RODOLFO FARINAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, seeking to declare as unconstitutional
Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair
Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The
Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. – Any
elective official, whether national or local,
running for any office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for
President and Vice-President, shall be considered
ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging
in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006,
insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in
violation of Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring every law to have only
one subject which should be expressed in its
title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of
Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand,
and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on
the other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with
the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda and the elimination of
unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity
by considering them as ipso facto resigned
therefrom upon filing of the certificate of
candidacy. The repeal of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in
the title, nor germane to the subject matter of
Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of
Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because it repeals
Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code,
leaving intact Section 66 thereof which imposes
a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or
position. – Any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No.
9006 discriminates against appointive officials.
By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official
who runs for office other than the one which he
is holding is no longer considered ipso facto
resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public
office even as they campaign for reelection or
election for another elective position. On the
other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus,
the limitation on appointive officials remains -
they are still considered ipso facto resigned from
their offices upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is
null and void in its entirety as irregularities
attended its enactment into law. The law, not
only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null
and void. Even Section 16 of the law which
provides that “[t]his Act shall take effect upon its
approval” is a violation of the due process clause
of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence,
which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67
of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law;
hence, should not have been repealed. The
petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in
Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code is based on the
constitutional mandate on the “Accountability of
Public Officers:”
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public
officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and
lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and
Secretary General of the House of
Representatives acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction for not considering those members
of the House who ran for a seat in the Senate
during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto
resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their
respective certificates of candidacy.
ISSUES:
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider.
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative
of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution.
W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that
“[t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval” is
a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which
require publication of the law before it becomes
effective.
HELD:
To determine whether there has been
compliance with the constitutional requirement
that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its
title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject
matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title
should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include
the general object which a statute seeks to
effect, without expressing each and every end
and means necessary or convenient for the
accomplishing of that object. Mere details need
not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract
or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: “An Act to
Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
Election Practices.”
The Court is convinced that the title and the
objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within
its contemplation. To require that the said repeal
of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the
title is to insist that the title be a complete index
of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a
limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding, to the
other provisions of Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal
with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda, does not violate the “one
subject-one title” rule. This Court has held that
an act having a single general subject, indicated
in the title, may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be,
so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by
providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the
Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment
or discrimination that had to be done away with
and repealed. The executive department found
cause with Congress when the President of the
Philippines signed the measure into law. For
sure, some sectors of society and in government
may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad
policy as it would encourage political
adventurism. But policy matters are not the
concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political
branches of the government. It is not for this
Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an
enactment is wise or unwise, whether it is based
on sound economic theory, whether it is the best
means to achieve the desired results, whether,
in short, the legislative discretion within its
prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment
of the legislature, and the serious conflict of
opinions does not suffice to bring them within
the range of judicial cognizance. Congress is not
precluded from repealing Section 67 by the
ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra
upholding the validity of the provision and by its
pronouncement in the same case that the
provision has a laudable purpose. Over time,
Congress may find it imperative to repeal the law
on its belief that the election process is thereby
enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws – the fair, honest and orderly
election of truly deserving members of Congress
– is achieved.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The
former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to
an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On
the other hand, appointive officials hold their
office by virtue of their designation thereto by an
appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are
entitled to security of tenure while others serve
at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Finally, the “Effectivity” clause (Section 16) of
Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it “shall
take effect immediately upon its approval,” is
defective. However, the same does not render
the entire law invalid. In Tañada v. Tuvera, this
Court laid down the rule:
... the clause “unless it is otherwise provided”
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislator may make the law
effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but
the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or
extended….
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
doctrine enunciated in Tañada, Rep. Act No.
9006, notwithstanding its express statement,
took effect fifteen days after its publication in
the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general
circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the
firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law
is that the courts do not involve themselves with
nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute.
That is the exclusive concern of the legislative
branch of the government. When the validity of
a statute is challenged on constitutional
grounds, the sole function of the court is to
determine whether it transcends constitutional
limitations or the limits of legislative power. No
such transgression has been shown in this case.
QUINTO VS. COMELEC (2009)
Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition and
certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and a writ of
preliminary injunction, assailing Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC). They contend that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
issued the assailed Resolution. They aver that
the advance filing of CoCs for the 2010 elections
is intended merely for the purpose of early
printing of the official ballots in order to cope
with time limitations. Such advance filing does
not automatically make the person who filed the
CoC a candidate at the moment of filing.
Petitioners further posit that the provision
considering them as ipso facto resigned from
office upon the filing of their CoCs is
discriminatory and violates the equal protection
clause in the Constitution.
The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679:
“Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and
employees in GOCCs shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon filling of his
certificate of candidacy“
Issue:
Whether or not the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.
HELD:
The Court reversed their previous decision and
declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
RULING:
These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art
IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
civil service officers and employees from
engaging in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.
The intention to impose a strict limitation on the
participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is
unmistakable.
The equal protection of the law clause in the
constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are
characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated
and regulated different from the other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against
undue favor and individual or class privelege, as
well as hostile discrimination or the oppression
of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation which is limited either in the object to
which it is directed or by territory within which it
is to operate. It does not demand absolute
equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike under like
circumstances and conditions both as to
priveleges conferred and liabilities enforced. The
equal protection clause is not enfringed by
legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike
to all persons within such class and reasonable
ground exists for making a distinction between
those who fall within such class and those who
do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exists between
elective officials and appointive officials. Elective
officials occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. Appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation by
an appointing authority.
LONZANIDA VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and
served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May
1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the duties
thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested
by his opponent who filed an election protest.
The court rendered a judgment declaring the
results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as
null and void on the ground that there was a
failure of election. In the May 11, 1998 elections
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed
winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely
filed a petition to disqualify him from running on
the ground that he had served three consecutive
terms in the same post. The COMELEC found that
Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his
proclamation in May 1995, although he was later
unseated before the expiration of the term,
should be counted as service for one full term in
computing the three term limit under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting
the petition for disqualification Petitioner
Lonzanida challenges the validity of the
COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was
duly elected mayor for only two consecutive
terms and that his assumption of office in 1995
cannot be counted as service of a term for the
purpose of applying the three term limit for local
government officials, because he was not the
duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May
1995 elections.
The private respondent maintains that the
petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should
be considered as service of one full term because
he discharged the duties of mayor for almost
three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few
months before the next mayoral elections.
Issue:
WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor
of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998
may be considered as service of one full term for
the purpose of applying the three‑term limit for
elective local government officials.
Held:
No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides
that, “the term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law shall be three years and no
such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was
elected.” Section 43 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule,
that: “No local elective official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.” The petitioner cannot be deemed
to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post
before the expiration of the term. Pursuant to
the constitutional provision above, voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three
term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption
of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995‑1998
mayoral term.
ALDOVINO VS. COMELEC
FACTS: The respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is
an effective interruption because it renders the
suspended public official unable to provide
complete service for the full term; thus, such
term should not be counted for the purpose of
the three-term limit rule. The present petition
seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling
for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected
councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive
terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or
during his 2004-2007 term of office, the
Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for
90 days in relation with a criminal case he then
faced.
This Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he
resumed performing the functions of his office
and finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same position. The petitioners
Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and
Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought
to deny due course to Asilo’s certificate of
candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he
had been elected and had served for three
terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore
violated the three-term limit rule under Section
8, Article X of the Constitution and Section
43(b)of RA 7160.
The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against
the petitioners and in Asilo’s favour in its
Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned
out that the three-term limit rule did not apply,
as Asilo failed to render complete service for the
2004-2007 term because of the suspension the
Sandiganbayan had ordered.
ISSUE:
Whether preventive suspension of an elected
local official is an interruption of the three-term
limit rule; and .Whether preventive suspension
is considered involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD:
NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded,
the constitutional provision fixes the term of a
local elective office and limits an elective
official’s stay in office to no more than three
consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the
rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as
a period of time – three years – during which an
official has title to office and can serve The word
"term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an
officer may hold an office. Preventive A preventive suspension cannot simply be a
suspension is not a qualified interruption… term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections
from exercising the functions and prerogatives
presented the question of whether the
of the office within the suspension period.
disqualification on the basis of the three-term
limit applies if the election of the public official The best indicator of the suspended official’s
(to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as continuity in office is the absence of a
winner of the public official) for his supposedly permanent replacement and the lack of the
third term had been declared invalid in a final authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists
and executory judgment. We ruled that the two
requisites for the application of the
disqualification (viz., 1. that the official
concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government
post; and 2. that he has fully served three
consecutive terms…… The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of
execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an
interruption of continuity of service and thus,
the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term.

B (EXCEPTION) "Interruption" of a term

exempting an elective official from the three-
term limit rule is one that involves no less than
the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective
official must have involuntarily left his office for
a length of time, however short, for an effective
interruption to occur. This has to be the case if
the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict
intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an
elective official’s continuous stay in office to no
more than three consecutive terms, using
"voluntary renunciation" as an example and
standard of what does not constitute an
interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of
the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered
an interruption that allows an elective official’s
stay in office beyond three terms.