NEBOSH International Oil and Gas Certificate

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Version 1.1c (05/02/2013)
1. Health, Safety and environmental management in context.

Element 1: Health, Safety and environmental management in context

Specific intended learning outcomes:

On completion of this element, candidates should be able to demonstrate an understanding and

knowledge of familiar and unfamiliar situations in the oil & gas industry. In particular you should
be able to:
1.0 Explain the purpose of and procedures for investigating incidents and how lessons learnt can
be used to improve Health & Safety in the oil & gas industry.
2.0 Explain the hazards inherent oil & gas arising from the extraction, storage and processing of
raw materials and products.
3.0 Outline risk management techniques used in the oil & gas industries.
4.0 Explain the purpose and content of an organisations documented evidence to provide a con-
vincing and valid argument that a system is adequately safe in the oil & gas industries.

Recommended tuition time:

Recommended tuition time for this unit is not less than 12 hours.

1.0 Learning from Incidents.

To learn from incidents we need to ensure an effective system is in place to investigate incidents
and significant near misses to determine the root causes so that proper action can be taken to
prevent re-occurrence. You must be able to:-

 Describe the basic steps in an incident investigation.

 Recognise and distinguish the quality of the investigation.
 Describe process for sharing of incident/near miss lessons learned.
 Understand what the term "root cause" means.
 Describe and communicate requirements for investigation of contractor incidents.
1.2 Video: Buncefield Video - Learning from Incidents.
http://www.sheilds-elearning.co.uk/file.php/87/videos/buncefield.flv

1.3 Learning from Incidents.

Incidents are broadly classified as unplanned events with undesirable consequences. Even under
the best of circumstances, when due diligence is used to develop and implement the process
safety management program, process safety incidents can occur. These incidents may happen
during any phase of the life cycle of the plant. The investigation of incidents should be the vehicle
for reducing or eliminating the causes that led to the particular incident and, ultimately, for improv-
ing the overall safety of the plant. Incident investigation guidelines and procedures are typically
developed by corporate management;

However, first and second line supervisors should play an active role in developing and imple-
menting the incident investigation procedures.

In addition, they should ensure that the recommendations resulting from incident investigations
are implemented as soon as possible.

1.4 Incident Management Cycle.

An incident has occurred, BEFORE we tend to the casualty, we have to ensure the situation
cannot get any worst. This is to ensure any rescuers/medical help are not put in a position of
danger. By securing the site, we may be shutting down systems/processes, closing valves etc.

Securing the site might also include restricting access to people other than those prepared to
deal with an emergency. (Wearing specialist PPE)
1.5 Rational for Preventing Accidents.

We want to prevent incidents from re-occurring for the following reasons:-

 To prevent unwanted and unintended impact on the safety or health of people.

 Prevent asset damage/loss for stake holders.
 Prevent negative impact on the environment.
 Legal and regulatory compliance.
 To maintain the "license to operate"
 To improve safety, reliability and effectiveness of operations.

1.6 IMPORTANCE OF INCIDENT INVESTIGATION.

Determining the root cause of an incident can lead to improvements in management systems

Quality of the incident investigation effects:-

 The improvement of the management systems. If an accident has occurred, this may be
the result of a management system failure. The accident investigation should look in to
compliance/non compliance with management systems (Policies, procedures put in place
to prevent accidents and safe operational processes)/
 The ability to learn from the accident. When an accident occurs, a failure in complying with
management systems has also occurred. This may be as a result in failure to follow an es-
tablished procedure, failure to provide information, instruction, training or supervision to
the person carrying out the task. It may be a result of equipment failure. Again this can be
traced back to management failures. Was the preventative maintenance process fol-
lowed? Was any pre start checks conducted?
 The ability to improve your safety performance.

1.7 LEARNING FROM THE INCIDENT.

The above model in known as the Swiss Cheese Model. For an accident to occur, a series (two or
more) failures need to occur.

If measures are put in place (Management systems, Information, Instruction, Training &
Supervision, safe systems of work, safe tools and equipment, safe work environment, then
accidents should be prevented.

 Uncover the causal factors (problems) associated with the incident that, if corrected,
would have prevented the incident from occurring or significantly mitigated its conse-
quences.
 Ensure proper actions are taken to prevent re-occurrence at the site.
  Ensure information is appropriately shared.

1.8 INVESTIGATION PROCESS.

Accident MED

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1.9 DEFINITIONS.

CAUSAL FACTOR :-

 Any problem associated with the incident that, if corrected, would have prevented the inci-
dent from occurring, or would have significantly mitigated its consequences.

(These need to be analysed further to get to the root cause).

ROOT CAUSE :-

 The most basic cause (or causes) that can reasonably be identified that management has
control to fix and, when fixed, will prevent (or significantly reduce the likelihood or conse-
quences of) the problem's recurrence.

(Root causes are determined from further analysis of an incident's causal factors).
1.10 EXAMPLES OF BASIC CAUSE CATEGORIES.

Effective root cause analysis techniques assess:

Human Performance Difficulty:-

 Procedures.
 Training.
 Quality Control.
 Communications.
 Management Systems.
 Human Engineering.
 Work Direction.

Equipment Difficulty:-

 Tolerable Failure.
 Design Specs.
  Design Review.
 Equipment / Parts Defective.
 Preventive / Predictive Maintenance.
 Repeat Failure.

1.11 EXAMPLES OF BASIC CAUSE CATEGORIES.

INCIDENT :-

 Forklift driver is injured when his forklift punctures a chemical container, releasing toxic
fumes which render him unconscious.

CAUSAL FACTORS :-

 Floor was slippery and driver was unable to control direction of forklift.
 Chemical containers were stored in the wrong location.

ROOT CAUSES :-

 HUMAN ENGINEERING – Work Environment – Wet / Slick.

"Issue was partly caused by a slippery floor that should have been dried"

 MANAGEMENT SYSTEM – Standards, Policies, or Administrative Controls Not Used –

Enforcement Needs Improvement

Note: Company standards address proper placement of chemical containers. Company

policy requires floor to be kept dry.

1.12 TRAITS OF A GOOD ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS SYSTEM.

Good root cause analysis should be:

 Easy to use in the field by non-experts.

 Effective in consistently identifying root causes.
 Well documented.
 Accompanied by effective user training.
 Credible with the workforce (does not promote finger pointing and the search for someone
to blame).
 Helpful in presenting the results to management so that management understands what
needs to be fixed.
 Designed to allow collection, comparison, and measurement of root cause trends.
1.13 ROOT CAUSE ANALYSIS PROCESS.
Root cause analysis will highlight and:

 Identify the sequence of events leading up to and immediately following the incident.
 Identify the causal factors that contributed to the incident.
 Analyse causal factors for root causes.
 Who did what?
 What equipment did what?
 More structured approaches (TapRooT, Fault Tree, Tripod, etc.)
 Less structured approach (Why Tree)
1.14 WHY TREE EXAMPLE.
By asking why during the investigation process, the investigation team can build up a
clear picture of where the failures occurred.

1.15 WHY TREE CONCLUSIONS.

1.16 COMMON ROOT CAUSE.

ANALYSIS TRAPS

EXAMPLES

 EQUIPMENT DIFFICULTY – "It wore out, nothing lasts forever," or, "It defective part."
 HUMAN PERFORMANCE DIFFICULTY – "Nobody else would have made that mistake -
he has never been one of our best operators," or, "The procedures are right and he re-
ceived our standard training"
 NATURAL DISASTER – "It was an Act of Nature- beyond our control."

1.17 IMPORTANCE OF SHARING INCIDENT LEARNINGS.

Your Site/Location (Inner Triangle).

Sharing of incident information is critical to world-wide learning so that every operation does not
have to learn from its own experiences. The above example shows typical statistical data that on
average for every 600 Near Miss and Hazard observations organisations experience 30 first
aid/minor injuries.

For every 30 first aid/minor injuries, organisations experience on average 10 Medical Treatment
Injuries (MTI).

For every 10 Medical Treatment Injuries, organisations experience onv average one Lost Time
Injury (LTI) /Fatality.

1.18 IDEAS FOR SHARING YOUR INCIDENTS.

Sharing our incidents between organisations and authorities is a productive and pro-active way of
understanding and improving our working enviroments in order to minimise any possible risks.

"We recommend that you consider the following course of action to help avoid similar fu-
ture incidents…"

 Ensure description of incident is clear

 Ensure all aspects of the incident are shared
 Include pictures if possible
 Include root possible causes
 Include causal factors

"The possible cause(s) of the incident include the following…."

 Include recommended corrective actions

 Include appointed incident officer
 Include emergency contingency plan
1.19 PROCESS FOR ASSESSING INCIDENT INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN SHARED.
 Identify a single point contact to receive and log alerts and ensure they are assessed.
 Assess information to determine applicability.
 Communicate incident to relevant personnel.
 Treat these events as having just happened to your operation.

1.20 INCIDENT INFORMATION ASSESSMENT.

1.21 COMMON PROBLEMS WITH SHARING PROCESSES.

 Timeliness of sharing. Ensure information (even if it is only an outline).
 Documents shared but nobody assesses applicability to operation.
 Documents shared and multiple people assess applicability to operation.
 Individuals too quick to dismiss incidents as not applicable.

1.22 ANALYSING TRENDS.

The Supervisor / Manager has the responsibility for periodically analysing incident trends
to identify common issues from incidents.
EXAMPLES OF THIS TYPE OF ANALYSIS WOULD BE:

 Identifying common types of injuries.

 Identifying common system-related causes.
  Identifying common equipment involved in incidents.
 Evaluating near miss trends.

BY IDENTIFYING COMMON TRENDS / ISSUES, MORE GLOBAL RECOMMENDATIONS CAN

BE DEVELOPED TO IMPROVE OVERALL SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES.

1.23 Recap.
 Ensure an effective system is in place to investigate incidents and significant near misses
to determine root causes.
 Ensure incidents, root causes and learnings are clearly communicated inside and outside
of the site where the incident occurred.
 Ensure all safety alerts received are properly assessed, acted upon and shared within the
site.
 Ensure all actions identified through investigations or shared incidents are acted upon in a
timely manner.
 Review analysis of incidents and ensure appropriate actions have been taken.
 Ensure incident information is input into an appropriate incident database.
 Proactive approach to prevention.
 Importance of Statistics/data etc.
 Detailed investigationsSharing of lessons learned.

Quiz - Drag & drop.

Please drag the elements of the 'Incident Management Cycle' to their corresponding areas.

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An incident has occurred, BEFORE we tend to the casualty, we have to ensure the situation
cannot get any worst. This is to ensure any rescuers/medical help are not put in a position of
danger. By securing the site, we may be shutting down systems/processes, closing valves etc.

Securing the site might also include restricting access to people other than those prepared to
deal with an emergency. (Wearing specialist PPE).

2.0 Hazards Inherent in the oil & gas industry.

In this section we will look at various hazardous definitions from the oil and gas industry
so that you have a greater understanding of hazardous situations and hazardous condi-
tions.

In particular we will cover the following hazards:-

 Flash point.
 Vapour Density.
 Vapour Pressure.
 Flammable,
  Highly Flammable,
 Extremely Flammable.
 Toxicity.
 Skin Irritant.
 Carcinogenic Properties.
 Upper Flammable Limit.
 Lower Flammable Limit.

2.1 Flash point.

The lowest temperature at which the vapour above a volatile liquid forms a combustible mixture
with air. At the flash point the application of a naked flame gives a momentary flash rather than
sustained combustion, for which the temperature is too low.

Liquids with low flash points pose the greatest danger.

2.2 Vapour density.

The gaseous form of a substance that is a liquid or solid at normal temperatures. The vapours of
flammable and combustible liquids can ignite if fire or sparks are present. The vapour density
would indicate whether a gas is denser (greater than one) or less dense (less than one) than
air.

The density has implications during storage and personnel safety - if a container can release a
dense gas, its vapour could sink and, if flammable, collect until it is at a concentration sufficient
for ignition. Even if not flammable, it could collect in the lower floor or level of a confined space
and displace air, possibly presenting a smothering hazard to individuals entering the lower part of
that space.

2.3 Vapour pressure.

Vapour pressure is the pressure of a vapour in thermodynamic equilibrium with its condensed
phases in a closed system. All liquids and solids have a tendency to evaporate into a gaseous
form, and all gases have a tendency to condense back to their liquid or solid form.

A substance with a high vapour pressure at normal temperatures is often referred to as volatile.

2.4 Flammable.

A liquid that will ignite if it reaches its flash point and is provided with an ignition source. Flamma-
ble liquids have a flash point below 37.8°C and having a vapour pressure not exceeding 40 psi
(absolute) at 37.8°C and shall be known as a Class I liquid. which generally needs to be heated
before giving off an ignitable vapour (e.g. diesel, paraffin oils etc.).

Highly flammable :-

Liquids with a flash point below 32°C. which will readily ignite at normal temperature ranges that
give of an ignition vapour in normal circumstances (e.g. petroleum spirit).
Extremely flammable :-

Liquids and liquefiable gases, which will readily ignite under normal temperature ranges and may
explode or react violently (e.g. petroleum gases (LPG) such as propane, butane and methane
etc.).

Question 1 - Potential Fire Hazard.

Question - Potential Fire Hazard

The higher the flash point, the greater the potential fire hazard
True/False (HP)
Answer 1: False
Response 1:
Jump 1: Next page
Answer 2: True
Response 2:
Jump 2: This page

Question 2 - Low Flash Point.

Question - Low Flash Point

_____ are liquids with a flash point below 32°C. which will readily ignite at normal temperature
ranges that give of an ignition vapour in normal circumstances(e.g. petroleum spirit).
Multiple Choice
Answer 1: Extremely flammable
Response 1:
Jump 1: This page
Answer 2: Highly flammable
Response 2:
Jump 2: Next page

2.5 Upper flammable limit.

Flammability limits, give the proportion of combustible gases in a mixture with air, between
which limits this mixture is flammable. Gas mixtures consisting of combustible, oxidizing, and inert
gases are only flammable under certain conditions.

Upper flammability limit

While the upper flammable limit (UFL) gives the richest flammable mixture. Too much vapour and
not enough air for ignition to take place.

Lower flammable limit

The lower flammable limit (LFL) describes the leanest mixture that still sustains a flame, i.e. the
mixture with the smallest fraction of combustible gas, too much air and not enough vapour for ig-
nition to take place.
2.6 Toxicity.

Toxicity is the degree to which a substance is able to damage an exposed organism. Toxicity can
refer to the effect on a whole organism, such as an animal, bacterium, or plant, as well as the ef-
fect on a substructure of the organism, such as a cell or an organ, the liver for example.

There are generally three types of toxic entities; chemical, biological and physical.

Toxicity can be measured by its effects on the target (organism, organ, tissue or cell). Because
individuals typically have different levels of response to the same dose of a toxin, effects to the
humane body can very in time/outcome.

2.7 Skin irritant.

Irritation, is a state of inflammation or painful reaction to allergy or cell-lining damage. A stimulus

or agent which induces the state of irritation is an irritant. Irritants are typically thought of as
chemical agents but mechanical, thermal (heat), and radiative stimuli (for example ultraviolet light
or ionising radiations) can also be irritants.

Chronic irritation is a medical term signifying that afflictive health conditions have been present for
a while. (acute large dose over short time-scale) There are many disorders that can cause
chronic irritation; the majority involves the skin, eyes and lungs.

In higher organisms, an allergic response may be the cause of irritation.

2.8 Carcinogenic properties.

A carcinogen is any substance, radionuclide or radiation, which is an agent directly involved in

causing cancer. Several radioactive substances are considered carcinogens, but their carcino-
genic activity is attributed to the radiation, for example gamma rays and alpha particles, which
they emit. Common examples of carcinogens are inhaled asbestos, certain dioxins, and tobacco
smoke.

Cancer is a disease in which damaged cells do not undergo programmed cell death. Carcinogens
may increase the risk of cancer by altering cellular metabolism or damaging DNA directly in cells,
which interferes with biological processes, and induces the uncontrolled, malignant division, ulti-
mately leading to the formation of tumours.

2.9 Properties and hazards of gases.

Hydrogen
Hydrogen is a colourless, odourless, tasteless, flammable non-toxic gas. It is the lightest of all
gases.
Several unique properties contribute to the hazards.

Associated with gaseous and liquid hydrogen systems :-

 Hydrogen is flammable over a wide range of concentrations.

 The ignition energy for hydrogen is very low.
 A single volume of liquid hydrogen expands to about 850 volumes of gas at standard tem-
perature and pressure when vaporised.
 Hydrogen is able to reduce the performance of some containment and piping materials,
such as carbon steel.

2.10 Methane.

Methane is a naturally occurring, combustible gas that is colourless and odourless. Methane is
the primary component of natural gas; 97 percent (by volume) of natural gas is methane. Meth-
ane is extremely flammable in the presence of oxygen; inhaling methane can be life threatening
because it causes asphyxiation by displacing the surrounding oxygen.

Methane can also be stored in liquid form, which is only flammable under high atmospheric pres-
sure. Methane comes from a number of different sources; underground deposits of natural gas
are the primary source of methane. Methane is also trapped in pockets near coal deposits.
2.11 Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG).

Liquefied petroleum gas:-

 Is a flammable (non flammable in liquid state) mixture of hydrocarbon gases.

 A powerful odorant, is added so that leaks can be detected easily.
 LPG is approximately twice as heavy as air when in gas form and will tend to sink to the
lowest possible level and may accumulate in cellars, pits, drains etc.
 LPG in liquid form can cause severe cold burns to the skin owing to its rapid vaporisation.
 Vaporisation can cool equipment so that it may be cold enough to cause cold burns.
2.12 LPG.

LPG forms a flammable mixture with air in concentrations of between 2% and 10%. It can,
therefore, be a fire and explosion hazard if stored or used incorrectly.

Vapour/air mixtures arising from leakages may be ignited some distance from the point of escape
and the flame can travel back to the source of the leak.

At very high concentrations when mixed with air, vapour is an anaesthetic and subsequently an
asphyxiant by diluting the available oxygen.

A vessel that has contained LPG is nominally empty but may still contain LPG vapour and be po-
tentially dangerous. Therefore treat all LPG vessels as if they were full.
2.13 Nitrogen.

Nitrogen is a nontoxic, ordourless, colourless, tasteless non-flammable gas. 78% (by volume) of
the air we breathe is nitrogen. Oxygen constitutes approximately 21%. When Nitrogen concentra-
tions increase (e.g. when purging equipment) and the oxygen levels drop below 19.5%, rapid suf-
focation can occur.

While some chemicals or substances may effect some of us to a greater degree than it will others
based on our tolerance to the substance, Nitrogen will not. Nitrogen will effect every individual the
same way. Nitrogen is non-flammable and weighs approximately the same as air. Nitrogen is an
extremely cold liquid (-200oC). Contact with this liquid or the cold vapours can causes severe
frostbite.

Question 3 - Purging.

Question - Purging
When Nitrogen concentrations increase (e.g. when purging equipment) and the oxygen levels
drop below _____, rapid suffocation can occur.
Multiple Choice
Answer 1: 21%
Response 1:
Jump 1: This page
Answer 2: 78%
Response 2:
Jump 2: This page
Answer 3: 19.5%
Response 3:
Jump 3: Next page
Answer 4: 200%
Response 4:
Jump 4: This page

2.14 Hydrogen Sulphide.

Hydrogen sulphide is considered a broad-spectrum poison, meaning that it can poison several
different systems in the body, although the nervous system and respiratory systems are most af-
fected. Besides being highly toxic H2S is a flammable gas.

It is heavier than air and hence tends to accumulate in low-lying areas. It is pungent but rapidly
destroys the sense of smell.
2.15 Oxygen.

The air we breathe contains about 21% oxygen. (O2) Without oxygen we would die in a matter of
minutes. Oxygen can also be dangerous. The dangers are fire and explosion. Oxygen behaves
differently to air, compressed air, nitrogen and other inert gases. It is very reactive. Pure oxygen,
at high pressure, such as rom a cylinder, can react violently with common materials such as oil
and grease. Other materials may catch fire spontaneously. Nearly all materials including textiles,
rubber and even metals will burn vigorously in oxygen.

A small increase in the oxygen level in the air to 23% (oxygen enrichment) can create a danger-
ous situation. It becomes easier to start a fire, which will then burn hotter and more fiercely than
in normal air. It may be almost impossible to put the fire out. A leaking valve or hose in a poorly
ventilated room or confined space can quickly increase the oxygen concentration to a dangerous
level.

2.16 Additives.

Anti-foaming:-

An additive which reduces the surface tension of a solution or emulsion, thus inhibiting or modify-
ing the formation of a foam. Commonly used agents are insoluble oils. The additive is used to
prevent formation of foam or is added to break a foam already formed.

Anti-wetting agents:-

Typically used to form a barrier between a liquid and an electrode. AWA's reduce the surface
tension of water by adsorbing at the liquid-gas interface. They also reduce the interfacial tension
between oil and water by adsorbing at the liquid-liquid interfac.

2.17 Micro-biocides.

A biocide is a chemical substance or micro-organism. Despite the name a biocide does not actu-
ally have to kill. It may instead deter, render harmless, prevent the action of or otherwise exert a
controlling effect on any harmful organism by chemical or biological means.
Biocides are commonly used in medicine, agriculture, forestry, and in industry.
Biocidal substances and products are also employed as anti-fouling agents or disinfectants: chlo-
rine, for example, is used as a short-life biocide in industrial water treatment.

When sludge collects in tank bottoms where there is also water, microbes also are likely present.
Personnel could suffer an allergic reaction or infection from exposure to such microbes.

2.18 Corrosion preventatives.

In liquid form is a flammable liquid, with a hydrocarbon lube oil odour. Health Hazards: Harmful by
inhalation and if swallowed. Irritating to eyes and skin. May cause cancer. Flammability Hazards:
This liquid is a combustible liquid with a flash point of 770C (1700F).

If accidentally released, precautions must be taken to protect the environment. Emergency Con-
siderations: In the event of fire or spill, adequate precautions must be taken for surrounding mate-
rials. Emergency responders must wear personal protective equipment suitable for the situation
to which they are responding.

2.19 Refrigerants.

Colourless, volatile liquid with faint sweetish odour. Non-flammable material. Overexposure may
cause dizziness and loss of concentration. At higher levels, Central Nervous System depression
and cardiac arrest may result from exposure. Vapours displace air and can cause asphyxiation in
confined spaces.
2.20 Water/steam.

Heated water produces steam. When released (intentionally or accidentally) it is generally under
very high pressure and extremely high temperature.

Steam most often refers to the visible white mist that condenses above boiling water as the hot
vapour mixes with the cooler air. This mist consists of tiny droplets of liquid water. Pure steam
emerges at the base of the spout of a steaming kettle where there is no visible vapour. Pure
steam is a transparent gas. At standard temperature and pressure, pure steam (unmixed with air,
but in equilibrium with liquid water) occupies about 1,600 times the volume of an equal mass of
liquid water. In the atmosphere, the partial pressure of water is much lower than 1 atom, therefore
gaseous water can exist at temperatures much lower than 1000C.

Water is used extensively in oil and gas processing, however water can also be hazard-
ous:-

 Stored under pressure, as in fire lines and steam water lines.

 May contain bacteria if the water is not circulated (dead end pipe legs) or if the water tem-
perature is outside of 200C-450C range.
 May cause an unstable reaction if mixed with some hydrocarbons.
2.21 Sludge's with low specific activities (LSA) material.

Sludge is composed of dissolved solids which precipitate from produced water as its temperature
and pressure change. Sludge generally consists of oily, loose material often containing silica
compounds, but may also contain large amounts of barium. Dried sludge, with a low oil content,
looks and feels similar to soil. Most sludge settles out of the production stream and remains in the
oil stock and water storage tanks. Sludge contains radium. Although the concentration of radia-
tion is lower in sludges than in scales, sludges are more soluble and therefore more readily re-
leased to the environment. As a result they pose a higher risk of exposure.

The concentration of lead is usually relatively low in sludge.

2.22 LSA - Low-specific-activity scale.

Low-specific-activity scale (LSA) in the oil and gas industry originates from natural sources. How-
ever, the radioactivity is concentrated through industrial processes. An oil industry worker who
works with LSA scale according to good procedures get an additional dose of about 0.05 mSv/yr.
This is not much compared to the dose we all receive through natural background radiation.

It is important that all personnel working with LSA scale are protecting themselves and other peo-
ple in their surroundings from contact with the radioactive materials. It is especially important to
avoid breathing-in or in other ways consume the material into the body.

LSA - Low-specific-activity scale

The common rock types in oil- and gas reservoirs contain radioactivity from potassium-40 and
different species from the uranium and thorium-chains, in particular radium-226, radium-228 and
lead-210.

Uranium and thorium in geological formations are not easily dissolvable in water. Radium is more
soluble and is more easily transported upwards through the production well. Lead-210 is also to
some extent dissolved in the water. Lead-210 is, however, more associated with oil components
and do to a lesser extent precipitate in the production equipment.

2.23 LSA - Low-specific-activity scale.

The activity of LSA scale depends on how much radium there is in the scale. The content of ra-
dium varies with the type of rock and its content of uranium and thorium. LSA scale is not easily
soluble. Removal for LSA scale from production equipment therefore requires use of speciality
chemicals or for instance high pressure water flushing. The part of LSA scale containing the ra-
dioactivity is the mineral part. LSA scale can therefore not be destructed by combustion but have
to be stored in a safe manner till the radioactivity has decreased to an insignificant level; i.e.
thousands of years.

2.24 Mercaptans.

Mercaptans are a group of sulphur-containing organic chemical substances. They smell like rot-
ting cabbage, If mercaptans are in the air, even at low concentrations, they are very noticeable.
Pulp mills are the chief source of mercaptans, they are found in production process of petroleum
products.

They are also used as an odorizing agent in natural gas. (LNG) The human body produces them
naturally during digestion of beer, garlic and some other foods.

2.25 Drilling mud.

Drilling fluid is an important component in the drilling process. A fluid is required in the wellbore to
cool and lubricate the drill bit. To remove the rock fragments, or drill cuttings, from the drilling
area and transport them to the surface.

Counterbalance formation pressure to prevent formation fluids (such as oil, gas, and water) from
entering the well prematurely (which can lead to a blowout), and prevent the open (uncased)
wellbore from caving in. There are several types of drilling fluids used depending on the drilling
conditions encountered: Water-based muds are used most frequently.
2.26 Thermal radiation.

Is the emission of electromagnetic waves from all matter that has a temperature greater than ab-
solute zero, It represents a conversion of thermal energy into electromagnetic energy. Thermal
energy is the collective mean kinetic energy of the random movements of atoms and molecules in
matter.

Atoms and molecules are composed of charged particles, i.e. protons and electrons and their os-
cillations result in the electrodynamic generation of coupled electric and magnetic fields, resulting
in the emission of photons, radiating energy and carrying entropy away from the body through its
surface boundary.

3.0 Risk Management techniques used in the Oil & Gas industries.

Legal context
In the context of the Offshore Installations (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SCR05)1.
SCR05 r.12 requires, among other matters, a demonstration by duty holders that:

 All hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified;
 All major accident risks have been evaluated; and,
 Measures have been, or will be, taken to control the major accident risks to ensure com-
pliance with the relevant statutory provisions (i.e. a "compliance" demonstration2).

A safety case 'compliance demonstration' has to show how a duty holder meets, or will meet, the
requirements of the relevant statutory provisions [i.e. Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974
(HSWA), Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response)
Regulations 1995 (PFEER), Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc)
Regulations 1996 (DCR) and other provisions relevant to the control of major accident risks].
Many of the requirements within the relevant statutory provisions are qualified by phrases such as
so far as it is reasonably practicable (SFAIRP), as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) or even,
"appropriate with a view to". Where legal duties use these qualifying phrases, they call for similar
tests to be applied. Wherever such wording is used this means a duty holder has to show,
through reasoned and supported arguments, that there is nothing else that could reasonably be
done to reduce risks further.

3.1 Approaches to Risk Assessment.

The risk assessment methodology applied should be efficient (cost-effective) and of sufficient de-
tail to enable the ranking of risks in order, for subsequent consideration of risk reduction. The rig-
our of assessment should be proportionate to the complexity of the problem and the magnitude of
risk.

It is expected that assessment would progress through the following stages to provide an
appropriate demonstration:

 Qualitative (Q), in which frequency and severity are determined purely qualitatively.
  Semi-quantitative (SQ), in which frequency and severity are approximately quantified
within ranges.
 Quantified risk assessment (QRA), in which full quantification occurs.

These approaches to risk assessment reflect a range of detail of assessment from Q (lowest) to
full QRA (highest).

The choice of approach should take into account the following dimensions:

 The level of estimated risk (and its proximity to the limits of tolerability).
 The complexity of the problem and/or difficulty in answering the question of whether more
needs to be done to reduce the risk.

Proportionate risk assessment

In the risk dimension, the level of risk assessment used should be proportionate to the
magnitude of risk. However, this may be modified according to the complexity of the decision
that risk assessment is being used to inform. For example, it may occasionally be possible to use
qualitative risk assessment in extremely high risk situations, where it is obvious that the risk is
so high that risk reduction is essential. Great care must also be taken when attempting to justify
something that is a significant deviation from existing codes, standards or good practice.

One approach to deciding the appropriate level of detail would be to start with a qualitative
approach and to elect for more detail whenever it becomes apparent that the current level is
unable to offer:

 The required understanding of the risks;

 Discrimination between the risks of different events; or
 Assistance in deciding whether more needs to be done (making compliance judgements).

Table 1: Factors in deciding Initial Risk assessment Approach

Issue Factors tending towards more de- Factors tending towards less detailed
tailed risk assessment approach approaches

1. Design 1. Combined operations

2. Initial operation 2. Abandonment/ decommis-
Stage in life-cycle 3. Significant modifications sioning
3. Minor modifications

1. High inventory/ throughput 1. Low inventory/ throughput

2. High pressure/ temperature 2. Low pressure/ temperature
Process condi-
3. Well fluids containing gas/ 3. Well fluid is oil/ water with no
tions
condensate gas or condensate

1. Novel concepts and designs 1. Standardised designs and

Degree of stan-
2. High complexity controls available
dardisation
 1. Integrated platforms 1. Drilling
2. Processing of well fluids 2. Export of well fluids only
Complexity 3. Storage
4. Accommodation

1. High POB 1. Low POB

Persons on Board 2. Permanent presence 2. Occasional manning
(POB)

Before looking at risk mitigation during the process element of the hydrocarbon cycle, it is
important to identify the hazards to a specific location.

1. HAZOP's (Hazardous Operability & Study),

2. HAZAN's (Hazard Analysis)
3. HAZID's (Hazard Identification) are used for this purpose.

HAZAN - Quantitative data based on past experience are the most important means of identifying
hazards and assessing potential frequency. Audits conducted by experienced assessors, who
consider past experience, near misses and procedures for dealing with emergencies and
abnormal events, will identify hazards effectively and produce a useful future record.

Checklist can also be useful but can result in limiting enquiries unless open questions are used
such as "how is the system protected against" rather than "is the system protected against".

HAZOP - Is a structured technique, which may be applied typically to a hydrocarbon production

process, identifying hazards resulting potential malfunctions in the process. It is essentially a
qualitative process. A HAZOP study would typically be undertaken by a multi-disciplinary team
involving engineers, production mangers, designers and safety specialists etc. asking a series of
"what if" questions, using "guide words".

By undertaking a HAZOP study at an early design stage, potential problems can be avoided
instead of having to make costly modifications after the process plant is built/operational:-

 HAZOP Characteristics. Systematic Analysis Methodology driven by Guide words

 Qualitative Analysis
  Analysis is done by Team with expertise
 Analysis is done Node by Node
 Output (Worksheet)
 Deviation, Potential Cause, Potential Effect, Safeguard, Recommendation

Benefits of HAZOP.
Proactive Hazard Identification enables the Owner to make rational and cost-effective decision in
terms of Health, Safety, and Environmental (HSE) concerns.

Use of HAZOP is used as a tool to identify potential hazard and operability problem.

1. HAZOP is one of the Process Hazard Analysis Methodology.

2. HAZOP is frequently used within the framework of Process Safety Management System.
3. HAZOP may be used to provide management with knowledge of where potential hazards
may exist, and to provide information on;

o Mitigation recommendations for plant design modifications prior to construction.

o Mitigation recommendations for providing specific details for administrative con-
trols.
o Hazard Information Communication.

HAZOP may also be used to:-

 Provide recommendation on studies where information is lacking.

 Provide the priority for implementing mitigation recommendations.

HAZOP Goals to identify all probable hazards or operation problems, and/or:-

 To judge whether an identified problem to be mitigated either by engineering or by admin-

istrative control.
Question 4 - Risk Indentification.

Question - Risk Indentification

Please select the correct missing words, in order for the below sentence.

The definition of Risk _________ is the identification, analysis and _______ of control exercised
of risks which have the _________ to threaten the _______ or well-being of an enterprise.
Jumbled Sentence (HP)
Answer 1: Management:
degree
potential
assets
Response 1:
Jump 1: Next page

3.2 HAZOP Process.

Process parameter is an aspect of a process that describe it physically, chemically or in terms of
what is happening:-

 FLOW;
 PRESSURE;
 TEMPERATURE;
 LEVEL;
 COMPOSITION, etc.

Use of Guide Words

Guide word Definition

No/None Negation of design intent
More Quantitative increase
Less Quantitative decrease
Reverse Logical opposite of intent
As well as Qualitative increase
Part of Qualitative decrease
Other than Complete substitution

Deviation

 The combination of parameters and guide words will describe the departure from design
or operating intention.

For Example;

o No + Flow = No Flow
o More + Pressure = High(er) Pressure

3.3 Key questions to understand Risk.

Typical Team Composition (Expertise):-

 HAZOP Leader (Facilitator, or Chairperson).

 Technical Scribe.
 Process.
 Operation/Production.
 Safety.
 Instrumentation (on-call basis).
 Mechanical (on-call basis).

Question 5 - Hazard Definition.

Question - Hazard Definiation

The definition of a Hazard is?
Multiple Choice (HP)
Answer 1: The likelihood of the hazard occurring
Response 1:
Jump 1: This page
Answer 2: The steps taken to reduce the risk of a hazard occurring to an acceptable
level
Response 2:
Jump 2: This page
Answer 3: Something having the potential to cause harm
Response 3:
Jump 3: Next page
Answer 4: Something Risky
Response 4:
Jump 4: This page

3.4 Study Process.

1. When deviation is found meaningful for a process parameter at a node, Team identified
credible cause(s) that generate corresponding deviation.
2. Corresponding to the credible cause(s), Team identified the possible consequence's) that
the deviation results in, assuming all the protection don't exist.
3. Then, Team identified if a mitigation and/or prevention measure has already been applied
in the present engineering, (mitigation or prevention).
4. Team evaluated a Risk Rank based on the Risk Ranking Criteria to conclude whether the
risk is lowered by present design to acceptable level or not.
5. When the Team concluded that the Risk was higher than 4 (1 or 2 or 3) , additional safe-
guards was recommended to reduce the Risk to acceptable level if any.
6. Team made a Risk Rank again based on the Risk Ranking Criteria in consideration of
recommendation.

3.5 Risk is expressed by the product of Severity and Likelihood.

Risk Ranking

Issue Description Required Mitigation

Critical Mitigate the hazard by implementing

engineering controls and, if necessary,
1
admiistrative controls to reduce the risk
ranking to an acceptable level.

Undesirable Mitigate the hazard with administrative

2 and/or engineering controls to reduce the
risk rank to an acceptable level.

Acceptable Verify hazard has administrative controls in

3
with Controls place.

Acceptable Indentified hazard is acceptable and does

4
not require further mitigation.

Likelihood

A Could occur more often than once per month.

B Could occur made often than once per year.

C Could occur several time in plant life.

 D Could occur once in plant life.

E Not ex[ected in plant life.

Severity

 Multiple factalities.
 Process unit damage
1  Major/Extended duration/Full scale re-
sponse/Long term effect

 Multiple factalities.
 Process unit damage
2  Major/Extended duration/Full scale re-
sponse/Long term effect

 Potential onsite death.

 Multiple Major equipment damage.
3  Serious/Significant resourcer commit-
ment/Long term effect.

 Potential onsite minor injury or minor health

effects.
4  Single minor equipment damage.
 Moderate/Limited resoinse if short duration.

 No injury or health effect.

 No equipment damage.
5
 Minor/Limited or no response need.

Question 6 - Risk.

Question - Risk

Please select the missing word(s) into the correct order

(Please ensure you put your answers in the same line otherwise your score may not be
counted)
Jumbled Sentence (HP)
Answer 1: Risk expresses
the likelihood
that the harm
from a
particular
hazard
is
 realised
Response 1:
Jump 1: Next page

3.6 HAZOP Worksheet Example.

3.7 Risk Management Process.

IDENTIFYING A HAZARD - where it start:-

 ASSESSING THE RISK - evaluating the potential incident's that could be caused by the
hazard
 Assessing consequences - determine the potential consequences of an incident
 Assessing probabilities - determine the probability of the incident taking place
 MANAGING THE RISK - what actions will be taken to eliminate or mitigate that risk
 Higher or medium risks reduced to as low as reasonably practical (ALARP)
 Lower risks reduced further where benefits exceed the cost
3.8 Risk Assessment Process.
3.9 Hazard Identification.
3.10 Consequence Analysis.

3.11 Causal and Probability Analysis.

3.12 Risk Determination.
3.13 Risk Assessment.

3.14 Risk Reducing Alternatives.

3.15 Rank Alternatives.

3.16 Risk Assessment and Management Tools.

Identification of hazards may often spark ideas about potential risk reduction and these should be
captured. Similarly, the risk estimation can help identify possible additional risk measures
because it entails a thought process about the way in which the hazard scenarios would unfold,
and about the interaction with the physical layout etc. of the installation. It can be particularly
helpful to consider which stage(s) of the scenario dominates its risk, e.g. whether fatalities would
be immediate, due to escalation or during escape, evacuation and rescue (EER).

The ranking of risks prioritises them for systematic consideration. A risk reduction measures study
is best carried out by a multi-disciplinary brainstorming team with adequate experience,
knowledge and qualifications. It will take each risk in turn and identify potential risk reduction
measures, including any identified during the risk assessment but also seeking to extend this by
further brainstorming. Ideally, this should be done by personnel from the duty holder who have
extensive knowledge of the installation and its operation.

Description of measures to manage major accident hazards

Has a hierarchical approach to managing major accident hazards been taken, including:-

 Elimination and minimisation of hazards by design (inherently safer design);

 Prevention (reduction of likelihood);
 Detection (transmission of information to control point);
 Control (limitation of scale, intensity and duration) and;
 Mitigation of consequences (protection from effects) (APOSC Para 92).

Has the highest priority been given to inherently safer design and measures to prevent and
control major accident hazards? (APOSC Para 93).

 In the design process:-

o Is due consideration given to inherent safety?
 Are fire and explosion risks addressed?
o Are such risks reduced ALARP through sound engineering design (primarily) and
management controls? (APOSC Para 94).

 For existing installations, does the Safety Case address the scope for improving inherent
safety and the measures to prevent and control major hazards? (APOSC Para 95)

3.17 Process Safety Standards during the design phase.

Inherent Safety

Criteria for Inherent safety.

 Has the hazard management strategy been developed at a suitably early stage in the de-
sign process, in order to maximise the opportunity to incorporate inherent safety?
(APOSC Para 97).
 Have fire and explosion hazards been designed-out, where practicable? (PFEER ACoP
Para 93)

The best way of dealing with a hazard is to remove it completely. The provision of means to
control the hazard is very much the second solution. As Lees (1996) has said the aim should be
to design the process and plant so that they are inherently safer.

"Inherent" is defined by the American College Dictionary as "existing in something as a

permanent and inseparable element, quality or attribute". Thus an inherently safer chemical
process is safer because of its essential characteristics, those which belong to to the process by
its very nature. An inherently safer design is one that avoids hazards instead of controlling them,
particularly by removing or reducing the amount of hazardous material in the plant or the number
of hazardous operations.

Inherent safety has first widely expressed in the late 1970's by Trevor Kletz. The basic principles
are common sense and include avoiding the use of hazardous materials, minimising the
inventories of hazardous materials and aiming for simpler processes with more bening and
moderate process alternatives (Kletz, 1984).

While the basic principle of inherently safer design is generally accepted, it is not always easy to
put it into practice. Inherently safer design has been advocated since the explosion at
Flixborough in 1974. Progress has been real but nevertheless the concept has not been adopted
nearly as rapidly as quantitative risk assessment, introduced into the chemical industry only a few
years earlier (Kletz, 1996).

It has been commented that methods developed to date have largely been for evaluating the
safety of some proposed design. In the future safety experts expect to see a greater emphasis on
the use of knowledge to synthesize a safe plant design in the first place. In their opinion the value
of inherent safety has been recognised, but there is still room for better awareness and practice.
The concern expressed by inherent safety experts is that best practice is not being adopted
quicly enough by the potential practitioners (Preston, 1998).

Mansfield (1994) has pointed out that in industry there is an increasing need to address and
sometimes balance the overall lifecycle health, safety and environmental aspects of performance.
This shows that in the real life we should talk about Inherent SHE (Safety, Environment and
Health) instead of plain inherent safety. Especially in the management of safety, health and
environmental protection integration of legislation (e.g. SEVESO II, OSHA Process Safety
Management) and systems such as EMAS, ISO 14000 and Responsible Care are needed
(Turney, 1998). Otherwise it is possible to create conflict situations. For example environmentally
and economically important energy savings may lead to inherently unsafer process solutions.
3.18 The Principles of Inherent Safety.

The inherent safety is the pursuit of designing hazards out of a process, as opposed to using en-
gineering or procedural controls to mitigate risk. Therefore inherent safety strives to avoid and
remove hazards rather than to control them by added-on systems. The inherent safety is best
considered in the initial stages of design, when the choice of process route and concept is made.

Kletz (1984, 1991) has given Basic Principles of Inherent Safety as follows:

 Intensification.

"What you don't have, can't leak." Small inventories of hazardous materials reduce the
consequencies of leaks. Inventories can often be reduced in almost all unit operations as
well as storage. This also brings reductions in cost, while less material needs smaller ves-
sels, structures and foundations.

 Substitution.
If intensification is not possible, an alternative is substitution. It may be possible to replace
flammable refrigerants and heat transfer with non-flammable ones, hazardous products
with safer ones, and processes that use hazardous raw materials or intermediates with
processes that do not. Using a safer material in place of a hazardous one decreases the
need for added-on protective equipment and thus decreases plant cost and complexity.

 Attenuation.
If intensification and substitution are not possible or practicable, an alternative is attenua-
tion. This means carrying out a hazardous reaction under less hazardous conditions, or
storing or transporting a hazardous material in a less hazardous form. Attenuation is
sometimes the reverse of intensification, because less extreme reaction conditions may
lead to a longer residence time.
  Limitation of Effects.
If it is not possible to make plants safer by intensification, substitution or attenuation, the
effects of a failure should be limited. For instance equipment is designed so that it can
leak only at a low rate that is easy to stop or control. For example gaskets should be cho-
sen to minimize leak rates. Also limitation of effects should be done by equipment design
or change in reaction conditions rather than by adding on protective equipment.

 Simplification.
Simpler plants are inherently safer than complex plants, because they provide fewer op-
portunities for error and contain less equipment that can go wrong. Simpler plants are
usually also cheaper and more user friendly.

 Change Early.
Change Early means identification of hazards as early as possible in the process design.
The payback for early hazard identification can make or break the capital budget of a new
process. This can be achieved by dedicated safety evaluation methodologies which are
designed for preliminary process design purposes.

 Avoiding Knock-On Effects.

Safer plants are designed so that those incidents, which do occur, do not produce knock-
on or domino effects. For example safer plants are provided with fire breaks between sec-
tions to restrict the spread of fire, or if flammable materials are handled, the plant is built
out-of-door so that leaks can be dispersed by natural ventilation.

 Making Status Clear.

Equipment should be chosen so, that it can be easily seen, wheather it has been installed
correctly or wheather it is in the open or shut position. This refers to ergonomics of the
plant. Also clear explanation of the chemistry involved in the process helps operating per-
sonnel to identify possible hazards.

 Making Incorrect Assembly Impossible.

Safe plants are designed so that incorrect assembly is difficult or impossible. Assembled
components must meet their design requirements. A loss of containment may result from
using eg. a wrong type of gaskets.

 Tolerance.
Equipment should tolerate maloperation, poor installation or maintenance without failure.
E.g. expansion loops in pipework are more tolerant to poor installation than bellows. The
construction materials should be resistant to corrosion and physical conditions. For most
applications metal is safer than glass or plastic.

 Ease of Control.
A process should be controlled by the use of physical principles rather than added-on con-
trol equipment (i.e. the dynamics of the process should be favourable). If a process is dif-
ficult to control, one should look for ways of changing the process or the principles of con-
trol before an investment in complex control system is made.

 Administrative Controls/Procedures.
Human error is the most frequent cause of the loss of containment. Training and certifica-
tion of personnel on critical procedures are permanent considerations. Also some other
inherent safety principles, like ease of control, making status clear, tolerance and making
incorrect assemply impossible, come into play here.

An inherent safety design should contain the mentioned principles. They should also cover the
whole design process. In the early stages of process design these principles help to choose the
safest materials, process conditions and even process technology. The difficulty at the moment is
the lack of rutines to implement these inherent safety principles into reality.

3.18.2 Inherent Safety in Preliminary Process Design.

The possibility for affecting the inherent safety of a process decreases as the design proceeds
and more and more engineering and financial decisions have been made. It is much easier to af-
fect the process configuration and inherent safety in the conceptual design phase than in the later
phases of process design. For instance the process route selection is made in the conceptual de-
sign and it is many times difficult and expensive to change the route later. Time and money is
also saved when fewer expensive safety modifications are needed andewer added-on safety
equipment are included to the final process solution.

In the early design phases the available information is limited to products, byproducts and raw
materials, capacity, main process equipment and a rough range
of process conditions e.g. temperature and pressure. From the steps of Suokas and Kakko
(1993), only hazard identification can be partly done in preliminary process design. However in
the early phases of a plant design the changes for safety will be most profitable, since nothing
has been built or ordered yet and thus no expensive modifications are needed.

Using "modelling" and computer "generated predictability" for:-

 Blast zones.
 Vapour cloud travel and dispersant.
 Plant zoning.
 Active/Passive fire fighting/ protection.
 Safe Havens.
 Sighting of safety critical controls.
 Avoiding Conflict of activities (storage/flaring/drain off etc.).
3.19 Designers Obligation.
 Design in safety features. (containment, blast zones, fire protection).
 Design out Hazards/ High Risk situations. (risk based design concept).
 Plant Design- Safety Considerations.
 Design- Human Engineering.
 Design- Maintenance.
 Modifications, demolition, upgrade, expansion.

3.20 Plant Design - Safety Considerations.

Process safety should be considered during all phases of plant design. During the design proc-
ess, the operations and maintenance departments contribute to process safety by informing the
designers of the potential hazards that may be encountered during manufacturing.

The design and engineering groups need to understand how the plant will be operated and main-
tained. When the knowledge and experience of the manufacturing personnel are integrated into
the design, the resulting plant will not only be safer, but also easier and more efficient to operate
and maintain.
3.21 Plant Design- Safety Considerations.
Plant design can be divided into three phases:-

 Phase I : Conceptual Engineering - involves the technical and economic evaluation of a

project's feasibility, including the process chemistry, process hazards, flow schematics, the
fundamental design basis for the equipment, instruments and controls, and safety sys-
tems.

 Phase II : Basic Engineering - involves process simulation calculations (mass and energy
balances) and process flow design, concluding with preliminary piping and instrumentation
diagrams (P&IDs), and equipment data sheets issued for design.
  Phase III : Detail Design - involves vessel thickness calculations, heat exchanger rating,
final P&IDs, line sizing and piping design, and isometric drawings, concluding with specifi-
cations and drawings issued for construction. Not all projects will require all three design
phases. For example, a new process will begin with Design Phase I and continue through
Phase III. The design for a processing project would typically start with Phase II and con-
tinue through Phase III. A small project such as the relocation of equipment may require
only Phase III design. In all cases, the operations and maintenance departments should
convey their process safety concerns to the project team as early in the project as possi-
ble.

3.22 Design - Human Engineering.

The human factors that affect plant design concern the skills and training of the personnel, the
operating and maintenance procedures, the design of the equipment, and the environment. The
operations and maintenance departments are responsible for ensuring that new facilities are de-
signed so they can be safely and efficiently operated and maintained by plant personnel. To op-
erate and maintain a plant safely, human factors should be considered in every phase of the de-
sign. Ergonomics is a word that has become popular in recent years. A system or item of equip-
ment (or plant design) that is ergonomically sound is one that allows humans to perform their
tasks safely and efficiently.

3.23 Design - Human Engineering.

The interface of human beings and equipment should be considered and the concept of ergo-
nomics applied at every point in the design. Often compromises must be made. For example, a
change in design to improve the operation could make maintenance more difficult or hazardous.

Human reliability is another factor that affects safety and should be considered during the design
process. Humans can make errors when performing tasks and making judgements, particularly
when performing complex operations under stressful conditions.

3.24 Design - Human Engineering.

Emergency shutdowns caused by equipment failure can be very stressful, and if the procedures,
equipment, and control layout are confusing, errors can easily be made. An example of this is
when an accident occurred when a cracking furnace in a plant ruptured a tube and caught on fire.
The board operator shut down the wrong cracking furnace because of the confusing layout of
emergency shutdown switches. During the design phase, the experience of operations and main-
tenance personnel can help reduce or eliminate opportunities for this type of error.
Human reliability analysis is a systematic evaluation of the factors that influence the behaviour
and performance of plant personnel. The analysis looks at the physical and environmental factors
involved in a job and the skills, training level, knowledge, etc. of the personnel. This analysis is
used to locate areas or situations in which the person in charge could make an improper decision
that leads to an incident. The information needed for a human reliability analysis includes normal
and emergency operating procedures, a knowledge of employee training levels, the layout of con-
trol and alarm panels, and job descriptions for the personnel.

For example;

Consider an analysis of operator response to an alarm in the control room. The human reliability
analysis technique might look into factors such as excessive noise in the control room, the loca-
tion of the shutdown switch, visual indicators for easy identification of the beginning of a shut-
down, and the training and background of the operators. The result of the analysis is a list of hu-
man errors that could lead to a hazardous situation and recommended corrective actions for each
error.

Many catastrophes or near misses have occurred because of operating and maintenance per-
sonnel error. These errors could have been avoided if potential problems had been investigated
during the design phase and possible ways for preventing or overcoming them had been built into
the design. The checklist of potential human reliability problem areas given in the following table
should be considered by operations and maintenance personnel when they participate in design
reviews. Several types of incidents caused by human error can be avoided by eliminating design
weaknesses.

3.25 Design- Human Engineering.

Take for example a mechanic walking from his work bench and falling into an open vehicle in-
spection pit, or a technician interchanging the inlet and outlet valves of a compressor. Both inci-
dents can be avoided by paying proper attention during the design process. For example, the
open pit problem can be avoided by proper layout and by placing barriers that make it impossible
to stumble into the pit. The compressor problem could be solved easily by making inlet and outlet
valves of different size or appearance.
3.26 Design - Human Engineering.

Human Engineering Checklist;

 Human-machine interface.
 Work environment.
 Complex systems.
 Fault-tolerant system.
 Adequate labelling.
 Proper arrangement/placement.
 Adequate displays.
 Adequate controls.
 Ease of monitoring.
 Unit differences.
 Colour selection.
 Housekeeping.
 Hot/cold environment.
 Lighting.
 Noise.
 Cramped quarters.
 Operating procedures and training.
 Monitoring multiple items.
 Errors not detectable.
 Errors not recoverable.

3.27 Design - Maintenance Considerations.

The maintenance requirements of a process plant are set by initial installation choices made dur-
ing the design phase. The designers of process plants can eliminate or reduce many potential
maintenance hazards by engineering them out of their designs. Besides cutting maintenance
costs, proper design can make it safer and easier to maintain process plants. The operating and
maintenance departments can ensure that new facilities are designed to allow safe, effective, and
efficient maintenance by informing the project team of maintenance requirements and by working
with them to ensure that their ideas are addressed. Designers can then enhance safety by provid-
ing ample access when laying out an operating area, by requiring that manufacturers include
maintenance aids in their equipment designs, by providing the working space needed for mainte-
nance, and by specifying built-in handling facilities where they may be needed.

Checklists can be used during design reviews to ensure that maintenance needs are not over-
looked. The project team should seek the answers to such questions from the operations and
maintenance departments.

Other maintenance considerations that may affect process safety include reliability and availabil-
ity, redundancy, diversity of redundant systems, and proof-testing procedures and provisions.

For easy maintenance in a process unit, similar items of equipment should be near each other
when such an arrangement would not adversely affect the safety of operations. For example,
pumps can be grouped so they can be easily reached and handled. Whenever possible, pumps
should be located outdoors and not inside buildings. Outdoors, pumps should be located next to
an access way and out from under low-clearance structures. Pumps are much easier and safer to
work on when clear space is provided around each pump. The maintenance department should
help the project team examine proposed equipment locations.
Practical maintenance department input at the design stage to promote inherent and ongoing
mechanical integrity can provide and unique and major contribution to process safety. Plant
equipment may be laid out so that it meets all the safety criteria for normal operations, but it still
may be hazardous during maintenance. For example, heat exchangers should be oriented so that
during cleaning and the removal of tube bundles, the associated lifting equipment will not impede
emergency access.

3.28 All Hazards identified? All Risks eliminated/reduced/controlled?.

3.29 Real Case Study.

Accident Area & Severed Helmet.
How could this accident have been prevented?

3.30 Other areas of Risk Management.

 Risk control using barrier models between hazard and hazard realisation.
 Using modelling such as thermal radiation output, blast zones for risk identification.
 The concept of hazard realisation - e.g. loss of containment leading to ignition, leading to
fire/explosion, leading to loss.

Question 6 - Action or Measure.

Question - Action or Measure

A _____ is anything (action or measure) put in place either to eliminate the hazard or reduce the
risk.
Multiple Choice (HP)
Answer 1: Hazard
Response 1:
Jump 1: This page
Answer 2: Control Measure
Response 2:
Jump 2: Next page
Answer 3: Risk
Response 3:
Jump 3: This page

3.31 Thermal radiation output blast zones.

A number of organizations, worldwide, conducted LNG fire experiments in the 1970s and 1980s.
These tests have included LNG spill tests on land (contained within a dike) and a limited number
on water. Tests ranged from immediate ignition upon release, delayed ignition of dispersed vapor,
dispersion without ignition of vapors generated by the boiling LNG, and in some cases, energetic
ignition of stoichiometric concentrations of LNG vapor and air in large volume balloons (simulating
unconfined energetic ignitions). Details of LNG fire field tests and their results have been pub-
lished by May & McQueen [1973], AGA [1974], JGA [1976], Raj, et al., [1979], Raj [1982], Mizner
and Eyre [1982], Nedelka, et al., [1989].

Some general montoir tests show that large LNG fires burn with the production of copious
amounts of black soot (smoke), contrary to the conventional assumption that LNG fires burn
clean. The effect of smoke is to obscure the inner burning core of the fire thereby reducing the
amount of total radiation that is emitted by the fire. In addition, the fire displays considerable simi-
larity in its dynamics with other hydrocarbon fires of the same size, including the "puffing" type of
burning in which large fireball puffs are released at a frequency determined by the fire size.

4.0 An Organisation's Documented Evidence of Safe to Operate.

Design error by having no means to open/close the valve at ground level or the use of a
platform for the operative to stand on or an electronically operated valve or chain driven
valve.

4.1 The Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 2005.

The Offshore Installation (Safety Case) Regulations 2005 (SCR05) came into force on 6 April
2006. There are significant changes to the regulatory requirements as a result of the introduction
of SCR05, including a duty on the installation operator or owner to consult safety representatives
on the preparation, review or revision of safety cases. The safety case should show how this was
done.
Introduction

1. An operator or owner is required by SCR05 to submit a safety case to HSE for each in-
stallation. This is a written demonstration of safety that has to be updated whenever nec-
essary, to reflect changing knowledge and operational conditions. HSE must accept the
safety case before an installation can operate. In reaching a decision about acceptability,
HSE assesses the content of the safety case - the APOSC principles guide that assess-
ment.

2. APOSC is for use by HSE assessors and industry safety practitioners. In publishing this
document, HSE aims to provide an understanding of how HSE evaluates the acceptability
of safety cases, by setting out the principles against which cases are assessed, with ex-
planations of what is required.

3. Safety cases should take account of each principle to the extent necessary to provide an
adequate demonstration, and also include the factual information required by SCR05.

4. APOSC complements the guidance on the Regulations. They should be read together.

5. The principal matters to be demonstrated in a safety case are that:-

o a) the management system is adequate to ensure compliance with statutory health

and safety requirements; and for management of arrangements with contractors
and sub-contractors;
o b) adequate arrangements have been made for audit and for audit reporting;
o c) all hazards with the potential to cause a major accident have been identified,
their risks evaluated, and measures have been, or will be, taken to control those
risks to ensure that the relevant statutory provisions will be complied with.

6. In addition, the SCR05 Schedules list factual information and other particulars to be in-
 cluded in each safety case.

7. SCR05 require the preparation and operation of a verification scheme, which now in-
cludes plant provided to comply with specified Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response (PFEER) regulations. The safety case should refer to the principles
of this scheme and describe how their objectives will be achieved.

8. The Pipeline Safety Regulations 1996 (PSR) and SCR05 verification requirements impose
a network of interrelated duties. The major accident prevention document required under
PSR regulation 23 may contribute to arguments in a safety case, and where appropriate
should be referenced in the case.

9. For the purposes of the safety case, the Offshore Installations and Pipeline Works (Man-
agement and Administration) Regulations 1995 deem any part of a pipeline connected to
the installation, and associated apparatus or works, located within 500 metres of the in-
stallation, to be part of the installation. The case also needs to take account of any equip-
ment beyond the 500 metre zone on which the safety of the installation may depend. This
includes the interaction between the installation and others linked by pipeline, and the ef-
fect that an interconnected pipeline system could have on the installation.

10. The term 'duty holder' is used throughout APOSC. This refers to the person (whether
owner, operator of an installation or licensee) on whom duties are placed by SCR05.

For Further details on principles for safety cases refer to APOSC.

Question 7 - Safe Systems of Work.

Question - Safe Systems of Work

A safe system of work, if appropriate, should be used by contractors and employees
True/False (HP)
Answer 1: True
Response 1:
Jump 1: Next page
Answer 2: False
Response 2:
Jump 2: This page

4.2 Safety Case (Offshore) Safety Plan (Onshore).

The Legal Requirements requires a duty holder to undertake a thorough review of a current
safety case within 5 years of:

1. The date on which the current safety case was accepted by the enforcing authorities; and
2. The date of the previous such review.

The enforcing authorities have powers to direct a thorough review of a current Safety Case.

This is most likely to direct such a review if it has concerns either that:
  (i) The safety case may not reflect the true safety situation on the installation i.e. that the
assumptions made are not fundamentally sound; or
 (ii) The management system being operated may not be as described in the safety case.

4.3 Thorough Review.

The purpose of the thorough review is to confirm that the case as a whole continues to be fun-
damentally sound, and should therefore be an examination of all the basic assumptions made in
the case, as well as its content. The periodic thorough review should be a systematic examination
of the whole safety case with the following objectives.

1. To confirm the current safety case is still adequate and likely to remain so until the next
thorough review.
2. To compare the case against current standards, and industry practice for new installa-
tions, evaluate any deficiencies, and identify and arrange implementation of any reasona-
bly practicable improvements to enhance safety.
3. To identify ageing processes, design parameters and changes in operating conditions that
may limit the life of the installation, and safety critical plant and equipment.
4. To check that the management of safety is adequate.

4.4 Guidance on Duty Holder's Arrangements for Thorough Review.

The arrangements for thorough review of the safety case should be a part of the duty holder's
current safety management system (SMS). Enforcing authority may inspect the SMS to ensure
that this is the situation and that the arrangements are readily available and up to date.

The SMS thorough review arrangements might be expected to consider some or all of the follow-
ing in relation to the basic assumptions made in the case and its content, since the case was ac-
cepted, or the last thorough review. Examples are given here, but should not be considered to
limit the scope of the review work in any way.

4.5 Guidance on Duty Holder's Arrangements for Thorough Review.

1. Design and operational parameters of the structure and plant, together with actual opera-
tional experience and projected operational status and lifetime.
e.g. Fatigue and corrosion life of the topsides and structure, use of measured corrosion
rates and measured structural loading parameters.

2. Maintenance, inspection and testing experience of safety critical elements (SCE);

e.g. Examination of records for emergency shut down valves (ESDV) closure tests (and
other SCE tests). Consideration of whether test intervals are adequate given the testing
history etc.

3. Modifications to the installation or plant (including SCE);

e.g. Changes to the types of fire and gas detectors. Consideration of the effects of
changes on detectable leak sizes.

4. Changes to and behaviour of SCEs;

 e.g. Re-examination of escape, evacuation and rescue (EER) arrangements after ac-
cess/egress routes are modified or decommissioned.

5. The history of incidents and abnormal/unexpected events;

e.g. The updating of task and operational risk assessments to include known hazards
from past incidents.
(intended to ensure that risks from a major accident will be at the lowest level that is rea-
sonably practicable.)

6. New knowledge and understanding;

e.g. Awareness of risks highlighted by industry or HSE safety alerts; for example on tem-
porary repairs. Recognition and inclusion of findings from relevant research (engineering
and human sciences).

7. Changes in safety standards or safety methodology/assumptions;

e.g. The publication of new codes.

8. Changes in management of safety and human factor aspects affecting the installation;
e.g. Arrangements for ensuring competence, adequate manning levels and that adequate
attention has been given to human factors.

4.6 Guidance on Duty Holder's Arrangements for Thorough Review.

The review is likely to involve a reconsideration of HAZOPs, risk assessments and other tech-
niques that were used to construct the original arguments for safety in the safety case.
Each review should be directed towards showing that the current safety case would remain valid
until the next thorough review.

It is EA opinion that it would be very beneficial for a thorough review team to include staff that are
independent from those routinely involved in maintaining and revising the case for safety. Inde-
pendence can ensure greater objectivity. However there is no requirement for the independent
staff to be employed by a third party. Enforcing authority will look to see how a duty holder en-
sures objectivity in the thorough review process.

4.7 Carrying out a thorough review.

The arrangements for carrying out a thorough review should therefore ensure that:

1. The people carrying out the review are suitably qualified and experienced.
2. The installation safety representatives are consulted during the review.
3. A degree of objectivity is achieved.
4. An accurate summary of the thorough review is prepared and sent to the EA.
5. Any necessary change to the safety case identified during the thorough review is imple-
mented.
6. Account is taken of any conclusions and recommendations from the review.
7. Where there is a shortfall in achievement of current standards, the current safety case
continues to demonstrate compliance with the relevant statutory provisions in respect of
major accident risks.
4.8 Safety Case (Offshore) Overview.
 Platform description.
 Reservoir description.
 Management system.
 Policy.
 Organisation.
 Processes.
 Risk assessment.
 Permit to work.
 Management of Change (MoC) etc.
 Performance measurement.
 Audit & review.
 Major hazard identification.
 Major hazard risk assessment.

Demonstration of:-

 Prevention.
 Control.
 Mitigation.
 Evacuation Rescue & Recovery.
 Safety Case.

4.9 Safety Report (Onshore).

Safety Report requirements applies mainly to the chemical / refining / petro-chemical industry and
also to some storage activities or sites where threshold quantities of dangerous substances are
kept or used.

Regulations ensure that every operator shall take measures to prevent major accidents. Regula-
tions place a stronger emphasis on the protection of the environment as well as human health. In
2005, changes to the requirements of a Safety Report were made to reflect lessons learned from
major accidents in Europe and the EU working group on carcinogens, fertilisers and substances
dangerous for the environment.

Under the regime of Safety Report, there is a fundamental requirement for operators to perform
and environmental risk assessment to clearly demonstrate that risks have been identified and
prevention measure put in place.

Every operator shall prepare and keep a document setting out their policy with respect to the pre-
vention of major accidents; known as the Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP). This policy is
designed to guarantee a high level of protection for persons and the environment by appropriate
means, structure and management system.
The regulations also require operators to prepare an onsite emergency plan which should include
measures for site clean up and remediation following an incident.

The 2008 Amendment Regulations remove the words 'installation' and 'safety case' and replaces
them with 'establishment' and 'safety report', respectively.

4.10 Supporting Legislation (European and UK).

  Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
 EC Directive 96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous sub-
stances (Seveso II Directive).

This Directive is aimed at the prevention of major accidents which involve dangerous substances
and the limitation of their consequences for man and the environment, with a view to ensuring
protection throughout the Community in a consistent and effective manner.

 Chemical (Hazard Identification and Packaging for Supply) Regulations 1994 as amended
(CHIP).

These regulations require that chemical substances and preparations, which are dangerous for
supply, as defined by CHIP be classified. This can either be as part of the Health and Safety
Executives (HSE's) "Approved List" or based on available data. The regulations also require that
dangerous chemicals carry special warning symbols and safety data sheets.

 Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR).

Requires the reporting of work related accidents,diseases and dangerous occurrences. It applies
to all work activities but not to all incidents.

 Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations 2002 (COSHH).

Requires employers to control exposures to hazardous substances to protect both employees

and others who may be exposed from work activities.

1. The Chemicals (Hazard Information and Packaging for Supply) (Amendment) Regulations
2008.

The CHIP 2008 Amendment Regulations amends the Control of Major Accident Hazards
Regulations 1999 to provide for the Health and Safety Executive to be the enforcing authority
except in the circumstance provided for.

A guide to the Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (as amended) (ISBN
071766175X).

This revised guidance on the COMAH Regulations gives detailed advice on the scope of the
Regulations and the duties imposed by them. The guidance is aimed at operators of
establishments that are covered by the Regulations.

Guidance on the interpretation of Major Accident to the Environment for the Purposes of COMAH
Regulation, DTI 1999 (ISBN 011753501X) available from the Stationery Office or available for
download on the Defra website (pdf).

4.11 COMAH.
This guidance is a 1999 update on major accidents to the environment, reviewed to ensure its
scope is adequate for the purposes of COMAH.

 Guidance on the Environmental Risk Assessment Aspects of COMAH Safety Reports,

COMAH Competent Authority 1999.

 Preparing Safety Reports: Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999, HSE 1999
(ISBN 0717616878).

 A guide to the reporting of injuries, diseases and dangerous occurrences regulations

1995, HSE 1999 (ISBN 0717610128).

 Emergency Planning for Major Accidents, Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulation
1999, HSE 1999 (ISBN 0717616959).

A Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) as outlined below.

The Safety Report should also include sufficient particulars to demonstrate that the operator has
established a Safety Management System (SMS) including organisational structure,
responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes and resources for determining and
implementing the Safety Report.

Top-tier establishments are not required to produce a documented version of the Safety Report
and SMS separately as under Regulation 7 both can be incorporated in the Safety Report.

Lower-tier establishments must produce a stand alone MAPP as they are not required to produce
a Safety Report. Within this document lower-tier site operators must demonstrate that an SMS
has been established.

All operators are also required under Regulation 9 to produce Emergency Plans.

Who does Safety Reports Apply to?

Any establishment is subject to the the needs of a Safety Report, if it has on site any substance
specified in Schedule 1 of the COMAH regulations above the qualifying quantity.
Substances listed include liquefied extremely flammable gases (including LPG) and natural gas
(whether liquefied or not). Substances classified as toxic, oxidising, explosive, flammable and
dangerous for the environment are also included.

4.12 COMAH.

There are two threshold quantities:

 Establishments with quantities equal to or greater than the upper threshold are known as
top-tier establishments;
 Establishments with lower quantifies, but which are equal to or greater than the lower
threshold are known as lower-tier establishments.

Notification
Operators of existing installations that come under are required to notify the Competent Authority
of the details of their activities as detailed within Schedule 3 of the COMAH regulations, unless
the information has already been supplied in a CIMAH or COMAH Safety Report.
Operators of new establishments should send notification within a reasonable time before the
start of construction, normally 3 to 6 months. Additional notification is only required prior to the
commencement of operations if any of the details in the pre-construction notification were missing
or have changed.

Who is subject to a Safety Report?

Regulation 3 of COMAH (UK) states that all operators of establishments subject to COMAH
must have a Safety Report. This document must be proportionate to the major accident hazards
presented by the establishment and should include their overall aims and principals of action with
respect to the control of major accident hazards.

What is included in a MAPP?

Schedule 2 of the COMAH regulations lists principals to be taken into account when preparing a
MAPP, including:

1. Organisation and Personnel.

2. Identification and evaluation of major hazards.
3. Operations control.
4. Management of change.
5. Planning for emergencies.

4.13 Safety Report.

What is included in a Safety Report?

The Safety Report must include:

1. Information on the management system of the organisation and the establishment with a
view to major accident prevention.
2. A description of the environment of the site including its geographical location, meteoro-
logical, geological and hydrographic conditions and if necessary its history. This section
must also include the human environment of the plant including other establishments, lo-
cal communities and their sensitivities.
3. Description of installation including main activities, processes and operation methods.
This section must also include information on the chemical characteristics of substances
contained on site.
4. Identification and accidental risks analysis and prevention methods, including potential
triggers and consequences both internal and external and a description of the technical
parameters and equipment used for the safety of installations.
5. Measures of protection and intervention to limit the consequences of an accident including
equipment both on and off site, organisation of alert and intervention procedure and a
summary of the elements necessary for drawing up the on-site Emergency Plan.

Who is subject to an Emergency Plan?

Regulations stipulates that all establishments subject to a Safety Report must produce an
Emergency Plan, however the procedure varies depending on the classification of the site:

 Top-tier establishments must produce two emergency plans in writing:

 1. On-site emergency plan, which is prepared by the operator, to specify the re-
sponse of those who work on site; and
2. Off-site emergency plan, which is prepared by the local authority, to specify the
coordinated response of agencies to an emergency which has off-site effects.

 Lower-tier sites do not have to produce a specific emergency plan, however the MAPP
required by Regulation 5 should include information on the management system and
procedures for identifying foreseeable emergencies. The level of planning for these emer-
gencies should be proportional to the probability of the accident occurring.

4.14 What is included in an Emergency Plan?.

Part 1 of the regulations describes the objectives of Emergency Plans which are referred to in
Regulations 9(1) and 10(1) as follows:

1. To contain and control incidents so as to minimise their effects, and to limit damage to
persons, the environment and property;
2. To implement the measures necessary to protect persons and the environment from the
effects of major accidents;
3. To communicate the necessary information to the public and to the emergency services
and authorities concerned in the area;
4. To provide for the restoration and clean-up of the environment following a major accident.

On-Site Emergency Plans

Regulation 9(3) and Schedule 5 provide for the production of an on-site emergency plan.

The on-site plan must include:

 Names and positions of persons authorised to set emergency procedures in motion;

 Person in charge of and coordinating the on-site response;
 Name or position of the person with responsibility for liaising with the local authority (off-
site emergency plan);
 For foreseeable scenarios, a description of the action which should be taken, including a
description of the safety equipment and the resources available;
 Arrangements for limiting the risks to persons on site including, warning, and alert proce-
dure;
 Arrangements for providing early warnings of the incident to the local authority, to set the
off-site emergency plan in motion, the type of information which should be contained in
the initial warning and the arrangements for the provision of more detailed information as
it becomes available;
 Arrangements for training staff in the duties they will be expected to perform, and where
necessary coordinating this with the emergency services;
 Arrangements for providing assistance with off-site mitigatory actions.

4.15 Off-site Emergency Plans.

Local authorities for the area where a top-tier site is located must prepare in writing, an adequate
emergency plan for dealing with the off-site consequences of possible major accidents.

This document must include the following:

 Names of positions of persons authorised to set emergency procedures in motion and

take charge of and coordinate off-site action;
 Procedure for the early warning of incidents, alert and call out procedure;
 Coordinating resources to implement the off-site emergency plan;
 Arrangements for providing assistance with on-site mitigatory action;
 Arrangements for all off-site mitigatory action;
 Arrangements for providing the public with specific information relating to the accident and
the behaviour which they should adopt.

Local authorities must also consult with the public when preparing an off-site emergency plan.

4.16 Health & Safety Management Systems.

This section summarises the key messages of the publication Successful Health and Safety
Management (HSG65) which retains the well-known framework for managing health and safety,
as well as providing improved guidance on:

 planning for health and safety;

 accident and incident investigation;
 health and safety auditing.

This section also explains what is involved in good management of health and safety, although
this is only in brief as these elements will be covered further in other units.

Key elements of successful health and safety management.

Taken from Successful health and safety management (HSG65)

Why manage health and safety?

As we mentioned previously, every working day in Great Britain at least one person is killed and
over 6000 are injured at work. Every year, three-quarters of a million people take time off work
because of what they regard as work-related illness. About 30 million work days are lost as a re-
sult.

Accidents and ill-health are costly to workers and their families. They can also hurt companies
because, in addition to the costs of personal injuries, they may incur far greater costs from dam-
age to property or equipment, and lost production.

With very few exceptions, such as a family business or a public organisation e.g, a government
department or a health service body, employers have to have liability insurance. It is a legal re-
quirement for employers to carry such insurance so that an employee who is harmed due to the
fault of his/her employer is assured of receiving compensation that the employer might otherwise
have insufficient resources to pay. They will also have insurance for accidents involving vehicles
and possibly third-party and buildings insurance.

However, insurance policies only cover a small proportion of the costs of accidents. Costs not
covered by insurance can include:

 Sick-pay.
 Damage or loss of product and raw materials.
 Repairs to plant and equipment.
 Overtime working and temporary labour.
 Production delays.
 Investigation time.
 Fines.

Remember the iceberg. Think of the cost accidents, with the majority of the losses uninsured and
hidden below the water line.

Benefits to business from following the five steps to health and safety management include:-
  Reduced costs of injuries, illness, property and equipment damage.
 Fewer stoppages.
 Higher output.
 Better quality.

By complying with the law and avoiding fines, the business will avoid damaging publicity. An or-
ganisation can not be a 'quality' organisation unless it applies sound management principles to
health and safety.

Inspectors visiting a workplace will want to know how health and safety is managed. If an acci-
dent occurs, employers, employees, systems and procedures will come under scrutiny.

Safety Management Systems Video

http://www.sheilds-elearning.co.uk/file.php/87/videos/SMS_Full.flv