2. A.

Freedom of expression and national security

Espuelas vs. People [GR L-2990, 17 December 1951] En Banc, Bengzon (J): 4 concur, 1
concurs in result, 1 concurs in separate opinion

Facts:​ Between June 9 and June 24, 1947, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y
Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely
standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to
several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, not only in the Province of Bohol but
also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter,
wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and
addressed to the latter's supposed wife, stating therein in part that "if someone asks you why I
committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas.
Tell the whole world about this. And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas,
point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen
and the banditry of Leyte. Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that
here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our
children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I committed suicide
because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the
world with this dirty government. I committed suicide because I have no power to put under
Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self." Espuelas
was charged for violating Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes those who
shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any
of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or
riots or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of
the community. Espuelas admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter and caused its
publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdang and other local
periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous
name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein
he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree. Espuelas was, after trial,
convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Espuelas appealed.

Issue:​ Whether sedition laws unnecessarily curtain the citizen’s freedom of expression.

Held:​ The freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license
that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those
who abuse this freedom." So statutes against sedition have always been considered not
violative of such fundamental guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to
unnecessarily curtail the citizen's freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. Not
to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his government and government
officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in
"the competition of the market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore
constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire
government set-up. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the
government. Herein, no particular objectionable actuation of the government was made in the
article. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular
omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with male-violence and hate
towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants
headed by President Roxas whose pictures Espuelas would burn and would teach the younger
generation to destroy. Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article cannot
fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The
infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide
and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to particularize. When the use of irritating
language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbance, the rationable of
free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty. Although it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men; still, article 142 punishes not
only all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer at least to the
President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and
Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld. To top it
all, Espuelas proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to
put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the expression
Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and
arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by Espuelas to be conveyed was no other
than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of
Roxas and his men. The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of
fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon the Supreme Court.

____________________________________________________________________________

(G.R. No. L-62992; 28 September 1984)

ARLENE BABST, petitioner,
VS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, respondent.
A. FACTS
● Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local
publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly
been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained
interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs,
associations and even their private lives.
● Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen.
Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila,
against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma.
Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the March 28,
 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by
respondents. The complaint included a staggering P10 million claim for damages.
● Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the
proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free
expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and
norms on mass media.
● Respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction over the proceedings which are
violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since they have the
effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
● Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of
action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a
member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity.
Moreover, the proceedings were already terminated by the NIB.
B. ISSUE
● Was the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their
subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit
unconstitutional?
C. RULING
The petition is dismissed, wherefore:
● The writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis
certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not
pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent.
● The issue of validity of the libel charges by reason of their alleged collision with
freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e.,
before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed.
The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that
have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by
respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained.
● The right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the
aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to
restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by
instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners
Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of
respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have anything to do with Gen.
Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
2. B. Freedom of expression and criticism of official conduct: The Test of “Actual
Malice”

Read Rev. Penal Code, arts. 353-354 & 361-362

Art. 353.​ Definition of libel. — A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354.​ Requirement for publicity. — Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown,
except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any
legal, moral or social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of
any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Art. 361.​ Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and,
moreover, that it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall
be acquitted.chanrobles virtual law library
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.chanrobles virtual law library
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be
acquitted.chanrobles virtual law library

Art. 362.​ Libelous remarks. — Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter
privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt the author
thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability

____________________________________________________________________________

Compare Act No. 2928, March 26, 1920

No. 2928.—An Act to adopt an official flag for the Government of the Philippine Islands,
prescribe rules for its use, and provide penalties for the violation of said rules.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature

assembled and by the authority of the same:

(​Adoption​) ​SECTION 1.​ The flag commonly known as the Philippine flag is hereby adopted as
the official flag of the Government of the Philippine Islands and shall be used publicly, in the
place next to that belonging to the flag of the United States, to represent the Government of the
Philippine Islands both on sea and on land.

(​Honors and respect​.) ​SEC. 2​. Whenever the Philippine flag is hoisted in public jointly with the
American flag, both shall be hoisted and lowered at the same time. The American flag shall be
placed above the Filipino flag when both are in a vertical line, and to the right of the latter and at
the same height when hoisted in a horizontal line. The Philippine flag shall be accorded the
same honors and respect which the existing laws and regulations prescribe or may hereafter
prescribe for the American flag.

(​Description​) SEC. 3.​ For the purposes of this Act, a Filipino flag is any tricolored quadrangular
piece of bunting answering the following description:
When the bunting is spread vertically, so that its two parallel shorter sides are to
the left and right, respectively, of the observer, and its two parallel longer sides
are above and below, respectively, the end of the bunting to the left of the
observer shall be occupied by an equilateral triangle. One of the angles of the
triangle shall be in the upper left corner of the bunting; another of the angles of
said triangle shall be in the lower left corner of the bunting, and the third angle of
the triangle shall be pointed in a straight horizontal line, from the left to the right of
the observer, towards the center of the quadrangle. The triangle so described
shall be white and shall have in its center a sun surrounded by eight rays, and in
each of its three angles a five-pointed star. Both the sun and the three stars shall
be yellow and said stars shall not extend beyond the sides of the triangle. The rest
of the quadrangular bunting shall be divided into two parts by an imaginary
horizontal line which, starting from the third angle of the triangle above mentioned,
shall run straight from the left to the right of the observer to the right border or side
of the bunting. The part of the bunting above said imaginary line shall be blue and
the part below said imaginary line shall be red. This description parts from the
supposition that the staff or pole of the flag, if any, is on the border or side of the
flag to the left of the observer.

(​Dishonor, ridicule, or contempt.─fine.─non-payment of the fine​) SEC. 4.​ Any utterance in

speech, writing or drawing, and any act or omission casting dishonor, ridicule, or contempt upon
the Philippine flag, as well as its use in places of ill-repute or for purposes involving disrespect,
including use as trade-marks and for industrial, commercial or agricultural labels or designs, and
any drawings or inscriptions upon the Philippine flag are hereby prohibited and their execution
shall constitute an offence; and any person who, either himself or through another, violates any
of the provisions of this Act and particularly those contained in this section, shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than twenty-five nor more than one thousand
pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court: Provided, That in case of non-payment of the fine or any part thereof,
the offender shall serve one day of subsidiary imprisonment for each peso of the fine unpaid:
And, ​provided
further​, That for any second and additional offence, both fine and imprisonment shall always be
imposed. −(​additional offence​).

(​Accomplices and accessories​) ​SEC. 5.​ All accomplices and accessories after the fact, and all
attempts and frustrated offences, such as said accomplices, accessories after the fact, attempts,
and frustrated offences are or may hereafter be defined in the existing Penal Code or in any
other penal or correctional code or any law that may hereafter replace the same, shall likewise
be liable to trial and punishment under the provisions of this Act.

Commonwealth Act No. 382, Sept. 6, 1938

An Act to adopt the original authentic form of the Philippine National Anthem and to appropriate
funds for its printing and free distribution.

To preserve the musical adaptation and motive in the original authentic composition of the
Philippine National Anthem as set by its author, Julian Felipe, and to attain uniform performance
therefore in the Philippines:

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1.​ ​The musical arrangement and composition of the Philippine National Anthem
as set by its author, Julian Felipe, is adopted.
SEC. 2.​ There is appropriated, out of the unappropriated funds in the National Treasury,
the sum of five thousand pesos for the preparation, printing and free distribution of copies
of the Philippine National Anthem as adjusted to its original authentic outline.
SEC. 3.​ ​The National Library of the Philippines is entrusted with the accomplishment
hereof.
SEC. 4.​ This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, September 5, 1938.

____________________________________________________________________________

Soliven v. Makasiar; Beltran v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) GRE

Facts: ​In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised:
1. whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
2. whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause.
● Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic.
● On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the
City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners.
 ● A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988.
● On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988.
● With these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.

Issues:
1. Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were
filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still
under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.
2. Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC
judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and
the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

Held:
● With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-
affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to
refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that
the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary
investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given
the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
● The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

● The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible
officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that
the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest.
This is not an accurate interpretation.
● What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
 not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
1. personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue
a warrant of arrest;
2. Or if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to
aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
● Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating
on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that
respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that
public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to
amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for
cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

on the part of the public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos.
82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of
the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is
LIFTED.

____________________________________________________________________________

Manuel v. Cruz Pano, 172 SCRA 225 (1989)

FACTS:
● Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary
Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP.
The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her
premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were
seized.
● Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Paño issued a search warrant to be served at
Aguilar-Roque’s leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On
the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG
were filed by but the fiscal’s office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal
possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the
evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void
because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the
things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly
established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.
ISSUE: ​WON the search warrant was valid?

HELD:
● NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no
Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
● It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal
properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description
which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front.
● It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not
otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to
be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching
team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a
portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.
● It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate
requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this
Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too
general.