RULE 23- DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION

G.R. No. 159127 March 3, 2008

RAMON GERARDO B. SAN LUIS, petitioner, vs. HON. PABLITO M. ROJAS in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, RTC. Br. 70, Pasig City and BERDEX INTERNATIONAL INC., respondents*.

FACTS:

Berdex International, Inc. (private respondent) filed with RTC a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner alleging that: it is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the USA with
principal office in San Francisco, California, and in a transaction with petitioner, he received from it
money partly as advances or loan and partly for the purchase of 40% shares however, not a single share
in those corporations was transferred to it and petitioner failed to pay the entire amount of loan despite
repeated demands. Private respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the amount of
US$150,335.75 plus interest until fully paid and attorney's fees.

Private respondent filed a MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written

Interrogatories) alleging that initial presentation of its evidence is set, however, all of its witnesses are
Americans who reside or hold office in the USA; that one of the witnesses is already of advanced age
and travel to the Philippines may be extremely difficult if not dangerous; that written interrogatories are
ideal in this case since the factual issues are already very few; that such mode of deposition-taking will
save precious judicial and government time and will prevent needless delays in the case.

However, petitioner opposed and contends: Taking the deposition through written interrogatories
would deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and demeanor of witnesses.
Petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be limited to cross-
interrogatories which will severely limit not only the scope but the spontaneity of his cross-examination.
It is doubtful whether the witnesses will give their deposition under sanction of the penalties prescribed
by Philippine law for perjury.

RTC granted private respondent's Motion, as it found the same appropriate and sanctioned by the rules
on deposition-taking. Petitioner's MR was denied. Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari.
CA dismissed the petition. CA denied petitioner's MR. Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether there will be grave injustice if private respondent, a non-resident foreign corp. will be allowed
to prove the existence of an oral contract through deposition by written interrogatories
HELD:

NO. Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can
avail of deposition. The fact that private respondent is a non-resident foreign corporation is
immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon
oral examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party. Depositions serve as a device
for ascertaining the facts relative to the issues of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts
before civil trials and thus prevent the said trials from being carried out in the dark.

Depositions may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand by the
proponent, under certain conditions and exceptional situations governed by Section 4, Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court.

“SEC 4. Use of depositions. — x x x . . .(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: x x x . . . (2) that the witness if out of the province
and at a greater distance than fifty25 (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the deposition; x x x
. . .”

Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in granting private respondent's
MOTION (To Allow Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering private
respondent's allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all Americans residing in the U.S. This
situation is one of the exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court.

It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment and should not be unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and
not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.
G.R. No. 136051 June 8, 2006
ALFREDO P. ROSETE, OSCAR P. MAPALO and CHITO P. ROSETE, Petitioners,
vs. JULIANO LIM and LILIA LIM, Respondents.

FACTS:

Respondents Juliano and Lilia Lim filed a Complaint in RTC Quezon City for Annulment, Specific
Performance with Damages against AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS), Espreme
Realty and Development Corporation (Espreme Realty), Alfredo P. Rosete, Maj. Oscar Mapalo, Chito P.
Rosete, Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), and Register of Deeds of the Province of Mindoro Occidental.
It asked, among other things, that the Deed of Sale executed by AFP-RSBS covering certain parcels of lands
in favor of Espreme Realty and the titles thereof under the name of the latter be annulled; and that the
AFP-RSBS and Espreme Realty be ordered to execute the necessary documents to restore ownership and
title of said lands to respondents, and that the Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the titles of said
land under the name of Espreme Realty and to transfer the same in the names of respondents.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action or suit and that venue has been improperly laid. The Motions to Dismiss filed by all
the defendants were denied. Respondents filed a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination giving
notice that on June 18 and 20, 1997 at 9:00 a.m., they will cause the deposition of petitioners Oscar
Mapalo and Chito Rosete. Petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion and Objection to Take Deposition
Upon Oral Examination. They argued that the deposition may not be taken without leave of court as no
answer has yet been served and the issues have not yet been joined since their Answer was filed ex
abudanti cautela. Moreover, they contend that since there are two criminal cases pending before the City
Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City and Pasig City involving the same set of facts as in the present case
wherein respondent Juliano Lim is the private complainant and petitioners are the respondents, to permit
the taking of the deposition would be violative of their right against self-incrimination because by means
of the oral deposition, respondents would seek to establish the allegations of fact in the complaint which
are also the allegations of fact in the complaint-affidavits in the said criminal cases. The lower court denied
petitioners’ motion and objection to take deposition upon oral examination, and scheduled the taking
thereof.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the taking of Oral Deposition of the petitioners would violate their right against self
incrimintion.
2. Whether or not the court erred in declaring in its order that notice to take deposition upon oral
examination need not be with leave of court.

HELD:

1. No. The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against himself"
signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the criminal case in which he is the
accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or
order of the Court. He cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused,
or even for himself. In other words – unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who may be
compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a particular incriminatory
question at the time it is put to him – the defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether.
He can refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. In the present controversy, the
case is civil it being a suit for Annulment, Specific Performance with Damages. In order for petitioners to
exercise the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions, the case must partake
of the nature of a criminal proceeding. The case on hand certainly cannot be categorized as such. The fact
that there are two criminal cases pending which are allegedly based on the same set of facts as that of
the civil case will not give them the right to refuse to take the witness stand and to give their depositions.
They are not facing criminal charges in the civil case. Like an ordinary witness, they can invoke the right
against self-incrimination only when the incriminating question is actually asked of them. Only if and when
incriminating questions are thrown their way can they refuse to answer on the ground of their right
against self-incrimination.

2. No. Section 1 of Rule 24 of the Revised Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. – By leave of court after jurisdiction has been
obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave
after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at
the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories.

From the quoted section, it is evident that once an answer has been served, the testimony of a person,
whether a party or not, may be taken by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories. In
the case before us, petitioners contend they have not yet served an answer to respondents because the
answers that they have filed with the trial court were made ex abudanti cautela. In other words, they do
not consider the answers they filed in court and served on respondents as answers contemplated by the
Rules of Court on the ground that same were filed ex abudanti cautela.

Ex abudanti cautela means "out of abundant caution" or "to be on the safe side." An answer ex abudanti
cautela does not make their answer less of an answer. A cursory look at the answers filed by petitioners
shows that they contain their respective defenses. An answer is a pleading in which a defending party sets
forth his defenses and the failure to file one within the time allowed herefore may cause a defending party
to be declared in default. Thus, petitioners, knowing fully well the effect of the non-filing of an answer,
filed their answers despite the pendency of their appeal with the Court of Appeals on the denial of their
motion to dismiss.
Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. v. Sps. Mangudadatu

Panganiban; Aug. 16, 2004

Facts

-(Respondent) Spouses Suharto and Miriam Sangki Mangudadatu filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
a Complaint for damages against (Petitioner) Jonathan Landoil International Co., Inc. ("JLI"). Initially,
petitioner had countered with a Motion to Dismiss; but when this was denied, it filed its Answer.

-Parties submitted their respective Pretrial Briefs. Trial proceeded without the participation of petitioner,
whose absence during the pretrial, had led the trial court to declare it in default.

-Petitioner received a copy of the RTC’s Decision dated June 19, 2001. It filed an Omnibus Motion for New
Trial and Change of Venue. It was denied.

-Petitioner received a copy of a Writ of Execution. Alleging that it had yet to receive a copy of an Order
resolving the Omnibus Motion for New Trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.
Later on counsels of petitioner, Attys. Jaime L. Mario Jr. and Dioscoro G. Peligro -- submitted separate
withdrawals of appearance. The law firm Ong Abad Santos & Meneses filed an Entry of Appearance with
Supplement to Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution.

-Petitioner received a Sheriff’s Notice regarding the public auction sale of its properties. By reason of the
immediate threat to implement the Writ of Execution, it filed with the CA on January 14, 2002, a Petition
for Prohibition seeking to enjoin the enforcement of the Writ until the resolution of the Motion to Quash.

-Petitioner received a copy of respondents’ Vigorous Opposition (Re: Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of
Execution, and its Supplement). Attached to this pleading were two separate Certifications supposedly
issued by the postmaster of Tacurong City, affirming that the Order denying the Motion for New Trial had
been received by petitioner’s two previous counsels of record. The Certification pertaining to Atty. Peligro
alleged that a certain Michelle Viquira had received on October 19, 2001, a copy of the Order intended
for him. The Certification as regards Atty. Mario stated that he had personally received his copy on
December 21, 2001.

-Petitioner personally served counsel for respondents a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
of Attys. Mario and Peligro. The Deposition was intended to prove that petitioner had not received a copy
of the Order denying the Omnibus Motion for New Trial.

-RTC Petition for Prohibition denied.

-Motion to Quash denied by RTC.

-CA denied the petition.

The Issues

1. WON the RTC/CA erred in declaring that the taking of the depositions of petitioner’s witnesses was
improper

Held:

1. Yes they erred but the RTC did not totally disregard petitioner’s depositions. In its February 21, 2001
Resolution, the trial court considered and weighed -- against all other evidence -- that its Order denying
the Motion for New Trial filed by petitioner had not been received by the latter’s counsels. Despite their
depositions, petitioner failed to prove convincingly its denial of receipt.

-A deposition may be taken with leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or over property that is the subject of the action; or, without such leave, after an answer has been served.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to supplement the pleadings
for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and affording an adequate
factual basis during the preparation for trial. The liberty of a party to avail itself of this procedure, as an
attribute of discovery, is "well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and
not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of the law." Limitations would
arise, though, if the examination is conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass,
or oppress the person who is the subject of the inquiry; or when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant
or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege.

As a mode of discovery resorted to before trial, deposition has advantages, as follows:

-1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and in checking and preventing perjury.

-2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.

-3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could
not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes not at all.

-4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses, thereby
encouraging settlements out of court.

-5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many
cases by settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried.

-6. It safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to
be tried, thereby expediting the trial.

-7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of cases.

The Rules of Court and jurisprudence, however, do not restrict a deposition to the sole function of being
a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes, it may be
taken even after trial has commenced and may be used without the deponent being actually called to the
witness stand. In Dasmariñas Garments v. Reyes, we allowed the taking of the witnesses’ testimonies
through deposition, in lieu of their actual presence at the trial.

Thus, "[ depositions may be taken at any time after the institution of any action, whenever necessary or
convenient. There is no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition against the taking of depositions after pre-trial." There can be no valid objection to allowing
them during the process of executing final and executory judgments, when the material issues of fact have
become numerous or complicated.

In keeping with the principle of promoting the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action
and proceeding, depositions are allowed as a "departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings
of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the trial judge."
Depositions are allowed, provided they are taken in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court
(that is, with leave of court if the summons have been served, without leave of court if an answer has
been submitted); and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility exists (Section 4, Rule
23, Rules of Court).

The Rules of Court vests in the trial court the discretion to order whether a deposition may be taken or
not under specified circumstances that may even differ from those the proponents have intended.
However, it is well-settled that this discretion is not

unlimited. It must be exercised -- not arbitrarily, capriciously or oppressively -- but in a reasonable manner
and in consonance with the spirit of the law, to the end that its purpose may be attained.

When a deposition does not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause
material injury to the adverse party, its taking should not be allowed. This was the primary concern in
Northwest Airlines v. Cruz. In that case, the ends of justice would be better served if the witness was to
be brought to the trial court to testify. The locus of the oral deposition therein was not within the reach
of ordinary citizens, as there were time constraints; and the trip required a travel visa, bookings, and a
substantial travel fare. In People v. Webb, the taking of depositions was unnecessary, since the trial court
had already admitted the Exhibits on which the witnesses would have testified.

The Rules of Court provides adequate safeguards to ensure the reliability of depositions. The right to
object to their admissibility is retained by the parties, for the same reasons as those for excluding evidence
if the witness were present and had testified in court; and for errors and irregularities in the deposition.
As a rule, depositions should be allowed, absent any showing that taking them would prejudice any party.

Depositions may be used for the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under
the circumstances specified under Rule 23 Sec. 4 the case involved a circumstance that fell under the
above-cited Section 4(c)(2) of Rule 23 -- the witnesses of petitioner in Metro Manila resided beyond 100
kilometers from Sultan Kudarat, the place of hearing. Petitioner offered the depositions in support of its
Motion to Quash (the Writ of Execution) and for the purpose of proving that the trial court’s Decision was
not yet final. As previously explained, despite the fact that trial has already been terminated, a deposition
can still be properly taken.
DASMARINAS GARMENTS INC. VS. REYES

FACTS:

American President Lines, Ltd. (APL) filed a complaint in the RTC for sum of moneyagainst Dasmarinas
Garments Inc. (Dasmarinas), and attorney’s fees. Dasmarinas answered denying all liability with APL. On
May 3, instead of presenting its two witnesses, APL prayed that it be allowed the issuance of Letters
Rogatory to take depositions of two Taiwan Nationals. The RTC resolved the rogatory issue in favor of APL,
and the deposition will be coursed through a private entity Asian Exchange Center, Inc. (AEC). MR by
Dasmarinas was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not foreign depositions may be taken by a private entity.

HELD:

Yes, but with qualifications.

Since Philippines doesn’t have a consulate in Taiwan because of the Philippines’ One China Policy, it would
have no embassy or consulate in Taiwan. Foreign depositions may thus be taken under Letters Rogatory
as provided for in Rule 24 ROC. Here, it appears that the letters rogatory will be coursed through the DFA
to its proper representative, the private entity AEC.
G.R. No. 71388 September 23, 1986

MARIA MONSERRAT R. KOH, petitioner,

vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. JOB. B. MADAYAG in his capacity as the
Presiding Judge, of Branch CXLV, Regional Trial Court of Makati, et al., respondents.

FACTS:
On June 15, 1983, respondent First Interstate Bank of California filed a Complaint against petitioner to
recover the sum of US-$7,434.90 or its equivalent in Philippine Currency which, due to a computer error,
it had overpaid to her on October 8, 1981. The Complaint alleged that on September 30, 1981,
petitioner's father sent her US-$500.00 through the Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company which was the
remitting bank of respondent Bank. But due to computer mistake, respondent Bank's Los Angeles Office
erroneously overstated the amount to US-$8,500.00 instead of US-$500.00, and as a consequence
respondent Bank issued and delivered to petitioner Cashier Check No. 1217681 amounting to US-
$8,500.00 dated October 8, 1981 which petitioner deposited to her account and subsequently withdrew.

In her Answer dated August 17, 1983, petitioner admitted the above-stated allegations in the Complaint
and alleged that immediately after receipt of a formal demand letter to return the overpayment, she
offered to pay respondent Bank through its lawyer in installments of $100.00 a month but the offer was
unreasonably rejected.

On August 19, 1983, Mr. E.R. Belen, Officer-in-Charge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 141,
sent a "NOTICE OF CASE STATUS" to the parties through their respective lawyers. Said notice stated the
following:

“... the cases will be scheduled for pre-trial conference only after Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, and
29-where applicable, necessary and or feasible have been resorted to by the parties.

xxx

If a party believes that those modes of discovery are not applicable, necessary or feasible with
respect to him, he shall file a manifestation to that effect.

xxx

If, after 30 days from receipt of this notice, no such manifestation has been filed, the case shall
be archived or dismissed as the case may be.”

No manifestation was filed by the parties' lawyers. On November 29, 1983, the presiding Judge (not
respondent Judge), issued the following order: “For non-compliance with the Order (Notice of Case
Status) dated August 19, 1983, more particularly the last paragraph thereof, this case is hereby
dismissed.”
On July 4, 1984, respondent Bank, through a new counsel, refiled its complaint which was assigned to
Branch 143 of the RTC of Makati presided over by respondent Judge. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of res adjudicata, which was opposed by respondent Bank.

On August 27, 1984, respondent Judge denied the motion to dismiss and on November 27, 1984, he
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, on the following grounds:

(1) The dismissal was too drastic and was tantamount to depriving the plaintiff of its day in
court.

(2) Notwithstanding the failure of the parties in said case to comply with said notice of case
status, the court (Branch 141) should have set the case for pre-trial conference since the last
pleading had been filed and there are no other conditions to be complied with before any case
is calendared for pre-trial under Section 1 of Rule 20.

(3) It would be better for the defendant to have a definite and clear-cut decision as to her
liability or non-liability, instead of winning a case on a technicality.

On May 8, 1985, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Intermediate Appellate Court praying
that the orders denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration be set aside as null
and void and that the complaint be ordered dismissed. On May 21, 1985, the appellate court, finding no
merit to the petition, resolved not to give it due course.

Petitioner has appealed by certiorari to this Court.

ISSUE:

WON the IAC was correct in denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

HELD:

YES. As the appellate court correctly held, the "notice of case status" was not an order of the court. It
was signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge. Even the warning in the notice (that if no such
manifestation has been filed after 30 days from receipt the case shall be archived or dismissed as the
case may be) was ambiguous. The failure of the parties to heed the warning did not constitute
disobedience of a lawful order of the court. Consequently, the order of dismissal could not have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits.

The order of dismissal of Judge Elbiñas in Civil Case No. 4272 (Annex F) was null and void for lack of legal
basis. Since the order of dismissal was null and void, it did not have the force of a judgment. It did not
constitute a bar to the refiling of the bank's complaint. Respondent Judge did not err, or abuse his
discretion, in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 7765. (pp. 35-36, Record)

Indeed, with the admission in petitioner's Answer of the allegations in the Complaint that due to
computer error there was an overpayment to her of the amount of US-$8,000.00, coupled with her offer
to pay respondent Bank the amount of the overpayment in installments of $100.00 a month, we cannot
find any justification for ruling that the order dismissing the first complaint operated as an adjudication
on the merits or constituted a bar to the second complaint.

Trial judges should encourage the proper utilization of the rules on discovery. However, recourse to
discovery procedures is not mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to such procedures, the
pre-trial conference should be set pursuant to the mandatory provisions of Section 1 of Rule 20.

The Court affirms the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court which dismissed the petition for
certiorari filed by petitioner against respondent Judge Job B. Madayag of the RTC of Makati and
respondent First Interstate Bank of California.
AURELIO DE LOS REYES and ROGELIO DE LOS REYES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, WONG
CHUKING and LA CAMPANA FABRICA DE TABACOS, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Rogelio de los Reyes and Aurelio de los Reyes filed two separate complaints against the herein
private respondents with the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Private respondents filed their respective
Answers with counterclaims.

Before the trial court set a date for the hearing of the civil cases, petitioners served notice upon the
counsel of respondent Wong Chu King that they would take the deposition of defendant-respondent
Wong Chu King, a resident of Makati, Rizal, upon oral examination, pursuant to the provision of Section
1, Rule 24 of the revised Rules of Court, at the Office of the Municipal Secretary of Makati, Rizal, the oral
examination to continue from day to day until completed.

Petitioners caused the issuance by the trial court, through its Deputy Clerk of Court, of a subpoena to
defendant-respondent Wong Chu King and a subpoena duces tecum to the President of respondent La Ca
mpana Fabrica de Tabacos, Inc., or his duly authorized representative, commanding them to appear on
said date, time, place before the Notary Public mentioned in the Notice To Take Deposition Upon Oral
Examination, dated July 30 ,1966.

Private respondents’ counsel sent a telegram to the counsel of the petitioners requesting postponement
of the taking of the deposition which was denied and refused.

The date set for the taking of the deposition while counsel for the petitioners was waiting for the
prospective deponent in the Office of the Notary Public before whom the deposition would be taken, he
(counsel for petitioners) received from one of the lawyers for the private respondents an Ex Parte Urgent
Motion asking the trial court to relieve the defendants-respondents from attending the taking of the
deposition scheduled on the same date.

Petitioners filed a motion citing defendants-respondents for contempt for their failure to appear during
the scheduled taking of deposition and an Opposition to the ex-parte urgent motion. The Trial Court
denied the motion to declare the defendants-respondents in default and in contempt of court and at the
same time directed the plaintiffs-petitioners to submit instead written interrogatories before the Court
would determine the date when the deposition could be held and taken.

Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals an action for certiorari with preliminary injunction. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction or authority when he issued the Order of
August 23, 1966, directing the plaintiffs, now petitioners, to submit instead written interrogatories within
10 days from receipt of the order before the Court could definitely determine the date when the
deposition would be held.
RULING:

We cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ view that the choice as to the mode of taking the testimony of a
deponent, whether upon oral examination or written interrogatories, rests exclusively upon the party
exercising such right. If the theory advanced by the petitioners were to be adopted, the exercise of this
right is bound to be abused and utilized for harassment. It is for this reason that Sections 16 and 18, Rule
24, of the Rules of Court, were incorporated to serve as safeguards and protection from abuse. A trial
Judge must possess certain measure of control over the right of parties in the taking of depositions in
order to prevent abuse.

Under Section 16 of the Rules of Court, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make
an order that the deposition be taken only on written interrogatories. Evidently the trial court exercises a
certain degree of discretion in connection with the taking of a deposition.
G.R. No. 153667. August 11, 2005

AYALA LAND, INC., Petitioners, vs. HON. LUCENITO N. TAGLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-
Imus, Branch 20, ASB REALTY CORP., and E. M. RAMOS & SONS, INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and E. M. Ramos and Sons, Inc. (EMRASON) filed a complaint against Ayala
Land, Inc. (ALI) for nullification of Contract to Sell Real Properties, Cancellation of Annotations on Transfer
Certificates of Title and Damages. Plaintiff ASB subsequently filed a Motion for Leave to take testimony
by deposition upon oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., citing Section 4(c), Rule 24 of the Revised
Rules of Court stating that Emerito Ramos, Sr. was already 87 years old and although he was of sound
mind there is always the possibility that he may not be able to testify on plaintiff’s behalf in the course of
the trial on the merits. The trial court granted plaintiff’s motion and ASB obtained the deposition upon
oral examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr. on six different occasions. Upon termination of Emerito Ramos,
Sr.’s direct testimony by deposition, both plaintiffs and defendants agreed that the cross-examination be
scheduled. However, ALI filed a "Motion to Resolve Objections (In deposition proceedings with Omnibus
Motion)" on the propriety, admissibility and conformity of the deposition proceedings to the Rules.

The trial court upheld the propriety of the presentation of evidence made by plaintiff through deposition
and directed that the cross-examination of Emerito Ramos, Sr., be scheduled.

Thereafter, ALI filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to restrain the
public respondent, Judge Lucenito Tagle, from implementing the Order to declare null and void. The Court
of Appeals rendered its decision denying due course and dismissing the petition of ALI.

Hence this Petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alleged deposition of the witness Emerito M. Ramos, Sr. is admissible under the rules.

HELD:

Yes. In this case, the court permitted the taking of Emerito Ramos, Sr.’s deposition chiefly because of his
advance age which ground is considered valid and justified under the Rules of Court. Also, It must be noted
that the depositions of Emerito Ramos, Sr., were substantially made in accordance with the requirements
of the Rules. In fact, in its Petition before the Court of Appeals, ALI confirmed the taking of deposition on
said dates and that it was duly represented by its counsel during the proceedings. It is not disputed that
the deposition was taken inside the courtroom of the trial court, before the clerk of court. A stenographer
was present, tape recorders and a video camera were even utilized to record the proceedings, in the
presence of all the opposing counsels of record including ALI’s. Strict compliance with the formal
requirements of Rule 23 would hold true in cases of depositions taken outside the Court. The rules on
discovery should not be unduly restricted; otherwise, the perceived advantage of a liberal discovery
procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.

Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP., and YU HE CHING, Petitioners, vs. LEY CONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., and PRINCETON DEVELOPMENT CORP., Respondents. G.R. No. 147143,
March 10, 2006

Facts:

Respondent Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages with the RTC of Makati, against petitioner Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing
Corporation claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real
property in Makati in favor of LCDC despite LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price of P2,634,000.00;
and that Hyatt failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC’s payment of 40% of
the pre-construction cost.

LCDC filed an amended complaint impleading Princeton Development Corporation as additional

defendant claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton in fraud of LCDC. On a later date,
LCDC filed a second amended complaint adding as defendant, Yu He Ching (Yu), President of Hyatt,
alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price of P2,634,000.00 to Hyatt through Yu.

Responsive pleadings were filed and LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go,
Account Officer of RCBC; and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition
of Manuel Ley, President of LCDC, while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and Janet
Ley. The RTC ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.

At the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all settings for depositions be
disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that the taking of depositions only delay the
resolution of the case. The RTC agreed and on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-
trial to take place.

LCDC contends, among others, that the mere fact that a deponent will be called to the witness stand
during trial is not a ground to deny LCDC the right to discovery and does not cause "unnecessary duplicity",
otherwise no deposition can ever be taken.

Issue: Whether or not the cancellation of the depositions by the RTC were proper.

Ruling: No. The cancellation of the depositions were improper.

A deposition should be allowed, absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any party. It is accorded
a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the
matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and
within the bounds of law.

Further, Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court provides: Depositions pending action, when may be
taken.--- By leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which
is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the use of a
subpoena as provided in Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these Rules. The
deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by leave of court on such terms as the court
prescribes.

As correctly observed by the CA, LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to
take depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served. LCDC having complied with the
rules then prevailing, the trial court, thus, erred in canceling the previously scheduled depositions.
FORTUNE CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108119; January 19, 1994

Facts:

An action for breach of contract was filed by petitioner Fortune Corporation against respondent Inter-
Merchants Corporation, docketed as Civil Case No. SP-3469. After respondent corporation had filed its
Answer, petitioner served the former with written interrogatories pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court. The interrogatories were answered by respondent corporation through its board chairman, Juanito
A. Teope. Petitioner served upon private respondent a Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination
in accordance with Section 15, Rule 24.

Private respondent filed an Urgent Motion Not To Take Deposition/Vehement Opposition to Plaintiff's
Notice to Take Deposition Upon Oral Examination, dated March 27, 1992, alleging inter alia that : (a)
herein petitioner has previously availed of one mode of discovery, that is, the written interrogatories
which practically covered all the claims, counterclaims and defenses in the case; (b) there is absolutely no
sound reason or justification advanced for the taking of the oral deposition; (c) such taking would cause
annoyance, embarrassment and oppression upon the prospective deponent, Juanito A. Teope; (d) Mr.
Teope has no intention of leaving the country; and (e) the intended deponent is available to testify in open
court if required during the trial on the merits.

The trial court ordered that the requested deposition shall not be taken. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied, petitioner filed an original action for certiorari before the Supreme Court. However,
in a resolution dated May 20, 1992, this Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration
and adjudication on the merits. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the
petition: Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not availing one mode of discovery will bar the party in availing the other modes?

Ruling:

No. As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with
information essential to the expenditious and proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute. Moreover,
it cannot be disputed that the various methods of discovery as provided for in the Rules are clearly
intended to be cumulative, as opposed to alternative or mutually exclusive.

Supreme Court held that under the present Rules the fact that a party has resorted to a particular method
of discovery will not bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as long as the party is not attempting
to circumvent a ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the other party. As a matter of practice, it will
often be desirable to resort to both interrogatories and depositions in one or the other sequence.
Additional lines of inquiry may come to light after the deposition has been taken, as to which written
interrogatories probably would be adequate, and there is no reason why the examining party should not
be entitled to obtain all the relevant information.
People v. Ayson, GR no. 85215, July 7, 1989.

FACTS:

Private respondent Ramos was a Philippine Airlines ticket freight clerk assigned in Baguio. He was
allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. PAL management notified him that an
investigation will be conducted on the matter. The investigation will be in accordance with PAL’s Code of
Conduce and Discipline and the CBA with PALEA (Ramos was a member).

The day before the investigation, Ramos gave his superiors handwritten notes stating his willingness to
settle the irregularities. At the investigation, Ramos was informed of the finding of the Audit Team. His
answers in response to questions asked by PAL branch manager Cruz were taken in writing. It seemed
that no compromise agreement was reached or consummated.

Two months later, an Information was filed against Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa. Ramos
entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued. At the close of the People’s case, the private prosecutors
made a written offer of evidence which included that statement of accused (the handwritten notes) as
well as his handwritten admission (the written responses to the questions).

Ramos’ lawyers filed “Objections/Comments to Plaintiff’s Evidence.” The objection was that the
document (handwritten notes), which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being
represented by a lawyer. The objection to the written responses was for the same reason.

Judge Ayson admitted all evidence as part of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection
therewith and for whatever they are worth but he rejected the handwritten notes (Exhibit A) and the
written responses (Exhibit K).

Judge Ayson declared Exhibit A, which according to the defense appears considered as a confession,
inadmissible since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was
with the assistance actually of a counsel. He also declared Exhibit K inadmissible since it did not appear
that the accused was assisted by counsel when the admission was made.

The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Ayson denied the motion on the
ground that the fact that Ramos was not detained at that time, or the investigation was administrative
in character could not operate to except the case from the ambit of the constitutional provision in
custodial investigation.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the right against self-incrimination is available in an administrative case.
2. Whether all statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the
scope of the constitutional right in custodial investigation
3. Whether the Exhibits should be excluded in evidence on the ground that Miranda rights was not
accorded to the accused.
HELD:

1. YES

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is
accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in
any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself"

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. It prescribes an "option of refusal to
answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether
he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the
answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed
only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to
appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a
subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only
when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some
offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be
claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not come into play. It follows
that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.

2. NO

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a person in police
custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the commencement of an adversary proceeding
against the suspect.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that
if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and
intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result
of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated

atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."

Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the scope of the
constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," the statement is not protected.
 3. NO

In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with its commission
in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or producing evidence, to wit:

1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but
after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on
being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which
vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

a) to refuse to be a witness;

b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;

c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;

d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some
crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended the nature and
import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. He has taken
them as applying to the same juridical situation, equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly
erred. To be sure, His Honor sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and
logical. The thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional
and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him tantamount to
totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders were thus rendered with grave
abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby, annulled and set aside.

It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry
into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared to have had a hand. The
constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too,
that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having
thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit
A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February
8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities,
was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-
called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
MANUEL F. CABAL, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR.,

FACTS:

Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner
Manuel Cabal, then COS of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other
equally reprehensible acts". Eventually, The President of the Philippines created a committee of five (5)
members to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth contained in said letter-complaint and submit
its report and recommendations as soon as possible. At the beginning of the investigation, the
Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be
sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth.
Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to
his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. Still petitioner, respectfully refused
to the order of the Committee.

Because of the firm refusal of Cabal, Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such
action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge"
of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was
assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to
quash, upon the ground that the Committee had no power to order and require petitioner to take the
witness stand and be sworn to, upon the request of Col. Maristela, as witness for the latter, and such
order is violation of his Constitutional right. However, his motion was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

Yes, the Committee’s order violates petitioner’s Constitutional right.

Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of the Anti-
Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or employee which
is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held to
partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be
witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto.

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition
against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-
criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason
of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or
remedial in nature. The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely
asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal,
and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to
incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel
as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the
witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-
incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in
support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions..
G.R. No. L-25018 May 26, 1969
ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitioner-appellee,
vs. BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent-appellant, SALVADOR GATBONTON and ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON, intervenors-appellants.

NOTE: The topic of this case is about the right of the accused not to be a witness against himself which is
under political law. I have read the full case and no mention about modes of discovery.

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:

Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed on February 1, 1965 with the Court of First Instance of
Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical
Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an
administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as
his first witness herein petitioner-appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.
Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board
of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on
February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

Petitioner-appellee then alleged that in thus ruling to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of
Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional
right against self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result in forfeiture
or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character. With his assertion that he was entitled to the relief
demanded consisting of perpetually restraining the respondent Board from compelling him to testify as
witness for his adversary and his readiness or his willingness to put a bond, he prayed for a writ of
preliminary injunction and after a hearing or trial, for a writ of prohibition.

On February 9, 1965, the lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the
respondent Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further proceeding with such an
administrative case, to await the judicial disposition of the matter upon petitioner-appellee posting a
bond in the amount of P500.00.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner-appellee
to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a
question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. It further elaborated the matter in the
affirmative defenses interposed, stating that petitioner-appellee's remedy is to object once he is in the
witness stand, for respondent "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,"
precluding the issuance of the relief sought. Respondent Board, therefore, denied that it acted with grave
abuse of discretion.
There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants
in the administrative case for malpractice against petitioner-appellee, asking that they be allowed to file
an answer as intervenors. Such a motion was granted and an answer in intervention was duly filed by
them on March 23, 1965 sustaining the power of respondent Board, which for them is limited to
compelling the witness to take the stand, to be distinguished, in their opinion, from the power to compel
a witness to incriminate himself. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be
availed of in an administrative hearing.

A decision was rendered by the lower court on August 2, 1965, finding the claim of petitioner-appellee to
be well-founded and prohibiting respondent Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a
witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence this
appeal both by respondent Board and intervenors, the Gatbontons.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the
constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.

HELD:

YES. Court ruled in favor of the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused
in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand."

As held in the case of Cabal vs. Kapunan, “the proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character
thus possesses a criminal or penal aspect.” The case before the Court is not dissimilar; the case for
malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative in character
possesses a criminal or penal aspect petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocations of his license as a medical practitioner, for some an even greater
deprivation. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.

The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness
stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self-
incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the
human personality.

In the light of the above, it could thus clearly appear that no possible objection could be legitimately raised
against the correctness of the decision now on appeal. We hold that in an administrative hearing against
a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is affirmed.

G.R. Nos, L-71208-09. August 30, 1985.

SATURNINA GALMAN AND REYNALDO GALMAN, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE
MANUEL PAMARAN

G.R. Nos. L-71212-13. August 30, 1985.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN), petitioner, vs. THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, GENERAL FABIAN C. VER

Facts:

A crime was committed inside the premises of Manila International Airport. Former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino Jr. was gunned down to death.

To determine the facts surrounding the killing P.D. 1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc fact finding
board which was later known as the Agrava Board.

The Board conducted public hearing where witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced
documentary and other evidence either by a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the
Board.

The Board submitted to President Marcos 2 investigation reports. One by the Chairman Juliano Agrava
and the other which was authored by the other members of the Board. The said reports were turned
over to the Tanod Bayan who then filed with the Sandiganbayan two informations for murder. One for
the killing of Senator Aquino and the other for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also found dead
on the airport tarmac.

In both criminal cases private respondents were charged as accessories and upon arraignment all
pleaded NOT GUILTY.

The prosecution offered as part of their evidence the individual testimonies of private respondents
before the AGRAVA board. The respondents through their counsel objected to the admission of the said.

General Ver filed a formal “ MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONIES OF GEN VER BEFORE FACT FINDING
BOARD AS EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM IN ABOVE-ENTITLED CASES” contending that its admission will be in
derogation of his right against self-incrimination and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. The
prosecution objected contending that the immunity invoked is not available to them because of their
failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before that AGRAVA BOARD.

The Sandiganbayan did not resolve the pending motion. It issued a Resolution directing parties that by
agreement of the parties all pending motions and opposition, and memorandum in support thereof shall
be considered joint in the Court’s Resolution on the prosecution’s formal offer of exhibits and other
documentary evidence.

The prosecution made a written formal offer of evidence which included the contested testimonies,
again the same was objected to with the same ground by the respondents.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting all the evidences offered by the Prosecution except
the testimonies and other evidence produced by the private respondents in view of the immunity
granted by P.D. 1886.

The motion for reconsideration on the ground of being issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amount to lack of jurisdiction,of the prosecution was denied, hence its recourse to
the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition is with merit.

RULING:

The petition is without merit, hence dismissed. The Supreme Court held that respondent Generals Ver
and Olivas were denied due process of law in the Agrava Board hearings. Sec. 5 of P.D. 1886 compelled
respondent Generals Ver and Olivas to be witnesses against themselves as P.D. 1886 gave them no
choice but to testify under pain of being declared in contempt of court.as Generals Ver and Olivas were
called before the Agrava Board as suspects in the killing of Sen. Aquino, they should have been
forewarned of their right to remain silent and to counsel no differently as any person being investigated
by the NBI or any police agency. manner in which the testimonies were taken from private respondents
fall short of the constitutional standards both under the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE and under the
EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20, Article IV.

The view that the right to remain silent must be invoked before the Agrava Board to prevent use of
testimony made thereat is wrong
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of private respondents
cannot be admitted against them in any criminal proceeding.

Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in truth and in fact, and
to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts
and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or
persons criminally responsible therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice.
Vda. De Manguerra vs Risos (G.R. No. 152643 August 28, 2008)

Facts:
Raul Risos, Susana Yongco, and Leah Abarquez (respondents) were charged with Estafa Through
Falsification of Public Document before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City(RTC) that arose from the
falsification of a deed of real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it
appear that Concepcion Vda. De Manguerra (petitioner), the owner of the mortgaged property known as
the Gorordo property, affixed her signature to the document.

Petitioner's counsel filed a motion to take the petitioner's deposition. He explained the need to
perpetuate petitioner's testimony due to the latter's weak physical condition and old age, which limited her
freedom of mobility.

The RTC granted the motion and directed that petitioner's deposition be taken before the Clerk of
Court of Makati City. The respondents motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court. The court
ratiocinated that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside because of the urgency of the situation,
since petitioner was already of advanced age. Aggrieved, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals(CA).

The appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of prosecution
witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases.Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, petitioner's deposition should have been taken before the judge or the
court where the case is pending and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the
assailed order, the RTC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.

The CA added that the rationale of the Rules in requiring the taking of deposition before the same
court is the constitutional right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face. The appellate court
likewise concluded that Rule 23 could not be applied suppletorily because the situation was adequately
addressed by a specific provision of the rules of criminal procedure.

Issue/s:
Whether or not Rule 23 applies in this case. (No)

Held:
In the case at bench, the issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to the
petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule 119 thus comes into
play, and it provides:

Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the Philippines
with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the
case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable
notice to attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as an
examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the accused.

The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that the conditional
examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is also necessary that the accused be
notified, so that he can attend the examination, subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable
notice. As to the manner of examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as
an examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.

To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking his
deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending. Such
is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. The Supreme Court found no necessity to depart
from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made elsewhere, the accused
may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that
the judge would be able to observe the witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility.
This is especially true when the witness testimony is crucial to the prosecutions case.
G.R. No. L-41166 August 25, 1976

Harry Go vs People
G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012

HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, Petitioners,
-versus-
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,

Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Manila for Other Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The prosecution's
complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September 9, 2004. However, trial
dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability. The private prosecutor filed with the MeTC
a Motion to Take Oral Deposition6 of Li Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at
the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the
long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill health. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC
granted the motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li
Luen Ping. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a
Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through
an Order dated March 5, 2006, the prosecution elevated the case to the CA. the CA denied petitioners'
motion for Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not CA erred in sustaining the judicial legislation committed by the MeTC in applying
the ruled on deposition-taking in civil case to criminal cases.

Held:

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true especially in
criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the

witnesses against him face to face. The requirement is the “safest and most satisfactory method of
investigating facts” as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner and
deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes the

conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil cases,
either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person
authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any Philippine
consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a foreign state or
country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party.

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who
would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court,
or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15,
Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for
the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the
court where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very same court
where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony
is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de
Manguerra where we further declared that –

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to prove its

case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the accused's
constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional examination
of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the rules.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AMELIA K. DEL ROSARIO and DIONISIO CERBO,Petitioners, vs. HON
NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO Judge, Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and GREGORIO OJOY respondents

Facts:

In Criminal Case No. 2891, entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Gregorio Ojoy, accused", of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch III, after the accused himself had testified in his defense, his
counsel manifested that for his subsequent witnesses he was filing only their affidavits subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution on matters stated in the affidavits and on all other matters pertinent and
material to the case. Private prosecutor Atty. Amelia K. del Rosario, one of the petitioners here, objected
to the proposed procedure but this notwithstanding, respondent Judge gave his conformity thereto and
subsequently issued the questioned Order. Contending that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion because the aforesaid Orders violates Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which requires that the testimony of the witness should be given orally in open court, and there is no
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, petitioners instituted
the present petition

Issue:

Did the judge’s orders violate Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which requires that
testimony of witnesses be given orally in open court?

Held:

Yes. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 and Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly require that
the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. Theessential purpose of requiring a witness
to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-
examination. Cross-examination cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and
obtaining immediate answers. Personal appearance of the witness before the judge also enables the judge
as the trier of facts, to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while
testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness
testifies orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may
confirm or detract from the weight of his testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will
reveal his capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will
reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in
court. Indeed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based
upon his having had just that opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain
the credibility of the witnesses.

Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rule requires that in determining the superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved, the court, aside from the other factors therein enumerated, may consider the "witness
manner of testifying" which can only be done if the witness gives his testimony orally in open court". If a
trial judge prepares his opinion immediately after the conclusion of the trial, with the evidence and his
impressions of the witnesses fresh in his mind, it is obvious that he is much more likely to reach a correct
result than if he simply reviews the evidence from a typewritten transcript, without having had the
opportunity to see, hear and observe the actions and utterances of the witnesses.
RULE 24 (DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL)
YUSINGCO vs. ONG HING LIAN

G.R. No. L-26523, Dec.24, 1971

FACTS
On Feb. 13, 1952 Pelagio Yusingco, filed a petition under R.A. No. 26 for the reconstitution of
certificates of title covering lots nos. 519, 520, 1014, 1015, 1016, and 1020, alleging, that Alfonso Yusingco
having died, his children formed a partnership called Alfonso Yusingco Hermanos to continue his business;
that the certificates of title to the said lots had also been transferred to Yusingco Hermanos and prayed,
that the transfer certificates of title in the name of the Yusingco Hermanos which had been lost or
destroyed be reconstituted and the same be cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificates of title be
issued in the name of the heirs of Alfonso.
The said petition was opposed by Ong Hing Lian, as administrator of the estate of the late Ong
Bonpin, alleging in effect that he and his co-heirs are the lawful owners and possessors of the lots covered
by the certificates of title sought to be reconstituted as successors of Ong Bonpin, who at the time of his
death was the lawful owner thereof.
The lower court issued an order denying the petition for reconstitution, predicated on a finding
that Ong Bonpin and his heirs exercised possession of the lots in concept of owners. After remanding the
case twice, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court on July 30, 1964.
On Oct. 30, 1964, Yusingco filed this 2nd civil complaint (Accion Reivindicatoria with damages and
preliminary injunction) against Ong Hing Lian, in his own behalf and/or as administrator of the estate of
Ong Bonpin to recover possession and ownership of the lots.
On Jan. 12, 1965, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the present action contending that the
same is barred by prior judgment or by the statute of limitations. On Feb. 23, 1965, defendant filed an
amended motion to dismiss, alleging further that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue, the complaint
states no cause of action, the cause of action has been abandoned, and the plaintiffs are in estoppel
and/or guilty of laches.
In an order dated June 17, 1965, the lower court dismissed the case.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON the 2nd civil complaint (Accion Reivindicatoria with damages and preliminary injunction) was
barred by res judicata? YES.
For a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case the following requisites must
concur: (1) It must be a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering the same must have jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the parties; (3) It must be a judgment or order of the merits; and (4)
there must be between the two case identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identify of action.
A prior judgment is conclusive in a subsequent suit between the same parties on the same subject
matter, and on the same cause of action, not only as to matters which were decided in the first action,
but also as to every other matter which the parties could have properly set up in the prior suit.
 The judgment in the reconstitution case was on the merits and is now final and that the
reconstitution court had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties. The present case and
the reconstitution suit refer to the same subject matter — Lots Nos. 519, 520, 1014, 1015, and 1020.
Yusingco dispute the identity of cause of action between the two suits, contending that the 1st
action was merely for the reconstitution of certificates, wherein the question of possession and ownership
cannot be validly passed upon; whereas the present action is an accion reivindicatoria, the proper action
to determine the question of possessiron and ownership
In the petition for reconstitution, Yusingco not only asked for the reconstitution of the certificates
of title in the name of Yusingco Hermanos but also that the certificates, once reconstituted, be cancelled
and new ones be issued in the name of the heirs of Alfonso Yusingco, asserting in effect their right of
ownership over the disputed parcels of lands, and the same was opposed by Ong Hing Lian who also
asserted his right of ownership over the lands. It is patent that the issue of ownership became the
determinative factor in the success of the petition for reconstitution.
Between the two suits, there is identity of cause of action — the Yusingcos' claim of ownership
over the disputed lost as opposed by Ong Hing Lian. What is different here is the form of action. But the
employment of two different forms of action, does not enable one to escape the operation of the principle
that one and the same cause of action shall not be twice litigated.
The parties in the two cases are not entirely identical. The only petitioner in the reconstitution
case was Pelagio Yusingco. The CA decision in the reconstitution case, therefore does not bind his co-
heirs, his co-plaintiffs in the second case for reivindicacion; said decision therefore can only be considered
as res judicata as far as Pelagio Yusingco is concerned, but not as against his co-heirs.
RULE 25 (INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES)
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. 90478

FACTS:
Tantoco and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated as interrogatories to
plaintiff as well as a motion for production and inspection of documents. PCGG claims that the
documents sought to be produced are privileged in character and their use is proscribed by the
immunity provisions of E.O. 1.

ISSUE(S):
Whether or not petitioner can object to the interrogatories served to it in accordance with Rule 25 of
the Rules of Court.

HELD:
NO. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued without its
consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing in action, it divests itself of its sovereign character and sheds its
immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant
G.R. No. 185145 February 5, 2014

SPOUSES AFULUGENCIA vs. METROBANK

Facts:

Petitioners filed a Complaint for nullification of mortgage, foreclosure and auction sale against
Metrobank. After the pre-trial, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad
Testificandum to require Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses
during hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to bring the documents relative to
their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’
200-square meter land in Bulacan.

Metrobank argued that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the Motion must be denied;
pursuant to Sections 1 and 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who are considered adverse
parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court for the petitioners since they were not
initially served with written interrogatories; that petitioners have not shown the materiality and
relevance of the documents sought to be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for
evidence.

In their reply to Metrobank’s Opposition, the lack of a proper notice of hearing was cured by the
filing of Metrobank’s Opposition; that leave of court is not necessary for the taking of Metrobank’s
officers’ depositions; and that the Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its
own witness.

RTC agreed with Metrobank in denying petitioners’ motion. In denying the MR, RTC stressed the
rule requiring prior service of written interrogatories to adverse parties before any material and relevant
facts in open court may be elicited from them cannot be afforded any laxity in their favor. This decision
was affirmed by CA.

Issue:

WON Petitioners must first serve written interrogatories to the bank officers before they can be
subpoenaed.

Held:

Yes, as prescribed by Section 6, Rule 25, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the
witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter. Failure to
comply maybe allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice. One of the
purposes of the said rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless delays; it is there to maintain
order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be presumed that a party who does not serve written
interrogatories on the adverse party beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its
case if it later opts to call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness.

Moreover, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand as their initial and
main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s possession as part of their principal
documentary evidence. This is improper. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the
evidence of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on Metrobank; if
petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the adverse party Metrobank may
not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.
RULE 26 (ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY)
Allied Agri-Business Development Co. Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 118438, December 4, 1998

FACTS: Private respondent Cherry Valley Farms Limited, a foreign company based in England, filed against
petitioner Allied Agri-Business a complaint for collection of sum of money alleging, among others that on
1 September 1982 up to 16 February 1983, or for a period of less than six (6) months, petitioner purchased
in ten (10) separate orders and received from respondent several duck hatching eggs and ducklings which
in value totaled English Sterling Pounds 51,245.12, which the petitioner failed to pay despite repeated
demands. And instead of paying its obligation, ALLIED through its president wrote CHERRY VALLEY inviting
the latter to be a stockholder in a new corporation to be formed by ALLIED, which invitation however was
rejected by CHERRY VALLEY. Lastly, the ALLIED's president Ricardo Quintos expressly acknowledged
through a letter the obligation of his corporation to CHERRY.

Private Respondent: CHERRY VALLEY served on ALLIED’s counsel a Request for Admission which states
among others that Mr. Quintos, in his capacity as president of ALLIED, sent a letter to CHERRY VALLEY
proposing the setting up of a new corporation with CHERRY VALLEY refusal; that Mr. Ricardo Quintos in a
letter admitted ALLIED’s indebtedness.

Petitioner: ALLIED filed its Comments/Objections alleging that: (a) the admissions requested were
matters which the private respondent had the burden to prove through its own witness during the trial
and thus petitioner need not answer; and, (b) the request for admission regarding the ownership set-up
of petitioner corporation was immaterial and improper for not having been pleaded in the complaint.
CHERRY VALLEY maintained that there was no need on its part to produce a witness to testify on the
matters requested for admission, for these pertained to incidents personal to and within the knowledge
of petitioner alone.

RTC: The trial court issued an order disregarding ALLIEDs Comments/Objections to Request for
Admission in view of its non-compliance with Sec. 2, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court and directing ALLIED
to answer the request for admission within ten (10) days from receipt of the order, otherwise, the matters
contained in the request would be deemed admitted. ALLIED moved to reconsider the order; however,
the lower court denied ALLIEDs motion for reconsideration and directed the latter to answer the request
for admission within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from receipt of the order. ALLIED failed to
submit a sworn answer to the request for admission within the additional period of five (5) days granted
by the trial court. Hence, CHERRY VALLEY filed a motion for summary judgment.

RTC: The trial court rendered judgment against petitioner, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the prayed
amount or its peso equivalent at the time of payment plus legal interest from the date of filing of this
complaint until fully paid. The appellate court rendered a decision affirming the summary judgment
rendered by the trial court with the modification that ALLIED should pay the monetary award to CHERRY
VALLEY in Philippine currency and that the award of attorney’s fees and costs of suit be deleted. Hence,
the instant petition by ALLIED.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court committed an error in rendering the summary judgment.

RULING: NO. The petition must fail.

Legal capacity to sue: In fact, petitioner is estopped from challenging or questioning the personality of a
corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering into a contract with it. The doctrine of lack
of capacity to sue or failure of a foreign corporation to acquire a local license was never intended to favor
domestic corporations who enter into solitary transactions with unwary foreign firms and then repudiate
their obligations simply because the latter are not licensed to do business in this country.

Failure to answer request for admission: The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts
and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which
will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry. Each of the
matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within a period designated
in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof, or within such further
time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request is directed files and serves upon
the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denying specifically the matters of which an
admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit or deny
those matters. Petitioner failed to submit the required answer within the period.

The burden of affirmative action is on the party upon whom notice is served to avoid the admission
rather than upon the party seeking the admission. Hence, when petitioner failed to reply to a request to
admit, it may not argue that the adverse party has the burden of proving the facts sought to be
admitted. Petitioners silence is an admission of the facts stated in the request.
PSCFC Financial Corp. vs. CA

Facts:

PSCFC filed a complaint against private respondent Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank for
annulment of foreclosure proceedings and damages. Banco Filipino filed its Answer.

PSCFC then served upon Banco Filipino a written request for admission of the truth of certain matters.

PSCFC received Banco Filipino's answer to its request for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip
Sigfrid A. Fortun.

PSCFC made a second request for admission, impliedly objecting to the first reply having been made by
its lawyer, Atty. Fortun. Banco Filipino objected.

PSCFC asked the trial court for a ruling that the matters sought to be admitted in its second bid for
admission should be considered as impliedly admitted when the answer was made by a lawyer who was
not qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal knowledge of the matters sought to be admitted.

Trial court did not grant PSCFC’s motion. CA sustained the trial court.

Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for admission under Rule 26 should be made by the
party himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer. Consequently, failure of respondent Banco Filipino,
upon whom the call for admission was served, to render the required sworn statement would constitute
an implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted.

Issue:

May a request for admission directed to an adverse party be answered only by his counsel?

Held:

Yes. Section 21 of Rule 138 states —

Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him
to appear in court for his client ...
Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls under any of the recognized exceptions as found in
Art. 1878 of the Civil Code which enumerates the instances when special powers of attorney are
necessary, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of Court on pre-trial where the parties and their attorneys are both
directed to appear before the court for a conference; so that for counsel to appear at the pre-trial in
behalf of the client, he must clothe the former with an adequate authority in the form of a special power
of attorney or corporate resolution.
Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary
judicial procedure ..."

Thus, when Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the request for admission, it should not be
restrictively construed to mean that a party may not engage the services of counsel to make the
response in his behalf. Indeed, the theory of petitioner must not be taken seriously; otherwise, it will
negate the principles on agency in the Civil Code, 4 as well as Sec. 23, Rule 138, of the Rule of Court.

Nonetheless, even assuming arguendo that Atty. Philip Sigfrid Fortun overstepped his authority, it is only
his client, respondent Banco Filipino, which has the prerogative to impugn his acts and not petitioner,
the adverse party. Interestingly, Banco Filipino has not objected to the response made by its counsel in
its behalf.
G.R. No. 78936 January 7, 1988

VILLA RHECAR BUS and/or ITS MANAGER, petitioner, vs. FRUCTUOUSO DE LA CRUZ and HONORABLE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner Villa Rhecar Bus is a transportation firm operating in Davao City. Private respondent
Fructuouso De la Cruz was employed as a line inspector of the firm as early as April, 1979. His
employment lasted until December 4, 1984. There appears to have been a dispute as to the separation
pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay and emergency living allowance due to the private respondent.

Private respondent instituted a Complaint against the petitioner with the National Labor Relations
Commission. The case was assigned to Labor Arbiter Jose O. Libron. A certain Atty. Ruben Pasamonte
represented the petitioner in the proceedings. The parties, through counsel, reached an agreement to
the effect that their respective position papers will be submitted to the Labor Arbiter within 20 days,
counted from April 8, 1985, after which period the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.
Counsel for the petitioner failed to file the necessary papers within the aforementioned period.

Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondent. The Labor Arbiter held that the petitioner waived
its right to adduce evidence in its defense.

The petitioner appealed to the respondent Commission. The Appeal is anchored on the theory that the
Labor Arbiter committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in deciding the
case with only the position papers submitted by the private respondent available for inspection. The
petitioner submits that the same amounts to a violation of its right to procedural due process of law
inasmuch as it was denied the opportunity to present evidence in its defense.

In a Resolution promulgated on April 30, 1987, the Second Division of the Commission dismissed the
Appeal for lack of merit. The Commission held that there is no abuse of discretion, much less a violation
of procedural due process, committed by the Labor Arbiter. The Commission likewise observed that the
petitioner should proceed against his counsel for neglecting his duties instead of insisting on a right
which had been waived.

Dissatisfied with the action taken by the Commission, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court on
July 8, 1987 by way of the instant Petition.
ISSUE:

WON the Labor Arbiter committed a grave abuse of discretion in resolving the case in favor of the
private respondent without affording the petitioner an opportunity to present its side, and that the
respondent Commission itself also committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to loss of
jurisdiction, when it ordered the dismissal of the Appeal.

RULING:

We find the instant Petition devoid of merit.

It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds
the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only
when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto be
called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner has
been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had
been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect.

Moreover, the petitioner retained the services of counsel of its choice. It should, as far as this suit is
concerned, bear the consequences of its faulty option. After all, in the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded against is not the lack of previous notice but the denial of the
opportunity to be heard. 10 The question is not whether the petitioner succeeded in defending its
interest but whether the petitioner had the opportunity to present its side. Notice to counsel is notice to
the client. The proposal of the petitioner to the effect that the Labor Arbiter should be required to send
a separate notice to the client should not be taken seriously. Otherwise, the provisions of the Civil Code
on Agency 11 as well as Section 23, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court 12 will be put to naught.

If the negligence of counsel had indeed caused serious prejudice to the petitioner, then it can always
take the necessary legal steps against him.

Accordingly, the instant Petition for certiorari should be dismissed for lack of merit.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ROSALINDA
CANADALLA-GO, G.R. No. 153034

FACTS:

In January 1977, Irene Canadalla obtained a loan of P100,000 from DBP for purposes of financing her
piggery business. Canadalla executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over two parcels of land. Because
of unforeseen calamities and destruction of her store by fire, she failed to comply with her obligations to
the DBP. DBP extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgages. DBP acquired the properties at a public auction
as it is the only bidder. She was given one year for one title and 6 years for the other two. She offered
1.5M but DBP countered that redemption price under its 1986 Revised Chapter must be based on its
total claim, which was P1,927,729.50. She assigned her daughter to redeem such. New certificates of
title were issued to DBP as Go failed to pay the amount asked by DBP thus loosing her chance to
redeem. Go filed with RTC for Supplemental Complaint the properties. DBP argued that the statements,
allegations, and documents submitted by Go in her Request for Admission are substantially the same as
those in the Supplemental Complaint which was already denied or admitted in its answer. RTC and CA
granted Go's motion. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

WON the CA erred in denying the motion of DBP.

HELD:

Yes. A request for admission that merely reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate
under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, which, as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that
would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does
not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleading. Here, the matters
stated in Gos Request for Admission are the same as those alleged in her Supplemental Complaint. They
had already been either specifically denied or admitted in DBP's Answer to the Supplemental Complaint.
To require the DBP to admit these matters under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court would be pointless and
superfluous.
Priscilla Susan Po vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.
GR No. L-34341
August 22, 1988
First Division, Griño-Aquino, J.

FACTS:
This case demonstrates the adage that sometimes "haste makes waste." Seventeen (17) years after the
petitioner Priscilla Susan Po filed a motion for summary judgment in the damage suit which she filed
against the private respondent, her refusal to abide by the trial court's order and the Appellate Court's
resolution denying her motion, has kept her complaint waiting in the wings to be called for pre-trial. Had
she been less intransigent, the case might have been finished long ago.

The petitioner filed a complaint for damages against the private respondent Jose P. Mananzan as
operator of a banca service for shooting the rapids at Pagsanjan Falls, arising from an accidental spill into
the water, which she and her friend suffered when the banca in which they were riding capsized during
their trip back to town. After Mananzan had answered the complaint, petitioner served upon him a
request for admission. Mananzan asked for an extension of time to answer the request for admission.
The petitioner opposed the motion for extension of time on account of alleged defects in the notice of
hearing. The petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that there exists no genuine
or substantial controversy on any issue of fact raised in the complaint because the defendant, by failure
to answer her request for admission within the reglementary period is deemed to have admitted the
facts set forth in the request.

Mananzan answered the request for admission and sent a copy of his answer to the petitioner. He filed
an opposition to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Respondent Judge Lustre denied the
motion for summary judgment, observing that "the interrogatories ... are nothing but a reiteration of a
portion of the plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint, which have already been answered and denied by
the defendant in his answer" hence; they "need not be answered again if asked in the form of
interrogatories.

After the trial court had denied her motion for reconsideration of its order, the petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 00220-R) which the Court of
Appeals likewise denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s refusal to abide by the trial court's order and the Appellate Court's
resolution denying her motion, has kept her complaint waiting in the wings to be called for pre-trial.

HELD:
A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and
concerning which there is no issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d 752, Terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S. 91), nor
should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A
request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting
party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. Unless
it serves that purpose, it is, as correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, "pointless, useless," and "a
mere redundancy."

Under Sec. 5 of Rule 26, however, it is provided that when a party fails to file and serve a request for
admission on the adverse party of material and relevant facts at issue which are or should be within the
personal knowledge of the letter, such party shall thereafter not be permitted from presenting evidence
on such facts.
G.R. No. 101682 December 14, 1992

SALVADOR D. BRIBONERIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, GERTRUDES B. MAG-ISA, married to and assisted by PEDRO MAG-
ISA, respondents.

RULE 26: ADMISSION BY ADVERSE PARTY

TAKE AWAY:
1) A request for admission should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents
described in and exhibited with the request NOT a reiteration of the allegations of the requesting
party;
2) The request for admission must be served directly upon the party.

FACTS:

Petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as plaintiff, filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages,
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent
Gertrudes B. Mag-isa who was able to acquire private respondent’s house and lot allegedly through an
unauthorized sale effected by his wife.

In due time, private respondent Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer.

After issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on Mag-isa, through her counsel, a request for
admission dated September 13, 1988.

On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request for
Admission, alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been
admitted, denied and/or clarified in their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that the other matters
not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper.

On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary Judgment, claiming that the Answer to
Request for Admission was filed by private respondent is beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the
request and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed
to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to
Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court.

The trial court denied the motion. The Motion for Reconsideration, however, was granted.

The petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus to annul and set aside the order but it was denied, hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are correct.

RULING:

The petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit.

A cursory reading of the petitioner's complaint and his request for admission clearly shows, as found by
respondent appellate court, that "the material matters and documents set forth in the request for
admission are the same as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted or
denied in their answer.”

A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting
party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and
exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. . . .

Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be served
directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have
admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters
of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for admission.

In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private
respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore,
cannot be deemed to have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for
having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request.

WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
13 August 1990 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Socorro Limos vs. Spouses Odones

FACTS:

Private respondents-spouses Francisco Odones and Arwenia Odones, filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed, Title and Damages against petitioners Socorro Limos, Rosa Delos Reyes and Spouses
Rolando Delos Reyes and Eugene Delos Reyes before the RTC of Camiling, Tarlac. It stated that spouses
Odones are the owners of a 940- square meter parcel of land. The registration of the document of
conveyance was delayed when they found out that the lands OCT was cancelled and replaced by a TCT in
the name of the petitioners who were able to secure TCT executed by Donata Lardizabal and her husband
Francisco Razalan.

Petitioners subdivided the lot among themselves and had the TCT cancelled. In lieu thereof, three
new TCTs were issued. The respondents then sought the cancellation of these new TCTs on the ground
that the signatures of Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan were forgeries, because they were already
dead during that time. The petitioners filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars stating the ambiguity in
respondents claim which was denied by the trial court. The petitioners then pleaded affirmative defenses,
which also constitute grounds for dismissal of the complaint. In their Reply, respondents denied the
foregoing affirmative defenses, and insisted that the Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and Sale was valid.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Set for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
Defenses but was denied by RTC which was then elevated to the CA by way of a special civil action for
certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in issuing the impugned resolution and
order. CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defense is proper.

RULING:

NO. Under Rule 26, Sec 1 and 2, a party who fails to respond to a Request for Admission shall be
deemed to have impliedly admitted all matters contained therein. It must be emphasized that the
application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the discretion of the court. A request for
admission is not intended merely to reproduce or reiterate the allegations but should set forth relevant
evidentiary matters of fact described in the request. Thus, if the trial court finds that the matters in the
Request were already admitted then the requested party cannot be compelled to admit or deny them
again. In turn the requesting party cannot reasonably expect a response to request or even demand the
application of the implied admission rule in Rule 26, Sec 2.

In the case, the redundant and unnecessary nature of the Petitioner’s Request rendered it
irrelevant so as to apply the implied admission rule. Since there is no implied admission attributable to
the Respondent’s failure to respond, then the argument that a preliminary hearing is imperative loses its
point.
CONCRETE AGGREGATES CORPORATION
vs. COURT OF APPEALS , G.R. No. 117574 January 2, 1997

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling

Bituminous Concrete Mix, Ready Mix Concrete and other construction materials. It has several plant sites
in the country one of which is the Cebu plant site situated in Tuyan, Naga, Cebu. Private respondent on
the other hand is engaged in the business of providing security services to various establishments under
the name and style 101 Security and Detective Services. Petitioner retained the services of private
respondent for its Cebu plant site. On 8 November 1991 it terminated the services of private respondent
alleging that it was dissatisfied with the latter's services because she failed to prevent and promptly
investigate a theft case which occurred in its Cebu plant site.

Private respondent Vivien S. Soriguez instituted an action with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
for collection of unpaid fees for her security services rendered to petitioner. She also claimed that the
termination of her services was unlawful so that she should be awarded moral damages. Petitioner
contended that its refusal to pay was justified because private respondent was answerable for the losses
it incurred arising from the theft attributable to her fault. Petitioner thus claimed that there was legal set-
off or compensation regarding the unpaid fees due private respondent and the amount of the stolen
articles owned by petitioner.

Petitioner sent private respondent a Request for Admission by the latter of her responsibility of
the theft that occurred on 5 June 1991 at the Cebu plant site. Thereafter private respondent through
counsel filed a Manifestation and Reply to the Request for Admission. It was not under oath. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment positing that private respondent impliedly admitted the matters
set forth in the Request for Admission by failing to respond under oath as required under Sec. 2, Rule 26,
of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contended that the manifestation and reply not being verified was
ineffectual and thus should be stricken off the records. Private respondent countered that her reply
although not under oath effectively denied the matters set forth in the request.

Public respondents ruled in favor of private respondent holding that the circumstances warranted
a relaxation of the rules in the interest of justice. Respondent courts further ruled that a summary
judgment was improper because the dispute involved factual issues which could only be resolved in a full-
blown hearing. The trial court denied its motion for reconsideration. The case was elevated to the Court
of Appeals, a special civil action for certiorari but the latter likewise denied the petition for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Does Rule 26 of the Revised Rules of Court require a party to respond to a Request for Admission
of matters raised in his pleadings? Will his failure to place under oath his denials in his response to the
request be deemed an admission of the matters sought to be admitted?

RULING:
 No. The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. As
we held in Po v. Court of Appeals and Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, Rule 26 as a mode of discovery
contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the
allegations in a pleading. That is its primary function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has
already been alleged in the pleadings.

A cursory reading of petitioner's Request for Admission clearly shows that it contains the same material
averments in his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court. Petitioner merely recopied or
reproduced in its Request for Admission its affirmative defenses and counterclaims alleged in its Answer.

Moreover, in the case of Bo v. CA, petitioner's request constitutes an utter redundancy and a
useless, pointless process which the respondent should not be subjected to. Respondent cannot be said
to have admitted the averments in the Answer of petitioner just because she failed to have her response
to the request placed under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified Complaint in
the court below.

Clearly, therefore, private respondent need not reply to the Request for Admission because her
Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner which were merely
reproduced in the request. We observed that the purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of
facts and genuineness of documents is to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts
which will not be disputed on trial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.

Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required in the instant case, it therefore
becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath. Although
not under oath the reply to the request readily showed that the intent of private respondent was to deny
the matters set forth in the Request for Admission. That the reply is not under oath is merely a formal and
not a substantive defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the circumstances call for the
dispensing of the rule in the interest of justice. While we commend petitioner's zeal in promoting faithful
adherence to the rules of procedure we cannot ignore the well-entrenched doctrine that all pleadings
should be liberally construed as to do substantial justice.

Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and may do so only when there is clearly
no genuine issue as to any material fact.

The instant petition is DENIED.

 [G.R. NO. 176570 - July 18, 2012] SPOUSES RAMON VILLUGA and MERCEDITA VILLUGA, Petitioners,
vs.

KELLY HARDWARE AND CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC., represented by ERNESTO V. YU, Executive Vice-
President and General Manager, Respondent.

FACTS:

Spouses Villuga purchased various construction materials from Kelly Hardware. However, Spouses
Villuga failed to pay despite demands from Kelly Hardware.

Kelly Hardware then filed a complaint against Sps. Villuga for a sum of money and damages in the
amounts of:

(1) P259,809.50 as principal obligation, plus interest;

(2) P64,952.38 by way of reimbursements of attorney's fees plus P500.00 appearance fee in
court.

(3) P26,000.00 for litigation and other related expenses.

In their Answer to Complaint, Sps. Villuga admitted having made purchases from respondent, but
claimed that they have already paid of P130,301.80. Sps. Villuga stated that they were willing to pay the
principal sum but without interests and costs, and on instalment basis.

Kelly Hardware said that it was amenable to the offer to pay the principal amount but insisted that the
other costs be paid.

Kelly Hardware filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings contending that petitioners were
deemed to have admitted in their Answer that they owed respondent the amount of P259,809.50 when
they claimed that they made partial payments.

The RTC deferred resolving the motion ground that there is no clear and specific admission on the part
of petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent.

Kelly Hardware then filed an Amended Complaint, alleging the principal amount owed by Sps. Villuga
was P279,809.50 and only P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50.

Sps. Villuga answered reiterating their Answer to Complaint.

Kelly Hardware filed a Request for Admission asking that Sps. Villuga admit that the latter's principal
obligation is P279,809.50 and that only P20,000.00 was paid.

Kelly Hardware motioned that since Sps. Villuga failed to timely file their comment to the Request for
Admission, they be considered to have admitted the genuineness of the documents.

Sps. Villuga then filed their Comments on the Request for Admission stating their objections.
Kelly Hardware filed its Second Amended Complaint, which reiterated its allegation that, despite
petitioners' partial payment, the principal amount which Sps. Villuga owe remains P259,809.50.

ISSUE:

WON the Request for Admission was proper.

HELD:

No, the Request for Admission was improper.

This Court has ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the very same allegations set
forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied, the required party cannot
be compelled to deny them anew.

Here, the said Request for Admission shows that the matters of fact set forth are simply a reiteration of
respondent's main allegation in its Amended Complaint and that petitioners had already set up the
affirmative defense of partial payment with respect to the above allegation in their previous pleadings.

Nonetheless, the party being requested should file an objection to the effect that the request for
admission is improper and that there is no longer any need to deny anew.
RULE 27 (PRODUCTION OR INSPECTION OF DOCUMENTS OR THINGS)
Security Bank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

323 SCRA 330

FACTS

Private respondents filed their Motion (For Production, Inspection and Copying of Documents) praying
for the issuance of an order directing SBC to produce and allow them to inspect and copy the original
and additional mortgage contracts executed by Jackivi Trading Center, Inc. and/or Jose Tanyao.
Defendant SBC opposed the motion. The trial court, however, order SBC to produce and permit
defendant Domingo P. Uy to inspect, copy or photograph the documents, papers and instruments made
and executed on the evaluation, processing and approval of the loans of Jackivi Trading Center, Inc.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that said
respondent has sufficiently shown the good cause on which his motion is anchored that of being able to
intelligently prepare his defenses against the cross-claim of petitioner SBC.

ISSUE

WON the CA is correct in affirming and granting of Motions for Production and Inspection of Documents.

RULING

YES. In Republic v. Sandiganbayanthe Court discussed exhaustively the significance of the

various modes of discovery, an example of which is Sec. 1 Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court. In sum,
the Court held that the said Rule aims to enable the parties to inform themselves, even before the trial,
of all the facts relevant to the action, including those known only to the other litigants. Through this
procedure, civil trials should not be carried on in the dark.

In the present case, the CA did not err in affirming the trial court ruling that there was good cause for
the grant of the Motions for inspection of documents. The latter s holding that the documents were not
indispensable to the preparation of the answer of Uy to the cross-claim did not militate against
respondents availment of this important mode of discovery. As he himself averred in his Motion, the
subject documents were material and important to the issues raised in the case in general, and as
between defendant and defendant SBC in particular.Verily, the CA noted that the documents would
enable Respondent Uy to intelligently prepare his defenses against the cross-claim of petitioner SBC and
not merely to formulate his answer. Likewise, we agree with the appellate court that the Motion of
Spouses Agustin Uy and Pacita Tang Sioc Ten was for a good cause, because the said documents were
necessary for a full determination of the issues raised in Civil Case.
Eagleridge Development Corporation vs. Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. G.R. No.
204700, April 10, 2013, Third Division, Decision, Leonen, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners Eagleridge Development Corporation (EDC), and sureties Marcelo N. Naval (Naval) and Crispin
I. Oben (Oben) are the defendants in a collection suit by Export and Industry Bank (EIB) currently pending
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City.

By virtue of a Deed of Assignment, EIB transferred EDC's loan of ₱10,232,998.00 to respondent

Cameron Granville 3 Asset Management, Inc. (Cameron), a special purpose vehicle, pursuant to the Loan
Sale and Purchase Agreement (LSPA), and Deed of Absolute Sale of said loan covered by an unregistered
Deed of Assignment of Receivables.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Production/Inspection of the LSPA referred to in the Deed of
Assignment. Cameron filed its Comment alleging that its production is irrelevant to the case a quo.
Petitioners filed their Reply explaining that it was for "good cause" to verify Cameron’s claim of the
consideration from the LSPA, considering that the Deed of Assignment was silent on the amount.

RTC denied for failure to show that the LSPA is material or contains evidence relevant to an issue
involved in the action. Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration alleging its relevance according
to Article 1634 of the Civil Code sanctioned by Section 12, Article III of Republic Act No. 9182, otherwise
known as the Special Purpose Vehicle Law (SPV Law). Cameron filed its Comment/Opposition. Petitioners
insisted the materiality but was denied.

Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari with the CA which dismissed it for lack of petitioner
Oben's verification and certification against forum shopping and failure to attach a copy of the complaint.
Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Hence this instant petition for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

whether the production and inspection of LSPA is relevant to the case a quo?

RULING:

Yes. The relevance of the LSPA sought by petitioners is readily apparent, and the denial of the Motion for
Production despite the existence of "good cause," relevancy and materiality for its production was
unreasonable and arbitrary.

Section 1, Rule 27 of the 1997 Rules of Court. Motion for production or inspection; order. – Upon motion
of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending may a) order any party
to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party,
of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control; xxx
The provision on production and inspection of documents is one of the modes of discovery in order to
enable the parties and also the court to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with the
case pending before it.

Generally, the scope of discovery is to be liberally construed so as to provide the litigants with information
essential to the fair and amicable settlement or expeditious trial of the case. All the parties are required
to lay their cards on the table so that justice can be rendered on the merits of the case.

The test to be applied by the trial judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of
their description is one of reasonableness and practicability.

Petitioners had maintained in their motions before the trial court the nullity or non-existence of the
assignment of credit purportedly made between Cameron and EIB (the original creditor).

As Cameron’s claim against the petitioners relies entirely on the validity of the Deed of Assignment, it is
incumbent upon it to allow petitioners to inspect all documents relevant to the Deed, especially those
documents which, by express terms, were referred to and identified in the Deed itself. The LSPA, which
pertains to the same subject matter – the transfer of the credit to respondent is manifestly useful to
petitioners’ defense.

Furthermore, under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is
given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and
when a detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence.

Fair play demands that petitioners must be given the chance to examine the LSPA. Besides, we find no
great practical difficulty, and respondent did not allege any, in presenting the document for inspection
and copying of the petitioners.

Because of the virtual refusal and denial of the production of the LSPA, petitioners were never accorded
the chance to reimburse respondent of the consideration the latter has paid.

In light of the general philosophy of full discovery of relevant facts, the unreceptive and negative attitude
by the respondent is abominable. The rules on discovery are accorded broad and liberal interpretation
precisely to enable the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts, including
those known only to their adversaries, in order that trials may not be carried on in the dark.
AIR PHILIPPINES CORP. VS. PENNSWELL INC.

GR 172835 | Dec 13 2007 | J. Chico-Nazario

Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from
being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.

Facts:

Air Philippines Corporation (APC) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and
selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. Pennswell delivered and sold to APC sundry
goods in trade. Under the contracts, APC’s total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with
interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. APC failed to comply that Pennswell
filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.

APC alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by Pennswell for its previous
sale of four items which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. APC said that had Penswell
been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items
complained of.

Moreover, APC alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held
them on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that Penswell would return to APC the amount it
previously paid. However, APC was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding
payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which later became the subject of Complaint for Collection of a
Sum of Money against APC.

During the pendency of the trial, APC filed a Motion to Compel Pennswell to give a detailed list
of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order
granting the petitioner’s motion.

Pennswell sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be

compelled to disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued
that what APC endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be
forced to divulge.

The RTC gave credence to Pennswell’s reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC, APC filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004 of the
RTC. APC’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Unyielding, APC brought the instant Petition before
SC.

Issue:
W/N CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioner’s motion to subject respondent’s
products to compulsory disclosure or discovery.

Held:
No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory
disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that
there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the
detailed chemical composition of its products.

The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the
recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the
Constitution. SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from
national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its
owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a
secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding
some article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following
factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.

APC cannot rely on Section 77of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines, in
order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all
consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their
general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to
respondent. Respondent’s specialized lubricants — namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound —
are not consumer products.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical
formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both
courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such
factual findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.

The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the
main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from
the facts, petitioner received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure,
there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the
greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the
conflicting interests between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade
secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from
being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
G.R. No. 98458 July 17, 1996

COCOLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. NLRC and JERIMIAS MAGO

FACTS:

In 1980, petitioner, which was engaged in the production of coffee, coconut, cacao and black
pepper at its plantation in Lamian, Basilan, hired Jerimias, an agriculturist by profession, as Field
Supervisor. His work consisted of servicing the agricultural needs of respondent at its plantation.

Sometime in January 1989, petitioner came to know that Jerimias was engaged in extending
technical services and advice to small farmers without prior clearance from the management. On account
thereof, the company through its vice president for operations, Alfredo de la Cruz, issued a memorandum
charging Jerimias with reportedly imparting company technology in coffee propagation techniques by
rendering professional services to outside parties without the knowledge or consent of the management
and in violation of its policy against unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets, which violation was allegedly
a ground for termination of his services with the company.

In his letter-reply, Jerimias admitted that he accepted the invitations of small farm owners and
gave outside consultancy services at their farms. However he denied having violated petitioner’s policy
against unauthorized disclosure of its trade secret, claiming that its technology on coffee propagation
techniques was no longer a trade secret as the same had been learned and applied by outside parties
since 1986.

De la Cruz refuted Jerimias’s assertions and averred that Jerimias was able to learn coffee
propagation techniques because he was sent for training in Bukidnon and subsequently trained by the
company. De la Cruz interpreted Jerimias’s explanations in his letter as a refusal to comply with
petitioner’s policy. Jerimias was directed to explain in writing within 48 hours why he should not be
terminated. Jerimias complied but de la Cruz was not satisfied and advised Jerimias that his explanations
were inadmissible to management and the management will terminate his services for loss of trust and
confidence.

Jerimias filed a complaint against petitioner and/or Alfredo de la Cruz for illegal dismissal with
damages, with DOLE. After hearing on the merits, LA Ismael found his dismissal tainted with illegality.
Petitioner and Jerimias appealed the decision to NLRC which issued two (2) resolutions sustaining illegal
dismissal and ordering reinstatement along with payment of backwages or if reinstatement is impossible,
payment of separation pay.

Petitioner argues that the dismissal was legal and it rejects the finding that the coffee propagation
techniques can no longer be considered a trade secret because Jerimias sufficiently established by means
of government published leaflets and brochures that the techniques are already freely available to the
public.

ISSUE:

Whether or not NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion for declaring that Jerimias was illegally
dismissed.
HELD:

No. Petitioner failed to establish by competent evidence the existence of a company policy and
as to the confidentiality of their technology. Thus, it failed to prove violation of its policy, hence the
dismissal is unjustified. It follows that there was no basis at all for Jerimias’s dismissal on the ground of
either disobedience or loss of trust and confidence.

Petitioner did not even present any evidence to prove its allegations against Jerimias. On the
contrary, it was Jerimias who before NLRC duly established that the purported secret propagation
technique was no longer secret as it had attained wide currency via government publications.

Further, petitioner’s failure to give Jerimias the benefit of hearing and investigation before his
termination constitutes an infringement of his right to due process of law.
Chan vs. Chan
G.R. No. 179786
July 24, 2013

Facts:

Petitioner wife filed against respondent husband a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, with
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains, and the award of custody of their children to her,
claiming that respondent husband failed to care for and support his family and that a psychiatrist
diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking and excessive use of prohibited drugs.

Respondent husband claims that it was the wife who failed in her duties. And that he initially agreed to
marriage counseling to save their marriage, but upon arriving at the hospital, two men forcibly held him
by both arms while another gave him an injection. He attached a Philhealth Claim Form to his answer as
proof that he was forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. However, that same form
carried a physician's handwritten note that the husband suffered from methamphetamine and alcohol
abuse.

Based on the physician's handwritten statement, petitioner wife requested for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum addressed to Medical City, for the production of the Husband's medical records. The husband
opposed, arguing that the medical records were covered by physician-patient privilege. The request of
the wife was denied by the trial court. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Did the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering the husband's hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character
of the physician-patient communication?

Held:

No. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum is premature. Petitioner wife made the request before trial
started. She will have to wait for trial to begin before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum covering her husband's hospital records. It is when those records are produced for
examination at the trial, that the husband may opt to object, not just to their admission in evidence, but
more so to their disclosure.

It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering
the hospital records as a motion for production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant
prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides: x x x
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a limitation: the documents to be
disclosed are “not privileged.”
Petitioner wife, of course, claims that the hospital records subject of this case are not privileged since it is
the “testimonial” evidence of the physician that may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130
states that the physician “cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined”
regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, according to her, does not cover the hospital
records, but only the examination of the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital records—the results of tests
that the physician ordered, the diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave
him— would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the patient’s consent. Physician
memorializes all these information in the patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of
compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with the patient, without
the latter’s prior consent.
RULE 29 (REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH MODES OF DISCOVERY)

Felisa Jaravata vs. Maria Diana Karolus, Grace Kuhail

G.R. No. 154988, June 21, 2007

FACTS:

The case stemmed from an action for reconveyance and declaration of nullity of titles and damages filed
by petitioner alleging that she is the lawful owner and actual occupant of a parcel of land involved. In her
complaint, it was narrated that as early as 1950, petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
actual, continuous, open, and public possession of Lots in the concept of an owner. In addition to the
uninterrupted physical possession, petitioner averred that she had planted and cultivated the subject
parcels of land and had declared the same for taxation purposes. Sometime in 1992, petitioner discovered
that her relatives, herein respondents, fraudulently and illegally secured titles over Lots 1 and 2. Petitioner
recounted that respondent Karolus, through fraud and misrepresentation, was able to obtain approval, in
her name, of Free Patent and for which an OCT was issued by the Register of Deeds of Zambales involving
an area of 41,505 sq. m. It was further alleged that petitioner's Lot 1 overlapped with the property
registered in the name of respondent Karolus. Moreover, respondent Kuhail, also purportedly through
fraud and misrepresentation, was granted a Free Patent for which an OCT was issued. The property, with
an area of 33,476 sq. m., is supposedly identical to or overlaps with Lot 2 of the petitioner.

Petitioner: Furthermore, petitioner asseverated that the free patents issued to respondents should be
declared null and void ab initio on the grounds that respondents or any of their alleged predecessors-in-
interest have never been in possession of the contested lots; that the titles to both lots were secured
through fraud and misrepresentation; and that respondents were never qualified to be grantees of free
patents in 1988 on account of their age and citizenship. Lastly, petitioner insisted that the disputed lots
ceased to be part of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources to dispose of or award as free patents to third parties,
because she became its owner, ipso facto and by operation of law, on account of her open and continuous
possession and cultivation for more than 30 years, her payment of taxes thereon, and her exercise of all
attributes of ownership.

Respondent: As affirmative and special defenses, respondents argued that petitioner's action for
reconveyance had already prescribed since it was admitted in her complaint that she came to know of the
existence of the titles in the early part of 1992. Accordingly, the four-year prescriptive period from the
discovery of fraud had already prescribed. On the declaration of nullity of the Torrens titles, respondents
averred that petitioner had no cause of action because the matter may only be raised by the government.
As compulsory counterclaims, respondents alleged that sometime in August 1995, petitioner, through
stealth and strategy, forcibly entered the areas covered by the Torrens titles of respondents, ousting the
latter from their lawful possession and despite demands, refused to vacate the said area.
Modes of Discovery: Petitioner served upon the respondents and their counsel two separate and different
sets of written interrogatories. Respondents filed their objection to the written interrogatories. The RTC
denied the objections interposed by the respondents and allowed petitioner's written interrogatories.
Respondents filed a manifestation and compliance attaching their answers thereto to the written
interrogatories. Petitioner filed an omnibus motion primarily to compel the respondents to fully and
completely answer their written interrogatories.

RTC: The RTC declared respondents in default for their failure to fully answer the written interrogatories
in the principal action. The trial court renders judgment by default in favor of plaintiff. Aggrieved,
respondents filed a notice of appeal before the CA. Disposing of the appeal, the CA ruled thereon and
reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner's Arguments: Petitioner argues that there was no trial on the merits and presentation of any
evidence before the court a quo and, therefore, the CA could not validly dismiss the case. She adds that
the CA's jurisdiction was merely limited to reviewing whether or not the default judgment of the RTC was
in accordance with Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court was correct in granting the respondents' appeal and in
dismissing the complaint before the court a quo.

RULING: YES. The petition has merit. The CA rightly held that the court a quo erred in rendering a
judgment by default against the defendants for refusal or failure to answer written interrogatories,
without first requiring an application by the proponent to compel an answer.

Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals erred in proceeding to decide the case on the merits since there was
as yet no trial or presentation of evidence in the court a quo. Petitioner's prayer to affirm the trial court's
default decision does not mean that there was a trial. The decision of the trial court was based on
constructive admissions by the defendants of the allegations of the plaintiff due to the court's application
of the sanction for not answering the written interrogatories.

In reversing the application of the sanction, the CA should have given the parties a chance to substantiate
by evidence their respective claims at the trial court. This is particularly true with respect to the plaintiff's
claim of physical possession for more than 30 years, regarding which the CA said that clear and convincing
evidence was required but wanting. This is because the wrong procedure followed by the trial court
effectively aborted a trial and presentation of evidence.
Dela Torre Vs. Pepsi Cola Products Phils. G.R No. 130243, October 30, 1998

Facts:
Regional Trial Court... complaint filed by the petitioners against private... respondents... on the ground
of refusal to make discovery.
Petitioners are holders of softdrink bottle caps bearing the number 349, allegedly a winning digit in a
contest sponsored by respondents
Due to the refusal of respondents... deliver the prizes, petitioners... filed eight (8) separate complaints...
for specific performance and damages
Respondent PI filed answers to the... complaints of petitioners, while respondent PCPPI filed motions to
dismiss the same on the grounds of failure to state a cause of action and forum shopping.
Petitioners likewise filed separate... motions for authority to litigate in forma pauperis.
respondent PI sent written interrogatories to petitioners consisting of 59 questions aimed at
determining their eligibility to litigate as paupers.
Regional Trial Court of Makati issued an order suspending the proceedings until petitioners could
complete the documents required for establishing their right to litigate as paupers.
petitioners did not answer the written interrogatories
Respondent... filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of refusal of petitioners to make
discovery... he trial court granted the motion to dismiss
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied their motion... then filed a
special civil action for certiorari in this Court to set aside the aforesaid orders of the trial court. The case
was referred to the Court... of Appeals,... ffirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioners' failure to answer written interrogatories is a sufficient reason for the
dismissal of their complaints.
Ruling:
Under Rule 24, §1 and Rule 25, §1 of the 1964 Rules of Court, a litigant may serve, with leave of
court and after jurisdiction has been obtained over the defendant or, even without such leave, after an
answer has been served, written interrogatories on the adverse party.
The purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the parties in clarifying the issues and in
ascertaining the facts involved in a case.
To ensure the efficacy of the various modes of discovery, the Rules provide sanctions against a party
who refuses to make discovery.
This Court has upheld the dismissal of an action due to the refusal of the plaintiff to make discovery.
However, the determination of the sanction a court should impose for the failure of a party to comply
with the modes of... discovery rests on sound judicial discretion.
In the case at bar, we think the trial court was rather precipitate in dismissing the complaints of
petitioners against respondents
The written interrogatories served by respondent PI on petitioners dealt with ancillary matters...
which,.are not directly related to the main issues in the suit.
the written interrogatories sent by respondent PI to petitioners were for the purpose of finding out if
the latter were entitled to litigate as paupers, that is, whether they should be exempted from paying
docket fees.
Since the payment of docket fees is jurisdictional,[11] respondent PI was certainly entitled to know
whether petitioners were eligible to litigate as paupers. The fact that petitioners later submitted
affidavits, documents, and other supporting papers on... this matter did not justify their failure to
answer the written interrogatories since at the time these were served, respondent PI obviously did not
have the information contained in the said documents. However, since after all respondent PI was able
to get the information it... needed, the dismissal of petitioners' complaints appears to be rather a drastic
action to take for failure to answer questions dealing with ancillary matters and not with the main issues
in a case.
Furthermore, it appears that petitioners' failure to answer the written interrogatories was due, not to
intransigence, but to a misapprehension of the scope of the trial court's order,... Petitioners thought
that the court's order had the effect of suspending all other matters connected with the case, including
the service of answers to the written interrogatories of private respondent PI and for this reason did not
respond to the same.
It would be unjust, however, to impose on petitioners such a drastic sanction as the dismissal of their
complaints for a mistake committed in good faith.
the circumstances in the instant case similarly warrant a benign attitude towards petitioners' failure to
answer the written interrogatories.
Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals 238 SCRA 88, November 14, 1994

Facts:

On 04 April 1989, Ofelia Brucal, together with her daughter Donna Brucal, herein private
respondents, claiming to be the designated beneficiaries of Horacio Aquino, brother of Ofelia Brucal,
brought an action against Insular Life to recover from the latter the proceeds of an insurance policy
covering the life of now deceased Aquino.

In its answer, Insular Life contended, among other things, that the insurance policy was a nullity,
there having been gross misrepresentation and material concealment in its procurement and that, in any
case, the death of the insured was not accidental, but deliberate, thereby precluding, under the terms of
the policy, the recovery of the insurance proceeds.

Before pre-trial, Insular Life filed a motion for leave to file a third-party complaint against Ofelia
Brucal’s husband, respondent Ricardo Brucal, an insurance underwriter of Philam Life Insurance. Insular
Life asserted that Ricardo Brucal forged, or caused to be forged, the signature of Horacio Aquino on the
application for insurance coverage. The trial court granted the motion. Ricardo Brucal filed his answer.
The parties thereupon submitted their respective pre-trial briefs.

In the course of the proceedings that followed, Insular Life sent private respondents a request for
admission along with a set of written interrogatories. Insular Life likewise filed a motion asking the trial
court to direct private respondents to produce six (6) other alleged insurance policies, as well as other
related papers, covering the life of Horacio Aquino and to allow the inspection of the site where Aquino
died. The trial court, in its 16th February 1990 Order, directed counsel for private respondents to
comment. In their manifestation, dated 02 March 1990, private respondents averred that the request of
Insular Life was merely “designed to delay the proceedings and just a fishing expedition.”

The trial court, in its 13th March 1990 Order, denied the request for the production of the
documents aforestated; relative, however, to the written interrogatories, it ruled:

“In the matter of the written interrogatories, Third-Party Defendant Ricardo Brucal and plaintiffs
objected to the same, thru its manifestation received by the Court on March 2, 1990. The
objection is anchored on immateriality, impertinency and irrelevancy. The Court believes
otherwise and rules that the plaintiffs and third-party defendant must answer the interrogatories
within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.” (Emphasis supplied)
“SO ORDERED.”

Private respondents failed to give their answers to the interrogatories. On the scheduled initial
presentation of evidence by private respondents on 13 June 1990, private respondents still had not
provided any answer to the written interrogatories, prompting Insular Life to file, on 20 June 1990, a
motion to dismiss the complaint and to declare third party defendant Rodolfo Brucal in default. Private
respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the modes of discovery should not be so utilized as to, in
effect, permit unrestrained “fishing expeditions.”

In an Order, dated 05 July 1990, the trial court denied the motion of Insular Life, holding that
“(s)ubstantial justice (would) be better served if the case (were to be) decided on (the) merits.” The denial
was reiterated in its 31st July 1990 Order, but the court re-scheduled the hearing “(t)o give (Insular Life)
ample time to elevate the matter to the higher courts and (to) secure a ruling thereon.”

Two months later, or on 01 October 1990, Insular Life filed with the Court of Appeals its petition
for certiorari, injunction and mandamus, with prayer for temporary restraining order, assailing the 05th
July 1990 Order of the trial court. On 11 October 1990, the appellate court issued a restraining order.

On 07 January 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision ultimately denying
Insular Life’s petition and remanding the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The grounds relied upon by Insular Life in filing the instant petition before us revolve around its
main predicate expressed in the prefatory statement, viz:

“ ‘In the interest of substantial justice,’ the trial court refused to dismiss the complaint or at least
to consider defendant’s (Insular Life) defense and third party plaintiff’s (Insular Life) action as
established on account of the adverse parties’ repeated and groundless refusal to obey the trial
court’s Order directing them to answer the written interrogatories proffered by defendant, in the
light of the express provision to that effect of Rule 29, Section 5 and other related provisions in
the Rules of Court.”

Issue:

Does the refusal of the private respondents to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under
Rule 25 in this case warrant the declaration of the third-party defendant in default and the dismissal of
the case?

Ruling:

No.

Section 5, Rule 29 states:

“Sec. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers.—If a party or an officer or managing agent of
a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served
with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25, after
proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any
part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter
a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable
expenses incurred by the other, including attorney’s fees.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests
on the sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and
overriding interest of justice. For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of
litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice.
It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of each case and to make their considered
determination thereafter. It is only in clear cases of grave abuse of that discretion when appellate courts
will interfere in their judgment.
 The real issue in this case, therefore, is whether or not the trial court has committed grave abuse
of discretion in its questioned order. Like the appellate court to which the matter has been initially
addressed, the Court is not inclined to conclude that any such clear transgression has been committed by
the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court.
Capitol Hills Golf & Country Club Inc. vs. Sanchez. G.R. No. 182738. February 24, 2014.

Facts. – This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Resolution of the Regional Trial Court.

On July 1, 2002, respondent Manuel O. Sanchez (respondent), a stockholder of petitioner Capitol Hills Golf
& Country Club, Inc. (Corporation) filed a petition for the nullification of the annual meeting of
stockholders of May 21, 2002 and the special meeting of stockholders of April 23, 2002.

On August 12, 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents, which the
court granted in an Order dated September 10, 2002 directing the defendants to produce and make
available for inspection and photocopying by the plaintiff the following documents:
1. The list of stockholders of record as of March 2002;
2. All proxies, whether validated or not, which have been received by the defendants;
3. The specimen signatures of all stockholders as contained in the Stock and Transfer Book or on the stub
of the stock certificate; and
4. The tape recording of the stockholders’ meeting on April 23, 2002 and May 21, 2002.

In the meantime, respondent sought to enforce the September 10, 2002 Order. The supposed inspection
also did not push through after petitioners and their co–defendants moved for its deferment. During the
January 11, 2007 inspection, the only document produced was the Stock and Transfer Book of the
Corporation. Petitioners alleged that they could not find from the corporate records the copies of the
proxies submitted by the stockholders, including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders’
meetings, and that they needed more time to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002,
which was in the bodega of the Corporation. This prompted respondent to file a Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion praying that an order be issued in accordance with Section 3, Paragraphs (a) to (d) of
Rule 29 of the Rules of Court (Rules), in relation to Section 4, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra–Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 (Interim Rules).

In order to give both the plaintiff and defendants one last chance to comply with the order dated
September 10, 2002, the trial court issued a Resolution reiterating the order to produce and make
available for inspection and photocopying the above documents. The court also resolved that failure of
the defendants to comply with all the requirements of the order dated September 10, 2002 will result in
the court citing all the defendants in contempt of court and shall sanction the defendants solidarily to pay
a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay to comply with the order of September 10, 2002 until the
defendants shall have fully and completely complied with the said order. Petitioners questioned the
aforesaid Resolution. Petitioners contend that the “threatened imminent action” is not proper and calls
for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s power of supervision over the lower courts. They also claim that
the threatened citation for contempt is not in line with the policy that there should be wilfullness or that
the contumacious act be done deliberately in disregard of the authority of the court.

Issue. – Is the lower court’s threatened imposition of sanction for contempt of court and the possible
payment of a hefty fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay proper?

Held. – Yes. The Court said that a person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court
or commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt. The Court also said that the threatened
sanction of possibly ordering petitioners to solidarily pay a fine of P10,000.00 for every day of delay in
complying with the September 10, 2002 Order is well within the allowable range of penalty.

Under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules, if a party or an officer or managing agent of a party refuses to obey
an order to produce any document or other things for inspection, copying, or photographing or to permit
it to be done, the court may make such orders as are just. The enumeration of options given to the court
under Section 3, Rule 29 of the Rules is not exclusive, as shown by the phrase “among others.” If adjudged
guilty of indirect contempt, the respondent who committed it against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank may be punished with a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos, or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both.
SPOUSES ZEPEDA vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION

[G.R. No. 172175] (October 9, 2006)

FACTS:

Spouses Expedito and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan
documents with damages against respondent Chinabank before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur.

They alleged that on June 28, 1995, they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00 from respondent
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-23136.

Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence they requested
for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when respondent
bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property on October 9, 2001 where it emerged as the highest
bidder. Respondent bank was issued a Provisional Certificate of Sale and upon petitioners’ failure to
redeem the property, ownership was consolidated in its favor.

According to petitioners, the foreclosure proceedings should be annulled for failure to comply with the
posting and publication requirements.

Respondent bank’s motion to dismiss was denied, hence it filed an answer with special affirmative
defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of written interrogatories with 20 questions.

RTC: denied Chinabank’s affirmative defenses for lack of merit as well as its motion to expunge the
complaint for being premature.

CA: reversed the RTC’s order of dismissal and held that spouses Zepada failed to answer Chinabank’s
written interrogatories; and the complaint states no cause of action.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer respondent’s written
interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

NO. The petition is granted.

As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon, the consequences enumerated in
Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served,
refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order
compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.

In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a
particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not
Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads:
“SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers.—If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party
willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such
interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that
party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that
party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including
attorney’s fees.”

Due to respondent bank’s filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that
the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on
Section 3.

The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within the sound discretion of the trial court.
G.R. No. L-34897 July 15, 1975

RAUL ARELLANO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF SORSOGON, BRANCH I, and SANTIAGO UY-BARRETA

Facts:
The case started when Barreta filed a civil case against Arellano and Bayona for reconveyance, with
damages, of a certain parcel of land located in Sorsogon. Arellano filed a motion to dismiss alleging
failure to state cause of action and simultaneously dispatched written interrogatories to Barreta
pursuant to Rule 25 of Rules of Court. However, Arellano did not receive Barreto’s answer to the
interrogatories. Arellano then filed a motion before the court to require Barreta to file his answer within
5 days, and in case of failure to do so, to dismiss the complaint. Repeated postponements were made by
Barreta. Eventually, Arellano filed an instant motion to dismiss alleging failure to comply with the Rules
of Court, and that 2 years had already lapsed since the written interrogatories were sent to Barreta. RTC
affirmed that motion of Arellano and dismissed the complaint.
Three months later, Barreta filed a "Motion for Reinclusion of Raul Arellano as Indispensable Party
Defendant.” He alleged that failure to file an answer to interrogatories is not a ground for dismissal of
complaint and he has now the documents needed to answer Arellano’s queries. However, RTC denied
the said motion of Barreta. A year later, Barreta again filed a "Motion to Set Aside Orders Dismissing
Complaint against Defendant Raul Arellano” alleging the same grounds. The trial court again denied the
motion.
A month later, Barreta again filed a "Motion for Admission of Amended Complaint," which was granted
by the trial court. Arellano moved for the dismissal but the same was denied. The trial court alleged that
there was an introduction of new cause of action on the complaint. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not failure to answer written interrogatories is a ground for dismissal of action.
Held:
Yes. Failure to answer to the written interrogatories is a ground for dismissal of action.
Section 5 of Rule 29 which provides that if a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to
take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories
submitted under Rule 25, after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice,
may dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof.
In this case, two years had passed when the written interrogatories were sent to Barreta. Instead of
answering, repeated motions for extension and postponement were filed. Several promises were made
by the counsel of Barreta on the filing of the answer to interrogatories. Further, Barreta was given
sufficient time to oppose the motion. But willingly failed to do so. Clearly, the failure to file an answer to
interrogatories is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the case.