TABLE

 OF  CONTENTS  
Article  I  –  National  Territory  ...................................................................................................   2  
Magallona  v.  Ermita  (2011)  .................................................................................................................  2  
Article  II  –  Declaration  of  Principles  and  State  Policies  ............................................................   4  
Section  1  Democratic  Republic  .........................................................................................................  4  
Agricultural  Credit  and  Cooperative  Financing  Administration  v.  Confederation  of  Unions  in  
Government  Corporations  and  Offices  (1969)  ....................................................................................  4  
Republic  v.  Judge,  Branch  XV  (1980)  ...................................................................................................  4  
Section  12  Family  Life  .......................................................................................................................  5  
Pierce  v.  Society  of  Sisters  (1925)  –  US  CASE  .......................................................................................  5  
Imbong  v.  Ochoa,  Jr.  (2014)  .................................................................................................................  6  
Section  16  Right  to  a  Balanced  and  Healthful  Ecology  .......................................................................  9  
Oposa  v.  Factoran,  Jr.  (1993)  ...............................................................................................................  9  
Article  VI  –  The  Legislative  Department  .................................................................................  11  
Section  1  Legislative  Power  ............................................................................................................  11  
Abakada  Guro  Party  List  v.  Purisima  (2008)  ......................................................................................  11  
People  v.  Rosenthal  (1939)  ................................................................................................................  13  
Agustin  v.  Edu  (1979)  .........................................................................................................................  14  
Chiongbian  v.  Orbos  (1995)  ...............................................................................................................  14  
Rubi  v.  Provincial  Board  of  Mindoro  (1919)  ......................................................................................  16  
People  v.  Vera  (1937)  ........................................................................................................................  17  
Philippine  Coconut  Producers  Federation,  Inc.  (COCOFED)  v.  Republic  (2012)  .................................  19  
United  States  v.  Panlilio  (1914)   .........................................................................................................  21  
Section  5  Congressional  Representatives  and  Legislative  Districts  ..................................................  23  
Atong  Paglaum,  Inc.  v.  Commission  on  Elections  (2013)  ...................................................................  23  
Barangay  Association  for  National  Advancement  and  Transparency  (BANAT)  vs.  Commission  on  
Elections  (2009)  .................................................................................................................................  25  
Section  11  Congressional  Privileges  ................................................................................................  26  
Jimenez,  et  al.  v.  Cabangbang  (1966)  ................................................................................................  26  
Pobre  v.  Defensor-­‐Santiago  (2009)  ....................................................................................................  26  
 

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 ARTICLE I – NATIONAL TERRITORY

Magallona v. Ermita (2011)

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); UNCLOS III has nothing to do
with the acquisition or loss of territory.—UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or
loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime
zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24
nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the
baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination
of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the
conduct of States in the world’s oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic
States’ graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); Baselines laws such as RA
9522 are enacted by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties
to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf.—Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties
to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight
or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones
and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any
clearer: x x x

Same; Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime
zones and continental shelves.—Baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for
UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope
of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right
to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III); Congress’ decision to classify
the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as ‘Regime[s] of Islands’ manifests
the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III.—Far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal, Congress’ decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “‘Regime[s] of
Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121” of UNCLOS III
manifests the Philippine State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under
UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the
category  of “regime of islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.

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Same; The recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by their
baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III.—The recognition of archipelagic States’ archipelago and the waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands
under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters
between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States’ territorial
sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.

Same; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) creates a sui generis
maritime space—the exclusive economic zone—in waters previously part of the high seas.—
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui
generis maritime space—the exclusive economic zone—in waters previously part of the high seas.
UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within
this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of
navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.

Same; Absent an United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant
baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally
acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is
measured.—Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the
Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth
of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster:
first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in
the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case
in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress
wisely avoided.

Same; Archipelagic Baselines of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 9522); The enactment of United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf.—
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent
areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth
of the Philippines’ maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on
the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.

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 ARTICLE II – DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

Section 1 Democratic Republic

Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration v. Confederation of Unions

in Government Corporations and Offices (1969)

Same; Same; Same; Functions of ACA may not be strictly described "constituent," as distinguished
from "ministrant," functions.—The governmental functions of ACA may not be strictly what
President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished from "ministrant"), such as those
relating to the maintenance of peace and the prevention of crime, those regulating property and
property rights, those relating to the administration of justice and the determination of political
duties of citizens, and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of sovereignty,
and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of the people—these latter
functions being ministrant, the exercise of which is optional on the part of the government.

The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this traditional classification
of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say obsolete, The areas which used to be
left to private enterprise and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter
optionally continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that
the government must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social
challenges of the times. In the Philippines as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly
towards a greater socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was
envisioned, indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social justice. It was in furtherance of such policy that the
Land Reform Code was enacted and the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to
carry out its purposes.

Republic v. Judge, Branch XV (1980)

Actions; Constitutional Law; Corporations; The Rice and Corn Administration is a government
agency without a distinct and separate legal personality from that of the Republic of the
Philippines.—To begin with, We have to determine whether the RCA is a governmental agency of
the Republic of the Philippines without a separate, distinct and independent legal personality from
the latter. We maintain the affirmative. The legal character of the RCA as a governmental agency
had already been passed upon in the case of Ramos vs. Court of Industrial Relations.

Respondent, however, contends that the RCA has been created to succeed to the corporate assets,
liabilities functions and powers of the abolished National Rice & Corn Corporation which is a
government owned and controlled corporation separate and distinct from the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. He further contends that the RCA, being a duly capitalized entity
doing mercantile activity engaged in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and corn cannot be the
same as the Republic of the Philippines; rather, it is an entity separate and distinct from the
Republic of the Philippines. These contentions are patently erroneous. x x x

  4  
NARIC was a corporation, x x x But with the RCA, a different picture is presented. A mere
instrumentality of the national government performing primarily governmental functions to
promote general welfare, the terms and conditions of employment of its laborers and employees,
such as herein petitioners, are governed by law. They are subject to civil service rules.

Same; Same; Same.—The mercantile activity of RCA in the buying and selling of palay, rice, and
corn is only incident to its primary governmental function which is to carry out its declared policy
of subsidizing and stabilizing the price of palay, rice, and corn in order to make it well within the
reach of average consumers, an object obviously identified with the primary function of
government to serve the well-being of the people.

Same; Same; Appeals; The Rice and Corn Administration is exempt from payment of legal fees
and posting of appeal bond.—As a governmental agency under the Office of the President the
RCA is thus exempt from the payment of legal fees as well as the posting of an appeal bond. Under
the decisional laws which form part of the legal system of the Philippines the Republic of the
Philippines is exempt from the requirement of filing an appeal bond on taking an appeal from an
adverse judgment, since there could be no doubt, as to the solvency of the Government.

Section 12 Family Life

Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) – US CASE

we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents
and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control: as often
heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation
which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.

Appellees are corporations, and therefore, it is said, they cannot claim for themselves the liberty
which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. Accepted in the proper sense, this is true. But they
have business and property for which they claim protection. These are threatened with destruction
through the unwarranted compulsion which appellants are exercising over present and prospective
patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very far to protect against loss threatened by such
action.

xxx

Generally it is entirely true, as urged by counsel, that no person in any business has such an interest
in possible customers as to enable him to restrain exercise of proper power of the State upon the
ground that he will be deprived of patronage. But the injunctions here sought are not against the
exercise of any proper power. Plaintiffs asked protection against arbitrary, unreasonable and

  5  
unlawful interference with their patrons and the consequent destruction of their business and
property. Their interest is clear and immediate, x x x

The suits were not premature. The injury to appellees was present and very real, not a mere
possibility in the remote future. If no relief had been possible prior to the effective date of the Act,
the injury would have become irreparable. Prevention of impending injury by unlawful action is a
well recognized function of courts of equity.

Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. (2014)

Same; Life begins at fertilization.—The ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at
fertilization. In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular
phrase of Section 12 which reads: Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and
shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Textually, the Constitution affords
protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is
no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly,
there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned
from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins. In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous
with “fertilization” of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the spectrum are
those who assert that conception refers to the “implantation” of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.

Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection of the Laws; It is apparent that the Framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of
the male sperm and the female ovum.—It is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution
emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child
from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that
to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.

Same; Same; Contraceptives; The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; Contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action
prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.—The
Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In
fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision
on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized
ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually

  6  
prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action
prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

Same; Conception; Words and Phrases; Mosby’s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary
defines conception as “the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon
enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote”; The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological &
Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human
life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue.—That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical
foundation. Mosby’s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as “the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms
a viable zygote.” It describes fertilization as “the union of male and female gametes to form a
zygote from which the embryo develops.” The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological &
Pathological Obstetrics), used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human
life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition that dictates all
developmental stages that ensue. Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that:
“Human development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a
process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with
the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion
of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their
chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell
that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being.”

Same; Same; In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the
undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being
commences at a scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.—In
all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion
is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a
scientifically well-defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

Same; Same While the Supreme Court has opted not to make any determination when life begins,
it finds that the Reproductive Health (RH) Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded
from the moment of fertilization.—The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987
Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it
otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission. x x x A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this
intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination,
at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be
afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete
with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should
be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation. Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that

  7  
abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction
or expulsion of the fertilized ovum.

Same; Abortifacients; In carrying out its declared policy, the Reproductive Health (RH) Law is
consistent in prohibiting abortifacients.—In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is
consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an
abortifacient as: Section 4. Definition of Terms—x x x x (a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or
device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb upon
determination of the FDA. As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded
from the moment of fertilization. By using the word “or,” the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that
either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb, upon
determination of the FDA.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; As defined by the Reproductive Health (RH) Law, any drug or
device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb, is an abortifacient.—Contrary to
the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden
duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or
device that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that
which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug
or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s womb (third kind). By
expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to
mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not
declare either that protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise
suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which
already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes
existent — all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother’s womb. After all, if life is
only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants — there is
nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to
implantation. From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the
fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court’s position that
life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine
wall, its viability is sustained but that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life.
It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that
is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb, is an abortifacient.

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Section 16 Right to a Balanced and Healthful Ecology

Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. (1993)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioners’ personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.—This case, however, has a special and novel
element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded, considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generation to come.—Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. Put a little differently, the minors’ assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that
right for the generations to come.

Constitutional Law; The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right; The right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.—The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right—
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation’s constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: x x x

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article: x x x

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to
a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation—aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners—the advancement of which may even
be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the
well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and
protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only
for the present generation, but also for those to come—generations which stand to inherit nothing
but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

  9  
Same; Same; The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.—The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries
with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

Same; Same; The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR’s duty to protect and advance the said right.—Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR’s duty—under
its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987—to protect and advance the said right.
 

  10  
 ARTICLE VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Section 1 Legislative Power

Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (2008)

Delegation of Powers; Test; A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and lays down a sufficient standard when it provides
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority
and prevent the delegation from running riot.—Two tests determine the validity of delegation of
legislative power:
(1) the completeness test and
(2) the sufficient standard test.
A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented
by the delegate.
It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law
to map out the boundaries of the delegate’s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.
To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegate’s authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.

RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets
and the implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the
policy of the law: x x x

Section 4 “canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing” the delegated power to the
President to fix revenue targets: x x x

Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of
the BIR and the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF
submitted by the President to Congress. Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest
solely on the President as it also undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.

xxx

x x x RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and
the BOC. The guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed
from the service for causes other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded
the employee.  In the case of RA 9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the
revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant
factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is analogous to inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary action under civil
service laws. The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and
compliance with substantive and procedural due process.

At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: “public interest,”
“justice and equity,” “public convenience and welfare” and “simplicity, economy and welfare.” In

  11  
this case, the declared policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection
of the BIR and the BOC is infused with public interest.

[Other Doctrines]

Same; Same; Principle of Bicameralism; Presentment Clause; The requirement that the
implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a condition for their
effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment; A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers—it can be
exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of either or both
chambers.—The requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by
Congress as a condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of
bicameralism and the rule on presentment. x x x Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact,
amend and repeal laws) is vested in Congress which consists of two chambers, the Senate and the
House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power requires the act of both chambers.
Corollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee of
either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-chamber
legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.

Same; Same; Publication; Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication under the due
process clause, the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress—as such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive
branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said law.—Where Congress delegates the
formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient standards
established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when
it leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature
when it becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and
obligations become available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the
indispensable requisite of publication under the due process clause, the determination as to when
a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of Congress. As such, it is only upon its effectivity that
a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires the duties and powers to execute the said
law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly of the President, is limited to
approving or vetoing the law.

Same; Same; Same; From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement
of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.—From the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle
of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires
Congress or its members to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken
effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn
any directive or ruling made by the members of the executive branch charged with the
implementation of the law.

  12  
People v. Rosenthal (1939)

We are of the opinion that the Act furnishes a sufficient standard for the Insular Treasurer to follow
in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit.

The certificate or permit to be issued under the Act must recite that the person, partnership,
association or corporation applying therefor "has complied with the provisions of this Act", and
this requirement, construed in relation to the other provisions of the law, means that a certificate
or permit shall be issued by the Insular Treasurer when the provisions of Act No. 2581 have been
complied with. Upon the other hand, the authority of the Insular Treasurer to cancel a certificate
or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation "is in the public interest."

In view of the intention and purpose of Act No. 2581—to protect the public against "speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky" and against the "sale of stock
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold mines, and other like fraudulent
exploitations",—we incline to hold that "public interest" in this case is a sufficient standard to
guide the Insular Treasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or
cancellation of certificates or permits. x x x And the term "public interest" is not without a settled
meaning.

xxx

In this connection, we cannot overlook the fact that Act No. 2581 allows an appeal from the
decision of the Insular Treasurer to the Secretary of Finance. Hence, it cannot be contended that
the Insular Treasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS.—The theory of the separation of powers is
designed by its originators to secure action and at the same time to forestall overaction which
necessarily results from undue concentration of powers, and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent
despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established which narrows the range of governmental
action and makes it subject to control by certain legal devices.

As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the earliest
time American legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be
exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however to confess that as one delves into the
mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of confusion. One thing, however, is
apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that is that the maximum
of delegatus non potest delegare, or delegate potestas non potest delegare, attributed to Bracton x
x x, has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation", not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments. The difficulty lies in the fixing of
the limit and extent of the authority. While courts have undertaken to. lay down general principles,
the safest is to decide each case according to its peculiar environment, having in mind the
wholesome legislative purpose intended to be achieved.

  13  
Agustin v. Edu (1979)

Same; Delegation of Powers; To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of power, the legislature
must set defined standards. In the case at bar the clear objective is public safety.—The alleged
infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power is equally without
any support in well-settled legal doctrines. x x x: “To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of
principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be
hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may fee
carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the
above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole.

In the Reflector Law, clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. x x x the principle of non-
delegation “has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise
to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of “subordinate legislation” not only in the
United States and England but in practically all modern governments.’ He continued:
‘Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward
the approval of the practice by the courts.’ Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the
reminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the
statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.”

The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by this
consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed   Letter of
Instruction: “[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by
international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and
Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention,
which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment
of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; * * *” It cannot be disputed
then that this Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The
Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land,* * *.” The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals is impressed with such
a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to which it had pledged its word.
The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at
war with the principle of international morality.

Chiongbian v. Orbos (1995)

Constitutional Law; Valid Delegation of the Legislative Power; R.A. 5435 authorized the
President of the Philippines, with the help of Commission on Reorganization, to recognize the

  14  
different executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the
government, including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by
it. Purpose was to promote “simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.”—It will be
useful to recall first the nature of administrative regions and the basis and purpose for their
creation. On September 9, 1968, R.A. No. 5435 was passed “authorizing the President of the
Philippines, with the help of a Commission on Reorganization, to reorganize the different
executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the government,
including banking or financial institutions and corporations owned or controlled by it.” The
purpose was to promote “simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government.” x x x

Administrative Law; Local Government Code; The division of the country into regions is intended
to facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices.—Thus the creation and
subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to
authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power “to merge [by
administrative determination] the existing regions” following the establishment of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous
legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of
the President as delegate is logical because the division of the country into regions is intended to
facilitate not only the administration of local governments but also the direction of executive
departments which the law requires should have regional offices.

Constitutional Law; Delegation of Legislative Power; Power conferred on the President is similar
to the power to adjust municipal boundaries which is administrative in nature.—As this Court
observed in Abbas, “while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for
in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate
the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the
Constitution].” The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces,
cities, municipalities and barangays but are “mere groupings of contiguous provinces for
administrative purposes.” The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust
municipal boundaries which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General as “administrative in
nature.”

There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the
President the power to merge administrative regions. The question is whether Congress has
provided a sufficient standard by which the President is to be guided in the exercise of the power
granted and whether in any event the grant of power to him is included in the subject expressed in
the title of the law.

First, the question of standard. A legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be
gathered or implied. Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in
other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation.

With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in
the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize
the Executive Department, to wit: “to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the

  15  
government to enable it to pursue programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social
and economic development and to improve the service in the transaction of the public business.”
Indeed, as the original eleven administrative regions were established in accordance with this
policy, it is logical to suppose that in authorizing the President to “merge [by administrative
determination] the existing regions” in view of the withdrawal from some of those regions of the
provinces now constituting the Autonomous Region, the purpose of Congress was to reconstitute
the original basis for the organization of administrative regions.

[Other Doctrines]

The regrouping of contiguous provinces is not even analogous to a redistricting or to the division
or merger of local governments, which all have political consequences on the right of people
residing in those political units to vote and to be voted for. It cannot be overemphasized that
administrative regions are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes,
not for political representation.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (1919)

That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be
zealously protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not
been violated in this instance.

The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and
since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the
delegation of power to make the law,  which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be,
and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." x x x Discretion,
as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs. Southard x x x may be committed by the
Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of
executive departments or subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact. x x x The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the "necessity" of the case.

xxx

There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the
general rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority
upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.

Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the
province, are better qualified to judge "when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order ?" As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of
its inhabitants, who but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most
favorable for improving the people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?

  16  
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power
by the Philippine Legislature to provincial officials and a department head.

People v. Vera (1937)

ID. ; ID. ; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT.—

The power to make laws—the legislative power—is vested in a bicameral Legislature by the Jones
Law and in a unicameral National Assembly by the Constitution. The Philippine Legislature or the
National Assembly may not escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any
other body or authority. Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the
principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. x x x

x x x Where the sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain; and
by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the Constitution itself is changed.
The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted
cannot relieve itself of the- responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall
be devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any other body for those
to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this sovereign trust. x x x

ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE FORBIDDING DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY NOT

INFLEXIBLE; EXCEPTIONS.—The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative
power is not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions.
1.   An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to
delegate legislative powers to local authorities.
a.   On quite the same principle, Congress is empowered to delegate legislative power
to such agencies in the territories of the United States as it may select. A territory
stands in the same relation to Congress as a municipality or city to the state
government.
2.   Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large, though
some authorities maintain that this may not be done.
3.   Doubtless, also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself.
a.   Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines
provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject
to such  limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits,
tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues."
b.   And section 16 of the Same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of
war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national policy."
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions hereinabove mentioned.

ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION ; DETAILS OF EXECUTION.—In testing

whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire
whether the statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the
legislature. x x x. The general rule, however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent

  17  
matters of detail may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated
by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act of the legislature is incomplete
and hence invalid if it does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.

ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
TO PROVINCIAL BOARDS.—The Probation Act does not, by the 'force of any of its provisions,
fix and impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards
to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does seemingly on its own
authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire
matter for the various provincial boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have
the Act applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the needed amount
for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender of legislative power to the provincial
boards.

ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DlSTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW AND DlSCRETION AS.
TO ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES.—The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. x x x

ID. ; ID.; ID.; CONDITIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF A LAW; RELAXATION OF THE

DOCTRINE.—Laws may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the
executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community x x x. In Wayman vs. Southard
x x x, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not
legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. The power to ascertain facts is such a power
which may be delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence of
facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a mental process common
to all branches of the government. x x x

“The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the administrative agent may determine
when the circumstances are such as require the application of a law is defended upon the ground
that at the time this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the
legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the legislature, as it is its duty to
do, determines that, under given circumstances, certain executive or administrative action is to be
taken, and that, under other circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus
left to the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public policy demands,
but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case' require to be done according to the terms
of the law by which he is governed.” x x x But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the
operation of the Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by
the provincial board. It leaves, as we have already said, the entire operation or non-operation of
the law upon the provincial boards. The discretion vested is arbitrary because it is absolute and
unlimited. A provincial board need not investigate conditions or find any fact, or await the
happening of any specified contingency. It is bound by no rule,—limited by no principle of
expediency announced by the legislature. x x x

  18  
The various provincial boards are, in practical effect, endowed with the power of suspending the
operation of the Probation Law in their respective provinces. In some jurisdictions, constitutions
provide that laws may be suspended only by the legislature or by its authority. x x x Yet, even
provisions of this sort do not confer absolute power of suspension upon the legislature. While it
may be undoubted that the legislature may suspend a law, or the execution or operation of a law,
a law may not be suspended as to certain individuals only, leaving the law to be enjoyed by others.
The suspension must be general, and cannot be made for individual cases or for particular
localities.

ID.; ID. ; ID. ; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND OPERATION OF

PROBATION ACT.—The statute does not expressly state that the provincial boards may suspend
the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested
with the authority to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers
they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the law should take effect
or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial boards are in reality empowered by the
legislature to suspend the operation of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held
in abeyance until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the necessary
funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done, but by what may be done under
its provisions. x x x

ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF; CONSTITUTION BOTH A

GRANT AND LIMITATION OF POWER.—A great deal of latitude should be granted to the
legislature not only in the expression of what may be termed legislative policy but in the
elaboration and execution thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and
yet imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular government lives
because of the unexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It is unquestionable that the mass of
powers of government is vested in the representatives of the people and that these representatives
are no further restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument imposing
the restraint, or by particular provisions which by  clear intendment, have that effect. But it should
be borne in mind that a constitution is both a grant and a limitation of power and one of these time-
honored limitations is that, subject to certain exceptions, legislative power shall not be delegated.

Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. (COCOFED) v. Republic (2012)

Constitutional Law; Congress; Delegation of Powers; Two tests determine the validity of
delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test.— x
x x To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inquiry must
be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is
the scope of his authority…. To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard,
which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays
down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A
standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the

  19  
legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be
carried out. x x x

In the instant case, the requisite standards or criteria are absent in P.D. No. 755. As may be noted,
the decree authorizes the PCA to distribute to coconut farmers, for free, the shares of stocks of
UCPB and to pay from the CCSF levy the financial commitments of the coconut farmers under
the Agreement for the acquisition of such bank. Yet, the decree does not even state who are to be
considered as coconut farmers. Would, say, one who plants a single coconut tree be already
considered a coconut farmer and, therefore, entitled to own UCPB shares? If so, how many shares
shall be given to him? The definition of a coconut farmer and the basis as to the number of shares
a farmer is entitled to receive for free are important variables to be determined by law and cannot
be left to the discretion of the implementing agency.

Moreover, P.D. No. 755 did not identify or delineate any clear condition as to how the disposition
of the UCPB shares or their conversion into private ownership will redound to the advancement
of the national policy declared under it. To recall, P.D. No. 755 seeks to “accelerate the growth
and development of the coconut industry and achieve a vertical integration thereof so that coconut
farmers will become participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development.” The
Sandiganbayan is correct in its observation and ruling that the said law gratuitously gave away
public funds to private individuals, and converted them exclusively into private property without
any restriction as to its use that would reflect the avowed national policy or public purpose.
Conversely, the private individuals to whom the UCPB shares were transferred are free to dispose
of them by sale or any other mode from the moment of their acquisition.

xxx

Clearly, P.D. No. 755, insofar as it grants PCA a veritable carte blanche to distribute to coconut
farmers UCPB shares at the level it may determine, as well as the full disposition of such shares
to private individuals in their private capacity without any conditions or restrictions that would
advance the law’s national policy or public purpose, present a case of undue delegation of
legislative power. As such, there is even no need to discuss the validity of the administrative orders
and resolutions of PCA implementing P.D. No. 755. Water cannot rise higher than its source.

Even so, PCA AO 1 and PCA Resolution No. 078-74, are in themselves, infirm under the undue
delegation of legislative powers. Particularly, Section 9 of PCA AO I provides: x x x

The foregoing provision directs and authorizes the distribution of fractional and undistributed
shares as a consequence of the failure of the coconut farmers with Coco Fund receipts to register
them, even without a clear mandate or instruction on the same in any pertinent existing law. PCA
Resolution No. 078-74 had a similar provision, albeit providing more detailed information. The
said Resolution identified 51,200,806 shares of the bank that remained undistributed and PCA
devised its own rules as to how these undistributed and fractional shares shall be disposed of,
notwithstanding the dearth as to the standards or parameters in the laws which it sought to
implement.

  20  
Eventually, what happened was that, as correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA gave
a “bonanza” to supposed coconut farmers who already got their bank shares, by giving them extra
shares according to the rules established—on its own—by the PCA under PCA AO 1 and
Resolution No. 078-74. Because of the lack of adequate guidelines under P.D. No. 755 as to how
the shares were supposed to be distributed to the coconut farmers, the PCA thus assumed that it
could decide for itself how these shares will be distributed. This obviously paved the way to
playing favorites, if not allowing outright shenanigans. x x x Likewise, the said PCA issuances did
not take note of the national policy or public purpose for which the coconut levy funds were
imposed under P.D. No. 755, i.e. the acceleration of the growth and development of the entire
coconut industry, and the achievement of a vertical integration thereof that could make the coconut
farmers participants in, and beneficiaries of, such growth and development. Instead, the PCA
prioritized the coconut farmers themselves by fully disposing of the bank shares, totally
disregarding the national policy for which the funds were created. This is clearly an undue
delegation of legislative powers.

United States v. Panlilio (1914)

The contention of the accused is that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do
not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 or any portion thereof.

We are forced to agree with this contention.

The original information against the accused charged a violation of section 6 of Act No. 1760
committed by the accused in that he ordered and permitted his carabaos, which, at the time, were
in quarantine, to be taken from quarantine and moved from one place to another on his hacienda.
An amended information was filed. It failed, however, to specify the section of Act No. 1760
alleged to have been violated, evidently leaving that to be ascertained by the court on the trial.

The only sections of Act No. 1760 which prohibit acts and pronounce them unlawful are 3, 4 and
5. This case does not fall within any of them. x x x

The Solicitor-General in his brief in this court admits that the sections referred to are not applicable
to the case at bar and also admits that section 7 of said Act is not applicable. x x x

We are in accord with the opinion expressed by the Solicitor-General with respect to this section,
as we are with his opinion as to sections 3, 4, and 5. The law nowhere makes it a penal offense to
refuse to comply with the provisions of section 7, nor is the section itself so phrased as to warrant
the conclusion that it was intended to be a penal section. The section provides the means by which
the refusal of the owner to comply therewith shall be overcome and the punishment, if we may
call it punishment, which he shall receive by reason of that refusal. It has none of the aspects of a
penal provision or the form or substance of such a provision. It does not prohibit any act. It does
not compel an act nor does it make the refusal to comply unlawful, nor does it really punish or
impose a criminal penalty. The other sections of the law under which punishments may be inflicted
are so phrased as to make the prohibited act unlawful, and section 8 provides the punishment for
any act declared unlawful by the law.

  21  
The Solicitor-General suggests, but does not argue, that section 6 is applicable to the case at bar.
Section 6 simply authorizes the Director of Agriculture to do certain things, among thern,
paragraph (c) "to require that animals which are suffering from dangerous communicable diseases
or have been exposed thereto be placed in quarantine at such place and for such time as may be
deemed by him necessary to prevent the spread of the disease." Nowhere in the law, however, is
the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there
provided any punishment for a violation of such orders.

Section 8 provides that "any person violating any of the provisions of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than one thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not
more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for
each offense." *

A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph (c), is not a
violation of the provisions of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may
possibly be said to have the force of law, are not statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a
violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation
thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein.

[Other Doctrines]

Finally, it is contended by the Government that if the offense. stated in the information and proved
upon the trial does not constitute a violation of any of the provisions of Act No. 1760, it does
constitute a violation of article 581, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code. It provides: x x x

It is alleged in the information and was proved on the trial that the Bureau of Agriculture had
ordered a quarantine of the carabaos at the time and place mentioned; that the quarantine had been
executed and completed and the animals actually segregated and confined; that the accused, in
violation of such quarantine and of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, duly promulgated,
broke the quarantine, removed the animals and used them in the ordinary work of his plantation.

We consider these acts a plain violation of the article of the Penal Code above quoted. The fact
that the information in its preamble charged a violation of Act No. 1760 does not prevent us from
finding the accused guilty of a violation of an article of the Penal Code. The complaint opens as
follows: "The undersigned accuses Adriano Panlilio of a violation of Act No. 1760, committed as
follows:" Then follows the body of the information already quoted in this opinion. We would not
permit an accused to be convicted under one Act when he is charged with the violation of another,
if the change from one statute to another involved a change of the theory of the trial or required
of the defendant a different defense or surprised him in any other way. The allegations required
under Act No. 1760 include those required under article 581. The accused could have defended
himself in no different manner if he had been expressly charged with a violation of article 581.

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Section 5 Congressional Representatives and Legislative Districts

Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections (2013)

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups:

(1) national parties or organizations;
(2) regional parties or organizations; and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or organizations.
National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need
not represent any particular sector.

xxx

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate
in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the
following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party,
and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented”
or lacking in “well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
“marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona fide members of such parties or organizations.

  23  
 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if
some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

[Other Doctrines]

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put,
the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving political parties that
cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.
The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative
district, and another for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution
provides: x x x

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that “the
party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral representation.” x x x [See Committee
Deliberations, pp. 549-554]

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not
only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to
constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner
Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system “[F]or as long
as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.”

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in
the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to
sectoral parties. x x x

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted.
Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral representatives was only allowed for the first three
consecutive terms. There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987 Constitution
expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only,
and that they clearly intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to
win in legislative district elections but they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same
number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district elections. The party-list
system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-
traditional parties that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system
both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, which states: x x x

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be “a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.” The commas after the words

  24  
“national[,]” and “regional[,]” separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the
framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time
sectoral, they would have stated “national and regional sectoral parties.” They did not, precisely
because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer:
the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only
one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt that national and
regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs.

Commission on Elections (2009)

Constitutional Law; Party-List System Act; In computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11 (b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional.—We rule that,
in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b)
of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive
ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list
representatives.

Same; Same; The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”—We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the
distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”

Same; Same; Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941.—In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives
under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1,
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

  25  
Same; Same; The remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are the maximum
seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.—In computing the additional
seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated,
at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed
seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for
a rounding off of fractional seats.

[See Admin digest on the Resolution of this case for a summary of the procedure]

Same; Same; Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from
participating in the party-list system.—Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major
political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through
their sectoral wings.

Section 11 Congressional Privileges

Jimenez, et al. v. Cabangbang (1966)

Constitutional law; Libel; Utterances made by Congressmen that are privileged.—The phrase
“speech or debate therein,” used in Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution, refers to utterances
made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered,
statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
discharge of their duties as Members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly
authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question.

Same; Congress; Open letter to the President, when Congress was not in session, is not covered
by constitutional privilege.—An open letter to the President of the Philippines when Congress was
not in session which defendant-Congressman caused to be published in several newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines is not a communication which the defendant published while
he was performing his official duty, either as a Member of Congress, or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Said communication is not absolutely privileged.

Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (2009)

As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon long experience and
arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process of the legislative department.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege
would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions
of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them based upon
a judge’s speculation as to the motives.

  26  
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in upholding the institution of
parliamentary immunity and promotion of free speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the
importance of the legislative and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative
body to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce anomalies, and
talk about how the country and its citizens are being served. Courts do not interfere with the
legislature or its members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in
committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the
statement uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary
authority of the assembly  and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity.

For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this
could not be the last word on the matter.

xxx

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8,
Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
xxx

A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions of
personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense,
therefore, her remarks were outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even
parliamentary immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and
destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust.
Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege
for the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.

xxx

The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting injunction of a strict Code.
Society has entrusted that profession with the administration of the law and dispensation of justice.
Generally speaking, a lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties, unless said misconduct
also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a lawyer.

The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty. Santiago
for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part towards the Court
and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from
doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional consideration dictates
this kind of disposition.

  27