Canadian Journal of Sociology

"A Social Structure of Many Souls": Moral Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation
Author(s): Mitchell Dean

Source: The Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie, Vol. 19, No. 2,
Special Issue on Moral Regulation (Spring, 1994), pp. 145-168
Published by: Canadian Journal of Sociology
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3341342 .
Accessed: 15/06/2014 09:34
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Canadian Journal of Sociology is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 09:34:35 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
"A social structureof manysouls":Moral
regulation,government,andself-
formation*
Mitchell Dean
Abstract. This article explores different ways of thinking about the general problem of the
interconnectionbetween self-formationand political and governmentalpracticesand processes. It
first explicates the thesis of the relation of moral regulationand state formationadvanced in the
writings of Philip Corrigan. It argues that, despite its strengths, this formulation has several
difficulties: its reliance on a culturalistaccountof the work of moralregulation;its unduefocus on
the state;andits inabilityto approachdomainsof self-formationat a distancefromthe state.It further
arguesthatmany of the problemsraisedwithinthis frameworkcan be formulatedmore effectively
by developing the analytic of governmentalityprovided by Michel Foucault. Such a framework
allows us to understandhow processesof politicalsubjectificationaredependentupon,if irreducible
to, both governmentaland ethical practicesof self-formation.
Resume. Cet articleexploredes manieresvari6esde penserauproblme gen6ralde larelationentre

la formationdu rapporta soi d'une partet les pratiqueset processuspolitiqueset gouverementaux
d'autre part. Il explique tout d'abord la these de la relation entre regulationmorale et formation
6tatiquepr6sent6edans les travauxde Philip Corrigan.L'article pr6tendque, malgr6ses qualit6s,
l'approchede Corriganest marqu6eparplusiersdifficult6s:elle s'appuiesurune versionculturaliste
du travail de regulationmorale;elle est trop centr6esur l'Etat; elle est incapabled'approcherdes
domainesde formationdurapporthsoi, a distancede l'Etat.L'articlepretendaussi que plusieursdes
problemessoulev6s parce cadreanalytiquepeuventplus efficacementetreformulesen d6veloppant
la problematiquede la gouverementalit6 offerteparMichel Foucault.Une telle approchepermetde
comprendrecommentdes processusd'assujetissementpolitiqued6pendent,sansleuretrer6ductibles,
de pratiquesgouverementales et 6thiquesde formationde soi.
* Please address all correspondenceand offprint requests to Dr. Mitchell Dean, School of
BehaviouralSciences, MacquarieUniversity, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia.
CanadianJournalof Sociology/Cahierscanadiensde sociologie 19(2) 1994 145

In all willing it is absolutelya questionof commandingand obeying, on the basis, as I have said
already,of a social structurecomposedof many 'souls' .... (Nietzsche, 1973: 31)'
AfterDurkheim,sociology mightbe describedas a "naturalscience of morals"

(cf. Turner, 1992) in that it presupposes the primacy of society over the
individual in accountingfor causes or origins of moral values and conduct.
Moreover, it construes this as a process immanentto the development of
societies. In his lectureson civic morals,Durkheimdiscusses the subsumption
andthepromotionof the individualby the stateas a "lawof moralmechanics ...
just as inevitable as the laws of physical mechanics"(1992: 60). In contrast,
Philip Corrigan'suse of the term "moralregulation"seeks to overcome this
naturalisticformulationof sociology by stressingthe constructedandcontested
characterof what is takento be naturaland normalincluding,presumably,the
necessityof socialdeterminationitself. Inotherwords,it is notsufficientto assert
thecausalprimacyof "thesocial"as a sociologicala priori;rather,it is necessary
to show how this primacyoccursin particularcases in such a way as to make it
appearas necessary, inevitable, and natural.Sociology cannot, then, ground
itself in generalnotionsof social causality;to be effective, it mustbegin with a
sense of the contingencyof what appearsas inevitable.
On this basis, Corriganfound an elision within Durkheim'sthought:
Thereis a slippagebetweenthe categories'moral'and 'social', andbetween 'State' and 'Society';
takentogether,these resultin systematicallysuppressingtheconstrainedbut-constructedfeaturesof
humansociationin favourof theirnaturalisationas normalisedstatesof humanlife (anyhumanlife).
Thusif we comparesuchtexts as TheDivisionof LabourandSuicideor ProfessionalEthics... and
Moral Education,we find the formertitle in each couple elaboratingin moreparticulartermsthat
which the latterhas (quite literally)socialized. (Corrigan,1990: 106, originalemphasis)
WhatCorriganseeks to address,then,is not the processby which "Society"

necessarilystampsitself on thepersonalityof individualsbutthemeansby which
"constructed"identitiescome to be formed,re-formedand takento be natural
and normal.It is this naturalizingandnormalizingprocessthatis at the core of
Corrigan's specification of the concept of moral regulation. This concept
concerns a) the naturalizationand normalizationeffects of b) the externaland
constrainingforce (afterDurkheim)of c) social relationson d) identities and
subjectivities.Nevertheless,pace Durkheim,or at least a certaintypecastingof
him, Corrigan(1990: 114) insists on the multiple natureof identity, without
which we cannotunderstand"thefragility,permeability,difficulty,agony, and
yet poetic energyof most humanlives which resultfromattemptingto live with
and through the contradictorycombinationof a variety of possible social
classifications,possible identities."
1. Inthis section,Nietzscherepeatedlyreturnsto ananalogybetweenthe social structureof the self
anda "well-constructedandhappycommonwealth."The will is comparedto a rulingclass that
establishesits commandover"under-wills"or"under-souls." This analogyseemsto meentirely
useful andgermaneto the discussionof moralregulationif for no otherreasonthanthatconcept
must include meansfor the promotionof such a "socialstructureof souls."
146

A preliminarypoint to note here can be raisedby asking the question, "why
moral"?This is somethingthatneeds to be clarifiedin the following discussion
if we are to be clear as to what separatesthis term, and the analysis it makes
possible, from a revamped version of that old sociological faithful, social
control. However, it is not the neologism that makes Corrigan's thought
interesting. It is the attemptto rethinkthe linkages between the regulationof
conduct and the state. This attempt is embodied in what might be called
"Corrigan'sformula."This formulais presentalreadyin the title of his doctoral
thesis (Corrigan,1977), "Stateformationandmoralregulation... ,"andis given
greaterclarityin the openingpagesof TheGreatArch(CorriganandSayer, 1985:
4), where it is statedthat"moralregulationis coextensive with stateformation."
The agency of moral regulationfor Corriganis, above all, the state. What is
interesting,althoughnot novel - given the work of NorbertElias (1978; 1982;
1983) and, more recently,Michel Foucault- aboutthis formulais the attempt
to thinkof the stateas an historicalprocess of formationlinked to the formation
of individualand collective capacities,identities,and conducts.This paperwill
deal with both sides of Corrigan'sformula,for it is not possible to think about
one withoutthe other,andwhatI am most interestedin is the developmentof the
insight thatthereis a relationor overlapbetween the two disparateprocesses of
state-buildingand individualcitizen-formation.
I wish, however, to dissentfromkey aspectsof Corrigan's approach.I dissent
not from Corrigan'sattemptto make intelligiblethe naturalizationandnormali-
zation of socially formedidentitiesbut from his accountof the means by which
this occurs. I suggest that this account is deficient in three major ways: its
dependence on the language and frameworkof "culture";the mannerin which
it conceives the state, particularlyits "state-centredness";and the absence of a
concertedapproachto domainsof self-formationthatoperateat a distancefrom
the state.Manyof theproblemsraisedwithinthetermsof Corrigan's formulacan
be reformulatedmore effectively in what amountsto the open analytic space
providedby a full appreciationof the thematicsof govermentality that appear
in Michel Foucault's later writings, lectures, and interviews.
In the first section, I considerCorrigan'sformula,particularlyin The Great
Arch, and expand upon and illustratethe limitationsjust noted. In the second, I
ponderthe possibilities of developing a morals/ethicscontrastas one between a
set of principles or codes, on the one hand, and practicesof self-formationand
regulation,on the other.I arguethatit is in this last regardthatthe Foucauldian
theme of govermentality as the intersection of practices of ethical self-
formationandpracticesof governmentprovidesan instructiveanalyticalframe-
work ratherthana generalsocial theory.Whatfollows is hence an interpretative
descriptionof some of the majorfeaturesof thatanalyticand illustrationsof its
use, and an exposition andtransformationof the conceptuallanguage appropri-
ateto it. InparticularI addresswhatI call theproblemof "politicalsubjectification"
147

from the perspectiveof a concernwith practicesof governmentaland ethical
self-formation.I also consider how that frameworkdiffers from its nearest
sociological counterpart,the theoryof the sociogenesis of the modem form of
self providedby NorbertElias's historicalsociology.
Ina briefconclusion,I summarizetheargumentwithrespectto thelimitations
of the Corriganthesis of the identityof moralregulationandstateformationand
the relative strengthsof Foucault'saccountof ethical and governmentalself-
formation. I suggest that the mode of political subjectificationin liberal-
democratic states (i.e., the treatmentof political subjects as if they were
autonomouscitizens within self-governingpolitical communities)should be
understoodas (at leastin part)conditionedby variouspracticesof governmental
and ethical self-formationoperatingfrom a varietyof locales both within and
outside the state.
1
Duringthe heydayof workon the theoryof the statein the 1970s therewas little
discussion- with the notableexceptionof Nicos Poulantzas'attempts(1978:
63-75) to incorporateFoucauldianthemes - on questions of identity and
individualityand practicesand process of individualization.It may be that a
similarpoint can be made aboutthe morerecentturnto an historicalsociology
of the state.This is a massiveoversightif it is notedthatwhatmightbe calledthe
"technologyof individualization,"i.e., the panoply of social security, educa-
tional, and medical practices concerned with the promotion, shaping, and
regulationof conductof free individuals,is a core conditionof the means and
objectivesof governanceandadministrationof the stateandotherauthoritiesin
contemporary"liberal"societies.
In this regard,Corriganand Sayer's historical sociology of English state
formation,The GreatArch (1985), may be, if not unique,at least exceptional.
Unlike much of the historicalsociology of the state, this book eschews both a
comparativemethod and the attemptto establish a causal thesis about the
formationof the state.Ratherit seeks to introduceconsiderationsof individual-
ity, identity,and subjectivityinto the heartof an accountof the developmentof
the Englishstate.In this it is remarkablysuccessful.The limitationsof the book
derivefromwhatamountsto a culturalistunderstandingof manyof the features
of state activities and power it examines. Its principalthesis, echoed in its
subtitle,is thatEnglishstateformationis culturalrevolution.I takethis to mean
thatthe narrativeof the state cannotbe divorcedfrom the regulationand even
constitutionof particularculturalforms, and thatthe state itself is constructed
within such forms. At the heart of such a problematicis the attributionof
meaningful identities by state practices and processes and the materialand
historicalforces - of class, gender,race,religion,andso on - thatgive rise to
such meanings.
148

A crucialpartof this culturaltransformation,and at the core of the way these
authorsconsiderthe effects of the state,is the process of moralregulation.This
is where the thesis of the common topographyof moral regulation and state
formationis introduced.Indeed,if one were to give the CorriganandSayerthesis
a theoretical form, it is that state formation effects cultural transformation
through the mechanism of moral regulation.However, in keeping with their
generalapproach,the notionof moralregulationis presentedin termsof culture.
Thus, returningto an earlierpaper,we find thatCorriganconceived (1990: 111)
the work of moralregulationas the reproductionof particularforms of expres-
sion thatattemptto fix as normalrepresentationsof types of experience,andthat
the "meansof moral regulation"are thus "expressiveforms and norms."
In TheGreatArchmoralregulationis above all a projectof normalizationand
naturalizationof the premisesof a specific social order.It concernsthe meaning
of state activities for the constitution and regulation of social identities and
subjectivities (Corriganand Sayer, 1985: 2). This moral regulation centrally
takes place by giving "unitaryand unifying expression"to "multifacetedand
differentialhistoricalexperiencesof groups,denying theirparticularity"(1985:
4). It legitimizes forms of individual and collective identity as it denies the
legitimacy of otherforms, as well as the realitiesof inequalityof class, gender,
ethnicity, age, locality, occupation,and belief.
Corriganand Sayer inflect what could be a quite straightforwardMarxist
account of the representationof individualitywithin "bourgeois"state forms
with two manoeuvres. The first is borrowed from a reading of Foucault's
writingson governmentalityandthe second fromDurkheim's conceptionof the
state. First they arguethatmoralregulationhas a "totalizing"and "individual-
izing" aspect (CorriganandSayer, 1985:4-5). It is totalizingin thatit represents
"people" as members of an illusory and imaginary political community in
notions of nationality and citizenship. It is individualizing in so far as it
represents people within various categories of identity, such as citizens,
taxpayers,jurors, parents,consumers, voters, and so on. The crucial terms in
their account of how these identities are represented and how they have
determinate effects are the "routines"and "rituals"of state. The routines
embody these forms of identity, treating people as if they fall within such
categories. The rituals of state, on the other hand, broadcastthese identities,
particularlythe totalizing ones, in a grandiloquentform and so naturalizeand
normalize them as a part of national identity. There are problems with this
notion of representationand its mechanisms I shall return to in a moment.
Simply note now that the effectiveness of state formationon moral regulation
is restrictedto the ways in which identities are constructedin various forms of
representationandthe consequentmeaning"people"(a highly naturalisticterm
if ever there was one) attachto their experiences, activities, lives, careers, and
relationships.
149

The second inflection within Marxism comes from its marriage with
Durkheimianthoughton the natureof the stateas an organof social thoughtand
moral discipline, at first a parasiteon the conscience collective, which it then
comes to regulate (Corriganand Sayer, 1985: 6-10). The dual sense of the
Frenchwordconscienceas conscienceandconsciousnesscomes intoplay in the
analysis. Collective representationsare both forms of descriptionof social
identitiesandrelationsandalso normativeprescriptionsof the legitimateforms
of existence possible.The statebecomesa focus of suchrepresentations,taking
an active role in the regulation of those collective representationswhich
prescribethe limits of what is permittedas they describe forms of identity.
CombiningDurkheimwith Marx, the authorsconclude that the state project
concerns the constructionof aspirationand the interalization of bourgeois
normsas constitutiveof personalities(1985:194-95). As a result,capitalism,for
example, is not simply an economybut a "setof social formsof life" regulated
throughthe state (1985: 188). TheGreatArchis a highly interestingattemptto
introducequestionsof individuality,identity,andsubjectivityinto problemsof
the state and its consequences for social life. However, there are several
weaknessesthatfollow fromthe way it constructsan accountof moralregula-
tion;thesebecomepertinentinouraccountof Foucault's rubricofgovermentality.
The first problem involves the range of effects of what we might call a
culturalistconceptionof the workof moralregulation.The way in which these
authorsconceive of moralregulationas a culturalprocesspresupposes,first, a
realmof experiencegroundedin materialrelations(Corriganand Sayer, 1985:
7) and, second, an ideal domainof the representationof experience.Cultural
processes,in sucha framework,areones in whichexperiencescanbe expressed,
denied,excluded,or distortedat anotherlevel, thatof meaningor representation
(or, in otherversions,ideas andvalues). Corriganand Sayeruse this dual-level
frameworkof experienceand meaningin a complex manner.Both realmsare
thoroughlyhistoricizedandpluralizedandthe representationof experienceis a
contesteddomain.They write, for example,of the "historicalexperiences"of
different groups and the "collective representations"of them, the contested
natureof the representationof the "historicalexperiencesof the dominated"and
the consequentdenialof oppositionalmeanings,moralities,representations, and
expressions(1985: 7-8, 187).
Neverthelessthere are generaldifficultieswith maintainingthis dual-level
structureof experienceand meaning.Not the least is thatthe very categoryof
experience invokes a residual naturalismthat belies the attemptto examine
processes of naturalization.This naturalismtakes the form of a philosophical
anthropologyof the humansubjectas a culturalbeing, i.e., as a being endowed
with a capacity to attachand bestow meaningto its experience,much in the
mannerof Max Weber's accountof the "transcendental presupposition"of the
culturalsciences.Weber(1949:81, originalemphasis)suggeststhatthe"cultural
150

sciences" are founded on the presuppositionthat "we are cultural beings,
endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberateattitudetowardthe
world and lend it significance."This presuppositionlimits the analysis of self-
formationto a process by which humansubjects,as a matterof course, come to
bestow meaning on or to represent their experience. It thus forecloses the
analysis of the multiplicityof the practical,technical, and discursive means by
which self-formationoccurs andthe possibility thatthe meaning-givingsubject
of its own experience itself is a particularsocial and cultural category and
dependent upon definite social-historicaland intellectual conditions. Even in
whatis impreciselyandproblematicallyregardedas Westernmodernitythe best
thatcan be saidis thatcertainhistoricallygiven social andculturalpracticesmay
treat human beings as if they were such subjects. While this might seem a
somewhat abstractpoint, much of what is arguedin the rest of the papercan be
understoodas its elucidationand illustration.
A more specific observationthatcan be madeconcerningthe introductionof
this philosophicalconceptionof the subjectinto an accountof the effects of the
state and state powers is that it is at odds with the recent emphasis on the
"infrastructural"or "administrative"powers of the state (e.g., Mann, 1988;
Giddens, 1985). These notions stress what might be thoughtof as the logistics
of governmentover time and space, the techniquesand means by which power
is concentratedin particularlocales or "powercontainers"andby which rule can
"actat a distance"(Rose andMiller, 1992). In themselves, they do not approach
the problemof moralregulation.However, they can be linked to what is now a
quite old insight of Foucaultinto the infrastructuralnatureof disciplinaryand
biopoliticalpowersandpractices(e.g., 1977:220-23; 1979b: 140-42). By doing
so, it becomes possible to considerthe way in which governmentalpowers use
andorganizecorporealandotherattributes,andso formdefinitecapacitiesin the
attainmentof particulargoals, andthe way in which varioustypes of identitymay
form the explicit objective of governmentalpractices,e.g., in education, social
welfare assistance,etc. The reversionto a formof culturalanalysisin which self-
formationis conceived in termsof the field of meaninghas a numberof effects.
It undulyrestrictsattentionto the symbolicrealmof the actionof the statein self-
formation and so cannot constitute an analytic of the diverse ways in which
governmentaltechniquesandpracticesareimplicatedin the formation,develop-
ment, and assemblage of humancapacities. As a consequence, it excludes the
possibility of an analysis of how particularlinguistic, discursive, and other
representationalmeans operate within the entire complex of governmental
practices,techniques, and powers.
To frame the question of moral regulationin terms of the representationof
experience is thus to ignore or at least underplaythe various ways in which
specific governmentaland administrativepractices operateboth singly and in
concert to direct the life-conduct of actors whether as clients, claimants, or
151

subjects, of the state, and the degree to which this directionhas come to be
dependent on the definition of what might be called life-choices (this is
especially clear in the administrativedevices concerningsocial welfare assist-
ance, debateson povertytraps,notionsof "activesystems"of income support,
etc.). In so far as we can speakof "representation" to denote the way in which
of
categories identity and agency are constituted within governmentaldis-
courses, it becomes efficacious to the extentthatit is inscribed withinstrategies,
policies, and administrative arrangements concerned to promoteandtransform
aspects of the conduct of life (Weber'sLebensfiihrung2) of variousgroupsand
individuals, often by means of the implantation of forms of self-relationby the
marshallingand trainingof bodily capacities.To thinkof moralregulationin
terms of the (mis)attributionof meaning to experience is to remainwithin a
generaltheoryof languageandrepresentationandthusto foreclosethe complex
analysisof the relationbetweenspecific politicalandgovernmentaldiscourses
andrationalities,andadministrativetechniques,practices,rituals,androutines.
If thereis a tendencyto conceive moralregulationas a componentof the state
as a cultural form in The Great Arch, there is also a tendency - this time
contraryto Durkheim'sstress on the complexityof the state (1992a: 48) - to
overemphasizethe unityof the stateandits consequences.I would note thatthis
unity may be implied by the philosophicalanthropologyjust considered.The
state takes the place of the philosophical subject in the moral regulationof
individuals,i.e., as the principalagent of the representationof experienceand
bestowal of meaning to it. In any case, Corrigan's insight into the fragile
constructionof individualidentityneedsto be complementedby a greatersense
of the fragmentarycharacterof state formationand the difficulty (and, in a
sense, fruitlessness)of seeking to locate a division between "thestate"and its
outside. This restrictionto the state is problematicin several ways. Above all,
it ignores the multiplicityof agencies and authoritiesinvolved in the govern-
ance of the life-conductof individuals,families, groups,andpopulations.This
is clearly illustratedby the multiple and overlappingjurisdictions involving
local, regional, national, international,and global authoritieswithin which
actorsarelocated.It is evidencedby the widespreaddevelopmentof non-profit
community and social services in advanced liberal democracies which are
fundedpartiallyby the nationalstatebutrunby citizen associations,andby the
neoliberaluse of corporations,charities,andfamilies, to achieve governmental
objectives (e.g., the provisionof welfare anddomesticcare, the establishment
2. Forexamplesof his use of this term,see Max Weber'sseminalprogrammaticstatementsof his
sociology of religion,the introductionto his "Theeconomic ethic of worldreligions,"and his
"Intermediatereflections,"publishedundersomewhatobscuretitles in Weber(1970: 267-301,
323-59). This concernis evident throughouthis justly famous The ProtestantEthic and the
Spirit of Capitalism(Weber, 1985). For a lively and provocativediscussion of the lattertext
whichemphasizesthe importanceof theproblematicof theformationof theLebensfiihrung,see
Hennis's article(1983), reprintedin Hennis(1988).
152

of prisons, job-centres, etc.). It can be also instanced by the introductionof
managementand efficiency normsmodelled on the supposedoperationsof the
private corporationinto state employment and organization. Moreover, this
form of analysis does not allow for dispersion of the policies and strategies
enunciatedwithinvarioussectorsof the state(say, betweenthe nationaltreasury
and a women's unit of a regionalDepartmentof Health)andthe possibility that
moral regulatory strategies could be similarly dispersed and dissonant (e.g.,
between the forms of sexuality sanctionedwithin the militaryand within anti-
discriminationlegislation). The oft-used caveat implied by the word "contra-
diction"- as in the earlierquote concernedwith humanidentity- cannot do
justice to this dispersion of both strategies, their intended consequences, and
their range of (intended, semi-intended, unintended, and indeed perverse)
effects, and the dissonance within and between specific strategies, programs,
policies, and their consequences.
A thirdset of problemswith the Corriganformulastems from the fact of this
dispersion of policies, practices, effects, and their consequences. If this is
accepted,thentherewould be reasonto examinethe activitiesandconsequences
of other agencies and authoritiesin regardto the formationof identities. Not to
do so is at odds with Durkheim(1992a: 47-50) who stresses the importanceof
"secondaryorgans"and "special groups,"as well as "social currents"uncon-
nectedto the state,in the networksof social governance.Not only arethereother
agencies involved in practicesof the governanceof the conduct of individuals
thatexist in variousrelations(legal, regulatory,fiscal, financial,diplomatic,etc.)
to sectors of the nation-state,but there are also other practicesand techniques
which centre on moral regulation,which have a highly variablerelationto the
state. These "practicesof the self' run the gamut from the "acceptable"ones
promoted by "psy"disciplines, social work, medicine, education, established
religion, forms of sport and physical culture, to the plethora of practices
associated with cults of self-liberationand self-improvement(frommartialarts
to sexual realization)and "how-to"programsin work, business, money, mar-
riage, andlove. Indeed,it may be thatby bringingthese practicesandtechniques
of the self into focus in relationto a considerationof governmentalpowers and
administrativepracticesthatwe areled to a problematizationof the notionof the
stateperse, i.e., as a unitaryentityconcernedwiththeproductionorreproduction
of a particularsocial orderbased on definite forms of subjectivity,and as the
agent of social control.
Finally, with regardto TheGreatArch,it mightbe observedthatamid all the
emphasis on moral regulationand the productionof individualities,the nub of
the problem of citizenship is not addressed:how political governmentcan be
conceived in termof a communityof self-governingcitizenswhen governmental
and ethical practicesare boundup with the creation,shaping,andpromotionof
the capacities of these citizens. Surprisinglylittle attentionis paid to the status
153

of the self-governingcitizennotonly in CorriganandSayerbutalso all therecent
literatureon the historicalsociology of the state.Yet it is preciselythis issue that
suggests a possible interconnectionof that historical sociology with central
issues of political thought.
In the next section, I want to suggest that a fuller appreciationof the
ramifications of Foucault's thought on discipline in particular, and
govermentality morebroadly,can help us move beyondthe limitationsof this
conceptionof moralregulation.
2
Despite the limitationsI have noted in the precedingsection, Corrigan's(and
Sayer's) accountof moralregulationis significantin thatit seeks to addressthe
problem of the intersectionof political and governmentalprocesses of state
formationwith types of self-formation.Thereis, however,the issue of the force
of the adjective, moral, and the differencebetween moral regulationand an
accountof socialcontrolas theformationof personalitytypesthroughtheagency
andpracticesof the state.To clarifythis, it is worthconsideringthe problemof
the use of "moral."
Considerthe distinctionbetween morals and ethics. As a first illustration,
Durkheim's sociology as a science of moralitysharessomethingwith its virtual
contemporary,Nietzsche's genealogyof morals(1969), whichuses the German
term Moral. Both seek to locate the social and historicalorigins and present
purposesof systemsof morality,i.e., of codes of good andbad,rightandwrong,
etc. Moralsreferin these,as in commonuse, to codes of evaluation.Inbothcases,
however,the stressis on thepracticalratherthantheoreticalformof morality.For
Durkheim,moralindividualismis a matterof practice,of moralsin so faras they
are embodied in social institutions(1992a: 59). For Nietzsche, the codes of
moralityare subordinateto the practicesof self-formation,what he called the
"moralityof mores."It is "withthe aid of this moralityof mores andthe social
straitjacketman was actually made calculable" (Nietzsche 1969: 59). Ni-
etzsche's task may be understoodas a "revaluation"of values and codes by
referenceto the social, political,ethical,andascetic practicesin which they are
embedded.Inthis sensehe is close to Kantwho, as IanHackingpointsout (1986:
239), uses thetermSittein numeroustitles,whichis translatedas ethicsbutrefers
to customsandpracticesnotexclusively moral.Weber,who owes muchto both
Kantand Nietzsche (Hennis, 1988), uses the termEthikin his writingson the
economicethicof worldreligionswhichhe definesas "thepracticalimpulsesfor
action which are founded in the psychological and pragmaticcontexts of
religions"(Weber, 1970: 267).
Withoutseekingto homogenizethe workof these differentthinkers,thereis
somethingto be learnthere for our presentpurposes.In so far as we seek to
addressissues of the directionof conductwithinsocial practices,thenwhat we
154

areconcernedwith is less the explicit, codified, system of evaluationsthanwith
self-formationwithin practicaland pragmaticforms and contexts of everyday
life, less with the theoreticalartifice of commandmentsand law than with the
practicalconduct of life. In this sense, we are concernedless with moralityand
more with ethics, or, to be more precise, we are concernedwith morality as it
codifies and is inscribedwithin and modified by ethical practices.
It is not, perhaps,coincidental that Foucault,like Weber both Kantianand
Nietzschean in certainways, allowed one of his last interviewsto be called "A
genealogy of ethics" (1986b). The latter volumes of his history of sexuality
(1985; 1986a) can be understoodas an explorationof ethics as a set of practices
of self-formationthatareautonomousfrom,yet interdependentwith, other(e.g.,
political, governmental,discursive)practicesof self-formation.Forthis thinker,
who had earlierbeen suspected of a "hyperdetermination" of the subject, this
new focus on ethics makes possible a considerationof the emergence of the
myriadpracticesthatfocus on the "relationof self to self,"the rapporta soi. This,
of course, also requiresa recastingof his earlierconcernsto such a degree that
Foucault(1986c) was eventuallyto agreeto a characterizationof his own abiding
concerns as more ethical thanpolitical.
This shift in our discussion to issues of ethical self-formationhighlights the
problems of the very term "moralregulation."The adjective, moral, remains
indeterminatebecause it delineates no clear domain that is (even relatively)
autonomous from forms of political regulation and state power. It might be
suspectedthatthe termsimply continuesthe sociological preoccupationwith the
state as the agency of social controland only differs by having a more complex
account of how that control occurs, i.e., by the naturalizingand normalizingof
certainforms of identitythroughthe representationsinscribedin state routines
and broadcastin state rituals.This bringsus back to the thirdproblemoutlined
above, the inabilityof the languageof moralregulationto addressthe existence
of spheresof self-regulationandself-formationthatarenotimmediatelypolitical
(unless thatterm is to encompasseverythingand so become meaningless). The
formationof politicalidentity- "politicalsubjectification"-can only be made
fully intelligible if placed in relationto the irreducibledomains of ethical self-
formationand governmentalself-formation.One key implicationof the discus-
sion thus far is the need to develop an analysis thatis capableof understanding
the diversity of processes of self-formation, in particularthe autonomy and
interrelationshipof governmentaland ethical practices in this regard,and the
relationbetween these practicesof self-formation,on the one hand,andpolitical
subjectification,on the other.
To clarify, by political subjectificationI mean the practices and discourses
that treat individuals as if they were political subjects in their diverse forms,
particularlythe treatmentof individualsas sovereignsubjectsor citizens within
a self-governingpolitical communityunderthe conditionsof liberaldemocracy
155

(cf. Hindess, 1991). Governmentalself-formationrefersto the ways in which
variousauthoritiesand agencies seek to shapethe conduct,aspirations,needs,
desires, and capacitiesof specified categoriesof individuals,to enlist them in
particularstrategiesand to seek definedgoals; ethical self-formationconcerns
practices,techniques,anddiscoursesof thegovernmentof the self by the self, by
meansof whichindividualsseekto know,decipher,andacton themselves.These
three terms allow us to distinguishanalyticdomainsthat, while not mutually
exclusive, mayconditionandpresupposeone anotherin specific circumstances.
FollowingbothWeberandFoucault,then,it is possible to recastthe problem
of sociology itself as one of the way in which social practices,customs,habits,
and beliefs are implicatedin diverseprocesses of self-formation.While proc-
esses of political subjectificationconstitutean autonomousdomainfor critical
thought,they drawupon, and intersect,variousforms of self-formation- not
only the governmentaland ethical practices explored in this paper but also
discursive practices and practicesfor the productionof truth(e.g., Foucault,
1982; 1993). Moreover,the theme of political subjectificationis not new. It is
alreadypresentin Hobbes's observationthat,dueto theirasocialnature,humans
can only becomepoliticalsubjectsex disciplina(De Cive,I, 1). It is also present
in Durkheim'sthemes on the state:the type of moralauthorityappropriateto
moral individualism;the constructionand enforcementof individual rights
within the state;the oppositionto doctrinesof naturalright,etc.
One might wish to rereadFoucault's great popularwork, Discipline and
Punish (1977) as a set of variationson this theme of political subjectification.
Drawing broadly on that text, we can note several clarificationsFoucault's
analysis offers us on the problems outlined in the first section. Firstly, the
analysisof politicalsubjectificationshouldbe morecautioustowarda presumed
identity of "moralregulation"with "stateformation."Processes of political
subjectificationare not necessarilylocatedwithin the statebut are constructed
from practices operating from multiple and heterogeneouslocales (citizen
associations,charities,tradeunions,families, schools, workplaces,etc.). These
practicesare not immediatelypolitical and have diverse historicalorigins and
uses - military, pedagogical, religious, ascetic, bureaucratic,medical, eco-
nomic, and so forth.While they areintensifiedandrefinedby theirapplication
within enclosed institutions(schools, factories,hospitals, asylums, etc.) they
"swarm"withinthe socialbody.To restrictattentionto theway in whichthe state
is involvedin politicalsubjectificationis to ignorethe way in whichgovernmen-
tal practicesof self-formationcome to colonize, compose, and transformthe
state itself.
Second, ratherthanpoliticalsubjectificationentailingprocessesof meaning
and(mis)representation of theexperienceof the subject,for Foucaultit involves
the use and applicationof differenttypes of self-relation.To takea well-known
example, the forms of surveillancepromotedby discipline,and exemplifiedin
156

Bentham's Panopticon,do not work by attachmentof (ideological) meaningto
one's activity but by the inducementwithin the subjectof "a state of conscious
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power"
(Foucault,1977: 201). This is achievedthroughthe organizationof powerwithin
definiteformsof time-space.InBentham's case, thevery design andarchitecture
of the enclosure is constructedaccordingto the principle of the visibility and
unverifiabilityof power.Politicalsubjectificationworksby the establishmentof
forms of self-relationthroughdisciplinarypracticesand techniquesof surveil-
lance, and throughthe materialorganizationof conductin time-space.Thus the
citizen - the self-governing subject of rights - and the "docile and useful"
individual sought by disciplinary practices are reciprocal conditions of one
another in Foucault's account of representativedemocracy (1977: 222-23).
Indeed,following Deleuze (1988: 99-103), one mightthinkof Foucault's notion
of the self by means of a spatial metaphoras involving the "folding"back of
exteriorrelationsof power andgovernanceto createan "interiority"thatcan act
of itself. One might furtherspeak of a tissue of foldings by which the self is
constitutedas an independentself-governingentity, a free subject,that can act
on itself through "practices of the self' as it is acted upon in practices of
government.While Discipline andPunish(Foucault,1977: 26-29) is concerned
with the folding back of the "politicaltechnology of the body" to encompass a
space of self-reflexivity, and so providesa "genealogyof the moder soul,"it is
in the lattervolumes of his History of Sexuality(1985; 1986a) that the foldings
in which the self acts on itself, knows and deciphersitself, are fully addressed.
Finally, these forms of political subjectificationoperatingthroughparticular
techniques of government are specified within forms of normalizing and
scientific discourse or, as he puts it, an entire "scientifico-legal complex"
(Foucault, 1977: 23). Foucault would seem to be emphasizing the "routines"
ratherthanthe "rituals"of power as the key to political subjectification.Indeed,
his account of the transformationof punitive practices within a changing
complex of "power-knowledge"is sketched against the background of the
diminutionof the significance of the ritualform of sovereigntymanifest in the
spectacular of torture (supplice). The crucial point, however, is that these
routinesdo not simply operateaccordingto moreor less arbitraryclassifications
and categories of individualsbut are the loci of the formationof definite types
of rationalityandknowledge,which in turnarelinkedto governmentalprograms
and operate as the means of strategy. The governmental routines of self-
formation conditioning political subjectificationcannot be made intelligible
apartfrom the forms of knowledge (the normalizingdiscourses of the human
sciences) which are invested in them and on which their operationdepends.
This history of disciplinarypracticesas a key to political subjectificationis
subsumed under a much more general theme of the practices, techniques and
mentalities of government in Foucault's later lectures. The key term here is
157

"governmentality."A glance at how Foucault uses this term immediately
reveals the multiplicity of its domains and the way they traverse a similar
territoryto that markedout by Corrigan.In a seminarin Vermont,he defined
govemmentality as "the contact between the technologies of dominationof
othersandthose of the self' (Foucault,1988d: 19; cf. 1993) and so capturedits
role at the fulcrum of his political and ethical problematics.Again, in an
interviewafterthe publicationof the second andthirdvolumes of TheHistory
of Sexuality,he suggestedthatgovermentality implies the ethical relationof
self to self, and that it concernsstrategiesfor the directionof conduct of free
individuals (Foucault, 1988a: 19-20). What makes Foucault's later studies
pertinentto the presentdiscussion,I would suggest, is condensedin this notion
of govermentality. It defines a novel thought-spaceacross the domains of
ethics, government,andpolitics,of thegovernmentof self, others,andthe state,
of practices of governmentand practices of the self, of self-formationand
political subjectification,thatweaves themtogetherwithouta reductionof one
to the other.
This term can act as the generalheading of two relatedtransmutationsof
Foucault's thoughtin theseyears.Ontheone hand,the "microphysicsof power"
- exemplifiedby thedisciplinarytechniqueswhichfindtheirpointof application
in the minutiae of the comportmentof the humanbody - becomes, in his
lectures, a genealogy of governmentality,with its concerns for the complex
historicaltrajectoryof formsof politicalrationality(e.g., his Stanfordlectures,
Foucault, 1988c) and theirrelationto techniquesand technologies of govern-
ment, particularlyin the contextof the historyof liberalismand the analysisof
neoliberalism(Foucault,1989: 110-19). On the other,his historyof sexuality
becomes a genealogyof the desiringsubject,concernedwith a kindof morphol-
ogy of the historical forms of ethical practice grounded in practices and
techniquesconcernedwith self-cultivationandself-stylization(Foucault,1985;
1986a). The notion of governmentality,encompassingthe governmentof the
state,the governmentof others,andthegovernmentof self is thefulcrumaround
which Foucaultproposesto thinkthe linkagesbetweenthesehistoricaldomains
of practice. It is also the angle from which he proposes to reflect upon the
formationof political subjects,citizens, and communities.
Foucaultestablishesa commonapproachto eachof thesedomains.Inkeeping
with Weberand Nietzsche,he gives primacyto the formsof governmentaland
ethicalpractice over theirlegal andmoralcodificationandformalization.More
importantly,he elaborates a methodology germane to the analysis of the
governmentof oneself andthegovernmentof others.Inrelationto thegenealogy
of ethics, this methodologyisolates four dimensions(Foucault,1985: 26-28;
1986a:238-39; 1986b:352-57; 1988d;1993):thatof ontology,concernedwith
whatwe seek to governin ourselvesandothers,the "ethicalsubstance"worked
on by the respectivetechniques(e.g., the pleasuresor aphrodisiain Greece,the
158

flesh in early Christianity,sexuality in contemporaryliberationethics); that of
ascetics, concernedwith how we govern this substance,the work on self, or the
self-forming activity or "forms of asceticism" (e.g., the employment of the
various "techniquesof the self' such as dialogue, listening, meditation,prayer,
trainingof memory,mortificationrituals,diary-keeping,self-examination,and,
of course, confession, thatcomprisethe Hellenistic andChristianculturesof the
self, Foucault, 1988d); that of deontology, concerned with the "mode of
subjectification,"with the positions we take or are given in relationto rules and
norms, with why we govern ourselves or othersin a particularmanner(e.g., to
live a noble andbeautifullife in antiquity,to submitto God's law in Christianity,
to become universal rationalbeings in Kantianism,to fulfil our potential in
contemporaryliberationmovements);and thatof teleology, the aim, end, goal,
design, or telos of these practices,of the mode of being we hope to create,of what
we hope to produce (e.g., self-mastery through moderation for the Greeks,
salvationthroughself-renunciationin Christianity,the emancipationof the self
for contemporaryliberationmovements).
While this methodologyis madeexplicit in relationto ethicalpracticesin The
Use of Pleasure, it can be appliedto what might be more narrowlyregardedas
governmentalpractices. To exemplify this, we have to go no furtherthan the
account of "moder" punitivepracticesfound in the first chapterof Discipline
and Punish (Foucault, 1977: 16-31). There the substance of the punishable
element is less the criminal act than the "soul"of the criminal- the circum-
stances, instincts,passions, desires, andeffects of environmentor heredity.The
work of punishmentbecomes one of the supervision, management,and nor-
malizationof the individual.The criminalis subjectifiedas delinquent,deviant,
or maladjusted,as one capableor incapableof normalization.Finally, the telos
of moder systems of punishmentis not to be found in the internalhistory of
criminaljustice itself. Ratherthe telos refersto how the penaltyis incorporated
in a patternof activities andknowledgeleadingto a specific end, a specific mode
of being or, as Weberwould have putit, conductof life. The telos of punishment
then is discipline itself, the new "politicaltechnology of the body" designed to
operateon the body so thatthe subjectwill governhim or herself as a docile and
useful individual.
Two aspectsof this schemaandmode of analysisof ethicalandgovernmental
practicesare germane:first, both sets of practicesare analyzedby similartools
concerned with the substance, work, mode, and end of practices of self-
formation;second, thatwhile both can be subjectto parallelforms of analysis,
they are quite distinctdomains.For Foucault'sthoughton the relationbetween
practices of governmentand self-formation,there is no one single schema, or
type and directionof causality.Thereis simply the suppositionthatboth can be
understoodin termsof the forms of self-relationthey presupposeand enact and
thatit is possible to discuss the interconnectionbetween the two domains.This
159

then is less a theory of the relation between state and individual, or state
formationandmoralregulation,andmorean analyticof differentialdomainsof
practice.
If we are to turn this analysis towardone of political subjectification,we
should note that no analysis of the formationof political subjectsis possible
withouta full accountof boththe way in whichvariousauthoritiesseek to direct
the conduct of individualsand groupsand the ways in which individualsand
groupsseek to acton themselves.Nevertheless,we shouldalso notethatpolitical
subjectificationcannotbe reducedto these governmentalandethicalpractices:
voluntaryassociation,political participationof variouskinds, communityac-
tion, public demonstrations,etc., are all means of formationof citizens and
collective solidaritiesquitedistinctfrompracticesof governmentandpractices
of the self. However,the capacitiesused in such activitiescruciallydependon
various governmentalpractices,from literacyand numeracyto a modicumof
economic security,and ethicalpractices,e.g., ones concernedwith "assertive-
ness," "self-esteem,"and "consciousnessraising."
One might like to view this dual transmutationof Foucault's work as an
openness to the questionsput to his earliergenealogies by critics. In the first
place, he addressesthe problemof how it is possible to analyzethe macro-level
of the state from within a methodologicalframeworkcontinuous with the
microphysicsof power.Second,he seeks to show how it is possible to conceive
of the subject as a site of independentconduct without relapsing into an
essentialist framework,and to addressquestions of resistanceto relations of
poweranddomination,andproblemsof freedomandautonomymoregenerally.
Finally,by markingthe consequencesof thesetwo problems,Foucaultis able to
suggest the contoursof a differentiatedanalysisof power and dominationthat
poses ways of thinkingaboutpoliticalnormswithoutrecourseto a foundationin
a universalsystem of values (e.g., 1988a;Patton,1989; 1993; Miller, 1987).
The notion of govemmentalityis pivotalbecauseit allows us to follow two
crucialsets of continuitiesin Foucault's thought.First,therearethe continuities
between the microphysicsof power (andthe politicaltechnology of the body)
and the concerns of the governmentof nations, populations,and societies.
Second, thereis a continuumestablishedbetweenbothof these andthe practice
of ethics as a form of governmentof the self. The notion of governmentality
implies, then, first a projectfor the analysisof the statewhich would no longer
relyon thejuxtapositionof micro-andmacro-levelsof power,andtheconceptual
antimonyof an analyticsof micropowersandthe theoryof sovereignty.It also,
however, suggests a domain of the investigationof the relationbetween the
governmentof the self by theself, of one's own existence,andotheragenciesand
spheres of the governmentof conduct, includingbut not limited to forms of
political government.It is in the delineationof such a domainthatthe problem
of political subjectificationcan be raised.
160

This triple domain of self-government, the government of others, and the
governmentof the state,is capturedby Foucault's concernto mobilize anearlier
sense of the term, in evidence in sixteenth-centuryChristianpastorals, neo-
Stoicism, pedagogy, and advice to the prince. Here governmentencompasses
the government of oneself, of souls and lives, of children and households, as
well as the art of conducting affairs of state (Foucault, 1979a: 5). Moreover,
Foucault's generalcharacterizationof governmentas la conduitede la conduite,
or the conductof conduct(Gordon,1987: 296), suggests thatthe termmarksout
a massive domain between the minutiae of individual self-examination, self-
care, and self-reflection andthe techniquesandrationalitiesconcernedwith the
governance of the state.
I want simply to draw out several points regardingFoucault's approachto
each of these domains and to suggest how they may be used to open up further
a criticalhistoricalsociology of politicalsubjectification.3First,the genealogies
of government and the self not only effect a displacement within Foucault's
thought, but also within conventional forms of ethics and political analysis.
Thus Foucault juxtaposes an analytic of the practices of government to the
theory of the state and remarksthat he refrains from the latter as one might
abstainfrom an indigestiblemeal (Gordon,1991: 4). He also juxtaposes ethical
practices, or practicesof the self, to moralcodes, suggesting thatthe history of
moralcodes reveals little aboutchangingmodalitiesof ethical self-relationand
self-formation.In both cases, instead on focusing on a unitaryentity ripe for a
general explanation,Foucaultapproachesthe problemfrom the perspective of
a multiplicity of practices as distinct events thatcan be arrangedand followed
in their lineages and series. Second, these lineages interweaveat certainpoints
and direct us to key questions for historicaland sociological analysis. Thus we
might like to pose questions aboutthe connection between the great cultureof
the self of later antiquity that Foucault covers in the third sexuality volume
(1986a) and the Hebraic conceptions of pastoralpower (1988c) in the assem-
blage of the institutional form of early Christianityand its powerful social
laboratory,the monastery. We might consider the revival of Stoicism in the
emergence of an early modern conception of the government of the state in
notions of reason of state (raison d'etat) and cameralistconceptions of police
(Oestreich, 1982). In a more contemporarycontext, we mightpose the question
of the relationbetween cults of personalliberationin recentdecades andthe rise
of a neoliberal critique of the welfare state with its notions of the "enterprise
culture"and the "entrepreneurialself."
These critical histories of ethical and governmental practices of self-
formation and their interconnectionscontributeto a genealogy of our current
3. I have recently sought to develop the implicationsof Foucault's methods of genealogy and
archaeology,andhis conceptionof the historyof thepresent,for historicalsociology, andsocial-
theoreticalunderstandingsof history,underthe title of Critical and EffectiveHistories (Dean,
1994).
161

forms of political subjectificationin relationto the ethos of the welfare-state.
Foucaultsuggests (1988b; 1988c)thattheidealof a welfarestateis boundto the
difficult relationshipbetween pastoraland citizenshipelements, between the
individualizingandtotalizingdimensionsof governmentthatconstructhuman
beings as both autonomousagentswithin a political communityand clients to
be administered,governed,andnormalizedwithrespectto specific governmen-
tal objectives. I think this may be pushed a little furtherin relationto ethical
practicesof the self. The very practiceandrationalityof "care"as it entersthe
welfareideal is madeproblematicbuttheco-presenceof elementsderivedfrom
the careandcultivationof the self, as anexerciseof freedomseekingto establish
an independentrelation of the self to itself, with elements presupposinga
subjectionto agencies concernedwith the provision,security,andhappinessof
populationsandindividuals.Thepastoralpowerof government,"theshepherd-
flock game,"co-exists in some dissociationfromnot only the statusof political
subjects within the "city-citizengame," as Foucaultnotes (1988c), but also
fromwhatwe mightcall the "self-self' gameit seeks to subsume.It is this latter
problemthatis manifestin recentsocial policy discussionsof the need for the
"activesociety" with active systems of income supportto replacethe depend-
ency implicit in the "passive"system of benefits of the welfare state and the
redefinitionof the social problemin termsof anemergentunderclasscharacter-
ized by chronic welfare dependency(e.g., OECD, 1988; Gass, 1988).
Third,all these examplesdemonstratea constantcross-referencingfromone
domain to the other. On the one hand, ethics as an action of "self on self," is
linked to the practice of government,the,governmentof others as well as
oneself. Similarly, the problemof governmentcannot be dissociated from a
reflection on the relation of individuals to themselves, whether as self-
governing citizens in Athenian and other versions of democracy, or in the
reflection on limits to governmentthat are coextensive with what we call
liberalism.At base, and of utmostimportance,the rights of resistance,of the
governed to protest the actions of various forms of government,and of the
governedto variousformsof information,areethicalones. It is in this light we
should read what might be called Foucault's "declarationof the rights of the
governed"in 1981 (Eribon, 1991: 279).
Finally, the problemof bothpolitics andethics is one of the use andpractice
of freedom.Foucaultsuggeststhat"libertyis the ontologicalconditionof ethics.
But ethics is the definite form assumedby liberty"(1988a: 4). That is to say,
ethics is simply not possible withoutfreedomand thatas a practiceit seeks to
shape freedom. Power - or at least the forms of power that compose liberal
practicesof government- comes to operateon andthroughthe conductof the
governed.It seeks a moreor less subtledirectionand shapingof conductrather
thana violentorgrossformof corporealdomination.Inthissense,themicrophysics
of powermay have been overstatedif it gave the impressionof a determinismof
162

power operating upon the body. Here, governmentalpower assumes a "free
subject,"not an individual existing in an essential space of freedom, but one
whose subjectionis consistentwith forms of choice. This theme is particularly
germane to Foucault's discussion of liberalism and neoliberalism. It is also
readily exemplified by all the great motifs of contemporarybureaucraticdeci-
sion-making:contract,consultation,participation,empowerment.The distinc-
tive features of any liberal mode of governmentis that it seeks to prevent the
collapse of types of rule into mere dominationby invoking the capacities and
powers of the self-governingindividual,while at the same time undertakingto
foster, shape, and use those same capacities and powers.
The themes of governmentand the ethical practicesof the self are thus two
separateyet intricatelyinterwovenstrandsof anincreasinglyworked-outthought-
space. It may be thatpracticesof the self and practicesof governmentmutually
presuppose, without ever collapsing into, one another, even when they are
superimposedin a particularmanner,such as withininstitutionalChristianity.It
is in the entwinementof thesetwo themesthatthecharacterof Foucault's thought
seems both to resemble thatof NorbertElias and to be most methodologically
distinctfromit. Both areconcernedwith the relationbetweenpoliticalformsand
forms of self. In Elias's case, however, this is conceived in the groundingof
moder forms of personalityin the emergenceof centralstate authorityand the
internalpacificationof states.However, it is in what each would claim for their
account of the rapportbetween power relations and self-formationthat most
clearly distinguishestheirprojects.Elias undertakesa dispassionateanalysis of
long-termsocial processes(see 1987: 3-41), andseeks to establishthe principles
of a sociological theoryby means of an analysis of historicaldata.He offers us
an englobing thesis of "thecivilizing process"in which thereis a fit between the
formation of the self and the rationalizationof conduct and broadersocietal
processes consequent upon the state monopolizationof violence and taxation
(1978; 1982). He claims no direct philosophical, political, or ethical conse-
quence or statusfor such a venture.Foucaultis both more modest in his claims
and bolder in the spheresof theirapplication.The relationbetween practicesof
government and practices of the self is an open one: these are simply two
relatively independent,but interdependent,domains.Thereis no generalthesis
of their relation, but an open space, one of dispersion rather than general
theoretical connection, that can lend itself to historical investigation. On the
other hand, as a genealogy, based on what Elias would have thought of as an
unwarrantedpolitical "involvement,"Foucault offers polyvalent and cross-
disciplinarydomains of application.The results of his studies can be at times
pertinentto political practice(aroundthe statusof medical power, the practice
of psychiatricconfinement,the role of scientific knowledge, prisoners' strug-
gles, movementsof sexual revolution,etc.), politicalphilosophy(liberalismand
neoliberalism,legal and contracttheory, and socialism), ethics (forms of self-
163

stylizationandself-practice,the debateon the "cultureof narcissism,"therights
of the governed),and the reflexivityof the humanand social sciences. Indeed,
in this paperI have soughtto makeclearthatFoucault'sreflectionon practices
of ethical and governmentalself-formationare not merely positive historical
analysesbutlead to a deeperlegibilityof the conditionsof formationof political
subjectsas citizens and communities.
The entwinementof complex domainsof practicein Foucaultprovidesan
analyticframeworkof the relationbetweentypes of governmentalself-forma-
tion, types of ethical self-formation,and- althoughI have not developedthis
theme here - the constitutionof the self in relationto "gamesof truth,"i.e.,
veridical discourses or discourseschargedwith saying the truth.Power, self,
truth,are the three points of the "Foucaultiantriangle."It is from this non-
reductivegenealogy of theirinterconnectionthatFoucaultchallengesus to the
formationof historicalstudiesthatarecriticalin thattheyproblematizeformsof
identitythatare takenas naturalandgiven, andeffectivein so far as they refuse
to providea safe havenfor any otherformof identity.It is quiteremarkablethat
he was to undertakesuch a projectduringthe periodwhen sociologists such as
NorbertElias andindeed,CorriganandSayer,were sketchingout the domainof
the relationbetween the forms of authorityof the state and the formationof
moder formsof identity.The realchallengeof Foucault's thoughtheremay lie
in its capacityto drivethese questionsfurtherthana newfoundinterdisciplinary
domainof historicalsociology.
3
Foucault'sown workon governmentalityremainedin a relativelyundeveloped
state,althoughthis has been somewhatrectifiedby the exemplaryworkof more
recentsocial analysts(e.g., the articlescontainedin Burchellet al., 1991; Rose
and Miller, 1992). Of course,Foucault'swork in this areais not immunefrom
criticism.We mightwantto investigatehow, havingbrokenwith state-focused
analysis,we canreconceiveaspectsof the nation-state,particularlythe sphereof
law andlegality,in termsof thisconcernforthepracticesof government,orhow,
moregenerally,we areto rethinkthe relationbetweengovernmentandpolitics.
Inthispaper,however,we havedemonstrated thebroadconsistencyof Foucault's
own illuminationof the spheresof governmentandethics:the primacyof ethics
over morality;the privilegeaccordedthe meansandmechanismsof government
over the form of the constitutional,territorialstate;the emphasison practical
questionsof the conductof life in self-formation;andthe posing of the general
problemof political subjectification.
It shouldbe clear thatseveralof the limitationsnotedin Corrigan's formula
of the identitybetween moralregulationand state formationare overcome in
Foucault's themeof governmentality.The latterdoes not rely on the a priori of
a culturalsubjectattachingmeaningorrepresentations to its experience;it shows
164

instead the historical conditions of political subjectification in ethical and
governmentalpractices of self-formation.Its emphasis is not on meaning and
representationbut the practical relations between governmental and ethical
practices and the development and formation of human psychological and
corporealcapacities. It is able to analyze the nation-stateas one, albeit special,
agencyamongothers,e.g., international governmentalorganizations,transnational
corporations, non-statewelfare organizations,businesses,tradeunions, sporting
associations, and media organizations.It enables us to pose questions of the
governmentof the economy, families, bodies, the conduct of life, and of one's
relation with oneself, and to analyze the governmentalizationof the state.
Moreover,if the theme of governmentalityrefuses the reductionof govern-
ment to the state, we must also refuse the reductionof political subjectification
to government.On the one hand,thereare forms of militancy and participation
(in unions, parties, social movement organizations, demonstrations,citizen
associations)thathave consequencesfor formsof politicalidentity.On the other,
there are the non-governmental,ethical practices that are implicated in self-
formation and have consequences for political subjectification. The classic
examples, of course, are the political and economic consequencesof the modes
of self-formationinscribedin religious ethics andthe practiceof religious sects
revealed by Weber's sociology of religion. To take a recentillustration,it may
be simply not possible to analyze the emergence of the "enterpriseculture"in
isolation from the myriadpractices of self-formationand self-cultivation that
have pervadedliberal democraciesin recent decades (the "Californian"cult of
the self, New Age enthusiasms,mass sportingrituals, martialarts, "Eastern"
cults, the "self-stylization"that followed the implosion of the counter-culture
into the "Me generation").
It is clear thatthe problemof political subjectificationcannotbe resolved in
the context of historicalsociological analysis.Forit is at thispointthe discussion
goes beyond the particularways in which individualsare constitutedas various
forms of political subject, e.g., citizen, migrant,voter, taxpayer, client, con-
sumer,claimant,juror,parent,or worker.Whatis at stake is the multiple status
of the political subject: on the one hand, the ideal, specified in our political
rationality,of autonomouscitizens in a self-governingpolitical community;on
the other hand, the space defined by the means and apparatusesof the govern-
ment of self andothers,of practicesof governmentandpracticesof the self. The
problemof political subjectificationat its most generallevel is how we address
the dissonances between these constituentsof the free individualor citizen that
are supported by various governmental and ethical practices and forms of
political reason, and that give shape to our political and social existence.
Thatproblemgoes beyond the boundariesof the presentpaper.What is also
clear, however, is that Foucault has increased the intelligibility of this free
political subject. This subject is constituted by our political rationality and
165

governmentaltechniques as both a self-governing citizen and an object of
fostering, welfare, and care. Yet this division presupposesa more primary
folding. The ways in which the subjectworksuponitself, the relationof self to
self, must also be taken into accountand linked to the most generalforms of
government.The citizen is formednot only as an active memberof a political
communityanda dependentsubjectbutalso as one who workson heror himself
and is, as a consequence,an ethicalbeing. The well-governedcommonwealth
can no longerbe divorcedfromthe commonwealthof manysouls thatis the self.
References
Burchell,Graham,Colin Gordon,andPeterMiller,eds.
1991 TheFoucault Effect:Studiesin Governmentality.London:HarvesterWheatsheaf.
Corrigan,Philip
1990 "Onmoralregulation:some preliminaryremarks."In Social Forms/HumanCapacities.
London:Routledge.
1977 "Stateformationandmoralregulationin nineteenth-centuryBritain:sociological inves-
tigations."UnpublishedPh.D. thesis, Universityof Durham.
Corrigan,Philip and Derek Sayer
1985 The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Dean, Mitchell
1994 CriticalandEffectiveHistories:Foucault'sMethodsandHistoricalSociology.London:
Routledge.
Deleuze, Gilles
1988 Foucault. Trans.S. Hand.Minneapolis:Universityof MinnesotaPress.
Durkheim,Emile
1992 ProfessionalEthics and Civic Morals.Trans.C. Brookfield.London:Routledge.
Elias, Norbert
1978 The CivilizingProcess. Vol. 1. TheHistoryof Manners.Trans.E. Jephcott.New York:
Urizen.
1982 The CivilizingProcess. Vol. 2. State Formationand Civilization.Trans E. Jephcott.
Oxford:Blackwell.
1983 The CourtSociety.Trans.E. Jephcott.Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
1987 Involvementand Detachment. Ed. M. Schrotter,trans. E. Jephcott. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Eribon,Didier
1991 Michel Foucault.Trans.B. Wing. Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversityPress.
Foucault,Michel
1977 Disciplineand Punish:TheBirthof thePrison.Trans.A. Sheridan.London:Allen Lane.
1979a "Governmentality." I and C 6: 5-21.
1979b TheHistoryof Sexuality.Vol. 1.AnIntroduction.Trans.R. Hurley.London:Allen Lane.
1982 "Thesubjectandpower."In H. DreyfusandP. Rabinow,eds., MichelFoucault:Beyond
Structuralismand Hermeneutics.Brighton:Harvester.
1985 The Use of Pleasure. Trans.R. Hurley.New York:Pantheon.
1986a The Care of the Self. Trans.R. Hurley,New York:Pantheon.
1986b "Onthe genealogy of ethics:an overview of the workin progress."In P. Rabinow,ed.,
TheFoucault Reader.Harmondsworth: Penguin.
1986c "Politics and ethics: An interview." In P. Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader.
Harmondsworth: Penguin.
166

1988a "Thecare for the self as a practiceof freedom."In J. BernauerandD. Rasmusssen,eds.,
The Final Foucault. Cambridge,Mass.: MIT Press.
1988b "Thepolitical technology of individuals."In L. H. Martin,H. Gutman,andP. H. Hutton
eds., Technologies of the Self: A Seminarwith Michel Foucault. London:Tavistock.
1988c "Politicsandreason."In M. Foucault,Politics, Philosophy,Culture,ed. L. D. Kritzman.
New York:Routledge.
1988d "Technologies of the self." In L.H. Martin, H. Gutman, and P.H. Hutton, eds.,
Technologies of the Self: A Seminarwith Michel Foucault. London:Tavistock.
1989 Resumedes cours 1970-1982. Paris:Julliard.
1993 "Aboutthe beginningsof thehermeneuticsof the self."Political Theory21 (2): 198-227.
Gass, James
1988 "Towardsthe active society." OECD ObserverJune-July:4-8.
Giddens, Anthony
1985 TheNation-Stateand Violence. Cambridge:Polity.
Gordon,Colin
1987 "The soul of the citizen: Max Weber and Michel Foucault on rationalityand govern-
ment." In S. Whimster and S. Lash, eds., Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity.
London:Allen and Unwin.
1991 "Governmentalrationality:An introduction."In G. Burchell,C. Gordon,and P. Miller,
eds., TheFoucault Effect:Studies in Governmentality.London:HarvesterWheatsheaf.
Hacking, Ian
1986 "Self-improvement."In D.C. Hoy, ed., Foucault: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Basil
Blackwell.
Hennis, Wilhelm
1983 "Max Weber's 'centralquestion'."Economyand Society 12(2): 135-80.
1988 Max Weber:Essays in Reconstruction.London:Allen and Unwin.
Hindess, Barry
1991 "Imaginarypresuppositionsof democracy."Economyand Society 20(2): 173-95.
Mann,Michael
1988 "Theautonomouspowerof the state:its origins,mechanismsandresults."In States, War
and Capitalism:Studies in Political Sociology. Oxford:Basil Blackwell.
Miller, Peter
1987 Dominationand Power. London:Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Nietzsche, Friedrich
1969 On the Genealogy of Morals. Trans. W. Kaufmannand R.J. Holingdale. New York:
RandomHouse.
1973 Beyond Good and Evil. Trans.R.J. Holingdale. Harmondsworth:Penguin.
OECD
1988 The Future of Social Protection. Paris: Organisationfor Economic Co-operationand
Development.
Oestreich,Gerhard
1982 Neostoicism and the Early ModernState. Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press.
Patton,Paul
1989 "Taylorand Foucaulton power and freedom."Political Studies 37: 260-76.
1992 "Le sujet de pouvoir chez Foucault."Sociologie et Societes 24(1).
Poulantzas,Nicos
1978 State, Power, Socialism. Trans.P. Camiller.London:New Left Books.
Rose, Nikolas and Peter Miller
1992 "Political power beyond the state: problematicsof government."British Journal of
Sociology 43(2): 173-205.
167

Turner,Bryan S.
1992 "Prefaceto the secondedition." In E. Durkheim,ProfessionalEthicsand CivicMorals.
Trans.C. Brookfield.London:Routledge.
Weber,Max
1949 TheMethodologyof theSocial Sciences.Trans.anded. E.A. Shils andH.A. Finch.New
York:Free Press.
1970 FromMax Weber:Essays in Sociology.Trans.anded. H.H. GerthandC. WrightMills.
London:Routledgeand KeganPaul.
1985 TheProtestantEthic and the Spiritof Capitalism.Trans.T. Parsons.London:Unwin.
168


Canadian Journal of Sociology

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Título original

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

Canadian Journal of Sociology

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

"A Social Structure of Many Souls": Moral Regulation, Government, and Self-Formation

Author(s): Mitchell Dean

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.160 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 09:34:35 AM

Resume. Cet articleexploredes manieresvari6esde penserauproblme gen6ralde larelationentre