ARTICLE III - BILL OF RIGHTS

Primacy of Human Rights and Enforcement

Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 104768, July 21, 2003
*Mijares v. Ranada, GR 139325, April 12, 2005
Facts: Ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights
abuses during the Marcos regime, filed a case in the US against the Estate
of Marcos. They won with an award of over 1 Billion. When filed in the RTC
for enforcement, respondent judge dismissed the case for failure to pay the
correct filing fees (472 million instead of 410 pesos).
Held: The current action is not a claim against the estate nor an action
capable of pecuniary estimation, but rather an action based on a judgment
(an action not involving property). The Rules did not distinguish if it is a local
or foreign judgment. Thus, the docket fee is correctly paid.

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Hierarchy of Rights
*Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v. Philippine Blooming
Mills Co. Inc., 51 SCRA 189, June 5, 1973
Facts: PBMEO is a labor union who decided to stage a mass demonstration
at Malacanang in protest against the alleged abuses of Pasig Police (not
against the company). Despite the pleas of the company that the first shift
workers and the regular employees should not absent themselves to
participate, the rally took place and the employees were terminated.
Held: The primacy of human rights over property rights is recognized. In the
hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression and of
assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions. The contention
of the company that they would suffer loss due to the rally is only a property
rights that can never overshadow the alleged abuse of the peace office that
will threaten the peace, life, and liberty of the people in the society.

Due Process: In General

*Tupas v. CA - 193 SCRA 597, 1991
Facts: Petition of review is filed out of time. Instead of filing the petition for
review with the Court of Appeals within the remainder of the 15-day
reglementary period, that is, on May 10, 1989, the petitioner did so only on
May 23, 1989, or 14 days later.
Held: It is a mistake to suppose that enforcement of procedural rules should
never be permitted if it will result in prejudice to the substantive rights of the
litigants. Observance of both substantive and procedural rights is equally
guaranteed by due process, whatever the source of such rights, be it the
Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of court.
Asilo v. People – 645 SCRA 41
I. Procedural Due Process
A. Judicial Proceedings

1. In General
a. *Banco Espanol 37 P 921
Facts: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land
as security. He was unable to pay and El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracio‟s property. Engracio however left for China and he never
returned till he died. Since Engracio is a non-resident El Banco has to notify
Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received
the summons.
Held: The essential of procedural fairness in judicial proceedings are: 1. There
must be a COURT or TRIBUNAL clothed with judicial power to hear and determine
the matter before it; 2. JURISDICTION must be lawfully acquired over the person
of the defendant or over the property which is the subject of the proceeding; 3.
The defendant must be given the OPPORTUNITY to be heard; and 4. Judgment
must be rendered upon lawful HEARING. Conclusions stated by the court
indicated that the judgment appealed from is without error, and the same is
accordingly affirmed.

2. Aspects of the Proceedings

a. Galvez v. CA 237 SCRA 685
b. State Prosecutors v. Muros 236 SCRA 505
c. Martinez v. CA 237 SCRA 575
d. Espeleta v. Avelino 62 SCRA 395
e. Rabino v. Cruz 222 SCRA 493
f. Ysmael v. CA 273 SCRA 165
g. Carvajal v. CA 280 SCRA 351
h. People v. Castillo 289 SCRA 213
i. Cosep v. Peo. 290 SCRA 378
j. People v. Galleno 291 SCRA 761
k. Oil v. CA 293 SCRA 26
l. Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan GR 125498 Feb. 18, 1999
m. People v. Hui 338 SCRA 2000
n. People v. Cabiles 341 SCRA 2000
o. Gozum v. Liangco 339 SCRA 253
p. Soriano v. Angeles 339 SCRA 253
q. Villanueva v. Malaya 330 SCRA 278
r. Almendras v. Asis 330 SCRA 69
s. Dayot v. Garcia 353 SCRA 280
t. People v. Hapa GR 125698 July 19, 2001
u. Aguirre v. People GR 144142 August 23, 2001
v. Puyat v. Zabarte 352 SCRA 738
w. Baritua v. Mercader 350 SCRA 86
 x. Barbers v. Laguio 351 SCRA 606
y. People v. Herida 353 SCRA 650
z. People v. Medenilla GR 1311638 Mar. 26, 2001
aa. People v. Rivera GR 139180 July 31, 2001
bb. People v. Basquez GR 144035 Sept. 27, 2001
cc. Cooperative Development v. DOLEFIL GR 137489 May 29, 2002
dd. Garcia v. Pajaro GR 141149 July 5, 2002
ee. Briaso v. Mariano, GR 137265, Jan. 31, 2003
ff. Macias v. Macias, GR 1461617, Sept. 3, 2003
gg. Albior v. Auguis, AM P-01- 1472, June 6, 2003
hh. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, GR 152154, Nov. 18, 2003
ii. Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 422 SCRA 649
jj. People v. Larranaga, 421 SCRA 530
kk. R. Transport v. Philhino 494 SCRA 630
ll. Trans Middle East v. Sandiganbayan 499 SCRA 308
mm. Uy v. First Metro 503 SCRA 704
nn. Deutsche Bank v. Chua 481 SCRA 672
oo. People v. Santos 501 SCRA 325
pp. Victoriano v. People 509 SCRA 483
qq. Santos v. DOJ 543 SCRA 70
rr. DBP v. Feston 545 SCRA 422
ss. Ruivivar v. OMB 565 SCRA 324
tt. Borromeo v. Garcia 546 SCRA 543
uu. Cesa v. OMB 553 SCRA 357
vv. DAR v. Samson 554 SCRA 500
ww. Hilario v. People 551 SCRA 191
xx. Pastona v. CA 559 SCRA 137
yy. Bibas v. OMB 559 SCRA 591
zz. Espina v. Cerujano 550 SCRA 107
aaa. Geronga v. Varela 546 SCRA 429
bbb. OMB v. Magno GR 178923, Nov. 27, 2008
ccc. Avenido v. CSC 553 SCRA 711
ddd. Romuladez v. COMELEC 553 SCRA 370
eee. Multi-Trans Agency v. Oriental 590 SCRA 675
fff. Siochi v. BPI, GR 193872, October 18, 2011
ggg. Catacutan v. People 656 SCRA 524
hhh. Mortel v. Kerr 685 SCRA 1
iii. Gravides v. COMELEC 685 SCRA 382
jjj. Tua v. Mangrobang 714 SCRA 248

3. Publicity and T.V. Coverage

a. Webb v. de Leon 247 SCRA 652
b. People v. Teehankee 249 SCRA 54
c. People v. Sanchez GR 121039-45 Jan. 25, 1999
d. People v. Sanchez GR 121039 Oct. 18, 2001
e. Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC June 29, 2001
 f. Perez v. Estrada A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC Sept. 13, 2001
g. People v. Roxas – 628 SCRA 378

B. Administrative; Quasi-Judicial Proceedings; Arbitration

1. In General; administrative due process

a. *Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 P 635
Facts: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company which
supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the layoff of members of National Labor Union (NLU). NLU averred that
Toribio’s act is not valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the SC,
but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion
for opposing the said motion.
Held: The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s
cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider
the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the
evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or
body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the
reason for the decision rendered.
b. Dazon v. Yap – 610 SCRA 19
c. *Shu v. Dee 723 SCRA 512
Facts: Forgery and falsification of public documents. The respondents argued
in their counter-affidavits that they were denied their right to due process during
the NBI investigation because the agency never required them and Metrobank
to submit the standard sample signatures of the petitioner for comparison.
Held: The Court held that the functions of this agency are merely investigatory
and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and
is incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine
probable cause. The NBI is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative or
as public welfare may require in accordance with its mandate. There was no
denial of the respondents’ due process right could have taken place as the
NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and the Secretary of
Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause.

2. Judges and Disciplinary Process

a. OCA v. Pascual 259 SCRA 604
b. Valenzuela v. Bellosillo 322 SCRA 536
3. Aspects of the Proceedings
a. Lumiqued v. Exevea 282 SCRA 125
c. Fabella v. CA 282 SCRA 256
d. Joson v. Exec. Sec. 290 SCRA 279
e. Busuego v. CA GR 95325 Mar. 11, 1999
f. CSC v. Lucas GR 127838 Jan. 21, 1999
g. NPC v. Bernabe 332 SCRA 74
h. Summary Dismissal v. Torcita 330 SCRA 153
i. Velayo v. Comelec 327 SCRA 713
j. Ramoran v. Jardine 326 SCRA 208
k. Immam v. Comelec 322 SCRA 866
l. Villarosa v. Comelec GR 133927 Nov. 29, 1999
m. Go v. Comelec GR 147741 May 10, 2001
n. Mollaneda v. Umacob GR 140128 June 6, 2001
o. Cruz v. CSC GR 144469 Nov. 27, 2001
p. Codilla v. De Venecia GR 150605 Dec. 10, 2002
q. Associated Communications v. Dumlao GR 136762 Nov. 21, 2002
r. Villarosa v. Pomperada, AdminCase No. 5310, Jan. 28, 2003
s. Alauya v. Comelec, GR 152151-52, Jan. 22, 2003
t. Spouses Casimiro v. CA, 136911, Feb. 11, 2003
u. Sy v. CA, GR 147572, Feb. 27, 2003
v. Namil v. Comelec, GR 15040, Oct. 28, 2003
w. Bautista v. Comelec, GR 154796- 97, Oct. 23, 2003
x. Office of OMB v. Coronel 493 SCRA 392
y. Erece v. Macalingay 552 SCRA 320
z. Marcelo v. Bungubung 552 SCRA 589
aa. SEC v. Interport 567 SCRA 354
bb. Calinisan v. Roaquin 630 SCRA 456
cc. IBP v. Atienza 613 SCRA 518
dd. Domingo v. OMB 577 SCRA 476
ee. Zambales v. Castillejos 581 SCRA 320
ff. OMB v. Evangelista 581 SCRA 350
gg. Phil Export v. Pearl City 608 SCRA 280
hh. OMB v. Reyes 658 SCRA 626
ii. Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary 677 SCRA 408
jj. Arroyo v. DOJ 681 SCRA 181
kk. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR 205033, June 18, 2013
ll. Posadas v. Sandiganbayan, GR 168951 and 169000, July 17, 2013
mm. Gundayao v. COMELEC, GR 205233, Feb 18, 2014
nn. Coalition v. COMELEC, 701 SCRA 786
oo. Miro v. Mendoza, 710 SCRA 371
pp. DOH v. Phil. Pharmawealth, 691 SCRA 421
qq. *GMA v. COMELEC 734 SCRA 88
Facts: Resolution 9615 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) changed the
airtime limitations for political campaign from “per station” basis, as used during
 the 2007 and 2010 elections, to a “total aggregate” basis for the 2013. Various
broadcast networks questioned the interpretation of the COMELEC on the ground
that the provisions are oppressive and violative of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of expression and of the press. Respondent claims that certiorari and
prohibition are not the proper remedies that petitioners have taken to question the
assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC. They also claim the legal standing of the
petitioners.
Held: Technically, respondent may have a point. However, considering the very
important and pivotal issues raised, and the limited time, such technicality should
not deter the Court from having to make the final and definitive pronouncement
that everyone else depends for enlightenment and guidance. For petitioner-
intervenor Senator Cayetano, he undoubtedly has standing since he is a candidate
whose ability to reach out to the electorate is impacted by the assailed Resolutions.
For the broadcast companies, they similarly have the standing in view of the direct
injury they may suffer relative to their ability to carry out their tasks of disseminating
information
* because of the burdens imposed on them.
rr. Apo Cement Corporation v. Mingson 740 SCRA 383

4. Extradition Proceedings
a. Sec. of Justice v. Lantion 343 SCRA 377
b. Cuevas v. Munoz GR 140520 Dec. 18, 2000
c. Gov’t. of U.S.A v. Purganan GR 148571 Sept. 24, 2002
d. Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, 483 SCRA 290
e. *Gov’t of Hong Kong v. Olalia, GR 153675 April 19, 2007
Facts: Respondent Muñoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of “accepting an
advantage as agent”, and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the
common law of Hong Kong. Hong Kong Administrative Region then filed in the
RTC petition for extradition and arrest of respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed
a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner, initially the RTC denied the
petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in extradition cases
and that private responded is a “flight risk”.
Held: The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the
process of extradition, but the length of time in the detention should be
reasonable. In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muñoz has
been detained for 2 years. The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the
individual his right to liberty and due process and should not therefor deprive the
extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain standards for the grant is
satisfactorily met. In other words there should be “CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE”. However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show
and clear and convincing evidence that he be entitled to bail.

5. Arbitration
a. *RCBC v. Banco de Oro 687 SCRA 583
Facts: RCBC entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Equitable-PCI
Bank, Inc. (EPCIB), George L. Go and the individual shareholders of Bankard, Inc.
(Bankard) for the sale to RCBC of 226,460,000 shares (Subject Shares) of
 Bankard. RCBC commenced arbitration proceedings with the ICC-ICA in
accordance with Section 10 of the SPA.
Doctrine: Due process dictates the cold neutrality of impartiality. This means that
"it is not enough that cases be decided without bias and favouritism. Nor is it
sufficient that prepossessions be rid of. Actuations should moreover inspire that
belief." Evident partiality in its common definition thus implies "the existence
of signs and indications that must lead to an identification or inference" of partiality.

C. Academic Discipline

1. In General
a. Angeles v. Sison 112 SCRA 26
b. Malabanan v. Ramento 129 SCRA 359
c. Guzman v. NU 142 SCRA 699
d. Alcuaz v. PSBA 161 SCRA 7
e. Non v. Judge Dames 185 SCRA 523
f. *ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644
Facts: The initiation rites of Aquila Legis, a fraternity in the Ateneo Law School
resulted in the death of 2 freshman students. During the investigation of the
school, respondent students failed to file their reply and after hearing the
testimonies of the witnesses, found a prima facie case against the respondents.
They also failed to file their answer with the Disciplinary Board and they only
asked for postponement and for the copies of the evidence against them. The
respondents were dismissed. They now alleged that they were denied due
process.
Held: In an academic institution, the following are the minimum standards to be
satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions:
1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them – The respondent were given ample notice regarding
the nature and cause of the accusation against them. Various notices dated Feb
14 and Feb 20 were given and were addressed individually to the respondent
students.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired – The law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog
and Associates put in its appearances and filed pleadings on behalf of
respondent students.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them – Respondents cannot
argue that since they did not have the opportunity to see and examine the
statements that became the basis of the case against them, they were denied
of due process. For disciplinary actions or cases involving students, it is not
necessary that right to cross examination is included. Here, it is clear that the
investigation is summary in nature with no right of cross examination.
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated to hear and decide the case – The decision of the Board were
only reached after the hearing wherein respondent students were summoned to
 answer clarificatory questions and after considering the written statements and
testimonies of the witnesses.
g. U.P. v. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342
h. *Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran 683 SCRA 358
Facts: Upon receiving information of fraternity recruitment on Letran’s High
School, an investigation was conducted. Four students admitted that they were
neophytes of Tau Gamma Fraternity who identified a certain Kim Go, a 4 th year
HS student in Letran as a senior member of the fraternity. The parents of Kim
was informed and Kim was also questioned although he denied the allegation.
Based on the testimonies of the neophytes, the school found substantial basis
to suspend Kim. However, the parents of Kim refused to sign the agreement
alleging that they had been denied of due process.
Held: (see requisites for due process in academic institutions in ADMU vs.
Capulong)
1. Right to cross-examine is not necessarily included. Respondent may not
argue that they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the
written statements which became the basis of the order.
2. Parents were well informed and were asked to assist Kim but they were the
one who failed to attend the hearing conducted.
3. They were properly notified of the charge (fraternity membership).
4. They were informed about the nature of evidence (testimonies).
5. They were given the time and opportunity to answer.

D. Deportation Proceedings

1. In General
a. *Lao Gi v. CA 180 SCRA 756
Facts: Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was
rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on the
ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners were
required to register as aliens but refused.
Held: Note that deportation proceeding is not judicial in nature, but rather
administrative to remove undesirable aliens. Although a deportation
proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, considering that
it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom
and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process
should not be denied.
b. Domingo v. Scheer, 421 SCRA 468

E. Regulations: Fixing of Rates and Regulation of Profession

1. Rates
a. Philcomsat v. Alcuaz 180 SCRA 218
b. Radiocom v. NTC 184 SCRA 517
c. *Maceda v. ERB 199 SCRA 454
 Facts: Caltex and Petron proffered separate application with the ERB for
permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products. The
Board in a joint Order granted said provisional relief authoring said applicants
a weighted average provisional increase on 1.42 pesos per liter in the
wholesale posted prices of their various petroleum products. Petitioner Maceda
also submit that the same was issued without proper notice and hearing.
Held: In the broad interest of justice, the administrative body may, in any
particular manner, except itself from technical rules and apply such suitable
procedure as shall promote its objectives. While EO 172 stressed that a hearing
is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a provisional
increase, as it did in this case, subject to its final disposition.
d. Globe Telecom v. NTC, 435 SCRA 110

2. Profession
a. *Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31
Facts: PPA General Manager issued PPA-AO No. 04-92 providing therein that
“all existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by
the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992
only” and that “all appointments to harbour pilot positions in all pilotage districts
shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from the date of effectivity
subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the authority after conduct of rigid
evaluation of performance.” Respondents argued that due process was not
observed because no hearing was conducted.
Held: In the present case, there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is
done without proper observance of due process. While notice and hearing are
essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial function,
there is no dispute that Pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a
property right. Therefore, PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor
pilots to enjoy their profession before their compulsory retirement.

F. Dismissals, Suspensions, Reinstatements, etc. …

1. Dismissal in Government Boards and Commissions

a. Abalos v. CSC -196 SCRA 81
b. GSIS v. CSC - 201 SCRA 661
c. Macayayong v. Ople - 204 SCRA 372
d. Gonzales v. CSC - 226 SCRA 66
e. Go. v. NPC - 271 SCRA 447
f. CHR v. CSC - 227 SCRA 42
g. Uy v. COA - 328 SCRA 607
h. Lameyra v. Pangilinan - 322 SCRA 117
i. NPC v. Zozobrado - 487 SCRA 16
j. PAGCOR v. CA, GR 185668, December 13, 2011

2. Dismissal in Private Sector

a. Hellenic v. Siete - 195 SCRA 179
 b. *Salaw v. NLRC - 202 SCRA 7
Facts: Salaw and a fellow employee were alleged to have conspired in
selling twenty (20) sewing machines and electric generators which had
been foreclosed by the respondent bank. The Criminal Investigation Service
(CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted Sworn Statement from them
without the assistance of a counsel. Petitioner was requested to appear
before the bank's Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee (PDIC)
which petitioner attended and 3 months after, his termination became
effective for alleged serious misconduct or willful disobedience and fraud or
willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the private respondents.
Held: In labor cases the rudimentary requirements of due process — notice
and hearing — must also be observed before an employee may be
dismissed. Those twin requirements constitute essential elements of due
process in cases employee dismissal. The petitioner was terminated
without the benefit of due process of law. Complainant was not given the
opportunity to present his own defense and confront the witnesses, if any,
and examine the evidence against him. Hearing was also set "without
counsel or representative. It is true that administrative and quasi-judicial
bodies are not bound by the technical rules of procedure in the adjudication
cases. However, the right to counsel, a very basic requirement of
substantive due process, has to be observed. Significantly, the dismissal of
the petitioner from his employment was characterized by undue haste.
c. Conti v. NLRC, GR 119253 April 10, 1997
d. Aparente v. NLRC, GR 117652
e. Lopez v. Alturas - 647 SCRA 566

3. Preventive Suspension
a. Alonzo v. Capulong - 244 SCRA 80
b. Castillo – Co v. Barbers 290 SCRA 717
c. Bacsasar v. CSC - 576 SCRA 787
d. Carabeo v. CA 607 - SCRA 394

G. Ordinance/Statute/Memo Cir./Rules
a. *People v. Nazario 165 SCRA 136
Facts: Any owner or manager of fishponds in places within the territorial
limits of Pagbilao shall pay a municipal tax. Nazario argued that the
ordinance is ambigious and uncertain since he is only a mere lessee while
the ordinance speaks of “owner or manager.
Held: It is Valid. As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for
failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in
carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
 Government muscle. It is unmistakable from their very provisions that the
appellant falls within its coverage. As the actual operator of the fishponds,
he comes within the term "manager."
b. Francisco v. CA - 199 SCRA 595
c. Misamis Or. v. DOF - 238 SCRA 63
d. *Estrada v. Sandiganbayan GR 148560 Nov. 19, 2001
Facts: Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then the President of the Philippines was
prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder). The petitioner contended that RA 7080 was unconstitutional, on
the ground, among others, that it was vague; said law allegedly suffers from
vagueness on the terms it uses, particularly: ‘combination’, ‘series’, and
‘unwarranted’. Based on this, the petitioner used the facial challenge to
question the validity of RA 7080.
Held: A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because of the
employment of general terms or the failure to define the terms used therein.
The validity of a law is sustained, so long as that law provides some
comprehensible guide as to what would render those subject to the said law
liable to its penalties. The petitioner cannot rely on the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, since this doctrine does not apply to laws that merely consist of
imprecise language. *The over-breadth doctrine states that a governmental
purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. *A facial challenge is
allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of a possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
e. People v. de la Piedra - 350 SCRA 163

H. Motion for Reconsideration

a. Medenilla v. CSC - 194 SCRA 278
b. Mendiola v. CSC - 221 SCRA 295
c. Rodriguez v. Proj. 6 - 247 SCRA 528
d. Lazo v. CSC - 236 SCRA 469
e. Salonga v. CA - 269 SCRA 534
f. Bernardo v. CA - 275 SCRA 413
g. Casuela v. Ombudsman - 276 SCRA 635
h. Cordenillo v. Executive Secretary - 276 SCRA 652
i. Chua v. CA - 287 SCRA 33
j. De la Cruz v. Abelle - 352 SCRA 691
k. Rodriguez v. CA, GR 134275 August 7, 2002
l. Gonzales v. CSC - 490 SCRA 741
m. Berboso v. CA - 494 SCRA 583
n. Pontejos v. Desierto - 592 SCRA 64
o. NAECOR v. ERC - 653 SCRA 642
p. Imperial v. GSIS - 658 SCRA 497
q. Arroyo v. Rosal Homeowners - 684 SCRA 297
r. Ylaya v. Gacott - 689 SCRA 452
s. Moldex v. Villabona - 675 SCRA 615
I. Suretyship
a. Stronghold Insurance v. CA - 205 SCRA 605

J. Tariff and Customs Code

a. *Feeder v. CA - 197 SCRA 842
Facts: Company owned foreign vessel M/T ‘ULU WAI’ from Singapore
carried oil and gas bound for Zamboanga. It however illegally anchored in
Iloilo without notifying the Customs authorities. The gas and oil were
immediately seized and forfeited due to illegal importation. The testimonies
of the owner’s representative were also made without counsel.
Held: No violation of due process. Seizure and forfeiture proceedings under
the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result
in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty. They
are purely civil and administrative in character. In this case, the degree of
proof required is merely substantial evidence. The right to the assistance of
counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or a law. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party
in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and
that without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings.

K. Appeal
a. Alba v. Deputy Ombudsman - 254 SCRA 753
b. Telan v. CA - 202 SCRA 534
c. Aris v. NLRC - 200 SCRA 246
d. Rivera v. CSC - 240 SCRA 43
e. Singson v. NLRC - 274 SCRA 358
f. Building Care v. Macaraeg - 687 SCRA 643
g. Diona v. Balergue - 688 SCRA 22

L. Closure Proceedings
a. *CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 (relative constitutionality)
Facts: Pursuant to Monetary Board Resolution No. 596, the Central Bank
was authorized to take over and close operations of Triumph Savings Bank
(TSB) due to insolvency even without notice and hearing. TSB argued it
was denied due process.
Held: This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and
legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank's assets
and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors,
stockholders and the general public. Due process does not necessarily
require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may
be subsequent to the closure. The banking business is properly subject to
reasonable regulation under the police power of the state because of banks
are affected with public interest because they receive funds from the
general public in the form of deposits.
b. Rural Bank v. CA 162 SCRA 288
 c. Phil. Merchants v. CA GR 112844 June 2, 1995

M. Biddings
a. Concerned Officials v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502

N. UDHA – R.A. 7279; Squatting; Procedure for relocation; summary abatement

a. *Perez v. v. Madrona 668 SCRA 696
Facts: The Demolition Office of Marikina wanted to demolish the fence and gate of
Madrona’s house because it encroached the sidewalk. Madrona filed a TRO
arguing that his rights to due process will be violated due to the summary
demolition. The Demolition Office argues that the clearing of the sidewalk is an
infrastructure project of Marikina and cannot be restrained.
Held: There is a right to be protected, that is, respondents’ right over their concrete
fence which cannot be removed without due process. If petitioner indeed found
respondents fence to have encroached on the sidewalk, his remedy is not to
demolish the same summarily after respondents failed to heed his request to
remove it. Instead, he should go to court and prove respondents supposed
violations in the construction of the concrete fence. Indeed, unless a thing is a
nuisance per se, it may not be abated summarily without judicial intervention.

O. Cancellation of Property Rights/Privileges

a. *American Inter-Fashion v. OP 197 SCRA 409
Facts: In 1984, the Garments and Textile Export Board (GTEB) found
Glorious Sun Fashion Garments Corp. (Glorious) guilty of dollar-salting
(occurs when dollars are removed from the Philippines without approval
from the Central Bank and transferred to an account outside the
county) and misdeclaration of importations. Glorious filed a petition for
certiorari in the Supreme Court but later on withdrew the same. It argued
that its right to due process was violated when it was prevented to present
evidence to the GTEB.
Held: The glaring fact is that Glorious was denied due process when GTEB
failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering a resolution against
Glorious. Moreover, the documents disclosed to Glorious by GTEB in 1987
enhanced the charge that the former was denied due process. Attention
was also brought to the Puno affidavit, wherein Puno, the Chairman of the
Investigating Panel created by the Ministry of Trade and Industry admitted
that he was pressured by Minister Ongpin to look for ways and means to
remove the quotas from Glorious.
b. Alliance of DFLO v. Laguesma 254 SCRA 565
c. ABAKADA v. Ermita 469 SCRA 1
d. *British American Tobacco v. Camacho 562 SCRA 511 and (MR) 585
SCRA 36
Facts: British American Tobacco filed a TRO to enjoin the implementing
rules of Sec. 145 of the NIRC on the ground that they discriminate against
new brands of cigarettes, in violation of the equal protection and uniformity
provisions of the Constitution. The said Section provides a classification
 freeze provision where it taxed new brands of cigarettes according to their
current net retail price while existing or "old" brands shall be taxed based
on their net retail price.
Held: The classification freeze provision was in the main the result of
Congress’s earnest efforts to improve the efficiency and effectivity of the tax
administration over sin products while trying to balance the same with other
State interests. In particular, the questioned provision addressed
Congress’s administrative concerns regarding delegating too much
authority to the DOF and BIR as this will open the tax system to potential
areas for abuse and corruption. Congress may have reasonably conceived
that a tax system which would give the least amount of discretion to the tax
implementers would address the problems of tax avoidance and tax
evasion.
e. DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, GR 179334, July 1, 2013

P. Administrative and Preliminary Investigation - Ombudsman

a. Roxas v. Vasquez GR 114944 June 19, 2001
b. Ocampo v. Ombudsman 322 SCRA 17
c. Serapio v. Sandiganbayan, GR 148468, Jan. 28, 2003
d. Estrada v. ombudsman, GR 212140, January 21, 2015