R v M’ NAGHTEN, (1843) 8 E.R.

718

Facts: Defendant was charged with the murder of Edward Drummond, secretary to the Prime Minister, Sir
Robert Peel. Defendant mistook Drummond for Peel and shot Drummond by mistake. At the time of his
arrest, he told police that he came to London to murder the Prime Minister because “the tories in my city
follow and persecute me wherever I go, and have destroyed my peace of mind. They do everything in
their power to harass and persecute me; in fact they wish to murder me. Defense counsel introduced
expert and lay witnesses who testified about Defendant’s obsession with delusions and that he suffered
from acute insanity. The judge gave the jury an instruction regarding his lack of understanding upon
commission of the act in question. The jury reached a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Following the trial, there was a meeting at the House of Lords attended by fifteen judges in order to
determine the standards for the insanity defense.

HELD: In response to these questions the Judges formulated the M’Naghten Rules (1843) 4
St.Tr.(N.S.) 847. These provide the legal definition of insanity. They provide that a defendant
wishing to rely on the defence of insanity must show that:

i. They laboured under a defect of reason

ii. Caused by a disease of the mind; so that either
iii. He did not know the nature and quality of his acts, or that he did not know what he was
doing was wrong.

R v Arnold: [1992] 2 SCR 208

he accused was committed for trial after a preliminary hearing on charges of participating in a criminal
organization, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code, and conspiracy, contrary to s. 465.(1)(c) of the
Code. He applied by way of certiorari for an order quashing the committal. The charges were laid after
the RCMP had conducted a lengthy surveillance of a number of people they suspected were involved in
distributing cocaine. The evidence submitted at the preliminary hearing consisted of intercepted
conversations between the various parties. The accused participated in only four of the intercepted calls.
The Crown also presented physical evidence seized from a search of a property, which yielded phones,
scales, “score sheets”, and a pay stub. The latter was alleged to belong to the accused. Evidence was also
received of police surveillance of a meeting between the accused and a co-accused where cocaine was
sold to a third man. The accused’s six co-accused pled guilty. The preliminary inquiry judge examined the
law applicable to the offence of participation in a criminal organization and commission of an offence and
found evidence that the accused was frequently involved in the activities of the organization and had been
involved in different roles in it, although she initially found him to be a collector. The accused argued that
the judge erred because she adopted a “distinct role” criteria for a criminal organization. She then
ambiguously ascribed to him different roles and undermined her conclusion about his defined role, thus
undermining her ultimate conclusion about the structure of the organization. The evidence regarding the
accused’s involvement was so thin as to give unreasonable inferences on the part of the judge
HELD: The application was denied. The court stated that a preliminary inquiry judge must commit in any
case in which there is admissible evidence that could, if believed, result in a conviction. The inferences
drawn at a preliminary hearing must be resolved in favour of the Crown. The court found that it did not
interpret the judge’s decision to mean that “defined roles” are presumptively necessary in all cases to
support a finding of organization or structure. At the preliminary hearing the judge was not making
findings of fact. She was assessing whether there was evidence pointing to a structure in which the
accused may have belonged. The evidence allowed the judge to conclude that the accused was involved in
the activities of an organization, that he had knowledge of it and its members, that he intended the
organization to benefit and the items seized from the property with which he as associated were consistent
with the criminal purpose of the organization.

Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. V. The State of Kerala and Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) NO. 373
OF 2006

Case Note: Constitution - Temple entry - Rights of females - Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 and Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution
of India - Petitioners had prayed for issuance of direction commanding to Respondents to ensure entry of
female devotees between age group of 10 to 50 at Lord Ayappa Temple which had been denied to them
on basis of certain custom and usage - To declare Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
Rules framed in exercise of powers conferred by Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship
Act, 1965 as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of Constitution - Further
to pass directions for safety of women pilgrims - Prayer had also been made for laying guidelines in
matters of general inequality related to religious practices in places of worship - Whether matter should be
referred to larger Bench or not. Facts: The Petitioners had prayed for issue of appropriate writ or direction
commanding to Respondents to ensure entry of female devotees between the age group of 10 to 50 at the
Lord Ayappa Temple which had been denied to them on the basis of certain custom and usage, to declare
Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules framed in exercise
of powers conferred by Section 4 of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry)
Act, 1965 as unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14, 15, 25 and 51A(e) of the Constitution of
India and further to pass directions for safety of women pilgrims. That apart, a prayer has also been made
for laying guidelines in matters of general inequality related to religious practices in places of worship.
Held, matter referred to the Larger Bench: (i) Whether the exclusionary practice which was based upon a
biological factor exclusive to the female gender amounts to "discrimination" and thereby violates the very
core of Articles 14, 15 and 17 and not protected by 'morality' as used in Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution?, Whether the practice of excluding such women constitutes an "essential religious practice"
under Article 25 and whether a religious institution can assert a claim in that regard under the umbrella of
right to manage its own affairs in the matters of religion?, Whether Ayyappa Temple has a
denominational character and, if so, was it permissible on the part of a 'religious denomination' managed
by a statutory board and financed under Article 290-A of the Constitution of India out of Consolidated
Fund of Kerala and Tamil Nadu could indulge in such practices violating constitutional
principles/morality embedded in Articles 14, 15(3), 39(a) and 51-A(e)?, Whether Rule 3 of Kerala Hindu
Places of Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Rules permits 'religious denomination' to ban entry of
women between the age of 10 to 50 years? And if so, would it not play foul of Articles 14 and 15(3) of
the Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex?, Whether Rule 3(b) of Kerala Hindu
Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 was ultra vires the Kerala Hindu Places of
Public Worship (Authorisation of Entry) Act, 1965 and, if treated to be intra vires, whether it would be
violative of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. [26]

Venkataramana Devaru & Ors. v State of Mysore and Ors.,