B. Eminent Domain – iii.
When Exercised by Local Government Unit
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners, VS COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
FACTS
Overview:
In this case, the Mandaluyong City adopted a resolution authorizing the City Mayor to expropriate a
parcel of land belonging to the herein petitioners. The petitioners were alarmed. Before the City
Mayor could take the necessary steps for the expropriation of the land, petitioners filed a petition for SUFFIECIENT FOR THE Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation,12 a case in which the Municipality of
certiorari and prohibition in the RTC against the Sanguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong. Will the PURPOSE OF INITIATING Parañaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an ordinance, the Court ruled
petition prosper? Are the petitioners aggrieved, considering no expropriation proceeding took
place?
Facts proper:
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,044 square meters situated between
Nueve de Febrero Street and Fernandez Street in Barangay Mauway, Mandaluyong City. On
October 2, 1997, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City adopted Resolution No. 552,
Series of 1997, to authorize then City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal
steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the purpose of developing it for low cost
housing for the less privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
Notwithstanding that the enactment of Resolution No. 552 was but the initial step in the City’s
exercise of its power of eminent domain granted under Section 19 of the Local Government Code of
1991, the petitioners became alarmed, and filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC,
praying for the annulment of Resolution No. 552 due to its being unconstitutional, confiscatory,
improper, and without force and effect.
On January 31, 2001, the RTC ruled in favor of the City and dismissed the petition for lack of merit,
opining that certiorari did not lie against a legislative act of the City Government. However, on
February 19, 2002, the RTC, acting upon the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, set aside its
decision and declared that Resolution No. 552 was null and void. The RTC held that the petition
was not premature because the passage of Resolution No. 552 would already pave the way for the
City to deprive the petitioners and their heirs of their only property.
Aggrieved, the City appealed to the CA.
In its decision promulgated on October 18, 2002, the CA concluded that the reversal of the January
31, 2001 decision by the RTC was not justified because Resolution No. 552 deserved to be
accorded the benefit of the presumption of regularity and validity absent any sufficient showing to
the contrary.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied their motion. Thus, they appeal to the
Court
April 6, 2011
ISSUE RULING
1. WON A MERE 1. NO.
RESOLUTION OF
SANGGUNIANG A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the Sangguniang
PANGLUNGSOD IS Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation proceeding. Indeed, in
AN EXPROPRIATION so: (PLEASE SEE DIGESTED CASE OF PARANAQUE VS VM REALTY, THE RULING HERE IS
PROCEEDING COPIED FROM IT IN TOTO).
2. WON AN ACTION FOR 2. NO
PROHIBITION WILL LIE
AGAINST Prohibition does not lie against eminent domain – Verily, there can be no prohibition against a
EXPROPRIATION. procedure whereby the immediate possession of the land under expropriation proceedings
may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt adjudication
and payment of just compensation to the owner. This bar against prohibition comes from the
nature of the power of eminent domain as necessitating the taking of private land intended for
public use, and the interest of the affected landowner is thus made subordinate to the power
of the State. Once the State decides to exercise its power of eminent domain, the power of
judicial review becomes limited in scope, and the courts will be left to determine the
appropriate amount of just compensation to be paid to the affected landowners. Only when
the landowners are not given their just compensation for the taking of their property or when
there has been no agreement on the amount of just compensation may the remedy of
prohibition become available.
Here, however, the remedy of prohibition was not called for, considering that only a resolution
expressing the desire of the Sangguniang Panglungsod to expropriate the petitioners’
property was issued. As of then, it was premature for the petitioners to mount any judicial
challenge, for the power of eminent domain could be exercised by the City only through the
filing of a verified complaint in the proper court. Before the City as the expropriating authority
filed such verified complaint, no expropriation proceeding could be said to exist. Until then, the
petitioners as the owners could not also be deprived of their property under the power of
eminent domain.
WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision promulgated on October 18, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 70618.
G.R. No. L-18841 January 27, 1969
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, defendant-appellant
Facts:
The plaintiff, Republic of the Philippines, is a political entity exercising governmental powers through its
branches and instrumentalities, one of which is the Bureau of Telecommunications.
The defendant, Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT for short), is a public service
corporation holding a legislative franchise, to install, operate and maintain a telephone system throughout
the Philippines.
BOT soon after its creation set up its own Government Telephone System (GTS) utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting the trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government offices to call
private parties. The Bureau has extended its services to the general public. Through these trunk lines, a
Government Telephone System (GTS) subscriber could make a call to a PLDT subscriber in the same way that
the latter could make a call to the former.
BOT entered into an agreement with RCA Communications (an American Co. party not in interest of the case),
Inc. for a joint telephone service whereby the BOT would convey radio-telephone overseas call received by
RCA to and from local residents.
PLDT complained that BOT violated conditions since BOT had used the trunk lines not only for government
offices but even to serve private persons or the general public in competition with the business of PLDT. PLDT
sever the telephone connections of BOT resulting to isolation of the Philippines on telephone services from
the rest of the world except the US.
The BOT had proposed that both enter into an interconnecting agreement, with the government paying (on
a call basis) for all calls passing through the interconnecting facilities from the GTS to the PLDT. 18 The PLDT
replied that it was willing to enter into an agreement on overseas telephone service to Europe and Asian
countries provided that the BOT would submit to the jurisdiction and regulations of the Public Service
Commission and in consideration sharing of the gross revenues. The proposals were not accepted by either
party.
The plaintiff commenced suit against the defendant, praying in its complaint for judgment; (1) commanding
the PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff, through the BOT, for the use of the facilities of defendant's
telephone system throughout the Philippines under such terms and conditions as the court might consider
reasonable, and; (2) for a writ of preliminary injunction against the defendant company to restrain the
severance of the existing telephone connections and/or restore those severed.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment that it could not compel the PLDT to enter into an agreement
with the Bureau because the parties were not in agreement;
Both parties appealed.
Issue/s:
Whether or not interconnection of Government Telephone System and PLDT can be subject for expropriation.
Ruling:
Yes.
 The Republic of the Philippines through Bureau of Telecommunications may in the exercise of the
sovereign power of eminent domain, require the Telephone Company to permit interconnection of the
Government Telephone System and that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may
required, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.
 The Republic’s cause of action is predicated upon the radio telephonic isolation of the BOT facilities from
the outside world if the severance of interconnection were to be carried out by the PLDT, thereby
preventing the BOT from properly discharging its functions, to the prejudice of the general public. The
case should be for the compulsory rendering of interconnection of services by the telephone company
upon such terms and conditions as the court may determine to be just.
 Since the lower court should have proceeded to treat the case as one of condemnation of such services
independently of contract and proceeded to determine the just and reasonable compensation for the
same, instead of dismissing the petition.
Under Section 79 of EO 94 paragraph (b)
To investigate, consolidate, negotiate for, operate and maintain wire-telephone or radio telephone communication service
throughout the Philippines by utilizing such existing facilities in cities, towns, and provinces as may be found feasible and under
such terms and conditions or arrangements with the present owners or operators thereof as may be agreed upon to the
satisfaction of all concerned.
Under Section 6 Article XIII 1935 Constitution “Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources.”
The State may, in the exercise of national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation
and communication, and upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the government.
Charter of PLDT expressly provides that Section 14.
The rights therein granted shall not be exclusive, and the rights and power to grant to any corporation, association or person
other than the grantee franchise for the telephone or electrical transmission of message or signals shall not be impaired or
affected by the granting of this franchise.
PLDT’s right to just compensation for the services rendered to the GTS and its users is herein recognized and preserved. To
uphold PLDT’s contention is to subordinate the needs of the general public to the right of the PLDT to deprive profit from the
future expansion of its services under its non-exclusive franchise.
 The acceptance by the defendant of the payment of rentals, despite its knowledge that the plaintiff had extended the use of
the trunk lines to commercial purposes, continuously since 1948, implies assent by the defendant to such extended use. Since
this relationship has been maintained for a long time and the public has patronized both telephone systems, and their
interconnection is to the public convenience, it is too late for the defendant to claim misuse of its facilities, and it is not now
at liberty to unilaterally sever the physical connection of the trunk lines.
 There is high authority for the position that, when such physical connection has been voluntarily made, under a fair and
workable arrangement and guaranteed by contract and the continuous line has come to be patronized and established as
a great public convenience, such connection shall not in breach of the agreement be severed by one of the parties. In that
case, the public is held to have such an interest in the arrangement that its rights must receive due consideration.
 "Such physical connection cannot be required as of right, but if such connection is voluntarily made by contract, as is here
alleged to be the case, so that the public acquires an interest in its continuance, the act of the parties in making such
connection is equivalent to a declaration of a purpose to waive the primary right of independence, and it imposes upon the
property such a public status that it may not be disregarded"
 "Where private property is by the consent of the owner invested with a public interest or privilege for the benefit of the
public, the owner can no longer deal with it as private property only, but must hold it subject to the right of the public in the
exercise of that public interest or privilege conferred for their benefit.
REPUBLIC V. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN
FACTS:
NIA is a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under R.A. 3601. It is
primarily responsible for irrigation development and management in the country. To carry out
its purpose, NIA was specifically authorized under P.D. 552 to exercise the power of eminent
domain.
NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-Marigadao
Irrigation Project. On 08 September 1994, it filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a
Complaint for the expropriation of a portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of
14,497.91 square meters.
NIA filed a Second Amended Complaint to allege properly the area sought to be expropriated,
the exact address of the expropriated properties and the owners thereof. NIA further prayed
that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the properties after depositing with the
Philippine National Bank the amount of ₱19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.
Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and Counterclaim.
They alleged that NIA had no authority to expropriate portions of their land, because it was
not a sovereign political entity; that it was not necessary to expropriate their properties,
because there was an abandoned government property adjacent to theirs, where the project
could pass through; that Lot No. 3080 was no longer owned by the Rural Bank of Kabacan; that
NIAs valuation of their expropriated properties was inaccurate because of the improvements
on the land that should have placed its value at ₱5 million; and that NIA never negotiated with
the landowners before taking their properties for the project, causing permanent and
irreparable damages to their properties valued at ₱250,000.
ISSUE/S
1. WON THE FINDING OF JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS
IS CORRECT.
2. WON THE PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION FOR LOT NO. 3080 SHOULD BE
MADE TO RESPONDENTS MARGARITA TABOADA AND PORTIA CHARISMA
RUTH ORTIZ.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The 12 August 2008 CA Decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 65196, awarding just compensation to the defendants as owners of the
expropriated properties and deleting the inclusion of the value of the excavated soil, is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The case is hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the
reception of evidence to establish the present owner of Lot No. 3080.
RATIO:
On the first issue, in expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The commissioners
properly determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties
were expropriated by petitioner.
The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to
determine the just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee
members made an ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also
determined the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on
the properties. When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land and the
improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members to carry
out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements.
The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated areas.
They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the expropriated
properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other factors such as
distance from the highway and the nearby town center.Further, the committee members also
considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated by the Province of Cotabato
on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of the properties and the improvements for
taxation purposes.
We can readily deduce from these established facts that the committee members endeavored a
rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to the owners of the
expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to, oversimplify the process
undertaken by the committee in arriving at its recommendations, because these were not based
on mere conjectures and unreliable data.
On the second issue, the Petition is meritorious.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court, which had awarded the payment of
just compensation intended for Lot No. 3080 registered in the name of the Rural Bank of
Kabacan to the defendants-intervenors on the basis of the non-participation of the rural bank
in the proceedings and the latters subsequent Manifestation that it was no longer the owner of
that lot. The appellate court erred on this matter.
It should be noted that eminent domain cases involve the expenditure of public
funds. In this kind of proceeding, we require trial courts to be more circumspect in their
evaluation of the just compensation to be awarded to the owner of the expropriated property.
Thus, it was imprudent for the appellate court to rely on the Rural Bank of Kabacans mere
declaration of non-ownership and non-participation in the expropriation proceeding to
validate defendants-intervenors claim of entitlement to that payment.
 The law imposes certain legal requirements in order for a conveyance of real
property to be valid. It should be noted that Lot No. 3080 is a registered parcel of land covered
by TCT No. T-61963. In order for the reconveyance of real property to be valid, the conveyance
must be embodied in a public document and registered in the office of the Register of Deeds
where the property is situated.
We have scrupulously examined the records of the case and found no proof of
conveyance or evidence of transfer of ownership of Lot No. 3080 from its registered owner, the
Rural Bank of Kabacan, to defendants-intervenors. As it is, the TCT is still registered in the
name of the said rural bank. It is not disputed that the bank did not participate in the
expropriation proceedings, and that it manifested that it no longer owned Lot No. 3080. The
trial court should have nevertheless required the rural bank and the defendants-intervenors to
show proof or evidence pertaining to the conveyance of the subject lot. The court cannot rely
on mere inference, considering that the payment of just compensation is intended to be
awarded solely owner based on the latters proof of ownership.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Carmen M. Vda. De Castellvi, et al.
G.R. No. L-20620 August 15, 1974
Case Digest
FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
entered into a lease agreement over a land in Pampanga with Castellvi on a year-to-
year basis. When Castellvi gave notice to terminate the lease in 1956, the AFP refused
because of the permanent installations and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00
that were erected and already established on the property. She then instituted an
ejectment proceeding against the AFP. In 1959, however, the republic commenced the
expropriation proceedings for the land in question.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compensation should be determined as of 1947 or 1959.
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that the “taking” should not be reckoned as of
1947, and that just compensation should not be determined on the basis of the value of
the property as of that year.
The requisites for taking are:
1. The expropriator must enter a private property;
2. The entry must be for more than a momentary period;
3. It must be under warrant or color of authorities;
4. The property must be devoted for public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; and
5. The utilization of the property for public use must be such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.
Only requisites 1, 3, and 4 were present. It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of
Catellvi's property for purposes of eminent domain cannot be considered to have taken
place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to occupy the property as lessee thereof.
Under Sec. 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, “just compensation” is to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. The Supreme Court has ruled that when the
taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint
for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed in possession of the
Castellvi property, by authority of court, on August 10, 1959. The “taking” of the
Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be paid
must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent
domain was filed.
Republic VS Vda. De Castellvi
Facts:
Appeal form the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, an
expropriation proceeding.
Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (referred to as the Republic)
filed, on June 26, 1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendants-
appellees, Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi (Castellvi) and Maria Nieves Toledo Gozun
(Toledo-Gozun) over parcels of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga.
The Republic entered into a lease agreement with Castellvi on July 1, 1947 on
a year to year basis. The Republic occupied, erected and installed facilities for the
Philippine Air Force the land of Castellvi. Before the expiration of the contract of lease
on June 30, 1956, the Republic sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. When
AFP refused to vacate the leased premises after the termination of contract, Castellvi
wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff demanding that the property be vacated in 30 days
for they had decided to subdivide the property in order to sell to the general public.
Thereafter, the Chief of Staff answered her saying that it was difficult for the army to
vacate the premises in view of the permanent installations and other facilities worth
almost 500k and there being no recourse to acquire the her property by means of
expropriation proceeding to be recommended to the Pres. Castellvi then brought suit
to eject the Phil Air Force from her property. While the ejectment case was pending,
the Republic instituted an expropriation proceedings, the Republic was placed in
possession of the lands on Aug. 10, 1959. The trial court appointed 3 Commissioners
to determine the actual fair market value of the lands sought to be expropriated. The
Commissioners recommended unanimously that the lowest price was P10 per square
meter for both the lands of Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun. The court then ruled that
Castellvi and Toledo-Gozun be paid in the amount of P10 per square meter for their
expropriated lands. But the Defendants contended that it should be P15 per square.
On one hand, the Republic averred that the fair market value of the lands of the
appellees was P.20 or at P2,000 per hectare, as the lands in the year 1949 were valued
at such.
Issue:
Whether or not the “taking” of the properties under expropriation
commenced upon the filing of the case or WHO the lower court erred in determining
the value of lands expropriated.
Ruling:
No. The “taking” of the Castellvi property should not be reckoned as of the
year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the property pursuant to the contract of
lease. It must be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent
domain was filed.
The Republic was ordered to pay the amount of P5 per square meter for the
lands expropriated of Castellvi (P3,796,495) and Toledo-Gozun (P2,695,225) with 6%
per annum interest until fully paid, attorney’s fees and costs of suits.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the NATIONAL
POWER CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q.
BORBON, AND COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
G.R. No.: 165354
Date: 12 January 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts: NAPOCOR entered a property located in Barangay San Isidro, Batangas
City in order to construct and maintain transmission lines. Respondents heirs of
Saturnino Q. Borbon owned the property. NAPOCOR filed a complaint for
expropriation in the Regional Trial Court in Batangas City (RTC), seeking the
acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property.
The respondents staunchly maintained that NAPOCOR had not negotiated with
them before entering the property and that the entry was done without their
consent; nonetheless, they tendered no objection to NAPOCOR’s entry provided
it would pay just compensation not only for the portion sought to be expropriated
but for the entire property whose potential was greatly diminished, if not totally
lost, due to the project.
During the pendency of an appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion
to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings, informing that the parties failed to
reach an amicable agreement; that the property sought to be expropriated was no
longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening retirement of the
transmission lines installed on the respondents’ property; that because the public
purpose for which such property would be used thereby ceased to exist, the
proceedings for expropriation should no longer continue, and the State was now
duty-bound to return the property to its owners; and that the dismissal or
discontinuance of the expropriation proceedings was in accordance with Section
4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not the expropriation proceedings should be discontinued or
dismissed pending appeal.
Ruling: The dismissal of the proceedings for expropriation at the instance of
NAPOCOR is proper, but, conformably with Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, the dismissal or discontinuance of the proceedings must be upon such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Before anything more, we remind the parties about the nature of the power of
eminent domain. The right of eminent domain is “the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property of all
citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose.” But the exercise of
such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements should underlie the
Government’s exercise of the power of eminent domain, namely: (1) that it is for a
particular public purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property
owner. These requirements partake the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Public use, in common acceptation, means “use by the public.” However, the
concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit
of the public. “Public use” has now been held to be synonymous with “public
interest,” “public benefit,” and “public convenience.”
It is essential that the element of public use of the property be maintained
throughout the proceedings for expropriation. The effects of abandoning the public
purpose were explained in Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v.
Lozada, Sr., to wit:
More particularly, with respect to the element of public use, the expropriator
should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition
for expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose.If not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said
property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise,
the judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be devoted.
Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due process of law, and
the judgment would violate the property owner’s right to justice, fairness and
equity.
It is not denied that the purpose of the plaintiff was to acquire the land in
question for public use. The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the
expropriation of lands, under the power of eminent domain, is public use. That
being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the proceedings that
the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and
should be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all
except when the expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even
during the pendency of the appeal or at any other stage of the proceedings. If, for
example, during the trial in the lower court, it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the court that the expropriation is not for some public use, it would
be the duty and the obligation of the trial court to dismiss the action. And even
during the pendency of the appeal, if it should be made to appear to the
satisfaction of the appellate court that the expropriation is not for public use,
then it would become the duty and the obligation of the appellate court to dismiss
it.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the
expropriation proceedings of the element of public use. To continue with the
expropriation proceedings despite the definite cessation of the public purpose of the
project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in favor of the
expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to discontinue the proceedings subject
to the conditions to be shortly mentioned hereunder, and requires the return of
the property to the respondents. Having said that, we must point out that
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying
just compensation to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as
required by law prior to its entry. The Constitution is explicit in obliging the
Government and its entities to pay just compensation before depriving any
person of his or her property for public use. Considering that in the process of
installing transmission lines, NAPOCOR destroyed some fruit trees and plants
without payment, and the installation of the transmission lines went through the
middle of the land as to divide the property into three lots, thereby effectively
rendering the entire property inutile for any future use, it would be unfair for
NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance of their
property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the
possession of the property.
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the
property to the respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them
because their property would not be taken by NAPOCOR. Instead of full market
value of the property, therefore, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for
the disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory
damages.
This should mean that the compensation must be based on what they actually
lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its use,
including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s
construction of the transmission lines. Considering that the dismissal of the
expropriation proceedings is a development occurring during the appeal, the
Court now treats the dismissal of the expropriation proceedings as producing the
effect of converting the case into an action for damages. For that purpose, the
Court remands the case to the court of origin for further proceedings. The court
of origin shall treat the case as if originally filed as an action for damages.
 REPUBLIC OF THE PH, represented by the NAPOCOR v.
HEIRS OF SATURNINO Q. BORBON and CA
GR No. 165354 12 January 2015
By Kylie Dado
FACTS:
NAPOCOR entered a property in Brgy. San Isidro, Batangas
 In order to construct and maintain transmission lines for the 230 KV Mahabang
Parang-Pinamucan Power Transmission Project
o The heirs owned the propery (14, 257 sq. m.)
NAPOCOR filed a COMPLAINT in the RTC-Batangas
 Seeking - acquisition of an easement of right of way over a portion of the property involving
an area of only 6,326 square meters, more or less
 Allegation:
o It had negotiated w/ the respondents but they failed to reach any agreement
o It was willing to deposit P9,790.00 representing the assessed value of the portion
sought to be expropriated
 Prayer:
o Issuance of a writ of possession upon deposit to enable it to:
1. Enter and take possession and control of the affected portion of the
property
2. Demolish all improvements existing
3. Commence construction of the transmission line project
4. Appointment of 3 commissioners to determine just compensation
Heirs’ ANSWER:
 NAPOCOR had not negotiated with them before entering the property (Entry w/o consent),
destroying some fruit trees without payment, and installing 5 woodpoles for its project
 Area being expropriated only covered the portion directly affected by the transmission lines
 Remaining portion of the property was also affected because the transmission line passed
through the center of the land, thereby dividing the land into 3 lots
 Presence of the high tension transmission line had rendered the entire property inutile for any
future use and capabilities
 NONETHELESS, they tendered no objection provided it would pay just compensation not only
for the portion sought to be expropriated but for the entire property whose potential was
greatly diminished, if not totally lost, due to the project;
 Their property is an industrial land
 Sought:
o Dismissal of the complaint
o Payment of P1K/sq. m. & attorney’s fees
o To be allowed to nominate their representative to the panel of commissioners to be
appointed by the trial court
PRE-TRIAL was conducted and the parties stipulated on the location, number of heirs, names of the
person upon whom title to the property was issued, and the ownership & possession of the property.
 RTC directed the parties to submit names of their nominees to sit in the panel of commissions
within 10 days from the date of pre-trial
RTC constituted the panel of 3 commissioners.
 2 commissioners submitted a joint report, and found:
o property was classified industrial land located within the Industrial 2 Zone
o although it is used to be an agricultural land, it was reclassified to industrial for
appraisal/taxation purposes
o Reclassification was made on the basis of a certification issued by the Zoning
Administrator
 2 commissioners appraised the value @ P550/sq. m.
 3rd commissioner filed a separate report
o Recommended the payment of easement fee of at least 10% of the assessed value
indicated in the tax declaration + damages + improvements affected + tower
occupancy
Parties submitted their OBJECTIONS:
 HEIRS - NAPOCOR should compensate them for the entire property at the rate of P550.00/ sq.
m. because the the property was already classified as industrial land at the time NAPOCOR
entered it
 NAPOCOR – insisted that the property was classified as agricultural land at the time of its
taking, and only seeking an easement of right of way over a portion of the property, not the
entire area so, it should only pay 10% of the assessed value of the portion
RTC DECISION:
 Price to be paid – value at the time of taking, which is the date of entry to the property or the
date of the filing of the complaint
o There is no evidence as to when NAPOCOR entered so the reference point should be
the date of filing – May 5, 1995
 Gave more weight to the Joint Report of the 2 commissioners
o NOTE: the 2 commissioners who submitted the Joint Report are gov’t EE, while the
one who has a separate report is a private lawyer representing the plaintiff
 Ordered NAPOCOR to pay:
1. Just compen for the whole area (14K sq. m.) @ the rate of P550/sqm
2. Legal rate of interest from May 5 until full payment
3. Costs of suit
CA DECISION: Affirmed but modified the area to be covered – 6,326 sqm
NAPOCOR appealed.
During the pendency of the appeal, NAPOCOR filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings stating that the
negotiations were going on with a view of amicable settlement.
 HOWEVER, a year after, NAPOCOR filed a Manifestation and Motion to DISCONTINUE
Expropriation Proceedings as:
o they failed to reach an agreement
o property is no longer necessary for public purpose because of the intervening
retirement of the transmission lines installed on the heirs’ property
o public purpose ceased to exist
o prayed that the compensation be reduced by the equivalent of the benefit they
received from the land during the time of its occupation
o Basis in dismissing the proceedings: Metropolitan Water District vs. De Los Angeles,
land sought to be expropriated was no longer “indispensably necessary” in the
maintenance and operation of petitioner’s waterworks system
ISSUE: W/N THE EXPROPRIATTION PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED/DISMISSED PENDING
APPEAL
SC: YES
Public use is the fundamental basis for the action for expropriation; hence, NAPOCOR’s motion to
discontinue the proceedings is warranted and should be granted.
As discussed in the case of Metropolitan Water District vs. De Los Reyes:
The fundamental basis then of all actions brought for the expropriation of lands, under the power of
eminent domain, is public use. That being true, the very moment that it appears at any stage of the
proceedings that the expropriation is not for a public use, the action must necessarily fail and should
be dismissed, for the reason that the action cannot be maintained at all except when the
expropriation is for some public use. That must be true even during the pendency of the appeal or at
any other stage of the proceedings.
 It is notable in that case that it was made subject to several conditions in order to address the
dispossession of the defendants of their land, and the inconvenience, annoyance and damages
suffered by the defendants on account of the proceedings. Accordingly, the Court remanded
the case to the trial court for the issuance of a writ of possession ordering Metropolitan Water
District to immediately return possession of the land to the defendants, and for the
determination of damages in favor of the defendants, the claims for which must be presented
within 30 days from the return of the record to the court of origin and notice thereof.
In this case, NAPOCOR seeks to discontinue the expropriation proceedings on the ground that the
transmission lines constructed on the respondents’ property had already been retired.
Verily, the retirement of the transmission lines necessarily stripped the expropriation proceedings of
the element of public use. To continue with the expropriation proceedings despite the definite
cessation of the public purpose of the project would result in the rendition of an invalid judgment in
favor of the expropriator due to the absence of the essential element of public use.
No board resolution to discontinue the proceedings
Despite the lack of the board resolution, therefore, the Court now considers the documents (such as
the Memorandum &Certificate of Inspection/Accomplishment) attached to NAPOCOR’s Manifestation
and Motion to Discontinue Expropriation Proceedings to be sufficient to establish that the
expropriation sought is no longer for some public purpose.
NAPOCOR’s entry without the owner’s consent
NAPOCOR entered the property without the owners’ consent and without paying just compensation
to the respondents. Neither did it deposit any amount as required by law prior to its entry.
 It would be unfair for NAPOCOR not to be made liable to the respondents for the disturbance
of their property rights from the time of entry until the time of restoration of the possession
of the property
Liability of NAPOCOR; Reckoning Point
There is sufficient showing that NAPOCOR entered into and took possession of the property as early as
in March 1993 without the benefit of first filing a petition for eminent domain.
 For all intents and purposes, therefore, March 1993 is the reckoning point of NAPOCOR’s
taking of the property, instead of May 5, 1995, the time NAPOCOR filed the petition for
expropriation. (Basis: Ansaldo vs. Tantuico)
No just compensation, only damages
In view of the discontinuance of the proceedings and the eventual return of the property to the
respondents, there is no need to pay “just compensation” to them because their property would not
be taken by NAPOCOR.
 Instead of full market value, NAPOCOR should compensate the respondents for the
disturbance of their property rights from the time of entry in March 1993 until the time of
restoration of the possession by paying to them actual or other compensatory damages.
(Basis: Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Lozada, Sr.)
Basis of damages
Basis would be the actual lost as a result and by reason of their dispossession of the property and of its
use, including the value of the fruit trees, plants and crops destroyed by NAPOCOR’s construction of
the transmission lines
Conversion of the proceedings: Expropriation Proceedings  Action for Damages
Court remands the case to the court of origin for further proceedings, with instruction to enable the
parties to fully litigate the action for damages.

United States v. Causby
Brief Fact Summary. Respondents claim that their property was taken, within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, by the regular army and navy aircraft
flights over their house and chicken farm.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The airspace is a public highway, but if the
landowner is to have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive
control over the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere.
Facts. Respondents own 2.8 acres near an airport outside of Greensboro,
North Carolina. Respondents’ property contained a house and a chicken farm.
The end of one of the runways of the airport was 2,220 feet from Respondents’
property, and the glide path passed over the property at 83 feet, which is 67
feet above the house, 63 feet above the barn, and 18 feet above the highest
tree. The use by the United States of this airport is pursuant to a lease
beginning June 1, 1942, and ending June 30, 1942, with provisions for renewal
until June 30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emergency,
whichever is earlier. The United States’ four motored bombers make loud
noises when flying above the property, and have very bright lights.
Respondents’ chicken farm production had to stop, because 150 chickens were
killed by flying into walls from fright. In the Court of Claims, it was found that
the United States had taken an easement over the property on June 1, 1942,
and that the val
ue of the property depreciation as the result of the easement was $2,000.00.
The United States petitioned for certiorari, which was granted.
Issue. Has the Respondents’ property been taken within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment?
Held. Yes. But the case is remanded for a determination of the value of the
easement and whether the easement was permanent or temporary.
The court noted the common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the
sky above the land. However, the court notes that an act of Congress had given
the United States exclusive national sovereignty over the air space. The court
noted that common sense made the common law doctrine inapplicable.
However, the court found that the common law doctrine did not control the
present case. The United States had conceded in oral argument that if flights
over the Respondents’ property rendered it uninhabitable then there would be
a taking compensable under the Fifth Amendment. The measure of the value
of the property taken is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain.
The airspace is a public highway. But it is obvious that if the landowner is to
have the full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. If this were not true then
landowners could not build buildings, plant trees or run fences.
The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the
public domain. The court does not set the precise limits of the line of
demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like here, they
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the
enjoyment of the land. The Court of Claims must, upon remand, determine the
value of the easement and whether it is a temporary or permanent easement.
Dissent. The dissent would reverse the decision of the Court of Claims and
hold that there has been no taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.
This is because of the modern nature of the airplane, and the desire to avoid
confusion.
Discussion. The national emergency, World War II, meant that the airport,
which was not previously used by large planes, would be the home to large
bombers. The use of the airspace above Respondents’ home and farm was
not a problem previously, because the flights were sporadic and not nearly as
loud as the bombers.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS (DPWH), petitioners vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS
AND CARMELITA C. LLAMAS
G.R. No. 194190 January 25, 2017
Facts:
On April 23, 1990, the Department of Public Works and Highways initiated an action
for expropriation for the widening of Dr. A. Santos Ave. (also known as Sucat Road)
in what was then the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila. This action was
brought against 26 defendants, none of whom are respondents in this case.
On November 2, 1993, the Commissioners appointed by the Regional Trial Court in
the expropriation case submitted a resolution recommending that just
compensation for the expropriated areas be set to P12,000.00 per square meter.
On January 27, 1994, the Llamas Spouses filed before the Regional Trial Court a
"Most Urgent and Respectful Motion for Leave to be Allowed Intervention as
Defendants-Intervenors-Oppositors." They claimed that they were excluded from
the expropriation case despite having properties affected by the road widening
project. After a hearing on this Motion, the Regional Trial Court allowed the Llamas
Spouses to file their Answer-in-Intervention.
The Llamas Spouses filed their Answer-in-Intervention on March 21, 1994. In it, they
claimed that a total area of 298 square meters was taken from them during the road
widening project.
The Llamas Spouses filed a "Most Urgent Motion for the Issuance of an Order
Directing the Immediate Payment of 40% of Zonal Value of Expropriated Land and
Improvements." On December 9, 1994, the Department of Public Works and
Highways filed its Comment/Opposition to the Llamas Spouses' Motion. On May 29,
1996, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment of the value of
the lots of the defendants in the expropriation case. After years of not obtaining a
favorable ruling, the Llamas Spouses filed a "Motion for Issuance of an Order to Pay
and/or Writ of Execution.
The Department of Public Works and Highways and the Llamas Spouses filed a Joint
Manifestation and Motion seeking to suspend the Llamas Spouses' pending Motions.
In an August 8, 2005 hearing, the Department of Public Works and Highways
manifested that the non-payment of the Llamas Spouses' claims was due to their
continued failure to comply with their undertaking. On the same date, the Llamas
Spouses filed a Manifestation seeking the payment of their claims. The Department
of Public Works and Highways then filed a Comment/Opposition. On October 8,
2007, the Regional Trial Court issued the Order directing the payment to the Llamas
Spouses of just compensation. It denied payment for areas covered by TCT No. In
the Order dated May 19, 2008, the Regional Trial Court denied the Llamas Spouses'
Motion for Reconsideration. The Llamas Spouses then filed before the Court of
Appeals a Petition for Certiorari. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and ordered the Department of Public
Works and Highways to pay the Llamas Spouses just compensation for a total of 237
square meters across three (3) lots, inclusive of the portions excluded by the
Regional Trial Court. The Court of Appeals added that the amount due to the Llamas
Spouses was subject to 12% interest per annum from the time of the taking.
Issue: Whether or not just compensation must be paid to respondents Francisco and
Carmelita Llamas for the subdivision road lots covered by TCT No. 179165?
Ruling: Yes. Petitioner's reliance on the 1991 White Plains Decision is misplaced. The
same 1991 Decision was not the end of litigation relating to the widening of
Katipunan Road. The owner and developer of White Plains Subdivision, Quezon City
Development and Financing Corporation (QCDFC), went on to file motions for
reconsideration. The second of these motions was granted in this Court's July 27,
1994 Resolution. This Resolution expressly discarded the compulsion underscored by
the Department of Public Works and Highways, and the dispositive portion of the
1991 White Plains Decision was modified accordingly. As this Court recounted in its
1998 Decision in White Plains Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.
The 1998 White Plains Decision unequivocally repudiated the 1991 White Plains
Decision's allusion to a compulsion on subdivision developers to cede subdivision
road lots to government, so much that it characterized such compulsion as an
"illegal taking." It did away with any preference for government's capacity to compel
cession and, instead, emphasized the primacy of subdivision owners' and
developers' freedom in retaining or disposing of spaces developed as roads.
The Department of Public Works and Highways makes no claim here that the road
lots covered by TCT No. 179165 have actually been donated to the government or
that their transfer has otherwise been consummated by respondents. It only
theorizes that they have been automatically transferred. Neither has expropriation
ever been fully effected. Precisely, we are resolving this expropriation controversy
only now.
Respondents have not made any positive act enabling the City Government of
Parañaque to acquire dominion over the disputed road lots. Therefore, they retain
their private character. Accordingly, just compensation must be paid to respondents
as the government takes the road lots in the course of a road widening project.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed October
14, 2010 Decision of the Fifth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
104178 is AFFIRMED.
BARTOLATA vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 223334
This is a claim for just compensation on the ground that the portion of his property
that was used by the government was subject to an easement of right of way
FACTS:
Bartolata acquired ownership over a parcel of land by virtue of an Order of Award
from the Bureau of Lands. Subsequently, respondents acquired 223 sq. m. of
petitioner’s property for the development of the Metro Manila Skyway Project. The
parties agreed that in exchange for the acquisition, petitioner would be paid just
compensation for the appraised value of the property, an aggregate of ₱l2,265,000
for the entire affected area. Subsequently, respondents appropriated ₱l,480,000 in
favor of petitioner as partial payment.
Since the date of initial payment, petitioner continuously demanded from
respondents the balance but the latter refused to settle their outstanding obligation
prompting petitioner to file a Complaint for a sum of money.
Respondents raised that the Order of Award from the Bureau of Lands granting title
to petitioner over the subject property states that the “land shall be subject to the
easement and servitudes provided for in Section 109-114 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended.” They also then argued that pursuant to Section 112 of CA 141 the
government is entitled to an easement of right of way not exceeding 60 meters in
width, without need of payment for just compensation, save for the value of
improvements existing and any payment for the government’s use of the easement,
unless made to compensate the landowner for the value of the improvements
affected, is unwarranted. Thus, they prayed, that the ₱l,480,000 partial payment
made to petitioner for the acquisition of the latter’s property, which was well within
the 60-meter threshold width, be returned to the government.
Petitioner contended that PD 2004 which amended RA 730 allegedly removed the
statutory lien attached to the subject property. Respondents, however, countered
that petitioner could not have benefited from PD 2004 since the removal of
restrictions and encumbrances contained in PD 2004 only applies to public land sold
by the government for residential purposes without public auction, whereas
petitioner was awarded the subject property through a public auction sale.
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the property acquired by virtue of an Order of Award is
subject easement of right of way in favor of the government despite the enactment
of PD 2004.
YES. First, no less than the Order of Award granting petitioner title over the subject
property reads that the parcel of land conferred to him is subject to the restrictions
contained under Sec. 109-114 of CA 141, which necessarily includes the easement
provided in Sec. 112. Notably, petitioner was awarded the subject property in 1987,
while PD 2004, which allegedly removed all encumbrances and restrictions from
awarded properties, was signed into law much earlier in 1985. This alone raises
suspicion on the applicability of PD 2004 to the subject property.
Second, the Court finds no reversible error in the RTC and CA’s interpretation of the
coverage of PD 2004 and RA 730. The title of RA 730 itself supports the rulings of the
courts a quo that the laws petitioner relied upon only cover the sale of public lands
for residential purposes and to qualified applicants without public auction. xxx
x x x RA 730 was crafted as an exception to Secs. 61 and 67 of CA 141. These
provisions govern the mode of disposition of the alienable public lands enumerated
under Sec. 59 of the same law. Synthesizing the provisions, CA 141 provides that
public lands under Sec. 59 can only be disposed for residential, commercial,
industrial, and other similar purposes through lease or sale, in both cases, “to the
highest bidder. ” The conduct of an auction is then required under Secs. 61 and 67.
By way of exception, however, RA 730 now allows the sale of public lands without
public auction to qualified applicants. It is through this exceptional case of purchase
of public land without public auction wherein PD 2004 would apply.
Under its plain meaning, only public lands acquired by qualified applicants without
public auction and for residential purposes are free from any restrictions against
encumbrance or alienation. The provision is inapplicable to petitioner’s property
which was awarded to petitioner not in accordance with RA 730, but through public
auction.
What is more, the easement of right of way under Sec. 112 of CA 141 is not
subsumed in the phrase “restrictions against encumbrance or alienation” appearing
in the amendment introduced by PD 2004. xxx
ISSUE # 2: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to just compensation.
NO.
The seminal case of Andaya likewise involved property subject to the statutory lien
under Sec. 112 of CA 141. xxx
The Court affirmed the CA’s interpretation of Sec. 112 of CA 141 and ruled that the
Republic was under no obligation to pay therein respondent Andaya just
compensation in enforcing its right of way. Be that as it may, the Court did not
foreclose the possibility of the property owner being entitled to just compensation if
the enforcement of the right of way resulted in the “taking” of the portions not
subject to the legal easement.
Jurisprudence teaches us that “taking,” in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain, “occurs not only when the government actually deprives or dispossesses
the property owner of his property or of its ordinary use, but also when there is a
practical destruction or material impairment of the value of his property.” xxx
To recapitulate, two elements must concur before the property owner will be
entitled to just compensation for the remaining property under Sec. 112 of CA 141:
(1) that the remainder is not subject to the statutory lien of right of way; and (2) that
the enforcement of the right of way results in the practical destruction or material
impairment of the value of the remaining property, or in the property owner being
dispossessed or otherwise deprived of the normal use of the said remainder.
ISSUE # 3: Whether or not the petitioner should return the initial payment made by
the respondents in the amount of ₱l,480,000.
NO. Respondents are barred by estoppel from recovering the initial payment of
₱l,480,000 from petitioner
Guilty of reiteration, Sec. 112 of CA 141 precludes petitioner from claiming just
compensation for the government’s enforcement of its right of way. The contract
allegedly entered by the parties for the government’s acquisition of the affected
portion of the property in exchange for just compensation is then void ab initio for
being contrary to law. Consequently, petitioner has no right to collect just
compensation for the government’s use of the 223 square meter lot. Anent the
₱l,480,000 partial payment already made by respondents, such amount paid shall be
governed by the provisions on solutio indebiti or unjust enrichment. xxx
Regardless, respondents’ action to compel petitioner to return what was mistakenly
delivered is now barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The doctrine is based upon the
grounds of public policy, fair dealing, good faith and justice, and its purpose is to
forbid one to speak against his own act, representations, or commitments to the
injury of one to whom they were directed and who reasonably relied thereon. The
doctrine of estoppel springs from equitable principles and the equities in the case.
As a general rule, the State cannot be barred by estoppel by the mistakes or errors
of its officials or agents. But as jurisprudence elucidates, the doctrine is subject to
exceptions, viz:
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except [in
rare] and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate
to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They
must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special
cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government
must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must
not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations … , the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals.
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS
ASSOCIATION, GR No. 189185, 2016-08-16
Facts:
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to
impose a ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural
entities within Davao City
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge
the constitutionality of the ordinance
They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power;
violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without
due process of law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 511[6] of Republic Act
No. 7160
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance
No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power[13] under the
General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code;[14] that the ordinance, being
based on a valid classification, was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that
aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of pesticides application because it
exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial drift;[15] and
that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be
invalidated only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of
the RTC.[22] It declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and
unconstitutional for being unreasonable and oppressive;
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the
public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand,
and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the
other.
Issues:
whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of
police power: (a) in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in
Davao City under Section 5; (b) in decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to
other modes of pesticide application under Section 5; and (c) in requiring the
maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all agricultural
lands in Davao City.
Ruling:
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao Cityenacted Ordinance No. 0309-07under its
corporate powers... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. It is under this
milieu that the questioned ordinance should be appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks
due to their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of
the ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that
will promote the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such
authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to
enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local
government and passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.[108] In order to
declare it as a valid piece of local legislation, it must also comply with the following
substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.[109]In the State's exercise of
police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and
burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.[110] A local government
unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the
following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished State governs impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on
from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; and (2) the means differences that are irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things
accomplished and not unduly oppressive.[111] The first requirement refers to the Equal
without distinction,[120] nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to
Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
which it is directed or by the territory in which it is to operate.[121] The guaranty of
Constitution.[112]Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a
equal protection envisions equality among equals determined according to a valid
sufficient justification for the Government's action.[113] This means that in exercising
classification.[122] If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
police power the local government unit must not arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as the ordinance
another.[123] In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial
realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are
distinctions; (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing
reasonably necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the
conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive a due process challenge.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will
appropriately applies herein. Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the
consume considerable time and financial resources given the topography and
reasonable relationship between the means and the purpose of the ordinance; and (2)
geographical features of the plantations.[117] As such, the conversion could not be
examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial spraying is based on a
completed within the short timeframe of three months. Requiring the respondents and
substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all persons or
other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of the ban within the three-
things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.
month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even cancellation of
business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power. Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the
occurrence of drift causes inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section
environment. Given this justification, does the ordinance satisfy the requirement that
6 of the ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition
the classification must rest on substantial distinction?We answer in the negative.
unduly deprives all agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of
their property that amounts to taking without just compensation. The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the
conduct of any mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted
The position of the respondents is untenable.
boom spraying produces drift that may bring about the same inconvenience,
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,[118] we have thoroughly explained that taking only discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and to the environment.[141] A
becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance seeks to
property achieve.[142] In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because
the classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
law seeks to eliminate.[143] A classification that is drastically underinclusive with
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly respect to the purpose or end appears as an irrational means to the legislative end
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the law.
imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for
in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection secures every person within the
their lack of merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R.
State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
CV No. 01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL;
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's duly
Principles:
Constitutional Law... the right to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an
issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.
Political Law... taking only becomes confiscatory if it substantially divests the owner of
the beneficial use of its property.
Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes 123 SCRA 220
Facts:
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the CFI of Cebu City for the
expropriation of 282 ha of rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu
City for the development into integrated resort complexes of selected and well-defined
geographic areas with potential tourism value. The PTA will construct a sports
complex, club house, golf course, playground and picnic area on said land. An electric
power grid will also be established by NPC as well as deep well and drainage system.
Complimentary support facilities (malls, coffee shops, etc) will also be created. The
defendants alleged that the taking is allegedly not impressed with public use under
the Constitution. Also, assuming that PTA has such power, the intended use cannot
be paramount to the determination of the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by legislative fiat is constitutionally repugnant; and that since
the land is under the land reform program, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and
not the Court of First Instance, that has jurisdiction over the expropriation cases. The
Philippine Tourism Authority having deposited with the PNB, an amount equivalent to
10% of the value of the properties pursuant to PD1533, the lower court issued
separate orders authorizing PTA to take immediate possession of the premises and
directing the issuance of writs of possession. The petitioners who are occupants of the
lands, filed a petition for certiorari in the SC. They contended that (1) the taking was
not for public use; (2) the land was covered by the land reform program; and (3)
expropriation would impair the obligation of contracts.
Issue: WON the public use requirement has been complied with
Held:
Yes, There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article XIV
allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment of
just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
deserving citizens.
The concept of public use is not limited to traditional purposes for the construction of
roads, bridges, and the like. The idea that "public use" means "use by the public" has
been discarded. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the power of
eminent domain comes into play. It is accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of
public use. The petititioners have not shown that the area being developed is land
reform area and that the affected persons have been given emancipation patents and
certificates of land transfer. The contract clause has never been regarded as a barrier
to the exercise of the police power and likewise eminent domain.
Below is a long explanation I got from the net:
Held: Yes Ratio: There are three provisions of the Constitution which directly provide
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain. Sec 2, Article IV states that private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Section 6, Article
XIV allows the State, in the interest of national welfare or defense and upon payment
of just compensation to transfer to public ownership, utilities and other private
enterprises to be operated by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states that the
Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon payment of just compensation the
expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
deserving citizens. While not directly mentioning the expropriation of private
properties upon payment of just compensation, the provisions on social justice and
agrarian reforms which allow the exercise of police power together with the power of
eminent domain in the implementation of constitutional objectives are even more far
reaching insofar as taxing of private property is concerned. We cite all the above
provisions on the power to expropriate because of the petitioners' insistence on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision.
The thrust of all constitutional provisions on expropriation is in the opposite direction.
As early as 1919, this Court in Visayan Refining Co. v. Samus categorized the restrictive
view as wholly erroneous and based on a misconception of fundamentals. The
petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably the search
would be in vain. To freeze specific programs like tourism into express constitutional
provisions would make the Constitution more prolix than a bulky code and require of
the framers a prescience beyond Delphic proportions. In said case, this Court
emphasized that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from sovereignty being
essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. The only purpose of the provision in the Bill of Rights is to provide
some form of restraint on the sovereign power. It is not a grant of authority . The
petitioners ask us to adopt a strict construction and declare that "public use" means
literally use by the public and that "public use" is not synonymous with "public
interest", "public benefit", or "public welfare" and much less "public convenience." The
petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their contention which is rather sweeping
in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly restrictive and
outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination that
the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of
Philippine tourism.
The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which circumscribes
the scope of government activities and public concerns and which possesses big and
correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private property for public
purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We have never been a
laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion of sovereign power
are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited government
resources.There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as
the construction of roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power plants, markets and
slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office buildings, and flood control
systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases
of "use by the public" has been discarded. In the Philippines, Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando has aptly summarized the statutory and judicial trend as follows: "The taking
to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise,
expropriation is not allowable. It is not any more. As long as the purpose of the taking
is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the
constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is public use.
One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities
and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that at
present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use."
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because
private concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as
restaurants, hotels, stores, etc. inside the tourist complex is impressed with even less
merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private
businesses using public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public
character of expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in
underpasses of streets built on expropriated land does not make the taking for a
private purpose. Airports and piers catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping
companies are still for public use. The expropriation of private land for slum clearance
and urban development is for a public purpose even if the developed area is later sold
to private homeowners, commercial firms, entertainment and service companies, and
other private concerns.
The petitioners have also failed to overcome the deference that is appropriately
accorded to formulations of national policy expressed in legislation. The rule in Berman
v. Parker (supra) of deference to legislative policy even if such policy might mean
taking from one private person and conferring on another private person applies as
well as in the Philippines. An examination of the language in the 1919 cases of City of
Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila and Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus, earlier
cited, shows that from the very start of constitutional government in our country
judicial deference to legislative policy has been clear and manifest in eminent domain
proceedings.
The expressions of national policy are found in the revised charter of the Philippine
Tourism Authority, PD 564. (Disregard of Land Reform Nature) According to them,
assuming that PTA has the right to expropriate, the properties subject of expropriation
may not be taken for the purposes intended since they are within the coverage of
"operation land transfer" under the land reform program; that the agrarian reform
program occupies a higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like
those relating to the health and physical well-being of the people; and that property
already taken for public use may not be taken for another public use. The petitioners,
however, have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform
area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land
transfer. The records show that the area being developed into a tourism complex
consists of more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is not affected by the land
reform program. The portion being expropriated is 282 hectares of hilly and
unproductive land where even subsistence farming of crops other than rice and corn
can hardly survive. And of the 282 disputed hectares, only 8,970 square meters - less
than one hectare - is affected by Operation Land Transfer. Of the 40 defendants, only
two have emancipation patents for the less than one hectare of land affected. (Non
Impairment Clause) The non-impairment clause has never been a barrier to the
exercise of police power and likewise eminent domain. As stated in Manigault v.
Springs "parties by entering into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting
laws intended for the public good." The applicable doctrine is expressed in Arce v.
Genato which involved the expropriation of land for a public plaza.
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the petitioners. They claim that since the
necessity for the taking has not been previously established, the issuance of the orders
authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession of the premises, as well as the
corresponding writs of possession was premature. Under Presidential Decree No. 42,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1533, the government, its agency or
instrumentality, as plaintiff in an expropriation proceedings is authorized to take
immediate possession, control and disposition of the property and the improvements,
with power of demolition, notwithstanding the pendency of the issues before the court,
upon deposit with the Philippine National Bank of an amount equivalent to 10% of the
value of the property expropriated.
The issue of immediate possession has been settled in Arce v. Genato. In answer to
the issue: ". . . condemnation or expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one that
is quasi-in-rem, wherein the fact that the owner of the property is made a party is not
essentially indispensable insofar at least as it concerns the immediate taking of
possession of the property and the preliminary determination of its value, including
the amount to be deposited."
Makasiar: It appearing that the petitioners are not tenants of the parcels of land in
question and therefore do not fall within the purview of the Land Reform Code, the
petition should be dismissed on that score alone. There is no need to decide whether
the power of the PTA to expropriate the land in question predicated on the police
power of the State shall take precedence over the social justice guarantee in favor of
tenants and the landless. The welfare of the landless and small land owners should
prevail over the right of the PTA to expropriate the lands just to develop tourism
industry, which benefit the wealthy only. Such a position would increase the
disenchanted citizens and drive them to dissidence. The government is instituted
primarily for the welfare of the governed and there are more poor people in this
country than the rich. The tourism industry is not essential to the existence of the
government, but the citizens are, and their right to live in dignity should take
precedence over the development of the tourism industry.
[G.R. No. 106440; January 29, 1996]
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al. petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et
al., respondents
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is asked to resolve whether
or not the “public use” requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted
expropriation by the Republic of a 492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the
National Historical Institute (“NHI”) as a national historical landmark.
Petitioners inherited a 492 sq.m. land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada,
Taguig, Metro Manila. When the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the
birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No.
1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the
land to be a national historical landmark. It was approved by the Minister of
Education, Culture and Sports, while the Secretary of Justice, in his opinion on the
legality of the measure, said in part that “the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni
Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who, admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine
history and culture has been declared as a national landmark. It has been held that
places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for which the power of
eminent domain may be authorized x x x. it is believed that the NHI… may initiate the benefit from the expropriation of property does not necessarily diminish the essence
institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in and character of public use.
question in accordance with the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law
Rules of Court.” and jurisprudence. The petition is DENIED.
In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for
expropriation before RTC Pasig for and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed
an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it to take immediate
possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. The trial court
ruled in favor of the Republic.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the
intended expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the act
would constitute an application of public funds, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Motion was dismissed. Petitioners
then lodged a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the expropriation of the land in the case at bar is for public
use.

HELD:
YES. Petitioners ask about the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation
of (Felix Manalo’s) birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni
Cristo would benefit. This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case
deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective
of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the
power. The purpose in setting up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive
contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather than to
commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. The practical
reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than
by most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be
merely incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually