G.R. No. L-37007 Milo vs.
Salanga
July 20, 1987
FACTS
An information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against herein
private respondent (accused Barrio Captain Tuvera, Sr.) and some
other private persons for maltreating petitioner Valdez by hitting him
with butts of their guns and fist blows. Immediately thereafter,
without legal grounds and with deliberate intent to deprive the latter
of his constitutional liberty, accused respondent and two members of
the police force of Mangsat conspired and helped one another in
lodging and locking petitioner inside the municipal jail of Manaoag,
Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours.
Accused-respondent then filed a motion to quash the information on
the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the elements of
said crime and that the proofs adduced at the investigation are not
sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Asst.
Provincial Fiscal Milo filed an opposition thereto. Consequently,
averring that accused-respondent was not a public officer who can be
charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Salanga granted
the motion to quash in an order. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE Whether or not accused-respondent, being a Barrio Captain,
can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
HELD
Yes. The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be
vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons
accused of a crime. One need not be a police officer to be chargeable
with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like
judges and mayors, who act with abuse of their functions, may be
guilty of this crime. A perusal of the powers and function vested in
mayors would show that they are similar to those of a barrio captain
except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both
must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention.
Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself
admitted that with the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain,
could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez.
Astorga v. People | GR No. 154130, October 1, 2003
Facts: In 1997, the Regional Operations Group of the DENR sent a
team to Daram to conduct research in line with govt’s campaign
against illegal logging. In transit, the team spotted boats being
constructed, prompting them to investigate. They met Mayor Astorga
who began assaulting the team and then called for reinforcements.
Astorga then had the team brought to a house in Daram. SB found
Astorga guilty of arbitrary detention. He filed MRs but these were
denied.
Astorga argues that the prosecution failed to establish the required
quantum of evidence to prove his guilt especially that the private
complainants executed a joint affidavit of desistance. There was no
fact of restraint employed by the armed men upon the persons of the
team.
Issue: W/N Astorga is guilty of Arbitrary Detention under Art. 124?
Held: YES. AD is committed by any public officer or employee
who, without legal grounds, detains a person.
Elements:
1) that the offender is a public officer/employee
 Astorga = mayor
2) that he detains a person
 jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention
tells us that victim’s liberty need not involve any
physical restraint upon the victim’s person. Inthis
case, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. The
complainants were not allowed to go home, and
were threatened by the armed men surrounding
them.
3) that the detention is without legal grounds
 acts were not motivated by legal grounds, instead by
his “instinct for self-presevation and the feeling that
he was being singled-out”
 MASAYUKI HASEGAWA, petitioner, vs. LEILA F. GIRON,
respondent.
G.R. No. 184536. August 14, 2013
NATURE: PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS: Giron, an office worker, claimed that she and her friend
were taken at gunpoint by two men and forcibly boarded into a
vehicle. They were detained for more than 24-hours. They were
taunted and repeatedly threatened by their abductors into
withdrawing the case against Hasegawa.
Hasegawa claimed that he has no knowledge of the crime
and doesn’t know the abductors. He asserted that respondent and
Marcos were extorting money from him because the instant case was
filed right after the negotiations to settle the civil aspect of the three
cases they filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID), National Labor Relations Commission, (NLRC) and MeTC
Pasay failed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: Giron filed a Complaint-
Affidavit for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention against
Hasegawa. Senior State Prosecutor dismissed the complaint for lack
of probable cause. Giron filed a Petition for Review before the DOJ
and her subsequent motion for reconsideration were likewise denied.
She filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
The CA reversed and set aside the resolution of the DOJ.
CONTENTION OF HASEGAWA: The prosecutor’s findings on
the existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the
courts.
CONTENTION OF GIRON: The CA did no err in finding that the
prosecutor usurped the duties belonging to the court when she
“overstretched her duties and applied the standards, not of ordinary
prudence and cautiousness, nor of mere ‘reasonable belief’ and
probability, but of a full-blown trial on the merits, where rules on
admissibility of testimonies and other evidence strictly apply.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecutor had overstretched her duties
that would amount to grave abuse of discretion warranting the
review of the court
HELD: Yes. The decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal
complaint against the accused depends on the sound discretion of the
prosecutor. Courts will not interfere with the conduct of preliminary
investigations, or reinvestigations, or in the determination of what
constitutes sufficient probable cause for the filing of the
corresponding information against an offender. Courts are not
empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive
branch. Differently stated, as the matter of whether to prosecute or
not is purely discretionary on his part, courts cannot compel a public
prosecutor to file the corresponding information, upon a complaint,
where he finds the evidence before him insufficient to warrant the
filing of an action in court. In sum, the prosecutor’s findings on the
existence of probable cause are not subject to review by the courts,
unless these are patently shown to have been made with grave abuse
of discretion. We find such reason for judicial review here present.
We sustain the appellate court’s reversal of the ruling of the
Secretary of the DOJ.
The Investigating Prosecutor has set the parameters of
probable cause too high. Her findings dealt mostly with what
respondent had done or failed to do after the alleged crime was
committed. She delved into evidentiary matters that could only be
passed upon in a fullblown trial where testimonies and documents
could be fairly evaluated in according with the rules of evidence. The
issues upon which the charges are built pertain to factual matters that
cannot be threshed out conclusively during the preliminary stage of
the case. Precisely, there is a trial for the presentation of
prosecution’s evidence in support of the charge. The validity and
merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of
testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper
than at the preliminary investigation level. By taking into
consideration the defenses raised by petitioner, the Investigating
Prosecutor already went into the strict merits of the case.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 134503. July 2, 1999]JASPER AGBAY, petitioner,
vs. THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE
MILITARY, SPO4 NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2
ELEAZAR M. SOLOMON,respondents.
Facts: Petitioner, together with one SHERWIN Jugalbot, was
arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an
alleged violation of R.A. 7610. The following day, a Complaint for
violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against petitioner and Jugalbot
before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
Cebu. Subsequently, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police
of Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering
that the latter had failed to deliver the petitioner to the proper judicial
authority within thirty-six (36) hours from his detention. September
7, 1997, this was not acted upon. When petitioner was able to post
bond and was released, he filed a complaint for delay in the delivery
of detained persons against herein private respondents. By virtue of
Memorandum Circular No. 14 of the Office of the
Ombudsman,[11] the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner
against herein private respondents was transferred to the Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military for its proper disposition. Thus, it was
this office which acted on the complaint, and issued the Resolution
recommending its dismissal against herein private
respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution
but it was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not there was delay in the delivery of detained
persons to the proper judicial authorities.
Held: No, there was not, the petition is thus dismissed. The filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court constitutes delivery to
a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
public officials or employees who shall detain any person for some
legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper
judicial authorities within the periods prescribed by law. The
continued detention of the accused becomes illegal upon the
expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such
detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial
authorities. The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125
mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with
judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a
person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the
Supreme Court and other such inferior courts as may be established
by law.In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal
court judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct
preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of
release or commitment[32]. Furthermore, upon the filing of the
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125
is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is
informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC.
Geroche vs. People GR No. 179080 November 26, 2014
Ponente: Peralta, J.
FACTS:
On the evening of May 14, 1989, Baleriano Limbag awoke when
Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde, and Generoso Marfil suddenly
entered into his house and, without a search warrant, began scouring
the place for firearms, but instead food and took away his airgun.
Limbag also sustained injuries as a result of the raid.
Edigardo Geroche, Roberto Garde, and Generoso Marfil were all
charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile, under Article 128
of the Revised Penal Code, and Less Serious Physical Injuries under
Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the above-mentioned
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Less Serious Physical
Injuries, but acquitted them of the crime of Violation of Domicile
because, according to the trial court, the prosecution failed to prove
that the petitioners were public officers, which is an essential
element of the crime.
The petitioners then appealed their case to the Court of Appeals
(CA), praying that the decision of the lower court be reversed. The
CA, however, ruled that the petitioners should not be convicted of
the crime of Less Serious Physical Injuries but, rather, Violation of
Domicile, considering their judicial admissions that they were the
barangay captain and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU).
ISSUE/S:
(1) Whether or not the CA’s conviction amounts to double
jeopardy.
 (2) Whether or not the petitioners are guilty of Violation of four years, nine months, and ten days of prision correccional, as
Domicile. maximum.)

HELD:

(1) NO, it does not amount to double jeopardy.

The Court explained that an appeal in a criminal case opens the

entire case for review to the appellate court. As such, the accused
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy, and
gives jurisdiction to the courts to examine the records of the case,
and impose the proper penalty, even if this means increasing the
penalty previously imposed. It is the duty of the appellate courts to
correct the errors that they may find in the assailed judgment.

That being the case, the petitioners could not have been placed in
double jeopardy when the CA set aside the original ruling of the trial
court, and instead found them guilty of Violation of Domicile

(2) YES, the petitioners are guilty of Violation of Domicile.

One of the essential elements of the crime of Violation of Domicile

is that the accused be a public officer or employee.

In the present case, the Court adopted the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the CA. In their testimonies and pleadings,
Geroche did not deny that he was the barangay captain. Likewise,
Garde and Marfil did not refute the fact that they were CAFGU
members. By virtue of their positions, they are considered to be
public officers or employees. Hence, they can be found guilty of
Violation of Domicile, as all the elements for the crime are met.

(The Court modified the penalty imposed by the CA in their

decision. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court
sentenced the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from
two years and four months of prision correccional, as minimum, to
G.R. No. 162808 April 22, 2008
FELICIANO GALVANTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices, BIENVENIDO C.
BLANCAFLOR, Director, DENNIS L. GARCIA, Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer, SPO4 RAMIL
AVENIDO, PO1 EDDIE DEGRAN, PO1 VALENTINO
RUFANO, and PO1 FEDERICO BALOLOT, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt
pistol super .38 automatic with serial no. 67973, one short magazine,
and nine super .38 live ammunitions. The confiscated materials were
covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September 2,
1999. Consequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor filed against
petitioner an Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunitions in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec)
Resolution No. 3258 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. Pending resolution of Criminal Case,
petitioner filed against private respondents an administrative case for
Grave Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region
XIII, and a criminal case, for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and
Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.
Petitioner alleged that upon arrival at the house of retired
police Percival Plaza, together with Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez
and Pedro Ramas, He immediately went down of the jeep but before
he could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked his way.
That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil
Avenido PNP, PO1 Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd
Company, Regional Mobile Group and PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and
PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of 1403 Prov'l Mobile Group,
all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all pointed
their long firearms ready to fire. He raised his arms and heard
[private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, "ANG IMONG PUSIL,
IHATAG" which means "Give me your firearm," to which I
answered, "WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL" translated as "I have no
firearm," showing his waistline when he raised his T-shirt. His other
companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and
showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in
civilian attire holding an armalite also pointed their firearms to them
to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came down from his house told
them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but they
did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements.
While we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4
Benjamin Conde, Jr. went near my owner type jeep and conducted a
search. To which I asked them if they have any search warrant. That
after a while they saw the super .38 pistol under the floor mat of the
petitioner’s jeep and asked for the MR of the firearm but due to fear
that their long arms were still pointed to them, He searched his wallet
and gave the asked document. He further alleged that he was
detained by Police Chief Rocacorba for two days having been
released only after posing a bail.
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance
with both the IAS and Ombudsman absolving private respondents
Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining the private
respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and
criminal cases. The IAS then issued a Decision finding all private
respondents guilty of grave misconduct even if they were merely
being enthusiastic in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. The
RTC dismissed the case against the petitioner. On the other hand, the
Ombudsman dismissed the charges against private respondents for
lack of probable cause.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ombudsman properly dismissed the criminal
complaints filed against the private respondents.

HELD:
Yes. Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint
for illegal search which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman against
private respondents was proper, although the reasons public
respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the
mark because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless
search conducted by private respondents was valid and that the
Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast doubt on the
veracity of his complaint. Public respondents completely overlooked
the fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the
Ombudsman as illegal search is not a criminal offense. Nevertheless,
the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a groundless
criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under
the RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not
public respondents erred in their finding on the validity of the search
for that issue is completely hypothetical under the circumstance.
Enrile vs Salazar
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
Facts:
In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by
Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the
strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No.
9010941.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and earlier that day
filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor
Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and
Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator
Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed
coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI
headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought
to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to
the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District,
Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights.
Issue:
(a) Whether the petitioner has committed complex crimes (delito
compleio) arising from an offense being a necessary means for
committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code?
Held:
There is one other reason and a fundamental one at that why Article
48 of the Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following
penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the
crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor,
in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision
mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out
to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance.
Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that
does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as
the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of
Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a
crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that
must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting a
right to bail or vindicating its denial? The criminal case before the
respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se
by reason of the weakness of the evidence against him. Only after
that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief
was also available there.
The Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People
vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners
Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio
must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said
petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely
provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered
remanded to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for
any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this
Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.
RELEVANT PROVISION: RPC Art 48, 134,135
ELEMENTS: (of Rebellion, Art134)
1. That there be:
a. Public uprising; and
b. Taking up of arms against the government
2. For the purpose of either:
a. Removing from the allegiance to said government or
its laws:
i. The territory of the Philippines, or any part
thereof, or
ii. Any body of land, naval or other armed
forces; or
b. Depriving the Chief Executive or Congress wholly
or partially of any of their powers or prerogatives.
NATURE: petition for bail
FACTS:
 Hernandex et al. (31 defendants), were convicted by the
lower courts of rebellion, w/ multiple murder, arsons and
robberies
 Organizations they were found to be affiliated w/ (and took
part in ‘rebellious’ activities w/): Congress of Labor
Organizations (CLO) w/c is an instrumentality of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP); Hukbong
Magpalayang Bayan (HMB, a.k.a. Hukbalahaps/Huks)
 Defendants apparently took arms w/ the Huks to make armed
raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent
civilians, and, as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof,
they also committed then and there committed acts of
murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned
destruction of private and public property
 The prosecution maintains that Hernandez is charged with,
and has been convicted of, rebellion complexed with
murders, arsons and robberies, for which the capital
punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed, although the
lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment
 The defense contends, among other things, that rebellion
cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
ISSUES:
(1) WoN rebellion can be complexed w/ murder, arson, or
robbery
(2) WoN defendants should be granted bail
HELD:
(1) NO. Consider first the following Articles of the RPC:
a. Art 48, RPC:“When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an
offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period.”
i. presupposes the commission of 2 or more
crimes, does not apply when the culprit is
guilty of only one crime
ii. a mere participant in the rebellion, who is
not a public officer, should not be placed at
a more disadvantageous position than the
promoters, maintainers or leaders of the
movement, or the public officers who join
the same, insofar as the application of this
article is concerned
b. Art 135; RPC: “…any person, merely participating
or executing the commands of others in a rebellion
 shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period.”
i. The penalty is increased to prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P20,000 for “any
person who promotes, maintains or heads a
rebellion or insurrection or who, while
holding any public office or employment,
takes part therein”: (1) “engaging in war
against the forces of the government”, (2)
“destroying property”, or (3) “committing
serious violence”, (4) “exacting
contributions or” (5) “diverting public funds
from the lawful purpose for which they have
been appropriated”.
ii. Whether performed singly or collectively,
these 5 classes of acts constitute only one
offense, and no more, and are, altogether,
subject to only one penalty — prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed P20,000.
Since all of the acts enumerated in Art 135 constitute only
ONE offense, Art 48 cannot apply since it presupposes the
existence of TWO. In no occasion has the court ever
complexed the crime of rebellion. The rule is that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and,
hence, are absorbed by the same and cannot be punished
either separately therefrom or by the application of Art 48.
(court uses several cases to show how this rules is applicable
to treason, then says the rule is even more applicable to
rebellion, basically, these violent acts are part of the crime,
they are how one commits them, they are inherent to the
crime).
Citing Spanish and other foreign cases, the SC states that
national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested
of their character as “common” offenses and assume the
political complexion of the main crime of which they are
mere ingredients, and, consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the
same, to justify the imposition of a graver penalty.
Further, if Art 48 were to be used in this case, it would be
unfavourable to the culprit, and Art 48 was enacted for the
purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the
several acts performed by him were punished separately. SC
also states that simply because one act may constitute two or
more offenses, it does not follow necessarily that a person
may be prosecuted for one after conviction for the other,
without violating the injunction against double jeopardy.
(2) YES. Since exclusion from bail in capital offenses is an
exception to the otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the
constitution, the natural tendency of the courts has been
toward a fair and liberal appreciation of the evidence in the
determination of the degree of proof and presumption of
guilt necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right. In the
evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one
other important factor to be taken into account. The court
took into account the ff. things: (1) Whether it appears that
in case of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability
would probably call for a capital punishment (Answer: no
clear showing); and (2) the probablility of flight (Answer:
possibility seems remote and nil). Additionally, the decision
appealed from the opposition to the motion in question do
not reveal satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the
accused showing, sufficiently, that his provincial release,
during the pendency of the appeal, would jeopardize the
security of the State.
PETITION FOR BAIL GRANTED.
TL;DR SEPARATE OPINIONS
 Padilla—Bail shouldn’t be granted. After conviction for a
capital offense, the Defendant has absolutely no right to bail,
because even before conviction a Defendant charged with
capital offense is not entitled to bail if the evidence of guilt
is strong. Even if the majority opinion that the crime charged
in the information is rebellion only — a non-capital offense
— be correct, still the granting of bail after conviction is
discretionary, and I see no plausible reason for the reversal
of this Court’s previous stand, because the security of the
State is at stake.
 Montemayor—Other crimes shouldn’t be absorbed by
rebellion. The main contention to why it cannot be
complexed. is that it cannot be complexed as the acts
enumerated in Art 135 are inherent to rebellion (necessary
means to commit it). However, “necessary means” as
interpreted by criminologists, jurists and legal
commentators, does not mean indispensable means, but
merely the means by which a crime is ordinarily committed.
The logic is the same as why abduction or trespass to
dwelling are not necessary means to rape, they are simply
ways the culprit used to facilitate his crime. Applying Art
134’s description of rebellion, it may be committed by
merely rising publicly and taking arms against the
government, thus acts mentioned in Art 135 are not
necessary means to committing the crime. (Montemayor
agrees that bail shouldn’t be granted though)
 Labrador -- Agrees with J. Padilla that bail shouldn’t be
granted, and w/ J. Montemayor that a complex crime of
rebellion exists in our laws.
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
Facts:
On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of
Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken,
making it to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and
in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of
his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the
Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and
other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but also throughout
the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note
or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious
suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed
wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and
administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in
Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to
write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in
the Philippines the government is infested with many Hitlers and
Mussolinis.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the
RPC against the Government of the Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And
there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on
him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article
written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it
seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating
language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's
simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is
failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not
on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable
of free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is removed
from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the
reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government
obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis
were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be
upheld.
Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious
conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the
constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who
may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the
offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency
to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to
say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those
provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which
press upon their minds.
Umil v. Ramos
GR 81567, 9 June 1990
Facts:
The Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital
Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential information
about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being
treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it was found that the
wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie
Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA
liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM
soldiers the day before. Dural was then transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as
the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile
patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car.
Consequently, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who
conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City information charging Rolando Dural alias
Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with Assault upon
Agents of Persons in Authority.” A petition for habeas corpus was
filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed. Umil and Villanueva
posted bail before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where
charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had been filed
against them, and they were accordingly released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of
arrest for the crime of rebellion.
Held: Yes. Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was
committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and
are in the nature of continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved
in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion,
is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the
prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a
judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a
judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense
is bailable. The absence of a judicial warrant is no legal
impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts
of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but
equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or
capture is thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that
involves the very survival of society and its government and duly
constituted authorities.
Dir. of Prisons v. Ang Cho Kio
G.R. No. L-30001 June 23, 1970
Petitioners: THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS and THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Respondents: ANG CHO KIO @
ANG MING HUY and THE COURT OF APPEALS
ZALDIVAR, J.:
SUMMARY
Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been charged, tried
and convicted of various offenses committed in the Philippines.After
serving six and one-half (6-½) years of his sentence said respondent
was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the President of
the Philippines. The conditional pardon partly reads as follows:
condition that he will voluntarily leave the Philippines upon his
release and never to return to this country. Ang Cho Kio duly
accepted the conditions of his pardon and actually left the
Philippines for Taipeh, Nationalist China. In the evening of June 26,
1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the Manila International Airport. Ang
Cho Kio was identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the
Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to
Taipeh. His identity having been established, Ang Cho Kio was
arrested, and the immigration authorities conducted an investigation
regarding his presence in the Philippines. The immigration
authorities did not allow him to proceed with his trip to Honolulu.
On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, ordered him recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired
portion of the sentence that were imposed on him, for having
violated the conditioned of his pardon. The CA majority opinion
affirms the reasons of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. However, the majority
opinion contains the recommendation that Ang Cho Kio be sent out
at once from this country and that he be allowed to leave Muntinlupa
Prisons under guard only when he has been booked for outward
flight at the Manila International Airport so as to avoid the
possibility of any further violation of his conditional pardon. W/N
the recommendation in the majority opinion to allow Ang Cho Kio to
leave the country on the first available transportation abroad should
be deleted. YES. The majority opinion should have been limited to
the affirmance of the decision of the lower court, and no more. We
do not consider it proper that the majority of the justices in the
special division make a recommendation that would suggest a
modification or a correction of the act of the Chief Executive, after
the same justices have said in their opinion "that the Chief Executive
may determine, alone and by himself, whether the condition attached
to a pardon given by him had been violated; and in the exercise of
this prerogative, the courts may not interfere, however erroneous the
findings may be."
FACTS:
Respondent Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy had been charged,
tried and convicted of various offenses committed in the Philippines
and was sentenced to suffer penalties, to wit: a total of forty-five (45)
years, ten (10) months and twenty one (21) days of imprisonment,
P6,000 indemnity, and P5,000 moral damages, plus life
imprisonment and P6,000 indemnity.
After serving six and one-half (6-½) years of his sentence said
respondent was granted conditional pardon on July 4, 1959 by the
President of the Philippines. The conditional pardon partly reads as
follows:
By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution,
and upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole,
the unexecuted portions of the prison terms of prisoner ANG CHO
KIO @ KIWA @ PHILIPP ANG @ ANG TIU CHIO @ KE WA @
LUCIO LEE @ GO ONG @ MR. ANG @ GO ANG @ MR. ONG
is hereby remitted on condition that he will voluntarily leave the
Philippines upon his release and never to return to this country.
Should the above-named prisoner refuse to accept said condition, be
shall continue serving his sentence and upon the expiration thereof,
he shall be deported from the Philippines for being an undesirable
alien.
Ang Cho Kio duly accepted the conditions of his pardon and
actually left the Philippines for Taipeh, Nationalist China, on July
28, 1959.
In the evening of June 26, 1966 Ang Cho Kio arrived at the
Manila International Airport on a Philippine Air Lines plane from
Taipeh, travelling under the name "Ang Ming Huy."
He was booked on Philippine Air Lines earliest connecting flight
to Honolulu on June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m., or with a stop-over of
about 72 hours in Manila.
He surrendered his passport to the immigration authorities at the
Manila International Airport, and was issued a note that his departure
was scheduled for June 29, 1966 at 6:30 p.m.
He left his luggage at the airport and was issued claim tags. He
registered for a three-day stay at the El Presidente Hotel at
Parañaque, Rizal. He contacted his two friends in Manila, Lim Pin
and Go Bon Kim. These two friends invited him to stay longer in the
Philippines.
On June 28, 1966 he and his two friends went to the Bureau of
Immigration, where his friend Lim Pin signed a letter addressed to
the Commissioner of Immigration requesting for a fourteen-day
extension of stay in the Philippines for him.
Ang Cho Kio was identified by inspector Mariano Cristi of the
Immigration Bureau as the Ang Cho Kio who was deported to
Taipeh on July 18, 1959. His identity having been established, Ang
Cho Kio was arrested, and the immigration authorities conducted an
investigation regarding his presence in the Philippines.
The immigration authorities did not allow him to proceed with his
trip to Honolulu. On July 5, 1966 the Executive Secretary, by
authority of the President, ordered him recommitted to prison to
serve the unexpired portion of the sentence that were imposed on
him, for having violated the conditioned of his pardon.
Ang Cho Kio filed with the Executive Secretary a motion for the
reconsideration of the supplemental order of recommitment.
The Executive Secretary failed to act on the motion for
reconsideration, and so Ang Cho Kio filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay
Branch).
After due hearing the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a
decision dismissing the petition for habeas corpus. The Court of
First Instance of Rizal held that Ang Cho Kio @ Ang Ming Huy was
validly recommitted to prison by the President of the Philippines in
the exercise of his prerogatives pursuant to the provisions of Section
64(i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
Ang Cho Kio appealed to the Court of Appeals from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. In the decision of a special
division of five justices, with three justices concurring, and two
justices concurring and dissenting, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision which in effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing Ang Cho Kio's petition for habeas
corpus.
The aforequoted portion of the majority opinion affirms the
reasons of the Court of First Instance of Rizal in dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus. However, the majority opinion contains
the recommendation that Ang Cho Kio
... be sent out at once from this country and that he be allowed to
leave Muntinlupa Prisons under guard only when he has been
booked for outward flight at the Manila International Airport so as
to avoid the possibility of any further violation of his
Title: People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19
Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 2 of the
Revised Penal Code
Facts:
On June 30, 1920, sixer vintas intercepted two Dutch boats which
were on its way in the midst of the islands of Buang and Bukid in the
Dutch East Indies. The six vintas were manned by 24 armed Moros.
The said Dutch boats were carrying men, women and children. At
first, the Moros asked for food. But when they got on the Dutch
boats, they asked for themselves all the vessel’s cargo, attacked
nearly all of the men and brutally violated two of the women by
methods too tremendous to be described. All of the persons on the
Dutch boat, except the two young women, were again placed on it
and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge. The
Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the
Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and
Saraw. At Maruro, the two women were able to escape.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi, Sulu. They were arrested there and were charged in the Court
of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
Issue:
Whether or not Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the crime of
piracy alleged in this case.
Held:
Yes, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction on the case. Piracy is a
villainy not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
should be tried and punished in the sufficient tribunal of any country
where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried.
The jurisdiction of piracy, unlike all other crimes, has no territorial PD No. 532 Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974
limits. Art. 286 Grave Coercion

PEOPLE VS. CATANTAN

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 118075

September 5, 1997
Ponente: BELLOSILLOa

Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)

BRIEF
This is an appeal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
on the conviction of accused Catantan and Ursal of the crime of
Piracy.

FACTS

The Pilapil brothers - Eugene and Juan Jr. were fishing in the sea
some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu when
accused Emiliano Catantan and Jose Macven Ursal, boarded the
pumpboat of the Pilapils and Catantan leveled his gun on the
Pilapils.

As the pumpboat of the Pilapil breaks donw, Catantan boarded

another pumpboat and ordered the operator Juanito to take them to
Mungaz, Cebu.
The new pumpboat ran out of gas and the accused were apprehended
by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local
authorities.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether accused-appellant committed grave coercion or Piracy
under PD 532.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Appellants were convicted of the crime of Piracy under
PD532.
Sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.
SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed
it is essential that there be an attack on or seizure of a vessel. He
claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing
boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely
boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on board
that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other
place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of
permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their
boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they
ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could
leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims,
he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
The Court does not agree on the contention of the appellant that the
facts constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised
Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.
Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave
coercion as penalized in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this
case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be
true that Pilapil brothers were compelled to go elsewhere other than
their place of destination, such compulsion was obviously part of the
act of seizing their boat.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon
or seizure of any vessel, xxx by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any
person, xxx in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided."
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the
Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person who, without
authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from
doing something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do
something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of
grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel
cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was
not produced in evidence cannot exculpate him from the crime. The
fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused
Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the
Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed
from, the conviction of accused-appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN
y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and
sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.