TABLE OF CONTENTS

Art.  VI  –  The  Legislative  Department  (cont.)  ...........................................................................   2  

Section  13  Double  Office  ..................................................................................................................  2  
Liban  v.  Gordon  (2011)  ........................................................................................................................  2  
Section  14  Proscription  Against  Conflicts  of  Interest  .........................................................................  4  
Puyat  v.  De  Guzman  (1982)  .................................................................................................................  4  
Section  16  (1)  Senate  President,  House  Speaker  and  Other  Officers  ..................................................  4  
Avelino  v.  Cuenco  (1949)  .....................................................................................................................  4  
Santiago  v.  Guingona,  Jr.  (1988)  ..........................................................................................................  6  
Section  16  (2)  Quorum  .....................................................................................................................  8  
People  v.  Jalosjos  (2000)  ......................................................................................................................  8  
Section  16  (3)  Congressional  Internal  Rules  and  Disciplinary  Powers  ................................................  9  
Arroyo  v.  De  Venecia  (1997)  ................................................................................................................  9  
Osmeña,  Jr.  v.  Pendatun,  et  al.  (1960)  ...............................................................................................  11  
Santiago  v.  Sandiganbayan  (2001)  .....................................................................................................  13  
Section  16  (4)  Congressional  Journal   ..............................................................................................  14  
United  States  v.  Pons  (1916)  .............................................................................................................  14  
Casco  Philippine  Chemical  Co.,  Inc.  v.  Gimenez  (1963)  .....................................................................  15  
Astorga  v.  Villegas  (1974)  ..................................................................................................................  16  
Philippine  Judges  Association  v.  Prado  (1993)  ...................................................................................  18  
Abakada  Guro  Party  List  v.  Ermita  (2005)  ..........................................................................................  18  
Section  17  The  Electoral  Tribunals  ..................................................................................................  23  
Vera  v.  Avelino  (1946)  .......................................................................................................................  23  
Abbas  v.  Senate  Electoral  Tribunal  (1988)  .........................................................................................  27  
Bondoc  v.  Pineda  (1991)  ....................................................................................................................  27  
 

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 ART. VI – THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (CONT.)
 
Section 13 Double Office

Liban v. Gordon (2011)

Corporation Law; Philippine National Red Cross; A closer look at the nature of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but
also in terms of history, public service and official status.—The passage of several laws relating to
the PNRC’s corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity of the constitutional proscription
on the creation of private corporations by law, is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the
nature of a private corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban. A closer look at
the nature of the PNRC would show that there is none like it not just in terms of structure, but also
in terms of history, public service and official status accorded to it by the State and the international
community. There is merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui generis.

xxx

The provisions of R.A. No. 95, as amended by R.A. Nos. 855 and 6373, and further amended by
P.D. Nos. 1264 and 1643, show the historical background and legal basis of the creation of the
PNRC by legislative fiat, as a voluntary organization impressed with public interest. x x x

xxx

It is in recognition of this sui generis character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid
and effective from the time of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution.

The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been questioned or challenged on
constitutional grounds, not even in this case before the Court now.

x x x the purpose of the constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations was to prevent the granting of special privileges to certain individuals, families, or
groups, which were denied to other groups. Based on the above discussion, it can be seen that the
PNRC Charter does not come within the spirit of this constitutional provision, as it does not grant
special privileges to a particular individual, family, or group, but creates an entity that strives to
serve the common good.

xxx

In the Decision of July 15, 2009, the Court recognized the public service rendered by the PNRC
as the government’s partner in the observance of its international commitments x x x

So must this Court recognize too the country’s adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention
has the force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally

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accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land. This constitutional provision
must be reconciled and harmonized with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of
using the latter to negate the former.

By requiring the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code just like any other private
corporation, the Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s special status under
international humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it in discharging
its obligations under the Geneva Conventions. Although the PNRC is called to be independent
under its Fundamental Principles, it interprets such independence as inclusive of its duty to be the
government’s humanitarian partner. To be recognized in the International Committee, the PNRC
must have an autonomous status, and carry out its humanitarian mission in a neutral and impartial
manner.

However, in accordance with the Fundamental Principle of Voluntary Service of National

Societies of the Movement, the PNRC must be distinguished from private and profit-making
entities. It is the main characteristic of National Societies that they “are not inspired by the desire
for financial gain but by individual commitment and devotion to a humanitarian purpose freely
chosen or accepted as part of the service that National Societies through its volunteers and/or
members render to the Community.”

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, can
neither “be classified as an instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality”
as well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of the State.

Based on the above, the sui generis status of the PNRC is now sufficiently established. Although
it is neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor a government-owned
or -controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as succinctly explained in the Decision of July
15, 2009, so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his
position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a conclusion does
not ipso facto imply that the PNRC is a “private corporation” within the contemplation of the
provision of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation Code. As correctly
mentioned by Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.

In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and auxiliary of the government in
the humanitarian field in accordance with its commitments under international law. This Court
cannot all of a sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It bears emphasizing that
the PNRC has responded to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is widely known to
provide a substantial portion of the country’s blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an untimely and drastic
manner that would not only have negative consequences to those who depend on it in times of
disaster and armed hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in the
international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were declared void must therefore
stay.

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[See Dissenting Opinion]

Section 14 Proscription Against Conflicts of Interest

Puyat v. De Guzman (1982)

Attorneys; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Corporations Act; An assemblyman cannot

indirectly fail to follow the Constitutional prohibition not to appear as counsel before an
administrative tribunal like the SEC by buying a nominal amount of share of one of the
shareholders after his appearance as counsel therein was contested.—Ordinarily, by virtue of the
Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel.
Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10)
shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—However, certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Fer-nandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth
of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them “after
the fact”, that is, on May 30, 1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after
the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled
hearing of the case before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to
intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C Acero,
but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he
decided, instead, to “intervene” on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And
it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared
as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that
there has been an indirect “appearance as counsel before x x x an administrative body” and, in our
opinion, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The “intervention” was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe  
the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the
event of an unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as
counsel indirectly.

Section 16 (1) Senate President, House Speaker and Other Officers

Avelino v. Cuenco (1949)

The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the
crucial points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-
matter?
b. If it has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly
approved?

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 c. Should the petition be granted?

To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused
to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended senators
were allegedly affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case
because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition
must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies in the Senate Session Hall—not in the Supreme Court.

The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might
change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should
not allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterize judicial deliberations.

xxx

It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court
in matters of similar nature.

The second question depends upon these sub-questions.

(1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly
assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of February 21, 1949?;
(2) Was there a quorum in that session?
Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr. Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these
questions once it is held, as they do, that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows
is the opinion of the other four on those sub-questions.

Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved
only by ten or less.

If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In
other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business
of the Senate? Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was,
firstly because the minutes say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators
including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and
thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators.

  5  
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House'' shall constitute a quorum, "the
House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the
House". There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority
of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority
(12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate
for the purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore that even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if
one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have
been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.

In fine, all the four justices agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that
of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days
immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven
will side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful
President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of
the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amendable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more
senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about
quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

[See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion]

Santiago v. Guingona, Jr. (1988)

Constitutional Law; Parliamentary Rules; Statutory Construction; Words and Phrases;

“Majority” and “Minority,” Explained; The plain and unambiguous words of Section 16 (1),
Article VI of the Constitution simply mean that the Senate President must obtain the votes of more
than one half of all the senators, and not by any construal does it thereby delineate who comprise
the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body.—The term “majority” has been
judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out of a total or aggregate,
it simply “means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.” The plain and
unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President
must obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate who comprise the “majority,” much less the “minority,” in the said body. And there is
no showing that the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these
terms.

Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must
be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the “minority,” who
could thereby elect the minority leader.—In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the
President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the
members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto

  6  
constitute the  “minority,” who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation
states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

Same; Same; Same; Same; History would also show that the “majority” in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged,
while the “minority” normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.—The
Comment of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested
in petitioners’ Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President
was seconded by a member of the minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada. During the ninth regular
session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was
reached to assign committee chairmanships to all senators, including those belonging to the
minority. This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where even the minority leader was
allowed to chair a committee. History would also show that the “majority” in either house of
Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged,
while the “minority” normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Majority may also refer to “the group, party, or faction with the larger
number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half—sometimes referred to as plurality—while
minority is “a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority;” No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many minority groups
or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.—Let us
go back to the definitions of the terms “majority” and “minority.” Majority may also refer to “the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,” not necessarily more than one half. This
is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is “a group, party, or faction with a
smaller number of votes or adherents than the majority.” Between two unequal parts or numbers
comprising a whole or totality, the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the
lesser would be the minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as
easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities. In a
government with a multiparty system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by petitioners
themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified by the
Comelec as the “dominant minority party” for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are
independent. No constitutional or statutory provision prescribes which of the many minority
groups or the independents or a combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Political Questions; The method of choosing who will be such
other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the Constitution,
and such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by the Supreme Court.—While the
Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress.
All that the Charter says is that “[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.” To our mind, the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision.
Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; In the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate
relative thereto.—Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such
offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine
the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature—it is
not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.—On grounds of respect
for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of
the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Paraphrasing the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a
real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement them, before the
courts may intervene.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Being merely matters of procedure, the observance of legislative rules
are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative
body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority.—Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity.
In fact, they “are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.” Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for
said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a
majority.

[See Separate Opinions]

Section 16 (2) Quorum

People v. Jalosjos (2000)

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress’ function to attend sessions is

underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution x x x

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from
the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

x x x in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

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Section 16 (3) Congressional Internal Rules and Disciplinary Powers

Arroyo v. De Venecia (1997)

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Legislative Rules of Procedure; The
cases, both in the Philippines and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts
the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply
with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision
or the rights of private individuals.—It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have
been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the
House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27.
Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in
violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum. Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that “each House may determine the rules of its proceedings” and that for
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the principle on
its head. In the decided cases, the constitutional provision that “each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings” was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support
claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct its business free from interference by
courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review. But
the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power
to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its
own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The prevailing view is that Rules of Proceedings are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural.—We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to determine its rules of
proceedings. He wrote: Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they
are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does
not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects persons other than members of the legislative body the
question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a
case where private rights are involved.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has no more power to look into the internal proceedings
of a House than members of that House have to look over the shoulders of the justices, as long as
no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.—In this case no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House
than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown. x x x

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Same; Same; Same; Same; If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has
“gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of the
Court’s Art. VIII, §1 power.—As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court’s function
is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a
showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion
for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is
apparent error. If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it follows that
such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has “gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction” so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.

Same; Same; Same; Legislative Rules of Procedure; Bicameral Conference Committee Reports;
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases
involving the approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and
conduct a viva voce or nominal voting.—Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the
House, Rep. Albano’s motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have
been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members should have been taken.
They say that the method used in  this case is a legislator’s nightmare because it suggests unanimity
when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the report. No rule of the House of
Representatives has been cited which specifically requires that in cases such as this involving
approval of a conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in
which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique
one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills
which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the
bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do
not present any matter for judicial consideration—the Court cannot provide a second opinion on
what is the best procedure.—Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. In the words of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, “this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best
procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual
congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the
constitutional command that the institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from
even attempting a diagnosis of the problem.”

[Other Doctrines]

Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution does not require that the yeas and the nays of the
Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances—upon

  10  
the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in
repassing a bill over the veto of the President.—Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas
and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances:
1.   upon the last and third readings of a bill,
2.   at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and
3.   in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by
yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly—
especially when the quorum is obviously present—for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House; A Member of the House waives his objection to the presence of a quorum by his continued
interpellation for in so doing he in effect acknowledges the presence of a quorum.—Here, the
matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court
should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s
earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established
the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly—especially when
the quorum is obviously present—for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep.
Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legislative Journals; The Journal is regarded as conclusive
with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein, and with
respect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journal has also been
accorded conclusive effect.—The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United
States v. Pons, this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as
“public memorials of the most permanent character,” thus: “They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of
time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.” As already noted, the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

[See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion]

Osmeña, Jr. v. Pendatun, et al. (1960)

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose
"is to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success" for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech,
and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." x x x It guarantees the legislator complete freedom

  11  
of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts
or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by
the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. x x x

For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be

censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The
appendix to this decision amply attests to the consensus of informed opinion regarding the practice
and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action against its members,
including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a
legislator in a foreign country.

xxx

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly
conduct f or which Osmeña may be disciplined, many arguments pro and con have been advanced.
We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not
only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if
this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmeña's conduct constituted disorderly
behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never
intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of
powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to
interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.

x x x In 1905, several senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of California for having
taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceedings to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given
them no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of the charges of bribery. The
Supreme Court of California declined to interfere, explaining in orthodox juristic language:

"Under our form of government, the judicial department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the Constitution. It has been
held by high authority that, even in the absence of an express provision conferring the power, every
legislative body in which is vested the general legislative power of the state has the implied power
to expel a member for any cause which it may deem sufficient-x x x that this power is inherent in
every legislative body; that it is necessary to enable the body 'to perform its high functions, and is
necessary to the safety of the state;' 'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the legislative
body must necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require its exercise.
'* * * There is no provision authorizing courts to control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise
by either house of the power to expel a member. These powers are functions of the legislative
department and therefore, in the exercise of the power thus committed to it, the senate is supreme.
An attempt by this court to direct or control the legislature, or either house thereof, in the exercise

  12  
of the power, would be an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is expressly forbidden
to do."

We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which in our opinion emphasize the
principles controlling this litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be applied
to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the case at bar: the House has exclusive power;
the courts have no jurisdiction to interfere.

Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as subconscious hesitation due to discovery
of impermissible course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort: we merely refuse
to disregard the allocation of constitutional functions which it is our special duty to maintain. x x
x

Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (2001)

Same; Same; Same; Same; Congressional Discipline; The order of suspension prescribed by
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution.—The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the
power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each—
“x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member.
A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed sixty days.” The suspension
contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The doctrine of separation of powers by
itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No.
3019 nor from its sanctions.—The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed
to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its
sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government—the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary—has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Where the question pertains to an affair internal to either
of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes to the view that unless an infringement of any
specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres the Court should not deign substitute its own
judgment over that of any other two branches of government—it is an impairment or a clear
disregard of a specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial
intervention.—Section 1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to act not
only in the settlement of “actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable,” but also in the determination of “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave abuse of
discretion committed by any government instrumentality has evidently been couched in general

  13  
terms in order to make it malleable to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu.
In its normal concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic, capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When the question,
however, pertains to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the Court subscribes
to the view that unless an infringement of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment over that of any of the other two branches
of government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a specific constitutional precept or
provision that can unbolt the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of the Constitution is
not, or ceases to be, responsive to contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must
promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.

Section 16 (4) Congressional Journal

United States v. Pons (1916)

While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question whether the courts
may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States that such
journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the question whether a particular bill became
a law or not. The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial
notice of the legislative journals of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These
journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment They show,
with absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on February
28, 1914.

x x x we will inquire whether the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. x x x   On the one
hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we have indicated, adjourn at midnight on
February 28, 1914, but on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be established by
extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the legislative
journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. x x x

Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the
memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Government
or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Legislature are as important
as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter
and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence,
to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature.

But counsel in his argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of all pending
matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to
effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the Governor's proclamation for the
expiration of the special session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.

  14  
If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared
with that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof
of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and
so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long centuries ago, these considerations
of public policy led to the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative
records. If that character is to be taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and
the evidence of the laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that
afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning comparatively
trifling matters."

x x x “x x x Imperative reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of laws should rest
upon public memorials of the most permanent character. They should be public, because all are
required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired to-day upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period
of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals.”

x x x The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This
settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. v. Gimenez (1963)

Hence, “urea formaldehyde” is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different
from urea” and “formaldehyde”, as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin
known as “urea formaldehyde”. Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress
contained the copulative conjunction “and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde”, and
that the members of Congress intended to exempt “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called “urea” formaldehyde”, not
the latter as a finished product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of
the Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof.

Statutory construction; Individual statements by members of Congress on the floor; Legislative

intent not necessarily reflected.—Individual statements made by Senators on the floor of the Senate
do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House
of Representatives.

Same; Enrolled bill conclusive upon the courts; Remedy in case of mistake in the printing of
bills.—The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed
by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of a bill
before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is
by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Imports; Imposition of margin fee on foreign exchange; Importation of urea and formaldehyde not
exempt.—The term “urea formaldehyde”, used in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609, under which
the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of certain articles is exempt from payment of
margin fees, refers to the finished product, and is distinct and separate from “urea” and
“formaldehyde”, which are separate articles used in the manufacture of synthetic resin. Hence, the

  15  
importation of urea and formaldehyde is not exempt from the imposition of the margin fee
established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provisions of Section 1 in relation to Section 2
of said Act.

Astorga v. Villegas (1974)

Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly approved by both Houses, namely,
by the signatures of their respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed copy of the
approved bill. It has been held that this procedure is merely a mode of authentication, to signify to
the Chief Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and
is ready for his approval or rejection. The function of an attestation is therefore not of approval,
because a bill is considered approved after it has passed both Houses. Even where such attestation
is provided for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or not the signatures are
mandatory such that their absence would render the statute invalid. The affirmative view, it is
pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the power of veto, which in itself is a
strong argument to the contrary. There is less reason to make the attestation a requisite for the
validity of a bill where the Constitution does not even provide that the presiding officers should
sign the bill before it is submitted to the President.

xxx

The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs. Clark as follows:
“The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one
that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to
the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative
branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional
requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill, thus
attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill
that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has
no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries,
on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to co-equal and independent departments requires the judicial
department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.”

Statutes; Enactment; 1935 Constitution does not indicate proof of due enactment of bill.—The
(1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not
require the presiding officers to certify to the same.

  16  
Same; Same; Enrolled bill theory; Basis.—The enrolled bill theory is based mainly on “the respect
due to co-equal and independent departments,” which requires the judicial department “to accept,
as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated.”

Petitioner’s argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof
of a bill’s due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal department of the
government, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate President declared his signature
on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature
meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration
should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason
that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.

Same; Same; Certification of bill by presiding officers of Congress; Effect of.—As far as Congress
itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers.
It is merely a mode of authentication. The law-making process in Congress ends when the bill is
approved by both Houses, and the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure any
defect already present upon its passage. In other words, it is the approval by Congress and not the
signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution says that “[e]very
bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes law, be presented to the President.”

Same; Same; In the absence of attestation, courts may resort to journals of Congress for proof of
statute’s due enactment.—Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent
and the same is not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment.

Same; Same; Journals of Congress may be resorted to determine whether the text of House Bill
No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress;
Case at bar.—This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill 9266 signed by
the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts
and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for that
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the
floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law,
which admittedly is a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and
therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein.

xxx

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The Constitution
requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks of
misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case. This Court is merely asked to
inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the same text
passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that

  17  
substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him.

This Court is not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is
a risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error committed and
subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has
become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not
intended by the law-making body.

Philippine Judges Association v. Prado (1993)

Constitutional Law; Doctrine of separation of powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers,
the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding
officers of Congress.—Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court may not inquire
beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco
Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill is conclusive upon
the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on
the final reading of the bill.) The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as
we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons, where we explained the reason thus: To
inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners’ charges that
an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House.
Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in
accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official
assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.

Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita (2005)

A. The Bicameral Conference Committee

Petitioners Escudero, et al., and Pimentel, et al., allege that the Bicameral Conference Committee
exceeded its authority by:
1) Inserting the stand-by authority in favor of the President in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A.
No. 9337;    
2) Deleting entirely the no pass-on provisions found in both the House and Senate bills;
3) Inserting the provision imposing a 70% limit on the amount of input tax to be credited
against the output tax; and

  18  
 4) Including the amendments introduced only by Senate Bill No. 1950 regarding other kinds
of taxes in addition to the value-added tax.
Petitioners now beseech the Court to define the powers of the Bicameral Conference Committee.
It should be borne in mind that the power of internal regulation and discipline are intrinsic in any
legislative body for, as unerringly elucidated by Justice Story, “[i]f the power did not exist, it would
be utterly impracticable to transact the business of the nation, either at all, or at least with decency,
deliberation, and order.”

Thus, Article VI, Section 16 (3) of the Constitution provides that “each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings.” Pursuant to this inherent constitutional power to promulgate and
implement its own rules of procedure, the respective rules of each house of Congress provided for
the creation of a Bicameral Conference Committee.

xxx

The creation of such conference committee was apparently in response to a problem, not addressed
by any constitutional provision, where the two houses of Congress find themselves in disagreement
over changes or amendments introduced by the other house in a legislative bill. Given that one of
the most basic powers of the legislative branch is to formulate and implement its own rules of
proceedings and to discipline its members, may the Court then delve into the details of how
Congress complies with its internal rules or how it conducts its business of passing legislation?
Note that in the present petitions, the issue is not whether provisions of the rules of both houses
creating the bicameral conference committee are unconstitutional, but whether the bicameral
conference committee has strictly complied with the rules of both houses, thereby remaining within
the jurisdiction conferred upon it by Congress.

In the recent case of Fariñas vs. The Executive Secretary, the Court En Banc, unanimously
reiterated and emphasized its adherence to the “enrolled bill doctrine,” thus, declining therein
petitioners’ plea for the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. Assailed in said case was
Congress’s creation of two sets of bicameral conference committees, the lack of records of said
committees’ proceedings, the alleged violation of said committees of the rules of both houses, and
the disappearance or deletion of one of the provisions in the compromise bill submitted by the
bicameral conference committee. It was argued that such irregularities in the passage of the law
nullified R.A. No. 9006, or the Fair Election Act.

Striking down such argument, the Court held thus:

Under the “enrolled bill doctrine,” the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate
President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to the
rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd
or 3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural and with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever doubts there

  19  
may be as to the formal validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court
reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the
power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or
the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun, it was held: “At any rate, courts have
declared that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.’ And it has been said that “Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body.” Consequently, “mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of
members have agreed to a particular measure.” (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing declaration is exactly in point with the present cases, where petitioners allege
irregularities committed by the conference committee in introducing changes or deleting
provisions in the House and Senate bills.

Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Judicial Review; Congress is the best judge of how it
should conduct its own business expeditiously and in the most orderly manner; If a change is
desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress
since this question is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of
each house; Even the expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot apply to questions
regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a review of the
internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.—Akin to the Fariñas case, the present
petitions also raise an issue regarding the actions taken by the conference committee on matters
regarding Congress’ compliance with its own internal rules. As stated earlier, one of the most basic
and inherent power of the legislature is the power to formulate rules for its proceedings and the
discipline of its members. Congress is the best judge of how it should conduct its own business
expeditiously and in the most orderly manner. It is also the sole concern of Congress to instill
discipline among the members of its conference committee if it believes that said members violated
any of its rules of proceedings. Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court cannot apply to
questions regarding only the internal operation of Congress, thus, the Court is wont to deny a
review of the internal proceedings of a co-equal branch of government.

Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary
of Finance, the Court already made the pronouncement that “[i]f a change is desired in the practice
[of the Bicameral Conference Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question is not
covered by any constitutional provision but is only an internal rule of each house.” To date,
Congress has not seen it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It seems, therefore,
that Congress finds the practices of the bicameral conference committee to be very useful for
purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The term “settle” is synonymous to “reconcile” and
“harmonize”; To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral Conference
Committee may then (a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill, (b)

  20  
decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would be carried
into the final form of the bill, and/or (c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing
provisions.—Under the provisions of both the Rules of the House of Representatives and Senate
Rules, the Bicameral Conference Committee is mandated to settle the differences between the
disagreeing provisions in the House bill and the Senate bill. The term “settle” is synonymous to
“reconcile” and “harmonize.” To reconcile or harmonize disagreeing provisions, the Bicameral
Conference Committee may then
(a) adopt the specific provisions of either the House bill or Senate bill,
(b) decide that neither provisions in the House bill or the provisions in the Senate bill would
be carried into the final form of the bill, and/or
(c) try to arrive at a compromise between the disagreeing provisions.

Same; Same; Same; It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an
entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill—if the
committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why
it cannot propose several provisions, collectively considered as an “amendment in the nature of a
substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee.—All the changes or modifications made by the Bicameral Conference Committee were
germane to subjects of the provisions referred to it for reconciliation. Such being the case, the
Court does not see any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the Bicameral Conference Committee. In the earlier cases of Philippine Judges
Association vs. Prado and Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Court recognized the
longstanding legislative practice of giving said conference committee ample latitude for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House. Thus, in the Tolentino case, it was
held that: . . . it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an entirely
new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can
propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot
propose several provisions, collectively considered as an “amendment in the nature of a
substitute,” so long as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the committee.
After all, its report was not final but needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become
valid as an act of the legislative department. The charge that in this case the Conference Committee
acted as a third legislative chamber is thus without any basis.

Same; Same; Same; “No Amendment” Rule; The “no-amend-ment rule” refers only to the
procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said
respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or
amendment—Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction
by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing
provisions in bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.—The Court
reiterates here that the “no-amendment rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by each
house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill
is transmitted to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said
provision in a way as to proscribe any further changes to a bill after one house has voted on it
would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the other house of Congress would be deprived of
its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of
the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference

  21  
Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills that have been
acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.

Same; Origin of Bills; Revenue Bills; Since there is no question that the revenue bill originated in
the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce
amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending
corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes—Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that
may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.—In the present cases, petitioners admit
that it was indeed House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705 that initiated the move for amending provisions
of the NIRC dealing mainly with the value-added tax. Upon transmittal of said House bills to the
Senate, the Senate came out with Senate Bill No. 1950 proposing amendments not only to NIRC
provisions on the value-added tax but also amendments to NIRC provisions on other kinds of taxes.
Is the introduction by the Senate of provisions not dealing directly with the value-added tax, which
is the only kind of tax being amended in the House bills, still within the purview of the
constitutional provision authorizing the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to a revenue
bill that originated from the House? * * * Since there is no question that the revenue bill exclusively
originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional power
to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.

Same; Same; Same; The main purpose of the bills emanating from the House of Representatives
is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government to supplement our country’s serious financial
problems, and improve tax administration and control of the leakages in revenues from income
taxes and value-added taxes, and the Senate, approaching the measures from the point of national
perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills, like providing ways that
would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer.—The main purpose of the bills
emanating from the House of Representatives is to bring in sizeable revenues for the government
to supplement our country’s serious financial problems, and improve tax administration and
control of the leakages in revenues from income taxes and value-added taxes. As these house bills
were transmitted to the Senate, the latter, approaching the measures from the point of national
perspective, can introduce amendments within the purposes of those bills. It can provide for ways
that would soften the impact of the VAT measure on the consumer, i.e., by distributing the burden
across all sectors instead of putting it entirely on the shoulders of the consumers.

[Other Doctrines]

Same; Same; Same; Germaneness Rule; The amendments made on provisions in the tax on income
of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which is to raise revenues for the
government, and the sections referring to other percentage and excise taxes are germane to the
reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would cushion the effects of VAT on consumers.—As
the Court has said, the Senate can propose amendments and in fact, the amendments made on
provisions in the tax on income of corporations are germane to the purpose of the house bills which
is to raise revenues for the government. Likewise, the Court finds the sections referring to other

  22  
percentage and excise taxes germane to the reforms to the VAT system, as these sections would
cushion the effects of VAT on consumers. Considering that certain goods and services which were
subject to percentage tax and excise tax would no longer be VAT-exempt, the consumer would be
burdened more as they would be paying the VAT in addition to these taxes. Thus, there is a need
to amend these sections to soften the impact of VAT.

Section 17 The Electoral Tribunals

Vera v. Avelino (1946)

Before the organization of the Commonwealth and the promulgation of the Constitution, each
House of the Philippine Legislature exercised the power to defer oath-taking of any member
against whom a protest had been lodged, whenever in its discretion such suspension was necessary,
before the final decision of the contest. The cases of Senator Fuentebella and Representative Rafols
are known instances of such suspension. The discussions in the Constitutional Convention showed
that instead of transferring to the Electoral Commission all the powers of the House or Senate as
"the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly," it was given only jurisdiction over "all contests" relating to the election, etc.

The Convention, however, bent on circumscribing the latter's authority to "contests" relating to the
election, etc. altered the draft. The Convention did not intend to give it all the functions of the
Assembly on the subject of election and qualifications of its members. The distinction is not
without a difference. "As used in constitutional provisions", election contest "relates only to
statutory contests in which the contestant seeks not only to oust the intruder, but also to have
himself inducted into the office."

One concrete example will serve to illustrate the remaining power in either House of Congress: A
man is elected by a congressional district who had previously served ten years in Bilibid Prison
for estafa. As he had no opponent, no protest is filed. And the Electoral Tribunal has no
jurisdiction, because there is no election contest. When informed of the fact, may not the House,
motu proprio postpone his induction? May not the House suspend, investigate and thereafter
exclude him? It must be observed that when a member of the House raises a question as to the
qualifications of another, an "election contest" does not thereby ensue, because the former does
not seek to be substituted for the latter.

So that, if not all the powers regarding the election, returns, and qualifications of members was
withdrawn by the Constitution f rom the Congress; and if, as admitted by petitioners themselves
at the oral argument, the power to defer the oath-taking, until the contest is adjudged, does not
belong to the corresponding Electoral Tribunal, then it must be held that the House or Senate still
retains such authority, for it has not been transferred to, nor assumed by, the Electoral Tribunal.
And this result flows, whether we believe that such power (to delay induction) stemmed from the
(former) privilege of either House to be the judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the
members thereof, or whether we hold it to be inherent to every legislative body as a measure of
self-preservation.

xxx

  23  
Therefore, independently of constitutional or statutory grant, the Senate has, under parliamentary
practice, the power to inquire into the credentials of any member and the latter's right to participate
in its deliberations. As we have seen, the assignment by the Constitution to the Electoral Tribunal
does not actually negative that power—provided the Senate does not cross the boundary line,
deciding an election contest against that member. Which the respondents at the bar never attempted
to do. Precisely, their resolution recognized, and did not impair, the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal to decide the contest. To test whether the resolution trenched on the territory of the last
named agency. let us ask the question: May the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate order that Body
to def er the admission of any member whose election has been contested? Obviously not. Then it
must be conceded that the passage of the disputed resolution meant no invasion of the former's
realm.

[Other Doctrines]

Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the
performance of duties purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to their
legislative functions and over which they have exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action
in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that where a member has
been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the
expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

xxx

When the Commonwealth Constitution was approved in 1935, the existence of three coordinate,
co-equal and co-important branches of the government was ratified and confirmed. That Organic
Act contained some innovations which established additional exceptions to the well-known
separation of powers; for instance, the creation of the Electoral Tribunal wherein Justices of the
Supreme Court participate in the decision of congressional election protests, the grant of rule-
making power to the Supreme Court, etc.; but in the main, the independence of one power from
the other was maintained. And the Convention—composed mostly of lawyers fully acquainted
with the Abueva, Alejandrino and Severino precedents—did not choose to modify their
constitutional doctrine, even as it altered some fundamental tenets theretofore well established.

However, it is alleged that, in 1936, Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), modified
the aforesaid ruling. We do not agree. x x x This Court, in that case, did not require the National
Assembly or any assemblyman to do any particular act. It only found it "has jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission."

That this court in the Angara litigation made declarations, nullifying a resolution of the National
Assembly, is not decisive. In proper cases this court may annul any Legislative enactment that fails
to observe the constitutional limitations. That is a power conceded to the judicature since Chief
Justice Marshall penned Marbury vs. Madison in 1803. x x x

And the power is now expressly recognized by our Organic Act.

  24  
More about the Angara precedent: The defendant there was only the Electoral Commission which
was "not a separate department of the Government" Hence, against our authority, there was no
objection based on the independence and separation of the three co-equal departments of
Government. Besides, this court said no more than that, there being a conflict of jurisdiction
between two constitutional bodies, it could not decline to take cognizance of the controversy to
determine the "character, scope and extent" of their respective constitutional spheres of action.
Here, there is actually no antagonism between the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate and the Senate
itself, for it is not suggested that the former has adopted a rule contradicting the Pendatun
Resolution. Consequently, there is no occasion for our intervention. Such conflict of jurisdiction,
plus the participation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal are essential ingredients to make the facts
of this case fit the mold of the Angara doctrine.

Now, under the principles enunciated in the Alejandrino case, may this petition be entertained?
The answer must naturally be in the negative. Granting that the postponement of the administration
of the oath amounts to suspension of the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that
such suspension is beyond the power of the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the
Philippine Senate, this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we
could not order one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to
establish judicial predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely
woven into our institutional setup.

Needless to add, any order we may issue in this case should, according to the rules, be enforceable
by contempt proceedings. If the respondents should disobey our order, can we punish them for
contempt? If we do, are we not thereby destroying the independence, and the equal importance to
which legislative bodies are entitled under the Constitution?

Let us not be overly influenced by the plea that for every wrong there is a remedy, and that the
judiciary should stand ready to afford relief. There are undoubtedly many wrongs the judicature
may not correct, for instance, those involving political questions. x x x

Let us likewise disabuse our minds from the notion that the judiciary is the repository of remedies
for all political or social ills. We should not forget that the Constitution has judiciously allocated
the powers of government to three distinct and separate compartments; and that judicial
interpretation has tended to the preservation of the independence of the three, and a zealous regard
of the prerogatives of each, knowing full well that one is not the guardian of the others and that,
for official wrong-doing, each may be brought to account, either by impeachment, trial or by the
ballot box.

The extreme case has been described wherein a legislative chamber, without any reason
whatsoever, decrees by resolution the incarceration, for years, of a citizen. And the rhetorical
question is confidently formulated. Will this man be denied relief by the courts?

Of course not: He may successfully apply for habeas corpus, alleging the nullity of the resolution
and claiming for release. But then, the defendant shall be the officer or person, holding him in
custody, and the question therein will be the validity or invalidity of resolution. x x x Courts will
interfere, because the question is not a political one, the "liberty of citizen" being involved and the

  25  
act will be clearly beyond the bounds of the legislative power, amounting to usurpation of the
privileges of the courts, the usurpation being clear, palpable and oppressive and the infringement
of the Constitution truly real.

xxx

At this juncture the error will be shown of the contention that the Senate has not this privilege "as
a residuary power". Such contention is premised on the proposition that the Houses of the
Philippine Congress possess only such powers as are expressly or impliedly granted by the
Constitution. And an American decision is quoted on the powers of the United States Congress.
The mistake is due to the failure to differentiate between the nature of legislative power under the
Constitution of the United States, and legislative power under the State Constitutions and the
Constitution of the Commonwealth (now the Republic). It must be observed that the Constitution
of the United States contains only a grant or delegation of legislative powers to the Federal
Government, whereas, the other Constitutions, like the Constitution of the Commonwealth (now
the Republic), are limits upon the plenary powers of legislation of the Government. The legislative
power of the United States Congress is confined to the subjects on which it is permitted to act by
the Federal Constitution. x x x The legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject
only to such limitations, as are found in the Republic's Constitution.- So that any power, deemed
to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless
the Organic Act has lodged it elsewhere.

xxx

During our deliberations, it was remarked that several justices subscribing the majority opinion,
belong to the electoral tribunals wherein protests connected with the Central Luzon polls await
investigation. Mulling over this, we experience no qualmish feelings about the coincidence. Their
designation to the electoral tribunals deducted not a whit from their functions as members of this
Supreme Court, and did not disqualify them in this litigation.

xxx

The Constitution provides (Article VI, section 15) that "for any speech or debate" in Congress,
Senators and Congressmen "shall not be questioned in any other place." The Supreme Court of the
United States has interpreted this privilege to include the giving of a vote or the presentation of a
resolution.

“It would be a narrow view of the constitutional provision to limit it to words spoken in debate.
The reason of the rule is as forcible in its application to written reports presented in that body by
its committees, to resolutions offered, which, though in writing, must be reproduced in speech, and
to the act of voting x x x”

xxx

  26  
Respondents' are, by this proceeding, called to account for their votes in approving the Pendatun
Resolution. Having sworn to uphold the Constitution, we must enforce the constitutional directive.
We must not question, nor permit respondents to be questioned here in connection with their votes.

Abbas v. Senate Electoral Tribunal (1988)

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the
Tribunal by any of his other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute’s competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform,
but which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership of
Senators.

To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from
discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental
law.

Same; Same; Same; Quorum; The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such,
absent its entire membership of Senators and no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.—Let us
not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may
inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every
Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution
of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the Constitution,
the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of
Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the
power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.

Bondoc v. Pineda (1991)

Constitutional Law; House Electoral Tribunal; Nature of functions.—The use of the word “sole”
in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores
the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives x x x. The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its members are
politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians x x x To be able to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide
congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.

Same; Same; Grounds for removal; Disloyalty to party not a valid cause for termination of
membership.—As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence—even independence
from the political party to which they belong. Hence, “disloyalty to party” and “breach of party
discipline,” are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. ln expelling

  27  
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc,
based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of
the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman
Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House
of Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasura’s right to security of tenure, Members
of the HRET, as “sole judge” of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure
just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution). Therefore; membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the member’s congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from-the political party he represents in the tribunal,
formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for-other valid cause. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives for “party disloyalty” short of proof that he has
formally affiliated with another political group. As the records of this case fail to show that
Congressman Camasura has become a registered member of another political party, his expulsion
from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated his right to security
of tenure.

  28