B UILDING A C OMPREHENSIVE R EGIONAL COMMUNITY IN

EAST ASIA

by

Young Jong Choi

(The Catholic University of Korea)

oldchoi@catholic.ac.kr

02-2164-4406 (office)

010-2821-8268 (M.P.)

Young Jong Choi is a Professor in the division of international studies at the Catholic
University of Korea. He received Ph D in political science from the University of
Washington. Dr. Choi has written many articles in English and Korean on topics related to
East Asian regionalism, including "South Korea’s Regional Strategy and Middle Power
Activism"(2009) and "Political Economy of Northeast Asian regionalism"(2007). He also
published a book in Korean, entitled A New Diplomatic Strategy for a Global Korea (2009).

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 I. I NTRODUCTION

East Asian security has been gaining more fluidity and uncertainty with the rise of China,
the normalization of Japan, and the North Korean problem. Newer, non-traditional security
issues such as energy security, climate change and transnational crime are adding more
burdens. Unresolved territorial disputes are flaring up from the East Sea (the Sea of Japan) to
the South China Sea. The resurge of US interest in East Asia is also increasing tensions.
Since the region is not ready to tackle these issues, the demand for security cooperation is
increasing.

Close economic interdependence and expanded security dialogue have so far buttressed
regional stability in East Asia. A complex web of bilateral and regional FTAs has developed.
The ASEAN Security Community among ten ASEAN members and the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) have contributed to political and security cooperation. Northeast Asia is
running the Six-Party Talks with the aim of resolving North Korea’s nuclear problem. These
economic and security arrangements, though not flawless, have brought in an impressive
level of regional prosperity and stability. The so-called “ASEAN Way” or “Asian Way”
based on the principles of domestic non-interference and consensus decision-making lacks
the power to make binding decisions or to secure proper implementation. Still, East Asia has
accomplished a remarkable success in financial cooperation. The absence of a single regional
market cannot stop the region from achieving impressive economic prosperity.

The region has rarely experienced military confrontations without a formal security
organization. A normalizing Japan is not a serious security threat to the region. A rising
China used to concentrate on building its economic muscle. A rogue state North Korea is at
best a nuisance who cannot defeat its arch enemy in the South without the support of China,
which is virtually a non-starter considering close China-South Korea economic relations. The
existence of the US an outside balancer is offering the last line of defense for peace in East
Asia. Seen from this perspective, the absence of a NATO- like security community in East

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Asia is quite understandable. Simply put, it is not because of certain defections of East Asia
but because there was no sufficient demand to justify its supply.

The situation will be totally different if the peacefully rising China turn into a real threat
to its neighbors. This will shake the existing regional security order from its foundation with
China’s sheer size of territory, population, and economic and military power. This new
security landscape will require East Asia to create a new security architecture. With the
escalating territorial sparring between regional states over several islands in the South China
Sea, the China threat is becoming a reality.

The region has two options to deal with new development: one is balance of power; and
the other is regionalism. The former is related to maintaining or upgrading the existing
regional security architecture based upon bilateral security agreements between the US and
its East Asian alliance partners. Looser, bilateral defense ties between the US and some
maritime states like Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines can also be considered. Broader
sub-regional security ties like US-Japan-South Korea triangular alliance or, as an extreme
case, an East Asian security community without China are also other alternatives. However,
this option, whatever forms it may take, will invite Chinese protests and can offer only an
unstable solution.

The other option is to promote East Asian regionalism with China as a legitimate
member. East Asian regionalism has so far been predominantly economic. Even its mediocre
progress has recently stalled due to the internal divisions over the choice between APT
(ASEAN plus three) and the EAS (East Asia Summit) as a platform for deepening economic
cooperation. Economic interests alone cannot drive regionalist impulses into fruition, and
mutual trust is also necessary. Trust cannot be secured without security cooperation. The
successes of the EU and to a lesser degree ASEAN, where both security and economic
cooperation went hand in hand, proves this point. This option will become more promising if
it can effectively tie its members into strong norms.

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 II. THE C ASE FOR A SECURITY C OMMUNITY

The recent flare up of territorial disputes over the South China Sea area indicates that
East Asia has a real security problem. The balancing strategy, particularly through the help of
outside balancers, may have some restraining effect on China’s unilateralism. It will,
however, irritate China and invite more aggressive behavior from China in return.
Institutional solutions are more enduring and less costly. But China is not ready and against
the idea of putting either ARF or ICJ in the middle. The Chinese government is not
comfortable with the presence of the US in the ARF, and international norms are still alien to
it and its national interests.

Under the circumstance, a regionalist solution without the presence of the US deserves
serious attention. China will feel much more comfortable in such a setting, and the danger of
China’s going unilateral can be contained by strengthening cooperation among regional
members. It will also have the effects of mitigating the risk of US-China confrontation, as
well as countering US influence in the region. The key to the success of a regionalist solution
is to persuade China to accept the binding power of regio nal norms and rules. This will
depend on the degrees of legalization and regional countries’ commitments to institutional
solutions. A gradualist approach to strengthening multilateral norms will help, and China will
find it difficult to ‘go it alone’ in the face of strong regionalist zeal among members. This
process is as good as building a regional community.

So far, East Asian regional cooperation has avoided security cooperation. This strategy
of separating the economic from the security realm facilitated economic cooperation in East
Asia. However, regional community-building cannot do without security cooperation. As is
well known, the EU project was initially to promote long- lasting peace in Europe. The
experience in both Europe and the Americas strongly suggests that “deeper economic
integration requires political reconciliation and a reduction in military tensions among the
principal participants.” A region-wide umbrella institution that handles both economic and
security issues will facilitate deeper integration in East Asia. Institutions are created out of
necessity. The existence of serious security problems is not in itself a hindrance to
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community building, but it may work as a trigger. The South China Sea issue may accelerate
security cooperation in East Asia.

III. I NSTITUTIONAL DESIGN

1) A NE W S ECURITY AR CHITE CTURE

A fundamentally new security environment is emerging in East Asia with the dominant China
turning more assertive and aggressive. Existing security institutio ns are not specifically
designed to deal with this new challenge. The call for a new security architecture enjoys
widespread support. However, they lack details about “what such an architecture would in
fact involve.” East Asia has tried a wide array of institutions to deal with security issues but
never tried a region-wide, exclusively East Asian organization. At present, pessimism
dominates over whether the region will witness the emergence of a singular regional
organization like an East Asian version of EU on the basis of internal disagreements and US
aversion. These are not insurmountable barriers, and what matters more is institutional design.

2) AMONG EAST A SIAN COUNTRIES

China suspects the US intention to contain itself behind any regional security cooperation, be
it security alliance or other forms of security institutions. This suspicion largely explains the
absence of meaningful security cooperation in East Asia. The Chinese government does not
want any multilateral mechanism to limit its options on high priority issues such as Taiwan or
the South China Sea. This attitude is also related to its objection to purportedly US-backed
universal values. China is losing zeal in its pursuit of soft power and a charm offensive as its
power continues to rise. Its muscle- flexing is posing a grave concern to maritime states in
Southeast Asia, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

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However, too much US support may aggravate the conflicts by emboldening them. If this
kind of power dynamic persists, any serious institutional cooperation may turn to a
battleground between the US and China.

The exclusion of the United States can be a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for
China’s participation in any regional organization to deal with territorial issues. The region
has not tried this option, and it is high time to give it a try. This new institution does not have
to be mutually exclusive with other existing security arrangements. The US can continue to
play the role of an outside balancer and a supporter of community building. East Asia has to
assure the US that it will not turn against it. The two closest allies with the US in the region,
Japan and South Korea, should play the key role in this regard. Exclusively East Asian
regionalism will also lay the foundation for a more independent East Asia from US influence
or the US- led global order.

3) PART OF COMPREHE NSIVE COMMUNITY B UILDING

At the present stage, the separation of economy from security is neither desirable nor feasible
any longer for the deepening of regional cooperation in East Asia. There is a consensus
among the APT members about the need for an East Asian community. East Asia needs to
hasten the process while expanding its scope beyond the economic realm. By incorporating
such issue areas as politics, security, and culture, member countries will have more room for
win-win bargaining through issue- linkages. East Asian regional cooperation had sailed
through until the rivalry between China and Japan derailed the momentum over the issue of
upgrading the APT into the EAS.

East Asia needs to resuscitate its enthusiasm for community building, this time for
the sake of security cooperation as well. A regional community is a combination of politico-
security community, economic community, and cultural community. It can exist in various
forms in terms of the degree of formalization. From this perspective, East Asia is more of a
community as compared with the late 1990s when the community building process began.
Incorporating China into a regional community is much better than creating an institution
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specifically targeting China for the specific issue of South China Sea dispute. Moreove r, the
Chinese government and most of Chinese analysts see the emergence of an East Asian
Community in China’s long run interests. China will surely be a key player in the emerging
East Asian community, but cannot dominate it as long as Japan, ASEAN, South Korea work
together.

4) O N THE BASIS OF APT

The parallel existence of both APT and the EAS is adding confusion over the direction of
regional cooperation. East Asia is experiencing a kind of identity crisis with the addition of
Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia, and lately the United States into the EAS. Japan feels
more comfortable within a wider EAS since the Chinese influence can be diluted. The EAS
can also provide the ASEAN with an institutional means for counterbalancing China's
growing power and assertiveness. The EAS is well positioned to discuss security matters
since great extra-regional powers like the US, Russia and India are in. However, China feels
uneasy about their very presence and clearly expresses its preference for the APT as the
driver of community building.
The strengths of APT reside in its long history, a common identity formed in the process
of overcoming the economic crisis in 1997-8, and the track-record of functional cooperation
in various issue areas. Security can be added to the APT process without much extra
institutional costs. The remaining task is to transform the “ASEAN plus three” format into an
integrated whole. This mission will have to start from strengthening trilateral cooperation
among China, Japan, and South Korea. The plus three countries, which occupy around 90
percent of regional GDP, should take the initiative by providing regional public goods and by
bearing the majority of the costs of community building.

5) GOLDEN STRAITJACKETS F OR ALL

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Thomas Friedman, in his famous book entitled The Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000), argues
that in the age of globalization individual countries must sacrifice some degree of economic
sovereignty to global institutions. He termed this situation as the “golden straitjacket.” It is
golden since it brings lots of benefits in the form of efficiency gains. Therefore, many are
willing to wear that jacket in spite of domestic opposition against losing national autonomy.
In a similar manner, East Asian countries must give up a degree of national sovereignty to
enjoy more security. It would be much better if they do it out of willingness. This is as good
as a quantum leap from the “ASEAN Way” and therefore very hard to make. It will be
particularly hard for a rising power like China.

The skeptics against security multilateralism in East Asia build their arguments on
the basis of a pessimistic assessment of China’s position. However, China’s position is
showing a sign of change. A relatively weak, newly internationally engaged China lacked the
confidence to engage in multilateral processes and preferred bilateral ones in which it could
avoid being outnumbered or outmaneuvered. A more powerful, internationally experienced
and self- confident China gradually saw tactical and rhetorical advantages in some aspects of
multilateralism. More recently, a still- more-powerful, confident-bordering-on arrogant but
still- insecure and umbrage-taking China has turned against meaningful multilateralism. Yet a
future, more- fully-risen China might be effectively pressured, and willing, to take on more
responsible, regional security-supporting roles in which multilateralism may prove more
appealing.

Then, China’s continuous rise is likely to facilitate security multilateralism in East

Asia. China’s willingness will also depend on the concerted efforts of other members to
embrace China as well as on the strength of institutional constraints. As long as regional
states can agree on a multilateral solution by building a security arm of a regional community,
a gradualist approach will do to enhance its bindingness. It will constitute a matter of political
negotiation among members. It may start from a mild form of cooperation, say cooperative
security that may promote military transparency and joint handing of regional crises. It may
gradually evolve into a collective defense and ultimately a security community.

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 IV. THE ROAD TO SUCCESS

Security arrangements are designed to reduce the risk of hostilities among members as
well as to present a united front to potential adversaries. Such arrangements range from
formal alliances and mutual defense pacts to forums to discuss security issues. The higher
the degree of legalization, the more effective will be security cooperation. However, there is
a trade-off between the effectiveness of cooperation and national sovereignty. Therefore,
sovereign states have a tendency to avoid binding security institutions until the benefits
justify the loss of national sovereignty. The “ASEAN way” is a clear example of states
putting autonomy ahead of cooperation; and the EU represents the opposite.

While the benefits of security cooperation are generally available to all the members in
the form of better security, sovereignty costs are perceived differently according to individual
members’ domestic politics and power position. Domestic politics is a key variable to
determine how seriously a state interprets the importance of national sovereignty. More
important is a country’s relative power position in the region. Specifically, powerful states
prefer ad hoc, political resolutions in which they can maximally take advantage of superior
power capabilities. They may choose to go institutio nal to reduce the costs of ‘rule by force’.
Weaker states prefer a rule by strong institutions to raw exercise of power. They, however,
are not in a good position to establish institutions.

It is those countries in the middle who have both the will and capacity to build powerful
institutions. Middle powers tend to be more sensitive to the abuse of power by the powerful
states and more interested in creating binding regional institutions to restrain major powers in
the region. Middle powers also have more diplomatic skills and resources to mobilize than
small powers. From the perspective of middle power diplomacy, successful security
multilateralism at the regional level requires three key conditions: (1) an abusive (or
potentially abusive) regional hegemon; (2) effective middle power leadership; (3) general
acceptance of institutional lock-in.

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 The first condition works as a trigger for middle power diplomacy. The rivalry between
regional hegemons and middle powers quite often set the stage for regional integration. In
East Asia, however, major powers have shown great degrees of restraints in their approaches
to neighbors. Japan has for long led the region from behind instead of rallying regional
countries around a regionalist flag. The rising China has taken a charm offensive toward its
neighbors. In this sense, there have been virtually no abusive regional powers to restrain with
strong regional institutions in East Asia. The first serious challenge is China, who has
abandoned its prior pursuit of quiet rise and come into conflict with regional states in
Southeast Asia and in Northeast Asia. Once regional states perceive this as a regional
problem that requires a regional solution, it will trigger a regionalist drive.

The second condition is about how effectively middle powers mobilize support among
weaker members while not antagonizing regional superpowers. Malaysia has traditionally
shown strong middle power activism toward East Asia regionalism. However, it failed largely
due to its inability to garner support from its neighbors as well as due to its antagonistic
posture toward the United States. The experience of middle power diplomacy shows that it is
unlikely to succeed by antagonizing the hegemon. The niche for middle power activism
resides more in the regional than in the global stage. Institution and coalition building are
keys to the success of middle power leadership. So far, ASEAN has provided leadership to
East Asian regionalism. Given the long stagnation of community building p rocess in East
Asia, the region needs to seek a new middle power leadership.

The third condition is to change the perception of regional countries toward hard
institutionalization. The “ASEAN way” is one of the most serious barriers to building a
genuinely institutionalized East Asia. ASEAN countries have avoided binding, legalistic
institutions in order to protect their national autonomy. Regional institutions like ASEAN
and ARF have largely remained as talk-shops. This ASEAN way is presiding over not just
Southeast Asia but also Northeast Asia. China’s aversion to security multilateralism is well
known. As the region’s greatest power, China can benefit from engaging regional states
individually. Judging from the continued rise of its power capabilities, the time is on the
side of China. China is likely to rely on delay tactics for the resolution of territorial disputes.
East Asian countries need to act promptly and decisively to build a consensus on security
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 multilateralism. Then, China will face the option to choose between institutional lock- in and
unilateralism. A highly interdependent China who reaps great benefits through engagement
with the region is unlikely to choose to go it alone.

IV. THE L EADERSHIP ISSUE

1. CONTINUED ASEAN LEADERSHIP

The ASEAN has been at the center of East Asian regionalism. The seed of stretching
ASEAN’s reach to the Northeast Asian three was planted in 1993 and 1994 when the
ASEAN countries (at that time only six) invited South Korea, Japan, and China to join them
in broader discussions. The APT became an official institution in the aftermath of the
economic crisis of 1997-8 under ASEAN’s initiative. Whereas its membership of 10 and a
long history as the leader of East Asian regionalism are strengths of ASEAN, its actual
influence has been waning particularly after the launching of the APT. East Asia used to have
a dual power structure with ASEAN at the forefront of regionalism while major powers like
China and Japan were in the backseat, eager to prevent each other from taking a hegemonic
position. Now China and Japan are competing for regional leadership, and ASEAN is facing
the danger of being marginalized in regional politics.

Apart from ASEAN’s leadership slack, ASEAN has shown its inability to give a clear
vision for an integrated East Asia. Its primary concern has been to maintain its internal unity
and external leverage in East Asia. ASEAN has always remained as an isolated island in
many regional groupings ranging from the APEC to the APT and has quite often turned out to
be a hurdle rather than a facilitator of integration. Its parochial interests will continue to
“shape the form, content, and parameters of an evolving East Asian regionalism”. Its
adherence to the ASEAN way will further limit its leadership capacity.

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 The more serious problem for ASEAN’s exercising leadership is the lack of internal
cohesion. ASEAN members have avoided tough internal deepening, and chosen instead
external widening and exercising of leverage. Its membership increased from its original five
to six and finally to ten, thereby making internal deepening harder. An unbridgeable divide
between the original six and the four new members has emerged. ASEAN’s ability to act as a
unitary actor is severely limited by its sluggish internal integration. In short, ASEAN’s
continuous leadership role is unlikely to lead East Asian regionalism into a reality.

2. JAPAN AS A MIDDLE POWER

Japan had dominated the region with its strong economic muscle before the arrival of
China as a contender. Japan’s approach to the age of rivalry with China has been to maintain
its regional influence with its hard and soft power capabilities and quite often with the help of
the US as well. Japan has been intent on balancing China with contending institutional
schemes (e.g., APT vs. EAS) and within existing regional institutions (e.g., APT). Japan’s
intention was more to do with preventing China from taking a leadership position while not
attempting to build its own. As a result, East Asian regionalism has stagnated due to
leadership deficiency. If Japan chooses to seek institutional lock-in instead of its conventional
strategy of institutional balancing to deal with China, it will provide a great boost to East
Asian regionalism and security multilateralism. If Japan can garner support from ASEAN and
South Korea in this endeavor, an East Asian community will become a sure thing.

Japan’s change of regional strategy will come when Japan somehow would begin to see
the benefits of an institutional solution or when Japan suddenly perceives itself as a
secondary power to China. This change is unlikely since Japan holds strong fear that such an
institution will be dominated by China. Moreover, Japan finds it very difficult go beyond the
US-Japan alliance and work with regional neighbors. Japan’s dominant strategy is still to
maintain a position of leadership in East Asia and accommodate China’s rise without
becoming subservient to it. If China’s rise and Japan’s slide continues at current paces, Japan

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will soon have to admit its middle power position in East Asia. However, Japan will face
difficulty in exercising middle power leadership by simply trying to erase its war-time history.

3. THE CASE FOR SOUTH KOREA’ S LEADERSHIP

Under the circumstance, South Korea’s strong economy and diplomatic resources are
consolidating its case for middle power leadership. The first and most important task for
South Korea’s middle power leadership is to secure the support or at least benign neglect of
the US for the attempt to build a security community without the US. It will require as high a
degree of mutual trust as shown in the US assent to European integration. South Korea can
play a pivotal role in assuaging US worry about an exclusively East Asian security institution.
The social capital South Korea has accumulated with the US under President Lee Myung-bak
may place South Korea in a favorable position. The US and South Korea agreed to strengthen
bilateral security alliance to meet the challenges of 21 st century, and the Korea-US FTA will
also strengthen bilateral cooperation in the economic realm. The possibility of gaining US
support will substantially increase if South Korea and Japa n can make a single voice in
persuading the US.

The second task is to find reliable coalition partners. The very existence of China and
Japan, the two great powers in the region, makes the ASEAN as a natural choice. If South
Korea can embrace Japan, along with ASEAN, East Asian regionalism will get closer to
reality. The ASEAN-South Korea FTA and regularized ASEAN-South Korea summit will
strengthen bilateral economic ties as well as strategic partnership. Both parties can keep the
power politics at bay in East Asia and lead the way to East Asian integration. There is also a
danger that ASEAN may play South Korea off against China and Japan to extract more
economic concessions. Since South Korea cannot compete with both China and Japan in
aid-giving, South Korea should focus on winning the hearts of rather than enhancing
leverage against ASEAN.

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 A significant achievement of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy is the
establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) with China and Japan in Seoul.
This idea was first proposed by South Korean President Lee Myung-bak during a three-way
summit with his Chinese and Japanese counterparts in Beijing in 2009. A formal agreement
was signed December 2010 in what became the first-ever treaty sealed among the three
governments. The three countries are key trade partners to each other, but their political
relations have often frayed over their shared history, including Japan's aggression against the
other nations in the early 20th century, as well as over territorial rows. TCS is expected not
only to deal with basic issues regarding trilateral cooperation but also have a positive
influence on resolving territorial disputes in the long run. One important task ahead for South
Korea’s middle power diplomacy is to consolidate the trilateral cooperation with China and
Japan and build a bridge between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia in an attempt to
facilitate an integrated East Asia.

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