance 12 provided for and applicable only under the situations contemplated in Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code. This contention of the appellant does not engender credence. His lone
testimony, without any other evidence to prove his claim, will not tilt the scales of justice in his favor.
The exceptional circumstance contemplated in Article 247, just like any circumstance which may
either absolve or exempt an accused from liability or modify his penalty, must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence. Having admitted the killing of his wife, the onus probandi has shifted to
appellant to establish that he did so while his wife was in sexual congress with another person,
either while his wife was in sexual congress with another person, either while they were in flagrante
delicto or immediately thereafter. On this score, appellant must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the supposed weakness of that for the prosecution.
In the instant case, there was failure of the defense to prove the alleged discovery of the sexual act
between the victim and Cadiz Catulong. Nowhere in the records of this case do we find any basis for
doubting the testimonies of child witnesses have long been matters of favorable judicial
experience. 13 The alleged adulterous interlude was not proven. On the contrary, the uncorroborated
testimony of appellant that his wife committed the ultimate act of infidelity is contradicted by the facts
established in this case, hence his bare protestations are unavailing.
Furthermore, appellant gave inconsistent answers on the witness stand which cannot but cast a
cloud of serious doubt on his story, to say the least. Initially he declared:
COURT
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was (your) wife doing before the killing?
A My wife was sleeping with another man, I just arrived from fishing.
Q You are sure about that?
A Yes, sir, the man in fact jumped out the window.
Q Before you went up the house, he jumped?
A I observed. 14
Then, in a later part of his testimony, when asked by the lower court what he saw upon his arrival
from the sea, he gave a completely different answer:
COURT
Q What was the man doing?
A The man was already putting on his pants, they have already
finished the carnal act. 15
Appellant likewise claimed that "(his) purpose was to kill the man but she pushed the man and my
wife was killed. 16He accordingly wants it to appear that he had no intention of killing his wife.
However, the physical evidence, as represented by the pictures taken of the deceased
victim, 17 disclose that she was killed with the multiple stab wounds. The manner of infliction and the
number of physical injuries negate the claim of appellant that he did not intend to kill his wife.
Appellant adamantly insisted in his testimony before the lower court, and also in his brief, that his
wife had no panties on the night he allegedly saw her with another man. 18 However, on a closer
examination of the pictures marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" for the prosecution, we can not entirely
believe the claim of the defense, since two of the exhibits 19 contradict such contention. The records
do not show nor has appellant essayed any explanation why in those two exhibits the deceased was
apparently wearing her panties.
Finally, from the testimony of Pat. Reynaldo Singco, which the trial court took pains to quote in its
decision, 20 during the custodial investigation appellant never mentioned that he surprised his wife in
the act of infidelity or that, on that occasion, Catulong was present or was inside their house or, for
that matter, anywhere in the vicinity thereof. If it was true that there was really a man inside the
house of appellant, the normal human reaction would be to tell that fact to the police right after the
stabbing incident when appellant went to the PNP station and/or during the investigation thereafter.
On the issue of whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of
passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender any voluntary plea of guilty, we agree with appellant
and the Solicitor General that the crime was attended by the last two mitigating circumstances. The
records of the case confirm the compliance by appellant with the requisites for the appreciation of
voluntary surrender and voluntary plea of guilty. Both appellant and appellee concur on these
particular points. Appellant indeed voluntarily surrendered himself to agents of a person in authority
before his arrest could be effected. He likewise admitted his guilt in open court prior to the
presentation of evidence by the prosecution.
With respect to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, however, it should be noted
that the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to
produce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. 21
In the case at bar, the trial court did not agree with the submission of the defense on this matter. We
have earlier discussed that appellant was not able to prove by convincing evidence that he saw his
wife sleeping with another man. Hence, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, that
allegation of appellant "is a afterthought to lessen his liability," 22 and that what appears is that
appellant killed his wife because "he was not in his right mind." 23Appellant cannot, therefore, be
credited with this mitigating circumstance.
Notwithstanding the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating

circumstance, we do not agree with the argument of appellant and, surprisingly, the recommendation
of the Solicitor General to reduce the penalty to reclusion temporal. This would patently run counter
to the rules for the application of invisible penalties under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
petinent portions of which provide:
Art. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.—
xxx xxx xxx
In all cases in which the law precribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof:
xxx xxx xxx
3. When the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstance and
there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
xxx xxx xxx
The trial court correctly found the accused guilty of parricide as charged in the information. Article
246 defines the crime of parricide and imposes thereof the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying Article 63, when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties, the penalty cannot be
lowered by one degree, no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present. What obviously
misled the parties in this case is that they overlooked the fact that the so-called special ** mitigating
circumstance that they rely on, that is, when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, is
found in paragraph 5 of Article 6 4, which, as its epigraph shows, provides the "(r)ules for the
application of penalties which contain three periods," meaning, divisible penalties. The inapplicability
thereof to the present case has long been settled.
In a number of cases, 24 we have held that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and
no aggravating circumstance but the imposable penalties are indivisible in nature, the court cannot
proceed by analogy with the provisions of paragraph 5 of Article 64 and impose the penalty lower by
one degree. Thus, in a parricide case, 25 the trial court imposed the penalty next lower, which
is reclusion temporal, applying paragraph 5 of Article 64 since the crime was attended by two
mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance. In reversing the decision of the
lower court, we ruled that the penalty imposed was not correct since the rule applicable in said case
is found in Article 63, and not in Article 64, of the Code.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing considerations demostrative of the lack of merit of the instant
appeal, the assailed judgment of the court a quo id hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. and Nocon, J., concur.
Padilla, J., is on leave.

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SECOND DIVISION

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 179035

Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged[1] with the complex

Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense,

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at

dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.[11]

Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial

Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused

The Court agrees with the trial courts observation, thus:

Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide[22] is

As distinguished from infanticide,[24] the elements of unintentional

Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

[G.R. No. 127818. November 11, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. plaintiff-appellee, vs. GUILLERMO

(pp. 20-21, Rollo)

At about 11:00 P.M. after dropping at a friend's house, he decided to go home,

Because of these continued pestering and nagging of his wife he thought of

The gun went off.

(pp. 16-17, Rollo)

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE KILLING WAS

ASSUMING THE ACCUSED IS CRIMINALLY LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT

(p. 5, Appellant's Brief.)

[G.R. No. 115686. December 2, 1996]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO

DIPOLOG CITY, Philippines, this 10th day of May 1994.

In an information dated January 7, 1994, accused-appellant was charged with the

The sentence of death imposed by the trial court on the appellant is an

We affirm the trial courts findings with modification

G.R. No. 95262 January 4, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Roberto R. Barrales for accused-appellant.

Hence, the present appeal.

Head & Neck: —

1. Rope embedded around the neck with knot

3. Ligature mark on the anterior neck extending to the

4. Tongue bitten right.

5. Abdomen enlarged, at about 5 months size with

6. Scanty pubic hair

8. Hematoma with contusion both labia

9. Punctured wound 1 cm. long & 2 cm. depth,

1. Cervix soft, closed, no vaginal discharge

2. Uterus — pregnant to about 4-5 months in size.

1. Lung — both lungs collapsed colored grayish.

2. Heart —- normal in size.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxation secondary to hanging.7

We uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.

The quantum of proof necessary to establish accused-appellant's guilt, albeit based on

OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE CRIME:

However, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The uninhabitedness of a

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-50905 September 23, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses CESARIO JUMAWAN alias 'Sario,'

Wherefore, the Court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye,

The case is now before this Court on appeal.

The brief of the appellants gives the following:

Francisco Jumawan is the father of his co-accused, namely, Cesario Jumawan,

Death of Rodolfo Magnaye:

The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to

On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought