RULE 128 operations manager, his task was to conceptualize or conduct
feasibility studies, formulate overall marketing plans, train field
G.R. No. 95145 August 5, 1993
GUALBERTO R. ESTIVA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS, JAIME KOA AND
OPSONIN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES PHILIPPINES
CORPORATION, respondent.
Arnold E. Magparangalan for petitioner.
Joaquin Rillo for public respondent.
Francisco C. Sevilla for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Petitioner Gualberto A. Estiva seeks a modification of the decision
rendered by respondent National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) dated May 31, 1990, which affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
decision by holding that there is sufficient basis for petitioner's
termination, hence, the award of separation pay without reinstatement
is in order (Rollo, p. 44).
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner was employed by private respondent Opsonin Chemical
Industries Philippines Corporation (Opsonin), on March 1, 1986, as
operation manager with a basic monthly salary of P6,500. As
employees and office staff as well as provide insights to the company
owners on the complexities of pharmaceutical marketing and
distributing operations.
On September 16, 1986, petitioner was appointed sales manager of
respondent company with a salary of P11,000.00 and additional fringe
benefits.
Towards the end of 1987, however, private respondent gradually
clipped petitioner's powers as sales manager. Respondent Jaime
Koa, Chairman of the Board of respondent corporation, began to
discharge some of the functions of the sales manager, such as
meeting with petitioner's subordinates, and preparing and signing the
appointment papers of probationary and permanent employees.
On December 12, 1987, private respondent Koa formally announced
that he was assuming the position of sales manager of respondent
company.
On January 5, 1988, petitioner filed a complaint with the Arbitration
Branch of respondent Commission for illegal dismissal, illegal
deduction, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay,
reimbursement of advance expenses, with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees.
A day after, or January 6, 1988, private respondents issued a
memorandum addressed to petitioner, charging him with the following
accusations, to wit:
 (1) that you have been absent since December 27,
1987 up to the present time without prior notice,
(2) that you have never reported on time, contrary to
our company rules and regulations,
(3) that you have refused without justifiable reason, to
observe regular office hours,
(4) that you have refused to sign the company logbook,
regarding your ingress and egress from the company,
and
(5) that you have never submitted weekly reports of
your accomplishments as required from you pursuant
to our company rules and regulations. (Rollo, pp. 12-
13)
The memorandum also directed petitioner to submit a written
explanation within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt of the said
memorandum why no disciplinary sanction should be imposed upon
him.
Meanwhile the Labor Arbiter assigned to hear the petitioner's case
directed both parties to file their respective position papers.
In his position paper, petitioner alleged that prior to his employment
with respondent company, he was employed with United Laboratories
for thirteen (13) years. He was enticed by respondent company to
leave his former employment by offering him a promising job with a
relatively higher salary and additional fringe benefits. His employment
was allegedly abruptly terminated on December 22, 1987, without
stating the reason or reasons for such termination nor was he served
any notice of termination contrary to the requirement of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 130. He claim that his termination from employment
caused him anguish and humiliation, especially since it took place
during the Christmas season.
Petitioner prayed that he be awarded his 13th month pay including his
sales incentive pay for the period of August to November 1987,
service incentive leave pay, reimbursement of advance expenses,
ECOLA, performance bonus, separation pay and unpaid salary, as
well as the option to buy a car of the company. He further prayed for
moral and exemplary damages.
In controversion, private respondents denied liability for petitioner's
claims and alleged that petitioner's letter of appointment does not bear
the approval or signature of respondent Koa, Opsonin's Chairman of
the Board. Private respondents claimed that the dismissal was
justified for the reasons contained in private respondents'
memorandum dated January 6, 1988.
In a decision dated May 31, 1989, the Labor Arbiter found that
petitioner was denied due process, declared that petitioner was
entitled to one-month pay from July, 1986 to December, 1987, and
further ordered private respondents to pay the sum of P2,910.00
which was deducted from petitioner's pay envelope. All other claims,
including moral and exemplary damages, were deemed unmeritorious
due to the absence of fraud or bad faith on the part of private
respondents. The dispositive portion of the Labor Arbiter's decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents Opsonin Chemical
Industries Philippines Corporation (Pharmaceutical
Division) and/or Jaime C. Koa, are hereby ordered to
pay complainant the following:
1. P11,000.00 separation pay;
2. P11,000.00 13th month pay (1987);
3. P5,500.00 13th month pay (July-
December 1986);
4. P2,910.00 illegal deduction from
complainants salary;
plus 10% attorney's fees of the total award. All the
other claims including the claim for moral and
exemplary damages are hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 21)
Petitioner appealed the foregoing decision to respondent
Commission, claiming that while the Labor Arbiter found that he was
unjustly dismissed from employment, the Labor Arbiter did not order
his reinstatement with backwages and denied his prayer for moral and
exemplary damages.
In a resolution dated May 31, 1990, respondent Commission found
that petitioner was indeed dismissed without the required notice and
hearing. However, it held that there was sufficient basis for petitioner's
termination since the position of Sales Operation Manager which
involves trust and confidence was betrayed by petitioner as shown by
respondents' memorandum (Rollo, pp. 43-44). Accordingly, it
dismissed petitioner's appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appealed
Decision is as it is hereby AFFIRMED and the Appeal
dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 45)
Unsatisfied with respondent Commission's verdict, petitioner comes
before us through this petition for certiorari.
When required to comment, the Solicitor General joined the petitioner
and submitted an adverse comment to the decision under review.
It is not disputed that private respondents failed to observe the twin
requirements of due process, i.e.; due notice and hearing, when
petitioner was unceremoniously dismissed as Sales Manager of
respondent company on December 22, 1987. As aptly found by the
Labor Arbiter:
On the issue of dismissal, it is clear that the
complainant was deprived of his functions as the sales
manager on December 22, 1987 by the Board of
Chairman, Mr. Koa. In fact, this was not denied by
respondent. All the respondents issued on January 6,
1988 was a letter containing the charges against the
complainant, but whether or not the letter was received
 by complainant, the letter does not even indicate nor
there (sic) was an allegation from the respondent that it
reached the complainant. Verily, respondent violated or
ignored the notice requirement under B.P. 130.
Complainant was denied due process so to speak,
before he was dismissed. In (sic) this reason, the
respondents should pay his separation pay, equivalent
to one month pay. (Rollo, p. 19)
Indeed, petitioner was deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the
charges against him as stated in private respondents' memorandum.
Worse, petitioner was actually dismissed from employment long
before he was notified or made aware of the acts and omissions he
allegedly committed in violation of company rules and policies.
Quite clearly, the act of private respondents violated petitioner's right
to due process before being terminated from employment. The
requirements for the dismissal of an employee are two-fold: the
substantive and the procedural. The twin requirements of notice and
hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in cases of
dismissal of employees (Salaw v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 7 [1991]).
We ruled that to constitute a valid dismissal, two requisites must
concur: (1) the dismissal must be of any of the causes provided for
under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (2) only after the employee
has been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be heard and
defend himself as required under Section 2 and 5, Rule XIV, Book V
of the Implementing Rules (Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, et al.,
G. R. No. 101527, January 19, 1993).
To meet the requirements of due process, the law requires that an
employer must furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two (2)
written notices before termination of employment can be legally
effected ,i.e.; (1) a notice which apprises the employee of the
particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2)
the subsequent notice after due hearing, which informs the employee
of the employer's decision to dismiss him (Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v.
NLRC, 210 SCRA 277 [1992]). Obviously, private respondents opted
to ignore petitioner's right to due process. Petitioner was effectively
dismissed as early as the end of 1987 when his powers and functions
were gradually taken from him. As correctly observed by the Solicitor
General, the memorandum given to petitioner was a mere
afterthought of private respondents since it was issued after petitioner
lodged his complaint with the Arbitration Branch of respondent
Commission (Rollo, pp. 72-73). An employer may not perfunctorily
dismiss an employee and ask questions later (BLTB Co. v. NLRC,
209 SCRA 430 [1992]).
Further, the fact the petitioner is a managerial employee is of no
moment. Settled is the rule that managerial employees, no less than
rank-and-file laborers are entitled to due process (Lawrence v. NLRC,
205 SCRA 737 [1992]; Hellenic Philippine Shipping, Inc. v. Siete, 195
SCRA 179 [1991]).
Private respondents seek to justify petitioner's dismissal by alleging
loss of confidence. In support thereof, they cite respondent
Commission's observation, to wit:
After an indepth review of the record. We agree with
appellant that he was terminated without the required
 notice and investigation as spelled out in BP. Blg. 130
now Article 277 of the Labor Code as amended, but
there is sufficient basis for appellant's termination,
hence the award of separation pay without
reinstatement is in order. As Sales Operation Manager,
appellant's position involves trust and confidence and
the same was betrayed as shown in the memorandum
issued by appellee to appellant. (Rollo, pp. 43-44)
As to how the "sufficient basis" vis-a-vis the betrayal of trust came
about, respondent Commission failed to discuss in detail. After finding
that petitioner was denied due notice and hearing, respondent
Commission now comes with a pronouncement that petitioner has
betrayed his employer's trust and confidence based on the latter's say
so. This, the Court cannot countenance. Records are bereft of any
proof that petitioner was guilty of the infractions aimlessly stacked
against him by private respondents. On the contrary, what is clear that
petitioner was illegally dismissed. Such being the case, his
reinstatement with payment of backwages is only proper (Spartan
Security and Detective Agency, Inc., v. NLRC, 213 SCRA 528 [1992]).
As provided for under Article 279 of the Labor Code:
Art. 279 Security of Tenure — In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
Private respondents further argue that in terminating the services of
an employee, proof beyond reasonable doubt of the employee's
misconduct is not required (Reyes v. Minister of Labor, 170 SCRA
134 [1989]). Thus it is maintained that if there is some basis for such
loss of confidence or if the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee concerned is responsible for misconduct, the same
serves as a sufficient basis to dismiss an employee.
The Court disagrees. The basic promise for a valid dismissal on
account of willful breach of trust is that the employee concerned holds
a position of trust and confidence and it is the breach of this trust that
results in the employer's loss of confidence in the employee (San
Miguel Corporation v. NLRC, 211 SCRA 353 [1992]). A position of
trust and confidence is one where a person is entrusted with
confidence on delicate matters, or with the custody, handling or care
and protection of the employer's property (Panday v. NLRC, 209
SCRA 122 [1992]).
In the instant case, there is no question that as sales manager of
respondent company, petitioner holds a position vested with trust and
confidence. It is in this regard that the employer is possessed with an
inherent right to dismiss an employee for loss of confidence. We have
a plethora of decisions that supports and recognizes this authority of
the employer to sever its relationship with the employee involving
such cases (Top Form Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. NLRC, et al., G.R.
No. 65706, December 11, 1992). However, loss of confidence as a
valid cause to terminate an employee must nonetheless rest on an
actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's imagined whim or caprice (Imperial Textile Mills v. NLRC,
et al., supra).
In other words, loss of confidence as a ground for dismissal requires
substantial proof (PNOC-Energy Development v. NLRC, 201 SCRA
487 [1991]; De Vera v. NLRC, 200 SCRA 439 [1991]). The employer's
evidence must clearly and convincingly establish the facts and
incidents upon which the loss of confidence in the employee may
fairly be made to rest (Commercial Motors Corporation v.
Commissioners, et al., 192 SCRA 191 [1991]).
In the case bar, the private respondents failed to prove that the
dismissal of petitioner on account of loss of confidence arose from
particular proven facts. No opportunity was given petitioner to meet
the charges levelled against him. In fact, he was dismissed from the
service even before he learned of the grounds for his dismissal and
which fact was not successfully controverted by private respondents.
Finally, it is the contention of petitioner that the respondent
Commission erred in not awarding him moral and exemplary damages
despite the patent illegality of the manner employed by the private
respondents in terminating his employment.
We find merit in petitioner's claim. As a rule, moral damages are
recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was attended
by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was
done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
On the other hand, exemplary damages may be awarded only if the
dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner(Spartan Security and Detective Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, supra).
A thorough review of the records of the case before us reveals that
bad faith attended petitioner's dismissal from respondent company. As
evidenced by the records, private respondents' memorandum was
issued apparently in retaliation after petitioner had lodged a complaint
with respondent Commission's Arbitration Branch. That petitioner was
never given a chance to explain or refute the charges levelled against
him before his dismissal smacks of bad faith. Coupled with the
absence of due process in effecting petitioner's dismissal, we find it
reasonable to award him under the circumstances moral as well as
exemplary damages (National Service Corporation, et al., v. NLRC,
168 SCRA 122 [1988]), the dismissal being effected in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive and malevolent manner.
Considering the nature of petitioner's office and functions, a closer
look at the alleged acts and omissions of petitioner as stated in private
respondents' memorandum would justify a pronouncement that
dismissal of petitioner is too harsh a penalty. Extreme caution should
be exercised in terminating the services of a worker.(Manggagawa ng
Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. NLRC, 194 SCRA 573 [1991]).
In view of the foregoing, we hold that petitioner is entitled to
reinstatement and backwages. The reasons or grounds for dismissing
the petitioner were not only too flimsy but were also not proven by
private respondents. Parenthetically, no grounds were shown to make
reinstatement of petitioner to his former position impossible. No
evidence was presented to prove that strained relations between
private respondents and petitioner exist. Where the differences of an
employee with the employer are neither personal nor physical nor are
they of so serious a nature, reinstatement is possible (Employee's
Association of the Philippine American Life Insurance Company v.
NLRC, 199 SCRA 628 [1991]).
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Commission is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Opsonin Chemical
Industries Philippines Corporation is hereby ordered to reinstate
petitioner, without loss of seniority rights, to pay him three (3) years
back wages without qualification or deduction, including the 13th
month pay and all other illegal deductions; moral damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 plus attorney's fees of P10,000.00. Costs against
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO
MANANGHAYA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and
VIOLETA DELOS REYES, respondents.
NOCON, J.:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya
question the respondent Court's decision promulgated on November
22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the agrarian court's
decision promulgated January 10, 1990,2 which ordered them and the
other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the
disputed landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.
Said respondent court's decision is now final and executory as to
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the
respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.
Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent
Court, the same shall be quoted verbatim and are as follows:
It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father
of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the
Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga,
with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000
square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production
of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian
dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.
Julian died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death
of Julian, she succeeded him as bona fidetenant of the
subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984,
Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other
defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and her
workers through force, intimidation, strategy and
stealth, from entering and working on the subject
premises; and that until the filing of the instant case,
defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the
lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore
prayed for judgment for the recovery of possession and
damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime.
Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and
Mananghaya, duly elected and/or appointed barangay
officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied
interference in the tenancy relationship existing
between plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly
in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that
they have always exercised fairness, equity, reason
and impartiality in the discharge of their official
functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and
 claimed moral damages and attorney's fees in the total
amount of P165,000.00 (Answer with Counterclaim,
Records, pp. 48-51).
For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment,
sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his
consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals,
irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as
his defenses. He also demanded actual and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer, pp. 77-
78).
During the pendency of the case in the lower court,
Mendoza of the case in the lower court, Mendoza was
in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the
same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its
Deputy Sheriff to supervise the harvesting of the palay
crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit the
net harvest (after deducting from the expenses
incurred), in a bonded warehouse of the locality subject
to the disposition of the court. 3
The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed
agrarian court's decision with the modification that Lot 106 is not
covered by it.
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified,
states as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor
of plaintiff and against defendants:
On the Mandatory Injunction:
1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of
the landholding subject of the action to the plaintiff and
enjoining said defendants and any person claiming
under them to desist from molesting them or interfering
with the possession and cultivation of the landholding
descriptive in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2,
Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate,
Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with
a total area of 23,969 square meters,
more or less, owned by a certain Juan
Mendoza, and devoted principally to the
production of palay, as evidenced by a
Certification from the Ministry of
Agrarian Reform issued on July 30,
1984.
2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of
the two landholding in question and to respect the
tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;
b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay
unto plaintiff 220 cavans of palay or its equivalent in
cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of
1984, and every harvest time until defendants finally
vacate and surrender possession and cultivation of the
landholding in question to plaintiff.
c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been
sufficiently proved, the same is denied.
d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the
costs of suit.
The awards herein provided should first be satisfied
from the deposits of the harvests ordered by the Court
from which the planting and harvesting expenses have
been paid to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if said
net deposits with the Court or the warehouses as
ordered by the Court are insufficient, then the balance
should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari, present for the consideration of the Court:
[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held
liable, jointly and severally, with the other defendants,
 for the harvests of the litigated property, Lot No. 46, or
the money equivalent thereof starting from the principal
crop years of 1984 and every harvest time thereafter
until the possession and cultivation of the aforestated
landholding are finally surrendered to the private
respondent. 5
It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and
severally with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo because the
present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the bahay
Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of
the estate, which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from
Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and which he later donated to the
barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction of
the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. 6 As to their supposed
participation in the dispossession of private respondent from the
disputed landholding, petitioners present the September 30, 1987
Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved
by Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No.
8576, 7 wherein private respondent's complaint against petitioners and
the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D.
5838 was dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is
already settled and considered closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that
they were included in the present controversy so that their political
career would be destroyed.10
Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it
was petitioners who conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino
Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No. 46 but also from Lot
No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they
were ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No.
106 was removed by the Court of Appeals from the judgment, as
Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least P33,000.00 per
year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the
possession and peaceful enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in
Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be compensated for
the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with
Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo. 11
We find for the private respondents.
It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence
already presented and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated
again by the respondent appellate court. Said evidence served as
basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's findings of fact.
We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead
put finis to the factual findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 12 absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case. 13
We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt,
on why it has to dismiss the appeal. Said the Court:
In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is
the tenant of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106 Block 2, Psd-
38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969
square meters, more or less . . ." (Complaint, Record,
vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's testimony, she
clarified that actually only Lot No. 106, which contains
an area of P19,000 square meters, is not included in
this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5; May 8,
1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by
plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo Rivera, who informed the
court that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a
pending case before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga
(Ibid., p. 15). The inconsistency between the averment
of the complaint and the testimony of the witness
should not only because there was no showing that she
intended to mislead defendants and even the trial court
on the subject matter of the suit. It would in the
complaint since together with Lot 106 had been include
in the complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned
by Olympio's father.
We also concur with the trial court's finding on the
participation of the other appellants in the
dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio
personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio
to help him cultivate the land, thus lending credence to
the allegation that defendant Olympio, together with his
co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from
 entering the land through "strong arm methods".
(Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).
Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it
favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and
Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-
examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that
the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory character." The same
provision states that "In the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy, affidavits
and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in evidence".
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence
required is no more than substantial evidence. This
substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section
18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976
(Castro vs. CS, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In
Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226,
the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence
is:
Substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderant
evidence, as is required in an ordinary
civil case. It has been defined to be such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and its absence is not shown
by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or
circumstantial, for the appellate court
cannot substitute its own judgment or
criteria for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of
evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.14
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed
from, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 22, 1990 is
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
RULE 129
JOSE C. SERMONIA, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH
SINSAY, Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; BIGAMY; DEFINED. — Bigamy is an illegal
marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. Bigamy carries with it
the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an
afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years. The
fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or
their agents. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; RULE ON CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE; NOT APPLICABLE
THERETO. — While we concede the point that the rule on
constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in criminal actions if
the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, we agree with the
view expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the
crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more
favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains —
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice
should be applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his
stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v.
Dinsay (40 SCRA 50). This Court is of the view that the principle of
constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of
bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy from the
spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous
marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person, in order to conceal his legal
impediment to contract another marriage. In the case of real property,
the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest
therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said
property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds
concerned of the transactions involving the said property can easily
be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage,
verification by the offended person or the authorities of the same
would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be entered into
in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein
constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or
property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property. The non-
application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive
notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws
should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof
would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability
therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said
to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender
however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority
and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting
marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person.
He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous
marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a
place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a
place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of
the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time.
It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of
bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime
was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agency
(sic). Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the
offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be
counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The
interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless
violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. To
this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make de
rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed
in the National Census Office and in various local civil registries all
over the country to make certain that no second or even third
marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate
spouse. This is too formidable a task to even contemplate.
3. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL REGISTRY; DOCUMENTS THEREIN NOT
COVERED BY THE RULE ON CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UNDER
PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE (P.D. NO. 1529). — While
Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the
time of such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart
provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in
Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion
that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to
the documents registered in the Civil Register.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings. 1 Bigamy carries with it the imposable penalty of prision
mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime prescribes
in fifteen (15) years. 2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences
to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents. . . ." 3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly
admitted. 4 At least, it is not expressly denied. Thus the only issue for
resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-
barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have
taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the
second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the
subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent
with the rule on constructive notice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The antecedents: In an information filed in 26 May 1992, petitioner
Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes
Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C.
Nievera remained valid and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his
criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to
quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to
reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals
through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed
decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of
merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the
second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of the
Civil Registrar in 1975, 7 such fact of registration makes it a matter of
public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The
offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice
of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered.
For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have
been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the
bigamous marriage" as declared by the appellate court, insisting that
the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity Church
in Marikina on 15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that
from the moment of registration the marriage contract was open to
inspection by any interested person.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive
period does not begin from the commission of the crime but from the
time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil
cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal
circumstances so warrant, 8 we agree with the view expounded by the
Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy
notwithstanding the possibility of its being more favorable to the
accused. The appellate court succinctly explains —
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice
should be applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his
stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v.
Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice
should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial
notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the
previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract
another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction
involving any right or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds
of the place where the said property is located. Verification in the
office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving
the said property can easily be made by any interested party. In the
case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended person or
the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a
marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender is not
known to be still a married person.chanrobles law library
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein
constructive notice was applied, involved therein were land or
property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that
penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from
registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the offenders
thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its
registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from
the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is
still a married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse
his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous
marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person.
And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the
discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and
would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period
for the crime of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which
the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the authorities or
their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the
offender, if the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be
counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of the
violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The
interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage fearless
violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 9
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages
listed in the National Census Office and in various local civil registries
all over the country to make certain that no second or even third
marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate
spouse. This is too formidable a task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) provides for constructive notice to all persons of every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land
to which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing or
entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act
to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code,
which leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for
applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in
the Civil Register.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no
concealment at all because his marriage contract with Ms. Unson was
recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry for
inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did
he indicate in the marriage contract that he was "single" thus
obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that matter,
why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage
in Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is
obvious: He knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform
or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to
punishment under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously, petitioner had no
intention of revealing his duplicity to his first spouse and gambled
instead on the probability that she or any third party would ever go to
the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple
expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil
registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year
prescriptive period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of
his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in
all likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers.
For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary
deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard
for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the
preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision
of the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED.chanrobles law
library
SO ORDERED.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST
LOANS represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO,
PCGG Chairman & ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, as
Consultant, Technical Working Group of the Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans, petitioner, vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, as
Ombudsman, P.O. DOMINGO, MARIO ORTIZ &
ALEJANDRO CRUZ, Philippine National Bank Officers, and
ENRIQUE T. GALAN, SEBASTIAN C. COSCOLLUELA,
ARSENIO L. DEL ROSARIO & JOSE HAUTEA, Officers of
Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc., respondents.
 DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari to
annul and set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman[1] dismissing the
complaint against respondents and to order the Ombudsman to file the
necessary information for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act against them.[2]
The Facts
Atty. Orlando Salvador was PCGG Consultant on detail with the
Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.[3] Likewise, he was
the coordinator of the Technical Working Group (TWG) composed of
officers and employees of different Government Financing Institutions
(GFI).[4]
Among the accounts referred to the TWG of the Behest Loans
Committee was the loan of Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc.[5] with
the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
In 1968, Calinog applied to the PNB for a stand-by irrevocable
confirmed letter of credit amounting to $22,109,412.00 to cover
importation of sugar machinery and equipment on turn-key basis,
construction, plantation and money loans in connection with its
proposed 4,000 TCD Sugar Central. On March 20, 1968, the PNB
approved the loan.[6] On May 8, 1968, the approved loan was increased
to $22,132,377.00.[7]
On March 24, 1997, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the
Ombudsman[8] a complaint against Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc.
(Calinog), alleging:
"5. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 13 dated October 18, 1992,
creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest
Loans and further defined its scope under Memorandum Order No. 61
dated November 9, 1992, (copies attached), the Committee
unanimously resolved that the presence of two or more of the eight (8)
criteria mentioned under Memorandum No. 61 will classify the
account as Behest Loan.
"In the instant case, the Committee endorsed the account to be
behest loan.
"1. It is undercollateralized;
"2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;
"3. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought.
"6. It appears from the foregoing facts and circumstances on record
that the provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 among other
laws, were violated:
"Sec. 3. Corrupt Practice of Public Officers. - In addition to the acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxxxxxxx
"7. x x x
"8. As of April 30, 1986, (the) firm has an outstanding and unpaid
balance of P348.291 million representing bid price of foreclosed
assets (Evidence 8)"[9]
On May 29, 1997, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the
ground of prescription. The resolution reads:
"The loan transactions subject of this complaint occurred in the years
1968, 1978, 1979 and 1982, respectively. A cursory look at the said
loan transactions would readily disclose the fact that the fifteen (15)
year prescriptive period for offenses punishable under R.A. 3019, as
amended has already passed from the time the alleged offenses were
committed. If there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be
discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by public
instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in
connection with said transactions was known to the offended party
when it was committed and the period of prescription commenced to
run from the date of its commission (People vs. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G.,
12 Supp. 50).
"Applying now the foregoing decision of the Court in the case at bar,
the prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years shall commence to run
from the date of commission. Hence, the subject offenses have
already prescribed following the pronouncement of the Court in the
foregoing case.
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
recommended that the instant charges against herein respondents be
dismissed on the ground of prescription.
"SO RESOLVED.
"Manila, Philippines, May 29, 1997."[10]
Hence, this petition.[11]
On October 28, 1999, the Ombudsman manifested to the Court his
willingness to have the case remanded to his Office for preliminary
investigation. Thus -
"In view of the fact that the case involves an alleged behest loan
which Public Respondent dismissed on the sole ground of
prescription, Public Respondent manifests its willingness to have the
case remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary
investigation.
Prayer
"Wherefore, it is respectively prayed of this Honorable Court that this
Manifestation be NOTED.[12]
The Court's Ruling
The subject loans were given in 1968, 1978, 1979 and 1982. On
March 24, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for
violation of R. A. No. 3019.[13]
Respondents contend that the action is barred by prescription
inasmuch as petitioner filed the complaint twenty nine (29) years after
the crime was committed, well beyond the 15-year prescriptive period
provided by law.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the
following shall be considered: ( 1) the period of prescription for the
offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription started to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.[14]
Looking closely at the provisions of R. A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), the law provides for its own prescriptive period.
"Section 11. Prescription of offenses. - All offenses punishable under
this Act shall prescribe in fifteen years." (Underscoring supplied)
However, since R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is provided
in Act No. 3326, Section 2[15] as amended, which provides:
"Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the
commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known
at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the
proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy."
This implies that if the commission of the crime were known, the
prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime was
committed. However, if the violation of the special law was not known
at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from
the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the
constitutive act or acts.[16]
In cases involving violations of R. A. No.3019 committed prior to
the February 1986 Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, we ruled that the government as the aggrieved party could not
have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions
were made.[17] Moreover, no person would have dared to question the
legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive
period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee
on Behest Loans.
As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second
paragraph of Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that
prescription is interrupted "when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person."
In this case, the prescriptive period was interrupted upon the filing
of the complaint with the Ombudsman on March 24, 1997, five (5) years
from the time of discovery in 1992.
Thusly, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive
period.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and SETS
ASIDE the Resolution of the Ombudsman in Case No. OMB-0-97-0724,
dated May 29, 1997.
The Court further DIRECTS the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation in Case No. OMB-0-97-0724 with deliberate
dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE TABUENA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., Respondents.
Ramon Dimen for Petitioner.
Dionisio A. Hernandez for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; EVIDENCE OUT FORMALLY OFFERED CANNOT BE
CONSIDERED NOR GIVEN ANY EVIDENTIARY VALUE. — The
mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not
mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a
party. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As
we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, "At the trial on the merits,
the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes they
will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at
all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered
evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary value."cralaw
virtua1aw library
2. ID; ID; RATIONALE OF THE RULE. — The offer is necessary
because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at
the trial.
3. ID; ID; WHEN CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE
ADVERSE PARTY. — We did say in People v. Napat-a that even if
there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against
the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly
recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of
the case. But we do not fine that these requirements have been
satisfied in the case before us.
4. ID; ORIGINAL RECORD OF A CASE ARCHIVED; WHEN
CONSIDERED READ INTO THE RECORD OF A CASE PENDING
BEFORE A COURT; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE CONDITIONS.
— It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in
the absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party,"
or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is
clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn form the archives" and "admitted as part of the
record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was
"unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
5. ID; TAX RECEIPTS AND DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP;
ACCOMPANIED BY ACTUAL POSSESSION SUPPORT CLAIM OF
OWNERSHIP. — While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence
of ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of
actual possession of the property. It is only where payment of taxes is
accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax
declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a
claim of ownership.
6. ID; ACTS ACCOMPANYING CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP. — All the
acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were
the owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her
forebears had been in possession thereof for more that fifty years and
indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. She paid the realty
taxes thereon in her own name. Jose Tabuena built a house of strong
materials on the lot. He even mortgaged the land to the Development
Bank of the Philippines and to two private persons who acknowledged
him as the owner. These acts denote ownership and are not
consistent with the private respondent’s claim that the petitioner was
only an overseer with mere possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.
7. ID; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INFERIOR COURTS HELD NOT
CONFORMABLE TO THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. — It is the
policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings
of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where
there is now showing that they have been reached arbitrarily. The
exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on
record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their
correctness. As in this case.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the
respondent court, for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts
should not have taken into account evidence not submitted by the
private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of
about 440 square meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In
1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla
against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to
vacate the disputed lot. 1
As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime
in 1926 to Alfredo Tabernilla while the two were in the United States.
Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934, and Damasa Timtiman,
acting upon her son Juan’s instruction, conveyed the subject land to
Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to
stay thereon as she had been living there all her life. Tabernilla
agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property, which she
promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her
death, following which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan
Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof The complaint was filed when
demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.
The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of
the lot, which he inherited from his parents, who acquired it even
before World War II and had been living thereon since then and until
they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the
sale between Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land
planted to coconut trees and bounded on three sides by the Makato
River.
Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in
arriving at its factual findings, the trial court motu proprio took
cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by
the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court
also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it
considered the proceedings in another case involving the same
parties but a different parcel of land.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter
dated October 4, 1921 addressed in Makato, Capis, Philippines; Exh.
"A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating that the amount of P600.00
— the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest since
October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a
Spanish document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa
Timtiman and Alfredo Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4
of Exh. "C."
In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to
the allegations of the appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally
submitted in evidence as disclosed by the transcript of stenographic
notes, which it quoted at length. 2 The challenged decision also
upheld the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case,
to bolster its findings in the second case.
We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted
were not the above-described documents but Exhibits "X" and "Y" and
their sub-markings, which were the last will and testament of Alfredo
Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of
exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C." In fact, the trial
court categorically declared that "Exhibits ‘A,’ ‘A-1,’ ‘A-2,’ ‘B,’ ‘C,’ and
‘C-1,’ were not among those documents or exhibits formally offered
for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction
of the finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused
Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence
mentioned in the quoted transcript.
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 35. Offer of evidence. — The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does
not mean it has thereby already been offered as part of the evidence
of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" were marked at the
pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of
identifying them at that time. They were not by such marking formally
offered as exhibits. As we said in Inter pacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 3
"At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the
exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it
may decide not to do so at all. In the latter event, such documents
cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any evidentiary
value." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his
findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties at the trial. 4
We did say in People v. Napat-a 5 that even if there be no formal offer
of an exhibit, it may still be admitted against the adverse party if, first,
it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, it
has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not
find that these requirements have been satisfied in the case before
us. The trial court said the said exhibits could be validly considered
because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of the
plaintiff’s witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the
trial and was even cross-examined by the defendant’s counsel. We do
not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was identify the
documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the
contents of the exhibits.
Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
ATTY. LEGASPI:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
What is this Exh. "A" about?
A The translation of the letter.
Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan
Peralta to Alfredo Tabernilla?
Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6
She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.
The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no
reversible error in taking judicial notice of Tabuena’s testimony in a
case it had previously heard which was closely connected with the
case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending
before them, of the contents of the records of other cases, even when
such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are
actually pending before the same judge." 7 Nevertheless, it applied
the exception that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all
parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record
of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending
before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is
made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original
record of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from
the archives by the court’s direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then
pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the
absence of objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or
"at the request or with the consent of the parties," the case is clearly
referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are
actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of the
record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been
established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being
considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As the
petitioner puts t, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was
"unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.
The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court
improperly took judicial notice of the other case, striking off all
reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiffs cause because
"the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences
submitted by the plaintiff." What "other evidences" ? The trouble with
this justification is that the exhibits it intends to corroborate, to wit,
Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally
submitted.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private
respondent, we feel that the complaint should have been dismissed
by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate its
allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same
parcel of land sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not
another property, as the petitioner contends. Even assuming it was
the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan
Peralta, Jr., who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to
the trial court, "there is no question that before 1934 the land in
question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not
have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him
unless he had appropriate authorization from the owner. No such
authorization has been presented.
It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, as we have held in many cases. However, that rule is also
not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known exception. In
the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest have possessed the disputed property since
even before World War II. In light of this uncontroverted fact, the tax
declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence
of the petitioner’s ownership. As this Court has held:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of
ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of the
property. 9
It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual
possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that such
circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership. 10
The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of
the subject parcels of land by the respondents and their parents
before them for more than 30 years qualify them to register title to the
said subject parcels of land. 11
The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the
property and magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain
there, he did not at least require her to pay the realty taxes in his
name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was
not much concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond only
of the three dogs he had bought from America. That is specious
reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really that
unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property
in the first place, even as dacion en pago. He would have demanded
another form of payment if he did not have the intention at all of living
on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the
property, we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name
when the realty taxes thereon were paid by Damasa Timtiman or why
he did not object when the payments were made in her own
name.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena
indicate that they were the owners of the disputed property. Damasa
Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession thereof for more
than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died. 12
She paid the realty taxes thereon in her own name. 13 Jose Tabuena
built a house of strong materials on the lot. 14 He even mortgaged the
land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private
persons who acknowledged him as the owner. 15 These acts denote
ownership and are not consistent with the private respondent’s claim
that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere possessory rights
tolerated by Tabernilla.
It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual
findings of the courts below and even to regard them as conclusive
where there is no showing that they have been reached arbitrarily.
The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence
on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their
correctness. As in this case.
The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C", which had not been formally offered as evidence and
therefore should have been totally disregarded, conformably to the
Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the
evidence submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice
thereof without the consent or knowledge of the petitioner, in violation
of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings here challenged
are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been
sustained by the respondent court.
Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower
court, failed to prove his claim of ownership over the disputed property
with evidence properly cognizable under our adjudicative laws. By
contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner’s
contrary contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule
in his favor and dismiss the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, with costs against the
private Respondent. It is so ordered.
CITY OF MANILA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GERARDO GARCIA —
Carmencita Villanueva, MODESTA PARAYNO — Narciso
Parayno, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — Simion Diliman,
AQUILINO BARRIOS — Leonora Ruiz, LAUREANO DlZO,
BERNABE AYUDA — Leogarda de los Santos, ISABELO OBAOB
— Andrea Riparip, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, 1
ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ;
MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO —
Sedora Orayle, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA;
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (Mrs.) Alunan, LORENZO
CARANDANG, JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA — Emigdio
Egipto, Defendants-Appellants.
Mauricio Z. Alunan, for Defendants-Appellants.
City Fiscal’s Office for Plaintiff-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. COURTS; RULINGS; ALTERATION THEREOF. — A court of
justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its power, to make it
conformable to law and justice (Sec. 5, Rule 124 of the 1940 Rules of
Court, now Section 5, Rule 135 of the new Rules of Court; Veluz v.
Justice of the Peace of Sariaya, 42 Phil. 557).
2. ID.; CITY OF MANILA; MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES; JUDICIAL
KNOWLEDGE. — Courts in the City of Manila should take judicial
knowledge of all municipal ordinances passed by the City for the
Charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial
notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.
3. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; ERECTION OF HOUSES
ON LAND OWNED BY ANOTHER WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE AND
CONSENT; SQUATTERS. — Where defendants entered the land,
built houses of second class materials thereon without the knowledge
and consent of the City, without city permits — their constructions are
illegal, and in familiar language they are known as squatters.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of
the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. Official approval of
squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country
where there is an orderly form of government.
4. POLITICAL LAW; SQUATTERS; BUILDING OF SCHOOL
HOUSES; INTEREST OF SQUATTERS MUST YIELD TO PUBLIC
GOOD. — The squatters’ houses and constructions clearly hinder and
impair the use of the property for school purposes. The courts may
well take judicial notice of the fact that construction of elementary
grades school houses has been and still is a perennial problem in the
city to which selfish interest of the squatters must yield. The public
purpose of constructing the school building annex is paramount.
5. ID.; ID.; PUBLIC NUISANCE. — The squatters’ houses and
constructions aforesaid constitute public nuisance per se for the
reason that they hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly
needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth
of the land. This nuisance could well have been summarily abated by
the city authorities even without the aid of courts.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one
compact area, bordering Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in
Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens titles Nos. 49763, 37082 and
37558. Shortly after liberation, from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered
upon these premises without plaintiff’s knowledge and consent. They
built houses of second class materials, again without plaintiff’s
knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits
from the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously
been discovered, defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto),
Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose
Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania, Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez,
Honorio Beriño, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto
Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor
Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract"
— to occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set
forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of
Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la
Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The
rest of the 23 defendants exhibited none.
For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals.
Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Name Area in Monthly Amount due from
sq.m. Rental date of delinquency
to Feb. 1962
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36
4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
5. Aquilino Barrios 54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)
6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40
7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
10. Cecilia Manzano in
lieu of Urbano Ramos Paid up to
(deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962
11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32
15. Marciano Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16
17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
18. Wilarico Ricamata 40.20 4.82 Paid up to
March 1962.
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82 Paid up to
March 1962.
20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60
23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48
________
P7,580.69
Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not
contiguous, to the property. Came the need for this school’s
expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff’s
City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor’s directive to clear squatters’
houses on city property, gave each of defendants thirty (30) days to
vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City Treasurer’s demand on each defendant,
made in February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount
due by reason of the occupancy and to vacate in fifteen (15) days.
Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession. 2
The Judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to
pay the amounts heretofore indicated opposite their respective
names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962, until they
vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.
1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the
trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school
purposes.
The city’s evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That
document recites that the amount of P100,000.00 had been set aside
in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget, for the
construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos
Elementary School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at
the hearing, ruled out the admissibility of said document. But then, in
the decision under review, the trial judge obviously revised his views.
He there declared that there was need for defendants to vacate the
premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E,
aforesaid.
It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the
case is within its power, to make it conformable to law and justice. 3
Such was done here. Defendants’ remedy was to bring to the
attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done so, this
Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. 4
Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would
not profit defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could
well have taken — because he was duty bound to take — judicial
notice 5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that the city charter of
Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. 6 And,
Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification aforesaid that an
appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the "construction of
additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.
Furthermore, defendants’ position is vulnerable to assault from a third
direction. Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the
premises. The excuse that they have permits from the mayor is at
best flimsy. The permits to occupy are revocable on thirty day’s
notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in
this factual background that we say that the city’s need for the
premises is unimportant. The city’s right to throw defendants out of
the area cannot be gainsaid. The city’s dominical right to possession
is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the
land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the
judgment below. 7
2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of
tenants. They are wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second class materials thereon
— without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were
erected without city permits. These constructions are illegal. In a
language familiar to all, defendants are squatters.
Since the last global war, squatting on another’s property in this
country has become a widespread vice. It was and is a blight.
Squatters’ areas pose problems of health, sanitation. They are
breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the
law and the right of others, even those of the government are being
flouted. Knowingly, squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of
occupying property whenever and wherever convenient to their
interests — without as much as leave, and even against the will, of
the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief
that they could violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of
some of them has tied up the hands of legitimate owners. The latter
are thus prevented from recovering possession by peaceful means.
Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of
course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong.
But, then, the mills of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers
who, by means fair or foul, are quite often successful in procuring
delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry into
government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some public
officials to enforce the government’s rights. Obstinacy of these
squatters is difficult to explain unless it is spawned by official
tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said squatters
have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong.
To them, violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting
still exist, much to the detriment of public interest. It is high time that,
in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be restored. It is in this
environment that we look into the validity of the permits granted
defendants herein.
These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by
the mayors in 1947 and 1948 when the effects of the war had
simmered down and when these defendants could have very well
adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located
permanent premises for their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are,
they preferred to remain on city property.
Defendants’ entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as
illegal, without permits. 8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to
"safeguard all the lands" of the City of Manila. 9
Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city’s land
in question. It is our considered view that the Mayor of the City of
Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into public property by the simple
expedient of giving permits or, for that matter, executing leases.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of
the city officials will elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a
compound of illegal entry and official permit to stay is obnoxious to
our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit
does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not
promote public welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots
in vice; so it is an infected bargain. Official approval of squatting
should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country where
there is an orderly form of government.
We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to
give permits, written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein
granted are null and void.

3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by
defendants on the premises. They clearly hinder and impair the use of
that property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial
notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary
grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The
selfish interests of defendants must have to yield to the general good.
The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is
paramount. 10
In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid
constitute public nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they
hinder and impair the use of the property for a badly needed school
building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth of the land. 11
They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct
performance of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and
maintain a complete and adequate system of public education, and
more, to "provide at least free public primary instruction." 12
Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The
public nuisance could well have been summarily abated by the city
authorities themselves, even without the aid of the courts. 13
4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Manila. They say that the case should have been started in the
municipal court. They prop up their position by the averment that
notice for them to vacate was only served in September, 1961, and
suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court. We have reached the conclusion that their
forcible entry dates back to the period from 1945 to 1947. That entry
was not legalized by the permits. Their possession continued to
remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year
limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 And the Manila Court of
First Instance has jurisdiction. 14
Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review.
Costs against defendants-appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, and Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
RULE 130
G.R. No. L-31189 March 31, 1987
MUNICIPALITY OF VICTORIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, NORMA LEUENBERGER and
FRANCISCO SOLIVA, respondents.
Enrique I. Soriano, Jr. for private respondents.
PARAS, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the decision * of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on September 29, 1969 in
CA-G.R. No. 35036-R (Rollo, p. 11) setting aside the decision ** of the
Court of First Intance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, dated
September 24, 1964 which dismissed the complaint for recovery of
possession in Civil Case No. 181-S and declared the cemetery site on
Lot No. 76 in Victorias as property of the municipality of Victorias
(Record on Appeal, p. 9).
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the
lower court is hereby set aside and another is hereby
rendered:
(1) Ordering the defendant municipality and/or thru its
appropriate officials to return and deliver the
possession of the portion of Lot 76 used as cemetery
or burial site of the plaintiff-appellant.
(2) Ordering defendant municipality to pay the plaintiff-
appellant the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963 until
the possession of said land is actually delivered.
Lot No. 76 containing an area of 208,157 sq. meters forms a part of
Cadastral Lot No. 140 (Rollo, p. 11), a 27.2460 ha. sugar land located
in Bo. Madaniog, Victorias, Negros Occidental, in the name of the
deceased Gonzalo Ditching under Tax Declaration No. 3429 of
Negros Occidental for the year 1941 (Exh. "3," Folder of Exhibits, p.
22). He was survived by his widow Simeona Jingeo Vda. de Ditching
and a daughter, Isabel, who died in 1928 (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 7)
leaving one off-spring, respondent Norma Leuenberger, who was then
only six months old (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 34).
Respondent Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Soliva,
inherited the whole of Lot No. 140 from her grandmother, Simeona J.
Vda. de Ditching (not from her predeceased mother Isabel Ditching).
In 1952, she donated a portion of Lot No. 140, about 3 ha., to the
municipality for the ground of a certain high school and had 4 ha.
converted into a subdivision. (TSN, July 1, 1964, p. 24).
In 1963, she had the remaining 21 ha. or 208.157 sq. m. relocated by
a surveyor upon request of lessee Ramon Jover who complained of
being prohibited by municipal officials from cultivating the land. It was
then that she discovered that the parcel of land, more or less 4 ha. or
33,747 sq.m. used by Petitioner Municipality of Victorias, as a
cemetery from 1934, is within her property which is now Identified as
Lot 76 and covered by TCT No. 34546 (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 7-9;
Exh. "4," Folder of Exhibits, p. 23 and Exh. "A," Folder of Exhibits, p.
1).
On May 20, 1963, Respondent wrote the Mayor of Victorias regarding
her discovery, demanding payment of past rentals and requesting
delivery of the area allegedly illegally occupied by Petitioner (Exh. "G,
Folder of Exhibits, p. 15). When the Mayor replied that Petitioner
bought the land she asked to be shown the papers concerning the
sale but was referred by the Mayor to the municipal treasurer who
refused to show the same (TSN, July 1, 1964, pp. 32-33).
On January 11, 1964, Respondents filed a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch 1, for recovery of
possession of the parcel of land occupied by the municipal cemetery
(Record on Appeal, p. 1). In its answer, petitioner Municipality, by way
of special defense, alleged ownership of the lot, subject of the
complaint, having bought it from Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching
sometime in 1934 (Record on Appeal, p. 7). The lower court decided
in favor of the Municipality. On appeal Respondent appellate Court set
aside the decision of the lower court (Record on AppeaL p. 9); hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
This petition was filed with the Court on November 6, 1969 (Rollo, p.
2), the Record on Appeal on December 19, 1969 (Rollo, p. 80). On
January 5, 1970, the Court gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p.
84).
The Brief for the Petitioner was filed on April 1, 1970 (Rollo, p. 88), the
Brief for Respondents was filed on May 18, 1970 (Rollo, p. 92).
On July 8, 1970, the Court resolved to consider the case submitted for
decision without Petitioner's Reply Brief, Petitioner having failed to file
the brief within the period which expired on June 10, 1970 (Rollo. p.
99).
On motion of counsel for the Respondents (Rollo, p. 104), the Court
resolved on June 30, 1972 to allow respondent Francisco Soliva to
continue the appeal in behalf of the estate of respondent Norma
Leuenberger who died on January 25, 1972, Respondent Francisco
Soliva having been appointed special administrator in Special
Proceedings No. 84-V of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental (Rollo, p. 110).
In their brief, petitioner raised the following errors of respondent Court
of Appeals: (Brief for the Petitioner, p. 1-3);
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondents Norma Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva
are the lawful owners of the land in litigation as they
are estopped from questioning the possession and
ownership of herein petitioner which dates back to
more than 30 years.
II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred in ordering
the petition petitioner to deliver the possession of the
land in question to the respondents Nomia
 Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva, by holding that non-
annotation on the Torrens Certificate of Title could not
affect the said land when the possession by the
petitioner of the said land for over 30 years and using it
as a public cemetery for that length of time are
sufficient proof of purchase and transfer of title and
non-annotation of the Certificate of Title did not render
the sale ineffectual
III.
The Honorable Court of Appeals further erred in
ordering the petitioner Municipality of Victories to pay
the respondents the sum of P400.00 a year from 1963
until possession is actually delivered because under
the law, an owner of a piece of land has no obligation
to pay rentals as it owns and possesses the same.
There is merit in the petition.
It is undisputed that petitioner failed to present before the Court a
Deed of Sale to prove its purchase of the land in question which is
included in the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34546 in the name of
private respondent Norma Leuenberger.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the secondary
evidence presented by the petitioner municipality is sufficient to
substantiate its claim that it acquired the disputed land by means of a
Deed of Sale.
Under the Best Evidence Rule when the original writing is lost or
otherwise unavailable, the law in point provides:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or
destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof
of its execution and loss or destruction or unavailability,
its contents may be proved by a copy, or by a recital of
its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of witnesses. (Rule 130, Rules of Court).
In lieu of a Deed of Sale, petitioner presented a certificate issued by
the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records Management in
Manila, of a page of the 1934 Notarial Register of Vicente D. Aragon
with the following entries:
Nature of Instrument — Compra venta 2 porciones
Terrenos: Lotes Nos. 140-A y 140-B, Victorias, Neg.
Occidental pago por esso despues aprobacion
Jusgado la Instance, Neg. Occidental causa civil 5116
Vendedora: — Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching . . .
administradora Abint. G. Ditching
Comprador: — Municipio Victorias, Neg. Occidental . . .
. por su Pres.Mpal Vicente B. Arnaes
Valor: — P750.00 ...
Vease copia correspondiente.
Names of-persons Executing/ Acknowledging:
Simeona Vda. de Ditching
Adm. Abint actuacion especial No. 5116
Jusgado la Instance Neg. Occidental
Vendedora
Vicente B. Arnaes
Pres. Municipal. Victorias
Comprador
Witnesses to the Signatures:
Esteban Jalandoni
Gregorio Elizalde
 Date: Month
9 Julio 1934
Fees: P2.00
Cedulas:
Exenta por susexo
F1027880 Enero 26/34 Victories, Neg.
Occidental
Remarks.
En Victorias, Neg. Occidental
Los annexes A. y B. estan unidos
solamente en el original de la
escritura.
Respondent Court of Appeals was of the view (Rollo, p. 16) that a
mere entry in the notarial register of a notary public of an alleged sale
cannot prove that a particular piece of land was sold by one person to
another, one of the important requirements being the indication of the
area and the technical description of the land being sold. In the
present case, since no deed of sale could be produced, there is no
way of telling what particular portion of the property was sold to
defendant municipality and how big was the sale of the land conveyed
to the defendant municipality.
It will be observed that the entries in the notarial register clearly show:
(a) the nature of the instrument. — a deed of sale; (b) the subject of
the sale — two parcels of land, Lot Nos. 140-A and 140-B; (c) the
parties of the contract — the vendor Simeona J. Vda. de Ditching in
her capacity as Administrator in Civil Case No. 5116 of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental and the vendee, Vicente B.
Ananosa, Municipal Mayor of Victorias; (d) the consideration P750.00;
(e) the names of the witnesses Esteban Jalandoni and Gregoria
Elizado; and the date of the sale on July 9, 1934.
It is beyond question that the foregoing certificate is an authentic
document clearly corroborated and supported by: (a) the testimony of
the municipal councilor of Victorias, Ricardo Suarez, (Original TSN
Hearing of September 14, 1964, pp. 1222) who negotiated the sale;
(b) the testimony of Emilio Cuesta, (Original TSN Hearing of
September 14, 1964, pp. 2238) the municipal treasurer of said
municipality, since 1932 up to the date of trial on September 14, 1964,
who personally paid the amount of P750.00 to Felipe Leuenberger as
consideration of the Contract of Sale; (c) Certificate of Settlement
(Original Exhibits, p. 20) "as evidence of said payment;" (d) Tax
Declaration No. 429 (Ibid., p. 22) which was cancelled and was
substituted by Tax Declaration No. 3600 covering the portion of the
property unsold (Decision, CFI, Neg. Occidental Orig. Record on
Appeal, p. 6) and (e) Tax Declaration No. 3601 (Ibid, p. 23) in the
name of the Municipal Government of Victorias covering the portion
occupied as cemetery.
Tax Declaration No. 3601 shows on its face the boundaries as
follows:
North — NE — Lot No. 140-C of the Subdivision
South — SW — Lot No. 140-C of the Subdivision
West — NW — Lots Nos. 140-C & 140-B of the
Subdivision.
The area is 33,747 sq.m.
At the back Exh. 4-A, the sale of a portion of the lot to the Municipality
of Victorias was clearly explained as follows:
Note: The whole Lot No. 140, belongs to Norma
Leuenberger as evidenced by a Transfer of Cert. of
Title No. 18672. Portion of this Lot, (30,000 sq.m. was
sold to Municipality of Victories for Cemetery Site as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed by Simeona
Jingco Vda. de Ditching in favor of the aforesaid
 Municipality and ratified by Notary Public Mr. Vicente
Aragon under Doc. No. 132; Page No. 2; Book No. 10,
Series of 1934.
At the lowest portion under Memoranda it was explained that —
The area under this declaration includes 3,746 sq.
meters donated by Mrs. Simeona Jingco Vda. de
Ditching and used as road leading to the cemetery. "
(EXIL 4; Original Exhibits, p. 23).
The above-mentioned testimonies and documentary evidence
sufficiently Identify the land sold by the predecessors-in-interest of
private respondent. To insist on the technical description of the land in
dispute would be to sacrifice substance to form which would
undoubtedly result in manifest injustice to the petitioner.
Moreover, it is expressly provided by law that the thing sold shall be
understood as delivered, when it is placed in the control and
possession of the vendee. (Civil Code Art. 1497). Where there is no
express provision that title shall not pass until payment of the price,
and the thing gold has been delivered, title passes from the moment
the thing sold is placed in the possession and control of the buyer.
(Kuenzle & Streiff vs. Watson & Co., 13 PhiL 26 [1909]). Delivery
produces its natural effects in law, the principal and most important of
which being the conveyance of ownership, without prejudice to the
right of the vendor to payment of the price. (Ocejo, Perez & Co. vs.
International Banking Corp., 37 PhiL 631 [1918]).
Similarly, when the sale is made through a public instrument, the
execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which
is the object of the contract, if from the deed, the contrary does not
appear or cannot be clearly inferred. (Civil Code Art. 1498). The
execution of the public instrument operates as a formal or symbolic
delivery of the property sold and authorizes the buyer to use the
document as proof of ownership. (Florendo v. Foz, 20 PhiL 388
[1911]).
In the case at bar it is undisputed that petitioner had been in open,
public, adverse and continuous possession of the land for a period of
more than thirty years. In fact, according to the municipal treasurer
there are over 1000 graves in the cemetery. (Decision, Court of
Appeals, Rollo, pp. 11-22).
As correctly observed by Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan in his
dissenting opinion (Rollo, pp. 23-28) in the decision of this case by the
Court of Appeals, the evidence establishes without debate that the
property was originally registered in 1916. Plaintiff was born only in
1928 and cannot possibly be the registered owner of the original lot
140 at the time. Indeed, according to her own evidence, (Exhibit A;
Original Record pp. 13) she became the registered owner only in
1963. Likewise, it is undisputed that in the intestate estate of Gonzalo
Ditching, the grandfather of private respondent Norma Leunberger, it
was her grandmother, Simeona, the surviving spouse of Gonzalo who
was named judicial administratrix. According to Norma's own
testimony, Isabel her mother, died in 1928 (TSN Aug. 12, 1964, p. 34)
while Simeona the grandmother died in 1942. (Ibid.) Therefore, as of
1934 when a document of sale was executed by Simeona in favor of
the municipality of Victories as indubitably shown in the notarial
register (Exhibit 5.A) in question, Simeona was still the administratrix
of the properties left by her husband, Gonzalo and of their conjugal
partnership. Consequently, she is the only person who could legally
dispose of by sale this particular four- hectare portion of Lot 140. And
so it is, that in 1934, Simeona Ditching in her capacity as judicial
administratrix made and executed the document described in the
Report as Lots 140-A and 140-B, showing clearly that they are
portions of the original big Lot 140. As this conveyance was executed
by the judicial administratrix, unquestionably the party authorized to
dispose of the same, the presumption must be that she did so upon
proper authority of the Court of First Instance.
As to the description of the property sold, the fact that a notarial report
shows that they are portions of Lot 140 and the property in question
occupied by the public cemetery is admittedly a portion of said lot in
the absence of evidence that there were other portions of Lot 140
ceded unto the petitioner municipality, the inevitable conclusion is that
the sale executed in the Notarial Register refers to the disputed lot.
Unfortunately, the purchaser Municipality of Victorias failed to register
said Deed of Sale; hence, when Simeona Jingco Vda. de Ditching
died, her grand-daughter, respondent Norma Leuenberger claimed to
have inherited the land in dispute and succeeded in registering said
land under the Torrens system. Said land is now covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-34036 (Exhibit A, supra) issued by the
Register of Deeds of -Negros Occidental on March 11, 1963 in the
name of Norma Leuenberger, married to Francisco Soliva, containing
an area of 208,157 square meters. As registered owner, she is
unquestionably entitled to the protection afforded to a holder of a
Torrens Title.
Admittedly, it is well-settled that under the Torrens System "Every
person receiving a certificate of title in pursuance of a decree of
registration, . . . shall hold the same free of all encumbrance except
those noted on said certificate ... " (Sec. 39, Act 496; now Sec. 43, PD
1529).
In the instant case, however, respondent Norma Leuenberger
admitted that she inherited the land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-34036 from her grandmother, who had already sold the
land to the petitioner in 1934; hence, she merely stepped into the
shoes of her grandmother and she cannot claim a better right than her
predecessor-in-interest. When she applied for registration of the
disputed land, she had no legal right to do so as she had no
ownership of the land since land registration is not a mode of
acquiring ownership but only of confirming ownership of the land.
(Grande, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 115 Phil. 521.)"The
Torrens System was not established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land, ..." It is intended merely to confirm and register the
title which one may already have on the land. Where the applicant
possesses no title or ownership over the parcel of land, he cannot
acquire one under the Torrens system of Registration. (Torela, et al.,
vs. Torela, et al., L-27843, October 11, 1979).
While an inherently defective Torrens title may not ordinarily be
cancelled even after proof of its defect, the law nevertheless
safeguards the rightful party's interest in the titled land from fraud and
improper use of technicalities by snowing such party, in appropriate
cases, to judicially seek reconveyance to him of whatever he has
been deprived of as long as the land has not been transferred or
conveyed to a purchaser in good faith. (Pedro Pascua, et al., vs.
Mariano Gopuyoc et al., L-23197, May 31, 1977.)
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1456. If the property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit
of the person from whom the property comes.
Thus, it has been held that where the land is decreed in the name of a
person through fraud or mistake, such person is by operation of law
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the persons
from whom the property comes. The beneficiary shag have the right
t• enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens
title and the trustee and his successors-in-interest are bound to
execute the deed of reconveyance. (Pacheco vs. Arro, 85 Phil. 505;
Escobar vs. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86).
As the land in dispute is held by private respondents in trust for the
Municipality of Victorias, it is logical to conclude that the latter can
neither be deprived of its possession nor be made to pay rentals
thereof. Private respondent is in equity bound to reconvey the subject
land to the cestui que trust the Municipality of Victorias. The Torrens
system was never calculated to foment betrayal in the performance of
a trust. (Escobar vs. Locsin, 74 Phil. 86).
For a more expeditious disposition of the case at bar, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 10. Judgment for Specific acts; vesting title. — ...
If real or personal property is within the Philippines, the
court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may
enter judgment divesting the title of any party and
vesting it in others and such judgment shall have the
force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form
of law.
Finally, the conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless
for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case. (Chase v.
Buencamino, Sr., 136 SCRA 365 [1985]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment of the respondent appellate
court is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I-Silay City in Civil Case No.
181-S declaring the cemetery site (Exh. E-2) on Lot No. 76 in
Victories as the property of the municipality of Victorias, is hereby
REINSTATED. Additionally, We hereby order (a) the petitioner to
have the disputed land segregated by a licensed surveyor from the
rest of Lot No. 76 described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
34036 and to have the corresponding subdivision plan, duly approved
by the Land Registration Commission, submitted to the court of origin
for approval; (b) the private respondents Norma Leuenberger and
Francisco Soliva to be divested of their title to the disputed land under
Rule 39, Sec. 10, Rules of Court; and (c) the Register of Deeds of
Negros Occidental to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 34036
and issue, in lieu thereof, one title in the name of the Municipality of
Victories for the disputed land and another title in the names of the
private respondents Norma Leuenberger and Francisco Soliva for the
rest of Lot No. 76. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 80505 : December 4, 1990.]
192 SCRA 28
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, vs. MARIO TANDOY y LIM, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated
October 13, 1987, convicting Mario Tandoy of the crime of violation of
Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, is before us on appeal.
The information against the accused-appellant read as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of May 1986, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused without being authorized by law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell eight (8) pieces
of dried marijuana flowering tops, two (2) pieces of dried marijuana
flowering tops and crushed dried marijuana flowering tops, which are
prohibited drug, for and in consideration of P20.00.
Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge
Buenaventura J. Guerrero rendered a decision the dispositive portion
of which declared:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, Rep. Act
No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and cost.: nad
The marijuana confiscated in this case is declared confiscated
and forfeited and ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board for proper disposal.
SO ORDERED.
The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this
appeal:
1. The Court a quo erred in finding accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite lack of evidence
to prove that he sold marijuana to the poseur-buyer.
2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the
accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the
P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
The evidence of the prosecution may be summarized as follows:
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police
Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R.
Singayan, Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao
Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-
bust operation at Solchuaga St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to
pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher
to approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned
themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was
the accused-appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo
bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and
there — two rolls/pieces of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00
bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and
Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant and took
from him the marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of
marijuana and crushed leaves.: nad
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics
Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin
Pajilan. The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having been
informed of his constitutional rights.
These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and
Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination
was performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles,
forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later
testified that the findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as
an exhibit. 2
As might be expected, the accused-appellant had a different story. His
testimony was that from 1:30 to 4:00 p.m. of the day in question, he
was playing "cara y cruz" with 15 other persons along Solchuaga St.
when somebody suddenly said that policemen were making arrests.
The players grabbed the bet money and scampered. However, he and
a certain Danny (another "cara y cruz" player) were caught and taken
to the Narcotics Command headquarters in Makati. There they were
mauled and warned that if they did not point to their fellow pushers, they
would rot in jail. The accused-appellant denied he had sold marijuana
to Singayan and insisted the bills taken from him were the bet money
he had grabbed at the "cara y cruz" game. 3
The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses and to listen to their respective testimonies, gave more
credence to the statements of the arresting officers. Applying the
presumption that they had performed their duties in a regular manner,
it rejected Tandoy's uncorroborated allegation that he had been
manhandled and framed. Tandoy had not submitted sufficient evidence
of his charges, let alone his admission that he had no quarrel with the
peace officers whom he had met only on the day of his arrest.
In People v. Patog, 4 this Court held:
When there is no evidence and nothing to indicate the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper motives, the presumption
is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit.
Tandoy submits that "one will not sell this prohibited drug to another
who is a total stranger until the seller is certain of the identity of the
buyer."
The conjecture must be rejected.: nad
In People v. Paco, 5 this Court observed:
Drug-pushing when done on a small level as in this case belongs to that
class of crimes that may be committed at anytime and at any place.
After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is made, the illegal
transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are
in a public place and in the presence of other people may not always
discourage them from pursuing their illegal trade as these factors may
even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has sustained
the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard
hall (People v. Rubio, G.R. No. 66875, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 329;
People v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 72141, January 12, 1987, 147 SCRA
252), in front of a store (People vs. Khan, supra) along a street at 1:45
p.m. (People v. Toledo, G.R. No. 67609, November 22, 1985, 140
SCRA 259), and in front of a house (People v. Policarpio, G.R. No.
69844, February 23, 1988).
As the Court has also held, "What matters is not an existing familiarity
between the buyer and the seller but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the marijuana leaves." 6
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the
best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of the
xerox copy only of the marked P10.00 bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention
thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00
bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is
excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy.
Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an
ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except
in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.:-cralaw
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document
are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not
such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the
circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best
evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
(Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution
solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents,
other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore
admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not
indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant because the
sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of
the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the
accused-appellant had been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to
produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.
We are convinced from the evidence on record that the prosecution has
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused-appellant with proof beyond reasonable doubt of his guilt. He
must therefore suffer the penalty prescribed by law for those who would
visit the scourge of drug addiction upon our people.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the accused-appellant.: nad
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 83377 February 9, 1993
BASILIO DE VERA, LUIS DE VERA, FELIPE DE VERA, HEIRS OF
EUSTAQUIA DE VERA-PAPA represented by GLICERIA PAPA-
FRANCISCO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIANO AGUILAR and LEONA V.
AGUILAR, respondents.
Pablo M. Gancayaco for petitioners.
De Mesa, Villarica & Associates for respondents.
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court
of Appeals dated November 27, 1987 in CA-GR CV No. 07448
entitled, "Basilio de Vera, Luis de Vera, Felipe de Vera, Heirs of
Eustaquia de Vera-Papa, represented by Gliceria Papa-Francisco,
and Heirs of Maria de Vera-Torres, represented by Luis V. Torres,
plaintiffs-appellees versus Spouses Mariano Aguilar and Leona V.
Aguilar, defendants-appellants", which reversed the decision ** of the
Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Third Judicial Region, Branch 14, for
failure of petitioners to prove the loss or destruction of the original
deed of sale and of all its duplicate original copies.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioners Basilio, Luis, Felipe, Eustaquia and Maria, all surnamed de
Vera and respondent Leona, married to respondent Mariano Aguilar,
are the children and heirs of the late Marcosa Bernabe who died on
May 10, 1960. In her lifetime, Marcosa Bernabe owned the disputed
parcel of land situated in Camalig, Meycauayan, Bulacan, with an
area of 4,195 square meters, designated as Cadastral Lot No. 3621,
Cad. 337, Case No. 4, Meycauayan Cadastre.
The disputed property was mortgaged by petitioners Basilio and
Felipe de Vera to a certain Atty. Leonardo Bordador. When the
mortgage had matured, the respondents redeemed the property from
Atty. Leonardo Bordador and in turn Marcosa Bernabe sold the same
to them as evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated February 11,
1956.
On February 13, 1956, the respondents registered the deed with the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan resulting in the cancellation of the tax
declaration in the name of Marcosa Bernabe and the issuance of
another in the name of the Aguilars. Since then and up to the present,
the Aguilars have been paying taxes on the land.
On July 20, 1977, respondent Mariano Aguilar was issued a free
patent to the land on the basis of which Original Certificate of Title No.
P-1356(M) was issued in his name.
On September 1, 1980, the petitioners wrote to the respondents
claiming that as children of Marcosa Bernabe, they were co-owners of
the property and demanded partition thereof on threats that the
respondents would be charged with perjury and/or falsification. The
petitioners also claimed that the respondents had resold the property
to Marcosa Bernabe on April 28, 1959.
On September 27, 1980, the respondents wrote in reply to the
petitioners that they were the sole owners of the disputed parcel of
land and denied that the land was resold to Marcosa Bernabe.
True to petitioners' threat, they filed a falsification case against the
respondents. However, on March 31, 1981, Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Arsenio N. Mercado of Bulacan recommended dismissal of the charge
of falsification of public document against the respondents for lack of
a prima facie case.
On March 26, 1981, petitioners filed a suit for reconveyance of the lot
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-1356(M).
On July 31, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision *** the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
defendants:
1. To reconvey the property in question to the plaintiffs;
2. To pay plaintiffs P10,000.00 as litigation expenses;
3. To pay plaintiffs P5,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. To pay P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.1
In ruling in favor of the petitioners, the trial court admitted, over the
objection of the respondents, Exhibit A purporting to be a xeroxed
copy of an alleged deed of sale executed on April 28, 1959 by the
respondents selling, transferring and conveying unto Marcosa
Bernabe the disputed parcel of land for and in consideration of
P1,500.00.
Not contented with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of
Appeals contending that they never sold back to Marcosa Bernabe
the disputed parcel of land. Furthermore, respondents contended that
since the petitioners have failed to produce the original of the alleged
deed of sale dated April 28, 1959, the same was not the best
evidence of the alleged sale hence it should have been excluded and
should not have been accorded any evidentiary value. On the other
hand, the petitioners claimed that the existence of the document of
sale dated April 28, 1959 had been duly established by the testimony
of the notary public before whom it was acknowledged and by Luis de
Vera who was present during its execution and that the loss of the
original document had been proven by the testimony of the
representatives of the offices of the National Archives and the
Provincial Assessor of Bulacan.
On November 29, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision
reversing the trial court's decision. It found that the loss or destruction
of the original deed of sale has not been duly proven by the
petitioners. Hence, secondary evidence, i.e., presentation of the
xeroxed copy of the alleged deed of sale is inadmissible.
Hence this petition.
The crux of this case is whether or not the petitioners have
satisfactorily proven the loss of the original deed of sale so as to allow
the presentation of the xeroxed copy of the same.
We rule in the negative.
Section 4 of Rule 130 (now Section 5, Rule 130) of the Rules of Court
on Secondary Evidence states:
Sec. 4. Secondary evidence when original is lost or
destroyed. — When the original writing has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof
of its execution and loss or destruction, or
unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document,
or by the recollection of witnesses.
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were
actually lost or destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such
secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former
existence of the instrument. The correct order of proof is as
follows: Existence; execution; loss; contents although this order may
be changed if necessary in the discretion of the court. The sufficiency
of proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an alleged lost
deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case.2
A reading of the decision of the trial court shows that it merely ruled
on the existence and due execution of the alleged deed of sale dated
April 28, 1959. It failed to look into the facts and circumstances
surrounding the loss or destruction of the original copies of the alleged
deed of sale.
In the case at bar, the existence of an alleged sale of a parcel of land
was proved by the presentation of a xeroxed copy of the alleged deed
of absolute sale.
In establishing the execution of a document the same may be
established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, or by any person who
was present and saw it executed or who, after its execution, saw it
and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to
the instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof.3
We agree with the trial court's findings that petitioners have sufficiently
established the due execution of the alleged deed of sale through the
testimony of the notary public to wit:
Preponderance of evidence clearly disclosed the facts
that Atty. Ismael Estela prepared Exhibit A. Atty.
Emiliano Ibasco, Jr. positively identified the signatures
appearing therein to be that (sic) of the spouses and
witnesses Luis de Vera and Ismael Estela, in his
capacity as Notary Public who ratified the document.4
After the due execution of the document has been established, it must
next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing
the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of
its loss, or by any one who had made, in the judgment of the court, a
sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who
has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the
court that the instrument is indeed lost.5
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before
using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of
the writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the
writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of
its parts are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a
third person or the like).6
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who
notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has
about four or five original copies.7 Hence, all originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one.
This petitioners failed to do. Records show that petitioners merely
accounted for three out of four or five original copies.
In reversing the trial court, the respondent Court of Appeals
considered the following points:
Asked on the witness stand where the original of the
document (Exhibit A) was, plaintiff-appellee Luis de
Vera answered that it was with the Provincial Assessor
in Malolos, Bulacan, whereupon the appellees reserved
its (sic) right to present it in evidence (p. 11, tsn.,
August 11, 1981, Steno, Tecson). The same question
propounded to the same witness at the next hearing,
he replied that in the early part of 1976 his sister Maria
borrowed from him the original document and a
certified true copy thereof and brought them to the
Office of the Register of Deeds in Malolos "for the
purpose of having it registered;" and that when she
returned she told him that the original copy of the
document was submitted to that office "and it (the
property) was transferred in the name of Marcosa
Bernabe instead of Mariano Aguilar" (p. 8, tsn.,
December 10, 1981, Steno, Crisostomo; p. 9, tsn., Mar.
16, 1982, Steno, Vallarta).
Indeed, upon the appellees' own evidence the original
of the deed of sale in question, a purported xerox copy
 and certified true copy of which are marked as Exhibits
A and B, has not been lost or destroyed. It was
submitted to the Office of the Register of Deeds of
Malolos for registration. The appellees, therefore,
should have asked the office to produce it in court and
if it could not be produced for one reason or another
should have called the Register of Deeds or his
representative to explain why. That they failed to do.
The loss or destruction of the original of the document
in question has not, therefore, been established.
Hence, secondary evidence of it is inadmissible . . . .
Neither did the testimony of notary public Ibasco, Jr. to
the effect that he did not have a copy of the deed of
sale in question because his files were burned when
his office at Ronquillo Street, Manila was gutted by fire
in 1971 and 1972 (p. 4, tsn., November 10, 1981,
Steno, Crisostomo) establish the loss or destruction of
the original document in question. What was lost or
destroyed in the custody of Atty. Ibasco, Jr. was but
one of the duplicate original copies on file with him. Nor
did the testimony of Hipolito Timoteo, representative of
the Assessor's Office of Bulacan, to the effect that he
failed to see the deed of absolute sale annotated on
the simple copy of tax declaration No. 15412 (p. 7, tsn.,
Aug. 12, 1982, Steno, Vallarta) and of David
Montenegro, Jr. of the National Archives to the effect
that his office had no copy of the document in question
because the notary public might not have submitted a
copy thereof; or that it was lost or destroyed during the
transmittal; and that most of the record before 1960
were destroyed by termites (pp. 8-12, tsn., Oct. 5,
1982, Steno, Tecson), prove loss or destruction of the
original and of all the duplicate original copies of the
document in question.8
We find no cogent reason to rule otherwise.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated November
27, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE,
REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court
of Appeals (CA) gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing a decision[2] and
resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order of the trial court,[4] which
denied petitioners motion to dismiss private respondents complaint for
support and directed the parties to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued
Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support
and support pendente lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in
1992, after which they entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel
supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10,
1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided otherwise and
gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at
the Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate
was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the
pre-natal and hospital expenses but later refused Fes repeated
requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity
and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel
also denied having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin
at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in
his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was
reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia
and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5,
2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support.[6]
 In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because
his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before
Martins conception. He claimed that Fe had at least one other secret
lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993 but he never
really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret
lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and
overly demanding and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-
and-off affair. What started as a romantic liaison between two
consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal attraction
where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even
entertaining the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various
devious ways and means to alienate (him) from his wife and family.
Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and children, Arnel
terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by
referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop[7] where she
worked. Later on, Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret
lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his entire family went to the United States
for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000, Arnel learned that Fe
was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to
acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was sometime
in 1998.[8] Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On
January 19, 2001, Fe followed Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and
Country Club parking lot to demand that he acknowledge Martin as his
child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the
discussion became so heated that he had no alternative but to move
on but without bumping or hitting any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel
claimed that the signature and the community tax certificate (CTC)
attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins birth certificate were
falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single
when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it
should have been 1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied
having sired Martin but expressed willingness to consider any proposal
to settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order
directing all the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing
pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right
against self-incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss the complaint
for lack of cause of action, considering that his signature on the birth
certificate was a forgery and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is
not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.[14] In his
motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for
falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192)
and a petition for cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth
certificate (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-46669). He attached the
certification of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory that his
signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and
ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the
expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint
for support can be converted to a petition for recognition and (2)
whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for
support without violating petitioners constitutional right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to
dismiss because the private respondents complaint on its face showed
that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The elements of
a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants
corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or
omission of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have
been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of
the complaint but by the facts alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous
relations with the petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin
out of wedlock. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he had sexual
relations with Fe but denied that he fathered Martin, claiming that he
had ended the relationship long before the childs conception and birth.
It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a
sexual relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question
is whether such sexual relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did,
as respondents have alleged, then Martin should be supported by his
father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each other
and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to
give support.
 Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues. as one to compel recognition. Further, that the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our
the genuineness and authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he jurisprudence.
purportedly signed as the father. He also claims that the order and
resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et
effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for
al. (43 Phil. 763 [1922]) wherein we said:
recognition, which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to
petitioner, Martin, as an unrecognized child, has no right to ask for
support and must first establish his filiation in a separate suit under The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff
Article 283[17] in relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code and Section can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a
1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of Court. natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the
character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court must be
The petitioners contentions are without merit. answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions
justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for
the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
support into one for recognition but merely allowed the respondents to
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have
prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the
been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior
authenticity of the documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But
to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in
even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an action
the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing so peculiar to the
to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in
action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be
accordance with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,[20]we
here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x
allowed the integration of an action to compel recognition with an action
x
to claim ones inheritance:
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support
formulated by this court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by
and successional rights from the putative or presumed parent, must
our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in numerous cases, and
prove his filiation to the latter. We also said that it is necessary to
the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
allege in the complaint that the putative father had acknowledged and
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been
recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is
in fact legally acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings
essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no
for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs x x x; and
allegation of such acknowledgment, the action becomes one to
the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of
compel recognition which cannot be brought after the death of the
the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of
putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the
a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is
fact of acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the
that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons
action.
who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although (Underscoring supplied)
petitioner contends that the complaint filed by herein private
respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan is an
Although the instant case deals with support rather than
illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for
inheritance, as in Tayag, the basis or rationale for integrating them
inheritance, from the allegations therein the same may be considered
remains the same. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to
support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how
intimately related the main issues in both cases are. To
paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to
these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized
by this Court as a conclusive means of proving paternity. He also
contends that compulsory testing violates his right to privacy and right
against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987 Constitution.
These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA
testing as a means for determining paternity has actually been the focal
issue in a controversy, a brief historical sketch of our past decisions
featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the appellant
was convicted of murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we
stated as an obiter dictum that while eyewitness identification is
significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms
of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test
result (emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the
previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,[22] promulgated in
1997, we cautioned against the use of DNA because DNA, being a
relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by
such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal
and written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as
evidence of parentage, as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test
for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA
Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing
using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of
DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative
evidence in Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en
banc decision in People v. Vallejo[24] where the rape and murder victims
DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were
admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing
(was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected
(were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused
charged with rape for lack of evidence because doubts persist(ed) in
our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense
(had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish
we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the Court en
banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then presidential candidate
Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A
positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court
of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA
testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we
affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results. We did a lengthy
discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons for its
admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the
genetic information in all living organisms. A persons DNA is the same
in each cell and it does not change throughout a persons lifetime; the
DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of
polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have
the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether proper standards and procedures were followed in
conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly
qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques. Based on Dr. de Ungrias testimony, it was
determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are
identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following
gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11,
which are identical with semen taken from the victims vaginal canal.
Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim
and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the
course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in
science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so
we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted waters.
Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically,
the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it
was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable.
Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel
procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a
fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence.
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which
was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is
reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics
and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA
testing and the admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that
case, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims vagina
were used to positively identify the accused Joel Kawit Yatar as the
rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood sample
for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against
self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III
of the Constitution. We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all
compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object
evidence taken from the person of the accused from the realm of self-
incrimination. These include photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily
substances.[30] We have also declared as constitutional several
procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for
women accused of adultery,[31] expulsion of morphine from ones
mouth[32] and the tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with
bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v. Caizares,[34] we even authorized the
examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for annulment filed by
her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice being
too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure,
rather invasive and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally
sound. DNA testing and its results, per our ruling in Yatar,[35] are now
similarly acceptable.
 Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us.
In Ople v. Torres,[36] where we struck down the proposed national
computerized identification system embodied in Administrative Order
No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy
does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The right is not
intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the
right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches
and seizures,[37] and the infringement of privacy of
communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy has been
critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already
stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water. His hollow invocation of his constitutional
rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that they are not
in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very
life is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no
reason why, in this civil case, petitioner herein who does not face such
dire consequences cannot be ordered to do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United
States, where it yielded its first official results sometime in 1985. In the
decade that followed, DNA rapidly found widespread general
acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State Supreme
Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of
procedure and evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so
commonly accepted that, in some instances, ordering the procedure
has become a ministerial act. The Supreme Court of St. Lawrence
County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged
paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The
Court pointed out that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the
New York Family Court Act, the Family Court examiner had the duty,
upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of
paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the
social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b
of the public health law shall establish the paternity of and liability for
the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must
be reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one
hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law with the registrar of the
district in which the birth occurred and in which the birth certificate has
been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings are
required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one
hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four thousand
one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law may be rescinded by
either signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate the
acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing
the acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial
proceeding (including a proceeding to establish a support order)
relating to the child in which either signator is a party. For purposes of
this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding"
shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the
petition. After the expiration of sixty days of the execution of the
acknowledgment, either signator may challenge the acknowledgment
of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or material
mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the
voluntary acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to
an acknowledgment, the court shall order genetic marker tests
or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity and
shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance
with this article. Neither signators legal obligations, including the
obligation for child support arising from the acknowledgment, may be
suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment except for
good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an
acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is
not the father of the child, or if the court finds that an acknowledgment
is invalid because it was executed on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the acknowledgment of
paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the
registrar of the district in which the childs birth certificate is filed and
also to the putative father registry operated by the department of
social services pursuant to section three hundred seventy-two-c of the
social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child who is the
subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services
pursuant to title six-A of article three of the social services law, the
court shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the child support
enforcement unit of the social services district that provides the
mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether
established through the parents acknowledgment of paternity or
through an administrative or judicial process, must be accorded full
faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court
Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports
of test results; costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more
genetic marker tests or DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or
the motion of any party, shall order the mother, her child and the
alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA tests
of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body
designated by the secretary of the federal department of health and
human services and performed by a laboratory approved by such an
accreditation body and by the commissioner of health or by a duly
qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged
father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be
ordered, however, upon a written finding by the court that it is
not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata,
equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child
born to a married woman. The record or report of the results of any
such genetic marker or DNA test ordered pursuant to this section or
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law
shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e)
of rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules
where no timely objection in writing has been made thereto and that if
such timely objections are not made, they shall be deemed waived
and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate
at least a ninety-five percent probability of paternity, the
admission of such record or report shall create a rebuttable
presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the
paternity of and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this
article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant
to this section, a report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this
section may be received in evidence pursuant to rule forty-five
hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by any
party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this
section shall be, in the first instance, paid by the moving party. If the
moving party is financially unable to pay such cost, the court may
direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if
practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of
the appropriate local social services district. In its order of disposition,
however, the court may direct that the cost of any such test be
apportioned between the parties according to their respective abilities
to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the
issue of paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay.
(emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court,
DNA tests were used to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an
offspring of the marriage between A.C.W. and C.E.W., was actually the
child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of conception,
maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany
M.H. v. Greg G.,[44] the 4th Department of the New York Supreme
Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G., who had been adjudicated as
T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment vacated, even after
six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he
was not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the tests
after the Department of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been
adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought an increase in his support
obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling
on the constitutionality of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable
support agreements pointed out that it was because of the difficulty of
determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that such
support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be
proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit
entered into their support agreement(current testing methods can
determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy).
However, at the time the parties before us entered into the disputed
agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an
illegitimate child's access to child support. The first reported results of
modern DNA paternity testing did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since
its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching has progressed to
'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior
blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the
possible father of a child, those methods could not affirmatively
pinpoint a particular male as being the father. Thus, when the
settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in
1980, establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at
present. Contested paternity actions at that time were often no more
than credibility contests. Consequently, in every contested paternity
action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the
putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on
whether the mother could prove to a court of law that she was only
sexually involved with one man--the putative father. Allowing parties
the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of proving
paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her
burden of proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have
included the use of DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as
to mother, child, and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to
typing or identification profiling; qualifications of person conducting
typing or identification profiling; compensation of expert; result of
typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection;
admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon
application made by or on behalf of either party, or on its own
motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged father
submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may
include, but are not limited to, determinations of red cell
antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte antigens, serum
proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether
the alleged father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child.
If the court orders a blood or tissue typing or DNA identification
profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the
typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other
remedies available, the court may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate
party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal
unless good cause is shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be
conducted by a person accredited for paternity determinations by a
nationally recognized scientific organization, including, but not limited
to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified
person described in subsection (2) conducting the blood or
tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99% or higher, and
the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible
as provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the
results of the analysis of genetic testing material from 2 or more
persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than 99%, the
contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity
testing until all but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless
the dispute involves 2 or more putative fathers who have
identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as
provided in subsection (5), either party may move for summary
disposition under the court rules. this section does not abrogate the
right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if
applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled
that DNA test results showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of legitimacy of a child born during the course of a
marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of
the blood test eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering
the evidence in the light most favorable to Perkins, we find that no
reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's father based upon
the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme Court
upheld an order for genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even
after trial on the merits had concluded without such order being given.
Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case for paternity
and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic
testing. It was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the
appellate court remanded the case and ordered the testing, which the
North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme Court
of South Dakota, demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity
could be vacated after the adjudicated father had, through DNA testing,
established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl, having excluded himself
as the father of Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able to have
the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling
ordering Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his
wages for child support. The Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a
remedy against the father of the child, she submit(ted) no authority that
require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's position,
the fact that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated,
(did) not foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the
amount withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another case
decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if
paternity was established through an earlier agreed order of filiation,
child support and visitation orders could still be vacated once DNA
testing established someone other than the named individual to be the
biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine
in Williams v. Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders of the trial
court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered
him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available when any
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[52] In Land Bank of the
Philippines v. the Court of Appeals[53] where we dismissed a special civil
action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of
such a petition and just what was meant by grave abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other
words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by
reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty
or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
The raison detre for the rule is when a court exercises its jurisdiction,
an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did,
every error committed by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and
every erroneous judgment would be a void judgment. In such a
scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal
soundness of the decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decisionthe same is beyond the province of a special civil action
for certiorari.
The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA
is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court. On the other hand, if the error subject of the recourse
is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was perpetrated by a
quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy
available to the aggrieved party is a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)
In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any
arbitrariness, passion, prejudice or personal hostility that would amount
to grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals. The
respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in promulgating its
decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an
error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the
respondent court, being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was
correct.
Epilogue
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by
fathers who choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication
of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for
such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the
past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence
gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our
stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious
mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and
personality," contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of
the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other
expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to
costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's
discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) —
Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) —
Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot
ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke
member ka na, magsumbong ka kung
ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses
na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon
—

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo,

vs. ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi
GARCIA, respondents. ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang
babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States,
nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung
kakailanganin ang certification mo,
KAPUNAN, J.: kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin
makakahingi.
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private
respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office,
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano
ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to
10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na
kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto
mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on
your own makakapasok ka kung hindi
ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita
(Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana
ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong
binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung
paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on
your own merit alam ko naman kung
gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang
nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam
noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni
Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na
may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala
mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-
explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano
ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-
sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at
tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil
nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka
puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan
nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako
ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero
huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka
makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung
hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin,
dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang
na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang
na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,
nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita
nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi
na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas
ka na. Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of
private communication, and other purposes." An information charging E
petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted T
herewith: A
A
INFORMATION s
s
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses t
Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No. .
4200, committed as follows: C
i
That on or about the 22nd day of t
February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro y
Manila, Philippines, and within the F
jurisdiction of this honorable court, the i
above-named accused, Socorro D. s
Ramirez not being authorized by Ester c
S. Garcia to record the latter's a
conversation with said accused, did then l
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with the use of a tape Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
recorder secretly record the said the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute
conversation and thereafter an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3,
communicate in writing the contents of 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
the said recording to other person. petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under
R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a
Contrary to law. the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to
the communication.4
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September
16, 1988. From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith referred the case
M to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June
A 19, 1989.
R
I On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its
A assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null
N and void, and holding that:
O
M [T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense
. punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
C quashing the information based on the ground that the
U facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
N
 respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its
Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that
the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the
taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the
conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the
unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than
those involved in the communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner
avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not
constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A.
4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private
conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her
conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said
act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a
statute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,
the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either
impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication
and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or
cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
"even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports
the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or
recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to
be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording
is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned
under section 3 but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is
made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by
some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous
even subsequent to the contract or the act may be
indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a
recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the
intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or
outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this
bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not
in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be
used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban
on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your
Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is
not sporting to record the observation of one without
his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not
fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor,
is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all
the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of
recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say
that in meetings of the board of directors where a tape
recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the
parties know. It is but fair that the people whose
remarks and observations are being made should know
that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements
of persons, we say: "Please be informed that whatever
you say here may be used against you." That is
fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of
that warning, he makes damaging statements against
his own interest, well, he cannot complain any
more. But if you are going to take a recording of the
observations and remarks of a person without him
knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him
knowing that what is being recorded may be used
against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March
12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that
under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a party
secretly records a public speech, he would be
penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.
Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not
contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person — not
between a speaker and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March
12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together
with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record,
therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that
the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not
distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of
the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The
mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to
constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor
General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be
regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication"
in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations"
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are
broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive
communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include
the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between
petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase
"private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that
the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably
used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted
below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to
fear from their conversations being overheard. But this
statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as
well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized
people have some aspects of their lives they do not
wish to expose. Free conversationsare often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of
views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to
the privacy of communication, among others, has
expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless
to state here, the framers of our Constitution must have
recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual
nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must
have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions
of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free
exchange of communication between individuals —
free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever
means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with
the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a
telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private
conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because
a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that
"penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the
applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the
unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use of
tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is
clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant
petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971
GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation
of her minor children, DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all
surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and EMMANUEL
JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.
Bonifacio P. Legaspi for plaintiff-appellant.
Cecilio P. Luminarias for defendants-appellees.
FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of
dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided
by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as yet been the
subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss
on the ground of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment, a lower court may take judicial notice of such previous
case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon. Judge
Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus
called for.
The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real
property filed by plaintiff, now appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February,
14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to dismiss filed by
defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by a prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The
instant complaint or case, besides being clearly unfounded and
malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed
by the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now
deceased and whose legal heirs and successors in interest are the
very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case No. 2639. Said
Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of
Possession and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel
Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, defendant,
involving practically the same property and practically the same
parties as defendants are the widow and the children, respectively,
thus the legal or forced heirs of the deceased Melecio Jalagat. That
the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case as
the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could
be clear from [an] order of this Honorable Court [dated December 6,
1965]."1 There was an opposition on the part of plaintiff made on
March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res
judicata to suffice as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the
face of the complaint. It was then alleged that there was nothing in the
complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on
September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus:
"Acting on the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants
under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground that plaintiff's
cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds
to be well-founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in
Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat,
defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived their
rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of
Rule 17 of the new Rules of Court, which case involved the same
parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as prayed for, Civil Case
No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication
upon the merits and consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in
abatement of any subsequent action against the same parties over
the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff.
[So ordered]"2 Hence, this appeal.
The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is
in accordance with law.
1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be
raised in a motion to dismiss when such ground does not appear on
the face of the complaint. What immediately calls attention in the
rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of
applicant is that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement
made by Judge Gorospe that there was a previous dismissal the
same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of
defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the
deceased husband of one of them and father of the rest. There was
no denial either of the property involved being the same and of the
finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that
appellant's claim was devoid of any support in law. It would be
therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as there had
been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then
was there for the lower court to do? Was there any sense in its being
engaged in what was essentially a fruitless, endeavor as the outcome
was predictible?
Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the
Rules of Court would sanction such a proceeding distinguished by
nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to appellant that under
the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice
of the finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and
thereafter decided by it. That was all that was done by the lower court
in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is not contrary to
law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is
relevant. Thus: "Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous
cases to determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one, or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration."3
2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant
undoubtedly had recourse to a remedy which under the law then in
force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of justice
better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part
and the vexation to which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a
little more on the matter. Then the valuable time of this Tribunal would
not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It
has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,4 a 1910
decision, that a litigant should not be allowed to worship at the altar of
technicality. That is not to dispense justice according to law. Parties,
and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative
of our legal system in mind.5
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is
hereby affirmed. With costs against plaintiff.
[G.R. No. L-58509. December 7, 1982.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF
RICARDO B. BONILLA, deceased, MARCELA
RODELAS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL.,
oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG, intervenor.
Luciano A. Joson for Petitioner-Appellant.
Cesar C. Paralejo for Oppositor-Appellee.
SYNOPSIS
The probate court ordered the dismissal of appellant’s petition for the
allowance of the holographic will of deceased Ricardo B. Bonilla on
the ground that the alleged photostatic copy of the will which was
presented for probate, cannot stand in lieu of the lost original, for the
law regards the document itself as the material proof of the
authenticity of the said will, citing the case of Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil.
509, 522. On appeal, the only question is whether a holographic will
which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.
The Supreme Court, in setting aside the lower court’s order of
dismissal, held that a photostatic or xerox copy of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased can he determined by the probate court,
as comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator.
Assailed order of dismissal, set aside.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SUCCESSION; HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS; PROBATE
THEREOF; DEFINITION. — Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code,
probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will by the Court
after its due execution has been proved.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NUMBER OF WITNESSES REQUIRED. — The
probate of holographic wills may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one identifying witness is required and, if no
witness is available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least
three identifying witnesses are required.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT POSSIBLE WHERE ORIGINAL WILL HAS
BEEN LOST OR DESTROYED AND NO OTHER COPY IS
AVAILABLE; REASON. — If the holographic will has been lost or
destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated
because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of the testator
in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison between
sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten
will.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHOTOSTATIC COPY OR XEROX COPY
MAY BE ALLOWED; CASE AT BAR. — A photostatic copy or xerox
copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can
be made with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan
v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the
contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by
the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
The will itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect.
The law regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity."
But, in Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be
proved by a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed
or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and
 tested before the probate court." Evidently, the photostatic or xerox
copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can
be determined by the probate court.
DECISION
RELOVA, J.:
This case was certified to this Tribunal by the Court of Appeals for
final determination pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of
Court.
As found by the Court of Appeals:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her
favor. The petition, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 8432, was opposed by
the appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes,
Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla on the following
grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) Appellant was estopped from claiming that the deceased left a will
by failing to produce the will within twenty days of the death of the
testator as required by Rule 75, section 2 of the Rules of
Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(2) The alleged copy of the alleged holographic will did not contain a
disposition of property after death and was not intended to take effect
after death, and therefore it was not a will;
"(3) The alleged holographic will itself, and not an alleged copy
thereof, must be produced, otherwise it would produce no effect, as
held in Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509; and
"(4) The deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise,
executed and attested as required by law.
"The appellees likewise moved for the consolidation of the case with
another case (Sp. Proc. No. 8275). Their motion was granted by the
court in an order dated April 4, 1977.
"On November 13, 1978, following the consolidation of the cases, the
appellees moved again to dismiss the petition for the probate of the
will. They argued that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(1) The alleged holographic was not a last will but merely an
instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools
and colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and
"(2) Lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be proved by
secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.
"Upon opposition of the appellant, the motion to dismiss was denied
by the court in its order of February 23, 1979.
"The appellees then filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground
that the order was contrary to law and settled pronouncements and
rulings of the Supreme Court, to which the appellant in turn filed an
opposition. On July 23, 1979, the court set aside its order of February
23, 1979 and dismissed the petition for the probate of the will of
Ricardo B. Bonilla. The court said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘. . . It is our considered opinion that once the original copy of the
holographic will is lost, a copy thereof cannot stand in lieu of the
original.
‘In the case of Gan v. Yap, 104 Phil. 509, 522, the Supreme Court
held that ‘in the matter of holographic wills the law, it is reasonable to
suppose, regards the document itself as the material proof of
authenticity of said wills.
‘MOREOVER, this Court notes that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May
13, 1976. In view of the lapse of more than 14 years from the time of
the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the
original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the
decedent had discarded before his death his allegedly missing
Holographic Will.
Appellant’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, an appeal
to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of
appellant’s petition is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.
On July 7, 1980, appellees moved to forward the case to this Court on
the ground that the appeal does not involve question of fact and
alleged that the trial court committed the following assigned
errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A LOST
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL MAY NOT BE PROVED BY A COPY
THEREOF;
"II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DECEDENT HAS DISCARDED BEFORE HIS DEATH THE MISSING
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL;
"III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING APPELLANT’S
WILL."cralaw virtua1aw library
The only question here is whether a holographic will which was lost or
can not be found can be proved by means of a photostatic copy.
Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills
is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has
been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested,
at least one identifying witness is required and, if no witness is
available, experts may be resorted to. If contested, at least three
identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will has
been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will can not
be probated because the best and only evidence is the handwriting of
the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the
handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the
holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made
with the standard writings of the testator. In the case of Gan v. Yap,
104 Phil. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and the contents of
a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare
testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will
itself must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law
regards the document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in
Footnote 8 of said decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by
a photographic or photostatic copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon
copy; or by other similar means, if any, whereby the authenticity of the
handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited and tested before the
probate court." Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or
destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court.
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court dated October 3, 1979,
denying appellant’s motion for reconsideration dated August 9, 1979,
of the Order dated July 23, 1979, dismissing her petition to approve
the will of the late Ricardo B. Bonilla, is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-23893. October 29, 1968.]
VILLA REY TRANSIT INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUSEBIO E.
FERRER, PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., and
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, Defendants, EUSEBIO E.
FERRER and PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO.,
INC., Defendants-Appellants.
PANGASINAN TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., third-party plaintiff-
appellant, v. JOSE M. VILLARAMA, third-party Defendant-
Appellee.
Chuidian Law Office for plaintiff-appellant Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
Bengzon, Zarraga & Villegas for defendant-appellant Pangasinan
Transportation Co., Inc.
Laurea & Pison for third-party defendant-appellee Jose
Villarama.
SYLLABUS
1. COMMERCIAL LAW; CORPORATIONS; CORPORATION
SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM MEMBERS THEREOF;
DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL. — The doctrine
that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the
members and stockholders who compose it is recognized and
respected in all cases which are within reason and the law. When the
fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an illegal act or
as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, the veil
with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the
members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals.
2. ID.; ID.; ALTER EGO; CORPORATION BOUND BY CONTRACT
WHEN SHOWN AS ALTER EGO OF COVENANTOR. — The
preponderance of evidence have shown that the Villa Rey Transit, Inc.
is an alter ego of Jose M. Villarama, and that the restrictive clause in
the contract entered into by the latter and Pantranco is also
enforceable and binding against the said Corporation. For the rule is
that a seller or promissor may not make use of a corporate entity as a
means of evading the obligation of his covenant. Where the
corporation is substantially the alter ego of the covenantor to the
restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from competing with the
covenantee.
3. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; VALIDITY OF STIPULATION IN
RESTRAINT OF TRADE. — The 10-year restrictive clause in the
contract between Villarama and Pantranco, while in the nature of an
agreement suppressing competition, it is, however, merely ancillary or
incidental to the main agreement which is that of sale. The
suppression or restraint is only partial or limited: first, in scope, it
refers only to application for TPU by the seller in competition with the
lines sold to the buyer; second, in duration, it is only for ten (10) years;
and third, with respect to situs or territory, the restraint is only along
the lines covered by the certificates sold. In view of these limitations,
coupled with the consideration of P350,000.00 for just two certificates
of public convenience, and considering, furthermore, that the disputed
stipulation is only incidental to a main agreement, the same is
reasonable and it is not harmful nor obnoxious to public service. It
does not appear that the ultimate result of the clause or stipulation
would be to leave solely to Pantranco the right to operate along the
lines in question, thereby establishing a monopoly or predominance
approximating thereto. The main purpose of the restraint was to
protect for a limited time the business of the buyer.
4. ID.; ID.; PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH; RULE OF CAVEAT
EMPTOR. — The 10 year prohibition upon Villarama is not against his
application for, or purchase of, certificates of public convenience, but
merely the operation of TPU along the lines covered by the
certificates sold by him to Pantranco. Consequently, the sale between
Fernando and the Corporation is valid, such that the rightful
ownership of the disputed certificates still belongs to the plaintiff being
the prior purchaser in good faith and for value thereof. In view of the
ancient rule of caveat emptor prevailing in this jurisdiction, what was
acquired by Ferrer in the sheriff’s sale was only the right which
Fernando, judgment debtor, had in the certificates of public
convenience on the day of the sale.
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PUBLIC SERVICE LAW; CERTIFICATE
OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE; SALE THEREOF; APPROVAL BY
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION NOT NECESSARY FOR THIS
CONSUMMATION OF THE SALE IN THE INSTANT CASE. — There
is no merit in Pantranco and Ferrer’s theory that the sale of the
certificates of public convenience in question, between the corporation
and Fernando, was not consummated, it being only a conditional sale
subject to the suspensive condition of its approval by the Public
Service Commission. It is clear, that the requisite approval of the PSC
is not a condition precedent for the validity and consummation of the
sale.
DECISION
ANGELES, J.:
This is a tri-party appeal from the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Civil Case No. 41845, declaring null and void the
sheriff’s sale of two certificates of public convenience in favor of
defendant Eusebio E. Ferrer and the subsequent sale thereof by the
latter to defendant Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc.; declaring the
plaintiff Villa Rey Transit, Inc., to be the lawful owner of the said
certificates of public convenience; and ordering the private
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff, the sum of
P5,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees. The case against the PSC was
dismissed.
The rather ramified circumstances of the instant case can best be
understood by a chronological narration of the essential facts, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Prior to 1959, Jose M. Villarama was an operator of a bus
transportation, under the business name of Villa Rey Transit, pursuant
to certificates of public convenience granted him by the Public Service
Commission (PSC, for short) in Cases Nos. 44213 and 104651, which
authorized him to operate a total of thirty-two (32) units on various
routes or lines from Pangasinan to Manila, and vice-versa. On
January 8, 1959, he sold the aforementioned two certificates of public
convenience to the Pangasinan Transportation Company, Inc.
(otherwise known as Pantranco), for P350,000.00 with the condition,
among others, that the seller (Villarama) "shall not for a period of 10
years from the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or
competing with the buyer."cralaw virtua1aw library
Barely three months thereafter, or on March 6, 1959, a corporation
called Villa Rey Transit, Inc. (which shall be referred to hereafter as
the Corporation) was organized with a capital stock of P500,000.00
divided into 5,000 shares of the par value of P100.00 each;
P200,000.00 was the subscribed stock; Natividad R. Villarama (wife of
Jose M. Villarama) was one of the incorporators, and she subscribed
for P1,000.00; the balance of P199,000.00 was subscribed by the
brother and sister-in-law of Jose M. Villarama; of the subscribed
capital stock, P105,000.00 was paid to the treasurer of the
corporation, who was Natividad R. Villarama.
In less than a month after its registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (March 10, 1959), the Corporation, on April 7,
1959, bought five certificates of public convenience, forty-nine buses,
tools and equipment from one Valentin Fernando, for the sum of
P249,000.00, of which P100,000.00 was paid upon the signing of the
contract; P50,000.00 was payable upon the final approval of the sale
by the PSC; P49,500.00 one year after the final approval of the sale;
and the balance of P50,000.00 "shall be paid by the BUYER to the
different suppliers of the SELLER."cralaw virtua1aw library
The very same day that the aforementioned contract of sale was
executed, the parties thereto immediately applied with the PSC for its
approval, with a prayer for the issuance of a provisional authority in
favor of the vendee Corporation to operate the service therein
involved. 1 On May 19, 1959, the PSC granted the provisional permit
prayed for, upon the condition that "it may be modified or revoked by
the Commission at any time, shall be subject to whatever action that
may be taken on the basic application and shall be valid only during
the pendency of said application." Before the PSC could take final
action on said application for approval of sale, however, the Sheriff of
Manila, on July 7, 1959, levied on two of the five certificates of public
convenience involved therein, namely those issued under PSC cases
Nos. 59494 and 63780, pursuant to a writ of execution issued by the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 13798, in favor
of Eusebio Ferrer, plaintiff, judgment creditor, against Valentin
Fernando, defendant, judgment debtor. The Sheriff made and entered
the levy in the records of the PSC. On July 16, 1959, a public sale
was conducted by the Sheriff of the said two certificates of public
convenience. Ferrer was the highest bidder, and a certificate of sale
was issued in his name.
Thereafter, Ferrer sold the two certificates of public convenience to
Pantranco, and jointly submitted for approval their corresponding
contract of sale to the PSC. 2 Pantranco therein prayed that it be
authorized provisionally to operate the service involved in the said two
certificates.
The applications for approval of sale, filed before the PSC, by
Fernando and the Corporation, Case No. 124057, and that of Ferrer
and Pantranco, Case No. 126278, were scheduled for a joint hearing.
In the meantime, to wit, on July 22, 1959, the PSC issued an order
disposing that during the pendency of the cases and before a final
resolution on the aforesaid applications, the Pantranco shall be the
one to operate provisionally the service under the two certificates
embraced in the contract between Ferrer and Pantranco. The
Corporation took issue with this particular ruling of the PSC and
elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, 3 which decreed, after
deliberation, that until the issue on the ownership of the disputed
certificates shall have been finally settled by the proper court, the
Corporation should be the one to operate the lines provisionally.
On November 4, 1959, the Corporation filed in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, a complaint for the annulment of the sheriff’s sale
of the aforesaid two certificates of public convenience (PSC Cases
Nos. 59494 and 63780) in favor of the defendant Ferrer, and the
subsequent sale thereof by the latter to Pantranco, against Ferrer,
Pantranco and the PSC. The plaintiff Corporation prayed therein that
all the orders of the PSC relative to the parties’ dispute over the said
certificates be annulled.
In separate answers, the defendants Ferrer and Pantranco averred
that the plaintiff Corporation had no valid title to the certificates in
question because the contract pursuant to which it acquired them
from Fernando was subject to a suspensive condition — the approval
of the PSC — which has not yet been fulfilled, and, therefore, the
Sheriff’s levy and the consequent sale at public auction of the
certificates referred to, as well as the sale of the same by Ferrer to
Pantranco, were valid and regular, and vested unto Pantranco, a
superior right thereto.
Pantranco, on its part, filed a third-party complaint against Jose M.
Villarama, alleging that Villarama and the Corporation, are one and
the same; that Villarama and/or the Corporation was disqualified from
operating the two certificates in question by virtue of the
aforementioned agreement between said Villarama and Pantranco,
which stipulated that Villarama "shall not for a period of 10 years from
the date of this sale, apply for any TPU service identical or competing
with the buyer."cralaw virtua1aw library
Upon the joinder of the issues in both the complaint and third- party
complaint, the case was tried, and thereafter decision was rendered in
the terms as above stated.
As stated at the beginning, all the parties involved have appealed
from the decision. They submitted a joint record on appeal.
Pantranco disputes the correctness of the decision insofar as it holds
that Villa Rey Transit, Inc. (Corporation) is a distinct and separate
entity from Jose M. Villarama, that the restriction clause in the
contract of January 8, 1959 between Pantranco and Villarama is null
and void, that the Sheriff’s sale of July 16, 1959, is likewise null and
void; and the failure to award damages in its favor and against
Villarama.
Ferrer, for his part, challenges the decision insofar as it holds that the
sheriff’s sale is null and void, and the sale of the two certificates in
question by Valentin Fernando to the Corporation, is valid. He also
assails the award of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees in favor of the
Corporation, and the failure to award moral damages to him as prayed
for in his counterclaim.
The Corporation, on the other hand, prays for a review of that portion
of the decision awarding only P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and
insisting that it is entitled to an award of P100,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages.
After a careful study of the facts obtaining in the case, the vital issues
to be resolved are: (1) Does the stipulation between Villarama and
Pantranco, as contained in the deed of sale, that the former "SHALL
NOT FOR A PERIOD OF 10 YEARS FROM THE DATE OF THIS
SALE, APPLY FOR ANY TPU SERVICE IDENTICAL OR
COMPETING WITH THE BUYER," apply to new lines only or does it
include existing lines?; (2) Assuming that said stipulation covers all
kinds of lines, is such stipulation valid and enforceable?; (3) In the
affirmative, that said stipulation is valid, did it bind the Corporation?
For convenience, We propose to discuss the foregoing issues by
starting with the last proposition.
The evidence has disclosed that Villarama, albeit was not an
incorporator or stockholder of the Corporation, alleging that he did not
become such, because he did not have sufficient funds to invest, his
wife, however, was an incorporator with the least subscribed number
of shares, and was elected treasurer of the Corporation. The finances
of the Corporation which, under all concepts in the law, are supposed
to be under the control and administration of the treasurer keeping
them as trust fund for the Corporation, were, nonetheless,
manipulated and disbursed as if they were the private funds of
Villarama, in such a way and extent that Villarama appeared to be the
actual owner-treasurer of the business without regard to the rights of
the stockholders. The following testimony of Villarama, 4 together with
the other evidence on record, attests to that
effect:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Doctor, I want to go back again to the incorporation of the Villa
Rey Transit, Inc. You heard the testimony presented here by the bank
regarding the initial opening deposit of ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS, of which amount Eighty-Five Thousand Pesos
was a check drawn by yourself personally. In the direct examination
you told the Court that the reason you drew a check for Eighty-Five
Thousand Pesos was because you and your wife, or your wife, had
spent the money of the stockholders given to her for incorporation.
Will you please tell the Honorable Court if you knew at the time your
wife was spending the money to pay debts, you personally know she
was spending the money of the incorporators?
"A. You know my money and my wife’s money are one. We never talk
about those things.
"Q. Doctor, your answer then is that since your money and your wife’s
money are one money and you did not know when your wife was
paying debts with the incorporator’s money?
"A. Because sometimes she uses my money, and sometimes the
money given to her she gives to me and I deposit the money.
"Q. Actually, aside from your wife, you were also the custodian of
some of the incorporators here, in the beginning?
"A. Not necessarily, they give to my wife and when my wife hands to
me I did not know it belonged to the incorporators.
"Q. It supposes then your wife gives you some of the money received
by her in her capacity as treasurer of the corporation?
"A. Maybe.
"Q. What did you do with the money, deposit in a regular account?
"A. Deposit in my account.
"Q. Of all the money given to your wife, she did not receive any
check?
"A. I do not remember.
"Q. Is it usual for you, Doctor, to be given Fifty Thousand Pesos
without even asking what is this?
x x x that the said purchases were paid by Philippine Bank of Commerce
JUDGE: Reform the question.
"Q. The subscription of your brother-in-law, Mr. Reyes, is Fifty Two
Thousand Pesos, did your wife give you Fifty-Two Thousand Pesos?
"A. I have testified before that sometimes my wife gives me money
and I do not know exactly for what."cralaw virtua1aw library
The evidence further show that the initial cash capitalization of the
corporation of P105,000.00 was mostly financed by Villarama. Of the
P105,000.00 deposited in the First National City Bank of New York,
representing the initial paid-up capital of the Corporation, P85,000.00
was covered by Villarama’s personal check. The deposit slip for the
said amount of P105,000.00 was admitted in evidence as Exh. 23,
which shows on its face that P20,000.00 was paid in cash and
P85,000.00 thereof was covered by Check No. F-50271 of the First
National City Bank of New York. The testimonies of Alfonso Sancho 5
and Joaquin Amansec, 6 both employees of said bank, have proved
that the drawer of the check was Jose Villarama himself.
Another witness, Celso Rivera, accountant of the Corporation,
testified that while in the books of the corporation there appears an
entry that the treasurer received P95,000.00 as second installment of
the paid-in subscriptions, and, subsequently, also P100,000.00 as the
first installment of the offer for second subscriptions worth
P200,000.00 from the original subscribers, yet Villarama directed him
(Rivera) to make vouchers liquidating the sum. 7 Thus, it was made to
appear that the P95,000.00 was delivered to Villarama in payment for
equipment purchased from him, and the P100,000.00 was loaned as
advances to the stockholders. The said accountant, however, testified
that he was not aware of any amount of money that had actually
passed hands among the parties involved, 8 and actually the only
money of the corporation was the P105,000.00 covered by the deposit
slip Exh. 23, of which, as mentioned above, P85,000.00 was paid by
Villarama’s personal check.
Further, the evidence show that when the Corporation was in its initial
months of operation, Villarama purchased and paid with his personal
checks Ford trucks for the Corporation. Exhibits 20 and 21 disclose
Checks Nos. 992618-B and 993621-B, respectively. These checks
have been sufficiently established by Fausto Abad, Assistant
Accountant of Manila Trading & Supply Co., from which the trucks
were purchased 9 and Aristedes Solano, an employee of the
Philippine Bank of Commerce, 10 as having been drawn by Villarama.
Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. 22, which are photostatic copies of ledger
entries and vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his
personal funds and transactions with those made in the name of the
Corporation, are very illuminating evidence. Villarama has assailed
the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that no evidentiary
value whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely
photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the
originals themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered
the said exhibits, it was the most likely possessor of the originals
thereof because they were stolen from the files of the Corporation and
only Pantranco was able to produce the alleged photostat copies
thereof.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites
for the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the
custody of the adverse party, thus: (1) opponent’s possession of the
original; (2) reasonable notice to opponent to produce the original; (3)
satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4) failure or refusal of
opponent to produce the original in court. 11 Villarama has practically
admitted the second and fourth requisites. 12 As to the third, he
admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and
also that he had seen some of them. 13 Regarding the first element,
Villarama’s theory is that since even at the time of the issuance of the
subpoena duces tecum, the originals were already missing, therefore,
the Corporation was no longer in possession of the same. However, it
is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary evidence
to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It
is enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the
writing is in his possession or under his control. Neither is it required
that the party entitled to the custody of the instrument should, on
being notified to produce it, admit having it in his possession. 14
Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having it in
his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a
copy thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exception to the
best evidence rule is "when the original has been lost, destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court. 15 The originals of the vouchers in
question must be deemed to have been lost, as even the Corporation
admits such loss. Viewed upon this light, there can be no doubt as to
the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22.
Taking account of the foregoing evidence, together with Celso
Rivera’s testimony, 16 it would appear that: Villarama supplied the
organization expenses and the assets of the Corporation, such as
trucks and equipments; 17 there was no actual payment by the
original subscribers of the amounts of P95,000.00 and P100,000.00
as appearing in the books; 18 Villarama made use of the money of the
Corporation and deposited them to his private accounts; 19 and the
Corporation paid his personal accounts. 20
Villarama himself admitted that he mingled the corporate funds with
his own money. 21 He also admitted that gasoline purchases of the
Corporation were made in his name 22 because "he had existing
account with Stanvac which was properly secured and he wanted the
Corporation to benefit from the rebates that he received." 23
The foregoing circumstances are strong persuasive evidence showing
that Villarama has been too much involved in the affairs of the
Corporation to altogether negative the claim that he was only a part-
time general manager. They show beyond doubt that the Corporation
is his alter ego.
It is significant that not a single one of the acts enumerated above as
proof of Villarama’s oneness with the Corporation has been denied by
him. On the contrary, he has admitted them with offered excuses.
Villarama has admitted, for instance, having paid P85,000.00 of the
initial capital of the Corporation with the lame excuse that "his wife
had requested him to reimburse the amount entrusted to her by the
incorporators and which she had used to pay the obligations of Dr.
Villarama (her husband) incurred while he was still the owner of Villa
Rey Transit, a single proprietorship. "But with his admission that he
had received P350,000.00 from Pantranco for the sale of the two
certificates and one unit, 24 it becomes difficult to accept Villarama’s
explanation that he and his wife, after consultation, 25 spent the
money of their relatives (the stockholders) when they were supposed
to have their own money. Even if Pantranco paid the P50,000.00 in
check to him, as claimed, it could have been easy for Villarama to
have deposited said check in his account and issued his own check to
pay his obligations. And there is no evidence adduced that the said
amount of P350,000.00 was all spent or was insufficient to settle his
prior obligations in his business, and in the light of the stipulation in
the deed of sale between Villarama and Pantranco that P350,000.00
of the selling price was earmarked for the payments of accounts due
to his creditors, the excuse appears unbelievable.
On his having paid for purchases by the Corporation of trucks from
the Manila Trading & Supply Co. with his personal checks, his reason
was that he was only sharing with the Corporation his credit with
some companies. And his main reason for mingling his funds with that
of the Corporation and for the latter’s paying his private bills is that it
would be more convenient that he kept the money to be used in
paying the registration fees on time, and since he had loaned money
to the Corporation, this would be set-off by the latter’s paying his bills.
Villarama admitted, however, that the corporate funds in his
possession were not only for registration fees but for other important
obligations which were not specified. 26
Indeed, while Villarama was not the Treasurer of the Corporation but
was, allegedly, only a part-time Manager, 27 he admitted not only
having held the corporate money but that he advanced and lent funds
for the Corporation, and yet there was no Board Resolution allowing it.
28
Villarama’s explanation on the matter of his involvement with the
corporate affairs of the Corporation only renders more credible
Pantranco’s claim that his control over the corporation, especially in
the management and disposition of its funds, was so extensive and
intimate that it is impossible to segregate and identify which money
belonged to whom. The interference of Villarama in the complex
affairs of the corporation, and particularly its finances, are much too
inconsistent with the ends and purposes of the Corporation Law,
which, precisely, seeks to separate personal responsibilities from
corporate undertakings. It is the very essence of incorporation that the
acts and conduct of the corporation be carried out in its own corporate
name because it has its own personality.
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate
from the members and stockholders who compose it is recognized
and respected in all cases which are within reason and the law. 29
When the fiction is urged as a means of perpetrating a fraud or an
illegal act or as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation, the
circumvention of statutes, the achievement or perfection of a
monopoly or generally the perpetration of knavery or crime, 30 the veil
with which the law covers and isolates the corporation from the
members or stockholders who compose it will be lifted to allow for its
consideration merely as an aggregation of individuals.
Upon the foregoing considerations, We are of the opinion, and so
hold, that the preponderance of evidence have shown that the Villa
Rey Transit, Inc. is an alter ego of Jose M. Villarama, and that the
restrictive clause in the contract entered into by the latter and
Pantranco is also enforceable and binding against the said
Corporation. For the rule is that a seller or promissor may not make
use of a corporate entity as a means of evading the obligation of his
covenant. 31 Where the Corporation is substantially the alter ego of
the covenantor to the restrictive agreement, it can be enjoined from
competing with the covenantee. 32
The Corporation contends that even on the supposition that Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. and Villarama are one and the same, the restrictive
clause in the contract between Villarama and Pantranco does not
include the purchase of existing lines but it only applies to application
for new lines. The clause in dispute reads thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(4) The SELLER shall not, for a period of ten (10) years from the date
of this sale apply for any TPU service identical or competing with the
BUYER." (Emphasis supplied)
As We read the disputed clause, it is evident from the context thereof
that the intention of the parties was to eliminate the seller as a
competitor of the buyer for ten years along the lines of operation
covered by the certificates of public convenience subject of their
transaction. The word "apply" as broadly used has for frame of
reference, a service by the seller on lines or routes that would
compete with the buyer along the routes acquired by the latter. In this
jurisdiction, prior authorization is needed before anyone can operate a
TPU service, 33 whether the service consists in a new line or an old
one acquired from a previous operator. The clear intention of the
parties was to prevent the seller from conducting any competitive line
for 10 years since, anyway, he has bound himself not to apply for
authorization to operate along such lines for the duration of such
period. 34

If the prohibition is to be applied only to the acquisition of new
certificates of public convenience thru an application with the Public
Service Commission, this would, in effect, allow the seller just the
same to compete with the buyer as long as his authority to operate is
only acquired thru transfer or sale from a previous operator, thus
defeating the intention of the parties. For what would prevent the
seller, under the circumstances, from having a representative or
dummy apply in the latter’s name and then later on transferring the
same by sale to the seller? Since stipulations in a contract is the law
between the contracting parties,
"Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." (Art. 19, New Civil Code.)
We are not impressed of Villarama’s contention that the rewording of
the two previous drafts of the contract of sale between Villarama and
Pantranco is significant in that as it now appears, the parties intended
to effect the least restriction. We are persuaded, after an examination
of the supposed drafts, that the scope of the final stipulation, while not
as long and prolix as those in the drafts, is just as broad and
comprehensive. At most, it can be said that the re- wording was done
merely for brevity and simplicity.
The evident intention behind the restriction was to eliminate the seller
as a competitor, and this must be, considering such factors as the
good will 35 that the seller had already gained from the riding public
and his adeptness and proficiency in the trade. On this matter, Corbin,
an authority on Contracts, has this to say: 36
"When one buys the business of another as a going concern, he
usually wishes to keep it going; he wishes to get the location, the
building, the stock, in trade, and the customers. He wishes to step into
the seller’s shoes and to enjoy the same business relations with other
men. He is willing to pay much more if he can get the `good will’ of the
business, meaning by this the good will of the customers, that they
may continue to tread the old footpath to his door and maintain with
him the business relations enjoyed by the seller.
". . . In order to be well assured of this, he obtains and pays for the
seller’s promise not to reopen business in competition with the
business sold."cralaw virtua1aw library
As to whether or not such a stipulation in restraint of trade is valid, our
jurisprudence on the matter 37 says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The law concerning contracts which tend to restrain business or trade
has gone through a long series of changes from time to time with the
changing condition of trade and commerce. With trifling exceptions,
said changes have been a continuous development of a general rule.
The early cases show plainly a disposition to avoid and annul all
contract which prohibited or restrained any one from using a lawful
trade `at any time or at any place,’ as being against the benefit of the
state. Later, however, the rule became well established that if the
restraint was limited to `a certain time’ and within `a certain place,’
such contracts were valid and not `against the benefit of the state.’
Later cases, and we think the rule is now well established, have held
that a contract in restraint of trade is valid providing there is a
limitation upon either time or place. A contract, however, which
restrains a man from entering into business or trade without either a
limitation as to time or place, will be held invalid.
"The public welfare of course must always be considered and if it be
not involved and the restraint upon one party is not greater than
protection to the other requires, contracts like the one we are
discussing will be sustained. The general tendency, we believe, of
modern authority, is to make the test whether the restraint is
reasonably necessary for the protection of the contracting parties. If
the contract is reasonable necessary to protect the interest of the
parties, it will be upheld." (Emphasis supplied.)
Analyzing the characteristics of the questioned stipulation, We find
that although it is in the nature of an agreement suppressing
competition, it is, however, merely ancillary or incidental to the main
agreement which is that of sale. The suppression or restraint is only
partial or limited: first, in scope, it refers only to application for TPU by
the seller in competition with the lines sold to the buyer; second, in
duration, it is only for ten (10) years; and third, with respect to situs or
territory, the restraint is only along the lines covered by the certificates
sold. In view of these limitations, coupled with the consideration of
P350,000.00 for just two certificates of public convenience, and
considering, furthermore, that the disputed stipulation is only
incidental to a main agreement, the same is reasonable and it is not
harmful nor obnoxious to public service. 38 It does not appear that the
ultimate result of the clause or stipulation would be to leave solely to
Pantranco the right to operate along the lines in question, thereby
establishing a monopoly or predominance approximating thereto. We
believe the main purpose of the restraint was to protect for a limited
time the business of the buyer.
Indeed, the evils of monopoly are farfetched here. There can be no
danger of price controls or deterioration of the service because of the
close supervision of the Public Service Commission. 39 This Court
had stated long ago 40 that "when one devotes his property to a use
in which the public has an interest, he virtually grants to the public an
interest in that use and submits it to such public use under reasonable
rules and regulations to be fixed by the Public Utility
Commission."cralaw virtua1aw library
Regarding that aspect of the clause that it is merely ancillary or
incidental to a lawful agreement, the underlying reason sustaining its
validity is well explained in 36 Am. Jur. 537-539, to
it:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Numerous authorities hold that a covenant which is incidental to
the sale and transfer of a trade or business, and which purports to
bind the seller not to engage in the same business in competition with
the purchaser, is lawful and enforceable. While such covenants are
designed to prevent competition on the part of the seller, it is ordinarily
neither their purpose nor effect to stifle competition generally in the
locality, nor to prevent it at all in a way or to an extent injurious to the
public. The business in the hands of the purchaser is carried on just
as it was in the hands of the seller; the former merely takes the place
of the latter; the commodities of the trade are as open to the public as
they were before; the same competition exists as existed before; there
is the same employment furnished to others after as before; the profits
of the business go as they did before to swell the sum of public
wealth; the public has the same opportunities of purchasing, if it is a
mercantile business; and production is not lessened if it is a
manufacturing plant."cralaw virtua1aw library
The reliance by the lower court on the case of Red Line
Transportation Co. v. Bachrach, 41 and finding that the stipulation is
illegal and void seems misplaced. In the said Red Line case, the
agreement therein sought to be enforced was virtually a division of
territory between two operators, each company imposing upon itself
an obligation not to operate in any territory covered by the routes of
the other. Restraints of this type, among common carriers, have
always been covered by the general rule invalidating agreements in
restraint of trade. 42
Neither are the other cases relied upon by the plaintiff-appellee
applicable to the instant case. In Pampanga Bus Co. Inc. v. Enriquez,
43 the undertaking of the applicant therein not to apply for the lifting of
restrictions imposed on his certificates of public convenience was not
an ancillary or incidental agreement. The restraint was the principal
objective. On the other hand, in Red Line Transportation Co. Inc. v.
Gonzaga, 44 the restraint there in question not to ask for extension of
the line, or trips, or increase of equipment — was not an agreement
between the parties but a condition imposed in the certificate of public
convenience itself.
Upon the foregoing considerations, Our conclusion is that the
stipulation prohibiting Villarama for a period of 10 years to "apply" for
TPU service along the lines covered by the certificates of public
convenience sold by him to Pantranco is valid and reasonable. Having
arrived at this conclusion, and considering that the preponderance of
the evidence have shown that Villa Rey Transit, Inc. is itself the alter
ego of Villarama, We hold, as prayed for in Pantranco’s third party
complaint, that the said Corporation should, until the expiration of the
1-year period abovementioned, be enjoined from operating the lines
subject of the prohibition.
To avoid any misunderstanding, it is here to be emphasized that the
10-year prohibition upon Villarama is not against his application for, or
purchase of, certificates of public convenience, but merely the
operation of TPU along the lines covered by the certificates sold by
him to Pantranco. Consequently, the sale between Fernando and the
Corporation is valid, such that the rightful ownership of the disputed
certificates still belongs to the plaintiff being the prior purchaser in
good faith and for value thereof. In view of the ancient rule of caveat
emptor prevailing in this jurisdiction, what was acquired by Ferrer in
the sheriff’s sale was only the right which Fernando, judgment debtor,
had in the certificates of public convenience on the day of the sale.
45
Accordingly, by the "Notice of Levy Upon Personalty" the
Commissioner of Public Service was notified that "by virtue of an
Order of Execution issued by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, the rights, interests, or participation which the defendant,
VALENTIN A. FERNANDO — in the above entitled case may have in
the following realty/personalty is attached or levied upon, to wit: The
rights, interests and participation on the Certificates of Public
Convenience issued to Valentin A. Fernando, in Cases Nos. 59494,
etc. . . . Lines — Manila to Lingayen, Dagupan, etc. vice versa." Such
nootice of levy only shows that Ferrer, the vendee at auction of said
certificates, merely stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor. Of
the same principle is the provision of Article 1544 of the Civil Code,
that "If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
"There is no merit in Pantranco and Ferrer’s theory that the sale of the
certificates of public convenience in question, between the
Corporation and Fernando, was not consummated, it being only a
conditional sale subject to the suspensive condition of its approval by
the Public Service Commission. "While section 20(g) of the Public
Service Act provides that "subject to established limitation and
exceptions and saving provisions to the contrary, it shall be unlawful
for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof,
without the approval and authorization of the Commission previously
had . . . to sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property,
franchise, certificates, privileges, or rights or any part thereof, . . ., "the
same section also provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Provided, however, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or
completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or
lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary
course of its business."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is clear, therefore, that the requisite approval of the PSC is not a
condition precedent for the validity and consummation of the sale.
Anent the question of damages allegedly suffered by the parties, each
of the appellants has its or his own version to allege.
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. claims that by virtue of the "tortious acts" of
defendants (Pantranco and Ferrer) in acquiring the certificates of
public convenience in question, despite constructive and actual
knowledge on their part of a prior sale executed by Fernando in favor
of the said corporation, which necessitated the latter to file the action
to annul the sheriff’s sale to Ferrer and the subsequent transfer to
Pantranco, it is entitled to collect actual and compensatory damages,
and attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00. The evidence on
record, however, does not clearly show that said defendants acted in
bad faith in their acquisition of the certificates in question. They
believed that because the bill of sale has yet to be approved by the
Public Service Commission, the transaction was not a consummated
sale, and, therefore, the title to or ownership of the certificates was
still with the seller. The award by the lower court of attorney’s fees of
P5,000.00 in favor of Villa Rey Transit, Inc. is, therefore, without basis
and should be set aside.
Eusebio Ferrer’s charge that by reason of the filing of the action to
annul the sheriff’s sale, he had suffered and should be awarded
moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, cannot be
entertained, in view of the conclusion herein reached that the sale by
Fernando to the Corporation was valid.
Pantranco, on the other hand, justifies its claim for damages with the
allegation that when it purchased Villarama’s business for
P350,000.00, it intended to build up the traffic along the lines covered
by the certificates but it was not afforded an opportunity to do so since
barely three months had elapsed when the contract was violated by
Villarama operating along the same lines in the name of Villa Rey
Transit, Inc. It is further claimed by Pantranco that the underhanded
manner in which Villarama violated the contract is pertinent in
establishing punitive or moral damages. Its contention as to the
proper measure of damages is that it should be the purchase price of
P350,000.00 that it paid to Villarama. While We are fully in accord
with Pantranco’s claim of entitlement to damages it suffered as a
result of Villarama’s breach of his contract with it, the record does not
sufficiently supply the necessary evidentiary materials upon which to
base the award and there is need for further proceedings in the lower
court to ascertain the proper amount.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby
modified as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The sale of the two certificates of public convenience in question by
Valentin Fernando to Villa Rey Transit, Inc. is declared preferred over
that made by the Sheriff at public auction of the aforesaid certificate of
public convenience in favor of Eusebio Ferrer;
2. Reversed, insofar as it dismisses the third-party complaint filed by
Pangasinan Transportation Co. against Jose M. Villarama, holding
that Villa Rey Transit, Inc. is an entity distinct and separate from the
personality of Jose M. Villarama, and insofar as it awards the sum of
P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees in favor of Villa Rey Transit, Inc.;
3. The case is remanded to the trial court for the reception of evidence
in consonance with the above findings as regards the amount of
damages suffered by Pantranco; and
4. On equitable considerations, without costs. So ordered.
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
SPS. RONALD HUTCHISON and VALENTINE NAVALLE-
HUTCHISON, petitioners, vs. ENRIQUE M.
BUSCAS, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar concerns a boundary dispute involving 6,471
square meters of land in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga. Petitioner
spouses RONALD and VALENTINE HUTCHISON seek the reversal of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated
February 19, 2003, holding that respondent ENRIQUE M. BUSCAS is
entitled to the possession of the disputed area.
The records show that on October 1, 1987, petitioner spouses
purchased from V.A. Development Enterprises, Inc. a 76,207-sq. m.
land (designated as Lot No. 7216) in San Juan, Lubao, Pampanga.
They occupied the land after a title was issued in their names.
On August 22, 1989, one Juanita Arrastia, the owner of a lot
adjacent to that of petitioner spouses, sold a portion of her land to
respondent. The transaction, covering 7,581 sq. m. (designated as Lot
No. 7047-A), was evidenced by a Quitclaim Deed in favor of
respondent. Respondent occupied 1,100 sq. m. of his land. However,
he failed to register the portion of the lot in his name and title to the
property remained in Arrastias name.
On January 10, 1995, respondent commissioned geodetic
engineer Narciso Manansala to survey his property. Manansala
prepared a sketch/subdivision plan of respondents lot. His survey
revealed that 6,471 sq. m. thereof was occupied by petitioner spouses.
Respondent sent a demand letter to petitioner spouses to vacate
the encroached area. Petitioner spouses refused and insisted that it
was part of their land. Thus, respondent filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer (Civil Case No. 1329) against petitioner spouses before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Lubao, Pampanga. After trial, the MTC
ruled in favor of respondent. However, on appeal, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dismissed the case. It ruled that MTC had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter as it is a boundary dispute and the proper action
should have been an accion reinvindicatoria before the RTC.
Consequently, respondent filed a case for accion
reinvindicatoria against petitioner spouses with the RTC of Guagua,
Pampanga.[1] At the trial, respondent adduced in evidence the
Quitclaim Deed to prove his title over the disputed area. He likewise
testified on the survey conducted by Manansala. Another geodetic
engineer, Angelito H. Nicdao, testified that in the unlawful detainer case
earlier filed by the respondent, he was directed by the MTC judge
hearing the case to conduct a verification survey of the parties lots. In
compliance with the order, he surveyed the two (2) lots using the title
of petitioner spouses and the records of the Bureau of Lands.[2] His
survey revealed that petitioner spouses encroached on 6,471 sq. m. of
the adjacent land claimed by respondent. Respondent offered in
evidence the verification plan and report of Nicdao relative to his
survey.
On the part of petitioner spouses, petitioner Valentine Hutchison
testified that she purchased Lot No. 7216 in Lubao, Pampanga,
covering an area of 76,207 sq. m., and title thereto was duly issued in
her name and that of her spouse.
After trial, the RTC dismissed[3] the complaint for lack of merit. It
ruled that respondents Quitclaim Deed was not sufficient proof of
ownership; that respondent failed to clearly identify the property
claimed as it was only marked with an X sign, and; that petitioner
spouses, as registered owners, are entitled to possession of the
disputed lot.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. [4] It ruled that respondent is entitled to possession of the disputed
area as he was able to prove his claim of ownership and the identity of
the subject land.
Hence, this appeal where petitioner spouses assign the following
errors:
I was not presented at the trial, and; (b) the surveys conducted by the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT
THE RESPONDENT SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED THE PROPERTY
HE SEEKS TO RECOVER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION
OF LAW THAT THE TITLE OF THE RESPONDENT TO THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY IS THE QUITCLAIM DEED OVER A
PORTION OF LAND.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION
THAT THE RESPONDENT STRENGTHENED HIS TITLE BY THE
SURVEY HE CAUSED TO BE PREPARED.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW
THAT THE RESPONDENT PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE THAT HIS PROPERTY WAS ENCROACHED UPON BY
THE PETITIONERS.
V However, a cursory reading of the Quitclaim Deed shows that the
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW
THAT THE RESPONDENT IS DECLARED OWNER OF THE 6,471
SQUARE-METERS DISPUTED LOT, AND THE PETITIONERS ARE
THUS ORDERED TO VACATE THE SAME.
Petitioner spouses contend that there was a gross
misapprehension of facts by the Court of Appeals and its legal
conclusions were contrary to law and jurisprudence. They assert that
respondent failed to identify the portion of land he was claiming
and prove his ownership thereof. They allege that: (a) respondents
identification of his 7,581 sq. m. property with a mere X mark on the
Annex A of the Quirclaim Deed is insufficient as the attached Annex A
geodetic engineers cannot be used to identify respondents lot as they
were based on the records of the Bureau of Lands and not on the
document of title of respondent.
We find for the petitioner spouses.
In civil cases, the law requires that the party who alleges a fact and
substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of
proving it.[5] This evidentiary rule is based on the principle that the suitor
who relies upon the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove
it.[6]
Article 434 of the New Civil Code[7] provides that to successfully
maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the
person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things:
first, the identity of the land claimed, and; second, his title thereto.
In the case at bar, we find that respondent failed to establish these
two (2) legal requirements.
The first requisite: the identity of the land. In an accion
reinvindicatoria, the person who claims that he has a better right to the
property must first fix the identity of the land he is claiming by
describing the location, area and boundaries thereof.[8] Anent the
second requisite, i.e., the claimants title over the disputed area, the rule
is that a party can claim a right of ownership only over the parcel
of land that was the object of the deed.[9] Respondent sought to
prove these legal requisites by anchoring his claim on the Quitclaim
Deed over a portion of land which was executed by Arrastia in his favor.
subject land was described, thus:
x x x a portion of that property situated at San Juan, Lubao,
Pampanga which portion subject of this sale consists of 7,581 square
meters more or less, as indicated particularly in the herein
attached plan marked as Annex A and made an integral part
hereof, and the subject property with an X sign.
 Thus, the Quitclaim Deed specified only the extent of the area
sold, i.e., 7,581 sq. m. of Arrastias land. Annex A of the Deed, where
the entire lot of Arrastia was particularly described and where the
specific portion of the property sold to respondent was marked,
was not presented by respondent at the trial. As the Deed itself
failed to mention the metes and bounds of the land subject of the sale,
it cannot be successfully used by respondent to identify the area he
was claiming and prove his ownership thereof. Indeed, the presentation
of the Annex A is essential as what defines a piece of land is not the
size mentioned in the instrument but the boundaries thereof which
enclose the land and indicate its exact limits.[10]
Neither can the surveys of the lots of petitioner spouses and
respondent prove the identity of the contested area and respondents
ownership thereof. The records show that when geodetic engineers
Manansala and Nicdao surveyed the lands, they merely relied on the
self-serving statement of respondent that he owns the portion of the lot
adjacent to petitioner spouses. They were not shown the Deed of
Quitclaim and its Annex A or any other document of title which
described the specific portion of the land allegedly conveyed to
respondent.[11] Thus, the surveys cannot be given evidentiary weight to
prove the identity of the land sold to respondent and his ownership
thereof.
Moreover, the rules on evidence provide that where the contents
of the document are the facts in issue, the best evidence is the
instrument itself.[12] In the case at bar, the identity of the land
claimed and respondents ownership thereof are the very facts in
issue. The best evidence to prove these facts is the Quitclaim
Deed and its Annex A where respondent derives his title and
where the land from which he purchased a part was described with
particularity, indicating the metes and bounds thereof.
Respondents failure to adduce in evidence Annex A of the Quitclaim
Deed or produce secondary evidence, after proof of its loss, destruction
or unavailability,[13] is fatal to his cause.
Finally, it bears stress that in an action to recover real property,
the settled rule is that the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
title, not on the weakness of the defendants title.[14] This
requirement is based on two (2) reasons: first, it is possible that neither
the plaintiff nor the defendant is the true owner of the property in
dispute,[15] and second, the burden of proof lies on the party who
substantially asserts the affirmative of an issue for he who relies upon
the existence of a fact should be called upon to prove that fact.[16] In
the case at bar, as respondent failed to prove his title to and
identity of the contested land, there exists no legal ground upon
which to turn over the possession of the disputed area to him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66077, dated February 19,
2003, is hereby reversed and set aside. The Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, dismissing the complaint for accion
reinvindicatoria in Civil Case No. G-3183, is reinstated. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160065 February 28, 2006
FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES ANTONIO and EVELYN P. BERAÑA,
IGNACIO EBREO and ELEUTERIA CUETO,Petitioners,
vs.
GIL EBREO, represented by His Attorney-in-Fact, FELIXBERTO
EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and HOMOBONO
CUETO, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Does an annotation in a tax declaration of an alleged Deed of Sale
sufficiently prove conveyance of title to a property? This is the issue
presented to Us in the present petition.
The factual antecedents of this case are narrated herein:
A Complaint dated 04 January 1994, docketed as Civil Case No. 4132
for Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and Damages, was filed by
Gil Ebreo, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Felixberto Ebreo,
Flaviano Ebreo and Homobono Cueto against petitioners Felino
Ebreo, Spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn P. Beraña-Ebreo, Ignacio
Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City, Branch 7.
From plaintiffs’ account in their complaint, Felipe Ebreo died intestate
in 1926 leaving behind as heirs his five children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio, and Felipa.1 Subsequently, Felipa died leaving behind her
heirs, Genoveva, Homobono and Eleuteria all surnamed Cueto.
Genoveva died in 1991 without any issue. Defendants-spouses
Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña are the son and daughter-in-law,
respectively, of defendant Felino, one of the five children of Felipe
Ebreo.
Felipe Ebreo left to his children an untitled parcel of land situated in
Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, more particularly described as
follows:
Isang palagay na lupang palayanin o linangin ipinamumuwis sa ilalim
ng Tax Declaration No. 39949 S-1953, na ang mga karatig sa Ilaya ay
Prudencia Coz, sa Silangan ay Pablo Cantro at Santiago Banaag, sa
ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa Kanluran ay Marcos at Fortunato Banaag
may luwang na 31,781 metros kuwadrados humigit kumulang at may
balor amiliorada na halagang ₱950.00, lalong kilala sa Lote 9046 ng
sukat katastro dito sa Batangas.2
Pursuant to the subdivision made by their father Felipe, Lot No. 9046
was subdivided into six lots identified as Lots A, B, C, D, E and
F.3 lawph!l.net
On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of Felipe Ebreo, through
themselves and their representatives, executed and signed a
document entitled, "Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa"4 where they
extrajudicially partitioned the above-described property except the
portion known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed upon by these heirs, Lot
No. 9046-F, with an area of 13,799 square meters, shall remain under
the co-ownership of Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the heirs of
Felipa Ebreo. However, plaintiffs were surprised to discover that Lot
9046-F was declared for taxation purposes in the name of defendant
Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs’ recitals, they alleged that they
never sold, ceded, conveyed or transferred their rights, share and co-
ownership over Lot 9046- F.
Answering the complaint, the defendants countered that after the
execution of the Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by and among
the heirs of the late Felipe Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs to
Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, the corresponding Real Property
Tax Declaration was transferred in the name of Santiago Puyo as
owner. However, the deed of sale evidencing this transaction was
never presented.
As narrated by the defendants, Tax Declaration No. 39241,5 beginning
in the year 1969 covering Lot 9046-F was under the names of the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo. Thereafter, upon the sale of the lot by the heirs
of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, Tax Declaration No. 39241 was
cancelled and a new one, Tax Declaration No. 482216 dated 15
January 1973, was issued in the name of Santiago Puyo. On this tax
declaration, the alleged sale of Lot 9046-F by the Heirs of Felipe
Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was annotated. Soon, Tax Declaration No.
48221 was cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 40427 for the year 1974,
still in the name of Santiago Puyo. Upon the sale by Santiago Puyo of
Lot 9046- F to Antonio Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax Declaration No.
4042 was cancelled and a new one, Tax Declaration No. 50669,8 for
the year 1977, was issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo. This Tax
Declaration was later on revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration
No. 075-534 upon the marriage of defendant Antonio Ebreo to
defendant Evelyn Beraña. From 1977 up to 1994, defendants-
spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña religiously paid the taxes
due on the land.9
Defendants further alleged that the Deed of Absolute Sale of Lot No.
9046-F by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was executed
and ratified sometime in 1968 before Attorney Doroteo M. Chavez of
Batangas City. From 1968 to 1976, Mr. Santiago Puyo possessed
said lot peacefully, continuously, publicly and in the concept of owner.
As stated earlier, on 23 July 1976, Lot No. 9046-F was sold by
Santiago Puyo by way of Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio Ebreo.
The Deed of Absolute Sale or "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa"10 was duly
executed and ratified before one Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.
After due proceedings, a decision11 dated 18 August 1997, was
rendered by the RTC which disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered as
follows:
(1) Ordering the parties-in-interest (heirs of Felipe Ebreo
and/or their representatives) to partition Lot No. 9046-F among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance under Sec.
 2, Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and in default
thereof, the partition shall be conducted in accordance with
Sec. 3, et. seq., of the same Rule.
(2) Ordering the dismissal of the Counterclaim of the
defendants.
(3) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(₱20,000.00), Philippine Currency, for and as attorney’s fee.
(4) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the
costs of suit.12
Defendants- appellants appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court
of Appeals. In a decision13 dated 27 February 2003, the Court of
Appeals denied the appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals held:
The main issue in this case is whether or not a valid transfer of Lot
No. 9046-F was effected which conveyed ownership of the property to
Santiago Puyo. The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Sale
supposedly executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago
Puyo. However, defendant-appellants failed to produce the alleged
Deed of Sale in violation of the Best Evidence Rule.
xxxx
The best evidence rule, applied to documentary evidence, operates
as a rule of exclusion, that is, secondary (or substitutionary) evidence
cannot inceptively be introduced as the original writing itself must be
produced in court, except in the four instances mentioned in Section
3. (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume II, Seventh
Revised Edition, p. 555). Defendant-appellants miserably failed to
prove that their case is included among the exceptions to the Rule.
The testimony of Felino Ebreo regarding the execution of the Deed of
Sale cannot be given credence. In fact, it was contradicted by his
supposed co-sellers and co-owners. His claim that it was borrowed by
Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to him was also refuted by
Eleuteria Cueto. Not only are the testimonies of Felino Ebreo and his
son Antonio Ebreo self-serving, they are also uncorroborated by
independent witnesses. Defendant-appellants did not even look for a
copy of the deed of sale on the notarial registry of Atty. Chavez, the
notary public who allegedly notarized the deed of sale. Neither did
they look for a copy in the archives of the Court where it should have
been submitted as required by the notarial law. In the words of the
trial court, "the decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive
phantom and conspicuously unproven." The controversial deed of
sale not having been produced as required by the rules of evidence,
the trial court was correct in ruling that Santiago Puyo acquired no
rights whatsoever to Lot No. 9046-F.
Since there was no valid transfer of the ownership of the subject lot
from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, the subsequent
transfer thereof to Antonio Ebreo is ineffectual. It is essential that the
seller is the owner of the property he is selling (Noel vs. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 78). Moreover, the fact that the tax declarations
for said lot were issued in the name of Antonio Ebreo is of no moment
for they are not conclusive proof of ownership. It must be remembered
that a tax declaration may be issued to any claimant even if it is not
supported by any deed.
Neither can defendant-appellants’ open, adverse, notorious and
continuous possession of the land for several years amount to
ownership for they are co-owners of the land as evidenced by the
"Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi Ng Lupa." A co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners. (Trinidad v. Court of Appeals, 289 SCRA 188).14
The motion for reconsideration of the defendants-appellants was
denied in the resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 22 September
2003.15
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The following issues are submitted for resolution in this petition:
1) Whether or not the annotation of the Deed of Sale
appearing in Tax Declaration No. 48221 is a sufficient proof of
transfer in line with the doctrine of presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty.
 2) Whether or not entries in official records are admissible in D.V. ₱2,500.00
evidence to establish the fact of valid transfer of Lot No. 9046-
F that effectively conveyed ownership of the property from the Doc. on file
heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo.16
Doc. No. 312
After a painstaking review of the records, we find the petition bereft of
merit. First, it is important to re-state the general rule that the findings Page No. 17
of the trial court which are factual in nature, especially when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals deserve to be respected and affirmed by this Book No. VI
court provided they are supported by substantial evidence on record,
as in the case at bench.17 Series of 196718
As recounted by defendants, now petitioners, Antonio and Evelyn The testimony of Pajilan went on as follows:
Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo initially to
Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 or 1968 as evidenced by a deed of
Q I am showing to you a tax declaration No. 32941 in the name of Gil
sale executed and ratified before Atty. Doroteo Chavez in Batangas
Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, Genoveva, Eleuteria Cueto which is already
City. Santiago Puyo caused the transfer of the tax declaration in his
marked as Exhibit "10" for the defendants in this case and Exhibit "F"
name and caused the sale to be annotated therein. Only this
for the plaintiff, will you please examine the same and identify it?
annotation in the tax declaration was offered as proof of the sale.
Santiago Puyo took possession, cultivated the land, exercised
uninterrupted ownership and paid real estate taxes thereon for a A Witness is examining the document. I think this tax declaration is an
period of eight years. owner’s copy, Sir.

Petitioners went on further to state that the Deed of Sale from the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo could not be presented
because the copy on file with the Office of the City Assessor was lost
in the fire which occurred in 23 May 1979 that gutted the building
housing their office. From then on, petitioners advance that they have
paid the real estate taxes on the land and were in open, continous
and uninterrupted possession until the Complaint for Partition,
Reconveyance and Damages was filed by the Respondents.
On the basis of the above narrations, petitioners insist that there was
a valid transfer of the lot from the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago
Puyo, and thereafter from Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress this
claim of sale by the heirs to Santiago Puyo, petitioners presented the
testimony of Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessors Office of Batangas
City who testified on the annotation in Tax Declaration No. 48221. The
annotation reads:
Deed of sale
Q But this tax declaration was issued by your office, the City Assessor
of Batangas?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Can you inform before this Honorable Court, if this tax declaration
was still existing in your office or a copy thereof?
A This tax declaration could not be found because our office was
burned on May 29, 1979, it could not be found anymore, Sir.
Q You are also required by this Honorable Court to bring a copy of the
tax declaration No. 48221, do you have copy of the same?
A I have copy of that tax declaration, Sir.
Q Will you please produce the same?
Witness is producing a copy of tax declaration No. 32941 in the name
of Santiago Puyo.
A Can you explain how this tax declaration was placed in the name of
Santiago Puyo?
Q Previously this tax declaration was owned by Gil, Flaviano, Felino,
Ignacio Ebreo and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono Cueto under
PD 32941 this tax declaration is under 48221 in the name of Santiago
Puyo and this was transferred by a virtue of Deed of Sale annotated in
the tax declaration and in the Deed of Sale and purchase value was
there: 2,500.00 document docketed No. 312, Page 17, Book No. 6,
Series of 1967, Doroteo de Chavez, the Notary Public, Sir.
Q Can you explain why this annotation was placed or written in this
tax declaration No. 48221?
A This was placed under Tax Declaration No. 48221 because the
office of the City Assessor transferred the tax declaration and
annotated the instrument used in the transfer of the tax declaration,
Sir.
Q Do you have copy of that document which is the basis of the
transfer?
A We could not be located (sic) because as I have said earlier our
office was burned on May 23, 1979, Sir.
Q So what does this phrase Deed of Sale, what do you mean by that?
A I placed that, that is the title of the instrument used in the transfer of
this tax declaration, Sir.19
It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan, an employee of the City
Assessor’s Office of Batangas City20 who testified regarding Tax
Declaration No. 48221 dated 15 January 1973 on which was
annotated the alleged sale between the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to
Santiago Puyo, was employed in the said office only in the year 1978.
Thus, he did not make nor did he witness the causing of the
annotation as he was not yet employed in the said office at that time.
Likewise, he was neither present when the deed of sale was executed
nor did he personally see the said deed of sale. For these reasons,
the testimony of Pajilan is inconclusive.
Petitioners next argue that Tax Declaration No. 48221 in the name of
Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of regularity in its issuance. It
is a good time as any to re-state that this rule is a mere presumption,
not absolute nor inflexible and applies only in the absence of proof to
the contrary.21 Besides, the mere fact that the disputed property may
have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of the
petitioners does not necessarily prove ownership. In the same
manner, neither does the payment of taxes conclusively prove
ownership of the land paid for.22 It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership.23
Petitioners also presented the testimony of Felino Ebreo, father of
petitioner Antonio Ebreo, who testified that the heirs of Felipe Ebreo
sold Lot 9046 –F to Santiago Puyo.24 When queried on the
whereabouts of the document of sale, Felino alleged that it was
borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto who is the daughter of one of
the heirs, Felipa Ebreo.25 According to Felino, Eleuteria refused to
return the document and even got angry when he tried to demand its
return.26 From Felino’s account,27 there are three copies of the
missing deed of sale. Lamentably, petitioners failed to present any
one of them.
Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion Aguado, step-daughter of
Santiago Puyo, who testified that her stepfather Santiago Puyo
bought the subject lot from the Ebreo heirs.28 Similar to Pajilan’s
testimony, Aguado’s testimony cannot be given much weight in view
of the fact that save for her bare allegations that Lot 9046-F was
purchased by her stepfather Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise
present when the deed was executed. In her testimony she merely
stated that her stepfather paid taxes for his real estate properties but
could not state with specificity if the payment was made for Lot 9056-
F.29
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan, Felino Ebreo and Asuncion
Aguado are at most secondary evidence; hence, they are
inadmissible considering that the petitioners, as offerors of the Deed
of Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the exceptions provided in
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and to establish conditions
for their admissibility.30 Even if they are admitted, they have no
probative value.31 This rule provides:
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of
the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter
fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great
loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is
only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a
public officer or is recorded in a public office.
Under this rule, it is axiomatic that before a party is allowed to adduce
secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original of a deed or
document, the party has to prove with the requisite quantum of
evidence, the loss or destruction or unavailability of all the copies of
the original of the said deed or document. As former Supreme Court
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran declared:
"Where there are two or more originals, it must appear that all of them
have been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced before secondary
evidence can be given of any one. For example, a lease was
executed in duplicate, one being retained by the lessor and the other
by the lessee. Either copy was, therefore, an original, and could have
been introduced as evidence of the contract without the production of
the other. One of these originals could not be found. The non-
production of the other was not accounted for it was held that "under
these circumstances, the rule is that no secondary evidence of the
contents of either is admissible until it is shown that originals must be
accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one."
Indeed, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to
prove the contents of the original of the deed, the offeror is mandated
to prove the following:
"(a) the execution and existence of the original (b) the loss and
destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (c)
unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the
offeror."32
On this score, the factual findings of the trial court are worth
repeating. It held:
The pivotal document of sale allegedly executed by the heirs of Felipe
Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo and chiefly relied upon by defendant
Antonio Ebreo as the derivative basis of his ownership is sadly
missing and remains a phantom in the dark. The testimonies of Felino
Ebreo, Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo to prove by way of
recollection of witnesses that Lot 9046-F was sold to Santiago Puyo
sometime in 1967 for ₱2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized before
deceased Atty. Doroteo Chavez merits scant consideration. They
were the verbal say-so of interested parties and attributed acts to a
party whose lips had been sealed by death. Quite evidently, their
testimony should be taken cum grano salis – with a grain of salt.
Both the testimonies of Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked
the legal underpinning needed to prove the deed of sale. Their
testimonies were not recollection of witnesses who saw the execution
and delivery of the document. According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the
contents of the lost writing may be proved, inter alia, by the
recollection of witnesses. As matters stand, however, Aguado’s
testimony relates not to the execution of the document but to what her
father (Santiago Puyo) did with the property after it was already
acquired. (t.s.n. pp. 4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995) Similarly, Antonio
Ebreo’s testimony does not refer to the execution and delivery of the
deed of sale but of having allegedly seen said document when he
purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo. He testified that "when I
bought it from Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the Tax
Declaration in the name of Santiago Puyo as well as the deed of sale
between my father and his brothers and Santiago Puyo." (t.s.n. pp.
13-14, Direct, Aug. 16, 1995). In fine, they were not witnesses to the
execution and delivery of the document of sale to qualify their
testimonies under the phrase "recollection of witnesses."
Neither does the testimony of Felino Ebreo evoke faith and
confidence. His salutary recollection of the missing document failed to
instill credulity. For one, it was uncorroborated by any of the parties to
the alleged deed of sale. In fact, such sale was directly controverted
by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners Gil and Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp.
7-8, Direct, July 18, 1994; t.s.n. pp. 22-23, Cross, Sept. 29, 1994)
Then too, it appears rather unusual for the heirs to retain Lot 9046-F
in co-ownership in their partition agreement of 1967 and sell the said
Lot that very same year (1967) if not on the same occasion. Felino
Ebreo did not give the exact date of the supposed sale to Santiago
Puyo except to say that it was sold in 1967. The Court got the
impression, though, that it was on the same occasion as the partition
agreement. (t.s.n. pp. 6-7, 14-16, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) More
important, his humanistic bias to favor his son Antonio Ebreo and his
natural interest to defend his actuations leading to the issuance of the
Tax Decl. 50669 (Exh. "2") which he signed caution us to accept his
testimony with great care. He does not have the cold neutrality of a
disinterested party. He was covetous of gain. The Tax Decl. No.
50669 that transferred in 1976 the property in the name of Antonio
Ebreo was signed by Felino Ebreo himself (Exh. "2"). This illustrated a
dialectical connection between him and his favored son Antonio
Ebreo. Finally, Felino Ebreo’s claim that he could not produce it
because it was borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto and never
returned to him was squarely refuted by said Eleuteria Cueto when
she testified in rebuttal for the plaintiffs. (t.s.n. pp. 9, 12-13, Direct,
Feb. 28, 1995) (See testimony of Eleuteria Cueto in rebuttal on July
17, 1997)
While many things have been said about the crucial deed of sale, the
decisive documentary evidence remains an elusive phantom and
conspicuously unproven. The ownership of Santiago Puyo becomes
moreover doubtful because while the alleged sale was executed by
the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in 1967 yet the earliest Tax Declaration in
the name of Santiago Puyo was issued only in 1973 (Exh. "9") or 1974
(Exh. "4") as far as the record of this case can reveal. The issuance of
a new tax declaration in the name of the sunrise owner (Puyo) which
was late by six (6) or seven (7) years naturally cast a slur on the
veracity of the sale.
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. 48221 (Exhs. "9" and "9-A")
detailing the particulars of the alleged deed of sale in favor of
Santiago Puyo is patently suspicious and a very very poor ersatz for
the primary document. While the sale allegedly took place in 1967,
said deed was annotated on Exh. "9" which however only "begins with
the year 1973." Moreover, while the alleged sale took place in 1967,
yet Tax. Decl. No. 32941 (Exh. "10") that was issued on Feb. 7, 1968
still carried the names of Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio, all EBREO
and Genoveva, Eleuteria and Homobono, all CUETO and not the
name of Santiago Puyo. There even appears thereon the annotation
that the 1968 tax was paid on Jan. 29, 1968 – with no mention of
Santiago Puyo despite his having allegedly acquired the property the
year before (1967).
Riveting further its attention to the typewritten entry on Exh. "9", the
Court finds it rather strange that such an entry appears on the Tax
Declaration. Firstly, it is not a widely accepted practice to make such
annotation. Secondly, there is more than meets the eye in the
conspicuous presence of this annotation only on this particular Tax
Declaration (Exh. "9"). All other tax declarations in this case do not
have similar entry to identify the documentary basis for the issuance
of the latest tax declaration. Thirdly, not even Tax Decl. Nos. 50669
and 075-534 (Exhs. "2" and "3") of Antonio Ebreo carry such
annotation to indicate that he acquired the property by virtue of Doc.
No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976 of the Notarial
Register of Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza. The pregnant suspicion lurks
that the alleged particulars of the document of sale from Santiago
Puyo to Antonio Ebreo were belatedly annotated.
As icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo categorically stated it was Felino
Ebreo who authored the transfer. He testified on cross-examination
that it was his eldest brother Felino Ebreo who was the caretaker of
the lot and in-charge of the payment of taxes. It was his brother Felino
who sold the subject lot known as Lot No. 9046-F in favor of his son
Antonio Ebreo. (t.s.n. pp. 16-17, Cross, July 18, 1994) The evidence
tended to show that indeed it was Felino Ebreo who had the
opportunity to cause the transfer as it was he (Felino) who took
possession of the lot and acted as its overseer. (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Direct,
Nov. 17, 1994)
The alleged document of sale executed between Santiago Puyo and
Antonio Ebreo denominated as "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa" (Exh. "1"),
was ineffectual for the purpose of transferring ownership of disputed
Lot No. 9046-F to said Antonio Ebreo because the alleged vendor
Santiago Puyo has not, as heretofore explained, acquired it from the
heirs of Felipe Ebreo as the transaction has no supporting document
of sale. It is self-evident that the seller cannot transfer more than what
he has or as oftenly stated hyperbolically, the river cannot rise above
its source. Moreover, Clerk of Court Jose C. Corales certified that the
Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book No. I,
Series of 1976) despite diligent efforts could not be found in the old
CFI vault located at the Capitol Building, Batangas City. (Exh. "E" –
Rebuttal)
The fact that tax declarations for Lot [No.] 9046-F were issued in the
name of defendant Antonio Ebreo (Exhs. "2" and "3") and that he paid
the taxes for the land (Exh. "8") provides no evidentiary value that he
was the owner thereof. The existence of the tax declarations and
payment of taxes did not transmogrify his possession into ownership.
Tax declarations are not sufficient evidence to prove possession in
the concept of owners. (Martinez, D., Summary of 1990 Supreme
Court Rulings, Part. II, p. 734) Tax receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership.33
In sum, considering that the annotation of the disputed Deed of Sale
in a tax declaration is not sufficient proof of the transfer of property
and inasmuch as the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it was
incumbent on the petitioners to adduce in evidence the original or a
copy of the deed consistent with Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court. In the absence of the said document, the exhortations of
petitioners regarding the existence of said deed of sale must fail.
Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Denied for lack
of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 February
2003 affirming in toto the decision of the trial court dated 18 August
1997 is likewise Affirmed. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
[G.R. No. 79962 : December 10, 1990.]
192 SCRA 209
LUCIO R. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND
CONRADO Q. SALONGA, Respondents.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The private respondent Conrado Salonga filed a complaint for collection
and damages against petitioner Lucio Cruz ** in the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City alleging that in the course of their business
transactions of buying and selling fish, the petitioner borrowed from him
an amount of P35,000.00, evidenced by a receipt dated May 4, 1982,
marked as Exhibit D, reading as follows:
5/4/82
Received the amount of Thirty Five Thousand Cash from Rodrigo
Quiambao and Conrado Salonga on the day of May 4, 1982.
Sgd. Lucio Cruz
The plaintiff claimed that of this amount, only P20,000.00 had been
paid, leaving a balance of P10,000.00; that in August 1982, he and the
defendant agreed that the latter would grant him an exclusive right to
purchase the harvest of certain fishponds leased by Cruz in exchange
for certain loan accommodations; that pursuant thereto, Salonga
delivered to Cruz various loans totaling P15,250.00, evidenced by four
receipts and an additional P4,000.00, the receipt of which had been
lost; and that Cruz failed to comply with his part of the agreement by
refusing to deliver the alleged harvest of the fishpond and the amount
of his indebtedness.
Cruz denied having contracted any loan from Salonga. By way of
special defense, he alleged that he was a lessee of several hectares of
a fishpond owned by Nemesio Yabut and that sometime in May 1982,
he entered into an agreement with Salonga whereby the latter would
purchase (pakyaw) fish in certain areas of the fishpond from May 1982
to August 15, 1982. They also agreed that immediately thereafter,
Salonga would sublease (bubuwisan) the same fishpond for a period of
one year. Cruz admitted having received on May 4, 1982, the amount
of P35,000.00 and on several occasions from August 15, 1982, to
September 30, 1982, an aggregate amount of P15,250.00. He
contended however, that these amounts were received by him not as
loans but as consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement and payment
for the sublease of the fishpond. He added that it was the private
respondent who owed him money since Salonga still had unpaid rentals
for the 10-month period that he actually occupied the fishpond. Cruz
also claimed that Salonga owed him an additional P4,000.00 arising
from another purchase of fish from other areas of his leased fishpond.
In a pre-trial conference held on August 24, 1984, petitioner and private
respondent entered into the following partial stipulation of facts.
COURT:
Plaintiff and defendant, through their respective counsel, during the pre-
trial conference, agreed on the following stipulation of facts:
1) That plaintiff Conrado Salonga entered into a contract of what
is commonly called as 'pakyawan' with defendant Lucio Cruz on
the fishes contained in a fishpond which defendant Lucio Cruz
was taking care of as lessee from the owner Mr. Nemesio
Yabut, with a verbal contract for the sum of P28,000.00
sometime in May 1982.
2) That because of the necessity, defendant Lucio Cruz at that
time needed money, he requested plaintiff Conrado Salonga to
advance the money of not only P28,000.00 but P35,000.00 in
order that Lucio Cruz could meet his obligation with the owner
of the fishpond in question, Mr. Nemesio Yabut;
3) That the amount of P35,000.00 as requested by defendant
Lucio Cruz was in fact delivered by plaintiff Conrado Salonga
duly received by the defendant Lucio Cruz, as evidenced by a
receipt dated May 4, 1982, duly signed by defendant Lucio Cruz
4) That pursuant to said contract of "pakyaw," plaintiff Conrado
Salonga was able to harvest the fishes contained in the fishpond
administered by Lucio Cruz in August 1982.
5) Immediately thereafter the aforesaid harvest thereon, they
entered again on a verbal agreement whereby plaintiff Conrado
Salonga and defendant Lucio Cruz had agreed that defendant
Lucio Cruz will sublease and had in fact subleased the fishpond
of Nemesio Yabut to the herein plaintiff for the amount of
P28,000.00 for a period of one year beginning August 15, 1982.
6) That sometime on June 15, 1983, Mayor Nemesio Yabut,
who is the owner of the fishpond, took back the subject matter
of this case from the defendant Lucio Cruz.
7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with their verbal
sublease agreement had received from the plaintiff Conrado
Salonga the following sums of money:
a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982 as evidenced by
Annex "B" of the Complaint. (Exh. E);
b) The sum of P500.00 on September 4, 1982, as
evidenced by Annex "C" of the complaint (Exh. F);
c) The sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982 as
evidenced by Annex "D" of the complaint (Exh. G);
and
d) The sum of P3,750.00 on September 30, 1982 as
Annex "E" of the complaint (Exh. H).
At the trial, the private respondent claimed that aside from the amounts
of P35,000.00 (Exh. D), P8,000.00 (Exh. E), P500.00 (Exh. F),
P3,000.00 (Exh. G) and P3,750.00 (Exh. H) mentioned in the partial
stipulation of facts, he also delivered to the petitioner P28,000.00, which
constituted the consideration for their "pakyaw" agreement. This was
evidenced by a receipt dated May 14, 1982 marked as Exhibit I and
reading as follows:
May 14, 1982
Tinatanggap ko ang halagang dalawampu't walong libong piso
(P28,000.00) bilang halaga sa pakyaw nila sa akin sa sangla sa
kahong bilang #8 maliit at sa kaputol na sapa sa gawing may
bomba. Ito ay tatagal hanggang Agosto 1982.
SGD. LUCIO CRUZ
Salonga also claimed that he had paid Cruz the amount of P4,000 but
the receipt of which had been lost and denied being indebted to the
petitioner for P4,000 for the lease of other portions of the fishpond.
For his part, the petitioner testified that he entered into a "pakyaw" and
sublease agreement with the private respondent for a consideration of
P28,000 for each transaction. Out of the P35,000 he received from the
private respondent on May 4, 1982, P28,000 covered full payment of
their "pakyaw" agreement while the remaining P7,000 constituted the
advance payment for their sublease agreement. The petitioner denied
having received another amount of P28,000 from Salonga on May 14,
1982. He contended that the instrument dated May 14, 1982 (Exh. I)
was executed to evidence their "pakyaw" agreement and to fix its
duration. He was corroborated by Sonny Viray, who testified that it was
he who prepared the May 4, 1982, receipt of P35,000.00, P28,000 of
which was payment for the "pakyaw" and the excess of P7,000.00 as
advance for the sublease.
The trial court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private
respondent to pay the former the sum of P3,054.00 plus P1,000.00 as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and the costs. Judge Eriberto
U. Rosario, Jr. found that the transactions between the petitioner and
the private respondent were indeed "pakyaw" and sublease
agreements, each having a consideration of P28,000.00, for a total of
P56,000.00. Pursuant to these agreements, Salonga paid Cruz
P35,000.00 on May 4, 1982 (Exh. D); P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982
(Exh. E); P500.00 on September 4, 1982 (Exh. F); P3,000 on
September 19, 1982; P3,750 on September 30, 1982 (Exh. H) and
P4,000.00 on an unspecified date. The trial court noted an earlier
admission of the private respondent that on an unspecified date he
received the sum of P6,000.00 from the petitioner. This amount was
credited to the petitioner and deducted from the total amount paid by
the private respondent. As the one-year contract of sublease was pre-
terminated two months short of the stipulated period, the rentals were
correspondingly reduced.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed. The respondent
court instead ordered the petitioner to pay the private respondent the
sum of P24,916.00 plus P1,500.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's
fees, on the following justification:
Exhibit "I" is very clear in its non-reference to the transaction behind
Exhibit "D." What only gives the semblance that Exhibit "I" is an
explanation of the transaction behind Exhibit "D" are the oral
testimonies given by the defendant and his two witnesses. On the other
hand, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its language. Thus, its tenor must not
be clouded by any parol evidence introduced by the defendant. And
with the tenor of Exhibit "I" remaining unembellished, the conclusion
that Exhibit "D" is a mere tentative receipt becomes untenable.
The trial court erred when it relied on the self-serving testimonies of the
defendant and his witness as against the receipts both parties
presented and adopted as their own exhibits. As said before, Exhibit "I"
is very clear in its tenor. And if it is really the intention of Exhibit "I" to
explain the contents of Exhibit "D", such manifestation or intention is
not found in the four corners of the former document.
The respondent court also found that the amounts of P35,000.00,
P8,000.00, P500.00, P3,000.00, P3,750.00 and P4,000.00 were not
payments for the "pakyaw" and sublease agreement but for loans
extended by Salonga to Cruz. It also accepted Salonga's claim that the
amount of P28,000.00 was delivered to the petitioner on May 14, 1982,
as payment on the "pakyaw" agreement apart from the P35,000.00
(Exh. D) that was paid on May 4, 1982. However, it agreed that the
amount of P6,000.00 received by the private respondent from the
petitioner should be credited in favor of the latter.
The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following issues:
1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in (1)
disregarding parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I" despite the
fact that these documents fall under the exceptions provided for
in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and thereby in (2)
making a sweeping conclusion that the transaction effected
between the private respondent and petitioner is one of contract
of loan and not a contract of lease.
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that exhibits "D" and "I"
evidence separate transactions, the latter document should be
disregarded, the same not having been pleaded as a cause of
action.
3. Whether or not the Stipulation of Facts entered into by the
parties herein relative to their executed transactions during the
hearing of their case a quo, are binding upon them and as well
as, upon the public respondent?
Our ruling follows:
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides: 1
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. — When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all such terms, and therefore, there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the
agreement other than the contents of the writing, except in the following
cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express
the true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the
agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term
"agreement" includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have
reduced their agreement to writing they have made such writing the
only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in
the writing must be understood to have been waived or abandoned. 2
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule
130 is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms
of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It
is only a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner
received from the private respondent the amount of P35,000. It is not
and could have not been intended by the parties to be the sole
memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not
even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most,
Exhibit D can only be considered a casual memorandum of a
transaction between the parties and an acknowledgment of the receipt
of money executed by the petitioner for the private respondent's
satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is not
covered by the parol evidence rule.
A receipt — i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one party to the
other, of the manual custody of money or other personality — will in
general fall without the line of the rule; i.e. it is not intended to be an
exclusive memorial, and the facts may be shown irrespective of the
terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is merely a written
admission of a transaction independently existing, and, like other
admissions, is not conclusive. 3
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also declared the
petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration for the
agreement. The petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and
under what circumstances the amount of P28,000.00 was received.
Their testimonies do not in any way vary or contradict the terms of
Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is dated May 14, 1982, it does not make any
categorical declaration that the amount of P28,000.00 stated therein
was received by the petitioner on that same date. That date may not
therefore be considered conclusive as to when the amount of
P28,000.00 was actually received.
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For
instance, it is not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor its
omission of a consideration conclusive evidence that none passed, nor
is its acknowledgment of a particular consideration an objection to other
proof of other and consistent considerations; and, by analogy, the
acknowledgment in a deed is not conclusive of the fact. 4
A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in
the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be
varied by parol evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130
clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that "there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence
of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing."
The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00
is just a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct
act of payment made by the private respondent. Its reference to the
amount of P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does
not make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may
therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to
the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date
when the said amount was received.
Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol
evidence rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper.
The record shows that no objection was made by the private
respondent when the petitioner introduced evidence to explain the
circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the said
instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. 6 In the
case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the
objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such
answer. 7
For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence
introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit
of the parol evidence rule. Thus, in Abrenica v. Gonda, 8 this Court
held:
. . . it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest
or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at
the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have
been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is when,
from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto,
or from the presentation of proof, the inadmissibility of evidence is, or
may be inferred.
It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered
admissible by the failure of a party to object thereto. Thus:
. . . The acceptance of an incompetent witness to testify in a civil suit,
as well as the allowance of improper questions that may be put to him
while on the stand is a matter resting in the discretion of the litigant. He
may assert his right by timely objection or he may waive it, expressly or
by silence. In any case the option rests with him. Once admitted, the
testimony is in the case for what it is worth and the judge has no power
to disregard it for the sole reason that it could have been excluded, if it
had been objected to, nor to strike it out on its own motion. (Emphasis
supplied.) 9
We find that it was error for the Court of Appeals to disregard the parol
evidence introduced by the petitioner and to conclude that the amount
of P35,000.00 received on May 4, 1982 by the petitioner was in the
nature of a loan accommodation. The Court of Appeals should have
considered the partial stipulation of facts and the testimonies of the
witnesses which sought to explain the circumstances surrounding the
execution of Exhibits D and I and their relation to one another.
We are satisfied that the amount of P35,000.00 was received by the
petitioner as full payment of their "pakyaw" agreement for P28,000.00
and the remaining P7,000.00 as advance rentals for their sublease
agreement. The claim that the excess of P7,000.00 was advance
payment of the sublease agreement is bolstered by the testimony of the
private respondent himself when during the cross examination he
testified that:
ATTY. CRUZ:
Q And during the time you were leasing the fishpond, is it not a fact that
you pay lease rental to the defendant?
SALONGA:
A No sir, because I have already advanced him money.
Q What advance money are you referring to?
A Thirty-Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), sir. 10
It was also error to treat the amounts received by the petitioner from
August 15, 1982, to September 30, 1982, from the private respondent
as loan accommodations when the partial stipulation of facts clearly
stated that these were payments for the sublease agreement. The
pertinent portions read:
7) That defendant Lucio Cruz in compliance with their verbal sublease
agreement had received from the plaintiff Conrado Salonga the
following sums of money: (Emphasis Supplied.)
(a) P8,000.00 on August 15, 1982, as evidenced by Annex "B" of the
complaint;
(b) the sum of P500.00 on September 4, 1982, as evidenced by Annex
"C" of the complaint;
(c) the sum of P3,000.00 on September 19, 1982, as evidenced by
Annex "D" of the complaint;
(d) the sum of P3,750.00 on September 30, 1982, as Annex "E" of the
complaint; 11
These admissions bind not only the parties but also the court, unless
modified upon request before the trial to prevent manifest injustice.
We find, however, that the Court of Appeals did not act in excess of its
jurisdiction when it appreciated Exhibit I despite the fact that it was not
pleaded as a cause of action and was objected to by the petitioner.
According to Rule 10 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of
evidence. — When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all
respects, as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment
of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does not
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall
do so freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that
the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his
action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a continuance
to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
In Co Tiamco v. Diaz, 12 the Supreme Court held:
. . . When evidence is offered on a matter not alleged in the pleadings,
the court may admit it even against the objection of the adverse party,
when the latter fails to satisfy the court that the admission of the
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his defense upon the
merits, and the court may grant him continuance to enable him to meet ————
the situation created by the evidence . . .
Total amount to be paid by
While it is true that the private respondent did not even file a motion to
the private respondent to
amend his complaint in order that it could conform to the evidence
presented, this did not prevent the court from rendering a valid the petitioner P51,334.00
judgment on the issues proved. As we held in the Co Tiamco case: Total amount to be paid
. . . where the failure to order an amendment does not appear to have by the private respondent P51,334.00
caused a surprise or prejudice to the objecting party, it may be allowed
as a harmless error. Well-known is the rule that departures from Total amount paid by
procedure may be forgiven when they do not appear to have impaired the private respondent 48,250.00
the substantial rights of the parties.
————
The following computation indicates the accountability of the private
respondent to the petitioner: Deficiency in the amount
Exh. D, May 4, 1982 — P35,000.00 paid by the private respondent P3,084.00
Exh. E, Aug. 15, 1982 — 8,000.00 ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and that of the Regional Trial Court of Laguna AFFIRMED,
Exh. F, Sept. 4, 1982 — 500.00 with the modification that the private respondent shall pay the petitioner
Exh. G, Sept. 19, 1982 — 3,000.00 the sum of P3,084.00 instead of P3,054.00, plus costs. It is so ordered.
Exh. H, Sept. 30, 1982 — 3,750.00
G.R. No. 105419 September 27, 1993
Lost receipt 4,000.00
———— PIONEER SAVINGS & LOAN BANK, petitioner,
vs.
P54,250.00 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL P.
Less: (amount received by the SANTOS, respondents.
private respondent from the Ynson and Associates for petitioner.
petitioner) (6,000.00)
Florante Calingo for private respondent.
————
Total amount paid by the
private respondent to
PADILLA, J.:
the petitioner 48,250.00
Amount to be paid by the private respondent to the petitioner: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 26670, promulgated on 30 April
1. Pakyaw P28,000.00
19921 which affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court,
2. Sublease — 28,000 per annum Branch 142, Makati, Metro Manila in Civil Case No. 10311, ordering,
among other things, delivery to therein defendant (herein private
Less: 2 months: 4,666 23,334.00
respondent) of the motor vehicle, subject of the complaint for delivery
of personal property filed by petitioner against private respondent
Manuel F. Santos.
Respondent appellate court summarized the facts of the case as
follows:
PLAINTIFF Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank acquired
ownership over a motor vehicle by virtue of a Deed of
Sale (Exhibit 'B'), executed by and between Finasia
Investment and Finance Corporation and the plaintiff
bank. Said motor vehicle is specifically described as
follows: make: Toyota Corolla; type: 4-door Sedan;
Motor No.: 4K-1489878; Serial
No. KE70-9101485; Plate No. PBZ-784; Model 1982;
and color: Mint Green.
SUBSEQUENTLY, defendant Manuel Santos, in his
capacity as manager of plaintiff bank's General
Services Department, was given the privilege to use
and possess the aforementioned vehicle coterminous
with his employment. In a regular board meeting of
plaintiff Pioneer Savings and Loan Bank held on June
28, 1984 at its principal office, the Board unanimously
passed Resolution No. 26, Series of 1984, authorizing
any two among the President, Arturo G. Eudela, and
the two First Vice Presidents namely: Francisco
Pangilinan and Antonio M. Siojo, to jointly sign any
deed or contract involving the sale, transfer or
conveyance of bank's assets or properties, pursuant to
the recommendation of the Executive Committee
(Exhibit 'C'). Pursuant to said authority, the plaintiff
bank, through its President, Arturo Eudela and First
Vice President, Atty. Francisco S. Pangilinan, for a
consideration of P40,000.00 in cash actually received
from defendant Manuel Santos in the presence of Noel
Pineda, a bank employee, sold, transferred and
conveyed unto the defendant the afore-described
motor vehicle, free from all liens and encumbrances.
Said document of sale is duly notarized. 2
Sometime in August 1984, respondent Santos ceased to be employed
with petitioner bank. He took the car with him. On 12 April 1985,
petitioner filed a complaint against respondent Santos for recovery of
the motor vehicle, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin.
Upon posting of a replevin bond by petitioner, the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 142, issued an order of seizure and the subject car
was thus delivered to petitioner.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of respondent
Santos, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
Premises considered, the Court hereby renders
judgment in favor of the defendant, ordering the
plaintiff:
1. to deliver to the defendant the subject motor vehicle
complete with its battery and the four tire replacement.
2. to pay the defendant P10,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. to pay the defendant the sum of P10,000.00 as and
for attorney's fees;
4. to pay the defendant P2,000.00 as litigation
expenses.
Should the motor vehicle no longer be available, or in
defendant's estimation already in a determinated or
dilapidated condition, the defendent has the option to
refuse to accept the motor vehicle, in which case the
plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of
P40,000.00 with interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from June 14, 1985 until fully paid.
Cost against the plaintiff. 3
As aforestated, this decision was affirmed in toto by
respondent Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules Court.
In this petition, the main contention of the petitioner is that there was
actually no consideration in the sale of the motor vehicle to
respondent Santos. The petitioner alleges that the deed of sale
merely served as security for the time deposit placements of private
respondent's relatives with the petitioner bank which was then
undergoing financial difficulties and was under consideration for
closure by the Central Bank of the Philippines. Petitioner avers that
the "underlying agreement," a special arrangement between petitioner
and respondent Santos was that in the event private respondent's
relatives failed to recover their time deposits due to the bank's
closure, then private respondent could keep the car as recompense.
According to petitioner, the relatives of private respondent were able
to recover their time deposit placements, through the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corp. (PDIC) after petitioner bank was placed
under receivership by the Central Bank of the Philippines so that there
was no further reason for respondent Santos to keep the vehicle in
question. Furthermore, petitioner assails the validity of the deed of
sale for not having been duly notarized because the signatories
thereto (the two [2] officers of the bank) never appeared before the
notary public who notarized the document.
It is further contended by petitioner that respondent Court of Appeals
and the trial court should not have discarded the testimonies of tho
two (2) officers of petitioner bank, namely, Messrs. Eudela and
Pangilinan, who clearly denied having received payment of
P40,000.00 from respondent Santos, and which testimonies were
supported by the bank's records that did not reflect any entry at all of
the said amount of P40,000.00.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The core issue in this appeal is whether or not the deed of sale of the
vehicle to respondent Santos may be proved or altered by parol
evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule.
4
In De la Rama vs. Ledesma, this Court held:
It is a well accepted principle of law that evidence of a
prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat
the operation of a valid instrument. (American Factors
(Phil.) Inc. vs. Murphy Tire Corporation, et al. [C.A.] 49
O.G. 189.)
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways
to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot
serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not
mentioned at all in the writing, unless there has been
fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek and Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil.
384.)
We find merit in the private respondent's contention that petitioner
failed to produce any instrument or written document which would
prove that the deed of sale in question was only a security for the time
deposit placements of respondent's relatives in the petitioner bank.
The two (2) main witnesses for the petitioner, namely, Messrs. Eudela
and Pangilinan, were not mere employees of the bank. They were
bank officers; one being a lawyer (Pangilinan), and supposed to be
steeped in legal and banking knowledge and practices. As such, they
were expected to know the consequences of their act of signing a
document which outrightly transferred ownership over the subject
vehicle in favor of respondent Santos. They could have incorporated
in the deed of sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the
parties) a stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration of the
vehicle in Santos' name were conditioned on the failure of his relatives
to recover their time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No such
stipulation was incorporated in the deed of sale which was an outright
and unconditional transfer of ownership of the motor vehicle to
respondent Santos.
Lastly, we see neither reason nor basis for resolving whether or not
the deed of sale was duly notarized as this question is being raised in
this appeal for the first time. It is settled doctrine that questions not
raised in the lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.5
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with
costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE; DOES
NOT SPECIFY THAT THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BE A
PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.- Clearly, the rule does not specify that the
written agreement be a public document.What is required is that
the agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long
experience that written evidence is so much more certain and
accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would
be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract
in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the
stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract
from that expressed in the writing signed by them" [FRANCISCO,
THE RULES OF COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. VII, Part I,
1990 ed., p. 179] Thus, for the parol evidence rule to apply, a
written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by
both parties. As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments
of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by
parol or extrinsic evidence.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS; SOLIDARY OR JOINT AND
SEVERAL OBLIGATION, DEFINED.- A solidary or joint and
several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole
obligation. [TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 217] Section 4, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book IV of
the Civil Code states the law on joint and several
obligations. Under Art. 1207 thereof, when there are two or more
debtors in one and the same obligation, the presumption is that the
obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable only for the
proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidary liability only when
the obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides or
when the nature of the obligation so requires. [Sesbreo v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 89252, May 24, 1993, 222 SCRA 466, 481.]
3. ID.; GUARANTY; GUARANTOR AS DISTINGUISHED FROM
SOLIDARY DEBTOR.- While a guarantor may bind himself
solidarily with the principal debtor, the liability of a guarantor is
different from that of a solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains: "A
guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor
under the provisions of the second paragraph does not become a
solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference
between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in solidum (surety). The
latter, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the
property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains all the
other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of
the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those
bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book IV of the
Civil Code." [Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992
ed., p. 502]
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Emilio G. Abrogena for petitioner.
Teogenes X. Velez for private respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court
of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental,
Branch 18,[1] which disposed of Civil Case No. 10507 for collection of a
sum of money and damages, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, defendant BALDOMERO L. INCIONG, JR. is
adjudged solidarily liable and ordered to pay to the plaintiff Philippine
Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City, the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),with interest thereon from May 5,
1983 at 16% per annum until fully paid; and 6% per annum on the
total amount due, as liquidated damages or penalty from May 5, 1983
until fully paid; plus 10% of the total amount due for expenses of
litigation and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The counterclaim, as well as the cross claim, are dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount
of P50,000.00 which he signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D.
Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding themselves jointly and
severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissory note
was due on May 5, 1983.
Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their
obligation. Consequently, on November 14, 1983 and on June 8, 1984,
private respondent sent petitioner telegrams demanding payment
thereof.[2] On December 11, 1984 private respondent also sent by
registered mail a final letter of demand to Rene C. Naybe. Since both
obligors did not respond to the demands made, private respondent filed
on January 24, 1986 a complaint for collection of the sum of P50,000.00
against the three obligors.
On November 25, 1986, the complaint was dismissed for failure of
the plaintiff to prosecute the case. However, on January 9, 1987, the
lower court reconsidered the dismissal order and required the sheriff to
serve the summonses. On January 27, 1987, the lower court dismissed
the case against defendant Pantanosas as prayed for by the private
respondent herein. Meanwhile, only the summons addressed to
petitioner was served as the sheriff learned that defendant Naybe had
gone to Saudi Arabia.
In his answer, petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1983,
he was approached by his friend, Rudy Campos, who told him that he
was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of private respondent in
Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos
also intimated to him that Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business
and would contribute a chainsaw to the venture. He added that,
although Naybe had no money to buy the equipment Pio Tio had
assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make with private
respondent. Campos then persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker"
in the said loan. Petitioner allegedly acceded but with the
understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of
P5,000.00.
Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank promissory
note were brought to him by Campos at his office. He affixed his
signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound himself
only for the amount of P5,000.00.Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and
misrepresentation that he was made liable for the amount of
P50,000.00.
In the aforementioned decision of the lower court, it noted that the
typewritten figure "P50,000-" clearly appears directly below the
admitted signature of the petitioner in the promissory note.[3] Hence, the
latter's uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability cannot prevail
over the presumed regularity and fairness of the transaction, under Sec.
5 (q) of Rule 131. The lower court added that it was "rather odd" for
petitioner to have indicated in a copy and not in the original, of the
promissory note, his supposed obligation in the amount of P5,000.00
only. Finally, the lower court held that even granting that said limited
amount had actually been agreed upon, the same would have been
merely collateral between him and Naybe and, therefore, not binding
upon the private respondent as creditor-bank.
The lower court also noted that petitioner was a holder of a
Bachelor of Laws degree and a labor consultant who was supposed to
take due care of his concerns, and that, on the witness stand, Pio Tio
denied having participated in the alleged business venture although he
knew for a fact that the falcata logs operation was encouraged by the
bank for its export potential.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals
which, in its decision of August 31, 1990, affirmed that of the lower
court. His motion for reconsideration of the said decision having been
denied, he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On February 6,1991, the Court denied the petition for failure of
petitioner to comply with the Rules of Court and paragraph 2 of Circular
No. 1-88, and to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed
any reversible error in its questioned decision.[4] His motion for the
reconsideration of the denial of his petition was likewise denied with
finality in the Resolution of April 24, 1991.[5] Thereafter, petitioner filed
a motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration which, in
the Resolution of May 27, 1991, the Court denied. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the entry of judgment in this case.[6]
Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a motion for
clarification. In the latter motion, he asserted that he had attached
Registry Receipt No. 3268 to page 14 of the petition in compliance with
Circular No. 1-88. Thus, on August 7,1991, the Court granted his prayer
that his petition be given due course and reinstated the same.[7]
Nonetheless, we find the petition unmeritorious.
Annexed to the petition is a copy of an affidavit executed on May
3, 1988, or after the rendition of the decision of the lower court, by
Gregorio Pantanosas, Jr., an MTCC judge and petitioner's co-maker in
the promissory note. It supports petitioner's allegation that they were
induced to sign the promissory note on the belief that it was only for
P5,000.00, adding that it was Campos who caused the amount of the
loan to be increased to P50,000.00.
The affidavit is clearly intended to buttress petitioner's contention
in the instant petition that the Court of Appeals should have declared
the promissory note null and void on the following grounds: (a) the
promissory note was signed in the office of Judge Pantanosas, outside
the premises of the bank; (b) the loan was incurred for the purpose of
buying a second-hand chainsaw which cost only P5,000.00; (c) even a
new chainsaw would cost only P27,500.00; (d) the loan was not
approved by the board or credit committee which was the practice, at it
exceeded P5,000.00; (e) the loan had no collateral; (f) petitioner and
Judge Pantanosas were not present at the time the loan was released
in contravention of the bank practice, and (g) notices of default are sent
simultaneously and separately but no notice was validly sent to
him.[8] Finally, petitioner contends that in signing the promissory note,
his consent was vitiated by fraud as, contrary to their agreement that
the loan was only for the amount of P5,000. 00, the promissory note
stated the amount of P50,000.00.
The above-stated points are clearly factual. Petitioner is to be
reminded of the basic rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. Having
lost the chance to fully ventilate his factual claims below, petitioner may
no longer be accorded the same opportunity in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the court below. Had he presented
Judge Pantanosas' affidavit before the lower court, it would have
strengthened his claim that the promissory note did not reflect the
correct amount of the loan.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the promissory
note "is not a public deed with the formalities prescribed by law but x x
x a mere commercial paper which does not bear the signature of x x x
attesting witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the contents of
the promissory note.[9] The first paragraph of the parol evidence
rule[10] states:
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement."
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a
public document.
What is required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact
founded on "long experience that written evidence is so much more
certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that
it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their
contract in writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the
stronger and to show that the parties intended a different contract from
that expressed in the writing signed by them."[11] Thus, for the parol
evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular
form, or be signed by both parties.[12] As a general rule, bills, notes and
other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be varied or
contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.[13]
By alleging fraud in his answer,[14] petitioner was actually in the
right direction towards proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a
loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a parol
contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of
the written contract, it may be shown by parol evidence.[15] However,
fraud must be established by clear and convincing evidence, mere
preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate.[16] Petitioner's
attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by
his own uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Petitioner also argues that the dismissal of the complaint against
Naybe, the principal debtor, and against Pantanosas, his co-maker,
constituted a release of his obligation, especially because the dismissal
of the case against Pantanosas was upon the motion of private
respondent itself. He cites as basis for his argument, Article 2080 of the
Civil Code which provides that:
"The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their
obligation whenever by some act of the creditor, they cannot be
subrogated to the rights, mortgages, and preferences of the latter."
It is to be noted, however, that petitioner signed the promissory
note as a solidary co-maker and not as a guarantor. This is patent even
from the first sentence of the promissory note which states as follows:
"Ninety one (91) days after date, for value received, I/we, JOINTLY
and SEVERALLY promise to pay to the PHILIPPINE BANK OF
COMMUNICATIONS at its office in the City of Cagayan de Oro,
Philippines the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000. 00)
Pesos, Philippine Currency, together with interest x x x at the rate of
SIXTEEN (16) per cent per annum until fully paid."
 A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to
demand the whole obligation.[17] On the other hand, Article 2047 of the
Civil Code states:
"By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the
creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter
should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the
provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be
observed, In such a case the contract is called a suretyship." (Italics
supplied.)
of the case against Judge Pontanosas may not be deemed as having
discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards Naybe, suffice it
to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Petitioner,
therefore, may only have recourse against his co-makers, as provided
by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is
hereby DENIED and the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal debtor,
the liability of a guarantor is different from that of a solidary
debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains:

"A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor
under the provisions of the second paragraph does not become a
solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference
between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in solidum (surety).The
later, outside of the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the
property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains all the
other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of
the fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those
bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3, title I, Book IV of the Civil
Code."[18]

Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code states the

law on joint and several obligations. Under Art. 1207 thereof, when
there are two or more debtors in one and the same obligation, the
presumption is that the obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is
liable only for a proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidarity
liability only when the obligation expressly so states, when the law so
provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.[19]
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states
that the three signatories therein are jointly and severally liable, any
one, some or all of them may be proceeded against for the entire
obligation.[20] The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine
against whom he will enforce collection.[21] Consequently, the dismissal