AICHE Pressure Relief Valve Inspection Interval Thiago Trotta, Charles Kashou, and Nancy Faulk © Siemens Energy, In, 4615 Southwest Puy, Suite 900, Houston, TX 027; naneyfaulk@siemens com (for correspondence) Published online 20 Api 2017 in Wiley Online Library (vileyonnelibrarzcom). DOT 10.1002/prs.11892 Determining the correct intesval for prescure rei eal inspection, testing, and mabntenance remains d major chal lenge for facilites cover! by tbe U'S. Ocetpational Safty ‘and Fels Administration Process Safety Management Stan dard, To this er, guidance & provided by AP! Standard 570, Presse Vessel Duspection Code bnService Inspection Raning, Repat, ere Alteration, by APE Recommended Prt tice 376, Inspection of Pressureerticing Devices, by APE Siandard 520, Sizing. Selection. and Installation of Pressre Relieving Dorices. Pan 0-Disallattn, ane hy Nie23, Nation fal Board Inspection Cade—Pant 2 Inspection, Fartbermore ASME HPV: Sections f and Vil. provide general gnudelines for toe repair of presse reli aes However, the restoyg and (nspeciion buerval listed, up to ton yeas, tthe mason tne span between sbop inspec ions and wverhaul. Further divection 4 often requested for determining the proper interval for atres i typical process serves, eqeeiaily im cases of PRY chattering, Recert API STD 520 Pur I guidance on performing engineering analy Ses for PRY installations, basal wi service and specific insta lation, is included bere, ‘inthis prpor a decsion-making apprach to ltermining ew imervals bases! on a combined understanding of Isisbased inspection, qualiy asernmce, engineering aiialsex ind facil experience ks presi. The proach pnts Pro ess operators aind managers wi axonal distance 1 Imad tis determbnatin..© 2017 American Insite of Che rel Engineurs Process Sal Prog. 37 Keywords. “i, 2018 PRY tnspection sntersal. PRY maintenance RV risk-based enspecon Pressure-relievig devices (PRD) are installed on pressure vessels and boilers in onder to sekve excess presse whiel tray ret from the overpressure cates described in the ‘American Pesoleum lastte Staglant $21 (APT SUD 521) [I ‘These include process upsets. operator error, extemal fires ancl other scenarios, Failure to function propery on demand ‘ould result in vessel overpressure, and powsbly lows of on lainment with subsequent explosions, fires, or tox) impacts. There are aso vonsequences assorated wit Ievkage OF PRDSs, To enstwe personnel safety as Well xs protection of fequipnient, Facies snd the envizonmeny, Is essen tat the PRD be propery designe, inalled, inspected egukirly and maintained in yood operating condition inspections are used to determine the’ generil physical and operating Conditions of the PRD, and assens whether meets the requirements for 4 given installation und service These inspections are of two ype ‘on steam Process Safety Progress (Wol3T, Nod inspections oF shop inspection and overhwul, How often should these inspections tke pla Deering the coneet inter for a pressure eee valve (PRY, which 6 x ype Of PRD) inspection an! testing. ts well as any indicated maintenance, remains « major challenge for facilities vovered by the US, Occupational Saesy andl Health Administration (OSHA) Process Safety, Management (PSM) Standard [2] or by similar reguliory requivements, To this tend, guidance is provided by API Standards 510 and 520 Par Tt, as well 38 API RP 576 andl the National Board Inspection Code—Pare 2 [3H6L Futbermoce, ASME RPVG, Sections VII and [. provide general guidelines for the eepair of presse rebel wilves [78 Note that definite tine interval between ingpeetions or tests should fe established for every PRV on Copeeating ehupnens Guidance & often resqlested for detcemining the proper Interval for valves in gypicl process services, especially in cises of presse tele! valve instability, This paper Aes lescribes the instabilities which may affect PRV performance land their cusses, then deseribes how the inspection interel tay be deiermined haved on risk-based inspections as well a aclitional engineering snalyss INSTABILITY PHENOMENA AND CAUSES The principal reason for inspecting ancl maintaining PRVs i to ensure that they can provide overpressure profection when needed, Enspections determine the conkltion of th ind look fof signs of cimage or oller concens, Ta addition wo corosion, deposits, and phiysgng, there are insta bility: phenomens whieh can cause damage to the sexing surface of 2 PRV and prevent it from pesforming projedy ‘These are described in the Following sections, ‘Cycling, Fluttering, and Chattering The total non-recoverable pressure loss hetween the pro= tected equipment and the PRV should not exceed 8 of the PRV set pressure, to prevent valve instability. with the fol Towing exceptions to dhe aforementioned citer 4 Thermal celief valves: PRVS designed! sulely to prose against the overpresaire caused by liguklylralie expansion, due 10 ambient or provess heating, They largely oversized forthe sell requirement, which could lead to eyeling. Moceoer, st iy result in exceeling the criteria, However this would! only be s concern For isolatable equipment, should happen, the amount of trapped liguiel would be limited. that ease, asthe relief device opens and discharges 2 volume of liquid, i bse ‘quently recloses dhe to fons of bailsp pressure on the Inlet of the valve. It swonl not Immediately. reopen Thecuuse stakes some time forthe pressure to" iil op agin, Chattering 48 no expected For ths case+ Remotely sensed! pilot operate! slief valves this arrange: ent for pilot uperited elie! valves permits che eeieh Uevice sense the pressure directly from the protected equipment. This prevents the rele device from reclosing {ue thigh, non-recoverible pressure loses ‘The concern in exceeding the 396 rule is chat it may res in one of the Following instability phenomena which may he “served on pressure tlie valves [10] cycting “Gyeling sees to lows frequency opening and reclosing of 4 rete device, tenn t0 occur whe the relief requirement is small compare! toi capacity. The pressure i the system decreases, then ik buck up agin penodiclly This low Frequency. movement docs not osually resi in-damage t0 the PRY; however, it does impact tee ability of the valve reseat and may fed to Wear aver Time. Fluuering later occurs while the device & open. Moving. pacts of the valve are rapidly reciprocating, however, the disk: does hot contact the seals instead, it reciprocates around 4 point ‘reiting pressure pulsations. Overtime this may lead tthe sulve Becoming stuck open. This phenomenon wears out the components of the wave Chatering CChatteting is a very high Fequency and high amplitade ‘oscillation; in dhe worst case, the disk mayy move between its two extremes of completely closed ane! maximum Wt. The Frequency of the osellations may exceed several hundred bem (11, Different from che eyeling, the main consequences of this event are possible loss of containment, damage «0 fnoving parts of the device, and damage 10 the equipment 10 ‘which the valve Is connected, Chattering can he very destructive 10 the vlve 2, ‘A eevent nicthod has been proposed in APL STD 520 Past 1 to investigate Hf w relief device Would ehater upon ie relief Ua], Experience has shown that a relief device may start chattering when the unrecoverable presse lasses are helo the 396 recommended ht, conversely. even ifthe Tosses are above 3s the PRV may not chatter or result in flores due to telicving events, Because the relationship herseeen inlet pressure deop aid catering is not well undensood, detailed Feajirenicnt for an engineering analysis te the responsibil ty of the user. The standart! states thatthe users engineering analysis my be qualitative or quantiative and shall he doct tented, Reiders are caliioned that an engineering analysis shail not be appliad ifthe relief deviee has a history of chatcering “Causes of PRY Instability Several sources discs the nun causes for PRY instil ul ace listed below. PRY insisbiiy #83 complex occurrence and often cannot be atrbuted 1 a single ese Excessive inlet Pressure Zosses ‘Av the relief valve opens. the pressure on the inlet nozzle decreases due 10 the pressure lasses resulting from fition in the inlet piping. IF dhe pressure losses ate significant, the inet pressure may fal below the reseaing value forthe PRY, ‘vb vl result i the device reclosing, As the presstce on the protected equipment builds up again. the valve will eapen, This effect may lead to chaering on the relier device (31 3 Murch 2008 Pubes mn behalf of the AICHE Excessive Mile Mackpressure Tull up backpressure che to flow in dhe discharge pip- ing. ofthe: PRY. resus in a Farce onthe valve disk, which in tum may seclove te valve, IF the huekpressure is excessively lunge. the valve aul cose, only 10 reopen again after the flows stop and the ree ceases, This also a cause for chat tering on the relief device IU, Acomstie Interaction. “The rapid opening of « relief valve results in an also: rapid drop on the pressure upstream of the valve disk, AS a femal, a pressnte reduction wave tavels. through the upstream fluid, wien comes in contact wih am upstream reservoir treleets and tavels back, a6 a compression ve towards the valve disk, I this wave reaches the disk before it closes, dhe valve may discharge in stable: manner oF nay utter, ff the dske is closed, however st may Keid 10 3 cyeling oF chattering effect [13 Retrograde Condensation Tr the tid during the relief scenario is superereal (eg pressure relief valves protecting high presure system on hhydmeracker unis). the drop in pressure asthe valve opens may lead 0 partial condensation ofthe fluid, When this wore ensation eecurs, there Will he an increased pressure drop flfect die to the contraction of the Hid fron stipereitical Tigui (16 enproper lave Selection Vapor certified valves will open fester chun liguid certified cones, For services with Only quid relief, a yapor certified valve would open much faster than what is required. 26 che pressure Dupo liquid service is also slow, which turn may lead 10 reclosing the valve right aler i sats teliey= ing 71, ‘oversized chief tnlves van oversized valve # ome 4 whieh the capacity greatly exceeds the relief requirement, This commonly occurs when specifying PRV for cquipmene which has credible scenart 13) with large elie rerements, however, other scenarios for minor upsets may only need 0 relieve fiction of that fount Conservatisn sn sizing, Coversizing) ca lead 10 On oft eyeling [hl Body Howl choking "Aa ekdiional cause for PRY instability is given by the emer for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) [9h The velocity at the outlet flange of «conventional PRY reaches sonic velociy in caves of larger PRV sizes at higher set pressures, “This phenomenon is known a body boss choking. Whee this occurs, the pressure inthe valve body rises regardless of the hack pressure atthe PRY outs, This presse ise in the PRV body uy in toon csuse reduced lft and/or unstable ‘mation of the valve Inhercatly Unstable Operation Tn adeltion fo the factors outlined above. the stability of the PRY i influenced by dynamic forces acting f open and ‘lose the valve, and the varius Factors which alex Those Forces, Duty ef al lerived and tested a model for dhe open- ing it dynamic response of pressure relief valve In gus) vapor service [2-221 This response depends on physica characteristics ofthe valve and the valve Nowe charactenstes ‘operating conditions, alet line and discharge piping, ancl ‘eapactance of the proveced vessel. They conchide the fnndel was capable of reasonable replication of the dynamic Fesponse of valves tested, including instaiities, and farther onchided that iis ellficule to generalize the inthience of OH 10.02/85 Process Safery Pogwess (Vol, No.1)any one parameter due (© the highly nonlinear nature of the system DETERMINING INSPECTION INTERVAL Toth the National Rost tnspection Code (NBIC) Past 2 and API RP 576 provide guidance on inspection and tes f= ‘quencies for pressice relief valves, incluing manual checks, Prene teas (pop tess), snd service intervals (preventive Imainteagace) [23,21], Both siandards sate tat the normal inierval berween shop insection/averhal is determined by ‘operating experience and the environment the rie device is subjected to, therefore, C8 expected that «valve with one for more of the following Would! eequte a shower interval ‘han a valk in lean, non fouling or non-cosrosive nerve + Corrosive oF fouling servi; Common discharge heater, 1 system cxtcl f phint operation # Discharge particularly detrimental (fre hazard. environ ‘mental damage, coxicey) Subject vibration, Low dilferental between sec and operating pressures 4 Feequent operational psc; oF «Leakage problems, Establishing shop inspection test history for a valve is therefore vill 1 che process of esublshing is test incerval Where several sequential tess of the “as received” valve reflect test results vonsistent with the cold differenti test pressre (CTP), and no change in service is expected for the valve, an increase in the (est inerval may he comidered iF allowed by Toca! regulations, On the other hand, if the tests show 2 history of erate ret, evidence of PRY insta Diy, of significant deviation from CDTP, the test interval shot decrease andor the valve insllation should be mode shied to improve perfomance Note that hoth standaids suggest inspection frequencies where test records andor inspection histories are not avail able: the NBIC provides these for various equipment types, for example, annually for PRV's in steam service oF five years for PRV's ia propane oF reffigerant service, Both standards state that i the effects oF corrosion, system fluid, oF service Conditions are unknown (Tor new processes, ¢4.), 4 eave Iy short inspection interval, not exceed one year, should he exablished AISK-BASED INSPECTION OF PRV'S APIRP. 576 sates, “In API 310, the subsection on. pressureelieving deviews esablithes i mmasinuns interval hparween device inspetion oF tests oF 10 yeas, unless a fied by a rislchased inspection (RED assessment” [25] This approach is accomplished thraxgh RET wethod! of tizing ARK” to manage and prioritize an inspection program based (00, APL RP 581126) ‘The following sleps are based om a recent RI case sly tn which iis assumed that all PRY’s were inspected in accor” lance with API RP'576, and inches the astmyption that all "RV's fave been sized, selected and installed per APL STD) 520 Pat I ‘The details of Consequence of Failure (COP) and Peoba- Dili of Fatlure (POF) regarding PR's will be demonstrated below. 12 COF was analyzed by defining the yes of overpressure scenarios, the discharge location of the rei val snd if these were mukiple relief valves in paral, © POP was analyzed by defining the number of overprese ‘sure scenarios, Mid service severity, relic! valve type. sta rupte disle exited upstream of the reliet valve, und inspection history. Process Suety Prgies (Vol $7, No.1) Pubs on beta ofthe ACHE ‘The resulting risk, cecommended! inspection interval, and ‘next inspection date can then be decermined PRY RMI Decision Making The folowing devision-mucking cecurted in 19 sleps: (1) Reviewing applicable sections from APL RP 381 [27h and (2) Reviewing equipment and piping applicable dats to des mine what items that addressed COF and POF cond actually he analyzed Risk Mate The cine study 039 performed using APE RP SAL 5x5 ese mates [28 Consequence of Failure (COF) Consequence is set up as A= E (Sanis of the Risk Mavis), equivalent to Very Low. Low. Moderate, High, andl Very High (respectively). The COF is evaluated by onside ing each PRV and noting what equiperent (and/or pypiny) or picves of equipment are provected hy that particule valve Observe the RBI analysis for the protected equipment and start with the COF for that equipment If these is more than ‘one pieve of equipment protected by the valve, use the high est COF to he conservative, Ia pump isthe piece of equip iment being protected thea defer to the piping assoclaced ‘with the pump and use the COF forthe pips, ‘Mer determining the sturting COF for each PRY, deters mmioe the types of overpressue svenarios, the discharge lect sion of the ret valve, and if thete are multiple reli valves in parallel with the valve that iS being) reviewed, for example, Cverpressure Scenarios Taeauly the overpressure seenasios, Utlize APE RP 381 Table 72 (Default eiiating Eveot Frequencies) and consider the overpressure scenarios thut have an Event Frequency of per 10 years of less, per the case study, Therefore the fl lowing ave considered. The following scenarios have an Event Frequency of per ‘© Runaway Chemical Reaction “The following scenatios have an Event Frequency’ of per 5 yeas, ‘Tower Pump Around Failure ov Reflux Pump Failure The following scenarios have an Event frequency of | per 10 years, flocked discharge, without adminisrative controls in place # Loss of cooling water utlty # Thesmal/hydeuulic expansion relief, without dininises- twe contrals in place # Contra Valve (CN) failure, initiating event fs sume direc= tion 3s CV’ normal fail position (ie. Fal safe) Liquid overiling without adminiirative cantly Discharge Location ‘Adjustments can be made to the PW consequence hase ‘on the discharge location for each PRY, For example: ‘© Atmosphere—Increase the (COF level) 1 Flare sytem—Decrease the (COF leveD 1 Closed Process—Inerease the (COF level) © Glosed Druin (undenwound piping. oF liquid postion of the fae system)—Decrease the (COF level) Or ta1002/prs March 2018 39