CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

Case Digests
Section 6 - 12
Section 6 - LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL
Case #1
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989Marcos, petitionerVS.Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)Facts:Former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people
powerrevolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to
the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of
his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Marcos and his family.Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &following
supervening events:failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaderschannel 7 taken over by
rebels &loyalistsplan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms
dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afarHonasans failed coupCommunist insurgency
movementssecessionist movements in Mindanaodevastated economy because ofaccumulated foreign
debtplunder of nation by Marcos &croniesMarcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to
order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of
President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos
power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision
was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the
President acted outside her jurisdiction.According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right
to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it
deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only
be impaired by a court order.Issue:Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.Whether or not
the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:No to both issues. Petition dismissed.Ratio:Separation of power dictates that each department
has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.However, it does not define what is
meant by executive poweralthough in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the
President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs.
14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &exclusive. She
has residual &discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the
general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare &advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore
Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin,
supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and
that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day
operation of the State.The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on
the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right
to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even
remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount
duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine
whether it must be granted or denied.For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is
whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest
to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in her
decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &protection of the people. She has to
uphold the Constitution.
Case #2
Manotoc Vs CaG.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986 RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES &EXCHANGE
COMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation
Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.FACTS: There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted
by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal
complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with
estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail. Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for
permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition
for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his
leave to travel abroad. According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right,
neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent
him from exercising his constitutional right to travelISSUE: WON the Court Acted with grave abuse of
discretionHELD: A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself
available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed
beyond the reach of the courts As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court
of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed
travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to
leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error
to have been committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had
satisfied itself that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
Case#3
RICARDO C. SILVERIO vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991Facts:
Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.More than two (2)
years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte
Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the
ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial
Court issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioners passport or to
deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the
country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Courts finding that since the filing of the
Information, the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the
dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied.Issue:Whether or not the right to travel may be
impaired by order of the courtRuling: The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed
upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence
operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by
the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that An accused
released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the
Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending. Petitioner takes the
posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the
liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to
travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the
provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
SECTION 7- RIGHT TO INFORMATION
Case#4
G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987 VALENTIN L. LEGASPI, petitioner, vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
respondent.FACTS : The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is
invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the
Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the
civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu
City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented
themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.ISSUE :
WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil service eligibilities of the
Health Department employeesHELD : The constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution,
access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be
circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that
involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional
guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public
interest or public concern. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of
the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any
discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of
showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the
same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to
dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to
marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ."(87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard
the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review
by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus Public office
being a public trust it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring
civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times
accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions. In the instant, case
while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision
in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil
service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service
examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to
the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the
government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a
right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission. The civil service eligibility of
a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access
to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to
confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative.
Mandamus, therefore lies.
Case#5G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL
CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN
"NINOY"ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO
BELMONTE, JR., respondent.FACTS : Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary
injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed: (a) to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with
certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners
access to the public records for the subject information On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel,
petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are
now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our
desired objective in pursuance of public interest."ISSUE : WON Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as citizens
and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans given by the former First Lady Imelda
Marcos to Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban political parties.HELD :
Respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power. The
concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy,
considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been
granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public
figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny The
"transactions"used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract,
and already a consummated contract, Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which,
though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that
government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental
functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the
GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the
people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government
dealings. Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
"access to official records,"the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official
records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on
matters of public concern.
Case#6
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic
of the Philippines
FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the
Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an
aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.This
agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement
mentions Bangsamoro Juridical Entity(BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the
Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural
resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act for
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).ISSUE: Whether
or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right
to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD
brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutionalHELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the
MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution
thereof.REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national
and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of
peoples participation in the peace process.Article III (Bill of Rights)Sec. 7. The right of people on matters
of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining
to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.Article
IISec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.LGC (1991), require all national
agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or program be implemented unless
such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.Article VII (Executive
Department)Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred
in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.Article X. (Local Government)Sec. 1. The
territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities,
municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordillera as hereinafter provided.Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.Section 16. The President shall exercise
general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.Sec. 18. The
creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and
geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.Sec. 20.
Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:1. Administrative
organization;2. Creation of sources of revenues;3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;4. Personal,
family, and property relations;5. Regional urban and rural planning development;6. Economic, social, and
tourism development;7. Educational policies;8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage;
and9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS
OR REVISIONS)Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:1. The
Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or2. A constitutional convention.Section 4.
Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than
ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof
which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of
a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework.The
presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional amendments. She cannot guarantee to any
third party that the required amendments will eventually be put in place nor even be submitted to a
plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
Case#7
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998LEO ECHEGARAY y PILOvs.THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICEFACTS :On June
25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouses ten year old daughter and
was sentenced to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration raising for the first time the constitutionality of RA 7659 The Death Penalty Law, and the
imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The motions were denied with the court finding no
reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the requirements for its
imposition.RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The
mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and directed the Director of Bureau of
Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction
and TRO to enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons from carrying out the
execution, contending that RA 8177 and its implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The
Executive Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 104 were later impleaded
to enjoin them from setting a date of execution.On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to
comment and mandated the parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to
clarify status quo and to request for TRO until resolution of the petition.The Solicitor General filed a
comment on the petition dismissing the claim that the RA in question is unconstitutional and providing
arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as
Amicus Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing applicable provisions and
statistics showing how other countries have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman
and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.ISSUE :WON R.A. 8117 and its
implementing rules do not pass constitutional muster for being an undue delegation of legislative
powerHELD:THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT SECTION 19 OF THE
RULES AND REGULATIONS TO IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.The separation of power is a
fundamental principle in our system of government and each department has exclusive cognizance of
matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. A consequence of the
doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin maxim, the rule
is : potestas delegata non delegari potest.(what has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are
however exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is Delegation to Administrative
Bodies The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of Health and the Director of the
Bureau of Corrections are empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of lethal
injection.The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies is the increasing complexity of
the task of government requiring expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers,
that said law: (a) be complete in itself – it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate – and (b) fix a standard – the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable – to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.Considering the
scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the
Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the
scope of his authority.RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark
its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.
Case#8
Chavez vs Presidential Commission on Good Government GR 130716 19 May 1999
Facts: PCGG and Marcos siblings agreed to General and Supplemental Agreements with regards to the ill-
gotten wealth cases against their family. The same was filed with Sandiganbayan. Chavez then filed
petition with SC to enforce a constitutional right against the PCGG and to determine whether the latter
has been acting within the bounds of its authority. SC decided the case on 09 December 1998. However,
the siblings did not file motion for reconsideration until the deadline for such lapsed. They instead filed
1) a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion for Leave to File the Attached Partial Motion for
Reconsideration . . .and (2) Partial Motion for Reconsideration,contending that their exclusion from the
case violated their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. Movants pray that the
proceedings before the anti-graft court be allowed to take their due course, consistent with the principle
of the hierarchical administration of justice.Issue: Whether or not equal protection was observed in the
(principle of hierarchical) administration of justice?Decision: Motion denied. The movants are merely
incidental parties to the instant case. Being contractors to the General and Supplemental Agreements
involving their supposed properties, they claim that their interests are affected by the petition. However,
the Agreements undeniably contain terms an condition that are clearly contrary to the Constitution and
the laws and are not subject to compromise. Such terms and conditions cannot be granted by the PCGG
to anyone. The principle of the hierarchy of the courts generally applies to cases involving factual
question. The oft-repeated justification for invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon the
precious time of the Court but, more important, inevitably result in their delayed adjudication. Often,
such cases have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum or as better
equipped to resolve to the issues, since the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Inasmuch as the
petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions concerning public interest, the Court
resolved to exercise primary jurisdiction on the matter.
Section 8 - RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
Case # 9
SSS Employees Association v Court of Appeals GR no. 85279 July 28, 1989
Facts:On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for
damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS
Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS
suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants
(petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.It appears that the
SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included: implementation
of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;
payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or
contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees
and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of
the SSS; and payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts
from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.Issue:Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to
strike.Held:The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the
State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law"[Art.
XIII, Sec. 31].Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful in understanding the
meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted
the 1987 Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to organize,
the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or associations only, without
including the right to strike.Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "the civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters"[Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No.
180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been created under
R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 &70295,
November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Case #10
Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope WorkersUnion
FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
factory Inc since 1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which had with the company a
CBA containing a closed shop provision which reads as follow Membership union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees worker covered by this agreement.RA 3350 was
enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows but
such agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their member
in any such 0labor organizationBenjamin victoriano presents his resignation to appellant union
thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact
that he was resigning from the union as member of the company notified the apellee and his counsel
that unless the appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the company would be
constrained to dismiss him from the service . this prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to
enjoin the company and the union from dismissing apallee.ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is
unconstitutionalHELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does
not require as a qualification on condition in joining any lawful association membership in any particular
religion on in any religious sect neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits
its member from joining a labor union as a condition on qualification for withdrawing from labor union
RA 3350 only exempts member with such religious affililiation from the required to do a positive act – to
exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage of any
closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal
evasion of constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired result which is lawful in itself
by vering or following a legal way to do it.
Case # 11
In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial Edillon
Facts: The respondent is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Supreme Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll
of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rules of
Court 139-A and the provisions of Paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of the IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same. Edilion
contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he
is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing to be a member
of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues and that as a consequence of this, compelled financial
support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes the above provisions of the Rules of Court and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court may compel the respondent to pay his
membership fee to the IBP.Held: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must
be a member of a distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment of reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only
compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional free to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting
of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion
to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court concluded that the
provisions of Rules of Court (Article 139-A) and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. The Supreme Court disbarred the respondent
and his name stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
Section 10 - NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Case # 12
Ortigas &co. ltd. partnership vs. Feati bank &trust co digest
Facts:On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision at
Mandaluyong to Augusto Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles. The latter transferred their rights in
favour of Emma Chavez, upon completion of payment a deed was executed with stipulations, one of
which is that the use of the lots are to be exclusive for residential purposes only. This was annotated in
the Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509 and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5 directly from Emma
Chavez and Lot 6 from Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati started construction of a building on
both lots to be devoted for banking purposes but could also be for residential use. Ortigas sent a written
demand to stop construction but Feati continued contending that the building was being constructed
according to the zoning regulations as stated in Municipal Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was made and decided in
favour of Feati.Issue: Whether or not Resolution number 27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an
industrial and commercial zone is valid considering the contract stipulation in the Transfer Certificate of
Titles.Held:Resolution No. 27 prevails over the contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264 of the Local
Autonomy Act empowers a Municipal Council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations
for the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264 states that implied power of the municipality should be
liberally construed in its favour, to give more power to the local government in promoting economic
conditions, social welfare, and material progress in the community. This is found in the General Welfare
Clause of the said act. Although non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g. the power to
promote health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people.
Resolution No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of police power to safeguard health, safety, peace
and order and the general welfare of the people in the locality as it would not be a conducive residential
area considering the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise which results in the surrounding industrial
and commercial establishments.Decision dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is AFFIRMED.
Case # 13
Lozano vs. Martinez
FACTS:Petitioners assail the validity of BP 22, also known as the Bouncing Check Law. BP 22 punishes a
person who makes or draws and issues any check on account for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank... It is aimed at putting a stop to the
practice of issuing checks that are worthless which causes injury to the public interest. Contentions on
the law are that: 1) it offends constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; 2) it impairs
freedom of contract; 3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; 4) it unduly delegates legislative and
executive powers; and 5) its enactment is flawed because the Interim Batasan violated the prohibition
on amendments in the Third ReadingISSUE:Whether or not BP 22 is a valid law (police power)HELD:The
offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check, not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The effects of issuance of a worthless check transcends the private
interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large since putting valueless commercial papers in circulation can pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
Hence, the enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of police power and is not in conflict with the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.There is no valid ground to sustain the contention
the BP 22 impairs freedom of contract since contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. The
statute does not deny the equal protection clause since it only penalizes the drawer of the check and not
the payee. Additonally, BP 22 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers. Contrary to
the contention, the power to define the offense and to prescribe the penalty are not delegated to the
payee. On the last contention, the Interim Batasan investigated the matter and reported that the clause
in question was an authorized amendment of the bill. With all the foregoing reasons, the
constitutionality of BP 22 is upheld.
Case # 14
Ganzon vs Inserto
FACTS:Petitioner Rodolfo Ganzon executed a deed of absolute sale of a parcel of land in favor of private
respondents. Several months later, a deed of real estate mortgage was executed between the same
parties to secure the payment by the private respondents of a promissory not in favor of petitioner.
Private respondents filed a civil action against petitioners after Ganzon initiated extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings in accordance with the terms and conditions of the said mortgage. Respondent judge
ordered the substitution of the mortgage lien with a surety bond.ISSUE(S):Whether or not the order of
respondent judge violates the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.RULING:YES. Substitution of
the mortgage with a surety bond to ensure the payment of a loan would in effect change the terms and
conditions of the mortgage contract. Even before trial on the very issues affecting the contract, the
respondent court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency and dispensed with a
primary condition.Instant petition si GRANTED. Orders of the trial court are SET ASIDE.
Section 12 - CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
Case: 15
Gamboa VS Cruz
Facts:
Petitioner herein was arrested and was brought to the police station because of vagrancy. The next day,
the petitioner and with other 5 detainees were ask to line up. The complainant, meanwhile, during the
line up pointed to the petitioner herein as a suspect of robbery. After that, he was asked to sit in front of
the complainant while the latter is being investigated. An information of robbery has been filed against
the herein petitioner.During the arraignment, the prosecution offered and presented its evidence. While
on the other hand, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, instead preparing for his evidence,
file a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer of evidence. The petitioner filed this motion on the ground that the
conduct of the line up, without notice, and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional right
to counsel and to due process.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners right to counsel and to due process was violated during the line up.
Held:
No. The Rights to counsel and to due process is protected by the constitution whether it be 1973 or
1987.The right to counsel attaches upon the start of the investigation, or when the investigating officers
tries to elicit or ask information from the accuse,even though the questions appeases to be innocent. At
this point of stage, the assistance of the counsel is needed in order to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips fo the person undergoing
interrogation, for the commission of an offense.When the petitioner was asked to line up with other
detainees, he was not asked any question nor to answer. The police line up is not wart of custodial
inquest, hence the petitioner was not entitled to right to counsel.Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitution,
the right to counsel attaches at the start of the investigation against the respondent, and even before the
adversary judicial proceedings against the accused begins.While the court finds no real need to afford a
suspect the services of counsel during a police line up, the moment there is a move to elicit admissions
or confessions, even a plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said
suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall
be made in writing and in the presence of the counsel.
Case 16
People VS Macam
Facts:
Prosecutions version:On Aug 18,1987, Eduardo Macam, Antonio Cedro, Eugenio Cawilan Jr., Danilo
Roque and Ernesto Roque went to the house of Benito Macam (uncle of Eduardo Macam) located at 43
Ferma Road QC. Upon the arrival of the accused, Benito invited the former to have lunch. Benito asked
his maid Salvacion Enrera to call the companions of Eduardo who were waiting in a tricycle outside the
house. A. Cedro, E. Cawilan and D. Roque entered the house while E. Roque remained in the tricycle.
After all the accused had taken their lunch, Eduardo Macam grabbed the clutch bag of Benito Macam
and pulled out his uncles gun then declared a hold-up. They tied up the wife (Leticia Macam), children,
maid (Salvacion) and Nilo Alcantara and brought them to the room upstairs. After a while Leticia was
brought to the bathroom and after she screamed she was stabbed and killed by A. Cedro. Benito, Nilo
and Salvacion was also stabbed but survived. The total value of the items taken was P536,
700.00.Defenses version:Danilo Roque stated that he being a tricycle driver drove the 4 accused to
Benitos house for a fee of P50.00. Instead of paying him, he was given a calling card by Eduardo Macam
so that he can be paid the following day. Upon arriving, he went with the accused inside the house to
have lunch. Thereafter he washed the dishes and swept the floor. When Eugenio Cawilan pulled a gun
and announced the hold-up, he was asked to gather some things and which he abided out of fear. While
putting the said thins inside the car of Benito (victim) he heard the accused saying kailangan patayin ang
mga taong yan dahil kilala ako ng mga yan. Upon hearing such phrase he escaped and went home using
his tricycle. He also testified that his brother Ernesto Roque has just arrived from the province and in no
way can be involved in the case at bar. On the following day, together with his brother, they went to the
factory of the Zesto Juice (owned by the father of Eduardo Macam) for him to get his payment (50.00) .
He and his brother was suddenly apprehended by the security guards and brought to the police
headquarters in Q.C. They were also forced to admit certain things. After which, he together with all the
accused, in handcuffs and bore contusions on their faces caused by blows inflicted in their faces during
investigation, was brought to the QC General Hospital before each surviving victims and made to line-up
for identification. Eugenio Cawilan was also charged with Anti-fencing Law but was acquitted in the said
case.
Issue:
Whether or Not their right to counsel has been violated. WON the arrest was valid. WON the evidence
from the line-up is admissible.
Held:
It is appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before trial. A
police line-up is considered a criticalstage of the proceedings. Any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence
regarding appellants identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open
court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.The
arrest of the appellants was without a warrant. HOWEVER, they are estopped from questioning the
legality of such arrest because they have not moved to quash the said information and therefore
voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and
participating in trial. The court believed the version of the prosecution. Ernesto Roque, while remaining
outside the house served as a looked out. Wherefore, decision of lower court is Affirmed. Danilo Roque
and Ernesto Roque is guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as co-conspirators of the other
accused to suffer reclusion perpetua.Things taken: 2 toygun, airgun riffle, CO2 refiller, TV, betamax tapes,
betamax rewinder, Samsonite attache case, typewriter, chessboard, TOYOTA Crown Car Plate No. CAS-
997, assorted jewelry. .22 gun and money.
Case 17
People VS Judge Ayson
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was
alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified
him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code
of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating
his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he
refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said
amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa
was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained
Ramoswritten admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken
without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that
accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and
statement of accused.
Held:
No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to
witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present
in case at bar).This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be
compelled to be a witness against himself.It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating
questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."the right can be claimed only when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does
not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must
claim it and could be waived. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the
rights of the accused include:1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. 2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him.3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be
inadmissible in evidence.The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Case 18
People VS Pinlac
Facts:
The accused was convicted for two separate criminal cases for robbery and robbery with homicide. He
assailed his conviction on the contention that the court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession as
evidence which was taken by force, violence, torture, and intimidation without having appraised of his
constitutional rights and without the assistance of counsel.
Issue:
Whether or not due process was observed during the custodial investigation of the accused.
Held:
The court find it meritorious to declare that the constitutional rights of the accused was violated in the
failure of the authorities in making the accused understand the nature of the charges against him
without appraising him of his constitutional right to have a counsel during custodial investigation.
Moreover the prosecution merely presented the extrajudicial confession of the accused which is
inadmissible as evidence and the other evidences provided therein are merely circumstantial and subject
for rebuttal. The court acquitted the accused.
Case 19
People VS Bolanos
Facts:
Police authorities arrested the accused for murder. Together with the accused the police boarded a jeep
to take him to their station. While on board the jeep the accused started admitting killing the deceased.
This extrajudicial confession was used as evidence in court and the accused was convicted.
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.
Held:
Yes. The accused on board the police vehicle on the way to the police station is already under custodial
investigation and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution and be informed of his
Miranda rights. Any extrajudicial confession he makes without his counsel is deemed inadmissible to
court.
Case 20
People VS Andan
Facts:
Marianne Guevarra, a second-year nursing student at Fatima was on her way to her school dormitory in
Valenzuelal, Metro Manila when Pablito Andan asked her to check the blood pressure of the
grandmother of Andans wife but there was nobody inside the house. She was punched in the abdomen
by Andan and was brought to the kitchen where he raped her. She was left in the toilet until it was dark
and was dragged to the backyard. It was when Andan lifted her over the fence to the adjacent vacant lot
where she started to move. Andan hit her head with a concrete block to silence her and dragged her
body to a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned it.The death of Marianne drew public attention
which prompted Baliuag Mayor Cornelio Trinidad to form a team of police officers to solve the case.
Apart from the vacant lot, they also searched Andans nearby house and found evidences linked to the
crime. The occupants of the house were interviewed and learned that accused-appellant was in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. A police team lead by Mayor Trinidad located Andan and took him to
the police headquarters where he was interrogated where he said that Dizon killed the girl. The three
were then brought to Andans house where he showed the police where the bags of Marianne were
hidden. They were then brought back to the police station while waiting for the result of the
investigation.The gruesome crime attracted the media and as they were gathered at the police
headquarters for the result of the investigation, Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the
investigation room. Upon seeing the mayor, appellant approved him and whispered a request that they
talk privately to which the mayor agreed. They went to another room and there, the Andan agreed to tell
the truth and admitted that he was the one who killed Marianne. The mayor opened the door of the
room to let the public and the media representatives witness the confession. Mayor Trinidad first asked
for a lawyer to assist the appellant but since no lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings
photographed and recorded in video. In the presence of the media and his relatives, Andan admitted to
the crime and disclosed how he killed Marianne and that he falsely implicated Larin and Dizon because
of ill-feelings against them.However, appellant entered a plea of not guiltyduring his arraignment. He
provided an alibi why he was at his fathers house at another barangay and testified that policemen
tortured and coerced him to admit the crime but the trial court found him guilty and sentenced him to
death.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Andan to the mayor without the assistance of counsel is in violation of
the constitution and cannot be admitted as evidence in court.
Held:
Under these circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the appellants confession before the mayor is
inadmissible. A municipal mayor has operational supervision and controlover the local police and may be
deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. However, Andans confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all and no police authority ordered the
appellant to talk to the mayor. It was the appellant who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor acted as a confidant and not as a law enforcer and therefore did
not violate his constitutional rights.Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary
manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the constitution bars is
the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confession. Hence, we hold that appellants
confession to the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.Andan was found guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide.
Case 21
Navallo VS Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Accused was the Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National Vocational School, which
school is also located at del Carmen, Surigao del Norte. His duties included the collection of tuition fees,
preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees, and remittance of collections exceeding
P500.00 to the National Treasury. An information for malversation of public funds was filed. A warrant of
arrest was issued, but accused-petitioner could not be found. on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree
No. 1606 took effect creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. On 15
November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was released on provisional liberty upon the approval
of his property bail bond. When arraigned by the RTC on 18 July 1985, he pleaded not guilty. Upon
motion of the prosecution, the RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the
Sandiganbayan. Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that since Navallo had already been
arraigned before the case was transferred to the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking
cognizance of the case. The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held
otherwise.The information was then docketed with the Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest
was issued by the Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC Clerk of
Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that since the
accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan
would constitute double jeopardy. However this was denied and trial ensued and he was found guilty.
Issue:
Whether or Not the constitutional right against double jeopardy and in custodial investigations in favor
of the accused violated.
Held:
No. Double jeopardy requires the existence of the following requisites:The previous complaint or
information or other formal charge is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; The court
has jurisdiction to try the case; The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and The
accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his express consent.The RTC was
devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been
conferred on the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with conviction or
acquittal nor was it dismissed.No. Appellant is not in custodial investigation. A person under a normal
audit examination is not under custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed
to be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case, the allegation of his
having been "pressured"to sign the Examination Report prepared by Dulguime (examined cash, as
ordered by Espino, the provincial auditor) appears to be belied by his own testimony.
Case 22
People VS Dy
Facts:
Accused is the owner of Bennys Bar at Boracay Island and was sentenced with murder before the trial
court for shooting a Swiss national in his bar. The accused contends the court erred in admitting the
presentation of the prosecution of evidence that he came to a police officer and made a confession on
the crime and informed said officer where to find the gun he used, a statement the accused denied to
have done. They assail its admissibility to the court on the grounds that such statement was not made in
writing and is in violation of the due process required in custodial investigation.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented by the prosecution be admissible to warrant guilt of the
accused.
Held:
In view of the documentary evidence on record the defense lost its credibility before the court. An oral
confession made by the accused to the officer and telling him the gun is in his bar which he wants to
surrender can be held admissible in court as evidence against him. This is because such confession was
made unsolicited by the police officer and the accused was not under investigation when he made the
oral confession. Therefore there is no need to invoke compliance of the proper procedure in a custodial
investigation at the case at bar. The rule on RES GESTAE is applicable where a witness who heard the
confession is competent to satisfy the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood it. An oral
confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such a case it must be given in substance. Thus the
oral confession made by the accused outside the ambit of custodial investigation can be admissible in
court and was given due credence to warrant the judgment of the accused being guilty of the crime.
Case 23
People VS Alicando
Facts:
Accused was convicted with a crime of rape with homicide of a 4 year old girl. He was arrested and
during the interrogation he made a confession of the crime without the assistance of a counsel. By virtue
of his uncounseled confession the police came to know where to find the evidences consisting of the
victims personal things like clothes stained with blood which was admitted to court as evidences. The
victim pleaded guilty during the arraignment and was convicted with the death penalty. The case was
forwarded to the SC for automatic review.
Issue:
Whether or not due process during the custodial investigation was accorded to the accused.
Held:
Due process was not observed in the conduct of custodial investigation for the accused. He was not
informed of his right to a counsel upon making his extrajudicial confession and the information against
him was written in a language he could not understand and was not explained to him. This is in violation
of section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The lower court also violated section 3
of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant without conducting a search inquiry on
the voluntariness and full understanding of the accused of the consequences of his plea. Moreover the
evidences admitted by the court that warranted his convicted were inadmissible because they were due
to an invalid custodial investigation that did not provide the accused with due process of the law. Thus
the SC annulled the decision of the imposition of the death penalty and remanded the case back to the
lower for further proceeding.