GENEROSA ALMEDA LATORRE v. LUIS ESTEBAN LATORRE (G.R. No.
subject property was owned in common by both of them. To protect her rights as
183926, March 29, 2010)
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45, in relation
to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 256, dated April 29, 2008.
The facts of the case are as follows:
In October 2000, petitioner Generosa Almeda Latorre (petitioner) filed before the
RTC of Muntinlupa City a Complaint[3] for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Absolute Sale with application for Injunction against her own son, herein
respondent Luis Esteban Latorre (respondent), and one Ifzal Ali (Ifzal).
Petitioner averred that, on September 28, 1999, respondent and Ifzal entered into
a Contract of Lease[4] over a 1,244-square meter real property, situated at No. 1366
Caballero St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City (subject property). Under the said
contract, respondent, as lessor, declared that he was the absolute and registered
owner of the subject property. Petitioner alleged that respondent's declaration
therein was erroneous because she and respondent were co-owners of the subject
property in equal shares.
Petitioner narrated that, on March 14, 1989, she and respondent executed their
respective Deeds of Donation, conveying the subject property in favor of The
Porfirio D. Latorre Memorial & Fr. Luis Esteban Latorre Foundation, Inc. (the
Foundation). Thus, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 161963 [5] was issued in
the name of the Foundation. Subsequently, on September 2, 1994, petitioner and
respondent executed separate Deeds of Revocation of Donation and
Reconveyance of the subject property, consented to by the Foundation, through the
issuance of appropriate corporate resolutions. However, the Deeds of Revocation
were not registered; hence, the subject property remained in the name of the
Foundation. Petitioner insisted, however, that respondent was fully aware that the
co-owner, petitioner formally demanded from Ifzal the payment of her share of the
rentals, which the latter, however, refused to heed.
Moreover, petitioner averred that, on or about August 16, 2000, she discovered that
respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim on the TCT of the subject
property, claiming full ownership over the same by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale[6] dated March 21, 2000, allegedly executed by petitioner in favor of
respondent. Petitioner claimed that the deed was a falsified document; that her
signature thereon was forged by respondent; and that she never received P21
Million or any other amount as consideration for her share of the subject property.
Thus, petitioner prayed that Ifzal be enjoined from paying the rentals to respondent,
and the latter from receiving said rentals; that both Ifzal and respondent be ordered
to pay petitioner her share of the rentals; and that respondent be enjoined from
asserting full ownership over the subject property and from committing any other
act in derogation of petitioner's interests therein. Petitioner also prayed for the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, litigation expenses, and costs of the
suit.
Respondent immediately filed a Motion to Dismiss [7] on the sole ground that the
venue of the case was improperly laid. He stressed that while the complaint was
denominated as one for Collection and Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Absolute
Sale with application for Injunction, in truth the case was a real action affecting title
to and interest over the subject property. Respondent insisted that all of petitioner's
claims were anchored on her claim of ownership over one-half () portion of the
subject property. Since the subject property is located in Makati City, respondent
argued that petitioner should have filed the case before the RTC of Makati City and
not of Muntinlupa City.
Ifzal also filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of want of jurisdiction, asserting
that he was immune from suit because he was an officer of the Asian Development
Bank, an international organization.
The RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated November 6, 2000,
restraining Ifzal from paying his rentals to respondent and enjoining the latter from
receiving from the former the aforesaid rentals. The RTC also directed both Ifzal
and respondent to pay petitioner her share of the rentals, with the corresponding
order against respondent not to commit any act in derogation of petitioner's interest
over the subject property.
In its Order dated January 2, 2001, the RTC denied respondent's motion to
dismiss. The RTC ruled that the nature of an action whether real or personal was
determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the
plaintiff was entitled to recover upon the claims asserted - a matter resolved only
after, and as a result of, a trial. Thus, trial on the merits ensued.
Undaunted, respondent filed an Answer Ad Cautelam[8] dated March 19, 2001,
insisting, among others, that the case was a real action and that the venue was
improperly laid.[9] Respondent narrated that he was a former Opus Dei priest but he
left the congregation in 1987 after he was maltreated by his Spanish superiors.
Respondent alleged that petitioner lived with him and his family from 1988 to 2000,
and that he provided for petitioner's needs. Respondent also alleged that, for almost
20 years, the Opus Dei divested the Latorre family of several real properties. Thus,
in order to spare the subject property from the Opus Dei, both petitioner and
respondent agreed to donate it to the Foundation. In 1994, when respondent got
married and sired a son, both petitioner and respondent decided to revoke the said
donation. The Foundation consented to the revocation. However, due to lack of
funds, the title was never transferred but remained in the name of the Foundation.
Respondent asseverated that he and his wife took good care of petitioner and that
they provided for her needs, spending a substantial amount of money for these
needs; that because of this, and the fact that the rentals paid for the use of the
subject property went to petitioner, both parties agreed that petitioner would convey
her share over the subject property to respondent; and that, on March 21, 2000,
petitioner executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondent.
Respondent further alleged that sometime in March to May 2000, the relationship
of the parties, as mother and son, deteriorated. Petitioner left respondent's house
because he and his wife allegedly ignored, disrespected, and insulted
her.[10] Respondent claimed, however, that petitioner left because she detested his
act of firing their driver.[11] It was then that this case was filed against him by
petitioner.
In the meantime, in its Order dated May 15, 2003, the RTC dismissed petitioner's
claim against Ifzal because the dispute was clearly between petitioner and
respondent.
On April 29, 2008, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, disposing of the case in
this wise:
While the case herein filed by the plaintiff involves recovery of
possession of a real property situated at 1366 Caballero St.,
Dasmarias Village, Makati City, the same should have been filed
and tried in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City who,
undoubtedly, has jurisdiction to hear the matter as aforementioned
the same being clearly a real action.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the above-entitled case is
hereby DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction, all in pursuance to the
above-cited jurisprudence and Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
 SO ORDERED.[12]
St., Dasmarias Village, Makati City. The venue for such action is unquestionably
the proper court of Makati City, where the real property or part thereof lies, not the
Aggrieved, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration,[13] which the RTC denied
RTC of Muntinlupa City.[18]
in its Order[14] dated July 24, 2008 for lack of merit.

In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the principle that the nature of an action is

Hence, this Petition, claiming that the RTC erred in treating the venue as jurisdiction
determined by the allegations in the Complaint itself, rather than by its title or
and in treating petitioner's complaint as a real action.
heading.[19] It is also a settled rule that what determines the venue of a case is the
primary objective for the filing of the case.[20] In her Complaint, petitioner sought the
While the instant case was pending resolution before this Court, petitioner passed
nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale on the strength of two basic claims that
away on November 14, 2009. Thus, petitioner's counsel prayed that, pending the
(1) she did not execute the deed in favor of respondent; and (2) thus, she still owned
appointment of a representative of petitioner's estate, notices of the proceedings
one half () of the subject property. Indubitably, petitioner's complaint is a real action
herein be sent to petitioners other son, Father Roberto A. Latorre.[15]
involving the recovery of the subject property on the basis of her co-ownership
thereof.
As early as the filing of the complaint, this case had been marred by numerous
Second. The RTC also committed a procedural blunder when it denied respondent's
procedural infractions committed by petitioner, by respondent, and even by the
motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
RTC, all of which cannot be disregarded by this Court.

First. Petitioner filed her complaint with the RTC of Muntinlupa City instead of the The RTC insisted that trial on the merits be conducted even when it was awfully
glaring that the venue was improperly laid, as pointed out by respondent in his
RTC of Makati City, the latter being the proper venue in this case.
motion to dismiss. After trial, the RTC eventually dismissed the case on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction, even as it invoked, as justification, the rules and jurisprudence
Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to
on venue. Despite the conduct of trial, the RTC failed to adjudicate this case on the
the issue of venue.[16] Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an
merits.
interest therein (real actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the area where the real property is situated. On the
Third. Respondent also did not do very well, procedurally. When the RTC denied
other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall be commenced and tried in the
his Motion to Dismiss, respondent could have filed a petition for certiorari and/or
proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides or where
prohibition inasmuch as the denial of the motion was done without jurisdiction or in
the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides. [17] The action in the RTC,
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
other than for Collection, was for the Declaration of Nullity of the Deed of Absolute
jurisdiction.[21] However, despite this lapse, it is clear that respondent did not waive
Sale involving the subject property, which is located at No. 1366 Caballero
his objections to the fact of improper venue, contrary to petitioner's assertion.

Notably, after his motion to dismiss was denied, respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to contest such denial. Even in his Answer Ad Cautelam,
respondent stood his ground that the case ought to be dismissed on the basis of
improper venue.
Finally, petitioner came directly to this Court on a Petition for Review
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once
it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented,
the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a
question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.[25]

on Certiorari under Rule 45, in relation to Rule 41, of the Rules of Civil Procedure
In her Reply to respondents Comment,[26] petitioner prayed that this Court decide
on alleged pure questions of law. In Murillo v. Consul,[22] we laid down a doctrine
the case on the merits. To do so, however, would require the examination by this
that was later adopted by the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In that case,
Court of the probative value of the evidence presented,
this Court had the occasion to clarify the three (3) modes of appeal from decisions
taking into account the fact that the RTC failed to adjudicate this controversy on the
of the RTC, namely: (1) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment
merits. This, unfortunately, we cannot do. It thus becomes exceedingly clear that
was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
the filing of the case directly with this Court ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy of
jurisdiction; (2) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in the
courts. Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) petition for review to the Supreme
Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy sought cannot be
Court.
obtained in the lower tribunals. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution
The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is brought to the Court of Appeals
and by immemorial tradition.[27]
(CA) on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of
appeal, covered by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or
Accordingly, we find no merit in the instant petition. Neither do we find any reversible
mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appeal, provided in Rule 45, is
error in the trial courts dismissal of the case ostensibly for want of jurisdiction,
filed with the Supreme Court only on questions of law.
although the trial court obviously meant to dismiss the case on the ground of
improper venue.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED. No costs.SO ORDERED.
of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts.[23] Our ruling in Velayo-Fong v. Velayo[24] is instructive:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is

on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a
question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
G.R. No. L-27033 October 31, 1969
POLYTRADE CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VICTORIANO BLANCO, defendant-appellant.
Suit before the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on four causes of action to
recover the purchase price of rawhide delivered by plaintiff to defendant. 1 Plaintiff
corporation has its principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal.
Defendant is a resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss
upon the ground of improper venue. He claims that by contract suit may only be
lodged in the courts of Manila. The Bulacan court overruled him. He did not answer
the complaint. In consequence, a default judgment was rendered against him on
September 21, 1966, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff and
against defendant ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the following
amounts:
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election
of the plaintiff." Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states
that venue may be stipulated by written agreement — "By written agreement of the
parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to
another."
Defendant places his case upon Section 3 of Rule 4 just quoted. According to
defendant, plaintiff and defendant, by written contracts covering the four causes of
action, stipulated that: "The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of
Manila." This agreement is valid.3 Defendant says that because of such covenant
he can only be sued in the courts of Manila. We are thus called upon to shake
meaning from the terms of the agreement just quoted.
But first to the facts. No such stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first
two causes of action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs,
and as to said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the
province of defendant's residence.

The stipulation adverted to is only found in the agreements covering the third and
First Cause of Action — P60,845.67, with interest thereon at 1% a month from May causes
fourth 9, 1965ofuntil the full
action. An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The
amount is paid. parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is that the
Second Cause of — P51,952.55, with interest thereon at 1% a month from Marchmerely
parties 30, 1965 until theto be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words
consented
Action full amount is paid. which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent
therefrom. We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
Third Cause of Action — P53,973.07, with interest thereon at 1% a month from July 3, 1965 until the full
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question only or
amount is paid.
exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer venue. It
Fourth Cause of — P41,075.22, with interest thereon at 1% a month2 untilsimply is permissive.
the full The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
amount is paid.
Action tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy
in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4. Renuntiatio non
praesumitur.
In addition, defendant shall pay plaintiff attorney's fees amounting to 25%
of the principal amount due in each cause of action, and the costs of the Illuminating on this point is Engel vs. Shubert Theatrical Co., 151 N.Y.S. 593, 594.
suit. The amount of P400.00 shall be deducted from the total amount due And this, became there the stipulation as to venue is along lines similar to the
plaintiff in accordance with this judgment. present. Said stipulation reads: "In case of dispute, both contracting parties agree
to submit to the jurisdiction of the Vienna courts." And the ruling is: "By the clause
Defendant appealed. in question the parties do not agree to submit their disputes to the jurisdiction of
the Viennese court, and to those courts only. There is nothing exclusive in the
1. The forefront question is whether or not venue was properly laid in the province language used. They do agree to submit to the Viennese jurisdiction, but they say
of Bulacan where defendant is a resident. not a word in restriction of the jurisdiction of courts elsewhere; and whatever may
be said on the subject of the legality of contracts to submit controversies to courts
of certain jurisdictions exclusively, it is entirely plain that such agreements should
Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on venue of personal actions triable by
be strictly construed, and should not be extended by implication."
courts of first instance — and this is one — provides that such "actions may be
Venue here was properly laid.
2. Defendant next challenges the lower court's grant to plaintiff of interest at the
rate of one per centum per month. Defendant says that no such stipulation as to
right of interest appears in the sales confirmation orders which provided: "TERMS
— 60 days after delivery with interest accruing on postdated cheques beyond 30
days." The flaw in this argument lies in that the interest and the rate thereof are
expressly covenanted in the covering trust receipts executed by defendant in favor
of plaintiff, as follows: "All obligations of the undersigned under this agreement of
trust shall bear interest at the rate of one per centum (1%) per month from the date
due until paid."
On this score, we find no error.
not even answer the complaint in the lower court, and was thus declared in default.
Nor does he deny the principal liability. Add to all these the fact that the writ of
attachment issued below upon defendant's properties yielded no more than P400
and the picture is complete. The continued maintenance by defendant of the suit is
plainly intended for delay. The attorneys' fees awarded cannot be called iniquitous
or unconscionable.
In the very recent case of Universal Motors Corporation vs. Dy Hian Tat (1969), 28
SCRA 161, 170, we allowed attorneys' fees in the form of liquidated damages at
the rate of 25% of the total amount of the indebtedness. Here, the trial court has
already reduced the attorneys' fees from the stipulated 25% "of the total amount
involved, principal and interest, then unpaid" to only 25% of the principal amount
due. There is no reason why such judgment should be disturbed.

3. Defendant protests the award of attorneys' fees which totals P51,961.63, i.e., FOR THE REASON GIVEN, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed, except that
25% of the total principal indebtedness of P207,846.51 (exclusive of interest). interest granted, in reference to the fourth cause of action, should start from March
Defendant's thesis is that the foregoing sum is "exorbitant and unconscionable." 24, 1965.

To be borne in mind is that the attorneys' fees here provided is not, strictly Costs against defendant-appellant. So ordered.
speaking, the attorneys' fees recoverable as between attorney and client spoken of
and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the attorneys' fees here are in the
nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal
clause.4 It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law,
morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant.5 The attorneys' fees so
provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not
counsel, who is the judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by
execution.6

The governing law then is Article 2227 of the Civil Code, viz.: "Liquidated
damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty, shall be equitably
reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable." For this reason, we do not really
have to strictly view the reasonableness of the attorneys' fees in the light of such
factors as the amount and character of the services rendered, the nature and
importance of the litigation, and the professional character and the social standing
of the attorney. We do concede, however, that these factors may be an aid in the
determination of the iniquity or unconscionableness of attorneys' fees as liquidated
damages.

May the attorneys' fees (P51,961.63) here granted be tagged as iniquitous or

unconscionable? Upon the circumstances, our answer is in the negative. Plaintiff's
lawyers concededly are of high standing. More important is that this case should
not have gone to court. It could have been easily avoided had defendant been
faithful in complying with his obligations. It is not denied that the rawhide was
converted into leather and sold by defendant. He raises no defense. In fact, he did
UNIMASTERS CONGLOMERATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and KUBOTA AGRI-MACHINERY PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
[G.R. No. 119657. February 7, 1997]
The appellate proceeding at bar turns upon the interpretation of a stipulation in
a contract governing venue of actions thereunder arising.
On October 28, 1988 Kubota Agri-Machinery Philippines, Inc. (hereafter, simply
KUBOTA) and Unimasters Conglomeration, Inc. (hereafter, simply UNIMASTERS)
entered into a "Dealership Agreement for Sales and Services" of the former's
products in Samar and Leyte Provinces.[1] The contract contained, among others:
1) a stipulation reading: "** All suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with
/ in the proper Courts of Quezon City," and
2) a provision binding UNIMASTERS to obtain (as it did in fact obtain) a credit line
with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co.-Tacloban Branch in the amount
of P2,000,000.00 to answer for its obligations to KUBOTA.
Some five years later, or more precisely on December 24, 1993, UNIMASTERS
filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City against KUBOTA, a
certain Reynaldo Go, and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company-Tacloban Branch
(hereafter, simply METROBANK) for damages for breach of contract, and injunction
with prayer for temporary restraining order. The action was docketed as Civil Case
No. 93-12-241 and assigned to Branch 6.
On the same day the Trial Court issued a restraining order enjoining
METROBANK from "authorizing or effecting payment of any alleged obligation of **
(UNIMASTERS) to defendant ** KUBOTA arising out of or in connection with
purchases made by defendant Go against the credit line caused to be established
by ** (UNIMASTERS) for and in the amount of P2 million covered by defendant
METROBANK ** or by way of charging ** (UNIMASTERS) for any amount paid and
released to defendant ** (KUBOTA) by the Head Office of METROBANK in Makati,
Metro-Manila **." The Court also set the application for preliminary injunction for
hearing on January 10, 1994 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
On January 4, 1994 KUBOTA filed two motions. One prayed for dismissal of
the case on the ground of improper venue (said motion being set for hearing on
January 11, 1994). The other prayed for the transfer of the injunction hearing to
January 11, 1994 because its counsel was not available on January 10 due to a
prior commitment before another court.
KUBOTA claims that notwithstanding that its motion to transfer hearing had
been granted, the Trial Court went ahead with the hearing on the injunction incident
on January 10, 1994 during which it received the direct testimony of UNIMASTERS'
general manager, Wilford Chan; that KUBOTA's counsel was "shocked" when he
learned of this on the morning of the 11th, but was nonetheless instructed to proceed
to cross-examine the witness; that when said counsel remonstrated that this was
unfair, the Court reset the hearing to the afternoon of that same day, at which time
Wilford Chan was recalled to the stand to repeat his direct testimony. It appears that
cross-examination of Chan was then undertaken by KUBOTA's lawyer with the
"express reservation that ** (KUBOTA was) not (thereby) waiving and/or abandoning
its motion to dismiss;" and that in the course of the cross-examination, exhibits
(numbered from 1 to 20) were presented by said attorney who afterwards submitted
a memorandum in lieu of testimonial evidence.[2]
On January 13, 1994, the Trial Court handed down an Order authorizing the
issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for, upon a bond
of P2,000,000.00.[3] And on February 3, 1994, the same Court promulgated an
Order denying KUBOTA's motion to dismiss. Said the Court:
"The plaintiff UNIMASTERS Conglomeration is holding its principal place
of business in the City of Tacloban while the defendant ** (KUBOTA) is
holding its principal place of business in Quezon City. The proper venue
therefore pursuant to Rules of Court would either be Quezon City or
Tacloban City at the election of the plaintiff. Quezon City and Manila (sic),
as agreed upon by the parties in the Dealership Agreement, are
additional places other than the place stated in the Rules of Court. The
filing, therefore, of this complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Tacloban
City is proper."
Both orders were challenged as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion by KUBOTA in a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition filed with
the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 33234. It contended, more
particularly, that (1) the RTC had "no jurisdiction to take cognizance of **
(UNIMASTERS') action considering that venue was improperly laid," (2)
UNIMASTERS had in truth "failed to prove that it is entitled to the ** writ of
preliminary injunction;" and (3) the RTC gravely erred "in denying the motion to
dismiss."[4]
The Appellate Court agreed with KUBOTA that -- in line with the Rules of
Court[5] and this Court's relevant rulings[6] -- the stipulation respecting venue in its
Dealership Agreement with UNIMASTERS did in truth limit the venue of all suits
arising thereunder only and exclusively to "the proper courts of Quezon City." [7] The
Court also held that the participation of KUBOTA's counsel at the hearing on the
injunction incident did not in the premises operate as a waiver or abandonment of
its objection to venue; that assuming that KUBOTA's standard printed invoices
provided that the venue of actions thereunder should be laid at the Court of the City
of Manila, this was inconsequential since such provision would govern "suits or legal
actions between petitioner and its buyers" but not actions under the Dealership
Agreement between KUBOTA and UNIMASTERS, the venue of which was
controlled by paragraph No. 7 thereof; and that no impediment precludes issuance
of a TRO or injunctive writ by the Quezon City RTC against METROBANK-Tacloban
since the same "may be served on the principal office of METROBANK in Makati
and would be binding on and enforceable against, METROBANK branch in
Tacloban."
After its motion for reconsideration of that decision was turned down by the
Court of Appeals, UNIMASTERS appealed to this Court. Here, it ascribes to the
Court of Appeals several errors which it believes warrant reversal of the verdict,
namely:[8]
1) "in concluding, contrary to decisions of this ** Court, that the agreement on
venue between petitioner (UNIMASTERS) and private respondent (KUBOTA)
limited to the proper courts of Quezon City the venue of any complaint filed arising
from the dealership agreement between ** (them);"
2) "in ignoring the rule settled in Philippine Banking Corporation vs.
Tensuan,[9] that 'in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, venue stipulations
in a contract should be considered merely as agreement on additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place;" and in concluding, contrariwise, that the
agreement in the case at bar "was the same as the agreement on venue in
the Gesmundo case," and therefore, the Gesmundo case was controlling; and
3) "in concluding, based solely on the self-serving narration of ** (KUBOTA that its)
participation in the hearing for the issuance of a ** preliminary injunction did not
constitute waiver of its objection to venue."
The issue last mentioned, of whether or not the participation by the lawyer of
KUBOTA at the injunction hearing operated as a waiver of its objection to venue,
need not occupy the Court too long. The record shows that when KUBOTA's counsel
appeared before the Trial Court in the morning of January 11, 1994 and was then
informed that he should cross-examine UNIMASTERS' witness, who had testified
the day before, said counsel drew attention to the motion to dismiss on the ground
of improper venue and insistently attempted to argue the matter and have it ruled
upon at the time; and when the Court made known its intention (a) "to (resolve first
the) issue (of) the injunction then rule on the motion to dismiss," and (b)
consequently its desire to forthwith conclude the examination of the witness on the
injunction incident, and for that purpose reset the hearing in the afternoon of that
day, the 11th, so that the matter might be resolved before the lapse of the temporary
restraining order on the 13th, KUBOTA's lawyer told the Court: "Your Honor, we are
not waiving our right to submit the Motion to Dismiss."[10] It is plain that under these
circumstances, no waiver or abandonment can be imputed to KUBOTA.
The essential question really is that posed in the first and second assigned
errors, i.e., what construction should be placed on the stipulation in the Dealership
Agreement that "(a)ll suits arising out of this Agreement shall be filed with/in the
proper Courts of Quezon City."
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court sets forth the principles generally governing the
venue of actions, whether real or personal, or involving persons who neither reside
nor are found in the Philippines or otherwise. Agreements on venue are explicitly
allowed. "By written agreement of the parties the venue of an action may be
changed or transferred from one province to another."[11] Parties may by stipulation
waive the legal venue and such waiver is valid and effective being merely a personal
privilege, which is not contrary to public policy or prejudicial to third persons. It is a
general principle that a person may renounce any right which the law gives unless
such renunciation would be against public policy.[12]
Written stipulations as to venue may be restrictive in the sense that the suit
may be filed only in the place agreed upon, or merely permissive in that the parties
may file their suit not only in the place agreed upon but also in the places fixed by
law (Rule 4, specifically). As in any other agreement, what is essential is the
ascertainment of the intention of the parties respecting the matter.
Since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules of venue,[13] it is easy to
accept the proposition that normally, venue stipulations should be deemed
permissive merely, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the
parties' convenience. In other words, stipulations designating venues other than
those assigned by Rule 4 should be interpreted as designed to make it more
convenient for the parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their
agreements; that is to say, as simply adding to or expanding the venues indicated
in said Rule 4.
On the other hand, because restrictive stipulations are in derogation of this
general policy, the language of the parties must be so clear and categorical as to
leave no doubt of their intention to limit the place or places, or to fix places other
than those indicated in Rule 4, for their actions. This is easier said than done,
however, as an examination of precedents involving venue covenants will
immediately disclose.
In at least thirteen (13) cases, this Court construed the venue stipulations
involved as merely permissive. These are:
1. Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, decided in 1969.[14] In this case, the venue
stipulation was as follows:
"The parties agree to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila."
This Court ruled that such a provision "does not preclude the filing of suits in the
residence of the plaintiff or the defendant. The plain meaning is that the parties
merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive words which would
indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the venue are totally absent therefrom. It
simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of Manila as
tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy
in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4."
The Polytrade doctrine was reiterated expressly or implicitly in subsequent cases,
numbering at least ten (10).
2. Nicolas v. Reparations Commission, decided in 1975.[15] In this case, the
stipulation on venue read:
"** (A)ll legal actions arising out of this contract ** may be brought in and submitted
to the jurisdiction of the proper courts in the City of Manila."
This Court declared that the stipulation does not clearly show the intention of the
parties to limit the venue of the action to the City of Manila only. "It must be noted
that the venue in personal actions is fixed for the convenience of the plaintiff and
his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice. We cannot conceive how the
interest of justice may be served by confining the situs of the action to Manila,
considering that the residences or offices of all the parties, including the situs of
the acts sought to be restrained or required to be done, are all within the territorial
jurisdiction of Rizal. ** Such agreements should be construed reasonably and
should not be applied in such a manner that it would work more to the
inconvenience of the parties without promoting the ends of justice."
3. Lamis Ents. v. Lagamon, decided in 1981.[16] Here, the stipulation in the
promissory note and the chattel mortgage specifed Davao City as the venue.
The Court, again citing Polytrade, stated that the provision "does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant under Section 2(b), Rule 4,
Rules of Court, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in the agreement
which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the
parties. The stipulation did not deprive ** (the affected party) of his right to pursue
remedy in the court specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of
Court. Renuntiato non praesumitur."
4. Capati v. Ocampo, decided in 1982.[17] In this case, the provision of the contract
relative to venue was as follows:
" ** (A)ll actions arising out, or relating to this contract may be instituted in the
Court of First Instance of the City of Naga."
The Court ruled that the parties "did not agree to file their suits solely and
exclusively with the Court of First Instance of Naga;" they "merely agreed to submit
their disputes to the said court without waiving their right to seek recourse in the
court specifically indicated in Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court."
5. Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1988.[18] Here, the provision
governing venue read:
"The parties stipulate that the venue of the actions referred to in Section 12.01
shall be in the City of Manila."
The court restated the doctrine that a stipulation in a contract fixing a definite place
for the institution of an action arising in connection therewith, does not ordinarily
supersede the general rules set out in Rule 4, and should be construed merely as
an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.
6. Moles v. Intermediate Appellate Court, decided in 1989.[19] In this proceeding,
the Sales Invoice of a linotype machine stated that the proper venue should be
Iloilo.
This Court held that such an invoice was not the contract of sale of the linotype
machine in question; consequently the printed provisions of the invoice could not
have been intended by the parties to govern the sale of the machine, especially
since said invoice was used for other types of transactions. This Court said: "It is
obvious that a venue stipulation, in order to bind the parties, must have been
intelligently and deliberately intended by them to exclude their case from the
reglementary rules on venue. Yet, even such intended variance may not
necessarily be given judicial approval, as, for instance, where there are no
restrictive or qualifying words in the agreement indicating that venue cannot be laid
in any place other than that agreed upon by the parties, and in contracts of
adhesion."
7. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Sherman, decided in 1989.[20] Here
the stipulation on venue read:
" ** (T)his guarantee and all rights, obligations and liabilities arising hereunder
shall be construed and determined under and may be enforced in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts in
Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all disputes arising under this guarantee **."
This Court held that due process dictates that the stipulation be liberally
construed. The parties did not thereby stipulate that only the courts of Singapore,
to the exclusion of all the others, had jurisdiction. The clause in question did not
operate to divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction.
8. Nasser v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1990,[21] in which the venue stipulation in
the promissory notes in question read:
" ** (A)ny action involving the enforcement of this contract shall be brought within
the City of Manila, Philippines."
The Court's verdict was that such a provision does not as a rule supersede the
general rule set out in Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, and should be construed
merely as an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the
specified place.
9. Surigao Century Sawmill Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1993:[22] In
this case, the provision concerning venue was contained in a contract of lease of a
barge, and read as follows:
" ** (A)ny disagreement or dispute arising out of the lease shall be settled by the
parties in the proper court in the province of Surigao del Norte."
The venue provision was invoked in an action filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila to recover damages arising out of marine subrogation based on a bill of
lading. This Court declared that since the action did not refer to any disagreement
or dispute arising out of the contract of lease of the barge, the venue stipulation in
the latter did not apply; but that even assuming the contract of lease to be
applicable, a statement in a contract as to venue does not preclude the filing of
suits at the election of the plaintiff where no qualifying or restrictive words indicate
that the agreed place alone was the chosen venue.
10. Philippine Banking Corporation v. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, etc., Circle
Financial Corporation, et al., decided in 1993.[23] Here, the stipulation on venue
was contained in promissory notes and read as follows:
"I/We hereby expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Valenzuela any
legal action which may arise out of this promissory note."
This Court held the stipulation to be merely permissive since it did not lay the
venue in Valenzuela exclusively or mandatorily. The plain or ordinary import of the
stipulation is the grant of authority or permission to bring suit in Valenzuela; but
there is not the slightest indication of an intent to bar suit in other competent
courts. The Court stated that there is no necessary or customary connection
between the words "any legal action" and an intent strictly to limit permissible
venue to the Valenzuela courts. Moreover, since the venue stipulations include no
qualifying or exclusionary terms, express reservation of the right to elect venue
under the ordinary rules was unnecessary in the case at bar. The Court made
clear that "to the extent Bautista and Hoechst Philippines are inconsistent with
Polytrade (an en banc decision later in time than Bautista) and subsequent cases
reiterating Polytrade, Bautista and Hoechst Philippines have been rendered
obsolete by the Polytrade line of cases."
11. Philippine Banking Corporation v. Hon. Salvador Tensuan, etc., Brinell Metal
Works Corp., et al., decided in 1994:[24] In this case the subject promissory notes
commonly contained a stipulation reading:
"I/we expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Manila, any legal action
which may arise out of this promissory note."
the Court restated the rule in Polytrade that venue stipulations in a contract, absent
any qualifying or restrictive words, should be considered merely as an agreement
on additional forum, not limiting venue to the specified place. They are not
exclusive, but rather, permissive. For to restrict venue only to that place stipulated
in the agreement is a construction purely based on technicality; on the contrary,
the stipulation should be liberally construed. The Court stated: "The later cases
of Lamis Ents v. Lagamon [108 SCRA 1981], Capati v. Ocampo [113 SCRA 794
[1982], Western Minolco v. Court of Appeals [167 SCRA 592 [1988], Moles v.
Intermediate Appellate Court [169 SCRA 777 [1989], Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation v. Sherman [176 SCRA 331], Nasser v. Court of
Appeals [191 SCRA 783 [1990] and just recently, Surigao Century Sawmill Co. v.
Court of Appeals [218 SCRA 619 [1993], all treaded the path blazed
by Polytrade. The conclusion to be drawn from all these is that the more recent
jurisprudence shall properly be deemed modificatory of the old ones."
The lone dissent observed: "There is hardly any question that a stipulation of
contracts of adhesion, fixing venue to a specified place only, is void for, in such
cases, there would appear to be no valid and free waiver of the venue fixed by the
Rules of Courts.However, in cases where both parties freely and voluntarily agree
on a specified place to be the venue of actions, if any, between them, then the only
considerations should be whether the waiver (of the venue fixed by the Rules of
Court) is against public policy and whether the parties would suffer, by reason of
such waiver, undue hardship and inconvenience; otherwise, such waiver of venue
should be upheld as binding on the parties. The waiver of venue in such cases is
sanctioned by the rules on jurisdiction."
Still other precedents adhered to the same principle.
12. Tantoco v. Court of Appeals, decided in 1977.[25] Here, the parties agreed in
their sales contracts that the courts of Manila shall have jurisdiction over any legal
action arising out of their transaction. This Court held that the parties agreed
merely to add the courts of Manila as tribunals to which they may resort in the
event of suit, to those indicated by the law: the courts either of Rizal, of which
private respondent was a resident, or of Bulacan, where petitioner resided.
13. Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, promulgated in 1987.[26] In this case, a similar
stipulation on venue, contained in the shipping ticket issued by Sweet Lines, Inc.
(as Condition 14) --
" ** that any and all actions arising out or the condition and provisions of this ticket,
irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City
of Cebu"
-- was declared unenforceable, being subversive of public policy. The Court
explained that the philosophy on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of
the plaintiffs as well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice; and
considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City
would incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably
decide not to file the action at all.
On the other hand, in the cases hereunder mentioned, stipulations on venue
were held to be restrictive, or mandatory.
1. Bautista vs. De Borja, decided in 1966.[27] In this case, the contract provided that
in case of any litigation arising therefrom or in connection therewith, the venue of
the action shall be in the City of Manila. This Court held that without either party
reserving the right to choose the venue of action as fixed by law, it can reasonably
be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the venue of the action, in
connection with the contract sued upon in the proper courts of the City of Manila
only, notwithstanding that neither party is a resident of Manila.
2. Gesmundo v. JRB Realty Corporation, decided in 1994.[28] Here the lease
contract declared that
" ** (V)enue for all suits, whether for breach hereof or damages or any cause
between the LESSOR and LESSEE, and persons claiming under each, ** (shall
be) the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City. . ."
This Court held that: "(t)he language used leaves no room for interpretation. It
clearly evinces the parties' intent to limit to the 'courts of appropriate jurisdiction of
Pasay City' the venue for all suits between the lessor and the lessee and those
between parties claiming under them. This means a waiver of their right to institute
action in the courts provided for in Rule 4, sec. 2(b)."
3. Hoechst Philippines, Inc. v. Torres,[29] decided much earlier, in 1978, involved a
strikingly similar stipulation, which read:
" ** (I)n case of any litigation arising out of this agreement, the venue of any action
shall be in the competent courts of the Province of Rizal."
This Court held: "No further stipulations are necessary to elicit the thought that
both parties agreed that any action by either of them would be filed only in the
competent courts of Rizal province exclusively."
4. Villanueva v. Mosqueda, decided in 1982.[30] In this case, it was stipulated that if
the lessor violated the contract of lease he could be sued in Manila, while if it was
the lessee who violated the contract, the lessee could be sued in Masantol,
Pampanga. This Court held that there was an agreement concerning venue of
action and the parties were bound by their agreement. "The agreement as to
venue was not permissive but mandatory."
5. Arquero v. Flojo, decided in 1988.[31] The condition respecting venue -- that any
action against RCPI relative to the transmittal of a telegram must be brought in the
courts of Quezon City alone -- was printed clearly in the upper front portion of the
form to be filled in by the sender. This Court held that since neither party reserved
the right to choose the venue of action as fixed by Section 2 [b], Rule 4, as is
usually done if the parties mean to retain the right of election so granted by Rule 4,
it can reasonably be inferred that the parties intended to definitely fix the venue of
action, in connection with the written contract sued upon, in the courts of Quezon
City only.
An analysis of these precedents reaffirms and emphasizes the soundness of
the Polytrade principle. Of the essence is the ascertainment of the parties'
intention in their agreement governing the venue of actions between them. That
ascertainment must be done keeping in mind that convenience is the foundation of
venue regulations, and that that construction should be adopted which most
conduces thereto. Hence, the invariable construction placed on venue stipulations
is that they do not negate but merely complement or add to the codal standards of
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. In other words, unless the parties make very clear, by
employing categorical and suitably limiting language, that they wish the venue of
actions between them to be laid only and exclusively at a definite place, and to
disregard the prescriptions of Rule 4, agreements on venue are not to be regarded
as mandatory or restrictive, but merely permissive, or complementary of said
rule. The fact that in their agreement the parties specify only one of the venues
mentioned in Rule 4, or fix a place for their actions different from those specified by
said rule, does not, without more, suffice to characterize the agreement as a
restrictive one. There must, to repeat, be accompanying language clearly and
categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be
litigated only at the place named by them,[32] regardless of the general precepts of
Rule 4; and any doubt or uncertainty as to the parties' intentions must be resolved
against giving their agreement a restrictive or mandatory aspect. Any other rule
would permit of individual, subjective judicial interpretations without stable
standards, which could well result in precedents in hopeless inconsistency.
The record of the case at bar discloses that UNIMASTERS has its principal place
of business in Tacloban City, and KUBOTA, in Quezon City. Under Rule 4, the
venue of any personal action between them is "where the defendant or any of the
defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs
resides, at the election of the plaintiff."[33] In other words, Rule 4 gives
UNIMASTERS the option to sue KUBOTA for breach of contract in the Regional
Trial Court of either Tacloban City or Quezon City.
But the contract between them provides that " ** All suits arising out of this
Agreement shall be filed with/in the proper Courts of Quezon City," without
mention of Tacloban City. The question is whether this stipulation had the effect of
effectively eliminating the latter as an optional venue and limiting litigation between
UNIMASTERS and KUBOTA only and exclusively to Quezon City.
This is true also of real actions. Thus, even if a case "affecting title to, or for
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on, real property"[37] were commenced in a province or city other than
that "where the property or any part thereof lies,"[38] if no objection is seasonably
made in a motion to dismiss, the objection is deemed waived, and the Regional
Trial Court would be acting entirely within its competence and authority in
proceeding to try and decide the suit.[39]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED,
the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 6, dated February 3,
1994, is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED, and said Court is DIRECTED to forthwith
proceed with Civil Case No. 93-12-241 in due course.
SO ORDERED.

In light of all the cases above surveyed, and the general postulates distilled
therefrom, the question should receive a negative answer. Absent additional words
and expressions definitely and unmistakably denoting the parties' desire and
intention that actions between them should be ventilated only at the place selected
by them, Quezon City -- or other contractual provisions clearly evincing the same
desire and intention -- the stipulation should be construed, not as confining suits
between the parties only to that one place, Quezon City, but as allowing suits
either in Quezon City or Tacloban City, at the option of the plaintiff (UNIMASTERS
in this case).

One last word, respecting KUBOTA's theory that the Regional Trial Court had "no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of ** (UNIMASTERS') action considering that venue
was improperly laid." This is not an accurate statement of legal principle. It equates
venue with jurisdiction; but venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in
criminal actions. This is fundamental.[34] The action at bar, for the recovery of
damages in an amount considerably in excess of P20,000.00, is assuredly within
the jurisdiction of a Regional Trial Court.[35] Assuming that venue were improperly
laid in the Court where the action was instituted, the Tacloban City RTC, that
would be a procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment -- precluding ventilation of
the case before that Court of wrong venue notwithstanding that the subject matter
is within its jurisdiction. However, if the objection to venue is waived by the failure
to set it up in a motion to dismiss,[36] the RTC would proceed in perfectly regular
fashion if it then tried and decided the action.
VIRGINIA GOCHAN, LOUISE GOCHAN, LAPU-LAPU REAL ESTATE
CORPORATION, FELIX GOCHAN AND SONS REALTY CORPORATION,
MACTAN REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs.
MERCEDES GOCHAN, ALFREDO GOCHAN, ANGELINA GOCHAN-
HERNAEZ, MA. MERCED GOCHAN GOROSPE, CRISPO GOCHAN, JR.,
and MARLON GOCHAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 146089. December 13, 2001]
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49084,[1] as well as its
Resolution[2] dated November 22, 2000, denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Respondents were stockholders of the Felix Gochan and Sons Realty
Corporation and the Mactan Realty Development Corporation. Sometime in 1996,
respondents offered to sell their shares in the two corporations to the individual
petitioners, the heirs of the late Ambassador Esteban Gochan, for and in
consideration of the sum of P200,000,000.00. Petitioners accepted and paid the
said amount to respondents. Accordingly, respondents issued to petitioners the
necessary “Receipts.”[3] In addition, respondents executed their respective
“Release, Waiver and Quitclaim,”[4] wherein they undertook that they would not
initiate any suit, action or complaint against petitioners for whatever reason or
purpose.
In turn, respondents, through Crispo Gochan, Jr., required individual petitioners
to execute a “promissory note,”[5] undertaking not to divulge the actual consideration
they paid for the shares of stock. For this purpose, Crispo Gochan, Jr. drafted a
document entitled “promissory note” in his own handwriting and had the same
signed by Felix Gochan, III, Louise Gochan and Esteban Gochan, Jr.
Unbeknown to petitioners, Crispo Gochan, Jr. inserted in the “promissory note”
a phrase that says, “Said amount is in partial consideration of the sale.” [6]
On April 3, 1998, respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for specific
performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-21854. Respondents alleged that sometime in
November 1996, petitioner Louise Gochan, on behalf of all the petitioners, offered
to buy their shares of stock, consisting of 254 shares in the Felix Gochan and Sons
Realty Corporation and 1,624 shares of stock in the Mactan Realty Development
Corporation; and that they executed a Provisional Memorandum of Agreement,
wherein they enumerated the following as consideration for the sale:
1. Pesos: Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200M)
2. Two (2) hectares more or less of the fishpond in Gochan compound,
Mabolo, Lot 4F-2-B
3. Lot 2, Block 9 with an area of 999 square meters in Gochan Compound,
Mabolo, Cebu
4. Three Thousand (3,000) square meters of Villas Magallanes in Mactan,
Cebu
5. Lot 423 New Gem Building with an area of 605 square meters.[7]
Accordingly, respondents claimed that they are entitled to the conveyance of
the aforementioned properties, in addition to the amount of P200,000,000.00, which
they acknowledge to have received from petitioners. Further, respondents prayed
for moral damages of P15,000,000.00, exemplary damages of P2,000,000.00,
attorney’s fees of P14,000,000.00, and litigation expenses of P2,000,000.00.
Petitioners filed their answer, raising the following affirmative defenses: (a)
lack of jurisdiction by the trial court for non-payment of the correct docket fees; (b)
unenforceability of the obligation to convey real properties due to lack of a written
memorandum thereof, pursuant to the Statute of Frauds; (c) extinguishment of the
obligation by payment; (d) waiver, abandonment and renunciation by respondent of
all their claims against petitioners; and (e) non-joinder of indispensable parties.
On August 7, 1998, petitioners filed with the trial court a motion for a preliminary
hearing on the affirmative defenses. In an Order dated August 11, 1998, the trial
court denied the motion, ruling as follows:
As the grant of said motion lies in the discretion of the court under Section 6 of
Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court in the exercise of its
discretion, hereby denies the said motion because the matters sought to be
preliminarily heard do not appear to be tenable. For one, the statute of frauds
does not apply in this case because the contract which is the subject matter of this
case is already an executed contract. The statute of frauds applies only to
executory contracts. According to Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino, a leading authority in
civil law, since the statute of frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing
frauds, it should not be made the instrument to further them. Thus, where one
party has performed his obligation under a contract, equity would agree that all
evidence should be admitted to prove the alleged agreement (PNB vs. Philippine
Vegetable Oil Company, 49 Phil. 897). For another, the contention of the
defendants that the claims of the plaintiffs are already extinguished by full payment
thereof does not appear to be indubitable because the plaintiffs denied under oath
the due execution and genuineness of the receipts which are attached as Annexes
1-A, 1-B and 1-C of defendants’ answer. This issue therefore has to be
determined on the basis of preponderance of evidence to be adduced by both
parties. Then, still for another, the contention that the complaint is defective
because it allegedly has failed to implead indispensable parties appears to be
wanting in merit because the parties to the memorandum of agreement adverted to
in the complaint are all parties in this case. Then the matter of payment of
docketing and filing fees is not a fatal issue in this case because the record shows
that the plaintiffs had paid at least P165,000.00 plus in the form of filing and
docketing fees. Finally, regarding exerting earnest efforts toward a compromise by
the plaintiffs, the defendants cannot say that there is an absence of an allegation
to this effect in the complaint because paragraph 11 of the complaint precisely
states that “before filing this case, earnest efforts toward a compromise have been
made.”
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the above Order was denied by the
trial court on September 11, 1998.
Petitioners thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 49084. On September 10, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered
the appealed decision dismissing the petition on the ground that respondent court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to hear the affirmative defenses. [8]
Again, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its assailed Resolution of November 22, 2000.[9]
Petitioners, thus, brought the present petition for review anchored on the
following grounds:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND PALPABLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT THE CORRECT DOCKET FEES HAVE BEEN PAID.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RULING THAT
THE PMOA WAS A PARTIALLY EXECUTED CONTRACT AND HENCE NOT
COVERED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN DECIDING THAT
THE CLAIMS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT BEEN EXTINGUISHED
BY PAYMENT OR FULL SETTLEMENT DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF
RECEIPTS SIGNED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS SHOWING THE
CONTRARY.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN RESOLVING THAT
FELIX GOCHAN III AND ESTEBAN GOCHAN, JR. ARE NOT INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES AND THEREFORE NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED AS PARTIES.[10]
Respondents filed their Comment,[11] arguing, in fine, that petitioners are guilty
of forum-shopping when they filed two petitions for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals; and that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for
certiorari.
The instant petition has merit.
The rule is well-settled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only
upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees. In the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[12] this Court held that it is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed
docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature
of the action.
Respondents maintain that they paid the correct docket fees in the amount of
P165,000.00 when they filed the complaint with the trial court. Petitioners, on the
other hand, contend that the complaint is in the nature of a real action which affects
title to real properties; hence, respondents should have alleged therein the value of
the real properties which shall be the basis for the assessment of the correct docket
fees.
The Court of Appeals found that the complaint was one for specific performance
and incapable of pecuniary estimation. We do not agree.
It is necessary to determine the true nature of the complaint in order to resolve
the issue of whether or not respondents paid the correct amount of docket fees
therefor. In this jurisdiction, the dictum adhered to is that the nature of an action is
determined by the allegations in the body of the pleading or complaint itself, rather
than by its title or heading.[13] The caption of the complaint below was denominated
as one for “specific performance and damages.” The relief sought, however, is the
conveyance or transfer of real property, or ultimately, the execution of deeds of
conveyance in their favor of the real properties enumerated in the provisional
memorandum of agreement. Under these circumstances, the case below was
actually a real action, affecting as it does title to or possession of real property.
In the case of Hernandez v. Rural Bank of Lucena,[14] this Court held that a real
action is one where the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or, as indicated
in section 2(a) of Rule 4 (now Section 1, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure),
a real action is an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.
It has also been held that where a complaint is entitled as one for specific
performance but nonetheless prays for the issuance of a deed of sale for a parcel of
land, its primary objective and nature is one to recover the parcel of land itself and,
thus, is deemed a real action. In such a case, the action must be filed in the proper
court where the property is located:
In this Court, the appellant insists that her action is one for specific performance,
and, therefore, personal and transitory in nature.
This very issue was considered and decided by this Court in the case of Manuel B.
Ruiz vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. et al., L-18692, promulgated 31 January
1963. There the Court, by unanimous vote of all the Justices, held as follows:
‘This contention has no merit. Although appellant’s complaint is entitled to be one
for specific performance, yet the fact that he asked that a deed of sale of a parcel
of land situated in Quezon City be issued in his favor and that a transfer certificate
of title covering said parcel of land be issued to him shows that the primary
objective and nature of the action is to recover the parcel of land itself because to
execute in favor of appellant the conveyance requested there is need to make a
finding that he is the owner of the land which in the last analysis resolves itself into
an issue of ownership. Hence, the action must be commenced in the province
where the property is situated pursuant to Section 3, Rule 5, of the Rules of Court,
which provides that actions affecting title to or recovery of possession of real
property shall be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any
part thereof lies.”[15]
In the case at bar, therefore, the complaint filed with the trial court was in the
nature of a real action, although ostensibly denominated as one for specific
performance. Consequently, the basis for determining the correct docket fees shall
be the assessed value of the property, or the estimated value thereof as alleged by
the claimant. Rule 141, Section 7, of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC, provides:
Section 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - x x x
(b) xxx
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees.
We are not unmindful of our pronouncement in the case of Sun Insurance,[16] to
the effect that in case the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive period. However,
the liberal interpretation of the rules relating to the payment of docket fees as applied
in the case of Sun Insurance cannot apply to the instant case as respondents have
never demonstrated any willingness to abide by the rules and to pay the correct
docket fees. Instead, respondents have stubbornly insisted that the case they filed
was one for specific performance and damages and that they actually paid the
correct docket fees therefor at the time of the filing of the complaint. Thus, it was
stated in the case of Sun Insurance:[17]
The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The
pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious
not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the
case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester, due to the
fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case and that the amended complaint could not have
been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for
considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as
required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that
sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee
as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change of stance by
manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.
Respondents accuse petitioners of forum-shopping when they filed two
petitions before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that
there was no forum-shopping as there was no identity of issues or identity of reliefs
sought in the two petitions.
We agree with petitioners that they are not guilty of forum-shopping. The
deplorable practice of forum-shopping is resorted to by litigants who, for the purpose
of obtaining the same relief, resort to two different fora to increase his or her chances
of obtaining a favorable judgment in either one. In the case of Golangco v. Court of
Appeals,[18] we laid down the following test to determine whether there is forum-
shopping:
Ultimately, what is truly important to consider in determining whether forum-
shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the courts and the parties-litigant by
a person who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the
same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in
the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issues.
In sum, two different orders were questioned, two distinct causes of action and
issues were raised, and two objectives were sought; thus, forum shopping cannot
be said to exist in the case at bar.

Likewise, we do not find that there is forum-shopping in the case at bar. The
first petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, which is now the subject of the
instant petition, involved the propriety of the affirmative defenses relied upon by
petitioners in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. The second petition, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 54985, raised the issue of whether or not public respondent Judge Dicdican
was guilty of manifest partiality warranting his inhibition from further hearing Civil
Case No. CEB-21854.
More importantly, the two petitions did not seek the same relief from the Court
of Appeals. In CA-G.R. SP. No. 49084, petitioners prayed, among others, for the
annulment of the orders of the trial court denying their motion for preliminary hearing
on the affirmative defenses in Civil Case No. CEB-21854. No such reliefs are
involved in the second petition, where petitioners merely prayed for the issuance of
an order enjoining public respondent Judge Dicdican from further trying the case
and to assign a new judge in his stead.
True, the trial court has the discretion to conduct a preliminary hearing on
affirmative defenses. In the case at bar, however, the trial court committed a grave
abuse of its discretion when it denied the motion for preliminary hearing. As we
have discussed above, some of these defenses, which petitioners invoked as
grounds for the dismissal of the action, appeared to be indubitable, contrary to the
pronouncement of the trial court. Indeed, the abuse of discretion it committed
amounted to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law,[19] which would have warranted the
extraordinary writ of certiorari. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. This
case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, which is
directed to forthwith conduct the preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses in
Civil Case No. CEB-21854.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007
PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER
HENRICHSEN, Petitioners,
vs.
KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules
of Court of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76563.
The CA decision reversed the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 029319-01, which, in turn, affirmed the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 30-12-04787-00 dismissing
the complaint of respondent Klaus K. Schonfeld.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster, British
Columbia, Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental
engineering and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is a
corporation duly established and incorporated in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. The primary purpose of PPI was to engage in the business of
providing specialty and technical services both in and out of the Philippines. 2 It is a
subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan (PCIJ). The president of
PPI, Jens Peter Henrichsen, who was also the director of PCIJ, was based in
Tokyo, Japan. Henrichsen commuted from Japan to Manila and vice versa, as well
as in other countries where PCIJ had business.
In 1997, PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and sanitation
in the Philippines. In October 1997, respondent was employed by PCIJ, through
Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department.
However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary
was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.
On January 7, 1998, Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment to respondent
in Canada, requesting him to accept the same and affix his conformity thereto.
Respondent made some revisions in the letter of employment and signed the
contract.3 He then sent a copy to Henrichsen. The letter of employment reads:
Mr. Klaus K. Schonfeld
II-365 Ginger Drive
New Westminster, B.C.
Canada V3L 5L5
Tokyo 7
January 1998
Dear Mr. Schonfeld,
Letter of Employment
This Letter of Employment with the attached General Conditions of Employment
constitutes the agreement under which you will be engaged by our Company on
the terms and conditions defined hereunder. In case of any discrepancies or
contradictions between this Letter of Employment and the General Conditions of
Employment, this Letter of Employment will prevail.
You will, from the date of commencement, be ["seconded"] to our subsidiary
Pacicon Philippines, Inc. in Manila, hereinafter referred as Pacicon. Pacicon will
provide you with a separate contract, which will define that part of the present
terms and conditions for which Pacicon is responsible. In case of any
discrepancies or contradictions between the present Letter of Employment and the
contract with Pacicon Philippines, Inc. or in the case that Pacicon should not live
up to its obligations, this Letter of Employment will prevail.
1. Project Country: The Philippines with possible short-term assignments
in other countries.
2. Duty Station: Manila, the Philippines.
3. Family Status: Married.
4. Position: Sector Manager, Water and Sanitation.
5. Commencement: 1st October 1997.
6. Remuneration: US$7,000.00 per month. The amount will be paid partly
as a local salary (US$2,100.00 per month) by Pacicon and partly as an
offshore salary (US$4,900.00) by PCI to bank accounts to be nominated
by you.
 A performance related component corresponding to 17.6% of the total
annual remuneration, subject to satisfactory performance against agreed
tasks and targets, paid offshore.
7. Accommodation: The company will provide partly furnished
accommodation to a rent including association fees, taxes and VAT not
exceeding the Pesos equivalent of US$2,900.00 per month.
8. Transportation: Included for in the remuneration.
9. Leave Travels: You are entitled to two leave travels per year.
10. Shipment of Personal
Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of
employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee and the
Company which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the
Company and which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to
both parties through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London. 5
Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector
Manager. He was accorded the status of a resident alien.
As required by Rule XIV (Employment of Aliens) of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit
(Permit) for respondent before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
It appended respondent’s contract of employment to the application.1awphi1.net

On February 26, 1999, the DOLE granted the application and issued the Permit to
Effects: The maximum allowance is US$4,000.00.
respondent. It reads:
11. Mobilization
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Labor & Employment
Travel: Mobilization travel will be from New Westminster, B.C., Canada. National Capital Region

This letter is send (sic) to you in duplicate; we kindly request you to sign and return ALIEN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT
one copy to us.
ISSUED TO: SCHONFELD, KLAUS KURT
Yours sincerely,
DATE OF BIRTH: January 11, 1942 NATIONALITY: Canadian
Pacific Consultants International
Jens Peter Henrichsen
POSITION: VP – WATER & SANITATION
Above terms and conditions accepted
EMPLOYER: PACICON PHILIPPINES, INC.
Date: 2 March 1998
ADDRESS: 27/F Rufino Pacific Towers Bldg., Ayala Ave., Makati City
(Sgd.)
PERMIT
Klaus Schonfeld

ISSUED ON: February 26, 1999 SIGNATURE OF BEARER:

as annotated and initialed4

VALID UNTIL: January 7, 2000 (Sgd.)

Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment appended to the letter of
employment reads:
APPROVED: BIENVENIDO S. LAGUESMA
21 Arbitration
By: MAXIMO B. ANITO
REGIONAL DIRECTOR
(Emphasis supplied)6
Respondent received his compensation from PPI for the following periods:
February to June 1998, November to December 1998, and January to August
1999. He was also reimbursed by PPI for the expenses he incurred in connection
with his work as sector manager. He reported for work in Manila except for
occasional assignments abroad, and received instructions from Henrichsen. 7
On May 5, 1999, respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that
his employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that
PCIJ and PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the
Philippines.8 However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by electronic
mail,9 requested respondent to stay put in his job after August 5, 1999, until such
time that he would be able to report on certain projects and discuss all the
opportunities he had developed.10 Respondent continued his work with PPI until
the end of business hours on October 1, 1999.
Respondent filed with PPI several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave
pay, air fare from Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI
partially settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to pay the rest.
On December 5, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint11 for Illegal Dismissal against
petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. It was docketed as NLRC-
NCR Case No. 30-12-04787-00.
In his Complaint, respondent alleged that he was illegally dismissed; PPI had not
notified the DOLE of its decision to close one of its departments, which resulted in
his dismissal; and they failed to notify him that his employment was terminated
after August 4, 1999. Respondent also claimed for separation pay and other
unpaid benefits. He alleged that the company acted in bad faith and disregarded
his rights. He prayed for the following reliefs:
1. Judgment be rendered in his favor ordering the respondents to reinstate
complainant to his former position without loss of seniority and other
privileges and benefits, and to pay his full backwages from the time
compensation was with held (sic) from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. In the alternative, if reinstatement is no longer feasible,
respondents must pay the complainant full backwages, and separation pay
equivalent to one month pay for every year of service, or in the amount of
US$16,400.00 as separation pay;
2. Judgment be rendered ordering the respondents to pay the outstanding
monetary obligation to complainant in the amount of US$10,131.76
representing the balance of unpaid salaries, leave pay, cost of his air
travel and shipment of goods from Manila to Canada; and
3. Judgment be rendered ordering the respondent company to pay the
complainant damages in the amount of no less than US $10,000.00 and to
pay 10% of the total monetary award as attorney’s fees, and costs.
Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are, likewise, prayed
for.12 1awphi1.net
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) venue was
improperly laid. It averred that respondent was a Canadian citizen, a transient
expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was employed and dismissed by PCIJ,
a foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo, Japan. Since respondent’s
cause of action was based on his letter of employment executed in Tokyo, Japan
dated January 7, 1998, under the principle of lex loci contractus, the complaint
should have been filed in Tokyo, Japan. Petitioners claimed that respondent did
not offer any justification for filing his complaint against PPI before the NLRC in the
Philippines. Moreover, under Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment
appended to the letter of employment dated January 7, 1998, complainant and
PCIJ had agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought before
the London Court of Arbitration. Since even the Supreme Court had already ruled
that such an agreement on venue is valid, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction. 13
Respondent opposed the Motion, contending that he was employed by PPI to work
in the Philippines under contract separate from his January 7, 1998 contract of
employment with PCIJ. He insisted that his employer was PPI, a Philippine-
registered corporation; it is inconsequential that PPI is a wholly-owned subsidiary
of PCIJ because the two corporations have separate and distinct personalities; and
he received orders and instructions from Henrichsen who was the president of PPI.
He further insisted that the principles of forum non conveniens and lex loci
contractus do not apply, and that although he is a Canadian citizen, Philippine
Labor Laws apply in this case.
Respondent adduced in evidence the following contract of employment dated
January 9, 1998 which he had entered into with Henrichsen:
Mr. Klaus K. Schonfeld
II-365 Ginger Drive
New Westminster, B.C.
Canada V3L 5L5
Manila 9 January, 1998
Dear Mr. Schonfeld,
Letter of Employment
This Letter of Employment with the attached General Conditions of Employment
constitutes the agreement, under which you will be engaged by Pacicon
Philippines, Inc. on the terms and conditions defined hereunder.
1. Project Country: The Philippines with possible assignments in other
countries.
2. Duty Station: Manila, the Philippines.
3. Family Status: Married.
4. Position: Sector Manager – Water and Sanitation Sector.
5. Commencement: 1 January, 1998.
6. Remuneration: US$3,100.00 per month payable to a bank account to be
nominated by you.
7. Accommodation: The company will provide partly furnished
accommodation to a rent including association fees, taxes and VAT not
exceeding the Pesos equivalent of US$2300.00 per month.
8. Transportation: Included for in the remuneration.
9. Shipment of Personal The maximum allowance is US$2500.00 in
Effects: connection with initial shipment of personal effects from Canada.
10. Mobilization Travel: Mobilization travel will be from New Westminster,
B.C., Canada.
This letter is send (sic) to you in duplicate; we kindly request you to sign and return
one copy to us.
Yours sincerely,
Pacicon Philippines, Inc.
Jens Peter Henrichsen
President14
According to respondent, the material allegations of the complaint, not petitioners’
defenses, determine which quasi-judicial body has jurisdiction. Section 21 of the
Arbitration Clause in the General Conditions of Employment does not provide for
an exclusive venue where the complaint against PPI for violation of the Philippine
Labor Laws may be filed. Respondent pointed out that PPI had adopted two
inconsistent positions: it was first alleged that he should have filed his complaint in
Tokyo, Japan; and it later insisted that the complaint should have been filed in the
London Court of Arbitration.15
In their reply, petitioners claimed that respondent’s employer was PCIJ, which had
exercised supervision and control over him, and not PPI. Respondent was
dismissed by PPI via a letter of Henrichsen under the letterhead of PCIJ in
Japan.16 The letter of employment dated January 9, 1998 which respondent relies
upon did not bear his (respondent’s) signature nor that of Henrichsen.
On August 2, 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting petitioners’
Motion to Dismiss. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, the same is
hereby granted. The instant complaint filed by the complainant is dismissed for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.17
The Labor Arbiter found, among others, that the January 7, 1998 contract of
employment between respondent and PCIJ was controlling; the Philippines was
only the "duty station" where Schonfeld was required to work under the General
Conditions of Employment. PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite his
having been sent to the Philippines. Since the parties had agreed that any
differences regarding employer-employee relationship should be submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling.
On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and
affirmed the latter’s decision in toto.18
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA where he
raised the following arguments:
 I Henrichsen who terminated his employment; PPI also paid his salary and
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE LABOR ARBITER’S
DECISION CONSIDERING THAT:
A. PETITIONER’S TRUE EMPLOYER IS NOT PACIFIC CONSULTANTS
INTERNATIONAL OF JAPAN BUT RESPONDENT COMPANY, AND
THEREFORE, THE LABOR ARBITER HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT
CASE; AND
B. THE PROPER VENUE FOR THE PRESENT COMPLAINT IS THE
ARBITRATION BRANCH OF THE NLRC AND NOT THE COURT OF
ARBITRATION IN LONDON.
II
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DISMISSAL OF THE
COMPLAINT CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER’S TERMINATION FROM
EMPLOYMENT IS ILLEGAL:
A. THE CLOSURE OF RESPONDENT COMPANY’S WATER AND
SANITATION SECTOR WAS NOT BONA FIDE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE CLOSURE OF RESPONDENT
COMPANY’S WATER AND SANITATION SECTOR WAS JUSTIFIABLE,
PETITIONER’S DISMISSAL WAS INEFFECTUAL AS THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE) AND
PETITIONER WAS NOT NOTIFIED THIRTY (30) DAYS BEFORE THE
ALLEGED CLOSURE.19
Respondent averred that the absence or existence of a written contract of
employment is not decisive of whether he is an employee of PPI. He maintained
that PPI, through its president Henrichsen, directed his work/duties as Sector
Manager of PPI; proof of this was his letter-proposal to the Development Bank of
the Philippines for PPI to provide consultancy services for the Construction
Supervision of the Water Supply and Sanitation component of the World Bank-
Assisted LGU Urban Water and Sanitation Project.20 He emphasized that as
gleaned from Alien Employment Permit (AEP) No. M-029908-5017 issued to him
by DOLE on February 26, 1999, he is an employee of PPI. It was PPI president
reimbursed his expenses related to transactions abroad. That PPI is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of PCIJ is of no moment because the two corporations have
separate and distinct personalities.
The CA found the petition meritorious. Applying the four-fold test21 of determining
an employer-employee relationship, the CA declared that respondent was an
employee of PPI. On the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that, even
under the January 7, 1998 contract of employment, the parties were not precluded
from bringing a case related thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an
agreement that issues between the parties were to be resolved in the London
Court of Arbitration, the venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the
complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines.
On November 25, 2004, the CA rendered its decision granting the petition, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the assailed Resolutions of the
NLRC are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
the Labor Arbiter a quo for disposition of the case on the merits.
SO ORDERED.22
A motion for the reconsideration of the above decision was filed by PPI and
Henrichsen, which the appellate court denied for lack of merit.23
In the present recourse, PPI and Henrichsen, as petitioners, raise the following
issues:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT AN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP EXISTED BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT RESPONDENT, A
FOREIGN NATIONAL, WAS HIRED ABROAD BY A FOREIGN CORPORATION,
EXECUTED HIS EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT ABROAD, AND WAS MERELY
"SECONDED" TO PETITIONERS SINCE HIS WORK ASSIGNMENT WAS IN
MANILA.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LABOR
ARBITER A QUO HAS JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENT’S CLAIM DESPITE
THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT RESPONDENT, A FOREIGN NATIONAL, WAS
HIRED ABROAD BY A FOREIGN CORPORATION, EXECUTED HIS
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT ABROAD, AND HAD AGREED THAT ANY
DISPUTE BETWEEN THEM "SHALL BE FINALLY SETTLED BY THE COURT OF
ARBITRATION IN LONDON."24
Petitioners fault the CA for reversing the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC. Petitioners aver that the findings of the Labor Arbiter, as affirmed by the
NLRC, are conclusive on the CA. They maintain that it is not within the province of
the appellate court in a petition for certiorari to review the facts and evidence on
record since there was no conflict in the factual findings and conclusions of the
lower tribunals. Petitioners assert that such findings and conclusions, having been
made by agencies with expertise on the subject matter, should be deemed binding
and conclusive. They contend that it was the PCIJ which employed respondent as
an employee; it merely seconded him to petitioner PPI in the Philippines, and
assigned him to work in Manila as Sector Manager. Petitioner PPI, being a wholly-
owned subsidiary of PCIJ, was never the employer of respondent.
Petitioners assert that the January 9, 1998 letter of employment which respondent
presented to prove his employment with petitioner PPI is of doubtful authenticity
since it was unsigned by the purported parties. They insist that PCIJ paid
respondent’s salaries and only coursed the same through petitioner PPI. PPI,
being its subsidiary, had supervision and control over respondent’s work, and had
the responsibilities of monitoring the "daily administration" of respondent.
Respondent cannot rely on the pay slips, expenses claim forms, and
reimbursement memoranda to prove that he was an employee of petitioner PPI
because these documents are of doubtful authenticity.
Petitioners further contend that, although Henrichsen was both a director of PCIJ
and president of PPI, it was he who signed the termination letter of respondent
upon instructions of PCIJ. This is buttressed by the fact that PCIJ’s letterhead was
used to inform him that his employment was terminated. Petitioners further assert
that all work instructions came from PCIJ and that petitioner PPI only served as a
"conduit." Respondent’s Alien Employment Permit stating that petitioner PPI was
his employer is but a necessary consequence of his being "seconded" thereto. It is
not sufficient proof that petitioner PPI is respondent’s employer. The entry was
only made to comply with the DOLE requirements.
There being no evidence that petitioner PPI is the employer of respondent, the
Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over respondent’s complaint.
Petitioners aver that since respondent is a Canadian citizen, the CA erred in
ignoring their claim that the principlesof forum non conveniens and lex loci
contractus are applicable. They also point out that the principal office, officers and
staff of PCIJ are stationed in Tokyo, Japan; and the contract of employment of
respondent was executed in Tokyo, Japan.
Moreover, under Section 21 of the General Conditions for Employment
incorporated in respondent’s January 7, 1998 letter of employment, the dispute
between respondent and PCIJ should be settled by the court of arbitration of
London. Petitioners claim that the words used therein are sufficient to show the
exclusive and restrictive nature of the stipulation on venue.
Petitioners insist that the U.S. Labor-Management Act applies only to U.S. workers
and employers, while the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to Filipino
employers and Philippine-based employers and their employees, not to PCIJ. In
fine, the jurisdictions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter do not extend to foreign
workers who executed employment agreements with foreign employers abroad,
although "seconded" to the Philippines.25
In his Comment,26 respondent maintains that petitioners raised factual issues in
their petition which are proscribed under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The finding of the CA that he had been an employee of petitioner PPI and not of
PCIJ is buttressed by his documentary evidence which both the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC ignored; they erroneously opted to dismiss his complaint on the basis of
the letter of employment and Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment.
In contrast, the CA took into account the evidence on record and applied case law
correctly.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It must be stressed that in resolving a petition for certiorari, the CA is not
proscribed from reviewing the evidence on record. Under Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, the CA is empowered to pass
upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. 27 If it appears
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC misappreciated the evidence to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion if such evidence had been properly
appreciated, the factual findings of such tribunals cannot be given great respect
and finality.28
Inexplicably, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ignored the documentary evidence
which respondent appended to his pleadings showing that he was an employee of
petitioner PPI; they merely focused on the January 7, 1998 letter of employment
and Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment.
Petitioner PPI applied for the issuance of an AEP to respondent before the DOLE.
In said application, PPI averred that respondent is its employee. To show that this
was the case, PPI appended a copy of respondent’s employment contract. The
DOLE then granted the application of PPI and issued the permit.
It bears stressing that under the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
one of the requirements for the issuance of an employment permit is the
employment contract. Section 5, Rule XIV (Employment of Aliens) of the Omnibus
Rules provides:
SECTION 1. Coverage. – This rule shall apply to all aliens employed or seeking
employment in the Philippines and the present or prospective employers.
SECTION 2. Submission of list. – All employers employing foreign nationals,
whether resident or non-resident, shall submit a list of nationals to the Bureau
indicating their names, citizenship, foreign and local address, nature of
employment and status of stay in the Philippines.
SECTION 3. Registration of resident aliens. – All employed resident aliens shall
register with the Bureau under such guidelines as may be issued by it.
SECTION 4. Employment permit required for entry. – No alien seeking
employment, whether as a resident or non-resident, may enter the Philippines
without first securing an employment permit from the Ministry. If an alien enters the
country under a non-working visa and wishes to be employed thereafter, he may
only be allowed to be employed upon presentation of a duly approved employment
permit.
SECTION 5. Requirements for employment permit applicants. – The application for
an employment permit shall be accompanied by the following:
(a) Curriculum vitae duly signed by the applicant indicating his educational
background, his work experience and other data showing that he
possesses technical skills in his trade or profession.
(b) Contract of employment between the employer and the principal which
shall embody the following, among others:
1. That the non-resident alien worker shall comply with all
applicable laws and rules and regulations of the Philippines;
2. That the non-resident alien worker and the employer shall bind
themselves to train at least two (2) Filipino understudies for a
period to be determined by the Minister; and
3. That he shall not engage in any gainful employment other than
that for which he was issued a permit.
(c) A designation by the employer of at least two (2) understudies for every
alien worker. Such understudies must be the most ranking regular
employees in the section or department for which the expatriates are being
hired to insure the actual transfer of technology.
Under Section 6 of the Rule, the DOLE may issue an alien employment permit
based only on the following:
(a) Compliance by the applicant and his employer with the requirements of
Section 2 hereof;
(b) Report of the Bureau Director as to the availability or non-availability of
any person in the Philippines who is competent and willing to do the job for
which the services of the applicant are desired;
(c) His assessment as to whether or not the employment of the applicant
will redound to the national interest;
(d) Admissibility of the alien as certified by the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation;
(e) The recommendation of the Board of Investments or other appropriate
government agencies if the applicant will be employed in preferred areas
of investments or in accordance with the imperative of economic
development.
Thus, as claimed by respondent, he had an employment contract with petitioner
PPI; otherwise, petitioner PPI would not have filed an application for a Permit with
the DOLE. Petitioners are thus estopped from alleging that the PCIJ, not petitioner
PPI, had been the employer of respondent all along.
We agree with the conclusion of the CA that there was an employer-employee
relationship between petitioner PPI and respondent using the four-fold test.
Jurisprudence is firmly settled that whenever the existence of an employment
relationship is in dispute, four elements constitute the reliable yardstick: (a) the
selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s
conduct. It is the so-called "control test" which constitutes the most important index
of the existence of the employer-employee relationship–that is, whether the
employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to
the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which
the same is to be accomplished. Stated otherwise, an employer-employee
relationship exists where the person for whom the services are performed reserves
the right to control not only the end to be achieved but also the means to be used
in reaching such end.29 We quote with approval the following ruling of the CA:
repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following
reasons:
First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.34

[T]here is, indeed, substantial evidence on record which would erase any doubt
that the respondent company is the true employer of petitioner. In the case at bar,
the power to control and supervise petitioner’s work performance devolved upon
the respondent company. Likewise, the power to terminate the employment
relationship was exercised by the President of the respondent company. It is not
the letterhead used by the company in the termination letter which controls, but the
person who exercised the power to terminate the employee. It is also
inconsequential if the second letter of employment executed in the Philippines was
not signed by the petitioner. An employer-employee relationship may indeed exist
even in the absence of a written contract, so long as the four elements mentioned
in the Mafinco case are all present.30
The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in the
vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan,31 is that while they are
considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule,
supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the
absence of qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an
agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They
are not exclusive but, rather permissive. If the intention of the parties were to
restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically
expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at
the place named by them.32
Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as
defense.35
Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals,36 this Court held that:
x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do
so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is
one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is
in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3)
that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x
Admittedly, all the foregoing requisites are present in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 76563 is AFFIRMED. This case is REMANDED to the Labor
Arbiter for disposition of the case on the merits. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively in this
court," "in no other court save —," "particularly," "nowhere else but/except —," or
words of equal import were stated in the contract.33 It cannot be said that the court
of arbitration in London is an exclusive venue to bring forth any complaint arising
out of the employment contract.

Petitioners contend that respondent should have filed his Complaint in his place of
permanent residence, or where the PCIJ holds its principal office, at the place
where the contract of employment was signed, in London as stated in their
contract. By enumerating possible venues where respondent could have filed his
complaint, however, petitioners themselves admitted that the provision on venue in
the employment contract is indeed merely permissive.

Petitioners’ insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens

must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a
MARIO SIASOCO, ANGELITA E. SIASOCO, MA. BELLA SIASOCO, ESTER
SIASOCO-LAMUG, MA. LOURDES SIASOCO LAMUG-BARRIOS, MA.
RAMONA SIASOCO LAMUG, MA. VICTORIA SIASOCO LAMUG-DOMINGUEZ,
BELEN SIASOCO-JOSE, RAFAEL SIASOCO JOSE, CYNTHIA SIASOCO
JOSE, CRISTINA SIASOCO JOSE, ROBERTO SIASOCO JOSE, CARIDAD
SIASOCO JOSE, RAMON SIASOCO JOSE, OSCAR SIASOCO, RUBEN
SIASOCO, SALOME SIASOCO-PAZ, MEDARDO PAZ SIASOCO, ROLANDO
PAZ SIASOCO, JESUS PAZ SIASOCO, NELLY STO. DOMINGO NARIO, MARY
GRACE, STO. DOMINGO NARIO and MARY ANNE STO. DOMINGO
NARIO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. MARCELINO F.
BAUTISTA, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 215, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City; and the IGLESIA NI CRISTO, respondents. [G.R. No. 132753. February
15, 1999]
Notwithstanding the filing of a responsive pleading by one defendant, the
complaint may still be amended once, as a matter of right, by the plaintiff in respect
to claims against the non-answering defendant(s). The Court also reiterates
that certiorari is not the proper remedy to contest a lower courts final adjudication,
since appeal is available as a recourse.
Statement of the Case
Petitioners assail the February 25, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in
CA-GR SP No. 45451, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, [the] foregoing considered, the present petition for certiorari is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this
Court on December 17, 1997 is hereby lifted. Petitioners are given six (6) days
from receipt of this decision within which to file their answer. The motion for oral
argument filed by respondent is rendered moot. Respondent court is ordered to
proceed and resolve the case with deliberate speed.[3]
The foregoing disposition affirmed two Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 215, dated August 11, 1997 and September 11, 1997 in Civil
Case No. Q-97-29960.[4] The first Order (1) admitted the Amended Complaint; (2)
dropped Defendant Carissa Homes Development and Properties, Inc. (hereafter
referred to as Carissa) from the Complaint; and (3) denied the Motion to Declare
Defendants Siasoco et al. (herein petitioners) in Default. The second Order denied
the Motion for Suspension filed by defendants and directed them to file their answer
to plaintiffs Amended Complaint.
Undaunted, petitioners seek recourse in this Court.[5]
The Facts
Petitioners were the registered owners of nine parcels of land located in
Montalban, Rizal. In December 1994, they began to offer the subject properties for
sale. Subsequently, Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) negotiated with the petitioners, but the
parties failed to agree on the terms of the purchase. More than a year later, both
parties revived their discussions. In a letter dated December 16, 1996, petitioners
made a final offer to the INC. The latters counsel sent a reply received by Petitioner
Mario Siasoco on December 24, 1996, stating that the offer was accepted, but that
the INC was not amenable to your proposal to an undervaluation of the total
consideration. In their letter dated January 8, 1997, petitioners claimed that the INC
had not really accepted the offer, adding that, prior to their receipt of the
aforementioned reply on December 24, 1996, they had already contracted with
Carissa for the sale of the said properties due to the absence of any response to
their offer from INC.
Maintaining that a sale had been consummated, INC demanded that the
corresponding deed be executed in its favor. Petitioners refused. The ensuing
events were narrated by the Court of Appeals, as follows:
On January 14, 1997, private respondent filed a civil suit for [s]pecific
[p]erformance and [d]amages against petitioners and Carissa Homes and
Development & Properties, Inc. docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-29960.
Petitioners filed therein a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue and
lack of capacity to sue.
Carissa Homes filed its answer to the complaint on February 24, 1997.
Pending resolution of petitioners Motion to Dismiss, private respondent negotiated
with Carissa Homes which culminated in the purchase of the subject properties of
Carissa Homes by private respondent.
On April 24, 1997, private respondent filed an [A]mended [C]omplaint, dropping
Carissa Homes as one of the defendants and changing the nature of the case to a
mere case for damages.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Strike Out Amended Complaint, contending that the
complaint cannot be amended without leave of court, since a responsive pleading
has been filed.
 Assignment of Errors
On August 11, 1997, the first assailed order denying petitioners Motion to Strike
Out Amended Complaint was rendered.

On August 31, 1997, petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceeding In their Memorandum, petitioners submit, for the consideration of this Court,
pending the resolution [by] the respondent court of the Motion to Dismiss earlier the following issues:[6]
filed.
A.
On September 11, 1997, the second assailed order denying petitioners Motion to
Suspend Proceeding was rendered[;] the Order reads: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that
the respondent Judges admission of INCs Amended Complaint was proper.
Filed also last September 1, 1997 [was] a Motion for Suspension by the defendant
Siasoco thru their counsel Atty. Clara Dumandang-Singh. Although the court could B.
not consider the motion filed because it violates the new rules on personal service,
in the interest of justice, the court will resolve the motion. In the resolution of this Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming
court dated August 11, 1997, it state[d] that defendants [were being] given a period respondent Judges denial of petitioners Motion for Suspension.
of five (5) days within which to file [an] answer to the Amended Complaint. The
defendants here obviously refer to the defendants Mario Siasoco, et. al. In the C.
Motion for Suspension filed by the defendants Siasoco, et al., the latter insist on
the court resolving the motion to dismiss. As stated in the resolution, the motion to
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in refusing to
dismiss is now moot and academic because of the Amended Complaint from
hear petitioners application for a temporary restraining order and writ of
Specific Performance with Damages to just Damages. For this court to resolve the
preliminary injunction.
Motion to Dismiss xxx the first complaint, would be an exercise in futility. The main
complaint now is damages and no longer Specific Performance with damages
which [was] actually what the Resolution dated August 11, 1997 [was] all about. Be Simply stated, the question is: did the CA err in affirming the two Orders of the
that as it may, the court gives defendants Siasoco, et al. fifteen (15) days from RTC which had allowed the Amended Complaint?
receipt of this Order to file their respective Answers to the Amended Complaint, not
from the receipt of the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss which will not be
forthcoming. The Courts Ruling

Ruling of the Court of Appeals The petition is devoid of merit. We sustain the Court of Appeals, but for reasons
different from those given in the assailed Decision.

The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled that although private respondent could no
longer amend its original Complaint as a matter of right, it was not precluded from Preliminary Issue: Propriety of Certiorari
doing so with leave of court. Thus, the CA concluded that the RTC had not acted
with grave abuse of discretion in admitting private respondents Amended Complaint.
In their Petition and Memorandum, Mario Siasoco et al. emphasize that the
Petitioners argued that the trial court where the original Complaint for specific
instant suit was commenced pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure
performance had been filed was not the proper venue. Debunking petitioners
and allege that Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
argument, the CA explained that the RTC nevertheless had jurisdiction over the said
in issuing the challenged Decision dated February 25, 1998 xxx. This is a procedural
Complaint.The CA also held that the Amended Complaint did not substantially alter
error. For the writ of certiorari under Rule 65 to issue, the petitioner must show not
private respondents cause of action, since petitioners were not being asked to
only that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion, but also that there is
answer a legal obligation different from that stated in the original Complaint.
no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law.[7] Since the questioned CA Decision was a disposition on the merits, and
since said Court has no remaining issue to resolve, the proper remedy available to
petitioners was a petition for review under Rule 45, not Rule 65. Furthermore, as a
general rule, certiorari under Rule 65 cannot issue unless the lower court, through a
motion for reconsideration, has been given an opportunity to correct the imputed
error.[8] Although there are recognized exceptions to this rule, petitioners do not
claim that this case is one of them. For this procedural lapse, the instant petition
should be dismissed outright.
Nonetheless, inasmuch as the Petition was filed within the 15-day period
provided under Rule 45, and considering the importance of the issue raised and the
fact that private respondent did not question the propriety of the instant Petition, the
Court treated the action as a petition for review (not certiorari) under Rule 45 in order
to accord substantial justice to the parties. We will thus proceed to discuss the
substantive issue.
Main Issue: Admission of Amended Complaint
Petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in admitting the Amended
Complaint. Under the Rules, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of
right at any time before a responsive pleading is served xxx. [9] When private
respondent filed its Amended Complaint, Carissa, the other party-defendant in the
original Complaint, had already filed its Answer. Because a responsive pleading had
been submitted, petitioners contend that private respondent should have first
obtained leave of court before filing its Amended Complaint. This it failed to do. In
any event, such leave could not have been granted, allegedly because the
amendment had substantially altered the cause of action.
This argument is not persuasive. It is clear that plaintiff (herein
private respondent) can amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, before a
responsive pleading is filed.[10] Contrary to the petitioners contention, the fact that
Carissa had already filed its Answer did not bar private respondent from amending
its original Complaint once, as a matter of right, against herein petitioners. Indeed,
where some but not all the defendants have answered, plaintiffs may amend their
Complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the
non-answering defendants, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.[11]
The rationale for the aforementioned rule is in Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules
of Court, which provides that after a responsive pleading has been filed, an
amendment may be rejected when the defense is substantially altered. [12] Such
amendment does not only prejudice the rights of the defendant; it also delays the
action. In the first place, where a party has not yet filed a responsive pleading, there
are no defenses that can be altered. Furthermore, the Court has held that
[a]mendments to pleadings are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in
furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as possible be determined
on its real facts and in order to speed the trial of cases or prevent the circuity of
action and unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as
inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by surprise or the like, which
might justify a refusal of permission to amend.[13]
In the present case, petitioners failed to prove that they were prejudiced by
private respondents Amended Complaint. True, Carissa had already filed its own
Answer. Petitioners, however, have not yet filed any. Moreover, they do not allege
that their defense is similar to that of Carissa. On the contrary, private respondents
claims against the latter and against petitioners are different. Against petitioners,
whose offer to sell the subject parcels of land had allegedly been accepted by private
respondent, the latter is suing for specific performance and damages for breach of
contract. Although private respondent could no longer amend, as a matter of right,
its Complaint against Carissa, it could do so against petitioners who, at the time, had
not yet filed an answer.
The amendment did not prejudice the petitioners or delay the
action. Au contraire, it simplified the case and tended to expedite its
disposition. The Amended Complaint became simply an action for damages, since
the claims for specific performance and declaration of nullity of the sale have been
deleted.
RTC Had Jurisdiction
Petitioners also insist that the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over
the original Complaint; hence, it did not have any authority to allow the
amendment. They maintain that the original action for specific performance involving
parcels of land in Montalban, Rizal should have been filed in the RTC of that
area. Thus, they chide the CA for allegedly misunderstanding the distinction
between territorial jurisdiction and venue, thereby erroneously holding that the RTC
had jurisdiction over the original Complaint, although the venue was improperly laid.
We disagree. True, an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no
jurisdiction over the original Complaint and the purpose of the amendment is to
confer jurisdiction on the court.[14] In the present case, however, the RTC had
jurisdiction because the original Complaint involved specific performance with
damages. In La Tondea Distillers v. Ponferrada,[15] this Court ruled that a complaint
for specific performance with damages is a personal action and may be filed in the
proper court where any of the parties reside, viz.:
Finally, [w]e are not also persuaded by petitioners argument that venue should be
lodged in Bago City where the lot is situated. The complaint is one for specific
performance with damages. Private respondents do not claim ownership of the lot
but in fact [recognize the] title of defendants by annotating a notice of lis
pendens. In one case, a similar complaint for specific performance with damages
involving real property, was held to be a personal action, which may be filed in the
proper court where the party resides. Not being an action involving title to or
ownership of real property, venue, in this case, was not improperly laid before the
RTC of Bacolod City.[16]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON v. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A.
"GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY
G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City,
Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the
July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No.
T-2246 for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E.
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they
alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28,
1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole
heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their
subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-
in-interest.8
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic
School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative
defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b)
the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by
the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been
judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10
The RTC Ruling
On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding that
the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It
observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir –
through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage
contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live
Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied
on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued. 14
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not
the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to
state a cause of action was proper.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined
by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a
sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct,
the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations
furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.19
As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s
favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would
consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the
determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding
special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of
title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo
Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper
special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in an
ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This
must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership.
The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of
heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made
in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while
a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a
right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship
can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right.
ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil
Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the
RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be
threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the
foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine
the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must
be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v.
Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an
heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action
which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order
to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the
dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the
same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to
the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with
applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an
SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DIRECTOR NONNATUS R. ROJAS and
DEPUTY DIRECTOR REYNALDO 0. ESMERALDA, Petitioners,
vs.
MAGTANGGOL B. GATDULA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013
Submitted for our resolution is a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin "the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 26, in Manila from implementing its Decision x x x in Civil Case No. 12-
127405 granting respondent's application for the issuance of inspection and
production orders x x x."1 This is raised through a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 from the "Decision" rendered by the Regional Trial Court
dated 20 March 2012.
From the records, it appears that on 27 February 2012, respondent Magtanggol B.
Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the Regional Trial
Court of Manila.2 This case was docketed as In the Matter of the Petition for
Issuance of Writ of Amparo of Atty. Magtanggol B. Gatdula, SP No. 12-127405. It
was raffled to the sala of Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. on the same day.
The Amparo was directed against petitioners Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima,
Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda of the
National Bureau of Investigation (DE LIMA, ET AL. for brevity). Gatdula wanted De
Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Petitioner [Gatdula] for the fake
ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against Petitioner
[Gatdula] in relation to the alleged ambush incident."3
Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge issued
summons and ordered De Lima, et al. to file an Answer.4 He also set the case for
hearing on 1 March 2012. The hearing was held allegedly for determining whether
a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, counsel for De
Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate
for Amparo cases.5
In an Order dated 2 March 2012,6 Judge Pampilo insisted that "[s]ince no writ has
been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer". 7 The judge noted that
the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases.8 He opined that the
Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. 9
Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March
2012.10 Even without a Return nor an Answer, he ordered the parties to file their
respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since the
period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the
memorandum of De Lima, et al. would be filed in lieu of their Answer.11
On 20 March 2012, the RTC rendered a "Decision" granting the issuance of the
Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the interim reliefs prayed for, namely:
temporary protection, production and inspection orders. The production and
inspection orders were in relation to the evidence and reports involving an on-
going investigation of the attempted assassination of Deputy Director Esmeralda. It
is not clear from the records how these pieces of evidence may be related to the
alleged threat to the life, liberty or security of the respondent Gatdula.
In an Order dated 8 October 2012, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration dated 23 March 2012 filed by De Lima, et al.
Petitioners Sec. De Lima, et al. thus came to this Court assailing the RTC
"Decision" dated 20 March 2012 through a Petition for Review on Certiorari (With
Very Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) via Rule 45, as enunciated in Section 19 of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo (A.M. No. 07-9- 12-SC, 25 September 2007), viz:
SEC. 19. Appeal. – Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or
both. x x x (Emphasis supplied).
It is the Court’s view that the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ
of Amparo is not the judgment or final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy at this time.
The RTC and the Parties must understand the nature of the remedy of Amparo to
put its procedures in the proper context.
The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to
safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty12 and security13 as enshrined in the
1987 Constitution.14 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of
the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights.15 It aims to address concerns such as, among
others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.16
Due to the delicate and urgent nature of these controversies, the procedure was
devised to afford swift but decisive relief.17 It is initiated through a petition18 to be
filed in a Regional Trial Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the
Supreme Court.19 The judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation20 of
the facts as alleged in the petition and the affidavits submitted "with the attendant
circumstances detailed".21 After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the
Writ of Amparo22 or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the
petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioner's right to life,
liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. On the
other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive judicial
protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to appear before a
court of law to show whether the grounds for more permanent protection and
interim reliefs are necessary.
The respondents are required to file a Return23 after the issuance of the writ
through the clerk of court. The Return serves as the responsive pleading to the
petition.24 Unlike an Answer, the Return has other purposes aside from identifying
the issues in the case. Respondents are also required to detail the actions they
had taken to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party.
If the respondents are public officials or employees, they are also required to state
the actions they had taken to: (i) verify the identity of the aggrieved party; (ii)
recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the
person identified in the petition; (iii) identify witnesses and obtain statements
concerning the death or disappearance; (iv) determine the cause, manner,
location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that
may have brought about the death or disappearance; and (vi) bring the suspected
offenders before a competent court.25 Clearly these matters are important to the
judge so that s/he can calibrate the means and methods that will be required to
further the protections, if any, that will be due to the petitioner.
There will be a summary hearing26 only after the Return is filed to determine the
merits of the petition and whether interim reliefs are warranted. If the Return is not
filed, the hearing will be done ex parte.27 After the hearing, the court will render
the judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is submitted for
decision.28
If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the
privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate.29 The
judgment should contain measures which the judge views as essential for the
continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures must
be detailed enough so that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions
taken by the respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the
Supreme Court via Rule 45.30 After the measures have served their purpose, the
judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the
petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that
renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through
consolidation should a subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil.31 Until the
full satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows
vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
The "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 assailed by the petitioners could not be the
judgment or final order that is appealable under Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo. This is clear from the tenor of the dispositive portion of the "Decision",
to wit:
The Branch Clerk of Court of Court [sic] is hereby DIRECTED to issue the Writ
of Amparo.
Likewise, the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to effect the service of
the Writ of Amparo in an expeditious manner upon all concerned, and for this
purpose may call upon the assistance of any military or civilian agency of the
government.
This "Decision" pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo, not the judgment under Section 18. The "Decision" is thus
an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary protection,
production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The
temporary protection, production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that
may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but before final judgment is
rendered.32
The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC.
First, the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that
serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs
of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the
Court to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security
are violated or are threatened to be violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring an
Answer.
Judge Pampilo’s basis for requiring an Answer was mentioned in his Order dated 2
March 2012:
Under Section 25 of the same rule [on the Writ of Amparo], the Rules of Court shall
apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with the said rule.
Considering the summary nature of the petition, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Summary Procedure shall apply.
Section 5. Answer – Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant
shall file his Answer to the complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. x x x
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the respondents are required to file their
Answer ten (days) from receipt of this Order.33
The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court
has devised for the following circumstances:
SECTION 1. Scope. – This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases falling within
their jurisdiction:
A. Civil Cases:
(1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x.
(2) All other cases, except probate proceedings, where the total
amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.
B. Criminal Cases:
(1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;
(2) Violations of the rental law;
(3) Violations of municipal or city ordinances;
(4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for
the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or
a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x
x.
xxxx
It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to
proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the application of
summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is
a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right or particular fact.34 It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the
application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.
The second irregularity was the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the
issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return. Without a Return, the issues could
not have been properly joined.
Worse, is the trial court’s third irregularity: it required a memorandum in lieu of a
responsive pleading (Answer) of De Lima, et al.
The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to
a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum,
on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a final
pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot
substitute for the other since these submissions have different functions in
facilitating the suit.
More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.35
The fourth irregularity was in the "Decision" dated 20 March 2012 itself. In the body
of its decision, the RTC stated:
"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and
the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner." (Emphasis supplied).
This gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the
phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo:
"SEC. 18. Judgment. — The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from
the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are
proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be
denied." (Emphasis supplied).
The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual
order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes availment of the entire
procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After
examining the petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence
presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts
from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the
threat to the petitioner's life, liberty or security.
A judgment which simply grants "the privilege of the writ" cannot be
executed.1âwphi1 It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to intervene and grant
judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo arise out of very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses
cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as "granting the privilege of the Writ
of Amparo."
The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that
petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court.
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to cause the personal service of
this Resolution on Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of Branch 26 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila for his proper guidance together with a WARNING that further
deviation or improvisation from the procedure set in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC shall be
meted with severe consequences.
SO ORDERED.

It is the responsibility of counsels for the parties to raise issues using the proper
procedure at the right time. Procedural rules are meant to assist the parties and
courts efficiently deal with the substantive issues pertaining to a case. When it is
the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion
result.

The Petition for Review is not the proper remedy to assail the interlocutory order
denominated as "Decision" dated 20 March 2012. A Petition for Certiorari, on the
other hand, is prohibited.36 Simply dismissing the present petition, however, will
cause grave injustice to the parties involved. It undermines the salutary purposes
for which the Rule on the Writ of Amparo were promulgated.

In many instances, the Court adopted a policy of liberally construing its rules in
order to promote a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.37 The rules can be suspended on the following grounds: (1) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property, (2) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (3) the merits of the case, (4) a cause not entirely attributable to
the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (5) a
lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (6)
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.38

WHEREFORE, in the interest of justice, as a prophylactic to the irregularities

committed by the trial court judge, and by virtue of its powers under Article VIII,
Section 5 (5) of the Constitution, the Court RESOLVES to:

(1) NULLIFY all orders that are subject of this Resolution issued by Judge
Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. after respondent Gatdula filed the Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Amparo;

(2) DIRECT Judge Pampilo to determine within forty-eight (48) hours from
his receipt of this Resolution whether the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is
proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.
G.R. No. 198718 November 27, 2013
SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSARIO SARAZA and FERNANDO
SARAZA, Petitioners,
vs.
WILLIAM FRANCISCO, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
which assails the Decision2 dated June 28, 2011 and Resolution3 dated September
30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 93961. The assailed
decision and resolution of the CA affirmed the Decision4 dated June 5, 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 0319-04,
an action for specific performance/sum of money and damages.
The Facts
The case stems from an amended complaint filed by William Francisco
(respondent) against Fernando Saraza (Fernando) and Spouses Teodoro and
Rosario (Rosario) Saraza (Spouses Saraza) (petitioners). The respondent alleged
in his complaint that on September 1, 1999, he and Fernando executed an
Agreement5 that provided for the latter’s sale of his 100-square meter share in a lot
situated in Bangkal, Makati City, which at that time was still registered in the name
of one Emilia Serafico and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 40376
(later covered by TCT No. 220530), for a total consideration of ₱3,200,000.00. The
amount of ₱1,200,000.00 was paid upon the Agreement’s execution, while the
balance of ₱2,000,000.00 was to be paid on installments to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses Saraza, Fernando’s parents, with the
bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property was to be executed by Fernando
upon full payment of the PNB loan.6
It was also agreed upon that should the parties fail for any reason to transfer the
subject property to the respondent’s name, Rosario and Fernando’s 136-sq m
property covered by TCT No. 156126 and encumbered to PNB to secure the loan
that was to be paid by the respondent shall be considered a collateral in favor of
the respondent.7 Spouses Saraza signified their conformity to the Agreement. The
respondent was also allowed to take immediate possession of the property
covered by TCT No. 156126 through a contract of lease8. The petitioners likewise
furnished PNB with an Authority9, allowing the respondent to pay their obligations
to the PNB, to negotiate for a loan restructuring, to receive the owner’s duplicate
copy of TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan secured by its mortgage,
and to perform such other acts as may be necessary in connection with the
settlement of the loan.10
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached ₱226,582.13, the
respondent asked for the petitioners’ issuance of a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) that would authorize him to receive from PNB the owner’s duplicate copy of
TCT No. 156126 upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners denied the request.
Upon inquiry from PNB, the respondent found out that the petitioners had instead
executed an Amended Authority, which provided that the owner’s copy of TCT No.
156126 should be returned to the mortgagors upon full payment of the
loan.11 Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction of the respondent from the
property covered by TCT No. 156126.12 These prompted the respondent to
institute the civil case for specific performance, sum of money and damages with
the RTC of Imus, Cavite on December 7, 2004.13
The petitioners admitted the existence of the Agreement and the Authority which
was addressed to PNB. They, nonetheless, opposed the respondent’s complaint
on the ground that the amount of ₱1,200,000.00 which was supposed to be paid
by the respondent upon the Agreement’s execution remained unpaid. The
respondent allegedly took advantage of the trust that was reposed upon him by the
petitioners, who nonetheless did not formally demand payment from him but
merely waited for him to pay the amount.14
The Ruling of the RTC
On June 5, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. The
RTC considered the contents of the Agreement executed by the parties, taking into
account that it was a notarized document. It held:
In another case, the High Court held that: "The recitals in a public instrument
executed with all the legal formalities are evidence against the parties thereto and
their successors in interest, and a high degree of proof is necessary to overcome
the presumption that such recitals are true." (Naval, et. al., v Enriquez, 3 Phil
669).15 (Italics supplied)
The RTC held that contrary to the petitioners’ claim, the respondent’s full payment
of the ₱3,200,000.00 consideration provided in the Agreement was supported by:
(1) the petitioners’ acknowledgment in the Agreement that they received the
amount of ₱1,200,000.00 upon its execution; and (2) the Certification from PNB
that the full amount of Spouses Saraza’s loan with the bank had been fully paid.
The RTC, however, declared that only Fernando should be held liable for the
respondent’s claims, since the main action was for specific performance,
specifically to compel him to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject
property already covered by TCT No. 220530 under Fernando’s name. Hence, the
decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
[petitioner] Fernando M. Saraza as follows, viz:
1. to EXECUTE a Deed of Absolute Sale covering the 100-square meter
parcel of land located in Barangay Bangkal, City of Makati and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 220530 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati
in favor of [respondent] William Francisco pursuant to their Agreement
dated 01 September 1999;
2. to DELIVER to [respondent] William Francisco the Owner’s Copy of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 220530 covering the 100-square meter
parcel of land located in Barangay Bangkal, City of Makati which is subject
of the Deed of Absolute Sale; and
3. to PAY all taxes imposable by law for the transfer of the title in the name
of [respondent], pursuant to the parties’ AGREEMENT dated 1 September
1999;
4. to PAY [respondent] William Francisco the following:
4.1 One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php 100,000.00) as and by
way of damages;
4.2 One Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand Pesos (Php
177,000.00) as and by way of attorney’s fees; and
4.3 the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Dissatisfied, Fernando questioned the RTC Decision before the CA. In addition to
the defenses which he raised during the proceedings before the RTC, he argued
that the RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an
adjudication of ownership of a property situated in Makati City.17
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC rulings via the Decision dated June 28, 2011. The CA
rejected the petitioners’ allegation that the amount of ₱1,200,000.00 remained
unpaid by the respondent, citing the stipulation in their Agreement which provided
that the said amount was paid upon the contract’s execution.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA cited Fernando’s failure to seasonably file
before the lower court a motion to dismiss stating that the action should have been
filed in Makati City. More importantly, the Court explained that the case was a
personal action since it did not involve a claim of ownership of the subject property,
but only sought Fernando’s execution of a deed of sale in the respondent’s favor.
Thus, the venue for the action was the residence of the plaintiff or the defendant,
at the plaintiff’s option.18
Petitioner Fernando’s Motion for Reconsideration19 was denied by the CA in the
Resolution dated September 30, 2011.20 Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
The Issue
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is: Whether or not the petitioners are
bound to comply with their obligations to the respondent as embodied in their
Agreement dated September 1, 1999.
This Court’s Ruling
The respondent’s satisfaction of his
obligation under the Agreement
It is imperative to look into the respondent’s compliance with his covenants under
the subject Agreement in order to ascertain whether or not he can compel the
petitioners to satisfy their respective undertakings.
At the outset, the Court underscores the limited scope of a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Section 1 of Rule 45 provides that
the petition shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
Questions of fact are not entertained, for the Court is not duty-bound to analyze
again and weigh the evidence introduced in and already considered by the
tribunals below.21 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of
the CA are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by the
Court, save in some recognized exceptions such as: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) where there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (10) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 22
The respondent’s obligation under the Agreement pertains to the payment of the
₱3,200,000.00 consideration for Fernando’s corresponding duty of executing a
Deed of Sale over the property formerly covered by TCT No. 40376. To dispute the
respondent’s claim that he has satisfied said obligation, the petitioners now raise
factual issues which the Court however emphasizes are not for the Court to
reassess. For one, the issue of whether or not the respondent’s obligation to pay
has already been satisfied is a factual question.
We consider the fact that both the RTC and the CA have determined that there has
been a full payment by the respondent of his ₱3,200,000.00 obligation under the
Agreement. Upon review, the Court finds no reason to deviate from this finding of
the courts, especially as it is supported by substantial evidence. To begin with, the
petitioners do not deny the authenticity and their execution of the subject
Agreement, a matter that is also sufficiently established by the fact that the
document was acknowledged before a notary public. As both the RTC and CA
correctly held, such Agreement sufficiently proves the fact of the respondent’s
payment to the petitioners of the agreed initial payment of ₱1,200,000.00, as it
states:
That, for and in consideration of the agreed purchase price of THREE MILLION
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,200,000.00), Philippine currency, of
which the sum of ONE MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
([P]1,200,000.00), has been paid by the buyer upon execution of this instrument x
x x.23 (Emphasis ours)
Given this categorical statement, the petitioners’ denial that they have received the
amount necessitated concrete and substantial proof. A perusal of the case records
shows that the petitioners failed in this regard. Even their unsubstantiated claim
that the document’s notarization was irregularly made cannot prevail over the
presumption that the notary public’s duty has been regularly performed.24 The CA
also correctly held that the parol evidence rule applies to this case.
Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tend to
vary the terms of the written agreement, is inadmissible under the rule.25
In addition to the foregoing, the petitioners’ plain denial of the respondent’s claim
of full payment is self-serving, belied by their admission that they had not at
anytime demanded from the respondent the payment of ₱1,200,000.00. The
petitioners are presumed under the law to have taken ordinary care of their
concerns;26 thus, they would have exerted efforts to demand payment of the
amount due them if in fact, no payment had been made. Moreover, given this
presumption, the petitioners were supposed to be wary of the import of affixing
their signature on the Agreement, and would not have voluntarily signed the
subject Agreement if they did not intend to give full effect thereto.
The petitioners also raise in their Supplemental Petition 27 some defenses which
were not introduced during the proceedings before the lower courts. These pertain
to the alleged failure of Spouses Saraza to fully understand the contents of the
Agreement as these were written in English, and their claim that the Agreement
was a contract of adhesion for having been prepared solely by the respondent.
Basic is the rule, however, that no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has
been brought before the lower tribunals for consideration.28 To consider such
issues and arguments that are belatedly raised by a party would be tantamount to
a blatant disregard of the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process. 29 In
any case, the new defenses that are raised by the petitioners deserve scant
consideration. There is no claim that the cited language limitation equally applied
to the respondent, the principal party in the Agreement. Contrary to the petitioners’
stance, the Agreement also does not appear to be a contract where the petitioners
had no opportunity to question its terms, negotiate or decline its execution. The
bare allegations of the petitioners fail to suffice.
Based on available evidence, it is then clear that the respondent had fully satisfied
his obligation under the subject Agreement given the stipulation in the document
on his initial payment of ₱1,200,000.00, and considering PNB’s Certification 30 that
the ₱2,000,000.00 loan of Spouses Saraza with the bank had been fully settled on
April 22, 2005. Fernando, being equally bound by the terms of the document, was
correctly ordered by the RTC and the CA to duly comply with his own obligation
under the contract, particularly the obligation to execute a deed of sale over his
100-sq m property in Bangkal, Makati City. The respondent’s satisfaction of his
obligation under the Agreement also rendered unmeritorious the petitioners’
counterclaim for damages.
Venue of an Action for Specific
Performance
As to the issue of venue, the petitioners’ argument that the action should have
been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is
misplaced. Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of
the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific
performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s execution of a deed
of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made.
Our ruling in Cabutihan v. Landcenter Construction & Development
Corporation31 is instructive. In the said case, a complaint for specific performance
that involved property situated in Parañaque City was instituted before the RTC of
Pasig City. When the case’s venue was raised as an issue, the Court sided with
therein petitioner who argued that "the fact that ‘she ultimately sought the
conveyance of real property’ not located in the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Pasig is x x x an anticipated consequence and beyond the cause for which the
action [for specific performance with damages] was instituted." 32 The Court
explained:
[I]n La Tondeña Distillers, Inc. v. Ponferrada, private respondents filed an action
for specific performance with damages before the RTC of Bacolod City. The
defendants allegedly reneged on their contract to sell to them a parcel of land
located in Bago City – a piece of property which the latter sold to petitioner while
the case was pending before the said RTC. Private respondent did not claim
ownership but, by annotating a notice of lis pendens on the title, recognized
defendants’ ownership thereof. This Court ruled that the venue had properly been
laid in the RTC of Bacolod, even if the property was situated in Bago.
In Siasoco v. Court of Appeals, private respondent filed a case for specific
performance with damages before the RTC of Quezon City. It alleged that after it
accepted the offer of petitioners, they sold to a third person several parcels of land
located in Montalban, Rizal. The Supreme Court sustained the trial court’s order
allowing an amendment of the original Complaint for specific performance with
damages. Contrary to petitioners’ position that the RTC of Quezon City had no
jurisdiction over the case, as the subject lots were located in Montalban, Rizal, the
said RTC had jurisdiction over the original Complaint. The Court reiterated the rule
that a case for specific performance with damages is a personal action which may
be filed in a court where any of the parties reside.33(Citations omitted and
emphasis supplied)
The Court compared these two cases with the case of National Steel Corporation
v. Court of Appeals34 where the Court held that an action that seeks the execution
of a deed of sale over a parcel of land is for recovery of real property, and not for
specific performance, because the primary objective is to regain ownership and
possession of the property. 35 It was explained that the prayer in National Steel was
not in any way connected to a contract that was previously executed by the party
against whom the complaint was filed, unlike in Cabutihan where the parties had
earlier executed an Undertaking for the property’s transfer, correctly giving rise to a
cause of action either for specific performance or for rescission, as in this case.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the
respondent’s action. It provides that personal actions "may be commenced and
tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the
defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff."
Considering the respondent’s statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus,
Cavite,36 the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was proper.
Award of Damages
The Court, however, modifies the lower courts’ award of damages in favor of the
respondent.1âwphi1 In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC’s award of
the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as damages; (2) ₱177,000.00 as
attorney’s fees; and (3) costs of suit.
Upon review, the Court finds no justification for the order to pay damages in the
amount Pl00,000.00. Both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the award's
classification and the factual and legal bases therefor, save for a general
statement by the R TC that it was deemed a "reasonable amount of damages
arising from the failure of the [petitioners] to fulfill [their] obligation under their
Agreement."37
The claim in the complaint was for moral and compensatory damages, yet the RTC
failed to indicate whether the Pl00,000.00 was for the moral damages for the
"undue anxiety, mental anguish and wounded feelings" 38, or compensatory
damages for the "actual business losses due to disruption of his business" 39 as
alleged by the respondent in his Amended Complaint. More importantly, there is no
showing that such allegations were sufficiently substantiated by the respondent,
rendering the deletion of the award warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 28, 2011 and Resolution dated
September 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93961 are
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of Pl00,000.00 as damages in
favor of respondent William Francisco is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 129184. February 28, 2001]
EMERGENCY LOAN PAWNSHOP INCORPORATED and DANILO R.
NAPALA, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS (Tenth Division)
and TRADERS ROYAL BANK, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
May an appeal be taken from a decision of the Regional Trial Court denying a
motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue? If not,
will certiorari lie?
The case before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing
the decision of the Court of Appeals,[1] granting respondents petition
for certiorari and dismissing the complaint below on the ground of improper venue.
On January 18, 1996, Traders Royal Bank (TRB for brevity) sold in favor of
petitioner Emergency Loan Pawnshop Incorporated (ELPI for brevity) a parcel of
land located at Km. 3 Asin, Baguio City for Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).[2]
At the time of the sale, TRB misrepresented to ELPI that the subject property
was a vacant residential lot valued at P600.00 to P800.00 per square meters, with
a usable land area of 1,143.75 square meters (approximately 75% of the land area
of 1,525 sq.m.) without any illegal occupants or squatters, when it truth the subject
property was dominantly a public road with only 140 square meters usable area.
ELPI, after having spent to fully ascertain the actual condition of the property,
demanded from TRB the rescission and cancellation of the sale of the property. TRB
refused, hence, on April 16, 1996, ELPI filed with the Regional Trial Court, Davao,
Branch 17, a complaint for annulment of sale and damages against TRB. [3]
On August 27, 1996, TRB filed a Motion to Dismiss[4] the complaint on the
ground of improper venue. On September 18, 1996 the trial court denied the motion
to dismiss.[5] On October 21, 1996, TRB filed a motion for reconsideration.[6] On
November 14, 1996, the trial court denied the motion.[7]
On January 15, 1997, TRB elevated the case to the Court of Appeals by petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order, contending that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
denying its motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. [8]
After due proceedings, on March 11, 1997, the Court of Appeals promulgated
its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Orders dated September 18,1996
and November 14, 1996 are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE and Civil Case
No. 24,317-96 is hereby DISMISSED on ground of improper venue.[9]
Hence, this petition.[10]
Petitioners seek to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals alleging that:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, for lack of jurisdiction;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Regional Trial Court erred in not
dismissing the complaint for improper venue.[11]
According to petitioners, the determination of whether the venue of an action
was improperly laid was a question of law, thus, the Court of Appeals had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition for certiorari and prohibition, which involves pure
questions of law.
Petitioners further alleged that an order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory in nature that can not be the subject of an appeal and can not be even
reviewed by a special civil action for certiorari.
We find the petition not meritorious.
The general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an
interlocutory order and, hence, cannot be appealed or questioned via a special civil
action of certiorari until a final judgment on the merits of the case is rendered.[12]
The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file an answer to the complaint and to
interpose as defenses the objections raised in his motion to dismiss, proceed to trial,
and in case of an adverse decision, to elevate the entire case by appeal in due
course. However, the rule is not ironclad. Under certain situations, recourse
to certiorari or mandamus is considered appropriate, that is, (a) when the trial court
issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) where there is patent grave
abuse of discretion by the trial court; or, (c) appeal would not prove to be a speedy
and adequate remedy as when an appeal would not promptly relieve a defendant
from the injurious effects of the patently mistaken order maintaining the plaintiffs
baseless action and compelling the defendant needlessly to go through a protracted
trial and clogging the court dockets by another futile case."[13]
In the case at bar, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred
grievously amounting to ousting itself of jurisdiction. The motion of respondent TRB
was well founded because venue was clearly improperly laid. The action in the
Regional Trial Court was for annulment of sale involving a parcel of land located at
Km. 3 Asin Road, Baguio City. The venue of such action is unquestionably within
the territorial jurisdiction of the proper court where the real property or part thereof
lies.[14] An action affecting title to real property, or for recovery of, or foreclosure of
mortgage on real property, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court having
jurisdiction over the area where the real property or any part thereof lies.[15]
Hence, the case at bar clearly falls within the exceptions to the rule. The
Regional Trial Court has committed a palpable and grievous error amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
of improper venue.
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 43095, in toto.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EMERITA MUÑOZ v. ATTY. YABUT and SAMUEL GO CHAN (G.R. No. 142676,
June 6, 2011)
Before Us are the following consolidated petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 142676, Emerita Muoz (Muoz) is seeking the reversal,
annulment, and setting aside of the Decision[1] dated July 21, 1995 and
Resolution[2] dated March 9, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322,
which affirmed the Orders[3] dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88 (RTC-Branch 88) of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-94-
20632. The RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 8286, the forcible entry case instituted
by Muoz against Atty. Victoriano R. Yabut, Jr. (Atty. Yabut) and Samuel Go Chan
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 33 of Quezon City; and nullified
the MeTC Order[4] dated May 16, 1994, granting Muozs prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which restored possession of the subject
property to Muoz.
In G.R. No. 146718, Muoz is praying for the reversal, setting aside, and
nullification of the Decision[5] dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution[6] dated
January 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which affirmed
the Orders[7] dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Quezon City RTC,
Branch 95 (RTC-Branch 95) in Civil Case No. Q-28580 denying Muozs Motion for
an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate
Copy of TCT No. 53297[8] against respondents Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
and the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan).
I M. Ching to substantially show that the RTC-Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals
FACTS
The subject property is a house and lot at No. 48 Scout Madrian St.,
Diliman, Quezon City, formerly owned by Yee L. Ching. Yee L. Ching is married to
Emilia M. Ching (spouses Ching), Muozs sister. Muoz lived at the subject property
with the spouses Ching. As consideration for the valuable services rendered by
Muoz to the spouses Chings family, Yee L. Ching agreed to have the subject
property transferred to Muoz. By virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale, seemingly
executed by Yee L. Ching in favor of Muoz,[9] the latter acquired a Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 186306 covering the subject property in her name on
December 22, 1972.[10]However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28,
1972, Muoz purportedly sold the subject property to her sister, Emilia M. Ching. As
a result, TCT No. 186306 was cancelled and TCT No. 186366 was issued in Emilia
M. Chings name. Emilia M. Ching, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979,
sold the subject property to spouses Go Song and Tan Sio Kien (spouses Go),
hence, TCT No. 186366 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 258977 in the
spouses Gos names.
On October 15, 1979, Muoz registered her adverse claim to the subject
property on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. The next day, on October 16, 1979,
Muoz filed a complaint for the annulment of the deeds of absolute sale dated
December 28, 1972 and July 16, 1979, the cancellation of TCT No. 258977 in the
spouses Gos names, and the restoration and revival of TCT No. 186306 in Muozs
name. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-28580 and raffled to RTC-
Branch 95. On October 17, 1979, Muoz caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go. In an Order dated December 17,
1979, the RTC-Branch 95 granted the spouses Gos motion for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordered the sheriff to put the spouses Go in
possession of the subject property. The writ was implemented by the sheriff on
March 26, 1980, driving Muoz and her housemates away from the subject property.
Muoz filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of
Appeals, assailing the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 10148. The appellate court dismissed
Muozs petition on January 4, 1980. Yee L. Ching and his son Frederick M. Ching
filed an urgent motion for leave to intervene in CA-G.R. SP No. 10148 and for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The Court of Appeals issued a
TRO. However, in a Resolution dated March 18, 1980, the appellate court denied
the motion to intervene of Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching, and cancelled the
TRO previously issued. Yee L. Ching and Frederick M. Ching challenged before this
Court, in G.R. No. 53463, the Resolution dated March 18, 1980 of the Court of
Appeals. Eventually, in a Resolution dated June 3, 1981, the Court dismissed the
petition in G.R. No. 53463, for lack of merit and failure of Yee L. Ching and Frederick
gravely abused their discretion. In a subsequent Resolution dated June 21, 1982,
the Court clarified that its Resolution of June 3, 1981 was without prejudice to the
continuation of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-28580 still pending before the trial
court, in order that proper and final adjudication may be made of whether or not the
deed of sale by Emerita L. Muoz in favor of Emilia M. Ching is a real, genuine and
authentic transaction, thereby to settle once and for all the issue of ownership of the
property herein in question.[11]
Trial in Civil Case No. Q-28580 proceeded before RTC-Branch 95.
In the meantime, Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens on TCT
No. 258977 was cancelled on October 28, 1982 on the basis of an alleged final
judgment in favor of the spouses Go.[12] The spouses Go obtained a loan
of P500,000.00 from BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) and to secure the same,
they constituted a mortgage on the subject property on November 23,
1982.[13] When the spouses Go defaulted on the payment of their loan, BPI Family
foreclosed the mortgage. BPI Family was the highest bidder at the auction sale of
the subject property. The spouses Go failed to exercise their right of redemption
within the prescribed period, thus, BPI Family was finally able to register the subject
property in its name on October 23, 1987 under TCT No. 370364.[14] Apparently, the
original copy of TCT No. 370364 was among those razed in the fire at the Quezon
City Register of Deeds on June 11, 1988. As a result of the administrative
reconstitution of the lost title, TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) was issued to BPI Family.
On December 3, 1990, BPI Family executed in favor of the spouses Samuel Go
Chan and Aida C. Chan (spouses Chan) a Deed of Absolute Sale [15] covering the
subject property for and in consideration of P3,350,000.00. Consequently, TCT No.
RT-54376 (370364) in the name of BPI Family was cancelled and TCT No. 53297
was issued in the spouses Chans names on January 28, 1991. [16] The spouses
Chan obtained a loan from BPI Family on October 2, 1992 for the construction of a
building on the subject property, and to secure the same, constituted a mortgage on
the subject property in favor of BPI Family.[17]
On July 19, 1991, RTC-Branch 95 rendered its Decision[18] in Civil Case No.
Q-28580, against Emilia M. Ching, Yee L. Ching, and the spouses Go (Emilia M.
Ching, et al.). It found that Muozs signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
December 28, 1972 was forged; that Muoz never sold the subject property to her
sister, Emilia M. Ching; and that the spouses Go were not innocent purchasers for
value of the subject property.The fallo of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing for
lack of merit [Emilia M. Ching, et al.s] respective counterclaims,
cross-claims, and counter-cross-claim, declaring as null and
void ab initio the following documents, to wit: (a) Deed of Absolute
Sale dated December 28, 1972, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. M; (b) TCT No. 186366 of the Registry of Deeds
for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in evidence as Exh. N; (c)
Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979, copy of which is marked
in evidence as Exh. 3; and, (d) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of
Deeds for Metro Manila District III, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. 4, and directing defendant Register of Deeds of
Quezon City to cancel from the records of the subject property the
registrations of all the said documents and to restore and revive,
free from all liens and encumbrances, TCT No. 186306 of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City, copy of which is marked in
evidence as Exh. L, as well as ordering defendants Emilia M. Ching,
Go Song and Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the
sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and to pay the costs
of suit. The court also hereby dismisses the rest of the claims in
[Muozs] complaint, there being no satisfactory warrant therefor.[19]
Emilia M. Ching, et al.s, appeal of the foregoing judgment of the RTC-
Branch 95 was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 33811 before the Court of Appeals. In
its Decision[20] dated March 4, 1993, the appellate court not only affirmed the
appealed judgment, but also ordered the spouses Go and their successors-in-
interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf to vacate the subject property,
to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED, with costs against [Emilia M.
Ching, et al.]. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued
on December 17, 1979 is hereby set aside and declared
dissolved. Defendants-appellants Go and Tan, their successors-in-
interest and assigns and those acting on their behalf, are ordered
to vacate the disputed premises and to deliver the same to [Muoz]
immediately upon receipt of this decision.[21]
Emilia L. Ching, et al., filed before this Court a motion for extension of time
to file their petition for review, which was assigned the docket number G.R. No.
109260. However, they failed to file their intended petition within the extended period
which expired on April 23, 1993. In a Resolution[22] dated July 12, 1993, the Court
declared G.R. No. 109260 terminated. The Resolution dated July 12, 1993 of the
Court in G.R. No. 109260 became final and executory on July 15, 1993 and was
entered in the Book of Entries of Judgments on even date.[23]
More than two months later, on September 20, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95
issued a writ of execution to implement the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
The spouses Chan, who bought the subject property from BPI Family, then came
forward and filed before the RTC-Branch 95 on October 22, 1993 an Urgent Motion
to Stop Execution as Against Spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida
Chan,[24] opposing the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The
spouses Chan asserted ownership and possession of the subject property on the
basis of a clean title registered in their names under TCT No. 53297. The spouses
Chan further contended that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 could not
be executed against them since they were not parties to the said case; they were
not successors-in-interest, assigns, or acting on behalf of the spouses Go; and they
purchased the subject property from BPI Family without any notice of defect in the
latters title.
 It was only at this point that Muoz, upon her own inquiry, discovered the
cancellation on October 28, 1982 of her adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens annotated on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the subsequent
events that led to the transfer and registration of the title to the subject property from
the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and finally, to the spouses Chan.
In its Order[25] dated December 28, 1993, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the
spouses Chans urgent motion to stop the execution. According to the RTC-Branch
95, the photocopy of TCT No. 370364 in the name of BPI Family, submitted by the
spouses Chan with their motion, could hardly be regarded as satisfactory proof that
Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated therein were also missing
from the original copy of said certificate of title. Muozs adverse claim and notice of lis
pendens were annotated on TCT No. 258977 in the spouses Gos names as P.E.-
8078 and P.E.-8178, respectively. So when TCT No. 258977 of the spouses Go was
cancelled and TCT No. 370364 was issued to BPI Family, it could be presumed that
the Register of Deeds regularly performed his official duty by carrying over Muozs
adverse claim and notice of lis pendens to TCT No. 370364. In addition, the RTC-
Branch 95 pointed out that in this jurisdiction, the entry of the notice of lis pendens in
the day book of the Register of Deeds was already sufficient notice to the whole
world of the dispute over the subject property, and there was no more need to
annotate the same on the owners duplicate of the certificate of title. Finally, the RTC-
Branch 95 held that TCT No. RT-54376 (370364) of BPI Family and TCT No. 53297
of the spouses Chan shall be subject to the reservation under Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 26[26] [t]hat certificates of title reconstituted extrajudicially, in the manner
stated in sections five and six hereof, shall be without prejudice to any party whose
right or interest in the property was duly noted in the original, at the time it was lost
or destroyed, but entry or notation of which has not been made on the reconstituted
certificate of title. Thus, the spouses Chan were deemed to have taken the disputed
property subject to the final outcome of Civil Case No. Q-28580.
On January 3, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 issued an Alias Writ of
Execution.[27] On January 10, 1994, the writ was enforced, and possession of the
subject property was taken from the spouses Chan and returned to Muoz. [28] In its
Orders dated April 8, 1994 and June 17, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied the
spouses Chans motion for reconsideration and notice of appeal, respectively. [29]
G.R. No. 142676
Pending resolution by the RTC-Branch 95 of the spouses Chans motion for
reconsideration and notice of appeal in Civil Case No. Q-28580, Muoz instituted
before the MeTC on February 4, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry with Prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction[30] against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut,
docketed as Civil Case No. 8286. Muoz alleged in her complaint that she had been
in actual and physical possession of the subject property since January 10,
1994. She hired a caretaker and two security guards for the said property. On
February 2, 1994, Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, along with 20 other men, some
of whom were armed, ousted Muoz of possession of the subject property by stealth,
threat, force, and intimidation. Muoz prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction directing Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut and all persons
claiming right under them to vacate the subject property. Muoz additionally prayed
for judgment making the mandatory injunction permanent and directing Samuel Go
Chan and Atty. Yabut to pay Muoz: (1) compensation for the unlawful occupation of
the subject property in the amount of P50,000.00 per month, beginning February 2,
1994 until the said property is fully and completely turned over to Muoz; (2) attorneys
fees in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P1,500.00 per court appearance of Muozs
counsel; and (3) costs of suit.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut denied Muozs allegations, insisting that
Samuel Go Chan is the valid, lawful, and true legal owner and possessor of the
subject property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut averred that the Turn-Over of
Possession and Receipt of Possession dated January 10, 1994 attached to Muozs
complaint as proof that the subject property had been placed in her possession is a
falsified document. The Writ of Execution issued on September 20, 1993 in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 had already expired and the Sheriffs Return on the Writ another
document purporting to show that possession of the subject property was turned-
over to Muoz on January 10, 1994 was then being challenged in a complaint before
the Office of Deputy Court Administrator Reynaldo L. Suarez of the Supreme
Court. Samuel Go Chans possession of the subject property has never been
interrupted. His sister, Cely Chan, resided at the subject property and was never
removed therefrom. On February 2, 1994, Atty. Yabut was at the subject property
only to protect the rights and interest of his client, Samuel Go Chan, and since the
latters possession of the subject property had never been interrupted, Atty. Yabut
entered the same peacefully, without intimidation, force, or stealth. The other people
at the subject property on February 2, 1994 were there to attend the services at
the Buddhist Temple which occupied the fourth floor of the building erected by the
spouses Chan on the subject property. Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, thus,
asked the MeTC to dismiss Muozs complaint for lack of merit and legal basis.[31]
The MeTC received evidence from the parties on whether a writ of
preliminary injunction should be issued, as prayed for by Muoz. In its Order dated
May 16, 1994, the MeTC adjudged that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580
was already executed against the spouses Chan and there was, indeed, a turn-over
of possession of the subject property to Muoz. Accordingly, the MeTC granted
Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, restoring
possession of the subject property to Muoz.
 Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut questioned the foregoing MeTC order (c) Declaring the Order dated May 16, 1994 of Public
through a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and respondent Hon. Elsa de Guzman in Civil Case No. 8286 illegal and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction[32] before the RTC-Branch 88, which was docketed as therefore null and void; and
Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. They asserted that they were not bound by the
execution of the final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 as they (d) Dismissing the ejectment suit in Civil Case No. 8286 on
were not parties to the said case.Muoz, on the other hand, argued that the MeTC ground of lis pendens.
Order of May 16, 1994 was an interlocutory order, and under Section 19 of the Rules
of Summary Procedure, a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order issued Without pronouncement as to costs.[33]
by the court is one of the prohibited pleadings and motions in summary proceedings.
Muoz appealed the Orders dated June 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of RTC-
In its Order dated June 10, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued a writ of
Branch 88 before the Court of Appeals. Her appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the MeTC Order dated May
No. 35322. Aside from the nullification of the two orders, Muoz additionally prayed
16, 1994.
for the dismissal from the service of the RTC-Branch 88 presiding judge and the
disbarment of Atty. Yabut.
On August 5, 1994, the RTC-Branch 88 issued another Order resolving
Muozs motion to dismiss the petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632,
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated July 21, 1995, sustained the
motion for reconsideration of the Order dated June 10, 1994 of RTC-Branch 88
appealed orders of RTC-Branch 88. The Court of Appeals held that the MeTC
granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and motion to resolve with
should have dismissed the forcible entry case on the ground of lis pendens; that the
additional grounds for dismissal. According to the RTC-Branch 88, the MeTC failed
spouses Chan were not parties in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and impleading them
to distinguish the issue of finality of the judgment of the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case
only in the execution stage of said case vitiated their right to due process; that the
No. Q-28580 from the assertions of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut that the
order of the RTC-Branch 95 involving the spouses Chan in Civil Case No. Q-28580
spouses Chan are not covered by said final judgment because they are not
was null and void, considering that they are strangers to the case, and they are
successors-in-interest, assigns, or privies of the spouses Go and they are
innocent purchasers for value of the subject property; that the notice of lis
purchasers of the subject property in good faith. The issue of whether the final
pendens was already cancelled from the spouses Gos certificate of title at the time
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan was then still
they mortgaged the subject property to BPI Family; and that the title to the subject
being litigated in the same case before RTC-Branch 95, where the spouses Chans
property was already free of any and all liens and encumbrances when the spouses
motion for reconsideration of the denial of their notice of appeal was pending. The
Chan purchased the said property from BPI Family. The Court of Appeals, in its
RTC-Branch 88 further found that the MeTC committed grave abuse of discretion in
Resolution dated March 9, 2000, denied Muozs motion for reconsideration.
not dismissing Muozs complaint for forcible entry on the ground of lis pendens, as
the issue as to who between Muoz and the spouses Chan had the better right to
G.R. No. 146718
possession of the subject property was the subject of the pending proceeding in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95. In the end, the RTC-Branch 88
Meanwhile, Muoz filed before the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580 a
decreed:
Motion to Cite the Register of Deeds in Contempt of Court for the failure of the
Register of Deeds to restore Muozs TCT No. 186306 despite having been served
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders
with a copy of the writ of execution on October 11, 1993. In its Judgment (on the
judgment
Contempt Proceedings against the Register of Deeds of Quezon City Samuel C.
(a) Denying the motion to dismiss of respondent Muoz for
lack of merit; Cleofe)[34] dated March 18, 1994, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion,
convinced that the Register of Deeds had a valid excuse for his inability to implement
(b) Denying the motion for reconsideration of respondent the served writ. The Register of Deeds could not cancel the spouses Chans TCT
Muoz for the recall and/or setting aside of the writ of preliminary No. 53297, the subsisting certificate of title over the subject property, absent any
injunction granted to petitioners; authority or directive for him to do so. The directive in the final judgment in Civil Case
No. Q-28580 and the writ of execution for the same only pertained to the cancellation
of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977.
Thereafter, Muoz filed a Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan and
a Second Motion for Contempt against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut. Muoz also
filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution and Application for Surrender of the
Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297,[35] in which she prayed for the issuance
of an alias writ of execution directing the Register of Deeds not only to cancel TCT
No. 258977 and all documents declared null and void ab initio in the dispositive
portion of the Decision[36] dated July 19, 1991 of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No.
Q-28580, and to restore and revive, free from all liens and encumbrances Muozs
TCT No. 186306, but likewise to cancel the present certificate of title covering the
subject property, TCT No. 53297.
In its Order dated August 21, 1995, the RTC-Branch 95 denied all of Muozs
aforementioned motions. The RTC-Branch 95 was of the view that Samuel Go
Chans title should be litigated in another forum, not in Civil Case No. Q-28580 where
the judgment had already become final and executory. The RTC-Branch 95 also
stressed that since the judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 had long become final
and executory, it could no longer be changed or amended except for clerical error
or mistake. Accordingly, the RTC-Branch 95 resolved as follows:
1. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the denial of [Muozs] first
and second motions for contempt and hereby absolves
respondents Samuel Go Chan, Celia Chan, Atty. Victoriano R.
Yabut, Jr., and several John Does of the Contempt Charges against
them.
2. Ordering, as it hereby orders, the issuance of an alias
writ of execution directing the Courts Deputy Sheriff:
(a) Defendants Go Song and Tan Sio Kien, their
successors-in-interest and assigns and those
acting on their behalf to vacate the disputed
premises and deliver the same to [Muoz];
(b) Defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel from the records of the subject property the
registration of all the following documents, to wit:
(1) Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 28,
1972; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
186366 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
(3) Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 16, 1979; and
(4) TCT No. 258977 of the Registry of Deeds for
Metro Manila II, and to restore and revive, free from
all liens and encumbrances TCT No. 186306 of the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City; and
(c) Defendants Emilia M. Ching, Go Song and
Tan Sio Kien jointly and severally to pay [Muoz] the
sum of P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees and
to pay the cost of suit.[37]
Unrelenting, Muoz filed a Motion for Clarificatory Order, pointing out that the
spouses Chan are the present occupants of the subject property. The Order dated
August 21, 1995 of the RTC-Branch 95 directed the deputy sheriff to deliver the
subject property to Muoz, and this could not be done unless the spouses Chan are
evicted therefrom. Resultantly, Muoz prayed that a clarificatory order be made
categorically stating that the spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan, and all
persons claiming right under them, are likewise evicted from the subject premises
pursuant to the Order of 21 August 1995.[38]
Once more, the RTC-Branch 95 denied Muozs motion in its Order dated
October 3, 1995. The RTC-Branch 95 reiterated the rule that after the judgment had
become final, only clerical errors, as distinguished from substantial errors, can be
amended by the court. Furthermore, when the decision or judgment sought to be
amended is promulgated by an appellate court, it is beyond the power of the trial
court to change, amplify, enlarge, alter, or modify. Ultimately, the RTC-Branch 95
pronounced that it was restrained x x x to consider as mere clerical error the
exclusion of spouses Samuel Go Chan and Aida C. Chan in the Decision of the
Court dated July 19, 1991, a final judgment, which judgment cannot now be made
to speak a different language.[39]
Attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC-Branch 95 in
issuing its Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995, Muoz filed before
this Court a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which was remanded to the Court
of Appeals in observance of the hierarchy of courts, where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 40019. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on September
29, 2000 dismissing Muozs petition. The Court of Appeals agreed with the RTC-
Branch 95 that the spouses Chan could not be covered by the alias writ of execution
considering that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The
cancellation of TCT No. 53297 in the spouses Chans names could not be done apart
from a separate action exclusively for that matter. The spouses Chan are deemed
buyers in good faith and for value as the certificate of title delivered to them by BPI
Family was free from any liens or encumbrances or any mark that would have raised
the spouses Chans suspicions. Every person dealing with registered lands may
safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of the vendor/transferor, and
he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire into the circumstances
culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The Court of Appeals denied
Muozs motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated January 5, 2001.
Muoz comes before this Court via the present consolidated petitions.
Muoz posits that the final judgment and writ of execution of RTC-Branch 95
in Civil Case No. Q-28580 bind not only Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, but
also their successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on their behalf, namely,
BPI Family and spouses Chan. The spouses Chan cannot be deemed innocent
purchasers for value of the property since the cancellation of the adverse claim and
notice of lis pendens on the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977 is completely null and
void.
Muoz further argues that the MeTC Order dated May 16, 1994 in Civil Case
No. 8286 correctly ordered the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
restoring possession of the subject property to her, as she had already acquired
prior possession of the said property upon the execution of the final judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-28580. Also, the spouses Chans petition for certiorari before the RTC-
Branch 88, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632, challenging the Order dated
May 16, 1994 of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 8286, is a prohibited pleading under
the Rules of Summary Procedure; and the RTC-Branch 88 and the Court of Appeals
should be faulted for giving due course to the said petition even in the absence of
jurisdiction.
On the other hand, in their comments to the two petitions at bar, the spouses
Chan, Atty. Yabut, and BPI Family assert that given the peculiar factual
circumstances of the case, RTC-Branch 88 was justified in taking cognizance of
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabuts petition for certiorari in Civil Case No. Q-94-
20632; that Muoz is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC-Branch 88
after participating in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632; that the spouses
Chans title to the subject property is not affected by the final judgment of RTC-
Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and the said judgment cannot be executed
against the spouses Chan since they are neither parties to the case, nor are they
the successors-in-interest, assigns, or persons acting on behalf of Emilia M. Ching
or the spouses Go; that BPI Family and consequently, the spouses Chan, obtained
title to the subject property as innocent purchasers for value, there being no notice
of any infirmity in said title; and that Muoz is guilty of forum shopping for filing her
petition in G.R. No. 146718 even while her petition in G.R. No. 142676 is still
pending.
II
RULING
For the sake of expediency, we will be discussing first the merits of the petition in
G.R. No. 146718.
G.R. No. 146718
Civil Case No. Q-28580 involved Muozs complaint for the annulment of the
deeds of absolute sale dated December 28, 1972[40] and July 16, 1979,[41] the
cancellation of the spouses Gos TCT No. 258977, and the restoration and revival of
Muozs TCT No. 186306. The final judgment of RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-
28580 was in favor of Muoz and against Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go. The
problem arose when during the pendency of the said case, title and possession of
the subject property were transferred from the spouses Go, to BPI Family, and
finally, to the spouses Chan. BPI Family and the spouses Chan were never
impleaded as parties and were not referred to in the dispositive portion of the final
judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
Muoz questions in G.R. No. 146718: (1) the Order dated August 21, 1995 denying
her Motion for Contempt against the spouses Chan, Second Motion for Contempt
against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut, and Motion for an Alias Writ of Execution
and Application for Surrender of the Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 53297; and
(2) the Order dated October 3, 1995 denying her Motion for Clarificatory Order, both
issued by the RTC-Branch 95 in Civil Case No. Q-28580, and upheld by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019. In sum, Muoz was seeking in her
aforementioned motions: (1) a categorical order from the RTC-Branch 95 that the
final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 be executed against the spouses Chan;
and (2) the surrender and cancellation of the spouses Chans TCT No. 53297 and
restoration of Muozs TCT No. 186306.
 There is no merit in Muozs petition in G.R. No. 146718.
Civil Case No. Q-28580 is an action for reconveyance of real
property. In Heirs of Eugenio Lopez, Sr. v. Enriquez,[42] we described an action for
reconveyance as follows:
An action for reconveyance is an action in
personam available to a person whose property has been
wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in anothers
name. Although the decree is recognized as incontrovertible and
no longer open to review, the registered owner is not necessarily
held free from liens. As a remedy, an action for reconveyance is
filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not
with the land registration court. Reconveyance is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent
third person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be
annotated on the certificate of title immediately upon the institution
of the action in court. The notice of lis pendenswill avoid transfer to
an innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real
owner.[43] (Emphases ours.)
The rule is that: (1) a judgment in rem is binding upon the whole world, such
as a judgment in a land registration case or probate of a will; and (2) a judgment in
personam is binding upon the parties and their successors-in-interest but not upon
strangers. A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another
is in personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors-in-interest
by title subsequent to the commencement of the action. An action for declaration of
nullity of title and recovery of ownership of real property, or re-conveyance, is a real
action but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although
it concerns the right to a tangible thing. Any judgment therein is binding only upon
the parties properly impleaded.[44]
Since they were not impleaded as parties and given the opportunity to
participate in Civil Case No. Q-28580, the final judgment in said case cannot bind
BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The effect of the said judgment cannot be
extended to BPI Family and the spouses Chan by simply issuing an alias writ of
execution against them. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is
a stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the
court. In the same manner, a writ of execution can be issued only against a party
and not against one who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest
in an action are bound by the judgment therein and by writs of execution issued
pursuant thereto.[45]
A similar situation existed in Dino v. Court of Appeals,[46] where we resolved
that:
As the registered owner of the subject property, petitioners
are not bound by decision in Civil Case No. R-18073 for they were
never summoned in said case and the notice of lis
pendens annotated on TCT No. 73069 was already cancelled at the
time petitioners purchased the subject property. While it is true that
petitioners are indispensable parties in Civil Case No. R-18073,
without whom no complete relief could be accorded to the private
respondents, the fact still remains that petitioners were never
actually joined as defendants in said case. Impleading petitioners
as additional defendants only in the execution stage of said case
violated petitioners right to due process as no notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the existing certificate of title of said
property nor were petitioners given notice of the pending case,
therefore petitioners remain strangers in said case and the Order of
the trial court involving them is null and void, considering that
petitioners are innocent purchasers of the subject property for
value.[47]
We further stress that Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, clearly provides that [a] certificate of
title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Herein, several
Torrens titles were already issued after the cancellation of Muozs. Certificates of title
had been successively issued to Emilia M. Ching, spouses Go, BPI Family, and
spouses Chan. Civil Case No. Q-28580, in which a final judgment had already been
rendered, specifically challenged the validity of the certificates of title of Emilia M.
Ching and the spouses Go only. To have the present certificate of title of the
spouses Chan cancelled, Muoz must institute another case directly attacking the
validity of the same.
The fact that the titles to the subject property of Emilia M. Ching and the
spouses Go were already declared null and void ab initio by final judgment in Civil
Case No. Q-28580 is not enough, for it does not automatically make the subsequent
titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan correspondingly null and void ab initio.
It has long been ingrained in our jurisprudence that a void title may become
the root of a valid title if the derivative title was obtained in good faith and for
value. Following the principle of indefeasibility of a Torrenstitle, every person dealing
with registered lands may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title of
the vendor/transferor, and he is not required to go beyond the certificate and inquire
into the circumstances culminating in the vendors acquisition of the property. The
rights of innocent third persons who relied on the correctness of the certificate of title
and acquired rights over the property covered thereby cannot be disregarded and
the courts cannot order the cancellation of such certificate for that would impair or
erode public confidence in the Torrens system of land registration.[48]
Hence, we pronounced in Republic v. Agunoy, Sr.[49]:
Here, it bears stressing that, by petitioner's own judicial
admission, the lots in dispute are no longer part of the public
domain, and there are numerous third, fourth, fifth and more parties
holding Torrens titles in their favor and enjoying the presumption
of good faith. This brings to mind what we have reechoed in Pino
v. Court of Appeals and the cases therein cited:
[E]ven on the supposition that the sale was void,
the general rule that the direct result of a previous
illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory that
the spring cannot rise higher than its source)
cannot apply here for We are confronted with the
functionings of the Torrens System of Registration.
The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may
become the ROOT of a valid title if the
certificate of title has already been transferred
from the name of the true owner to the name of
the forger or the name indicated by the
forger.[50] (Emphases ours.)
Although the RTC-Branch 95 had declared with finality in Civil Case No. Q-
28580 that the titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go were null and void, there
is yet no similar determination on the titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan. The
question of whether or not the titles to the subject property of BPI Family and the
spouses Chan are null and void, since they are merely the successors-in-interest,
assigns, or privies of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go, ultimately depends on
the issue of whether or not BPI Family and the spouses Chan obtained their titles to
the subject property in bad faith, i.e., with notice of Muozs adverse claim and
knowledge of the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-28580. The latter is a factual issue
on which we cannot rule in the present petition, not only because we are not a trier
of facts, but more importantly, because it was not among the issues raised and tried
in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
In support of her prayer for an alias writ of execution against BPI Family and
the spouses Go, Muoz cites our ruling in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of Quezon
City,[51] in relation to De la Cruz v. De la Cruz.[52]
De la Cruz is an action for reconveyance of Lot 671 founded on breach of
trust filed by Augustina de la Cruz, et al., against Lucia dela Cruz (Lucia) and Iglesia
Ni Kristo (INK). We upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 671 by Lucia to INK, and
thereby validated the title of INK to the said property.
Calalang actually involved two petitions: (1) a special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition originally filed by Virginia Calalang (Calalang) before
this Court, and (2) a petition for injunction with damages originally filed by Augusto
M. de Leon (De Leon), et al., before the RTC and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
45767. Calalang and De Leon, et al., assert titles that were adverse to that of
INK. De Leon, et al., in particular, claim that their titles to Lot 671 were derived from
Amando Clemente. Calalang and De Leon, et al., sought from the court orders
enjoining INK from building a fence to enclose Lot 671; requiring the Administrator
of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NLTDRA) to
conduct an investigation of the anomaly regarding Lucias reconstituted title to Lot
671; and dismissing the proceedings instituted by the Register of Deeds for the
cancellation of their titles. We dismissed the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et
al., on the ground of res judicata, the legality or validity of the title of INK over Lot 671
had been settled with finality in De la Cruz. De la Cruz was applied to Calalang and
De Leon, et al., since the facts on which such decision was predicated continued to
be the facts on which the petitions of Calalang and De Leon, et al., were based.
Muozs reliance on Calalang is misplaced. There are substantial differences
in the facts and issues involved in Calalang and the present case.
In Calalang, there is duplication or overlapping of certificates of title issued
to different persons over the same property. We already upheld in De la Cruz the
validity of the certificate of title of INK over Lot 671, which effectively prevents us
from recognizing the validity of any other certificate of title over the same property. In
addition, Lucia, the predecessor-in-interest of INK, had her certificate of title
judicially reconstituted. The judicial reconstitution of title is a proceeding in rem,
constituting constructive notice to the whole world. Hence, we rejected the petitions
of Calalang and De Leon, et al., to enjoin INK from building a fence enclosing Lot
671, and the concerned public authorities from instituting appropriate proceedings
to have all other certificates of title over Lot 671 annulled and cancelled.
In the instant case, there has been no duplication or overlapping of
certificates of title. The subject property has always been covered by only one
certificate of title at a time, and at present, such certificate is in the spouses Chans
names. As we have previously discussed herein, Muoz cannot have the spouses
Chans TCT No. 53297 cancelled by a mere motion for the issuance of an alias writ
of execution in Civil Case No. Q-28580, when the spouses Chan were not parties to
the case. Civil Case No. Q-28580 was a proceeding in personam, and the final
judgment rendered therein declaring null and void the titles to the subject property
of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go should bind only the parties
thereto. Furthermore, despite the void titles of Emilia M. Ching and the spouses Go,
the derivative titles of BPI Family and the spouses Chan may still be valid provided
that they had acquired the same in good faith and for value.
More in point with the instant petition is Pineda v. Santiago.[53] Pineda still
involved Lot 671. INK sought from the RTC a second alias writ of execution to
implement the judgment in Calalang against Conrado Pineda (Pineda), et. al. In
opposing the issuance of such writ, Pineda, et al., asserted that they held titles
to Lot 671 adverse to those of Lucia and INK and that they were not parties in De la
Cruz or in Calalang. In its assailed order, the RTC granted the second alias writ of
execution on the basis that the issue of ownership of Lot 671 was already
determined with finality in favor of Lucia and INK. The writ ordered the deputy sheriff
to eject Pineda, et al., from Lot 671. When the matter was brought before us, we
annulled the assailed order as the writ of execution issued was against Pineda, et
al., who were not parties to Civil Case No. Q-45767, the ejectment suit instituted by
De Leon, et al. We elaborated in Pineda that:
Being a suit for injunction, Civil Case No. Q-45767 partakes
of an action in personam. In Domagas v. Jensen, we have
explained the nature of an action in personam and enumerated
some actions and proceedings which are in personam, viz:
The settled rule is that the aim and object
of an action determine its character. Whether a
proceeding is in rem, or in personam, or quasi in
rem for that matter, is determined by its nature and
purpose, and by these only. A proceeding in
personam is a proceeding to enforce personal
rights and obligations brought against the person
and is based on the jurisdiction of the person,
although it may involve his right to, or the exercise
of ownership of, specific property, or seek to
compel him to control or dispose of it in accordance
with the mandate of the court. The purpose of a
proceeding in personam is to impose, through
the judgment of a court, some responsibility or
liability directly upon the person of the
defendant. Of this character are suits to compel a
defendant to specifically perform some act or
actions to fasten a pecuniary liability on him. An
action in personam is said to be one which has
for its object a judgment against the person, as
distinguished from a judgment against the
propriety to determine its state. It has been held
that an action in personam is a proceeding to
enforce personal rights or obligations; such
action is brought against the person. As far as
suits for injunctive relief are concerned, it is well-
settled that it is an injunctive act in personam.
In Combs v. Combs, the appellate court held that
proceedings to enforce personal rights and
obligations and in which personal judgments are
rendered adjusting the rights and obligations
between the affected parties is in
personam. Actions for recovery of real property
are in personam.
The respondent judge's jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to
the parties in the injunction suit. To stress, the petition for injunction,
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-45767, was filed only by therein
petitioners Augusto M. de Leon, Jose de Castro, Jose A. Panlilio,
Felicidad Vergara Vda. De Pineda, Fernando L. Vitug I, Fernando
M. Vitug II, Fernando M. Vitug III, and Faustino Tobia, and later
amended to include Elena Ostrea and Feliza C. Cristobal-Generoso
as additional petitioners therein, against Bishop Erao Manalo, in his
capacity as titular and spiritual head of I.N.K. Herein
petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. never became parties thereto.
Any and all orders and writs of execution, which the respondent
judge may issue in that case can, therefore, be enforced only
against those parties and not against the herein
petitioners Conrado Pineda, et al. In issuing the assailed Order
dated 22 April 1998, which directed the issuance of the 2nd Alias
Writ of Execution to eject non-parties (herein petitioners), the
respondent judge clearly went out of bounds and committed grave
abuse of discretion.
The nature of the injunction suit Civil Case No. Q-45767 as
an action in personam in the RTC remains to be the same whether
it is elevated to the CA or to this Court for review. An action in
personam does not become an action in remjust because a
pronouncement confirming I.N.K.'s title to Lot 671 was made by this
 Court in the Calalang decision. Final rulings may be made by this G.R. No. 142676
Court, as the Highest Court of the Land, in actions in
personam but such rulings are binding only as against the
parties therein and not against the whole world. Here lies G.R. No. 142676 is Muozs appeal of the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286,
another grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
judge when he relied on the Calalang decision in his assailed Order the forcible entry case she instituted against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut
dated 07 May 1998 as if it were binding against the whole world, before the MeTC.
saying:

After evaluating the arguments of both

There is forcible entry or desahucio when one is deprived of physical
parties, decisive on the incident is the decision of
the Supreme Court in favor of the respondent possession of land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
I.N.K., represented by its titular and spiritual head
stealth. In such cases, the possession is illegal from the beginning and the basic
Bishop Erao G. Manalo, sustaining its ownership
over the subject Lot 671. This Court could do no inquiry centers on who has the prior possession de facto. In filing forcible entry
less but to follow and give substantial meaning to
its ownership which shall include all dominical cases, the law tells us that two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to
rights by way of a Writ of Execution. To delay the acquire jurisdiction: first, the plaintiff must allege prior physical possession of the
issuance of such writ is a denial of justice due the
I.N.K. property, and second, he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession
by any of the means provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, i.e., by
As a final word, this decision shall not be
misinterpreted as disturbing or modifying our ruling force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. It is also settled that in the resolution
in Calalang. The final ruling on I.N.K.'s ownership and title is
thereof, what is important is determining who is entitled to the physical possession
not at all affected. Private respondent I.N.K., as the true and
lawful owner of Lot 671 as ruled by the Court in Calalang, of the property. Indeed, any of the parties who can prove prior possession de
simply has to file the proper action against the herein
petitioners to enforce its property rights within the bounds of facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself since such
the law and our rules. I.N.K.'s recourse of asking for the issuance cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs
of an alias writ of execution against the petitioners in Civil Case No.
Q-45767 and the respondent judge's orders in said case, granting merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof.[55]
I.N.K.'s prayer and enforcing the alias writ of execution against the
present petitioners, constitutes blatant disregard of very
fundamental rules and must therefore be stricken Title is never in issue in a forcible entry case, the court should base its
down.[54] (Emphases ours.)
decision on who had prior physical possession. The main thing to be proven in an
action for forcible entry is prior possession and that same was lost through force,
Consistent with Pineda, and as appositely recommended by the RTC-
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth, so that it behooves the court to restore
Branch 95 and the Court of Appeals in the present case, Muozs legal remedy is to
directly assail in a separate action the validity of the certificates of title of BPI Family possession regardless of title or ownership.[56]
and the spouses Chan.

We more extensively discussed in Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals[57] that:

 Ownership or the right to possess arising from
ownership is not at issue in an action for recovery of
possession. The parties cannot present evidence to prove
ownership or right to legal possession except to prove the nature of
the possession when necessary to resolve the issue of physical
possession. The same is true when the defendant asserts the
absence of title over the property. The absence of title over the
contested lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief
from the parties in an ejectment case.
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment
proceedings is - who is entitled to the physical possession of the
premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the
possession de jure. It does not even matter if a partys title to the
property is questionable, or when both parties intruded into public
land and their applications to own the land have yet to be approved
by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable
quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand,
violence or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property
allowed. Courts will always uphold respect for prior
possession.
Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can
recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession, if
he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until a person with
a better right lawfully ejects him. To repeat, the only issue that
the court has to settle in an ejectment suit is the right to physical
possession.[58] (Emphases ours.)
Based on the foregoing, we find that the RTC-Branch 88 erred in ordering
the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286 even before completion of the proceedings
before the MeTC. At the time said case was ordered dismissed by RTC-Branch 88,
the MeTC had only gone so far as holding a hearing on and eventually granting
Muozs prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
Muoz alleges in her complaint in Civil Case No. 8286 that she had been in
prior possession of the subject property since it was turned-over to her by the sheriff
on January 10, 1994, pursuant to the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the RTC-
Branch 95 to implement the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. The factual
issue of who was in prior possession of the subject property should be litigated
between the parties regardless of whether or not the final judgment in Civil Case No.
Q-28580 extended to the spouses Chan. Hence, the pendency of the latter issue in
Civil Case No. Q-28580 before the RTC-Branch 95 did not warrant the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC on the ground of litis pendentia. The two cases
could proceed independently of one another.
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut aver that the spouses Chan have never
lost possession of the subject property since acquiring the same from BPI Family in
1990. This is a worthy defense to Muozs complaint for forcible entry, which Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut should substantiate with evidence in the continuation of
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 8286 before the MeTC.
In addition, Civil Case No. 8286, a forcible entry case, is governed by the
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 19 whereof provides:
SEC. 19. Prohibited pleadings and motions. The following
pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases
covered by this Rule:
xxxx
(g) Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court.
The purpose of the Rule on Summary Procedure is to achieve an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical
rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rule prohibits petitions for certiorari, like a
number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite
the disposition of cases.[59]
 Interlocutory orders are those that determine incidental matters that do not recover damages if she is able to prove wrongful deprivation of possession of the
touch on the merits of the case or put an end to the proceedings.[60] An order granting subject property from February 2, 1994 until the finality of this decision in G.R. No.
a preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, is interlocutory and 146718.
unappealable.[61]

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the MeTC in its Order
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we:
dated May 16, 1994, directing that Muoz be placed in possession of the subject
property during the course of Civil Case No. 8286, is an interlocutory order. Samuel
Go Chan and Atty. Yabut assailed the said order before the RTC-Branch 88 via a
petition for certiorari, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. The RTC-Branch 88 (1) GRANT Emerita Muozs petition in G.R. No. 142676. We REVERSE and SET
gave due course to said petition, and not only declared the MeTC Order dated May
16, 1994 null and void, but went further by dismissing Civil Case No. 8286. ASIDE the Decision dated July 21, 1995 and Resolution dated March 9, 2000 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35322, which affirmed the Orders dated June
The prohibition in Section 19(g) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
is plain enough. Its further exposition is unnecessary verbiage.[62] The petition 10, 1994 and August 5, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88 of Quezon City
for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 is
clearly covered by the said prohibition, thus, it should have been dismissed outright in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632. We DIRECT the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33
by the RTC-Branch 88. While the circumstances involved in Muozs forcible entry
case against Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut are admittedly very peculiar, these of Quezon City to reinstate Emerita Muozs complaint for forcible entry in Civil Case
are insufficient to except the petition for certiorari of Samuel Go Chan and Atty.
No. 8286 and to resume the proceedings only to determine whether or not Emerita
Yabut in Civil Case No. Q-94-20632 from the prohibition. The liberality in the
interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under Muoz was forcibly deprived of possession of the subject property from February 2,
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance 1994 until finality of this judgment, and if so, whether or not she is entitled to an
with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.[63] award for damages for deprivation of possession during the aforementioned period

of time; and
Nonetheless, even though the peculiar circumstances extant herein do not
justify the dismissal of Civil Case No. 8286, they do require limiting pro hac vice the
reliefs the MeTC may accord to Muoz in the event that she is able to successfully
prove forcible entry by Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut into the subject property (2) DENY Emerita Munozs petition in G.R. No. 146718 for lack of merit,
(i.e., that the sheriff actually turned-over to Muoz the possession of the subject
property on January 10, 1994, and that she was deprived of such possession by and AFFIRM the Decision dated September 29, 2000 and Resolution dated January
Samuel Go Chan and Atty. Yabut on February 2, 1994 by means of force,
5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40019, which in turn, affirmed
intimidation, threat, strategy, and stealth). Taking into account our ruling in G.R. No.
146718 that the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580 does not extend to the the Orders dated August 21, 1995 and October 3, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court,
spouses Chan, who were not impleaded as parties to the said case the MeTC is
precluded from granting to Muoz relief, whether preliminary or final, that will Branch 95 of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-28580.
give her possession of the subject property. Otherwise, we will be perpetuating
the wrongful execution of the final judgment in Civil Case No. Q-28580. Based on No pronouncement as to costs.
the same reason, Muoz can no longer insist on the reinstatement of the MeTC Order
dated May 16, 1994 granting a preliminary mandatory injunction that puts her in SO ORDERED.
possession of the subject property during the course of the trial. Muoz though may