RULE 128

EVIDENCE DEFINED:

Atienza vs Board of Medicine (GR No. 177407 February 9, 2011)

Facts: Due to her Lumbar parts, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February
4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered
several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left
kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. This, she underwent kidney operation in 1999, September. On February 18, 2000,
private respondents husband Romeo Sioson, filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the board of
medicine against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation. It was alleged in the complaint that the
gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of the removal of private
respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney. Among the evidence
presented are certified photocopy of the results of the ultrasound and X-ray conducted to Editha with the interpretation that
both of her kidneys are in their proper anatomical location.

Issue: Whether or not the doctors who conducted the kidney operation are liable for gross negligence despite the evidence
presented were mere photocopies.

Held: Yes. To begin with, it is a well settled rule that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the Board of Medicine. It is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or
technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their
admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or
ignoring them.

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. This, they
likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both
mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology include the structural make-up
and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Editha’s kidneys before,
and after the time of her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE

People v. Wagas G.R. No. 157943; 4 September 2013

Facts: Alberto Ligaray (Ligaray) transacted business with Gilbert Wagas (Wagas) in which the latter placed an order of 200bags
of rice over the telephone. Ligaray released the goods to Wagas and at thesame time received a check for P200000 payable to
cash. Upon depositing the said check, the same was dishonoured because of insufficient funds. Ligaray demanded from Wagas
for the payment of the check but the latter did not pay the former.

Wagas was charged with estafa in an information stating that he issued a check in the amount of 200000, however, when the
check was presented for encashment" it was dishonoured because it was drawn against insufficient funds. Despite of notice
and several demands upon Wagas to make good said check, he failed to do so.

In arraignment, Wagas pleaded not guilty. On pre-trial, Wagas admitted that the check alleged in the information had been
dishonoured due to insufficient funds. Trial ensued and on cross examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not personally meet
Wagas because they transacted through telephone only and he release the 200 bags of rice directly to Robert Canada, the
brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon receiving the rice. In his defense, Wagas admitted that he issued
the check to Canada for the payment of Canada's property and denied he had any dealings with Ligaray. The trial court
convicted Wagas of the crime charged against him. After denial of Wagas' motion for new trial/ consideration, he appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Wagas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Held: No. The Supreme Court acquitted Wagas. The check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. Under the Negotiable
Instruments Law, this type of check was payable to the bearer and could be negotiated by mere delivery without the need of an
indorsement. This rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like
Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray.1wphi1 Relevantly, Ligaray confirmed that he did not himself see
or meet Wagas at the time of the transaction and thereafter, and expressly stated that the person who signed for and received
the stocks of rice was Cañada.

It bears stressing that the accused, to be guilty of estafa as charged, must have used the check in order to defraud the
complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere issuance of the worthless check. Wagas could not be
held guilty of estafa simply because he had issued the check used to defraud Ligaray. The proof of guilt must still clearly show
that it had been Wagas as the drawer who had defrauded Ligaray by means of the check.

People vs. Lauga 615 SCRA 548 (March 15 2010)

Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses for the
prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he
proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which
Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control
himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed,
confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted
by a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Issue:Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer admissible in evidence?

Held: No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community. Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are
recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay
level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and
responsibilities delegated to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he
makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights
provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore,
the extrajudicial confession of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People vs Antonio Lauga, G.R.
No. 186228, March 15, 2010]

TATING vs. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27

FACTS: On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating.
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena.
Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for
tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However, the land
remained in possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no
intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the
title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her
children as her heirs. In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their
rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved
futile. Hence, her son filed a complaint with the RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in
favour or the plaintiff and was affirmed by the C A.

ISSUE: Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts.

RULING: The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn statement probative weight.
Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given
probative value on Daniela's sworn statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was
simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Considering that the Court finds the
subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to
discuss the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The
complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION [G.R.
No. 107518. October 8, 1998]

Facts: This is a civil case for damages arising from a sea collision incident when plaintiff's tanker hit respondent's fishing boat,
causing the boat to sink.

The lower court and CA ruled in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary exhibits presented, mainly the price
quotations. These price quotations were issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them from dealers of equipment
similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. However, these are not published in any list, register, periodical or
other compilation nor containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.T

Issue:Are price quotations considered commercial list, thus can be admissible in evidence?

Held: NO. Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals,
containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation.These are simply letters
responding to the queries of Del Rosario.

The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along
with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings
even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.

A document is a commercial list if:

(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; (2) such statement is contained in a list,
register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that
occupation, and (4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

SASAN vs.NLRC G.R. No. 176240 October 17, 2008

FACTS: Petitioners filed with the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC separate complaints against E-PCIBank andHI for illegal
dismissal. In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCI Bank with respect to
the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and messengerial services to the bank for
more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and supervision over the means and methods by which they were to
perform their jobs; and that their dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had
become regular employees of E-PCI Bank. For its part, E-PCI Bank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI, an
independent job contractor which hired and assigned petitioners to the bank to perform janitorial and messengerial services
thereat. HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of providing
janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCI Bank was one of its clients. On the basis of the parties’
position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered
a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the required substantial
capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own account and responsibility as required under
the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to
petitioners. Aggrieved by the decision of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, respondents E-PCI Bank and HI appealed the same to the
NLRC, 4th Division. The NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter Gutierrez. The NLRC took into consideration the documentary
evidence presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized venture with
sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in "labor-only contracting." Distressed by the decision of the
NLRC, petitioners sought recourse with the CA by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. In its Decision, the CA affirmed
the findings of the NLRC that HI was alegitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally dismiss petitioners. Hence, the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not submission of additional evidence on appeal is allowed in labor cases.

RULING: The submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases.

The NLRC and labor arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. In keeping with this
directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for
the first time on appeal. The submission of additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could
submit counter-evidence.

The NLRC is not precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal, because technical rules of procedure are
not binding in labor cases.

ANTI-WIRE TAPPING

Ramirez v. CA, G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995

“Recording of conversation through a tape recorder”

The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT
AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.

Facts: A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and humiliated
her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages.

In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW for secretly taping the
confrontation.

Issue: Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense?

Ruling: YES.

The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person,
NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically
alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or
thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latter's office.

In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of
a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200
because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the
principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused."

In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone, Dictagraph, Detectaphone,
Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape constitutes an offense.

The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

SALCEDO-ORTANEZ V CA GR NO 110662

FACTS: Respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological incapacity of the petitioner. Among the
exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner
and unidentified persons. CA dismissed the petition stating tape recordings are not inadmissible per se. They and any other
variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on
how the trial judge utilizes them in the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.

ISSUE: W/N Tape recordings are admissible as evidence.

HELD: No. Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy
of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. Clearly,
respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in evidence
the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording
of the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

GR No. L-69809, October 16, 1986 [145 SCRA 112]

FACTS:A direct assault case against Leonardo Laconico was filed by complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon. The said complainants made a telephone call to Laconico to give their terms for withdrawal of their complaint.

Laconico, later on, called appellant Gaanan, who is also a lawyer, to come to his office to advise him about the proposed
settlement. When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through
a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement. After enumerating the conditions,
several calls were made to finally confirm if the settlement is agreeable to both parties.
As part of their agreement, Laconico has to give the money to the complainant's wife at the office of the Department of Public
Highways. But, he insisted to give the money to the complainant himself.After receiving the money, the complainant was
arrested by the agents of the Philippine Constabulary, who were alerted earlier before the exchange. Appellant stated on his
affidavit that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the
affidavit of appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against the complainant.

In defense, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act as the appellant heard the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent.

Trial Court: both Gaanan and Laconico were guilty of violating Sect. 1 of RA No. 4200.

IAC: affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Hence, this petition. The case at bar involves an interpretation of the Republic Act No. 4200 or also known as Anti-Wiretapping
Act. Petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known"
listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law.
However, respondent argues that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the context of
the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus.

ISSUE: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to
overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a
telephone line.

HELD: No.Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken
word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-
talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to
knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication
or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay
the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by
this prohibition.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in
Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement", although not exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to
comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping
the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties
being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping,
intercepting or recording a telephone conversation. The petition is granted and the petitioner is acquitted of the crime of
violation of Republic Act No. 4200.
ARREST SEARCHES SEIZURES ORDER

Pollo vs David G. R. No. 181881, October 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-Charge of
the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the “Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na” program of the CSC.

On January 3. 2007, CSC Chairperson Karina Constantino-David received an unsigned complaint letter which was marked
“Confidential” and was sent through a courier service (LBC) from certain Allan San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. The
letter contain allegations that the petitioner have been helping many who have pending cases in the CSC and the letter sender
pleas that the CSC should investigate this anomaly to maintain the clean and good behaviour of their office.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology (IT), and issued a
memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically “to back up all the files in the computers found in the
Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”

After some briefing, the team proceeded at once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. The backing-up of all
files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by several employees, together
with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m., Director Unite sent text messages to
petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time, informing them of the ongoing copying of
computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.

Issue: Legality of the search conducted in the petitioner’s office computer and the copying of his personal files without his
knowledge and consent, alleged as a transgression of his constitutional right to privacy.

Ruling: Yes.

In sum, we conclude that the “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the…probable-cause
requirement impracticable,” x x x for legitimate, work-related noninvestigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-
related misconduct. A standard of reasonableness will neither unduly burden the efforts of government employers to ensure
the efficient and proper operation of the workplace, nor authorize arbitrary intrusions upon the privacy of public employees.
We hold, therefore, that public employer intrusions on the constitutionally protected privacy interests of government
employees for noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be
judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception
and the scope of the intrusion must be reasonable:

“Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider ‘whether the…action was
justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place,’” x x x

Ordinarily, a search of an employee’s office by a supervisor will be “justified at its inception” when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct, or that the
search is necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose such as to retrieve a needed file. x x x The search will be
permissible in its scope when “the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of …the nature of the [misconduct].” x x x39 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)

Under the facts obtaining, the search conducted on petitioner’s computer was justified at its inception and scope. We quote
with approval the CSC’s discussion on the reasonableness of its actions, consistent as it were with the guidelines established by
O’Connor:

Even conceding for a moment that there is no such administrative policy, there is no doubt in the mind of the Commission that
the search of Pollo’s computer has successfully passed the test of reasonableness for warrantless searches in the workplace as
enunciated in the above-discussed American authorities. It bears emphasis that the Commission pursued the search in its
capacity as a government employer and that it was undertaken in connection with an investigation involving a work-related
misconduct, one of the circumstances exempted from the warrant requirement. At the inception of the search, a complaint was
received recounting that a certain division chief in the CSCRO No. IV was “lawyering” for parties having pending cases with the
said regional office or in the Commission. The nature of the imputation was serious, as it was grievously disturbing. If, indeed, a
CSC employee was found to be furtively engaged in the practice of “lawyering” for parties with pending cases before the
Commission would be a highly repugnant scenario, then such a case would have shattering repercussions. It would undeniably
cast clouds of doubt upon the institutional integrity of the Commission as a quasi-judicial agency, and in the process, render it
less effective in fulfilling its mandate as an impartial and objective dispenser of administrative justice. It is settled that a court or
an administrative tribunal must not only be actually impartial but must be seen to be so, otherwise the general public would
not have any trust and confidence in it.

Considering the damaging nature of the accusation, the Commission had to act fast, if only to arrest or limit any possible
adverse consequence or fall-out. Thus, on the same date that the complaint was received, a search was forthwith conducted
involving the computer resources in the concerned regional office. That it was the computers that were subjected to the search
was justified since these furnished the easiest means for an employee to encode and store documents. Indeed, the computers
would be a likely starting point in ferreting out incriminating evidence. Concomitantly, the ephemeral nature of computer files,
that is, they could easily be destroyed at a click of a button, necessitated drastic and immediate action. Pointedly, to impose the
need to comply with the probable cause requirement would invariably defeat the purpose of the wok-related investigation.

Worthy to mention, too, is the fact that the Commission effected the warrantless search in an open and transparent manner.
Officials and some employees of the regional office, who happened to be in the vicinity, were on hand to observe the process
until its completion. In addition, the respondent himself was duly notified, through text messaging, of the search and the
concomitant retrieval of files from his computer.

All in all, the Commission is convinced that the warrantless search done on computer assigned to Pollo was not, in any way,
vitiated with unconstitutionality. It was a reasonable exercise of the managerial prerogative of the Commission as an employer
aimed at ensuring its operational effectiveness and efficiency by going after the work-related misfeasance of its employees.
Consequently, the evidence derived from the questioned search are deemed admissible.

Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument invoking the privacy
of communication and correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution is also untenable considering the
recognition accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy of employees in the government workplace under the
aforecited authorities.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts: The PC (Philippine Constabulary) officer received a tip from one of their informers that the accused was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer pointed at him. They detained him and
inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contained three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by the
NBI forensic examiner. On the basis of the finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Ruling: The Supreme Court Held that warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the rules of court not justified unless the
accused was caught in flagrante or a crime was about to be committed or had just been committed.

A vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles
may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

In the present case, from the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which
they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name
was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of his arrival was certain. And from the information they have received, they
could have persuaded a judge that there was a probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team had
determine on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary.

The evidence of probable cause should be determined by a judge and not law enforcement agents.

People of the Philippines vs. Rogelio Mengote y. TejasG.R. No. 8759, June 22, 1992

Facts: A telephone call was by Western Police district that here were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan
Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo Manila. A surveillanve team of plainclothesmen was dispatch to the place. They saw
two men “looking from side to side” one of whom is holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified
themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused was found with a .38
caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken
from them.

Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is violated

Ruling: The Supreme court held that par(a) section 5 Rule 113 of rules of court requires that a person be arrested 1 After he has
committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense 2 In the presence of the arresting
officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused was
merely “looking from side to side” and “holding his abdomen”. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed
or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

Par. B. is no less applicable because it’s no less stringent requirements have not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown
that at the time of arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a
crime that had yet to be committed.– ACQUITTED

PEOPLE v. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR. & LAWRENCE WANG

Facts: Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local
Government, arrested SPO2 de Dios, \Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. In the course of the
investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the
drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order
another supply of shabu. That same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested while they were about to hand over
another bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but
admitted that they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the
following morning, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police
operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. Police
Inspector and his men then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same under surveillance. Wang, who was
described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he
(witness) together with Captain Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as
police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open
the back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated
from him an unlicensed Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other members of the operatives searched the
car and found inside it were the following items: (a) transparent plastic bags of shabu; (b) P650,000.00 cash ; (c) on lectronic
and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the
warrantless arrest and search. The trial court held that the warrantless arrest was illegal and that warrantless search incidental
to the arrest was also unlawful.
Issue: Whether or not Hon. Laguio erred in acquitting the accused due to the invalid warrantless arrest?

Held: No. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide: Sec. 5. Arrest
without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b) When an
offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in
flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative
of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of
Section 5. And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5. The inevitable conclusion, as
correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the
illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has no factual basis. While we
agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on record, Wang
resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered
no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the
warrantless arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and
search.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs.CARLOS DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant G.R. No. 182348 November 20, 2008

FACTS: In this case, Carlos Dela Cruz was apprehended by the police officers during the organized arrest of Wilfredo Loilo alias
“Boy Bicol” who was a wanted drug pusher in San Mateo, Rizal. According to the prosecution, Carlos Dela Cruz was seen talking
to Boy Bicol in the nipa hut during the organized arrest and was seen holding a shotgun through a window. A plastic bag of
suspected shabu, digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition and magazines were seen lying on the table during the
arrest. Thereafter, two (2) charges against Carlos Dela Cruz were made before the RTC for the crimes of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition and possession of dangerous drug.

In his defense, Carlos Dela Cruz contended that he was at Boy Bicol’s house for a welding job of Boy Bicol’s motorcycle.

When he asked the police officers the reason for his arrest, they told him that it was because he was a companion of Boy Bicol.
Carlos Dela Cruz denied under oath that the gun and drugs found were his. The RTC then acquitted Carlos Dela Cruz for the
crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals (CA) sustained his conviction for possession of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: WON the warrantless arrest of Carlos Dela Cruz was illegal.

HELD: YES. The prosecution in this case failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual or
constructive possession of Carlos Dela Cruz. Since he was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicol’s hut, his subsequent
arrest without a warrant was also invalid. Rule 113 Section 5 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides
that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b) when an offense has just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and, c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In the present case, the warrantless arrest was effected under Sec. 5 (a) of Rule
113. To be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and, (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. Here, the act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been sufficient basis for
his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately prove that Carlos Dela Cruz was committing
an offense.

Although he merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecution’s charge was weak since the alleged firearm was not
presented. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful since it was not
proved that he was committing an offense.

HUMAN SECURITY ACT

REPUBLIC v. HERMINIO HARRY ROQUE GR No. 204603, Sep 24, 2013

Facts: On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a Petition[6] for declaratory relief before the RTC, assailing the
constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3,[7] for being void for vagueness;[8] (b) Section 7,[9] for
violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships;[10]
(c) Section 18,[11] for violating due process, the prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article
125[12] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;[13] (d) Section 26,[14] for violating the right to travel;[15] and (e) Section
27,[16] for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[17]

Petitioners moved to suspend the proceedings,[18] averring that certain petitions (SC petitions) raising the issue of RA 9372's
constitutionality have been lodged before the Court.[19] The said motion was granted in an Order dated October 19, 2007.[20]

The Court promulgated its Decision[21] in the Southern Hemisphere cases and thereby dismissed the SC petitions.

Petitioners filed the subject motion to dismiss,[22] contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites for
declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been upheld by the Court in the
Southern Hemisphere cases.

In their Comment/Opposition,[23] private respondents countered that: (a) the Court did not resolve the issue of RA 9372's
constitutionality in Southern Hemisphere as the SC petitions were dismissed based purely on technical grounds; and (b) the
requisites for declaratory relief were met.

RTC issued an Order[24] which denied the subject motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass upon the
constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents' petition for declaratory relief was properly filed.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration[25] which was, however, denied by the RTC in an Order dated July 31, 2012.[26] The RTC
observed that private respondents have personal and substantial interests in the case and that it would be illogical to await the
adverse consequences of the aforesaid law's implementation considering that the case is of paramount impact to the Filipino
people.[27] Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues Before the Court: The present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied the subject motion to dismiss.

Asserting the affirmative, petitioners argue that private respondents failed to satisfy the requirements for declaratory relief and
that the Court had already sustained with finality the constitutionality of RA 9372.

On the contrary, private respondents maintain that the requirements for declaratory relief have been satisfied and that the
Court has yet to resolve the constitutionality of RA 9372, negating any grave abuse of discretion on the RTC's part.

Ruling: The petition is meritorious.

An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[28] It is well settled that the abuse of discretion to be
qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the
duty or to act at all in contemplation of law.[29] In this relation, case law states that not every error in the proceedings, or every
erroneous conclusion of law or fact, constitutes grave abuse of discretion.[30] The degree of gravity, as above-described, must
be met.

Applying these principles, the Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC
when it found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern Hemisphere cases, it, however,
exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents' petition had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory
relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject motion to dismiss was altogether improper.

To elucidate, it is clear that the Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA
9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural grounds, namely: (a) the
remedy of certiorari was improper;[31] (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi;[32] and (c) petitioners therein failed to present
an actual case or controversy.[33] Therefore, there was no grave abuse of discretion.

The same conclusion cannot, however, be reached with regard to the RTC's ruling on the sufficiency of private respondents'
petition for declaratory relief.

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief: first, the subject matter of the
controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance;
second, the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third, there must
have been no breach of the documents in question; fourth, there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth, the issue must be ripe for judicial determination; and sixth,
adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of action or proceeding.[34]

Based on a judicious review of the records, the Court observes that while the first,[35] second,[36] and third[37] requirements
appear to exist in this case, the fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening seeds" of one exists in
this case. Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial
determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.[38] Corollary thereto, by "ripening seeds" it is meant, not that
sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the
asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of
facts indicating imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.[39]

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the
petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial
review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.[41] (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among
others, lack of actual justiciable controversy (or the ripening seeds of one), the RTC should have dismissed private respondents'
petition for declaratory relief all the same.
It is well to note that private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against the
implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the
case.[42] While it has been previously held that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that the
petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury,[43] it must be stressed that cases
involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.[44]
Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial
scrutiny of locus standi,[45] as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every
worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.[46]

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy at hand is ripe for
adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations in private respondents' petition, remain
highly-speculative and merely theorized. It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged
has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.[47] This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at
bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the availability of adequate
reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in the first place.

All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as well as the irrelevance of
the sixth requisite, private respondents' petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course
to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED