VICTORIA BARRIENTOS V. TRANSFIGURACION DAAROL
Eventually, she became pregnant and informed
FACTS:
This is a disbarment case filed by Barrientos against Atty
Daarol, on grounds of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
Barrientos first knew Daarlo in 1969. She was a college
student, single. Atty. Daarol went to her house because he was
a friend of her sister, hence they also became friends. She knew
Daarol to be a single and as a General Manager of ZANECO
(electic cooperative).
On June 1973, Daarol went to Barrientos’ house and
asked her to be one of the usherettes in the Mason’s
convention so the latter said he should ask for the permission
of her parents. They consented and so she served as an
usherette, Daarol picking her up and taking her home everyday.
In July 1973, Daarol came to petitioner’s house and
invited her for a joy ride, with the permission of her mother
(who was Daarol’s former classmate). They went to the beach
and Daarol proposed his love for Barrientos and told her that if
she would accept him, he would marry her within 6 months
from her acceptance. After a few days of courting, she accepted
the offer of love. Visitations continued and they agreed to get
married in Dec 1973.
In Aug 1973, he took Barrientos to a party and when
they left, he took her for a joy ride to an airport in Sicayab
where there were no houses around. There, he pressured her
into having sexual intercourse reiterating that he loved her, and
that he would marry her and that December was very near
anyway they would marry soon. She gave in after much
hesitation because she loved him. She cried after the deed.
This event happened frequently thereafter during
August to October 1973, where she consented because she
loved him.
Daarol. He however suggested that she have the baby aborted.
She refused. He told her that she didn’t have to worry because
they were getting married soon anyway.
In late October 1973, Daarol came to see Barrientos and
her mother and told them that he could not marry her because
he was already married. He reassured them though that he has
been separated from his wife for 16 years and that he would
work for the annulment of his marriage and subsequently
marry her. So Barrientos waited and delivered the baby but
eventually wasn’t able to contact Daarol anymore (he went
MIA).
ISSUE:
W/N Daarol should be disbarred for grossly immoral
conduct.
HELD/RATIO:
YES. The fact of his previous marriage was disclosed by
respondent only after the complainant became pregnant. Even
then, respondent misrepresented himself as being eligible to
re-marry for having been estranged from his wife for 16 years
and dangled a marriage proposal on the assurance that he
would work for the annulment of his first marriage. It was a
deception after all as it turned out that respondent never
bothered to annul said marriage.
Respondent resorted to deceit in the satisfaction of his
sexual desires at the expense of the gullible complainant. He is
perverted. He says that: "I see nothing wrong with this
relationship despite my being married." Worse, he even
suggested abortion.
 Finally, respondent even had the temerity to allege that
he is a Moslem convert and as such, could enter into multiple
marriages and has inquired into the possibility of marrying
complainant. As records indicate, however, his claim of having
embraced the Islam religion is not supported by any evidence
save that of his self-serving testimony.
By his acts of deceit and immoral tendencies to appease
his sexual desires, respondent Daarol has amply demonstrated
his moral delinquency. Hence, his removal for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar on the grounds of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct is in order.
ALAWI V. ALAUYA
Facts:
Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing
company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They
were classmates, and used to be friends.
Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President
of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract
with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated
because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote
similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice
President of NHMFC.
On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative
complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s
usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion
that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that
he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often
mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term
"consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor.
Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Issue:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use
the title of Attorney
Held:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular
Philippine bar.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has
already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the
Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one
who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title
of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the
Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing;
and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction
OCA v Ladaga
Facts:
Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as
pro bono counsel for a relative in a criminal case, without the
previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
as required by the Administrative Code. An administrative
complaint was filed against Atty. Ladaga for practicing law
without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required
by law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he merely gave
a free legal assistance to a relative and that he was on an
approved leave of absence during his appearances as such
counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which
he is assigned knew his appearances as such counsel.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a
pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of law as
prohibited by the Administrative Code.
HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the
statute should be customarily or habitually holding one’s self to
the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in
this case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department (CJ) as required
by law, respondent was reprimanded.
FACTS
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by then
President Aquino for the position of COMELEC Chairman in
1991. This nomination was opposed by petitioner Cayetano on
the ground that Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for
at least 10 years. Apparently, the Constitution requires that the
COMELEC Chairperson be a member of the Philippine Bar who
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.
Despite Cayetano’s opposition, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination. Thus, Cayetano filed
an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, basically
challenging the confirmation by the CA of Monsod’s
nomination.
ISSUE
Is Monsod qualified to be COMELEC Chairperson?
HELD
YES.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and having
no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in
many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with
men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult
and complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be
drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys.
The SC, in order to arrive at its decision,
presented a brief history of Monsod’s employment. After
passing the bar exam, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of
his father. From 1963 to 1970, he worked for the World Bank
Group, where he was assigned as operations officer in Costa
Rica. His job involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic and project work of the bank. In 1970, he returned to
the Philippines and worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive of an investment bank and a business
conglomerate. By 1986, he rendered his services to various
companies as a legal and economic consultant and he also
worked as a Chief Executive Officer. He was also the Secretary-
General and National Chairman of NAMFREL in 1986-1987. His
position in NAMFREL required his knowledge in election law.
Also, he sat as a member of the Davide Commission in 1990.
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term
Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's
past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional
requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
There are several factors determinative of whether a particular
activity constitutes "practice of law."
1. Habituality
2. Compensation
3. Application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure
which calls or legal knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law”.
4. Attorney-client relationship.
MAURICIO C. ULEP V. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
FACTS:
This is a petition praying for an order to the respondent
to cease and desist from issuing certain advertisements
pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than
those allowed by law.
The said advertisement of the Legal Clinic invites
potential clients to inquire about secret marriage and divorce
in Guam and annulment, and the like. It also says that they are
giving free books on Guam Divorce.
Ulep claims that such advertisements are unethical and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity
of lawyers. He, being a member of the bar, is ashamed and
offended by the said advertisements. On the other hand, the
respondent, while admitting of the fact of the publication of the
advertisements, claims that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but is merely rendering legal support services through
paralegals. It also contends that such advertisements should be
allowed based on certain US cases decided.
ISSUE:
W/N the Legal Clinic Inc is engaged in the practice of law.
W/N the same can properly be the subject of the
advertisements complained of.
HELD/RATIO:
Yes, it constitutes practice of law. No, the ads should be
enjoined.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession.
Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation
of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are
secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a
court. When a person participates in a trial and advertises
himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers
with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes
the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the
case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another
and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a practice of
law. The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. And applying the criteria,
respondent Legal Clinic Inc. is, as advertised, engaged in the
“practice of law”.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. With its attorneys and
so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the
client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by
said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for the
which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of
"practice of law."
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's
advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession advertise his talents or skill as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The only
exceptions are when he appears in a reputable law list and use
of an ordinary, simple professional card.
The advertisements do not fall under these exceptions. To
allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a
deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack. Hence, it should
be enjoined.
In Re: Integration of the Bar
Facts:
[T]he Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with
the “earnest recommendation” — on the basis of the
said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No.
526 of the Court, and “consistently with the views and counsel
received from its [the Commission’s] Board of Consultants, as
well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the
Philippine Bench and Bar” — that “(the) Honorable (Supreme)
Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as
possible through the adoption and promulgation of an
appropriate Court Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526
formally prays the Court to order the integration of the
Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local
Bar associations.
ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine
Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this
time?
HELD:
YES. On all issues.
T]he Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar
in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning x x x the
admission to the practice of law.”
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on
Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is
“perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within
the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively.
[T]he Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, ordained the integration of the
Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.
In Re: Cunanan
Facts:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of
unsuccessful candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al
petitioners.
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much
public interest and concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the
“Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” Generally a candidate is deemed
passed if he obtains a general ave of 75% in all subjects w/o
falling below 50% in any subject, although for the past few
exams the passing grades were changed depending on the
strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations (1946- 72%,
1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 1949-74%, 1950-1953 – 75%).
Believing themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as
those reconsidered and passed by the S.C., and feeling that
they have been discriminated against, unsuccessful candidates
who obtained averages of a few percentages lower than those
admitted to the bar went to congress for, and secured in 1951
Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president after he was
given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate
then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June
21, 1953
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to
admit to the Bar those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations.
By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation
for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure
in the exams.
Issue:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
Held:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the
legal profession and the administration of justice, the S.C.
would seek to know if it is CONSTITUTIONAL.
 An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites
for the practice of the law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly.
 The Judicial system from which ours has been derived, the
act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly
judicial.
 The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress and the S.C.
equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice
of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court.
 Its retroactivity is invalid in such a way, that what the law
seeks to “cure” are not the rules set in place by the S.C. but
the lack of will or the defect in judgment of the court, and this
power is not included in the power granted by the Const. to
Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary.
 Reasons for Unconstitutionality:
1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the
court, and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in
attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules
made by congress must elevate the profession, and those
rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is
void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court:
1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said law
are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and
effect.
2. The part of ART 1 that refers to the examinations
subsequent to the approval of the law (1953- 1955) is valid
and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the candidates
who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952 are denied, and all the
candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN
Ave. of 71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject
are considered as having passed whether they have filed
petitions for admissions or not.)
In re: Lanuevo A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
FACTS:
Landicho wrote a confidential letter to the court about the
startling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at
least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another,
before the bar results were released that year and that there
are grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects
that underwent alterations to raise the grades prior to the
release of results. The Court checked the records of the 1971
Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects —
Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile
Law, Criminal Law, and Remedial Law — of a successful bar
candidate with office code no. 954, Ramon Galang, underwent
some changes which, however, were duly initialed and
authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Each of
the five examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted
having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved
pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and
that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular and/or
was on the borderline of passing.
The investigation showed that the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of Ramon E. Galang alias Roman Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did noy obtain a passing
average in the 1971 Bar Examinations.
Lanuevo admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation or re-checking. The five examiners
having re-evaluated or re-checked the notebook to him by the
Bar Confidant.
As investigator conducted by the NBI also showed that
Ramon Galang was charged with the crime of slight physical
injuries committed on certain de Vera, of the same University.
Confronted with this information, respondent Galang declared
that he does not remember having been charged with the crime
of slight physical injuries in that case.
It must also be noted that immediately after the official
release of the results of the 1971 Bar Examinations, Lanuevo
gained possession of few properties, including that of a house
in V+BF Homes, which was never declared in his declaration of
assets and liabilities. But Lanuevo’s statement of assets and
liabilities were not taken up during the investigation but were
examined as parts of the records of the court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Lanuevo is guilty defrauding the
examiners into re-evaluating Galang’s exam notebook.
2. Whether or not Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the court his pending case.
RULING:
1. Yes. It is evident that Lanuevo staged the plot to convince
the examiners to individually re-examine the grades of Galang
to help him pass even without the authority of the Court.
2. Yes. Ramon Galang is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for
physical injuries in 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969,
and 1971; and in 1966, 1967, 1969, and 1971, he committed
perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending
criminal case in court. That the concealment of an attorney of
the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an
alleged crime, in his application to take the Bar Exam is a ground
for revocation of his license to practice law as well-settled. He
is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble
profession of law.
RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
PER CURIAM; February 4, 2004
Facts: On September 22, 2003, the day following the bar
examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman
of the 2003Bar Examinations Committee, was apprised of a
rumored leakage in the examination on thes ubject. He then
reported to Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. and to the other
members of the Court, recommending that the examination on
the subject be nullified and that an investigation be conducted
forthwith.- On September 2003, the Court adopted the
recommendation of Justice Vitug and resolved to nullify the
examination in Mercantile Law and to hold another exam on
the said subject against which petitions were filed. The
petitions voiced out the support to nullifying the exam on the
said subject and not to take another exam due to the
emotional, physical and financial burdens it will cause the
barristers. Alternative proposals were submitted to the Court.
The Court moved to nullify and to spread out the weight of the
Mercantile Law among the remaining seven bar subjects.- The
Court resolved also to create a Committee composed of three
retired members of the Court that would conduct a thorough
investigation of the incident subject of the September23, 2003
resolution.
The Investigating Committee found that the leaked test
questions in Mercantile Law were the questions which the
examinee, Atty. Balgos had prepared and submitted to Justice
Jose Vitug. His questions constituted 82% of the questions
asked in the examination in Mercantile Law in the morning of
September 21, 2003, Sunday, in some cases with slight changes
which were not substantial and in other cases exactly as Atty.
Balgos, 71years old, proposed.- The circumstances that the
leaked test questions consisted entirely of test questions
prepared by Atty. Balgos proves conclusively that the leakage
originated from his office, not from the Office of Justice Vitug.
Atty. Balgos claimed that the leaked test questions were
prepared by him on his computer. Without any doubt, the
source of the leaked test questions was Atty. Balgos’ computer.
The culprit who stole or downloaded them from Atty.
Balgos’computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent,
and who faxed them to other persons, was Atty. Balgos’ legal
assistant, Atty. Danilo De Guzman, who voluntarily confessed
the deed to the Investigating Committee.
De Guzman revealed that he faxed the test questions, with the
help of his secretary Villasis to his frat brods in Beta Sigma
Lambda Fraternity, namely, Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan. In
turn, Garvida faxed the test questions to Iñigo and Bugain.Iñigo
passed a copy or copies to other Betan Guiapal who gave a copy
to the MLQU-BetaSigma’s Most Illustrious Brother, Ronald
Collado who ordered the printing and distribution of 30 copies
to the MLQU’s 30 bar candidates.-
issue:
Whether or not Atty. De Guzman be found guilty of the act of
leaking the bar questions and be disbarred from the practice of
law
Held: Atty De Guzman’s act of downloading Balgos’ test
questions in mercantile law from the latter’s computer, without
his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It
was theft of intellectual property.
Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful
infraction of Balgos’ right to privacy of communication and to
security of his papers and effects against unauthorized search
and seizure, rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of
our Constitution. He transgressed the very first canon of the
lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility which provides
that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of
the land, and promote respect for law and legal processes.-
De Guzman also violated rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as Canon
7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the
Bar, which provide:
Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7—A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.-
He is guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the
Bar. Also, the Investigating committee does not believe that he
acted alone. Palma, secretary of Atty. Balgos and Atienza knew
of the password. Certain brods should also be investigated. The
committee does not believe De Guzman did this out of love for
the fraternity. There must have been an ulterior material
consideration for his breaking the law and tearing the shroud
of secrecy that, he very well knows, covers the bar
examinations.
He should be disbarred plus he ought to make a public apology
and pay damages to the Supreme Court- Atty. Balgos should be
reprimanded by the Court and make a written apology as a
result of his negligence. He is not entitled to receive any
honorarium as examiner for that subject.-
Guevarra vs. Eala A.C. No. 7136
Facts:
On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar
Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala
for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the
respondent in January 2000 when his then fiancée Irene Moje
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married
to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant
noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been
receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages
some which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at
Megamall.” He also noticed that Irene habitually went home
very late at night or early in the morning of the following day,
and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her
whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parent’s house
in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and
Respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant
went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw
her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends.
Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the
conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings.
Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7,
2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw
respondent’s car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-
B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime
in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002
together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the
reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala.
Held:
Lawyer’s oath stated that a lawyer should support the
Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use
of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly
immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral
turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of
Concubinage, under ART. 334 of the Revised Penal Code, “ Any
husband who shall keep a mistress in a conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances,
with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in
any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium period. Section 2 of ART. XV states that
“Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the state. Respondent’s
grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the constitution and the
laws, that he as a lawyer has sworn to uphold. Hence the court
declared Atty. Jose Emmanul M. Eala DISBARRED for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
PEREZ VS. CATINDIG
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015
FACTS:
Atty. Tristan A. Catindig admitted to Dr. Elmar Perez that he was
already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez. Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez
that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign
country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would
eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed.
Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez
obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic.
On July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State
of Virginia in the United States of America (USA).
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty.
Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained
from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not
recognized by Philippine laws. Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez
reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by
filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s
scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later,
she came upon a love letter written and signed by Atty.
Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter,
Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to
marry her once his “impediment is removed.”
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and
their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo
Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.
allawlibrary
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married
Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she
was incapable of complying with her marital obligations.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing,
including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican
Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez
turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to
prevent any acrimony from
developing.anroblesvirtuallawlibrary
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr.
Perez.
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty.
Catindig.
IBP – recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross
immorality, violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Complaint against Atty.
Baydo – dismissed for dearth of evidence.
ISSUE:
WON the respondents committed gross immorality, which
would warrant their disbarment.
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
The Code of Professional Responsibility
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the
Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in
public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.cralawred
In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the
practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct.
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty,
probity or good demeanor.” Immoral conduct involves acts that
are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral
indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it
is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock
the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these
distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from
conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one
amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties
and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed
establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not
only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high
degree.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is
true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a
nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal
strategies in order to render a façade of validity to his otherwise
invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite
the various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their
union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their
son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly
seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he
was then already entranced with the much younger Atty.
Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr.
Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a
grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern
showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be
misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral conduct is
hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his
contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
his previous marriage to Gomez.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
his previous one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission,
Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required
of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty
of disbarment.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the
respondents.
As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove
her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing
her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the
purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty.
Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the
presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon
the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The
evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence.
DISPOSITION: Catindig – disbarred. Baydo – dismissed.
ARRIETA VS. LLOSA A.C. No. 4369 [1997[ 282 SCRA 248
FACTS:
Arrieta filed a petition for disbarment upon the ground that
Atty. Llosa notarized an Absolute Deed of Sale knowing that
some who were parties to it were dead. The vendors in the
instant deed were dead when Llosa affixed his signature on the
notarized document. Later on, complainant moved to dismiss
the complaint as a product of his misapprehension of the facts.
The Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) followed by the Board of the Governors of the
IBP recommended the dismissal of the case finding no
compelling reason to continue with the disbarment
proceedings. The Court did not agree however. Llosa contends
that he merely notarized the sale for expediency because it was
urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Llosa should be disbarred on account of
violation of his lawyer’s oath by notarizing a document knowing
that the vendors of the Absolute Deed of Sale at that time when
he notarized it were dead.
HELD:
Being his first Administrative offense, he was only suspended
for six months. The act of a notary public is impressed with
public interest. Notarized documents are ascribed with full
confidence by the Courts and the general public. To
countenance these irregular acts would endanger the full faith
and credit given upon its face and would undermine the
evidentiary weight given to it by the Courts to assure the public
of its authenticity.
OMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002
Facts:
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him
recover a claim of money against a creditor. Respondent
prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not
successful and so the former intimated that a case should
already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees
and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet
received any feedback as to the status of his case. Petitioner
made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even
invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify
the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in
the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the
Clerk of Court to inquire about the case. The lawyer went back
to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court was
absent that day.
Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went
to the office of the clerk of court to see for himself the status of
his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has been filed.
Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie
to with the excuse that the delay was being caused by the court
personnel, and only when shown the certification did he admit
that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent
the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to
appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in
the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00, respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the
P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law Office
was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With
complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of
respondent was created and that was to file the Regwill
complaint within the time frame contemplated by his client.
The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his
misuse of the filing fees deposited by complainant, and his
attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client, which
caused complainant additional damage and prejudice,
constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement
by the respondent of part of the money deposited by
complainant for filing fees, does not exculpate the respondent
for his misappropriation of said funds.”
IN RE: ARGOSINO (270 SCRA 26, 03/19/1997)
FACTS: This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking
of a successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino
was previously involved with hazing which caused the death of
Raul Camaligan a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites but
he was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide. He was sentenced with 2 years and 4 months
ofimprisonment where he applied a probation thereafter
which was approved and granted by the court. He took the
bar exam and passed but was not allowed to take the oath. He
filed for a petition to allow him to take the lawyer’s oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law averring that his
probation was already terminated. The court note that he spent
only 10 months of the probation period before it was
terminated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Al Argosino may take the lawyer’s oath
office and admit him to the practice of law.
HELD: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those
who possess the STRICT, INTELLECTUAL and MORAL
QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in
the effective and efficient administration of justice. The court
upheld the principle of maintaining the good moral character
of all Bar members, keeping in mind that such is of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper
administration of justice are concerned. Hence he was asked by
the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has
reformed and has become a responsible member of the
community through sworn statements of individuals who have
a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr.
Argosino for a significant period of time to certify that he is
morally fit to the admission of the law profession. The
petitioner is then allowed to take the lawyer’s oath, sign
the Roll of Attorney’s and thereafter to practice the legal
profession.
In re: Petition to sign the Roll of Attorneys; Michael A.
Medado
Facts: Michael Medado graduated from the University of the
Philippines with the Bachelor’s degree of law in 1979. On May
7, 1980. On Myay 7, 1980, he took the Attorney’s oath at the
PICC and on May 13,1990, he was scheduled to sign the Roll of
Attorneys, but he failed to do so because he misplaced hi Notice
to sign the Roll given by the Bar Office. Several Years later, while
running through his college files, he then realized that he had
not signed the roll of attorney and what he signed was probably
just an attendance record.
By the time that medado found the notice, he was already
working, mainly doing corporate and taxation and that he was
not mainly involved in litigation practice. Thus he operated
under mistaken belief that since he had taken the oath, the
signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not an urgent matter, and
subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado attended
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) he was required
to provide his roll number, which was not able to for not signing
the roll.
About seven years later, medado filed his instant petition to
sign the roll of attorney. The office of the Bar Confidant
conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter and
submitted its report and recommendation to the court denying
such petition for because of his gross negligence, gross
misconduct, and utter lack of merit. It further said that the
petitioner had no valid justification for his negligence.
Issue: whether of not Medado be granted of his petition to sign
the Bar.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the petitioner
demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
finally filed a petition to sign the roll of attorneys and that it was
not a third party who called their attention. Another is that the
petitioners has not subjected himself to any disciplinary or
disqualification from the practice of law. All these demonstrate
medado’s worth to become a full fledged member of the
Philippine Bar. The practice of law is not a right, but a privilege,
the court cannot unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown the mental fitness and moral fiber
to withstand the rigors of the profession.
However, the court cannot exonerate Medado from liability
from inaction. “An honest mistake of fact can excuse a person
from legal consequences, but a mistake of law cannot be
utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed
to know the law and its consequences. When Medado first
operated under the mistake of fact when he thought what he
signed was the roll of attoyneys. However, from the moment
he kew that it was a mere attendance, he should have known
that he was not a full-fledged lawyer because of his failure to
sign the Roll. Inspite the knowledge, he chose to practice law
without taking the necessary steps to complete all the
requirements if the admission to the bar.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which provides:
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assis in the
unauthorized practice of law.
As Canon 9 speaks of assisting in the practice of law, it is
assumed that the unauthorized practice of law by himself is also
reprehensible. It also applies to law students and Bar
candidates, as aspiring members if the Bar. They are bound to
comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards
of the legal profession.
Caronan vs Caronan
Facts:
Complainant and respondent are full siblings and both
completed their secondary education at Makati High School
where they graduated in 1993 and in 1991, respectively.
Complainant graduated at the University of Makati in 1997 with
a degree in Business Administration. He married Myrna G. Tapis
in 2001 with whom he has two daughters. Concurrently,
respondent enrolled at Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila
(PLM) for one year and then transferred to Philippine Military
Academy in 1992 where he was discharged after a year.
Respondent was not able to obtain any college degree since
then. In 1999, respondent enrolled in St Mary’s Law School in
Nueva Vizcaya and passed the Bar examinations in 2004.
Complainant had knowledge of such events but did not mind as
he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him. In
2009, complainant realized that respondent had been using his
name to perpetrate crimes. Complainant filed the present
Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the
former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law.
Respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked
res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can
no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved
in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors
dismissed the administrative case filed against him, and which
case had already been declared closed and terminated by the
Supreme Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover, according to
him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse,
Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace,
malign, discredit, and harass him because he filed several
administrative and criminal complaints against them before the
Ombudsman. On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating
Commissioner Jose Villanueva Cabrera issued his Report and
Recommendation, finding respondent GUILTY of illegally and
falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic
records. Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity,
and academic records of complainant and the real "Patrick A.
Caronan" neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor
took the Bar Exams, the Investigating Commissioner
recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of
Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. He also recommended that respondent and the
name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a
member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the
judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate
actions against respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
erred in their ordering that (a) the name “Patrick A. Caronan”
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name “Richard
A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted to the Bar.
Ruling:
No. Respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the
name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A.
Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar
Examinations. The Court hereby resolves that: (1) the name
"Patrick A. Caronan" with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 is
ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys; (2)
respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law
or making any representations as a lawyer; (3) respondent is
BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar
in the future; ( 4) the Identification Cards issued by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name
"Atty. Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education Certificates issued in such name are CANCELLED
and/or REVOKED; and (5) the Office of the Court Administrator
is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin
boards of all courts of the country a photograph of respondent
with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that
he is not a member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his
false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."
Samuel B. Arnado vs. Atty. Homobono A. Adaza
Facts: In March 15, 2013, Arnado called the attention of the SC
to the practice of Adaza of indicating “MCLE application for
exemption under process” in his pleadings filed in 2009-2012,
and “MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration” in a
pleading filed in 2012. Arnado informed the SC that he inquired
from the MCLE Office of the status of Adaza’s compliance and
received a Certification from the MCLE Executive Director that
Adaza did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter No.
850 for the periods: First Compliance Period (April 15, 2001 –
April 14, 2004); Second Compliance Period (April 15, 2004 –
April 14, 2007); and Third Compliance Period (April 15, 2007 –
April 14, 2010). Also, his application for exemption from MCLE
requirement on 2009 was denied by the MCLE Governors on
the ground that the application did not meet the requirements
of expertise in law under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No.
850.
In his Comment, Adaza stated that he was wondering why his
application for exemption could not be granted. Adaza then
enumerated his achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he
had been practicing law for about 50 years. He stated: 1. that
he was the first outsider of the SC whom president Cory offered
a seat as Justice of the SC but refused the intended
appointment because he hid not like some of the Cory crowd;
2. That he almost single-handedly handled the case of Cory in
canvassing of the results in the 1986 snap elections, discussing
constitutional and legal issues which finally resulted to EDSA I
revolution; 3. That he was one of the two lead counsels of
Senator MDS in the national canvassing for President, the other
counsel being the former Justice Serafin Cuevas; 4. The he
handled the 1987 and 1989, as well as the 2003 Coup cases; 5.
That he filed a case in the SC contesting the constitutionality of
2010 national elections; 6. That he filed a case together with
another lawyer in the SC on the constitutionality of the Corona
impeachment; 7. That he have been implementing and
interpreting the Constitution and other laws as Governor of
Misamis Oriental, Commission of Immigration and senior
member of the Opposition in the regular Parliament in the
Committee on Revision of Laws and Constitutional
Amendments; 8. That he was the leading Opposition member
Parliament that drafted the Omnibus Election Law; 9. That he
was the leading member of the Parliament that prepared and
orchestrated the debate in the complaint for impeachment
against President Marcos; 10. That he has been engaged as
lawyer for a number of lawyers who have exemptions from the
MCLE. He also further claimed that he had written five books.
The OBC recommended that Adaza be declared a delinquent
member of the Bar and guilty of noncompliance with the MCLE
requirements. It further recommended his suspension from the
practice of law for six months.
Issue: Is Adaza administratively liable for his failure to comply
with the MCLE requirements?
Ruling: Yes. Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to
undergo continuing legal education “to ensure that throughout
their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law”. Arnado’s letter covered
Adaza’s pleadings filed in 2009 – 2012, which means he also
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth
Compliance Period (April 15, 2010 – April 14, 2013). According
to the MCLE Governing Board, Adaza’s application for
exemption covered First and Second Compliance Periods, but
did not apply for exemption for the Third Compliance Period.
The application for exemption was denied on January 2009,
however, the MCLE Office failed to convey the denial of the
application for exemption of Adaza, and only informed him in
its letter dated October 1, 2012 when it received inquiries from
complainants. Clearly, Adaza had been remised in his
responsibilities by failing to comply with Bar Matter No. 850.
But the MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it
acted on Adaza’s application for exemption on January 14,
2009, it took the office three years to inform Adaza of the denial
of his application. Hence, during the period when respondent
indicated “MCLE application for exemption under process” in
his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE
Governing Board on his application for exemption. However,
after he had been informed of the denial of his application for
exemption, it still took Adaza one year to file a motion for
reconsideration. After the denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Adaza still took, and still taking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of MCLE. In addition, when Adaza
indicated “MCLE Application for Exemption for
Reconsideration” in a pleading, he had not filed any motion for
reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Adaza’s failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and
disregard of the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his
declaration as a delinquent member of the IBP.