PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
BENANCIO MORTERA the prosecution and which thus depart from the commonstandard of
FACTS:
That on or about August 25, 2002, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines
and withinthe jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named
accused, armed with a knife, bymeans of treachery and with intent to kill,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully andfeloniously, assault, attack and
stab from behind with the use of said weapon that he wasthen armed
with, at the person of ROBELYN ROJAS y MALLARI, employing
means,manner and form which tended directly and specially to insure its
execution without anydanger to the person of the accused, and as a result
of which attack, the said Robelyn Rojasy Mallari sustained stabbed wound
on the fatal part of the latter’s body which directly causedhis death to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.Upon arraignment on
February 6, 2004, the accused pleaded "Not
Guilty." Although the accused pleaded not guilty when arraigne
d, during the trial, he admittedhaving stabbed the victim whom he
referred to as Tonying, but claimed self-defense. By hisaccount, after
leaving his uncle's house at Gov. Camins, he passed by a corner and saw
agroup of people drinking. They were Ramil Gregorio, Jonel Veñales and
Tonying. Uponseeing him, Tonying ran away and called his brother, Alberto
Rojas. When the accused wasabout to reach the main road, Alberto Rojas,
Tonying and a certain "Duk" (brother-in-law ofTonying) accosted him and
asked him for liquor money. When he refused, the three mengot angry.
After telling them that he had to go, Tonying hit him with a spray gun (for
painting),causing him to fall down. While he was in a supine position,
Tonying attempted to hit himagain. It was at that point that he was able to
get hold of his knife and thrust it forward andhit someone. He did not know
who got stabbed. He then immediately fled to Ayala and laterto Lintangan,
Zamboanga del Norte.The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime
charged. The accused appealed tothe Court of Appeals raising the issues of
denial of due process of law and his right to animpartial trial. He claimed
that the trial court judge, Judge Jesus Carbon, was hostiletowards him and
prejudged his guilt as could be inferred from his "prosecutor-like"
conduct.The accused likewise reiterated his claim of self-defense.The Court
of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE:
Whether there was there was a denial of his right to due process and of his
right tohave an impartial trial.
RULING:
The Court is not unaware of the case of
Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,
where it waswritten:The Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge
to questionwitnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material
point whichpresents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides.
But not onlyshould his examination be limited to asking clarificatory
questions, the rightshould be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is
that the court shouldstay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering
nor intervening in theconduct of trial hardly in fact can one avoid the
impression that theSandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more
precise, had taken thecudgels for the prosecution in proving the case
against Tabuena and Peralta.The cold neutrality of an impartial judge
requirement of due processwas certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta
when the court, with itsoverzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate A substantial portion of the TSN was
incorporated in the majority opinion not tofocus on numbers alone, but
more importantly to show that the court questionswere in the interest of
fairness and impartiality. (emphasis added)The situation in the case at
bench is, however, different. As correctly pointed out by the
Court of Appeals, although the trial judge might havemade
improper remarks and comments, it did not amount to a denial of his right
to dueprocess or his right to an impartial trial. Upon perusal of the transcript
as a whole, it cannotbe said that the remarks were reflective of his partiality.
They were not out of context. Notonly did the accused mislead the court by
initially invoking a negative defense only to claimotherwise during trial, he
was also not candid to his own lawyer, who was kept in the darkas to his
intended defense The accused having admitted the killing, a reverse order
of trial could haveproceeded. As it turned out, the prosecution undertook
to discharge the burden of provinghis guilt, when the burden of proof to
establish that the killing was justified should havebeen his.Most probably,
the trial judge was peeved at the strategy he adopted. The trial
judgecannot be faulted for having made those remarks, notwithstanding
the sarcastic toneimpressed upon it. The sarcasm alone cannot lead us to
conclude that the trial judge hadtaken the cudgels for the prosecution.The
invocation of
Opida fails to persuade us either. The facts therein are not at allfours with
the case at bench. In Opida, we did not fail to notice the malicious, sadistic
andadversarial manner of questioning by the trial judge of the accused
therein, including theirdefense witness. In
Opida, the accused never admitted the commission of the crime, andso the
burden of proof remained with the prosecution.
Bilbao vs. People
A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR WHO HAS BEEN ASSIGNED TO PROSECUTE A
CASE AND WASLATER APPOINTED AS JUDGE MAY NOT HEAR AND
DECIDE ON THE SAME, EVEN IF THEASSIGNMENT AS PROSECUTOR
OCCURRED AFTER THE PROSECUTION HAS ALREADYRESTED ITS
CASE. TO DO SO WOULD VIOLATE DUE PROCESS.
Nelson Lai Y Bilbao v PeopleG.R. No. 175999, July 1, 2015Bersamin,
J:Nelson Lai Y Bilbao was convicted of the crime of Homicide under Article
249 of the RevisedPenal Code, for allegedly killing Enrico Villanueva Jr.
during a benefit dance that was being heldin Purok Azucena, Barangay 6,
Bacolod City. Judge Fernando Elumbra heard and decided onthe
case.However, on Motion for Reconsideration, the defense argued that
Elumbra should be disqualifiedfrom hearing and deciding on the case,
because he had prosecuted the same case prior to hisappointment as
Judge. The Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, the issue,
amongothers, was raised before the Court of Appeals.CA affirmed the
judgement of the RTC, and ruled against the disqualification case on the
groundthat 1) Judge Elumbra was only assigned as public prosecutor after
the prosecution has alreadyrested its case, and 2) a petition to disqualify a
judge should have been filed before the renditionof judgement. The
accused asks for relief before the Supreme Court, arguing that his right to
dueprocess has been violated because the case was not decided by an
impartial judge.
ISSUE: Is a decision rendered by a trial court judge who previously
prosecuted the same invalid forviolating the due process clause of the
Constitution?
HELD: Yes, a judge cannot claim impartiality when he, regardless of extent
of participation, hadpreviously prosecuted the case. “To be clear, that
Judge Elumba's prior participation as the publicprosecutor was passive, or
that he entered his appearance as the public prosecutor long after
theProsecution had rested its case against the petitioner did not really
matter.”
Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary requires
judges who had served as counsel in a case to inhibit themsel
ves. “As such, the mere appearance
of his name as the public prosecutor in the records of Criminal Case No.
17446 sufficed todisqualify Judge Elumba from sitting on and deciding the
case.”
The Constitutional right to dueprocess assures parties a decision of a cold,
neutral judge. Such is absent in the case at bar.Furthermore, the rule that a
petition to disqualify a judge must be filed before rendition of judgement
applies only when the supposed disqualification of the judge
is premised on bias asperceived by a party. It does not apply in cases
where there is a mandatory basis fordisqualification, such as what
happened in the case at bar.The decision must be set aside and is
remanded to the lower court.
JOSE R. CATACUTAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Petitioner Jose Catacutan was held guilty before the
Sandiganbayan for the violation of Section 3(e) of RA
3019(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for his refusal to
implement the promotion and appointments of Georgito
Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational
Supervisors III despite the directive of CHED and the Civil
Service commission. Catacutan questioned the judgment,
contending that he was denied due process when he was not
allowed to present the CA judgment, dismissing the
adiminstrative case against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the judgment, finding petitioner guilty of
violating RA 3019, was well founded despite the refusal of the
trial court to admit the dismissal of the administrative case as
evidence.
Held:
The stubborn defiance by petitioner in carrying out the
memorandum issued by CHED was attended by ill motive and
bad faith. Such factual finding by the Trial courts, which was
affirmed by the sandiganbayan, was based on the evidence
presented before it. The non-admittance of the dismissal of
the administrative case did not violate petitioner’s right to due
process where such dismissal was not relevant to the
adjudication of the criminal case. After all, administrative
proceedings require a different quantum of proof compared to
criminal proceedings, the judgment in one is not dependent on
the other.
Present in the case were the elements to find the petitioner
guilty of violating Sec3(e) of RA 3019, to wit: 1.that the accused
was a public officer performing an official function; 2) that he
acted in bad faith; and 3) that injury was caused to another
party because of such act.
Chan-Tan vs. ChanG.R. no. 167139 (February 25, 2010)
Facts:
−June 1989: Petitioner and respondent got married at the
Manila Cathedral. They had sons Justin (born inCanada in
1990) and Russel (born in the Philippines in 1993).
−Susie Chan-Tan, petitioner, then filed a case of annulment
under FC 36 (psychological incapacity) againstJesse Tan.
The parties, thereafter, submitted a compromise agreement.
−July 31, 2003: trial court issued a partial judgment
of approval of the said compromise agreement.
−March 30, 2004: trial court declared the marriage null and
void, under FC 36, on the ground of psychologicalincapacity
of the parties. TC incorporated the compromise agreement it
previously approved in said decision.Petitioner then cancelled
the offer to purchase the Corinthian Hills Subdivision Lot No.
12, Block 2 property, andauthorized Megaworld Corp. to offer
it to other interested buyers. It also appeared that
the petitioner left the countrywith the children. Respondent
then filed an omnibus motion, seeking the main custody of
the children claiming thatpetitioner brought the kids out
of the country w/o his knowledge; that said petitioner failed
to settle the balance for theMegaworld property, w/c, if
forfeited, would prejudice the interest of the children; and
that petitioner failed to turn over to him documents and titles
in his name.
−May 17, 2004: TC awarded respondent custody of the
children, ordered petitioner to turn over to
respondentdocuments and titles in his name, and allowed
respondent to stay in the family dwelling in Mariposa, QC.
−June 28, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration,
claiming that she was denied due process, was notable to
properly present evidence due to negligence from her
counsel, and said that she was forced out of thecountry due
to beating she received from the respondent. Petitioner also
prayed for an increase in the respondent'smonthly support
obligation.
−October 12, 2004: TC denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, because it was filed beyond the 15-
dayreglementary period. TC also declared petitioner
in contempt of court for non-compliance with the July
31, 2003partial judgment and the May 17, 2004 resolution.
TC also denied the prayer for an increase in monthly
supportobligation, since petitioner was able to enroll the
children to another school by herself without
respondent'sknowledge.
−November 4, 2004: Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and
a motion for reconsideration of the October
12, 2004resolution, claiming that she was no longer
interested in the suit, claiming that withdrawing from the
case would be inthe best interest of her children. She prayed
to be vacated her from all prior orders, and leave the parties
at a statusquo ante the filing of the suit, or re-instating the
parties to their conditions prior the filings.
−December 28, 2004: TC denied both November 4, 2004
motions, declaring that the March 30, 2004 and May17, 2004
decisions had become final and executory upon lapse of the
15-day reglementary period..
−February 15, 2005: TC again denied another motion for
reconsideration of the December 28, 2004 decision. TCthen
issued a Certificate of Finality of the March 30 and May 17,
2004 decisions.
Issue: W/N the March 30, 2004 and May 17, 2004 decisions
had become final and executory despite allegations of denial
of dueprocess.
Held: Petition has no merit, on the basis of lapse of the15-day
reglementary period.
−Alleged negligence of counsel to inform the petitioner
resulting in loss of petitioner's right to appeal is not a ground
for setting aside a judgment that is valid and regular.
−Petitioner cannot claim she was denied due process, since
records showed that she was very active in court.
She alsocannot claim negligence on the part of her counsel,
since said counsel issued a manifest on May 3, 2004, saying
that saidcounsel made attempts to call the petitioner, but
failed.
Tan vs. Judge Tabin
Facts: Complainant avers: On November 9, 2006, the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City Police District
(QCPD) served her a warrant of arrest dated October 13,
2006, issued by the MTCC Baguio City, Branch 4, presided by
respondent, relative to Criminal Case No. 118628 for alleged
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. It was only then that she
learned for the first time that a criminal case was filed against
her before the court. She was detained at the Quezon City
Hall Complex Police Office and had to post bail of ₱1,000.00
before the Office of the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City for her temporary release. Upon
verification, she learned that respondent issued on August 8,
2006 an Order directing her to appear before the court on
October 10, 2006 for arraignment. It was sent by mail to PNP
Quezon City for service to her. However, she did not receive
any copy of the Order and up to the present has not seen the
same; hence, she was not able to attend her arraignment.
She also found out that there was no proof of service of the
Order or any notice to her of the arraignment. This
notwithstanding, respondent issued a warrant for her arrest.
Complainant alleges that she was deeply aggrieved and
embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant for her arrest
despite the fact that she was never notified of her
arraignment. Complainant prayed that the appropriate
investigation be conducted as to the undue issuance of a
warrant for her arrest.1
Issue: WON Tan has been denied of due process
Held: The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of
authority when she hastily issues a warrant of arrest against
the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule that
the accused should first be notified of the charges against
him and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits
and countervailing evidence.15
While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary
action for every erroneous order or decision they render, that
relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive and
arbitrary in their prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the
powers vested in them by law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive
disregard of the basic requirements of due process.16 While
there appears to be no malicious intent on the part of
respondent, such lack of intent, however, cannot completely
free her from liability.17 When the law is sufficiently basic, a
judge owes it to her office to know and simply apply it. 18
Considering that this is respondent's first administrative
infraction in her more than 8 years of service in the
judiciary,19 which serves to mitigate her liability, the Court
holds the imposition of a fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00 to
be proper in this case.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice
received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for
the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The
Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other
supporting documents for said extradition were attached
along with the request. Charges include:
1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US
2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another
The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel
proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of
the extradition treaty which they found having matters
needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for
copies of all the documents included in the extradition
request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The
Secretary of Justice denied request on the following grounds:
1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the
DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD
1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-US
Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the
Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of the
documents is not a preliminary investigation like in
criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed
rights of the accused in criminal prosecution
inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized
disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance
proceedings in connection with an extradition request,
as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of
treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon
the parties.
Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of
Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez.
Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the
requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings.
Thus, this petition is now at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings
constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine
Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal
tribunals are confronted with situations in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law
and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local
state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a
situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a
choice has to be made between a rule of international law
and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts. The doctrine of
incorporation decrees that rules of international law are
given equal standing, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the
rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should
take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting
state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve
preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so
although we recognize treaties as a source of binding
obligations under generally accepted principles of
international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of
the law of the land
Matuguina vs. CA
Due Process – Not Being Party to a Case
In 1973, license was issued to Milagros Matuguina to operate
logging businesses under her group Matuguina Logging
Enterprises. MIWPI was established in 1974 with 7
stockholders. Milagros Matuguina became the majority
stockholder later on. Milagros later petitioned to have MLE be
transferred to MIWPI. Pending approval of MLE’s petition,
Davao Enterprises Corporation filed a complaint against MLE
before the District Forester (Davao) alleging that MLE has
encroached upon the area allotted for DAVENCOR’s timber
concession. The Investigating Committee found MLE guilty as
charged and had recommended the Director to declare that
MLE has done so. MLE appealed the case to the Ministry of
Natural Resources. During pendency, Milagrosa withdrew her
shares from MIWPI. Later, MNR Minister Ernesto Maceda
found MLE guilty as charged. Pursuant to the finding,
DAVENCOR and Philip Co requested Maceda to order MLE
and/or MIWPI to comply with the ruling to pay the value in
pesos of 2352.04 m3 worth of timbers. The Minister then
issued a writ of execution against MIWPI. MIWPI filed a
petition for prohibition before the Davao RTC. The RTC ruled
in favor of MIWPI and has ordered to enjoin the Minister from
pursuing the execution of the writ. DAVENCOR appealed and
the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC. MIWPI averred that it is
not a party to the original case (as it was MLE that was sued –
a separate entity). That the issuance of the order of execution
by the Minister has been made not only without or in excess
of his authority but that the same was issued patently without
any factual or legal basis, hence, a gross violation of MIWPI’s
constitutional rights under the due process clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not MIWPI’s right to due process has been
violated.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of MIWPI. Generally accepted is
the principle that no man shall be affected by any proceeding
to which he is a stranger, and strangers to a case not bound by
judgment rendered by the court. In the same manner an
execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court. There is no basis for the
issuance of the Order of Execution against the MIWPI. The
same was issued without giving MIWPI an opportunity to
defend itself and oppose the request of DAVENCOR for the
issuance of a writ of execution against it. In fact, it does not time, she fell unconscious.
appear that MIWPI was at all furnished with a copy of
DAVENCOR’s letter requesting for the Execution of the Private respondents aver that a judgment of acquittal is
Minister’s decision against it. MIWPI was suddenly made liable immediately final and executory and that the prosecution
upon the order of execution by the respondent Secretary’s cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional
expedient conclusions that MLE and MIWPI are one and the prohibition against double jeopardy.
same, apparently on the basis merely of DAVENCOR’s letter
requesting for the Order, and without hearing or impleading
MIWPI. Until the issuance of the Order of execution, MIWPI ISSUE:
was not included or mentioned in the proceedings as having Did the Court of Appeals act with grave abuse of discretion in
any participation in the encroachment in DAVENCOR’s timber acquitting the private respondents?
concession. This action of the Minister disregards the most
basic tenets of due process and elementary fairness. The
HELD:
liberal atmosphere which pervades the procedure in
administrative proceedings does not empower the presiding YES, the Court of Appeals erred in acquitting private
officer to make conclusions of fact before hearing all the respondents. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot
parties concerned. (1996 Oct 24) appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered
in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. If there is grave
abuse of discretion, however, granting petitioner’s prayer is
not tantamount to putting private respondents in double
People of the Philippines and AAA v. Court of Appelas 21st
jeopardy.
Division, Mindanao Station, Raymund Carampatana, Jeofhel
Oporto, and Moises Alquizola
The petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of
G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015
proving that the respondent appellate court committed grave
abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents. It
FACTS:
appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied
Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were
on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
charged with the crime of rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC
disregarded that of the prosecution. A more careful perusal
convicted Carampatana and Oporty guilty as prinicpals and
will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted,
Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA acquitted them of
from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of
the crime charged, hence, this present appeal.
Oporto, Carampatana,and Alquizola. It presented the private
respondents’ account and allegations as though these were
After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with
the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently
her friends, went to Alson’s Palace for a drinking session to
utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.
celebrate their graduation. During such session, they shared
their problems with each other. AAA became emotional and
The elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal
started crying, prompting her to take her first shot of
knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five glasses
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived
of drinks, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s
of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is
lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they would
under twelve years of age. Here, the accused intentionally
remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them
made AAA consume hard liquor more than she could handle.
to stop, and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. The
They still forced her to drink even when she was already
group just laughed at her and still made her drink more. She
obviously inebriated. They never denied having sexual
fell asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the
intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of
remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle. She refused but
reason or unconscious at the time the private respondents
they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.
ravished her.
When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was
Moreover, Alquizola should not only be deemed as an
already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that
accomplice but a principal as well by virtue of conspiracy. As
place because she had been there before. She would
the caretaker of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a
thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one
room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and
of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top
furtiveness. He was likewise inside the room, intently
of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having
watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused
intercourse with her. At one point, AAA woke up while
AAA and did not do anything to stop the bestial acts of his
Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ.
companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts,
Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last
and other parts of her body. Indubitably, there was
conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to
sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the act of any one was the act of
all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of
the crime of rape.
JAVIER VS. COMELEC
G.R. No.L- 68379-812, September 22, 1986
FACTS:
1. The petitioner Evelio Javier and the private respondent
Arturo Pacificador were candidates in Antique for the
Batasang Pambansa election in May 1984;
2. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections
and the canvass of the election returns, Javier went to the
COMELEC to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival;
3. On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the COMELEC
directed the provincial board of canvassers to proceed with
the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate until further orders;
4. On June 7, 1984, the same Second Division ordered the
board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner
without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by
Javier with the COMELEC;
5. On certiorari with the S.C. the proclamation made by the
Board of Canvasser was set aside as premature, having been
made before the lapse of the 5 – day period of appeal, which
the petitioner seasonably made;
6. On July 23, 1984 the Second Division itself proclaimed
Pacificador the elected assemblyman of Antique.
ISSUE:
Was the Second Division of the COMELEC, authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984 proclaiming
Pacificador the winner in the election ?
APPLICABLE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSITUTION:
The applicable provisions of the 1973 Constitution are Art.
XII-C, secs. 2 and 3, which provide:
“Section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of all members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials.”
“Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in
three divisions. All election casesa may be heard and decided
by divisions except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en
banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases
shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their
submission for decision.”
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES:
Petitioner:
The proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid
because all contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Elections en banc.
Respondents:
Only “contests” need to be heard and decided en banc, all
other cases can be – in fact, should be – filed with and
decided only by any of the three divisions.
There is a difference between “contests” and “cases” and
also a difference between “pre-proclamation controversies”
and “election protests”. The pre-proclamation controversy
between the petitioner and the private respondent was not
yet a contest at the time and therefore could be validly heard
by a mere division of the Commission on elections, consonant
with Sec. 3. The issue at that stage was still administrative
and could be resolved by a division.
HELD:
a. The S.C. decided to resolve the case even if the Batasang
Pambansa had already been abolished by the Aquino
government, and even if Javier had already died in the
meantime. This was because of its desire for this case to
serve as a guidance for the future. Thus it said: “The Supreme
Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but
also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to
us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two
are not always the same. There are times when we cannot
grant the latter because the issue has been settled and
decision is no longer possible according to law. But there are
also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in
this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice
demands that we act, then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and
as a restraint upon the future.”
b. The S.C. held on the main issue that in making the
COMELEC the sole judge of all contests involving the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang
Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the
Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and
decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter
related thereto, including those arising before the
proclamation of the winners.
The decision rendered by the Second Division alone was
therefore set aside as violative of the Constitution. The case
should have been decided en banc.
c. Pre-proclamation controversies became known and
designated as such only because of Sec. 175 of the 1978
Election Code. The 1973 Constitution could not have
therefore been intended to have divided contests between
pre and post proclamation when that Constitution was
written in 1973.
d. The word “contests” should not be given a restrictive
meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest
possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in
the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed
in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as
referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to
an elective office, made before or after the proclamation of
the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the
office in dispute.
e. There was also a denial of due process. One of the
members of the Second Division, Commissioner Jose Opinion
was a law partner of Pacificador. He denied the motion to
disqualify him from hearing the case. The Court has
repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge” as the indispensable imperative of due
process. To bolster that requirement we have held that the
judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his
decision will be just.
FELICIANO and MELENCIO-HERRERA, concurring:
All election contests involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa must be decided by the Commission on Elections
en banc under Secs. 2 and 3 of Art. XII-C of the 1973
Constitution. These sections do not distinguish between “pre-
proclamation” and “post-proclamation” contests nor
between “cases” and “contests”.
Azul vs. Castro
Due Process – Impartial and Competent Court
Azul owns and operates a construction shop. To finance it he
entered a loan agreement with Tecson in the amount of P391k.
Tecson was only able to collect P141k thus leaving about P250k
as a balance. She filed a petition for collection of sum of money
before the Rizal RTC and the case was given to J Sarmiento. On
27 Mar ’79, Azul received the copy of the complaint. On 10 Apr
’79, Azul filed a motion for a 15 day extension to file for
responsive pleading. Azul was unaware that J Sarmiento
retired and was temporarily substituted by J Aňover who
granted the extension but only for 5 days starting the next day.
But Azul only received the notice granting such on the 23 rd of
the same month way passed the 5 day period. On the 17th of
April, Tecson already filed a motion to dismiss averring that
Azul’s 5 day extension has already lapsed. On the 18th of the
same month, J Castro, the permanent judge to replace J
Sarmiento took office and he ordered Azul to be in default due
to the lapse of the 5 day extension. J Castro proceeded with
the reception of evidence the next day and of course without
Azul’s evidence as he was still unaware of him being in default.
On April 27th, J Castro ruled in favor Tecson. On May 2nd Azul,
unaware that J Castro already decided the case appealed to
remove his default status. On May 7thAzul received the
decision rendered by the court on Apr 27th (but on record the
date of receipt was May 5th). Azul filed a motion for new trial
on June 6th. The lower court denied the same on the 20 th of
the same month. On Aug 1st, Azul filed a notice of appeal it was
denied on the 3rd but was reconsidered on the 7th hence Azul
filed his record on appeal on the 21st and J Castro approved it
on the 27th but surprisingly upon motion of Tecson on the 30th,
J Castro set aside its earlier decisaion on the 27th. Finally, J
Castro denied the appeal on the 7th of September.
ISSUE: Whether or not Azul has been denied due process.
HELD: The SC agreed with the Azul that he was denied due
process. The constitutional provision on due process
commands all who wield public authority, but most
peremptorily courts of justice, to strictly maintain standards of
fundamental fairness and to insure that procedural safeguards
essential to a fair trial are observed at all stages of a
proceeding. It may be argued that when the Azul’s counsel
asked for a fifteen (15) day extension from April 11, 1979 to
file his answer, it was imprudent and neglectful for him to
assume that said first extension would be granted. However,
the records show that Atty. Camaya personally went to the
session hall of the court with his motion for postponement
only to be informed that J Sarmiento had just retired but that
his motion would be considered “submitted for resolution.”
Since the sala was vacant and pairing judges in Quezon City are
literally swamped with their own heavy loads of cases, counsel
may be excused for assuming that, at the very least, he had the
requested fifteen (15) days to file his responsive pleading. It is
likewise inexplicable why J Añover, who had not permanently
taken over the sala vacated by the retired judge, should
suddenly rule that only a five-day extension would be allowed.
And to compound the Azul’s problems, the order was sent by
mail and received only twelve (12) days later or after the five-
day period. Before the much publicized Project Mercury of the
Bureau of Posts, a court should have known that court orders
requiring acts to be done in a matter of days should not be sent
by mail. Meanwhile, the petitioner was declared in default.
The motion to declare defendant in default is dated April 17,
1979. No copy was furnished the petitioner. It was acted upon
on April 18, 1979, the very first day in office of J Castro in
Quezon City.
Paderanga vs. Azura
Due Process – Hostility Between the Judge and the Parties –
Inhibition
Paderanga was the mayor of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental.
He petitioned that J Azura inhibits himself from deciding on
pending cases brought before him on the grounds that they
have lost confidence in him, that he entertained tax suits
against the city and had issued TROs on the sales of properties
when it is clearly provided for by law (Sec 74 PD 464) that the
remedy to stop auction is to pay tax, that J Azura is bias,
oppressive and is abusive in his power.
ISSUE: Whether or not J Azura should inhibit himself from the
trial.
HELD: The SC ruled that Azura must. As decided in
the Pimentel Case (21 SCRA 160), “All the foregoing
notwithstanding, this should be a good occasion as any to draw
attention of all judges to appropriate guidelines in a situation
where their capacity to try and decide fairly and judiciously
comes to the fore by way of challenge from any one of the
parties. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation But when suggestion is made of record that he might
be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice
against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a
careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a
way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not
impaired. . .
The reminder is also apropos that next in importance to the
duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in
such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge.
David vs. Aquilizan
Due Process – Hearing
David has a large parcel of land in Polomolok, Cotabato. He
let Felomeno Jugar and Ricardo Jugar tend and caretake
separate portions of his land in 1971. The land is estimated to
be yielding 60-70 cavans of corn cobs an dthe share agreed
upon is 50-50. In 1973, David withdrew the land from the
brothers and has not allowed them to go back there. The
brothers prayed for reinstatement but David refused to do
so. David denied that the borthers were his tenants. He said
that Ricardo was his tractor driver before but he resigned to
take care of his dad and to work for DOLE. Fewlomeno on the
other hand surrendered the portion of the land he was
tending to continue his faith healing. J Aquilizan handled the
case filed by the brothers against David and after three
months he rendered a decision in favor of the brothers
without any hearing. David averred he was denied due
process. J Aquilizan admitted that there was indeed no
hearing conducted but he said the decision has already
become final and executory as the period for appeal has
already lapsed.
ISSUE: Whether or not David is entitled to an appeal.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of David. A decision rendered
without a hearing is null and void and may be attacked
directly or collaterally. The decision is null and void for want
of due process. And it has been held that a final and
executory judgment may be set aside with a view to the
renewal of the litigation when the judgment is void for lack of
due process of law. In legal contemplation, it is as if no
judgment has been rendered at all.
Lorenzana vs. Cayetano
Due Process – Hearing
Lorenzana was renting a parcel of land from the Manila
Railroad Company (later from the Bureau of Lands). She later
purchased the land (San Lazaro Estate). She had the property
be rented to tenants occupying stalls. Due to nonpayment of
rents, she filed 12 ejectment cases against her tenant. On the
other hand, Cayetano was an occupant of a parcel of land
adjacent to that of Lorenzana’s land. Cayetano was renting
the same from the Bureau of Lands. The lower court granted
Lorenzana’s ejectment cases. Lorenzana then secured a writ
of execution to forcibly eject her tenants but she included to
eject Cayetano’s property. Cayetano was not a party to the
ejectment cases so she prayed for the lower court that her
property be not touched. The lower court denied Cayetano’s
petition. The CA, upon appeal, favored Cayetano. Lorenzana
averred that Cayetano is now a party to the ejectment cases
as she already brought herself to the Court’s jurisdiction by ISSUE: Whether or not Gozon can validly affirm his earlier
virtue of her appeal. decision w/o disturbing due process.

ISSUE: Whether or not Cayetano’s right to due process has HELD: The SC annulled the decision of Gozon calling it as a
been violated. mockery of justice. Gozon had acted with grave abuse of
discretion. In order that the review of the decision of a
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Cayetano and has affirmed the
subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce, the
CA. It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any
reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer
of the 12 ejectment cases wherein the writs of demolition
whose decision is under review; otherwise, there could be no
had been issued; she did not make her appearance in and
different view or there would be no real review of the case.
during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Cayetano only
The decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view;
went to court to protect her property from demolition after
inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he
the judgment in the ejectment cases had become final and
would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the
executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said
case. The SC affirmed the 2nd decision of the CA.
ejectment cases, Cayetano remains a third person to such
judgment, which does not bind her; nor can its writ of
execution be informed against her since she was not afforded
Anzaldo vs. Clave
her day in court in said ejectment cases.
Due Process – Administrative Due Process

Dr Anzaldo, 55, had been working in the National Institute of

Zambales Chromite Mining vs. CA
Science and Technology for 28 years. She was holding the
Due Process – Administrative Due Process position Scientist Research Associate IV when she was
appointed as Science Research Supervisor II. Her
ZCM filed an administrative case before the Director of Mines
appointment was approved by the CSC in 1978. The position
Gozon to have them be declared the rightful and prior
was previously held by Dr Kintanar who recommended Dr
locators and possessors of 69 mining claims in Sta. Cruz,
Venzon to his position. Dr Venzon contested the position. Dr
Zambales. They are asserting their claim against the group of
Afable, the one who appointed Anzaldo, averred that
Martinez and Pabiloňa. Gozon decided in favor of Martinez et
Anzaldo’s appointment was approved by the NIST evaluation
al. ZCM appealed the case before the Secretary of Agriculture
Committee which gave 88 points to Anzalado and 66 points
and Natural Resources. During pendency, Gozon was assigned
to Venzon. The issue was elevated to the Office of the
as the Sec of Agri. And Natural Resources. He did not inhibit
president by Venzon. Clave was then the Presidential
himself from deciding on the appeal but he instead affirmed
Executive Assistant. Pursuant to PD 807 or the Civil Service
his earlier decision when he was still the director of mines.
Decree, Clave referred the issue to the CSC. Clave was also
ZCM then appealed before the CFI of Zambales. The CFI
holding the chairmanship of the CSC. Clave issued Res 1178
affirmed the decision of Gozon. It held that the
appointing Venzon to the contested position. After the denial
disqualification of a judge to review his own decision or ruling
of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on
(Sec. 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court) does not apply to
January 5, 1980, Anzaldo appealed to the Office of the
administrative bodies; that there is no provision in the Mining
President of the Philippines. Since Clave was holding the
Law, disqualifying the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
office of PEA he just affirmed his decision as the CSC
Resources from deciding an appeal from a case which he had
chairman.
decided as Director of Mines; that delicadeza is not a ground
for disqualification; that the ZCM did not seasonably seek to ISSUE: Whether or not there is due process in the case at bar.
disqualify Gozon from deciding their appeal, and that there
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Anzaldo. When PEA Clave said
was no evidence that Gozon acted arbitrarily and with bias,
in his decision that he was “inclined to concur in the
prejudice, animosity or hostility to ZCM. ZCM appealed the
recommendation of the Civil Service Commission”, what he
case to the CA. The CA reversed Gozon’s finding and declared
meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave’s
that ZCM had the rights earlier attributed to Martinez et al by
recommendation: he was concurring with himself. It is
Gozon. Martinez et al appealed averring that the factual basis
evident that Anzaldo was denied due process of law when
found by Gozon as Director of Mines be given due weight.
Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred with the
The CA reconsidered after realizing that Gozon cannot affirm
recommendation of (himself) Chairman Clave of the Civil
his own decision and the CA remanded the case to the
Service Commission. Due process of law means fundamental
Minister of Natural Resources. Now both parties appealed
fairness. It is not fair to Anzaldo that PEA Clave should decide
urging their own contentions; ZCM wants the CA’s earlier
whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the CSC, as
decision to be reaffirmed while Martinez et al demanded that
to who between Anzaldo and Venzon should be appointed
Gozon’s finding be reinstated. The CA denied both petition.
Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the
President of the Philippines.
Singson vs. NLRC
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Due Process;
Administrative Bodies – Dismissal of Employees Miguel
Singson was an employee of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL). In
1991, a Japanese national alleged that Singson extorted
money from her ($200.00) by accusing her of having excess
baggage; and that to settle the issue, she needs to pay said
amount to him. Singson was later investigated and the
investigating committee found him guilty. PAL then dismissed
Singson from employment. Singson then filed a case before
NLRC against PAL for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter Raul
Aquino ruled in favor of Singson as he found PAL’s side
insufficient to dismiss Singson. PAL appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and his case was raffled
to the 2nd Division thereof. The 2nd Division, however, was
composed of Commissioners Victoriano Calaycay, Rogelio
Rayala, and former Labor Arbiter Raul Aquino – same arbiter
which decided Singson’s case. The commissioners deliberated
on the case and thereafter reversed the decision of Aquino.
Singson moved for reconsideration. This time, only
Commissioners Calaycay and Rayala deliberated on the
motion. The motion was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singson was denied of due process.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Singson was denied
due process. The SC held that Singson was denied due
process when Aquino participated, as presiding commissioner
of the 2nd Division of the NLRC, in reviewing PAL’s appeal. He
was reviewing his own decision as a former labor arbiter.
Under Rule VII, Section 2 (b) of the New Rules of Procedure of
the NLRC, each Division shall consist of one member from the
public sector who shall act as the Presiding Commissioner and
one member each from the workers and employers sectors,
respectively. The composition of the Division guarantees
equal representation and impartiality among its members.
Thus, litigants are entitled to a review of three (3)
commissioners who are impartial right from the start of the
process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be
considered impartial since he was the arbiter who decided
the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from
any participation in this case. The infirmity of the resolution
was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration
of Singson was denied by two commissioners and without the
participation of Aquino. The right of petitioner to an impartial
review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal.
He is not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover, his
right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The
denial of Singson’s right to an impartial review of his appeal is
not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.
Alonte vs. Savellano
Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due
Process
Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with
accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that
Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into
Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna.
The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the
prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie
executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued
on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled
to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found
probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and
Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and
had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same
being due to media pressure and that they would rather
establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for
decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion
perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right
to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when
clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the
rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due
process.
HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from
further deciding on the case due to animosity between him
and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his
right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must
be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should
not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting
on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded
to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.