24 Patrick Wormald sn un S60-Coces nite eat Danes sn agi ne rman, gn a8 ris er ae arin a he i et oer As Teo Sa i ue en YM Se Oe ee Wier ea te a By ee West cys oon of 6: nan Rc, Si en ‘Britons: Scottish Political Thought and the Union of 1603. CUP. vs et pute a onc og eel, Fe se Cnc Hern fen ly Sal niet Se sr oath ae aS See ae gee ant te “Chih wenalsh In Rowell G., ed... ‘The English Religious Tradition and the Genius Engh nme meen - ofan Wa senator Came Cee ee a a i east world, "Patrick (1994b) ‘On Second Thoughts: the Making of Er . eral a eninge ttgesh a rAd ote cr organ ie co Ot qaonefeary go Somme ied Journal of Hstoreal Sociology Vol. 7 No. 1 March 1964 ISSN 0952-1609. Sidestepping Capitalism: on the Ottoman Road to Elsewhere* TOSUN ARICANLI and MARA THOMAS ‘Abstract Mapping productivist loge derived from the history of capitalism onto the rest of the world blocks the view of alternative systems, and thelr internal loge. “Theortes ofthe capitalist state can capture neither the nature of the non-capitalist lates nor those states" social and economic relations. Our alternative formulation of ‘the Otfoman state disassociales class, property, and distribution from the sphere of production and associates them with the state. Thereby, Ottoman history sheds its ‘etniled cloak and the Ottoman state comes to life: motion, change and class confiet [Be things Ottoman once again. Introduction Before capitalism some social systems outside western Europe — ‘such as the Ottoman — were in a process of transformation that led elsewhere." Yet. the histories of these regions are written after the pattern of experience of their west European counterparts, utilizing the same concepts and themes.* There isa wealth of eritical literature discussing the flaws of these Eurocentric histories. In critiquing the limits of the existing accounts, this literature identifies what the east ‘was not. Disappointingly, the criticism does not gomuch beyond this identification. ‘Our purpose is to begin telling the story. It is our contention that the history of the Ottomans can be reconstructed utilizing the concepts of the Eurocentric accounts —such as state, class, property and distribution — while qualifying their meanings. Moreover, we argue that in the Ottoman context the interactions among these concepts are quite different from the west European case. We hold the following views on the state of analysis of historical change in non-European societies. The historical trajectory of western Europe can neither define the course of a non-European historical transformation nor is it suitable for constructing a comparative model encompassing both the European experience and the rest of the world. Thus, when an analysis of non-European change is attempted, the explanatory potential of some ofthe classical postulates ofliberal and Marxist social theory needs to be explicitly scrutinized, Moreover, liberal and Marxist theories are at their best as theories of a specific historical development, i.e. that of capitalism in western Europe.® Likewise, they are at their weakest when understood as trans-historical theories of social development. Yet, the predominant ‘Rasen by ache Posters 108 Covey Raa. Ort ke 1, Ut and 384 Mas rs, Ctee, MA 242 A We26 ‘Tosun Ancankt and Mara Thomas trend in Marxist and modernization studies of the ‘Third World’ has tent Sead these theories in terms of the latter understanding. The veer 1s thus taken as the primary referent; the ‘West’ becomes the sre ard for trans-historical and cross-cultural “universals.’ This Sroduces the all too commor, though unacknowledged, contiation of Prositie categories with historically specific cultural categories such as class, state, and property.* "Whettier non-European societies underwent social and political treneformation is not at issue. They did! And there is good evidence UPmevernent on a path resembling neither the motion of capitalism orto feudal predecessors. Our concern hereis with the identification not he character of that movement. The basic problem with social fierce of the non-European world is the petrified account of tts ‘Ron capitalist past. Given the ‘universalist’ approach of moderniza¥icr Theories the character and the dynamics of the ‘traditional’ society jreot specified. Concentration ison the'process’ of modernization a8 se rensequence of the encounter with Europe, providing a stil-Hfe a conirization of the ‘traditional’ epoch. Furthermore, the (resumably universal concepts applied in mapping out the historcts prcetacle cannot ive life tothe earlier structures in most of he word wiore the period of European colonization or ‘encounter.’ Those ae ncepts begin to assume auniversal character —ifatall—only ater the dawn of the capitalist era. "The dynamism of Ottoman history remains invisible as long 95 transformation Is associated solely with the sphere of production. To Jmgnstrate this we will erically discuss the following four categories ceo ttoman history: the identification and definition of class(es), i the concept of ti) the distribution of social surplus — within the sontentofthe state, —andW) the state. We willbe following the Ottoman soni to reach a reformulation of articulations that were non-moder. yet, viable and dynamic. Itwillnotead towards charted territory such yet Mpitalism or modernity. The counterfactural question, where te 2 ould have led had the encounter with capitalism not taken place, oat tlevant. Our problem is to identify the movement itself not its *s Sioed destination. Its necessary to capture the movement and Uitracterize its own dynamics which continue into the post encounter toriod in order to avold falling back on the Eurocentric model which Paste more shade than light on alien structures. ‘Chase and property are the two categories of social analysis that provide the dynamism of European history. The motion of Oem Pietory can also be understood through the interaction of these etegores, but not as aninteraction of classes over property. On the canary, in the Ottoman context both class and property can be conjeretood only in relation to the state. Definition of the dominant inss Ie problematic in itself, and property inland, the baste source ‘Sidestepping Capitalism: on the Ottoman Road to Elsewhere 27 ofourpius. does not evolve into private property. In the Ottoman case Imeration of ans a eines a sytem bt wit the exit clusion ofthe state, as opposed to the modern European context wihere state is understood as a derivative of lass’ and society” Class ‘A discussion of class in the Ottoman framewc rk raises ecules, Te iets the eneation feudal clases n mapping out Ottoman social iteration nhiatory. The aecondidentifotion [cass as an ently separate from the concep of the sate e Marxian concept of class ‘takes its content or meaning i analysis of the ourgeie tert clus for whom po fon and property acquire primary importance vi-a-is bath its postion of ower and lgiimatingdelogy.* Marxprivlgentecontradicion between wage labor and captal as the driving free of all history. In 1g, he risks the presumption that control over production or ownership of the means of production translates into a medium of ‘non-capitalist societies. This extension of to tballhistery educes relations of domination oprosucton rations, comprehended as class antagonism, and precludes an analysis of non-clase relations of domination, striction and diferentation — isness enters the analysis as an added dimension to identify In the Ottoman context no dominant no dominant social group fit a category ofc cass aie ownersipathe means ofpreduction or pation n the production proces. The cae of econo activiy veling the major pert of surplus in the Otlomen contest was . 1s were relatively insignificant tothe merchants and to thelr counterpart in south Asia oe the wesem Mediterranean* Nor did their guild organizations enjoy Bolla autonomy comparable to that of European ties Artisans andthe gulds remained, by andlarge as organizations provisioning man cities, which can best be identified as seats of bureaucr: Inagrealture astrataofclammants onagarian surplus superficially resembled landiords, but they were neither independent of the central political power, nor were their claims ‘property claims. Their attempt to monopolize the surplon on “ale property ook pice within the realm of state practices, without a challenge tothe right of the central power to elther ‘property surpis, The claimants ight a share of state revenue through their privileged positions, within the state. They did not make permanent claims on factors of reduction, Individuals’ ances to the ageulural surplus did not [reo cencommiany br Uedersmnena mean spree ‘represented political confrontation among individuals within28 ‘Tosun Ancanh and Mara Thomas a context of legitimate state practices. And, as far as the specific tersons and their successors were concerned, continua of claims pete systematically regenerated, they were neither institutionalized were syssciated with the emergence of privileged classes of the ‘Buropean type’ such as the nobility. ret arho would choose to analyse Ottoman history through the European paradigm have two cholees with respect to resolving the cance ownership of landed-property. The first isto seek a landlord gas and assume a property relationship; this option s not supported by history. The other option isto acknowledge the reality ofthe state py | consider it the dominant class. This may seem appealing since amctiles the issue of ownership of the means of production. in the sete that arable land would then belong to a class — or the state. However, from a theoretical point of view this is no solution at ali vighin this approach because ‘property’ here has nothing to do with the production process itselfand the bureaucracy or the army in the ere Prran context does not have the active class role in production Chations. In Ottoman history property serves the function of wettishing a legal basis to inhibit private claims and inviolable seize toland, The dominant class in terms of property relations does act pave a role in the production process. Nor does the state, as the eyure land ‘owner. have the role of a landlord in produetion, “Fie next possible group we can look to are the peasants. In terms of mlative position of agentsin the production process, the peasantry tethe only candidate who can fil the subordinate role in a possible eMtext of conflict. however, without a corresponding landlord class (othe production process. The relation of the subordinate and the Superordinate is nota labor relation as described in the materialist sapiyoes of capitalism, feudalism, or slavery. Instead, the relation aaadins one of distribution of surplus within the domain of state Tractice, Another peculiar spect ofthe Ottoman case Is the locus of eratlct over distribution of surplus. As opposed to the landlord {peasant pair in the accounts of European feudalism: n the Ottoman Pease central government and the ‘would-be landlord!’ were the ‘major parties in conflict.” lor Peat candidate for a dominant class independent of the ‘state with control of its own material means of reproduction is the wit pants." While we could conceptualize merchants as a class on Thebasis of similar material interests. this does not yield a ‘dominant caer in the Ottoman context. If another potential basis in addition CaS terial interests for the emergence of class identity of merchants tomatic of religious, the Ottoman social process simply did not gee weight to such criteria. Rather, the Ottoman administration was aie weted in perpetuating the cosmopolitan nature of its social tnganization, notin accentuating ethnic differences that might have ‘Sidestepping Capitalism: on the Ottoman Road to Elsewhere 29 led to conflict. Unification of the interests of those tient a the vourgeate onthe basi of ther mater terest mushroomed in the Ottoman lands only after the triumph of local a in the nineteenth century to other criteria by which to identify the dom! untenne sory. rjaication and coherence te boreal and military strata associated with the state was the primary social comstuted category that demonstrated consciousness or coheaveness against other categories — such as ethnic or occupational. While in this instance identification of consciousness is not problematic, classifying the conscious category as a class creates difficulties. ‘Specifically. the problem in treating the state as class is that any conflict which may exist within the state cannot be adequately interpreted if all the constituent elements of the state are identified as one and the same. This is of particular importance because most of the conflict that affected the structure took place among agents that can Best be identified as affliated with the government or the ‘army. The conflict of different functional groups within the bureaucracy and the army are organized around distinct material benefits based on various forms of acess to surplus, Then, the Tunctona groups jemselves, rather than the greater of the st ter canduiates lobe ented aseises Consciousness relating to the state as a whole, ane by al the constitent groupe under the sae ube, Each subsection or functional group had a group identity which enhanced its solidarity based on its regional or occupational role within the administrative mechanism. Yet the identity of these groups which ‘sometimes worked against central policies can be defined as a form of consciousness opposing the function and role of the st = role of the state in the Taio syneracios of Ottoman Social Stratification: Class Nature of While the functional categories ind. jependent of the state in sock veprodin canna be inte as dominant soll laste, maor functional categories created by the administrative mechanism — such as the cavalrymen and the standing army — come closer to a socal category that enters info ‘dass relations tn the social structure. Their continuity and embeddedness in the ure 7 ty |dedness in the social fabric is In this sense, functional layers within the state can be classified as ‘semi-autonomous social categories. These functional layers did not come and go. They represent longstanding, well-defined material interests within the bureaucratic mechanism. In the analysis of