CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC)

BACKGROUND

History was made on 29 April 1997 with the

entry into force of the Chemical Weapons

Convention (CWC) — the world’s first multilateral

disarmament agreement or treaty to provide for the

elimination of an entire category of weapons of

mass destruction within a fixed time frame. The

event marked both the culmination of many years of painstaking negotiations in

the Conference on Disarmament and Preparatory Commission and the birth of an

international chemical weapons disarmament regime headed by the Organisation

for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Organisation strives to fulfill

the Convention’s mandate to end the development, production, stockpiling,

transfer and use of chemical weapons; to ensure the elimination of existing stocks

of such weapons; and, in so doing, to make the world safe from the threat of

chemical warfare.

Past Chemical Disarmament Efforts

Although toxic chemicals had been used as tools of war for thousands of

years—e.g. poisoned arrows, arsenic smoke and noxious fumes, etc, their use has

long been stigmatised by an association with both unnecessary cruelty and unfair

play, something beneath the standards of ‘civilised’ battle. Because of this,

international efforts to ban chemical weapons took a prominent position in many

early disarmament agreements.

The first international agreement limiting the use of chemical weapons dates

back to 1675, when France and Germany came to an agreement, signed in

Strasbourg, prohibiting the use of poison bullets. Almost exactly 200 years later, in

1874, the next agreement of this sort was concluded: the Brussels Convention on

the Law and Customs of War. The Brussels Convention prohibited the employment

of poison or poisoned weapons, and the use of arms, projectiles or material to

cause unnecessary suffering, although the agreement never entered into force.

British soldiers blinded by exposure to mustard gas, 1918

Before the turn of the nineteenth century, a third agreement came into

being. The chemical disarmament efforts of the twentieth century were rooted in

the 1899 Hague Peace Conference. The contracting parties to the 1899 Hague

Convention declared their agreement to ‘abstain from the use of projectiles, the

sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases’. A second

Hague Convention, in 1907, reiterated earlier bans on employing poison or

poisoned weapons.

In spite of these measures, the world witnessed the use of toxic chemicals

in warfare to an unprecedented extent during World War I, the first large scale

attack with chemical weapons taking place at Ieper, Belgium, on 22 April 1915. By

the war’s end, some 124,200 tonnes of chlorine, mustard and other chemical

agents had been released, and more than 90,000 soldiers had suffered painful

deaths due to exposure to them. Close to a million more men left battlefields blind,

disfigured or with debilitating injuries. British soldiers blinded by exposure to

mustard gas, 1918 Public dismay at the horrors of chemical warfare spurred post-

World War I negotiations on a number of instruments meant to prevent its

recurrence, most prominently the 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use of

Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of

Warfare, commonly known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Geneva Protocol

does not, however, prohibit the development, production or possession of chemical

weapons. It only bans the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons

in war. Furthermore, many countries signed the Protocol with reservations

permitting them to use chemical weapons against countries that had not joined the

Protocol or to respond in kind if attacked with chemical weapons. In the years since

the Geneva Protocol entered into force, some of these States Parties have

withdrawn their reservations and accepted an absolute ban on the use of chemical

and biological weapons.

 During the first half of the twentieth century, many developed countries

spent considerable resources on the development of chemical weapons. Chemical

weapons were used by a number of countries in the 1920s and 1930s, and the

discovery of powerful nerve gases in the late 1930s renewed interest in the field.

All the major powers involved in World War II anticipated that large-scale chemical

warfare would take place, however, chemical weapons were never used in Europe,

for reasons historians still debate. During the Cold War, the United States and

Soviet Union came to maintain enormous stockpiles of tens of thousands of tonnes

of chemical weapons. In time, chemical weapons were again used during the

1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War and the conflict in Syria (in 2013) and were alleged to

have been used on numerous other occasions.

Timeline of the Usage of Chemical Weapons

 HISTORY

Chemical Weapons Convention Negotiations

Overshadowed by concerns

about nuclear war for much of the

post-World War II period, chemical

weapons did not receive serious

consideration again until 1968, when

discussions on biological and

Scene following a chemical attack in
chemical weapons started at the
Halabja, Iraq in 1988
Disarmament Conference in Geneva.

The treaties to which these discussions would eventually lead were arrived at by

divergent paths. The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was concluded

relatively quickly, opening for signature in 1972, although it lacked verification

measures. Significantly for subsequent efforts to ban chemical weapons, the BWC

obliged its States Parties to continue negotiations on chemical weapons, the goal

of which being the institution of measures mandating their destruction and the

prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling.

Negotiations on the CWC took much longer, progressing in fits and starts

as breakthroughs accompanied political and other changes. In 1980, the

Conference on Disarmament established an ad hoc working group on chemical

weapons. Four years later, the group was assigned the task of elaborating what a

ban on chemical weapons would contain, and thus emerged the provisional,

annually updated ‘rolling text’ of the Convention. The improvement in superpower

relations in the late 1980s, the chemical attack on Halabja, Iraq in 1988, publicity

given to the threat of chemical warfare during the Gulf War, and the announcement

of a bilateral United States–Soviet Union agreement to destroy most of their CW

stockpiles and to refrain from further CW production all gave impetus to the

Convention negotiations.

In spite of advances, a number of issues remained to be ironed out. Some

countries wanted chemical disarmament to be linked to progress in nuclear

disarmament. Others wanted provisions for assistance in defending against

chemical attack. The degree of support the Convention would lend to free trade in

chemicals and consequent economic and technological development was a major

concern for a large number of countries. Many worried about the intrusiveness of

the Convention’s verification regime, particularly its challenge inspections. The

United States insisted on retaining the right to retaliate in kind in the event of CW

use until a very late stage of the negotiations. One by one, obstacles were removed

and outstanding issues resolved.

In 1992, a draft Convention was formally adopted by the Conference on

Disarmament. The United Nations General Assembly requested that the UN

SecretaryGeneral, the depositary of the Convention, open it for signature on 13

January 1993 in Paris. In an unprecedented show of support for an international

arms control treaty, 130 countries signed the CWC during the three-day Paris

signing conference.
The Preparatory Commission

To the Signatory States in Paris in 1993, it was clear that a considerable

amount of groundwork needed to be done before an international organisation

capable of implementing the CWC could be established. Furthermore, the

Convention provided that its entry into force was to occur at least two years after

being opened for signature and only after 180 days had elapsed from the deposit

of the 65th instrument of ratification. This left open a period of time in which such

preparations could be made. In what was called the Paris Resolution, the Signatory

States therefore decided to set up a Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) with a

mandate to make the necessary preparations for the first Conference of States

Parties and to continue work on issues that remained unresolved by the

Convention’s negotiators. The PrepCom held its first Plenary Session in The

Hague in February 1993 and wasted no time in establishing a Provisional

Technical Secretariat, a forerunner to the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

The date of entry into force of the Convention was not determined until 31

October 1996, when Hungary became the 65th state to ratify. As required, the

Convention entered into force 180 days later, on 29 April 1997. During the previous

four years, the PrepCom met for 16 sessions, laying the foundation for the

workings of the future Organisation.

The PrepCom was successful in resolving a number of tasks within its

mandate, the results of which were reflected in its Final Report. Among its major

achievements were solutions to several substantive verification issues as well as

the setting up of the OPCW Laboratory and Equipment Store, the development of
a general training scheme for inspectors and the recruitment of inspector trainees,

arrangements relating to the new OPCW headquarters building, and the

development of draft documents, such as the Headquarters Agreement, the Staff

and Financial Regulations, the Health and Safety Policy and Regulations, the

Policy on Confidentiality, and the Media and Public Affairs Policy. The PrepCom

was also responsible for the orderly transfer of its property, functions and

recommendations to the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical

Weapons).
 Philippine Implementation of the CWC

Jan. 13, 1993 - the Chemical Weapons Convention

(CWC) is opened for signature in Paris. 130 States

signs the Convention including the Government of

the Philippines and ratifies the Treaty on 21

February 1995.

The CWC enters into force on April 29, 1997, 180 days after Hungary

becomes the 65th States to deposit its instrument of ratification.

Obligation as a State Party under the CWC

1. As a state party to the CWC, the Philippines is required to accomplish

its initial declaration, annual declaration and plant /site declaration.

2. It also requires for the adoption of enabling legislation in compliance with

the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Justification of the Philippines for the Ratification of the CWC

A. Political Consideration

In line with its foreign policy thrust on disarmament, the Philippines wanted

to demonstrate its firm commitment to global peace, protection of people and the

environment.

B. Security Consideration

As the Philippine does not possess the capability to protect itself from a

chemical attack, the CWC ensures that states are provided against a chemical
attack. The OPCW coordinates & delivers assistance in the event of an attack or

threatened (may request on-site challenge inspection of any suspected

weapons/site facility in the territory of another party.

C. Industry Perspective

Being a Party to the CWC, the Philippines will avoid becoming the target for

restrictions which are placed on transfer of chemicals from state parties to non-

state parties. Under the CWC, transfer of Schedule I chemicals have been

prohibited since the entry into force of the Convention on 29 April 1997. For

Schedule II, in 2000 and restriction on the trade in Schedule III in 2002.

Through the universal implementation of the Chemical Weapons

Convention, the Philippines is protected in terms of unlawful attacks, ensured

assistance from other state parties (OPCW). Further, will be informed on global

trade programmes in chemical products and technology.

CWC will compliment the Philippine implementation of other international

commitments: Stockholm Convention, Rotterdam Convention, Basel Convention,

Montreal Protocol which is integral in the enforcement of RA 6969.

 Benefits and Gains of a State-Party

1. International Cooperation

The Chemical Weapons Convention

stipulates in paragraph 2 of Article XI that States

Parties "undertake to facilitate, and have the

right to participate in, the fullest possible

exchange of chemicals, equipment and

scientific and technical information relating to

the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under

[the] Convention". This provision creates the foundations for OPCW's work in the

area of international cooperation.

2. Access to Capacity Building Programmes

The OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition

of Chemical Weapons) has established a number of

projects and programmes in the field of international

cooperation already. These can be grouped into

three main areas:

(a) assistance in the development of the scientific and technical

infrastructure in Member States particularly in areas related to the Convention's

implementation,

(b) capacity building for peaceful uses of chemistry, and

 (c) support for National Authorities in implementing the Convention.

3. Technical Assistance

Effective and sustainable infrastructure

building is an important aspect, not just of the

implementation of the Chemical Weapons

Convention, but also of other regulatory

instruments in the field of the sound

management of chemicals. In the context of

the Convention, two areas of science and technology are of particular relevance:

destruction of toxic chemicals, and chemical analysis.

Although only six OPCW Member States are involved in the destruction of

CW stocks, many other Member States are at present addressing the issue of how

to deal with old and abandoned chemical weapons, or with other toxic wastes. The

OPCW supports technical workshops on destruction technologies. In the area of

chemical analysis, the Secretariat is taking an integrated approach towards

assisting Member States in the development of their technical capabilities.

This concept recognises that only very few countries can afford to develop

and maintain highly specialised laboratories that deal with CW agents but many

Member States need to be able to conduct other types of chemical analysis for

regulatory, environmental and occupational safety reasons, including in respect to

the chemicals contained in the three Schedules of the Convention (many of which

are constituents of such products as dyes, inks, detergents, toiletries, surfactants,

pesticide preparations and other commodities, and require analysis for a variety of

regulatory reasons such as product licensing, chemical safety audits or import

controls).

The OPCW offers at present: technical audits of existing national

laboratories to assist in defining future requirements in particular in relation to the

setting-up of quality assurance systems; financing of scientific exchanges and

internships for scientists from laboratories in developing countries and countries

with economies in transition at advanced laboratories abroad; attendance of

scientists from such laboratories at international conferences and symposia and

the conduct of scientific symposia (on a regional or global basis) at such

laboratories.

4. Financial Support

In the area of peaceful applications of

chemistry, the OPCW Secretariat financially

supports scientific exchanges and the attendance

of scientists and engineers from developing

countries and countries in transition to important

international scientific symposia; it assists in exchanges of scientific equipment

between laboratories from Member States including in respect to shipments and

any necessary start-up training; it operates a free information service for

institutions in Member States in respect to properties and uses of scheduled

chemicals; and it financially supports small-scale research projects on relevant

subjects including environmental aspects of toxic chemicals, chemical analysis

and detoxification. Funding is either direct by OPCW, or jointly together with such

partners as the Stockholm based International Science Foundation.

5. Exposure to Modern Industrial Practices

The OPCW conducts the Associate

Programme for chemists and chemical engineers

from developing countries and countries in

transition. The programme familiarises the

participants with the work of the OPCW and the

requirements for the implementation of the Convention in chemical

industry, and provides extensive opportunities to become familiar with modern

safety, production and management practices in the chemical industry.

Participants undergo intensive training at OPCW headquarters as well as a

university facility in the United Kingdom, and spend time working with chemical

companies in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe where they are exposed

to modern industrial practices. They prepare research projects and participate in

workshops on scientific and technical issues, and visit a variety of institutions,

companies and governmental agencies. Their broadened experience and their

exposure to modern industrial practices will benefit their countries, whether in

relation to the companies or institutions they return to or in relation to the national

implementation of the CWC, as well as of regulations in the field of chemical safety

at large.
 The additional insight and experience that the participants gain during the

programme may also help them take up a technical position in an international

environment such as the OPCW or within the National Authority department of

their own country. In the future, this OPCW programme will further expand and

may be conducted in other regions of the world.

6. Support for National Authorities

Support for National Authorities is an

activity of the Secretariat not directly related

to the implementation of Article XI. This

programme reflects the necessity to build

national capacities for the effective

implementation of the provisions of the Convention.

At the same time, however, such implementation support has a positive

spin-off in other fields. It can help pursuing integrated solutions in such areas as

legislation, infrastructure building, administration, information systems and

databases. In this way, the programme enhances national capabilities that are

important not only for the CWC, but also for environmental regulations (for

example, the Rotterdam Convention on prior informed consent, the Basel

Convention on transboundary movements of hazardous wastes, the Convention

on persistent organic pollutants, and the Montreal Protocol) and other regulations

in the field of the sound management of chemicals.

 The OPCW support programme for National Authorities includes training of

personnel, the organisation of exchanges and workshops between National

Authorities to share their experience and discuss common issues, on-site

assistance in areas such as declarations or legislation, and the development of

implementation tools such as software or information packages. Many activities

are tailored to the needs of individual States Parties or (sub) regions. Participation

of a number of representatives from developing countries is sponsored by the

OPCW.
 CHALLENGE/PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY THE CWC

1. Deterrence of security threats from non-state actors and authoritarian

regimes that have the capability to acquire/ or already possess chemical

weapons.

2. Destruction of the remaining 10% of declared chemical weapons.

3. Regulation of chemicals and the fostering of peaceful chemistry.

PROBLEMS OF THE PHILIPPINES IN IMPLEMENTING THE CWC

1) Absence of an enabling legislation to implement the Chemical Weapons

Convention

Issue to be resolved:

a) Either to amend R.A. 6969 “An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous

Nuclear Wastes, Providing Penalties Thereof, and for Other Purposes” in order to

make it conform to the requirements of the CWC or to;

b) Draft a new enabling legislation

2) Absence of a formal National Authority

a) Whether to draft an Executive Order creating a formal National Authority to

replace the existing ad hoc body (The proposed National Authority would have a

structure, functions and procedures) or;

b) To maintain current ad-hoc body

Conclusion

The Philippines continues to study options and possible legislative

measures to comply with the CWC. Peace and security is the paramount aim of

the CWC, to protect humans and environment from the devastating effects of

chemical weapons. The Philippines look forward to be a part in achieving this goal

of the world for the total disarmament in chemical weapons and to fulfill its

obligations to the CWC.

 About the Author

She is Honey Jade Belen Zaragoza. A

twenty-year old, AB Political Science fourth

year student in Bicol University College of

Social Sciences and Philosophy. She is the

author of the “Chemical Weapons Convention”

(CWC). She was born on February 12, 1997

and raised in a small and ordinary island city

called Masbate. She went to Jose Zurbito Sr. Elementary School for her

Elementary Education and Masbate National High School for her Secondary

Education.

She loves spending her leisure time watching Korean dramas as well as

variety shows. She has an enormous appetite for delicious food. She laughs like

there is no tomorrow. She is comfortable being with herself most of the time but

does not forget to spend time with her loved ones and friends. Her biggest dream

is to be a lawyer in the future.

References:

https://www.acs.org/content/dam/acsorg/events/program-in-a-
box/documents/2016-global-security/cw-history.pdf
https://www.opcw.org/our-work/universality/benefits-of-membership/

http://cwm.unitar.org/publications/publications/cbl/synergy/pdf/cat1/submission/p
hilippines.pdf