People vs Francisco Jumawan, et.al.

Facts:

On the basis of a written statement made by Vicente Recepeda on July 18, 1976, and an affidavit
executed by Trinidad Alcantara on July 19, 1976, a complaint for murder was filed in the Municipal Court
of Sariaya, Quezon, on July 19, 1976, by Station Commander Sisenando P. Alcantara, Jr. against Francisco
Jumawan, Cesario Jumawan, Manuel Jumawan and Presentacion Jumawan for the death of Rodolfo
Magnaye.

The lower court finds Cesario Jumawan, Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye, Manuel Jumawan, and
Francisco Jumawan guilty as principals beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as defined and
punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a
penalty of life imprisonment and to indemnify jointly and severally the parents of the victim in the
amount of Twenty-four Thousand (P24,000.00) Pesos.

It appears from the evidence adduced during the trial that Rodolfo Magnaye was married on 26 January
1974 to Presentacion Jumawan, one of the accused in the above entitled criminal case. Presentacion
Jumawan-Magnaye left the conjugal home and stayed with her sister Sebastiana Jumawan. Rodolfo
Magnaye, on the other hand, went and stayed with his mother Trinidad Alcantara.

The mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye made several attempts to secure the signature of
Rodolfo Magnaye on a document agreeing to a separation from his wife so that both he and his wife will
be free to marry again but Rodolfo Magnaye persisted in refusing to sign said document.

On one occasion the mother of Mrs. Presentacion Jumawan-Magnaye even brought Rodolfo Magnaye
and his mother to the Provincial Constabulary Command to ask for the assistance of Sgt. Mortilla to
assist her daughter in securing a separation from Rodolfo Magnaye but they were told by Sgt. Mortilla
that it cannot be legally done.

Issue:

W/O accused-appellants be liable of the crime of parricide or simply murder?

Held:

Presentacion should have been accused of parricide but as it is, since her relationship to the deceased is
not alleged in the information, she, like the others, can be convicted of murder only qualified by abuse
of superior strength.
Although not alleged in the information, relationship as an aggravating circumstance should be assigned
against the appellants. True, relationship is inherent in parricide, but Presentacion stands convicted of
murder. And as to the others, the relationships of father-in-law and brother-in-law aggravate the crime.
The penalty for murder with an aggravating circumstances is death. However, for lack of necessary
votes, the penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The jugment of the court a quo is hereby affirmed in
toto. No costs. So Ordered.
People vs. Tomotorgo (April 30, 1985)

Facts: Plaintiff was the husband of the victim – Magdalena de los Santos. Magdalena had been
persistently asking her husband to sell their conjugal home in Camarines Sur in order for them to
transfer to the house of her husband’s in-laws. Plaintiff didn’t want to abandon their house because the
improvements that he made to the land since this is where he farms. Said lot had a lot of plants and was
very far from his in-laws place.

Upon returning home from his farm one day, he found his wife and three-month old baby already gone.
He went out to look for them and caught up with them 200 meters from their house. He saw his wife
with their kid and a bundle of clothes. Plaintiff begged for his wife to surrender and when she refused,
they got into a scurry when the plaintiff tried to take their child from his wife. The wife aroused the ire
of the plaintiff when she threw their child onto the grassy portion of the trail. Plaintiff picked up a wood
and began hitting his wife. She fell to the ground and complained of severe chest pains. Realizing what
he had done, he brought her home but she died despite plaintiff’s effort to alleviate her pain.

Plaintiff brought the piece of wood and reported the incident to the baranggay captain who brought him
to the police. He was charged with parricide and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of his
offense, he changed his plea to guilty. The court found him guilty of parricide but with three mitigating
circumstances – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as
naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation.

He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant claims that the court handed him the wrong
punishment. Appellant claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper applicable
penalty when the crime committed is different from what was intended. If the penalty prescribed for
the felony committed is higher than the offense which the accused wanted to commit, the penalty
corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the maximum period. Appellant avers that the penalty for
the felony committed by him – parricide – was higher than that which he intended to commit – physical
injuries.

Issue: Whether the court imposed the wrong penalty

Held: The judgment is affirmed but the court would recommend that executive clemency be extended
to the accused

Article 4 of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that accused is liable for
all the consequences of his felonious act.

Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more serious consequences not intended by the
offender result from his felonious act because under Article 4. Par. 1 of the same code, he is liable for all
the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to commit a grave wrong is
at best mitigating.
People of the Philippines vs Francisco Abarca

Facts:
One day in 1984, Francisco Abarca, through a peephole, caught his wife having sexual intercourse with
one Khingsley Paul Koh inside the Abarca residence. The two also caught Abarca looking at them and so
Koh grabbed his pistol and thereafter Abarca fled. One hour later, Abarca, armed with an armalite, went
to the gambling place where Koh usually stays and then and there shot Koh multiple times. Koh died
instantaneously. However, two more persons were shot in the adjacent room. These two other persons
survived due to timely medical intervention.

Eventually after trial, Abarca was convicted of the complex crime of murder with frustrated double
murder.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the judgment of conviction is correct.

HELD:
No. Abarca is entitled to the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall
inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case.

Even though one hour had already lapsed from the time Abarca caught his wife with Koh and the time
he killed Koh, the killing was still the direct by-product of Abarca’s rage. Therefore, Abarca is not liable
for the death of Koh.

However, Abarca is still liable for the injuries he caused to the two other persons he shot in the adjacent
room but his liability shall not be for frustrated murder. In the first place, Abarca has no intent to kill the
other two persons injured. He was not also committing a crime when he was firing his gun at Koh – it
being under Art. 247. Abarca was however negligent because he did not exercise all precaution to make
sure no one else will be hurt. As such, he shall be liable for less serious physical injuries through simple
negligence for the injuries suffered by the two other persons who were in the adjacent room when the
incident happened.
People vs Buensuceso

Facts:
on April 21, 1967 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Dinalupihan, Bataan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused by conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, with intent to kill, treachery and by taking advantage of their official positions and
superior strength, using their service revolvers did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot one PARESEO TAYAG Y ANGELES hitting him in the different parts of his body inflicting upon his
person several gunshot wounds which caused his death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

Issue:
WON accused are guilty of murder?

Held:
Yes

Ratio:
All told, there is ample evidence establishing that AGUILAR, BUENSUCESO, IZON, and JOSON had fired
their guns at the victim hitting him on different parts of his body. True, it has not been established as to
which wound was inflicted by each accused. However, as this Court has held, where the victim died as a
result of wounds received from several persons acting independently of each other, but it has not been
shown which wound was inflicted by each assailant, all of the assailants are liable for the death of the
victim. 11

The crime is Murder, qualified by treachery. The victim was already retreating backwards until he
reached the fence of the town plaza when AGUILAR fired his revolver at the former hitting him above
the right knee.
People vs. Pugay

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The accused are pronounced by the RTC of Cavite guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
murder of Bayani Miranda and sentencing them to a prison term ranging from 12 years (prison mayor)
as mimimum to 20 years (prison temporal) as maximum and for samson to be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.

Miranda and the accused Pugay are friends. Miranda used to run errands for Pugay and they used to
sleep together. On the evening of May 19, 1982 a town fiesta was held in the public plaza of Rosario
Cavite. Sometime after midnight accused Pugay and Samson with several companions arrived (they
were drunk), and they started making fun of Bayani Miranda. Pugay after making fun of the Bayani, took
a can of gasoline and poured its contents on the latter, Gabion (principal witness) told Pugay not to do
the deed. Then Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him. They were arrested the
same night and barely a few hours after the incident gave their written statements.

ISSUES OF THE CASE:

Is conspiracy present in this case to ensure that murder can be the crime? If not what are the criminal
responsibilities of the accused?

There is no:
CONSPIRACY- is determined when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy must be proven with the same quantum of evidence as the felony itself, more specifically
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is not essential that there be proof as to the existence of a
previous agreement to commit a crime. It is sufficient if, at the time of commission of the crime, the
accused had the same purpose and were united in its executed.
Since there was no animosity between miranda and the accused, and add to the that that the meeting
at the scene of the incident was purely coincidental, and the main intent of the accused is to make fun
of miranda.
Since there is no conspiracy that was proven, the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samson
arising from different acts directed against miranda is individual NOT collective and each of them is
liable only for the act that was committed by him.

**Conspiracy may be implied from concerted action of the assailants in confronting the victim.

Criminal Responsibilities:
PUGAY: Having failed to exercise diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising
from any act committed by his companions who at the same time were making fun of the deceased. -
GUILTY OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE

SAMSON:Since there are NO sufficient evidence that appears in the record establishing qualifying
circumstances (treachery, conspiracy). And granted the mitigating circumstance that he never INTENDED
to commit so grave a wrong. - GUILTY OF HOMICIDE

HELD:
JUDGEMENT OF THE LOWER COURT WAS AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. JUDGEMENT FOR GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR MURDER WAS LOWERED TO THE ABOVE JUDGEMENTS.
People vs. Salufrania

Facts:
That on or about the 3rd day of December, 1974, in Tigbinan, Labo, Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on MARCIANA
ABUYO-SALUFRANIA, the lawfully wedded wife of the accused, by then and there boxing and stranging
her, causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act
committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months on the family way,
the accused likewise did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously cause the death of the child
while still in its maternal womb, thereby committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL
ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code,
to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said woman and child in the amount as the Honorable Court
shall assess.

Issue:
WON accused is guilty of unintentional abortion?

Held:
The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno
Salufrania committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of Marciana
Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim.

It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant
when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband accused; and (c)
that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus in her womb. In this
afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be punished with the
penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum period
which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty,
appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
People v Orita

Facts: Ceilito Orita was accused of frustrated rape by the RTC. He appealed to the Court of Appeals for
review. The accused poke a “balisong” to college freshman Cristina Abayan as soon as she got into her
boarding house early morning after arriving from a party. She knew him as a frequent visitor of another
boarder. She was dragged inside the house up the stairs while his left arm wrapped around her neck,
and his right hand poking the Batangas knife to her neck. Upon entering her room, he pushed her in and
got her head hit on the wall. He immediately undressed while still holding the knife with one hand, and
ordered her to do the same. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He asked
her to hold his penis and insert it in her vagina, while still poking the knife to her. She followed, but the
appellant could not fully penetrate her in such a position. Next, he laid down on his back and
commanded her to mount him, but he cannot fully penetrate her. When Orita’s hands were both flat on
the floor, complainant escaped naked. She ran from room to room as appellant pursued her, and finally
jumped out through a window. She went to the municipal building nearby and knocked on the back
door for there was no answer. When the door opened, the policemen inside the building saw her crying
and naked. She was given a jacket for covering by the first policeman who saw her. The policemen
dashed to her boarding house but failed to apprehend the accused. She was brought to a hospital for
physical examination. Her PE revealed that she is still a virgin, with abrasions on the left breast, left and
right knees, and multiple pinpoint marks on her back, among others. The trial court convicted the
accused of frustrated rape.

Issue: Whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape?

Contention of the Accused: The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The trial
court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses; and the
trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the accused. He was
not able to fully penetrate in her. The accused also questions also the failure of the prosecution to
present other witnesses to corroborate the allegations in the complaint. The accused used the Article
266 of the RPC to show that he is not guilty of frustrated rape, and Article 6 to stress the difference of
consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies.

Contention of the People: The victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the
municipal building up to the time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras.
Rather than discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must
be viewed as adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies. The accused committed
rape.

Ruling: The decision of the RTC is hereby MODIFIED. The accused Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape [consummated] and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as
well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the
moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that
moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to
be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus,
the felony is consummated. [Art. 266 and Art. 6] We have set the uniform rule that for the
consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the
male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction
People vs. Mangalino

Facts:
At about 10 or 11 o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1984, Marichelle Carlos, 6 years old and a Grade I
pupil at the Moises Salvador Elementary School, Manila, was playing "takbuhan" alone at the first level
(ground floor) of the two-story apartment of the accused, Semion Mangalino, 53, married to 55-year old
Laura Gasmin, childless, a security guard by occupation, and residing at 1597-D Honradez Street,
Sampaloc, Manila. 3 At the time of the incident, Laura was in Balayan, Batangas, having left the day
before the incident. The accused and Marichelle's parents (Tomas and Bernardine Carlos) are neighbors,
their respective rented apartments being almost opposite each other.

During the morning of March 7, 1984, Ramil las Dulce, a 16-year old high school student occupying the
second floor of the apartment, for free and free board, too, a grandson of the accused (his mother, Edita
Onadia who lived with him upstairs, being an adopted daughter of the accused), and Laura's nephew,
Armando Ayroso, were allegedly playing chess 4 in the sala of the apartment. Ramil, a witness for the
defense, testified that he did not hear or see the accused calling out to Marichelle and motioning her to
go inside his bedroom or "sleeping quarters" at one end of the sala of the ground floor, opposite the
kitchen.

Once inside the bedroom, the accused handed the girl a two peso bill (P2.00) 5 and told her not to tell
anybody about his calling her to his bedroom. The girl assented. 6

The accused then laid Marichelle down, removed her jogging pants, and placed them beside her feet. 7
He kissed her and fondled her infantile breasts. 8 He inserted his finger into the private part of the
victim, 9 and then forcibly and repeatedly introduced his sexual organ into her undeveloped genitalia,
but in vain.

Issue:
WON accused is guilty of rape?

Held:
The heart of the matter is the violation of a child's incapacity to discern evil from good. As the behavior
of the victim towards the accused during the commission of the crime and her testimony before police
officers and in the court indicate, she had no awareness of the wrongfulness of the action of the accused
who was old enough to be her grandfather. Her willingness to lie down on and accept the P2.00 given
her by the accused, whom she looked up to as an elder person, a neighbor, and a friend of her family,
indicate not naivete, but the absolute trust and confidence of the very young in an older person. She
was incapable of reading malice or evil in his intentions. It is likely that it was only when she saw how
distraught her mother was at her telling of her story and the flurry of police and judicial activity stirred
up by her narration that her young and innocent mind was violently exposed to the reality of the
existence of evil in the hearts of men. The moment of truth, dawning so violently upon young and
innocent minds is contemptible. The older persons in the community should set themselves up as
models of proper decorum and high moral purpose for young children; it is they who should guide the
young, teach them, and nurture them in the way of the righteous. A 53-year-old man who instead
corrupts and violates the purity and dignity of a minor is morally depraved and should be punished to
the limits of the law.