1

CHAPTER IV—CO-OWNERSHIP
CASE
Concept
De Guia v CA
Pardell v Bartolome
Salantadol v Retes
Right of Any Co-owner to Recover/ Limitation of such right
Adlawan v Adlawan
FACTS/ ISSUE
- Teofilo Abejo is seeking to recover possession
of the 1⁄2 undivided portion of the subject
fishpond. Fishpond is registered under the
names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza
Araniego, married to Juan Abejo. De Guia
acquired possession of the entire fishpond by
virtue of a lease contract between him and the
heirs of Lejano with the knowledge and consent
of Teofilo. De Guia continues to possess the
entire fishpond and derive income from the
property despite the expiration of the Lease
Contract and several demands to vacate made
by. De Guia, to prove his ownership over the
lot, showed records that he acquired his ½
undivided share in the fishpond from the Lejano
heirs in February 1986.
- Vicenta Ortiz Pardell and Defendant Matilde
Ortiz Bartolome are the existing heirs of their
late parents who left with them among others,
real properties—a house in Escolta Street
- In 1888, defendants, without judicial
authorization nor extrajudicial agreement took it
upon themselves the administration and
enjoyment of the properties, collecting the
fruits, rents and products thereof.
- Among others, Vicenta argues that Matilde and
her husband be obliged to pay rent for their
occupation of the upper story of the house in
Escolta Street
- Plaintiffs and one Eufemia Omole are the co-
owners of Lot No 513, each owning 1/3 share
(last 1/3 portion was not mentioned).
- In January 17, 1965, Eufemia sold her 1/3
portion to defendant Catalina Retes
- The Register of wrote to plaintiff Flavia
Salatandol received on January 21, 1965
informing her about sale.
- However, plaintiffs were never notified by the
Eufemia nor by Catalina. Plaintiffs wrote to
Cataline on January 30, 1965 informing her of
her desire to repurchase the 1/3 portion sold to
her by Eufemia.
- Adlawan alleges to be the illegitimate son of the
late Dominador Adlawan. He asserts to be his
sole heir, thereafter executed an affidavit
adjudicating to himself Lot 7726 and the house
built thereon to the prejudice of the
Dominador’s siblings, Narciso and Emeterio
- In January 1999, Arnelito Adlawan verbally
requested the respondents to vacate but
refused to do so. After their refusal to heed the
last demand letter, petitioner filed for unlawful
detainer
RULING
- Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third person, but also against another co-
owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case,
however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership
- Abejo and De Guia are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of dominion. However,
they are at the same time individual owners of a 1⁄2 portion, which is truly abstract because until there is partition,
such portion remains indeterminate or unidentified.
- Since a co-ownership subsists between them judicial or extra-judicial partition is the proper recourse.
- Lejano Heirs and Abejo agreed to lease the entire fishpond to De Guia. After the lease expired in 1979, he could
no longer use the entire fishpond without paying rent. To allow such would prejudice Abejo's right to receive rent,
which would have accrued to his 1⁄2 share in the fishpond had it been leased to others
- Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of joint
ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any detriment to the
interests of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story
according to her rights.
- It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and an accounting of the rents was duly made to the
plaintiffs. Matilde was merely exercising her legitimate right pertaining to her as a coowner of the property
- Matilde’s husband is obliged to pay rent for having used a room of the lower floor as his office as the justice of the
peace. Even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use
gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment
of the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should have
produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was obtained from the rooms on
the lower floor that were used as stores.
- Art. 1623 of the Civil Code clearly and expressly prescribes that the thirty (30) days for making the pre-emption
or redemption are to be counted from notice in writing by the vendor.
- a co- ownership exists whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. Under
such concept, a co-owner cannot point to a particular portion of the property owned in common as his own,
because his portion thereof is intangible rather than identifiable. There had been an actual partition of the lot such
that each co-owner is in possession of his respective share. Here, the portion of Eufemia Omole as well as those
of the plaintiffs had been identified and localized, so that co-ownership, in its real sense, no longer exists. Hence,
the right of redemption or pre-emption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code can no longer be invoked by the
plaintiffs over the portion appertaining to Eufemia Omole.
- by intestate succession, Graciana (the wife of Dominador) and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226, such
that the death of Graciana did not make petitioner the absolute owner of the property. The share of Graciana
passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations
- A co- owner may bring an ejectment suit without the necessity of joining all the other co- owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
- If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession
thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. Herein,
it cannot be denied that the petitioner asserts sole ownership over the property even adjudicating to himself the
same. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not
recognize the co-ownership

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Resuena v CA - Borromeo, Sr. is the co-owner and overseer of - Thus, a co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one
certain parcels of land of the Talisay- co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice
Manglanilla Estate. He owned 6/8 of Lot 1 while their rights
the Sps. Bascon owned 2/8 thereof. - Borromeo’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of
- Resuena et al resided in the upper portion of the property since petitioners were not able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.
Lot 1, allegedly under the acquiescence of the - Petitioners’ lack of authority to occupy the properties, coupled with respondent’s right under Article 487, clearly
Spouses Bascon and their heir, Andres settles Borromeo’s prerogative to eject petitioners from Lot 1.
Bascon. On the other hand, petitioner Eutiquia - persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
Rosario occupied a portion of Lot 2, allegedly them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand
with the permission of the heirs of Maneja, one
of the original co-owners of Lot 1.
- Borromeo developed portions of the 2 lots
occupied by him into a resort known as the
Borromeo Beach Resort. He demanded that
petitioners vacate the property. Petitioners,
however, refused. Borromeo then filed a
Complaint for ejectment
Arcelona v CA - Farnacio filed an action for peaceful - It is logical that a tenant, in an action to establish his status as such, must implead all the pro-indiviso co-owners;
possession, maintenance of security of tenure in failing to do so, there can be no final determination of the action. In other words, a tenant who fails to implead
and damages against three fishpond co- all the co-owners cannot establish with finality his tenancy over the entire co-owned land.
owners - petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond. It is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the property is owned
- The case was intended to maintain him as by Olanday, et al. and which portion belongs to petitioners. Thus, it is not possible to show over which portion the
tenant of the fishpond. tenancy relation of Farnacio has been established. Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as
- 3 other co-owners, petitioners herein, are indispensable parties. Obviously, the failure to implead petitioners barred the lower court from making a final
naturalized Americans, residing in California, adjudication
USA. Judgment was rendered by the trial
declaring Farnacio as tenant-caretaker, which
was affirmed by the IAC and the Supreme
Court.
- Subsequently, petitioners filed a petition for
annulment of said judgment with the Court of
Appeals claiming that the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over their persons. They
claimed that being co-owners, they should all
be impleaded as indispensable parties.
Alteration of a Property under Co-ownership
Cruz v Catapang - Catapang, with the consent of Maligaya (one of - Under Article 491, none of the co-owners shall, without the consent of the others, make alterations in the thing
the co-owners), built a house on a lot adjacent owned in common. It necessarily follows that none of the co- owners can, without the consent of the other co-
to the subject land. The house built intruded the owners, validly consent to the making of an alteration by another person, such as respondent, in the thing owned
land of the three co-owners. When Cruz in common.
learned about the intrusion, she asked - Alterations include any act of strict dominion or ownership, and any encumbrance or disposition has been held
Catapang to demolish the part intruding the implicitly to be an act of alteration. The construction of a house on the co-owned property is an act of dominion.
property. Catapang refused. So, Cruz filed a
complaint for forcible entry against Catapang.
Catapang argues that she asked the
permission of one of the co-owners; thus, there
is no forcible entry
Cruz v Leis - Gertrudes Leis, married to Adriano Isidro, - The redemption of the land "did not terminate the co-ownership nor give Gertrudes title to the entire land subject
acquired a parcel of land. It was registered and of the co-ownership.
TCT solely in the name of "Gertrudes Isidro, - As a rule, a co-owner such as Gertrudes could only dispose of her share in the property owned in common.
widow," was issued. Unfortunately for private respondents, however, the property was registered in TCT No. 43100 solely in the name
- Unable to pay her obligation, she executed two of "Gertrudes Isidro, widow."
contracts in favor of Cruz (repurchase and sale - Where a parcel of land, forming part of the undistributed properties of the dissolved conjugal partnership of gains,
of land) For failure to repurchase the property, is sold by a widow to a purchaser who merely relied on the face of the certificate of title thereto, issued solely in
ownership thereof was consolidated in the the name of the widow, the purchaser acquires a valid title to the land even as against the heirs of the deceased
name of Cruz and TCT was issued in his name. spouse.
- When Gertrudes died, her heirs received
demands from petitioners to vacate the

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premises (heirs argued that it was conjugal

property)
- Petitioners, contended that the subject property
is not conjugal but is owned exclusively by
Gertrudes, who was described in the Deed of
Sale as well as in the TCT as a widow; and
assuming the land was conjugal property, the
same became hers exclusively when she alone
redeemed the property from the foreclosure
sale initiated by the Daily Savings Bank and
Loan Association, to which she previously
mortgaged such.
Segura v Segura - Grandchildren of Gertrudes Zamora fighting - Prescription of deed of extrajudicial partition(within 2 years from execution) does not apply to invalid partition
over lot - The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
- three of the nine grandchildren executed a shares in the partitioned property.
deed of extrajudicial partition arrogating the - Under the rule, "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
entire property to themselves alone had no notice thereof."
- Before registration, lot was sold to AMOJIDO
with the annotation “with a reservation to the
rights of the other heirs”—later sold to DE
ELISO without the annotation—then to DE
JAVELOSA—finally to IGMEDIO AMOJIDO
- 6 excluded grandchildren pray to invalidate the
partition and subsequent transfers of land
Arambulo v Nolasco - Petitioners, together with their siblings and their - Since a co–owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co–owner without the
mother co-owned a Land. When their mother consent of the other co–owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co–owner–seller are
died, she was succeeded by her husband, transferred, thereby making the buyer a co–owner of the property
Genero Nolasco and their children - To be a co–owner of a property does not mean that one is deprived of every recognition of the disposal of the
- petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that thing, of the free use of his right within the circumstantial conditions of such judicial status, nor is it necessary, for
all co-owners, except for Nolasco, have the use and enjoyment, or the right of free disposal, that the previous consent of all the interested parties be
authorized to sell their respective shares to the obtained
properties, saying that in the Civil Code, if one
or more co-owners shall withhold their consent
to the alterations in the thing owned in common,
the courts may afford adequate relief
Extent of Co-Owner’s Right
Paulmitan v CA - dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot 1091, - When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Art. 1078 states that “Where there are 2 or more heirs, the
which were owned by Agatona Paulmitan. whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of
- She had 2 children, Pascual and Donato. debts of the deceased”. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died, they are co-owners of the
Pascual’s (7) children are the respondents and estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the property
Donato and his daughter and son-in-law are - When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his undivided
petitioners portion of the property. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
- Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration of to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 - When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone. But she may compel them to reimburse her for half of the repurchase
the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a TCT price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the expenses for the preservation of
was issued in his name; executed a deed of sale the thing and to taxes
of Lot 1091 in favor of his daughter, Juliana.
- For non-payment of taxes, the lot was forfeited
and sole at a public to the Provincial Gov’t of
Negros Occidental, however, Juliana was able
to redeem the property.
- Upon learning these, the children of Pascual
filed w/ the CFI a complaint against petitioners to
partition the land plus damages.
- Petitioners’ defense was that the action has
already prescribed for it was filed more than 11
years after the issuance of the TCT and that

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Juliana has acquired exclusive ownership thru

the Deed of Sale and by redeeming the said
property
Sanchez v CA - Lilia Sanchez, constructed a house on a 76- - Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and
square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. But he has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific or determinate
The lot was registered under TCT No. 263624 part of the thing owned in common because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion
with the following co-owners (enumerated) without any physical adjudication
- On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered - As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to
under TCT No. 289216 in the name of private 1/6 of the property must be respected.
respondent Virginia Teria by virtue of a Deed of - Partition needs to be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her
Absolute Sale supposed to have been property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as buyer
executed on 23 June 1995 by all six (6) co- of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute
owners in her favor
- Lilia Sanchez claimed that she did not affix her
signature on the document and subsequently
refused to vacate the lot, thus prompting
Virginia Teria to file an action for recovery of
possession of the aforesaid lot
- 1998, the MeTC issued an order for the
issuance of a writ of execution in favor of
private Virginia Teria, buyer of the property.
- 1999 private respondent started demolishing
petitioner’s house without any special permit of
demolition from the court
Sale or Mortgage of Common Property
Del Banco v IAC - Pansacola Brothers (Benedicto, Jose and Fr. - There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of the Island had really been
Manuel) entered into an agreement to made by either the original owners or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859
purchase the Island of Cagbalite as co-owners simply provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island
- The co-owners entered into the actual - In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the Island was to be
possession and enjoyment of the island. 2 partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the
years later, they agreed to modify the terms signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition of the Island had as yet been done
and conditions of the agreement entered into. - A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant
The new agreement provided for a new to the provision of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, adjudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the
sharing and distribution of the lands and lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of other co-owners.
whatever benefits may be derived therefrom - It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in
(benefits of 1/4 portions of lots were delineated accordance with which they take actual and exclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles
to belong to the different co-owners) issued to each of them accordingly
- 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the
original owners of Cagbalite Island entered
into an agreement to partition the island,
supplemented by another agreement dated
1908
- 100 years later, in 1968, private respondents
(Alejandra Pansacola, et al) brought a special
action for partition, including as parties the
heirs and successors-in-interest of the co-
owners of the Cagbalite Island in the 2nd
contract of co-ownership.
Pamplona v Moreto - Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were - Petitioners own entire property
husband and wife. During their marriage, they - The estate became the property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children
acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545 and with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-ownership
1496, covered by certificates of title issued in - during said period of 9 years when Pamplona occupied, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica
the name of “Flaviano Moreto, married to Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the
Monica Maniega”. They had 6 children petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the land
- More than 6 years after the death of his wife, purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in
Monica, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent estoppel by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void.
of the heirs of his deceased wife, and before - We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when at the time of the sale
any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees

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Monica and Flaviano could be effected, on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house
executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, and an adjacent coral for piggery
the Deed of Absolute Sale covering Lot No. - The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and
1495. even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erected without objection, protest or
- After the execution of the Deed of Sale, complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
Spouses Pamplona constructed their house occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although partial,
on the Eastern part of Lot No. 1496, as was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein
Flaviano pointed to it as the land which he from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of sale executed by
sold to Geminiano. Shortly thereafter, Rafael said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
(Son of Spouses Pamplona), also built his - the contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and
house within lot 1496 about 1 meter from its heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation
boundary with the adjoining lot to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was the original obligation
- Flaviano died and 5 years after, the plaintiffs of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said
demanded the defendants to vacate the obligation
premises where they had their house and
piggery on the ground that Flaviano had no
right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
as it belonged to the conjugal partnership of
Flaviano and wife Monica, and the latter was
already dead when the sale was executed
without the consent of the plaintiffs who are
the heirs of Monica
Del Campo v CA - Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 - There can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its
for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. Thereafter, entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership.
Soledad immediately took possession of the Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection
land and built a house thereon can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
- Soledad and husband, Simplicio, mortgaged - Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her favor. It
the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April
a P4000 debt to Jose Regalado Sr. 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16
- Three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously sold by Salome to Soledad.
(Salome, Consorcia, and Alfredo) sold - Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. These rights
portions of the said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalado’s name in 1977.
- Simplicio, heir of Soledad, paid the mortgage
debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of
Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr, who in turn
executed a Deed of Discharge of Mortgage in
favor of Soledad’s heirs.
- On the same date, the said heirs sold the
redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500 to
herein petitioners (Spouses Del Campo
- the title was transferred later to Jose
Regalado Sr. who subdivided the entire
property into smaller lots, each covered by a
respective title in his name
- Petitioners claimed that they owned an area
of 1,544 square meters located within Lot
162-C-6 which was erroneously included in
TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado
Segura v Segura - See above
Homeowners Savings and - During the marriage of Marcelino and - In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the
Loan Bank v Dailo Miguela, they were able to purchase a house entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted
and lot. Though the lot was declared for the sale.
taxation purposes, a deed of absolute sale - The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife, Marcelino
was executed in favor of the late Marcelino as Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
vendee to the exclusion of his wife. partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
- Marcelino executed an SPA in favor of consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to - Other than Homeowners Bank’s bare allegation, there is nothing from the records of the case to compel a finding
obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family.

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Loan Bank secured by a real estate mortgage Consequently, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.
on the subject property. This transaction was
done without the knowledge of Miguela.
- After the demise of Marcelino, Miguela
claimed she had no knowledge of the
mortgage constituted on the subject property.
- she instituted a civil case for Nullity of Real
Estate with Reconveyance and Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Damages.
Effect of Redemption of Co-owned property by one Co-owner
Adille v CA - The land in question is originally owned by - While the records show that the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor,
Felisa Azul as her own private property. She that did not make him the owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of co-ownership.
contracted 2 marriages in her lifetime, the first - While his half-brothers and sisters are, as we said, liable to him for reimbursement as and for their shares in
with Bernabe Adille in which they had a son, redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Rustico Adille; the second marriage is with - Rustico Adille in taking over the property, did so either on behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted
Procopio Asejo, and they have several himself a negotiorum gestor under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is
children, Emeteria Asejo et al (plaintiff guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under the Article 1456.
respondents herein). - Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of
- Sometime in 1939, Felisa engaged in a pacto the co-ownership).
rd
de retro sale to a 3 person with 3 years - The act of repudiation, in turn is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2)
repurchase period, but she died before the such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
repurchase in 1942. conclusive, and (4) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
- Hence, Rustico Adille repurchased the the property for the period required by law
property and executed a deed of extra- - We are not convinced that he had repudiated the co-ownership; on the contrary, he had deliberately kept the
judicial partition representing himself to be private respondents in the dark by feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He cannot therefore be
the only heir and child of his mother Felisa said to have "made known" his efforts to deny the co-ownership.
with the consequence that he was able to
secure title in his name alone also. Hence the
OCT was transferred to him in 1955. Hence
in 1974 Emeteria et al filed the case for
partition with accounting, arguing that Rustico
is a mere trustee. Rustico filed for a
counterclaim that Emeteria being an
occupant to the property should vacate
Tan v CA - Tan Tiong Tick married Tan Ong Hun, was - The period to redeem had expired more than one year earlier, on July 6, 1973. The respondent China Bank
the registered owner of a parcel of land and consolidated its ownership and a new title was issued in the bank's name. When the heirs allowed the one-year
its improvements subject of this case. They redemption period to expire without redeeming their parents' former property and permitted the consolidation of
bore six children, George Tan et al ownership and the issuance of a new title, the co-ownership was extinguished.
(respondents) and D. Anne Tan (Anne, - Upon the foreclosure of the mortgaged property and its purchase by China Bank as the highest bidder, the
petitioner). proceeds of the auction sale were applied to the various debts of the Tan spouses. The obligation having been
- Tan Tiong Tick mortgaged the property with extinguished, there was no more common debt and no legal subrogation arising when one pays the debts properly
CBC in order to secure payment of accruing to several others.
obligations with CBC. However Mr. Tan died - Mr. Dee could not impose a new co-ownership upon the petitioner, her brothers and sisters. (The records show
without paying the obligation. The bank that the annotation at the back of the P180,000.00 manager's check that the funds were contributed by all the
foreclosed the property. After the one year heirs was made by a China Bank representative and that D. Annie Tan was told by Dee K Chiong that if she would
period, the Tan heirs were not able to not sign it, he would not accept the manager's check and she would lose her right to buy the lot within the period
exercise their right of redemption. offered by the bank)
- When Mrs. Tan died, the children were left to - Annie can repurchase the property alone. There is, therefore, no doubt that the money used in buying back the
redeem the lot and building. CBC were able property belongs exclusively to the petitioner
to consolidate ownership. A verbal
agreement was made by four children with
the bank, reduced in a letter of agreement
giving them a chance to repurchased at
180,000.
- Finally Annie went to the office of Mr. Chiong
and tendered her check of 180,000 as
payment. Upon the insistence of the Mr.
Chiong, the deed of sale of the property was

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Termination of Co-ownership
Mariano v De Vega
Paulmitan v CA
Aguilar v CA
7
executed in favor of the six heirs. This led to
the filing of Annie against her brothers and
sisters and the CBC. Annie prayed that the
TC reconvey the property and to pay
damages. The CFI dismissed the complaint.
This was affirmed by the CA. The decisions
of both courts is based on the principle that
the heirs of Mr. and Mrs. Tan Tiong Tick being
co- owners of the foreclosed property, a
repurchase or reconveyance effected by only
one of those heirs redounds to the co-
ownership
- Spouses Panganiban owned as conjugal - In view of their lack of a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, duly communicated to the Mariano and Eugenios
property 29 parcels of unregistered land with (the other co-owners), cannot acquire the shares of the Mariano and Eugenios by prescription.
improvements during their lifetime. - The record in the Office of the Assessor is not the sufficient repudiation and communication contemplated by the
- Roberta died intestate and without debts. She law. Neither may the Panganibans’ possession of the premises militate against petitioners’ claim.
left her husband Urbano and their 2 legitimate
children, Mercedes and Gaudencia as forced
heirs. Urbano also died without debts and
intestate leaving as his compulsory heirs, the
children of Mercedes and Gaudencia who
had predeceased their father as petitioners
(Mariano and Eugenios) and his legitimate
children with Atanacia Agustin on the second
marriage (the Panganiban) as respondent.
- After 28 years after the death of Urbano, the
Mariano and Eugenios instituted an action
with the CFI for partition and delivery of
possession of their shares in the conjugal
estate of Urbano and Roberta since the
Panganibans had taken possession of the
whole conjugal property and appropriated to
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners the
products coming from the 29 parcels of land.
- The dispute covers 2 lots, Lot 757 and Lot - When Agatona died, her estate was still unpartitioned. Since Pascual and Donato were still alive when she died,
1091, which were owned by Agatona they are co-owners of the estate. When Pascual died, his children succeeded him in the co-ownership of the
Paulmitan. She had 2 children, Pascual and property. When Donato sold to his daughter the lot, he was only a co-owner of the same thus he can only sell his
Donato. Pascual’s (7) children (Alicio, Elena, undivided portion of the property. Only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred making the buyer (Juliana)
Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking, Anito) are the a co-owner
respondents and Donato and his daughter - When she redeemed the property, it did not end the co-ownership. The right of repurchase may be exercised by
and son-in-law are petitioners a co-owner w/ respect to his/her share alone as stated in Art. 1612. But she may compel them to reimburse her
- Donato executed an Affidavit of Declaration for half of the repurchase price for a co-owner has the right to compel other co-owners to contribute to the
of Heirship, adjudicating to himself Lot 757 expenses for the preservation of the thing and to taxes
claiming that he is the sole surviving heir thus
the OCT of Agatona was cancelled and a
TCT was issued in his name. He executed a
deed of sale of Lot 1091 in favor of his
daughter, Juliana. For non-payment of taxes,
the lot was forfeited and sole at a public to the
Provincial Gov’t of Negros Occidental,
however, Juliana was able to redeem the
property. Upon learning these, the children of
Pascual filed w/ the CFI a complaint against
petitioners to partition the land plus damages.
- Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen, - Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership, and that
brothers, purchased a house and lot in each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned.
Parañaque for their father. Later on they Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-
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agreed, through writing, that their interests in
the property should be equal with Senen
assuming the remaining mortgage obligation
of the original owners with SSS in exchange
for his possession and enjoyment of the
house together with their father.
- When their father died, petitioner Virgilio
demanded for respondent Senen to vacate
the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof be divided among them but
the latter refused.
- Petitioner then filed an action to compel the
sale of the property so that proceeds can be
divided among them. Petitioner prayed that
the proceeds of the sale be divided based on
st
their 1 agreement (2/3 for Virgilio, 1/3 for
Senen) and to be paid monthly rentals.
Respondent alleged he had no objection to
the sale so long as proceeds be divided
equally and that being a co-owner, he was
entitled to the use and enjoyment of the
property
Prescription and Repudiation of Co-ownership
Delima v CA - Lino Delima acquired Lot No 7758 of the
Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate by sale
on installments from the government. Lino
died in 1921 leaving, as his only heirs, 3
brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio, Junita,
Galileo and Vicente. TCT 2744 in the name
of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima was issued
on August 1953, represented by Galileo
Delima. On September 1953, Galileo
executed an affidavit of Extrajudicial
Declaration of Heirs, thus, TCT 2744 was
cancelled and TCT 3009 was issued, in Feb
1954, in his name alone, to the exclusion of
the other heirs. Galileo declared the lot in his
name for taxation purposes and paid taxes
thereon from 1954 to 1965.
- In 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving
heirs of Eulalio and Juanita, filed with CFI of
Cebu an action for reconveyance and/or
partition of property and for the annulment of
TCT 3009 with damages.
Pangan v CA - The property in question is a parcel of land
originally owned by Leon Hilario and is now
being disputed between the herein
petitioners, who are his great grandchildren
by his daughter Silvestra, and the private
respondent, Teodora Garcia, who is his
granddaughter by his daughter Catalina
- In 1964, the petitioners filed an application for
the registration of the land in their names by
virtue of their continuous and exclusive
possession thereof since 1895, by
themselves and their father and grandfather
before them.On March 31, 1966, the trial
court approved the application.
8
owners cannot agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its
proceeds accordingly distributed.
- When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and
ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced
the interest of petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally between them.
To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for monthly rentals until he and his family vacate
- an action to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In
other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to
be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all.
- However, this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute and exclusive
ownership and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptability of the action for partition shall no longer
apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over the property
- In order that a possession be considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following
elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the
cestui que trust; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and (3)
that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive
- Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the cancellation of the old title
and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, he thereby in effect denied
and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares. The issuance of TCT 3009 constituted an
open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by
Galileo from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription
- Petitioners’ possession was not for their benefit alone but also in favor of Teodora who was a co-heir and therefore
was also a co-owner. While their possession was adverse to the rest of the world, it was not against Teodora
herself, whose share they held in implied trust for her as a co-owner
- For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear showing that he has repudiated the
claims of the other co-owners and that they have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making
to the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given that the period of prescription
will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably
defend it.
- Although there are admittedly some precedents to the contrary, it would appear that the weight of authority
requires a categorical and final rejection of the co-owners' claim, usually manifested by a formal legal action, to
make the prescriptive period start to run against the claimant
- The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated the trust relation in 1956 upon
the filing of the complaint for recovery of possession against private respondents so that the counterclaim of the
private respondents contained in their amended answer wherein they asserted absolute ownership of the disputed
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Maritegui v CA
Heirs of S. Maningding v CA
9
- On June 8, 1966, the herein private realty by reason of the continuous and adverse possession of the same is well within the 10-year prescriptive
respondent (Teodora) filed a petition to set period
aside the said decision, which the trial court - There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of property causes the cancellation
granted. On September 13, 1968, the of the title thereto in the name of the apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in his own name
opposition was dismissed and the original - Noticeably absent here is a categorical assertion by the petitioners of their exclusive right to the entire property
order of March 31, 1966 was reinstated for that barred her own claim of ownership of ½ thereof nor is there any explanation as to why they said she had no
the reason that whatever rights Teodora right to a share. If the private respondent did not immediately take legal action to protect her rights, it was simply
might have had over the property had been because of forbearance toward her nephews and nieces, and that there was no need for her to act yet. However,
forfeited by extinctive prescription because that legal provocation arose only when the petitioners commenced the registration proceedings in 1965, and it
she had left the land in 1942 and had not was from that time she was required to act, as she did, to protect her interests
since then asserted any claim thereto until
1966.
rd
- Lupo Maritegui died without will and durig his - Prescription does not run against the Heirs of the 3 wife with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long
lifetime he contracted 3 marriages. as the Heirs who benefit from the prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated co-ownership.
- His first wife was Eusebia Montellano, - an action to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Petitioners contend that they
rd
second was Flaviana Montellano, third was have repudiated the co-ownership by executing extra judicial partition excluding the heirs of the 3 wife. However,
rd
Felipa Velasco. no valid repudiation can be made without prejudice to the Heirs of the 3 wife
- When Lupo died he left certain properties - In as much as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs prescription can only
rd
before he was married and these properties be deemed commenced from the time the heirs of the 3 marriage discovered the petitioners act of defraudation
were described as the Muntinglupa Estate.
st nd
- Lupo’s descendants from the 1 and 2
Marriage executed a deed of extra judicial
partition where they adjudicated a portion of
the Muntinglupa Estate (Lot 163) to
themselves.
rd
- Lupo’s children by his 3 Marriage filed a
complaint alleging that the Muntinglupa
Estate is owned by their common father and
that they were deprived of their respective
shares of the lot.
- Heirs of Maningding claim together with Luis - Roque Bauzon acquired the properties through acquisitive prescription. Prescription is a mode of acquiring
and Erberta Bauzon the disputed lands in ownership through the lapse of time under the conditions laid down by law.
Pangasinan in common and pro-indiviso. - The Donation Propter Nuptias was executed in April 21, 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of Maninding
- Erberta Bauzon avers that her father Roque demanded partition of the properties. More than 60 years had elapsed. Even granting that Roque Bauzon
Bauzon was the owner of the subject lots by possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more than 30 years have already elapsed,
virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. acquisitive prescription may finally set in
- Roque Bauzon, Juan Maninding, Maria
Maninding, Segunda Maninding were the
surviving children of Ramon Bauzon who
died intestate. The Heirs of Maninding allege
that Roque Bauzon repudiated the co-
ownership and adjudicated it to himself.
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