Rule 98 - TRUSTEESHIP  In previous cases, it has been held that an express trust may be declared by a

writing made after the legal estate has been vested in the trustee.
De Leon v. Molo-Peckson, 6 SCRA 978 (1962)
DOCTRINE: A document clearly and unequivocally declaring the existence of a trust, even
if executed after the death of the trustor, shall be considered as a valid recognition of pre-
existing trust.
FACTS:
 Mariano died leaving a will wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to his wife,
Juana. This will was probated.
 Juana in turn executed a will naming therein devisees and legatees, including
Guillermo (mother of petitioners) and Pilar.
 Juana later executed a donation inter vivos in favor of Emiliana and Pilar of almost
all of her entire property, and which included 10 parcels of land subject of the
present action. Juana died.
 Emiliana and Pilar executed a document entitled “Mutual Agreement” which
provides that the 10 lots shall be sold to Justa and Resurreccion (beneficiaries)
in conformity with the verbal wish of the late Mariano and Juana before their
death.
 Emiliana and Pilar executed another document revoking the Mutual Agreement,
stating that the parties realized that the said Agreement does not represent the
true and correct interpretation of the verbal wishes of the late spouses Mariano
and Juana.
 The beneficiaries filed a complaint demanding the conveyance of the 10 parcels
of land.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Mutual Agreement represents a recognition of pre-existing trust or a
declaration of an express trust impressed on the 10 parcels of land? YES.
2. W/N the revocation of the Mutual Agreement is valid? NO.
3. W/N the provisions of the new Civil Code on trust shall apply? NO.
o The contention of Emiliana and Pilar that the will and the donation
executed by the decedents were absolute since it did not contain a hint
that the 10 lots should be held in trust by them does not merit weight.
The fact that an express trust was created by a deed which was absolute
on its face may be shown by a writing (in this case, the “Mutual
Agreement”) separate from the deed itself.
 Also, the fact that the beneficiaries were not notified of the existence of the trust
or that they were not given an opportunity to accept is of no importance since
this is not essential to the existence of a valid trust. Neither is it necessary that
the beneficiary should consent to the creation of the trust.
(2)
 Emiliana and Pilar’s subsequent revocation of the “MUTUAL AGREEMENT”
cannot be accepted as the said revocation did not have any legal effect. The rule
is that in the absence of any reservation of the power to revoke, a voluntary trust
shall be considered irrevocable without the consent of the beneficiary. In the
present case, there was no such reservation.
(3)
 Although the “Mutual Agreement” was executed after the effectivity of the new
Civil Code, the express trust was constituted during the lifetime of the decedents
or before the effectivity of the new Civil Code. As such, it is the Civil Code of 1889
and previous laws and authorities on the matter that shall govern.
 The Civil Code of 1889, however, contains no specific provisions on trust, and
neither does the Code of Civil Procedure of 1901. As such, the Court instead relies
on the principles on trust embodied in Anglo-American jurisprudence as derived
from Roman and Civil law principles.

RULING:
(1)
 A declaration of trust has been defined as an act by which a person acknowledges
that the property, title to which a person acknowledges that the property, title to
which he holds, is held by him for the use of another.
 In the present case, the nature of the will of the donor was precisely to convey
the titles of the lands to Emiliana and Pilar with the duty to hold the same in trust
for the beneficiaries. Emiliana and Pilar obligingly complied with this duty by
executing the “Mutual Agreement”.
 Although it is true that to establish a trust, the proof must be clear, satisfactory
and convincing and it cannot rest on vague, uncertain evidence, or on a loose,
equivocal or indefinite declaration, the Court finds that the “Mutual Agreement”
clearly and unequivocally declares the existence of the trust even if it was
executed after the death of the trustor, Juana.
o The right creating or declaring a trust need not be contemporaneous or
inter-parties.
Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. CA, 312 SCRA 603 (1999)
Created by the Those which, without being express, are deducible from the
direct and positive nature of the transaction as matters of intent or, independently of
DOCTRINE: A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust would be invalid if the
acts of the parties, the particular intention of the parties, as being superinduced on
enforcement of the trust or provision is against the law even though its performance does
by some writing or the transaction by operation of law basically by reason of equity
not involve the commission of a criminal or tortuous act. What the parties are not allowed
deed, or will, or by
to do expressly is one that they also may not do impliedly as, for instance, in the guise of a
words evincing an Resulting Trust Constructive Trust
resulting trust.
intention to create
a trust
FACTS:
one that arises by implication Trust not created by any word
 Ramon Yap bought a parcel of land in QC from Sps. Nery. Ramon has 2 bros: of law and presumed always to or phrase, either expressly or
Lorenzo and Benjamin have been contemplated by the impliedly, evincing a direct
 He constructed a 2-storey apartment building for the Yap family parties, the intention as to intention to create a trust, but
 He covered 1/5 of the construction cost while the rest was shouldered by Chua which can be found in the one that arises in order to
Mia, his mother. When the building was completed, the improvement was nature of their transaction satisfy the demands of justice.
declared for real estate tax purposes in Lorenzo’s name, in deference to their although not expressed in a
mom’s wishes deed or instrument of
 After Lorenzo died, Ramon allowed Lorenzo’s heirs to continue using 1 of the conveyance.
units of the bldg.
 Ramon then sold the land and his share of the bldg to Benjamin. based on the equitable It does not come about by
 The conflict arose when Petitioner Heirs laid claim of ownership over the doctrine that it is the more agreement or intention but in
property and demanded that Ramon and Benjamin execute a deed of conveyance valuable consideration than main by operation of law
to them the legal title that determines construed against one who, by
 Ramon and Ben then filed an action for quieting of title against Petitioner Heirs. the equitable interest in fraud, duress or abuse of
o Heirs averred that Sps. Nery offered to sell the land to their predecessor property. confidence, obtains or holds
Lorenzo, but since Lorenzo was still a Chinese citizen at that time, he the legal right to property
requested his brother Ramon to allow use of Ramons ‘name for which he ought not, in equity
documentation purposes. and good conscience, to hold.
o It was agreed that the property would remain registered in Ramon’s
name until such time that Lorenzo acquires PH citizenship. BUT, should
Lorenzo pre-decease, the lot would be transferred to Lorenzo’s heirs  One basic distinction between an implied trust and an express trust is that while
upon the latter’s naturalization. the former may be established by parol evidence, the latter cannot. Even then, in
o The apartment bldg was built upon Lorenzo’s initiative without order to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the proof
objection from Ramon and Ben. should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are
o They requested Ramon to have the title to the lot transferred to their proven by an authentic document. An implied trust, in fine, cannot be established
names but to their chagrin, they discovered that Ramon sold the lot to upon vague and inconclusive proof.
Ben
 Here, the evidence presented by the Heirs is wanting. Sally Yap herself admitted
 TC → for Benjamin Yap. that the business establishment of her husband Lorenzo was razed by fire in
 CA → affirmed Ben’s ownership, debunking the claim of the Heirs that Ramon 1964 that would somehow place to doubt the claim that he indeed had the means
was merely a dummy for Lorenzo, giving full credence to the DOS between Nery to purchase the subject land about two years later from the Nery spouses.
and Ramon.  On the other hand, Ramon Yep was an accountant with apparent means to buy
the property himself
Issue: W/N there was a trust set up between Lorenzo and Ramon? NO.
 Anyway, a trust cannot be set up to perpetuate fraud or subvert the law
in/directly. If a trust indeed existing, it would’ve been in contravention of §5,
Ruling:
Article XIII (can’t alienate private agri lands to aliens)
 A trust may either be express or implied.

Express Implied
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION 3. Whether petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees – NO
HELD:
Landingin v Republic GR 164948, June 27, 2006 1
FACTS: 1. Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of
1. Diwata Landingin, a US citizen, of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, the child to be of paramount consideration. Every reasonable intendment should
filed a petition for the adoption of minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos. All minors are the natural childen of Manuel objectives of the law.

Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
2. However, the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats
2. Landingin alleged that when Manuel died, the children were left to their paternal
matters leading to adoption should be understood in its proper context and
grandmother; that their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married
perspective. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
anchored solely on the best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to
communicated with her children by Manuel nor with her in-laws from the time
the natural rights of the parents over the child.
she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors were being financially
3. [DOCTRINE] As provided under Sec. 9 of RA 8552, the written consent of the
supported by Landingin and her children, and relatives abroad; as the children’s
biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption.
grandmother passed away, Landingin desires to adopt the children; the minors
Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must
have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as
be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
shown by the fact that she is a 57 y/o widow, has children of her own who are
established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the
already married, gainfully employed, and have their respective families; she lives
written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
alone in her own home in Guam and works as a restaurant server. She came back
4. We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview
to the PH to spend time with the minors; her children gave consent to the
Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May
adoption. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano, who earns substantial income, signified
2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to
his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s
interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
custody.
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor children. Neither did the
3. The RTC ordered the DSWD to conduct a case study as mandated by PD 603 and
petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition.
to submit a report not later than the date set for the initial hearing of the petition.
5. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother
Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her
is no longer necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for
evidence ex parte.
Italy and never came back and in effect, abandoned her children. This contention
4. Subsequently, the social welfare officer Pagbilao of DSWD submitted a Child
must be rejected.
Study Report stating that the minors are all eligible for adoption and
6. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
recommended that the minors be adopted by Landingin.
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological
5. The petitioner, however, failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in
parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
evidence the voluntary consent of the biological mother, Amelia to the adoption.
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the
Petitioner likewise failed to present documentary evidence to prove that Amelia
minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written
assents to the adoption.
consent of their legal guardian.
6. The RTC still granted the petition for adoption.
7. Also, abandonment was not proven. In the Home Study Report by the DSWD
7. The OSG however, appealed the decision to the CA, contending the lack of
social worker, it stated in the background of the case that “petitioner, together
consent of the proposed adoptee’s biological mother, lack of written consent of
with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor
the petitioner’s children, and failure to establish that petitioner is in a position to
children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their
support the proposed adoptees.
natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal.”
8. CA reversed. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary
8. It was also stated in the report that the eldest of the minors usually consult her
consent of Amelia Ramos, the children’s natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit
mother and petitioner-aunt for serious problems.
of consent of the petitioner’s children could not also be admitted in evidence as
9. Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children,
the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a
impelled to leave the country by financial constraints.
job, she was not stable enough to support the children.
2 [Evid issue not important]
9. Hence, this petition.
1. Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit
ISSUE/S:
of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
1. Whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was
consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos – NO
notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of
2. Whether the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-
Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply
adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law – NO
 with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, which requires the acknowledgement of the
Philippne consular office.
2. As the alleged written consent of the petitioner’s children did not comply with
the aforecited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private
document whose authenticity must be proved wither by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the makers.
3. Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to
authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is
inadmissible in evidence.
3
1. Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children
and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states
that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping
with the means of the family.
2. Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it
follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully
evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the
family.
3. According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of
Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD,
petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are
already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the
petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main
intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a
house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being
amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a
hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
4. Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to
sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She
only has a parttime job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she
has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is
correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation
that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to
support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the
CA on this issue.
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia GR 148311, March
31, 2005
DOCTRINE: Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that
Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and
her mother. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and
Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father. It is a
settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare
of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.
FACTS:
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein that, Stephanie’s mother is
Gemma Astorga Garcia and prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to
Garcia, her mother’s surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
surname. The adoption was GRANTED by the Trial Court. However, the use of the
surname of the mother as middle name of the child was denied. Subsequently, petitioner
filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be
allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. The same
was also denied by the Trial court. Stating therein, there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name. Hence, the present petition to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner in his petition submits the following: the trial court erred in depriving
Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law
prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting
parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the
mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for
the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her
mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of
Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families. The
Republic through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also supports and agrees with
the petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname
of her natural mother.
Issue: Whether an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held: YES
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the adopted shall bear the surname of
the adopters. Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly
allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the
adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. However, it is a settled rule that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of
primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why
she should not be allowed to do so.
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an
act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the
child with a legitimate status.This was, indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines,
as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated by the United
Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, secures
these rights and privileges for the adopted.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination
of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code
and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother
in the future. Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together
in the house built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan.
Petitioner provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother
and father. She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy family.
Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy. PETITION GRANTED.
HABEAS CORPUS The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the temporary
release of the petitioner constitute restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such
Moncupa v. Enrile, 141 SCRA 233 (1986) restrictions limit the freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint
Doctrine: A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and academic alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.
must be one which is free from involuntary restraints.
The court ruled in Toyoto, et al v. Hon. Fidel Ramos, et al that:
Facts: Ordinarily, a petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the restraint on
 Efren C. Moncupa, together with others, was arrested on April 22, 1982 at about the liberty of the petitioners is lifted either temporarily or permanently. We have so held in a
10:50 P.M., at the corner of D. Street and Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. number of cases. But the instant case presents a different situation. The question to be
 Moncupa D. Tuazon was brought to MIG-15 Camp Bago Bantay, Quezon City resolved is whether the State can reserve the power to re-arrest a person for an offense after
where he was detained. a court of competent jurisdiction has absolved him of the offense. An affirmative answer is
the one suggested by the respondents because the release of the petitioners being merely
 On April 23, 1982, on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front
'temporary' it follows that they can be re-arrested at anytime despite their acquittal by a
(NDF) staff member, a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against
court of competent jurisdiction.
him and eight other persons.
 After two separate investigations it was ascertained that the petitioner was not In effect the principle is clear. A release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
a member of any subversive organization. Both investigators recommended the
moot and academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where a person
prosecution of the petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal
continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there
possession of subversive documents under Presidential Decree No. 33.
is present a denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but
 Consequently, two separate informations were filed against the petitioner, one, appear to be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has, in the
for illegal possession of firearms before the Court of First Instance of Rizal and light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the person concerned or those
the other for violation of P.D. 33 before the City Court of Quezon City. Against the applying in his behalf may still avail themselves of the privilege of the writ.
other accused, however, the cases filed were for violation of P.D. 885
 Significantly, the petitioner was excluded from the charge under the Revised
Anti-Subversion Law. During the pendency of this petition, it is significant that
his arraignment and further proceedings have not been pursued. And yet, the
petitioner's motions for bail were denied by the lower court.
 Hence, the petitioner filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus.
 The respondents, in their return of the writ justified the validity of petitioner's
detention on the ground that the privilege of the writ had been suspended as to
the petitioner. However, on August 30, 1983, the respondents filed a motion to
dismiss stating that on May 11, 1983, the petitioner was temporarily released
from detention on orders of the Minister temporary of National Defense with the
approval of the President.

Issue: Whether or not the instant petition has become moot and academic in view of the
petitioner's temporary release.

Ruling: NO. It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner's temporary release are
restrictions imposed on him. These are:
1) His freedom of movement is curtailed by the condition that petitioner gets the
approval of respondents for any travel outside Metro Manila.
2) His liberty of abode is restricted because prior approval of respondents is also
required in case petitioner wants to change his place of residence.
3) His freedom of speech is muffled by the prohibition that he should not
"participate in any interview conducted by any local or foreign mass media
representatives nor give any press release or information that is inimical to the interest of
national security."
4) He is required to report regularly to respondents or their representatives.
Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (1919)
Doctrine: The writ will issue, even if the person to be produced before the Court is no
longer in the custody of the Respondent. As long as the Respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the Court, he is obliged to obey the order and produce the body of the
person.
Facts:
 Justo Lukban, mayor of the city of Manila, ordered the district for women of ill
repute to be closed.
 Thereafter, the women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the
police.
 After some preparation, the police, along with Lukban, hustled some 170 women
into patrol wagons and placed them aboard steamers that brought the women to
Davao to be labourers.
 This prompted the relatives and friends of some of the deportees to apply for
habeas corpus with the SC, alleging that the women were illegally restrained of
their liberty by Lukban.
 The city fiscal appeared for Respondents, praying that the writ shouldn’t be
issued because the Respondents no longer had control and custody of the
women. However, the fiscal admitted that the women were sent out of Manila
without their consent.
 The SC issued the writ (1st order), but none of the persons in whose behalf the
writ was ordered were produced by the Respondents. However, some of the
women were able to return to Manila through their own efforts.
 The Respondents reiterated the same defense and also presented some affidavits
that showed some of the women not wanting to return.
 The SC issued a 2nd order directing the Respondents to produce the women,
which the Respondents complied with in part. (See below for specifics. Not
important but just in case he asks).
o Respondents were able to bring back 8, and notified the Court that 81
of the women renounced their right to return, 59 had already returned
on their own, and the remaining could not be found despite diligent
efforts.
 Petitioners now seek to have Respondents cited in contempt for failure to obey
the 1st order.
 Respondents on the other hand questions the standing of the petitioners. They
further alleged that the SC should not assume jurisdiction, the women were not
restrained of their liberty, and that the jurisdiction of the Respondents only
extends to the city of Manila so they could not bring the women from Davao.
Issue:
1. Whether the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus was proper? –YES
2. Whether the Respondents are guilty of contempt? – Partly YES, only Lukban is
guilty.
Ruling:
(1)
(This is just some fluff, but it set a good background for the discussion of the SC) A single
fact must be recalled: 170 women were isolated from society and, without their consent
and without opportunity to consult friends or defend their rights, forcibly hustled on
steamers for transportation to unknown regions. Despite attempts to show that the
women left voluntarily, the mere fact that the police and constabulary were present and
necessary shows that such was not the case. While it is possible to expel a person from a
place, it has always been that case that such acts are done pursuant to a law granting the
authority to do so. In this case, there is no law granting Lukban such power. The privilege
of domicile and the liberty of abode is so deeply embedded in jurisprudence and so
elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction.
The remedies of victims of official oppression are 3: civil action; criminal action; and
habeas corpus. As to Respondents’ defenses:
Firstly, the petitioners are proper parties in this case as they were friends and relatives of
the deported women. The expulsion done by the city officials made it impossible for the
women to sign the petition for habeas corpus. Thus, the petition on their behalf was
proper.
Secondly, while it is a general rule of good practice that that petitions for habeas corpus
should be presented to the nearest judge of the CFI, this is not a hard and fast rule. The
writ may be granted by the SC or any judge thereof, and the enforceable anywhere in the
Philippine islands. Whether the writ is made returnable before the SC or before an inferior
court rests in the discretion of the SC and is dependent on the particular circumstances.
Lastly, the essential object of and purpose of the writ is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint and to relieve a person is such restraint is illegal. In this case, the
restraint began in Manila and continued until the aggrieved parties were returned to
Manila and released or until they waived their right freely and truly. It is not a defense
that the persons are in a municipality were the Respondent has no jurisdiction. As
long as the Respondent is within the jurisdiction of the Court and has the power to obey
the order of the court, he should be compelled to do so. If these officials had the means to
deport these women, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return
them from Davao.
(2)
The first order was directed against Respondents to present the persons named in the writ
before the court. They were given practically a month to comply with the writ. However,
Lukban only took some action more than 2 weeks after the issuance of the order by
sending a telegram to the governor of Davao. This resulted in none of the parties being
brought before the court. After failure to comply with the first order, a second order was
issued which was more diligently obeyed. While there were many officials involved (like
the chief of police), the person who facilitated and was primarily responsible for the
expulsion of the women was Lukban. His intention may have been commendable, but his
methods were unlawful, and he only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged the writ. Thus
he is liable for contempt.
In re Ashraf Kunting, 487 SCRA 602 (2006)
Doctrine:
The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective–to inquire into the cause of detention of a
person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee, but if the detention is
proven illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee, but if the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer questions his detention by
a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Facts:
 A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus was filed directing Police Chief
Superintendent Rafanan and PNP-Intelligence Chief General Delfin to bring petitioner
Ashraf Kunting before this court and show cause why he is illegally detained.
 Kunting was arrested in Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Police in KL, Malaysia turned
over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his
arrests by the RTC of Isabela City. Kunting was charged with four counts of
Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC. Petitioner was
immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to Camp Crame for booking and
Custodial Investigation.
 The Police superintendent informed the branch clerk of court of the RTC that Kunting
was already in the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s
temporary detention at the PNP-IG, Camp Crame due to the high security risk
involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order.
 Subsequently, the RTC issued an order directing the Police Superintendent to
Immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion
for Reinvestigation.
 Then, the PNP-IG filed a motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela
City to Pasig City because:
o several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that
utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the
custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG and
o that there is a big possibility the Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he
will be detained in Basilan.
 The RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused.
 The RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated
its Order.
 Police Chief Superintendent reiterated the request to Chief State Prosecutor to
facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case.
o He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he
could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April
10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free.
 PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order citing,
among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue
of the trial against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court.
 Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order of the RTC, directing the turnover of
Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is
resolved.
 Then Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus.
 Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the
PNP-IG led by the Police Chief Superintendent and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief.
o He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until
he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City.
o It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared
in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident
which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.Kunting asserted that
he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an
Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003.
o He was aware that the PNP-IG requested the Chief State Prosecutor for
representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of
his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further
information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for
Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005.
o He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he
filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the
records as "for safekeeping purposes only."
Issue:
Whether the petition for Habeas Corpus can prosper? – No.
Ruling:
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of
habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found
illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed:
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the person alleged to
be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be
allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was
arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by RTC Isabela City, Basilan. His
temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial
court.
Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal
Detention. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued
and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense.
Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he
may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.
 Burgos v. Macapagal-Arroyo et al, 621 SCRA 481 (2010)
*This case is about writ of amparo*
Facts:
 Jonas Burgos was a farmer advocate and a member of the militant peasant
organization “Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas”
 On April 28, 2007, he was forcibly taken by 4 men and a woman, from the Hapag
Kainan Restaurant in Ever Gotesco, Commonwealth
 The guard of the restaurant could not intervene as Burgos was being grabbed by the
group; However, the guard took note of the car used by the abductors: a maroon
Corolla, plate #TAB-194
 April 30, 2007: Petitioner Edna Burgos, Jonas’ mother, held a press conference,
announcing the disappearance of her son.
 Police Investigation ensued: The plate #TAB-194 was actually registered as an Isuzu
XLT vehicle, owned by a certain Mauro Mudlong
 This Isuzu XLT was impounded with the 56th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army, for transporting timber without a permit.
 However, after Jonas Burgos was taken, it was found that the Isuzu XLT was missing,
and that the car had been cannibalized.
 On direct examination, Edita Burgos stated that the police were able to generate
cartographic sketches of the abductors, based on eyewitness’ interviews.
 State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco identified the sketches and named 5 people
allegedly involved in the abduction
o Sgt. Jason Roxas
o Cp. Jana Francisco
o M/Sgt. Aron Arroyo
o 1st Lt. Jaime Mendaros
But the PNP-CIDG posits the theory that it is not the AFP-PNP responsible for the
abduction, but the NPA
Court of Appeals:
 found that Edita Burgos’ evidence did not establish her claim that the military
abducted Jonas.
· the evidence:
o did not show how license plate #TAB-194 went from the Isuzu car to the
Corolla
o did not even show if the 2 license plates are one and the same at all.
o did not show if the abductors are militarymen or civilians
 found that the investigations of the PNP and AFP left much do be desired, as they did
not fully exert their efforts to unearth the truth and bring the real culprits before the
bar of justice.
CA RULINGS:
 Dismissed the petition for Habeas Corpus
 Denies the motion to declare Respondents in contempt
 Partially grants the writ of Amparo
 held that President GMA cannot be subject of the writ of Amparo as she enjoys
immunity from suit
ISSUE:Can the SC rule on the Writ of Amparo?
HELD:
NO. The SC cannot rule on the case until a more meaningful investigation is made.
However, the petition for the issuance of a Writ of Amparo with respect to President GMA
is dismissed (immunity from suit)
RULING:
 Based on the CA findings, the PNP and AFP have failed to conduct an exhausting and
meaningful investigation into the disappearance of Jonas Burgos
 The PNP and AFP have also failed to exercise the extraordinary diligence that the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo requires.
 Because of these shortcomings, the SC cannot rule on the case until a more
meaningful investigation, using extraordinary diligence, is undertaken.
 There are significant lapses in the handling of the investigation.
 There was no search for the 5 people identified by State Prosecutor Velasco
 The PNP-CIDG never made any significant follow through regarding the identities of
the cartographic sketches of th abductors
 Hence, the SC refers the case to the Commission on Human Rights, which is the
SC’s directly commissioned agency tasked with the continuation of the investigation
of the Burgos abduction, and to report the findings and recommendations to the
Court.
 The CHR is a specialized and independent agency created and empowered by the
Constitution to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights and to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines.
 The SC tasks the CHR with
o Ascertaining the identities of those appearaing in the cartographic sketches
o Determining the identies of the persons identified by State Prosecutor
Veloso
o Inquiring into the eracity of the claims of the NPA’s involvement
 The SC tasks the AFP Chiefs to make available all documents to the CHR, relevant to
the case of Jonas Burgos
 The SC directs the PNP-CIDG to submit the results of its investigation to the CHR and
DOJ
 The SC authorizes the CHR to conduct a comprehensive and exhaustive investigation
that extends to all aspects of the case
 The SC requires the CHR to submit a report with recommendations.
 (2)
 [SEE DOCTRINE]
CHANGE OF NAME (Rule 103) and CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES  The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY (Rule 108) that may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name:
o (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
Haw Liong v. Rep., 16 SCRA 677 (1966) - Payad o (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status,
Doctrine: Before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and
certificate of birth or civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any o (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be  The claims of Haw Liong were merely supported by his own testimony cannot
denied. overcome the fact that the name given him from the very beginning as Haw Liong
as in fact this is the name that appears in his landing certificate. The fact that he
claims to be the son of one Placido Lantin, a Filipino is of no moment because if
Facts:c the same were true it is strange that the name that was given him upon birth is
 Petitioner filed a petition to change his name from Haw Liong to Alfonso Lantin Haw Liong and he had to file a petition for naturalization to become a Filipino
before the CFI Leyte. citizen. This indirectly belies his claim that the name that should be given him is
 He testified the following: Alfonso Lantin because that is the family name of his father "to conform with the
o that he is 47 years old, married, and an employee of the Leyte Asia customs and traditions and also for sentimental reasons.
Trading Company;
o that he has been a resident of Tacloban City for more than 20 years;
o that he wants to change his name to Alfonso Lantin because he is called
by his Filipino friends as Alfonso and the name of his father is Placido
Lantin;
o that he wants to have a Filipino name because he will soon be a Filipino
citizen;
o that he came to the Philippines in 1925 and since then his Filipino
friends have been calling him Alfonso;
o that there is no pending case against him as Haw Liong;
o and that in the event a case will arise against him as Haw Liong he is
willing to appear and answer the same.
 CFI granted the petition.
 The government appealed.

Issues:
(1)
Whether or not the State has interest to appeal the decision in a petition for change of
name? - Yes.
(2)
Whether or not Haw Liong has presented compelling reasons to justify the change of name
he desires? -No.

Held:
(1)
 This Court has already had occasion to state the view that the State has an
interest in the names borne by individuals for purposes of identification and that
a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right.
Llaneta v. AGrava, 57 SCRA 29 (1994) - Santos
Llaneta v. Agrava
DOCTRINE:
Court allowed to bear surname of husband of mother because as far as she know, Teresita
used the surname Ferrer, all he records, in school and elsewhere, bear the surname Ferrer,
that her friends and associates know her only as Teresita Ferrer; and that even the late
Serafin Ferrer's nearest of kin have tolerated and still approve of her use of the surname
Ferrer. A sudden shift at this time by the petitioner to the name of Teresita Llaneta (in
order to conform to that appearing in her birth certificate) would result in confusion
among the persons and entities she deals with and entail endless and vexatious
explanations of the circumstances of her new surname. In her official dealings, this would
likewise mean a lifelong fending with the necessary affidavits. Moreover, it is a salutary
law that would allow the petitioner, inspite of her illegitimate birth, to carry on in society
without her unfortunate status being bandied about at every turn.
FACTS
· Atanacia Llaneta was merried to Serafin Ferrer, they had a child, Victoriano Ferrer.
Atanacia had relations with anaother man, it bore Teresita (petitioner).
· Teresita used the surname Ferrer.
· It was discovered that in her Birth Cert, Llaneta is her surname.
· She petitioned for change of name.
ISSUE
WON petition for change of name should be granted
HELD
Yes. See doctrine.
Secan Kok v. Republic, 52 CRA 322 (1973) - Sta. Ana
Doctrine: One cannot change a name by mere motion.
Facts:
 Secan Kok filed a petition to change his name and that of his daughter Marilyn Se
respectively to Antonio Cuakok and Gloria Cuakok. It was granted.
o The evidence also shows that the petitioner's true and correct Chinese
name is Cua Kian Kok but the immigration official who prepared his
registration papers committed a clerical mistake
 Secan Kok then filed motion for supplemental judgment to have this other
children and wife’s names be changed as well.
Issue: Whether or not a mere motion to change their name would suffice? No
Held:
 To allow the change of name of his wife and other children by mere motion will
not only deprive the government of the required filing fees therefor but will also
dispense with the essential requirements respecting the recitals in the title of the
petition and the publication to apprise person. The reason for these
requirements is that a change of name is a matter of public interest.
 Since petitions for change of name are proceedings in rem, strict compliance with
the requirements is essential, namely, that such verified petition should be
published for three (3) successive weeks in some newspapers of general
circulation in the province; and that both the title or caption of the petition and
its body shall recite:
1. the name or names or aliases of the applicant;
2. the cause for which the change of name is sought; and
3. the new name asked for.
Villegas et al v. Fernando et al, 27 SCRA 119 (1969) - Tolentino
Note: The correct SCRA number for this case is 27 SCRA 1119. However, it is a Land
Registration case with no relation to a petition for a change of name or cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry.
Rep. v. Cagandahan, 565 SCRA 72 (2008) - Yap levels of male hormones (androgen), there is preponderant biological support
Topic: Change of Name and Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry for considering him as being make. Sexual development in cases of intersex
Doctrine: Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
the civil register; these are entries provided in NCC 407 and 408. The acts, events, or that the gender of such persons, like Cagandahan, is fixed.
factual errors contemplated therein include those that occur after birth.  Cagandahan has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
Facts: steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. In the absence of law on
1. Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live the matter, the Court will not dictate on Cagandahan concerning a matter so
Birth. But growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was innately private as one’s sexcuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on w/n
diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where a to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
person possesses both male and female characteristics.
2. Cagandahan alleged that she was diagnosed with CAH at a young age. At age 13, she
stopped growing and has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that 3. Change of name under Rule 103: The SC has held that the change of name is
for all interests and appearances, as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a not a matter of right but judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
male person. Thus, she prayed that the entries in her birth certificate be corrected: adduced and the consequences that will follow. The change herein from “Jennifer” to
(1) gender be changed from female to male, and (2) first name be changed from “Jeff” merely recognizes his preferred gender, which will conform with the change of
Jennifer to Jeff. the entry in Cagandahan’s birth certificate from female to male.
3. Cagandahan also presented the testimony of one Dr Sionzon, who testified that Fallo: Republic’s petition is denied.
Cagandahan she is female, but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally; that she has both male and female organs; that the
condition is very rare and permanent. Hence, he recommended the change of gender
because Cagandahan has made up her mind, adjusted to her chose role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her.
4. RTC: Granted.
5. OSG alleged: petition is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108,
because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries under Sec. 3 of Rule 108, Cagandahan’s petition
did not implead the local civil registrar. Moreover, Rule 108 does not allow change
of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition
does not make her a male.
6. Cagandahan: Courts shall construe the Rules liberally.
Issue: W/N the TC erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
Cagandahan, to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her
medical condition called CAH, and her name from “Jennifer” to “Jeff”, under Rules 103 and
108. (NO)
Held:
1. RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 the correction of clerical or
typographical errors. Hence, insofar as such errors are involved, the correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.

2. Change of sex under Rule 103: A correction in the civil registry involving the
change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108. In the case herein, there is substantial
compliance with Rule 108 when Cagandahan furnished a copy of the petition to the
local civil register.
 Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the individual, like Cagandahan, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Cagandhan
here thinks of himself as a male, and considering that his body produces high
Braza et al v. Civil Register et al, 607 SCRA 638 (2009) - Banguis
DOCTRINE: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation
or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.
FACTS:
 Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo),
also known as Pablito Sicad Braza, were married on January 4, 1978.
 The union bore Ma. Cristinas co-petitioners Paolo Josef and Janelle Ann on May
8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo on June 4, 1980.
 Pablo died on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java,
Indonesia.
 During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines,
respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille) began introducing her co-respondent minor
Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son.
 Ma. Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained
Patrick's birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental with the following entries:
o Date of Birth: 01 January 1996
o Annotation/Remarks: Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on
January 13, 1997
o Remarks: Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on
April 22, 1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick
Alvin Titular
 Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing that Pablo
and Lucille were married on April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners
to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick
in the Local Civil Register.
 Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed
marriage between Lucille and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account
of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo, petitioners
prayed for:
o (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect
to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and
the use of the last name "Braza";
o (2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as
guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing to
determine his paternity and filiation; and
o (3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in
his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
 Patrick filed MTD for lack of jurisdiction.
 RTC= Dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special
proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court
under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage
of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be
subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an
ordinary adversarial action. MR=Denied.
ISSUE:WON the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on
legitimacy even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. (NO.)
HELD:
 The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule
108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and
filiation.
 Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the
procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected.
o The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the civil registry.
o A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name
that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the
parent.
o Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded
and due process is properly observed.
 The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that
petitioners seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground
that it is bigamous and impugn Patricks filiation in connection with which they
ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
 Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of
Patricks birth records and that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental
thereto.
o Petitioners position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually
to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucilles marriage as void for
being bigamous and impugn Patricks legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family
Court as expressly provided in said Code.
 It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before
the court a quo.
SC= Petition is DENIED.
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas et al, 628 SCRA 266 (2010) - Acabado the entry. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
Doctrine: Being contrary to law, registration of the foreign divorce decree without the proceeding itself, since the object of the special proceeding is to establish the status or
requisite of judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. right of a party or a particular fact)

Facts:
 Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen, now Canadian. He married Sto. Tomas in
Pasig.
 He left for Canada soon after the wedding. Upon his return, he discovered his wife
was having an affair. Corpuz filed for and was granted a divorce in Canada.
 Two years later, he met another Filipina whom he wanted to marry. He went to
the Pasig Civil Registry and had the divorce decree registered on his marriage
certificate. He was informed he had to have the decree judicially recognized first.
 He filed a petition for recognition with the RTC. Sto Tomas did not oppose, and
manifested her conformity with the petition.
 The RTC denied, Corpuz was not the proper party to file the petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he was the foreign spouse.
Only the Filipino spouse may avail of such remedy under Art. 26 of the Family
Code.
(On whether the alien spouse may file the petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree - YES)
Art. 26 was included in the law in order to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse, who, after obtaining a divorce decree, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. This provision is for the benefit of the Filipino
spouse, by granting him/her a substantive right to have their marriage considered
dissolved under our law, capacitating him/her to remarry. Legislative intent was for it to
benefit only the Filipino spouse who would otherwise be left in an absurd situation.
That the law bestows no rights in favor of aliens does not necessarily strip
Corpuz of legal interest to file the petition for recognition. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly
proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Corpuz, pursuant to Sec. 48 (b), Rule 39 of the ROC, which provides for the effect
of foreign judgments. Direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign divorce
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action for
recognition before our courts.

Issue: W/N the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was correct in recording the fact of divorce
on the marriage certificate based on mere presentation of the divorce decree - NO

Held: The recording of the divorce was improper. Art. 407 of the Civil Code states that
acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded
in the civil register. Act No. 3753 (Law on Registry of Civil Status) requires the entry in the
civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s
legal capacity and status, such as legitimacy, naturalization, adoption or marriage status;
and this includes the registration of divorce decrees.
However, the law and the submission of the decree alone do not authorize
registration of the divorce. There must first be judicial recognition of the foreign judgment
first. Without a judicial order recognizing the divorce, the Civil Registry was without
authority to annotate the divorce decree on the marriage certificate on the strength of the
foreign decree alone. Being contrary to law, registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite of judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any
legal effect. In fact, mere recognition of the divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize cancellation of the entry in the civil registry without a judicial order to
that effect.
Under Rule 108 of the ROC, before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or
correction, may be annotated in the civil registry it requires:
1. that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;
2. that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be
made parties to the proceedings;
3. and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.
(SC said this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the
foreign divorce decree to be given effect - one for recognition and one for cancellation of