Jucca Noreen S.

Sales Criminal Procedure

The Case- Paul G. Roberts, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 113930,
March 5, 1996

The Facts- On 15 April 1993, petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to
the Department of Justice seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor. They also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and
the holding in abeyance of the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile,
the public prosecutor also moved to defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants
pending the final disposition of the appeal to the Department of Justice.

On 17 May 1993, respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1)
denying, on the basis of Crespovs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the
petitioners and the public prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest
“after June 1993” and setting the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent
judge stated in his order that since the case is already pending in this Court for trial,
following whatever opinion the Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would
undermine the independence and integrity his court. To justify his order, he quoted the
ruling of the Supreme Court in Crespo, which stated:

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the
Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for
review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has
already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the
Court.

Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the respondent judge
had not the slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the
issuance of warrants of arrest.

The issue- Did Judge Asuncion commit grave abuse of discretion in denying, on the
basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in abeyance
the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition for
review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved?

The Ruling- YES, Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in denying, on
the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the
petition for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.

There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance
of an appeal, by way of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, “as far
as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of
the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court.”

Whether the DOJ would affirm or reverse the challenged Joint Resolution is still a
matter of guesswork. Accordingly, it was premature for respondent Judge Asuncion to
deny the motions to suspend proceedings and to defer arraignment on the following
grounds:

This case is already pending in this Court for trial. To follow whatever opinion the
Secretary of Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and
integrity of this Court. This Court is still capable of administering justice.

Doctrine Learned- In this case I learned that the real and ultimate test of the
independence and integrity of this court is not the filing of the aforementioned motions
[to suspend proceedings and issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment] at
that stage but the filing of a motion to dismiss or to withdraw the information on the basis
of a resolution of the petition for review reversing the Joint Resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. However, once a motion to dismiss or withdraw the information is filed the
trial judge may grant or deny it, not out of subservience to the Secretary of Justice, but in
faithful exercise of judicial prerogative.