DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122274. July 31, 1996]
SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner, vs. HON. ISAIAS P.
DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B. BAJARIAS, SR.,
Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, and
VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The key issue raised in this special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is whether
the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a
complaint against a government official for grave oral
defamation interrupts the period of prescription of such
offense.
We find this issue to be important enough to merit our
attention. We thus resolved to give due course to the
petition, consider the private respondent's comment on
the petition[1] as the answer thereto, and decide it on the
basis of the pleadings which have sufficiently discussed
the issue.
The factual and procedural antecedents are not disputed.
On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G.
Ginete, then officer-in-charge of the Physical Education
and School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional
Office of Region VII in Cebu City of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), filed with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
(hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave
oral defamation[2] allegedly committed on 23
September 1993 by petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an
Education Supervisor II of the same Regional Office.
The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit
pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of
the Ombudsman, but she failed to do so.
In his resolution of 15 March 1994,[3] Antonio B. Yap,
Graft Investigation Officer I of the said office,
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of
Page 1 of 142
the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of the
necessary information against the petitioner. This
resolution was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-
Visayas.
On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City
filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cebu
City an information[4] for grave oral defamation against
the petitioner. This was docketed as Criminal Case No.
35684-R and assigned to Branch 7 thereof.
On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to
quash[5] the information on the ground that the
"criminal action or liability" has been extinguished. She
contended that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code, the offense of grave oral defamation prescribes in
months and that since the information was filed only on
28 March 1994, or 186 days or 6 months and 6 days
after its alleged commission, the crime had then already
prescribed. In support thereof, she cited the decision in
"Zalderia[6] vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, 211 SCRA 277," wherein this Court ruled that the
filing of an information at the fiscal's office will not stop
the running of the prescriptive period for crimes.
In her opposition,[7] the private respondent cited
Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court which
provides, inter alia, that for offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases and which
fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the
complaint directly with the said court or with the fiscal's
office interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged. The filing of the complaint by the private
respondent with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-
Visayas was equivalent to the filing of a complaint with
the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office under said Section
1 pursuant to its powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The private respondent further claimed that Zaldivia is
inapplicable because it involves an offense covered by
the rule on summary procedure and it explicitly stated
that Section 1 of Rule 110 excludes cases covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN
The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge
Bajarias, denied the motion to quash in the order of 18
July 1994.[8] It fully agreed with the stand of the private
respondent.
Her motion to reconsider[9] the above order having been
denied on 29 November 1994,[10] the petitioner filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special
civil action for certiorari,[11] which was docketed
therein as Civil Case No. CEB-16988. The case was
assigned to Branch 11.
In its decision of 3 July 1995,[12] the RTC, per public
respondent Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed the
challenged orders of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and
29 November 1994. It ruled that the order denying the
motion to quash is interlocutory and that the petitioner's
remedy, per Acharon vs. Purisima,[13] reiterated in
People vs. Bans,[14] was to go to trial without prejudice
on her part to reiterate the special defense she had
invoked in her motion to quash and, if after trial on the
merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Besides, the
petitioner has not satisfactorily and convincingly shown
that Judge Bajarias has acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the orders considering that the
ground invoked by her does not appear to be
indubitable. And even assuming that the MTC erred in
venturing an opinion that the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman is equivalent to the
filing of a complaint with the fiscal's office, such error is
merely one of judgment. For, there is no decided case on
the matter, and the substantive laws have not clearly
stated as to what bodies or agencies of government
should complaints or informations be filed in order that
the period of prescription of crimes or offenses should
be considered interrupted. Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code simply states that the prescriptive period
shall be interrupted by the "filing of the complaint or
information" and has not specified further where such
complaint or information should be filed.
Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to
reconsider[15] the decision in the order of 23 August
1995,[16] the petitioner filed this special civil action
Page 2 of 142
wherein she reiterates the arguments she adduced before
the two courts below. The private respondent likewise
did nothing more in her responsive pleading than
reiterate what she had raised before the said courts.
The basic substantive laws on prescription of offenses
are Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for
offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as
amended, for those penalized by special laws. Under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave
oral defamation, which is the subject of the information
in Criminal Case No. 35684-R of the MTC of Cebu,
prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the Civil
Code provides that when the law speaks of months it
shall be understood to be of 30 days, then grave oral
defamation prescribes in 180 days.[17] Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The
period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information,
and shall commence to run again when such proceedings
terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not
imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were
directly uttered in the presence of the offended party on
23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for
the offense started to run on that date.
The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due
to the filing of the complaint or information had been
the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In
People vs. Tayco,[18] People vs. Del Rosario,[19] and
People vs. Coquia,[20] this Court held that it is the filing
of the complaint or information with the proper court,
viz., the court having jurisdiction over the crime, which
interrupts the running of the period of prescription. On
the other hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte,[21]
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN
a case for libel, this Court held that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace court even for
preliminary investigation purposes only interrupts the
running of the statute of limitations.
However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court
in the second case of People vs. Olarte[22] resolved
once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that
the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court
even for purposes of preliminary investigation only
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription
discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents
holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of
the peace (now municipal judge) does interrupt the
course of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte,
L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People
vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino,
68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of decisions declares
that to produce interruption the complaint or information
must have been filed in the proper court that has
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del
Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration,
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is,
and should be, the one established by the decisions
holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility,
even if the court where the complaint or information is
filed cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons
buttress this conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" without distinguishing
whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for
Page 3 of 142
action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender.
Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.
And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that
the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted," thereby
indicating that the court in which the complaint or
information is filed must have power to acquit or convict
the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But
it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation
where the proceedings may terminate without conviction
or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused
because no prima facie case has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby
overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del
Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.
Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs.
Court of Appeals,[23] this Court not only reiterated
Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding
that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office for
preliminary investigation also suspends the running of
the prescriptive period. Thus:
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .
Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in
People vs. Tayco held that the complaint or information
referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the
proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged
by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so,
according to the court, because under this rule it is so
provided that the period shall commence to run again
when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN
complaint or information terminate without the accused
being convicted or acquitted, adding that the
proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there
in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.
The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however,
was disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited
by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before
the Olarte case, there was diversity of precedents on the
issue of prescription. One view declares that the filing of
the complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal
judge) does interrupt the course of prescriptive term.
This view is found-in People v. Olarte, L-13027, June
30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People v. Uba,
L-13106, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590. The other pronouncement is that to produce
interruption, the complainant or information must have
been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try
the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del
Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People v.
Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and
enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor
General. The reasons for the doctrine which We find
applicable to the case at bar read:
xxx xxx xxx
As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the
court conducting a preliminary investigation, a
proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without
conviction or acquittal.
As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:
To the writer's mind, these reasons logically call with
equal force, for the express overruling also of the
doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that
the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the offended
party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by
law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not
interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities,
criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing
of the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for
Page 4 of 142
preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial
fiscals, besides being empowered like municipal judges
to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even
reverse actions of municipal judges with respect to
charges triable by Courts of First Instance x x x.
Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or
complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended
party, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral
defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39
days after the alleged defamatory remarks were
committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. (Italics supplied)
This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1
October 1993 in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Metro Manila.[24]
The procedural law articulating Francisco is the last
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 110 (Prosecution of
Offenses) of the Rules of Court. We quote the entire
Section for a better understanding of the last paragraph:
SEC. 1. How instituted. For offenses not subject to the
rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:
(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts, by filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the
requisite preliminary investigation therein;
(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, by filing the complaint or information directly
with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's
office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with
the office of the fiscal.
In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of
prescription of the offense charged. (Italics supplied)
The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No.
3326, as amended, whose Section 2 explicitly provides
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN
that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the
institution of judicial proceedings, i.e., the filing of the
complaint or information with the court. The said
section reads:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings
are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons
not constituting double jeopardy. (Italics supplied)
And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,[25] this Court held that
the proceedings referred to in said Section 2 are "judicial
proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or
information with the proper court.
Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the
petitioner, and her invocation thereof is misplaced. In
the first place, it involved a violation of an ordinance,
which is covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
By its express mandate, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court does not apply to cases covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Second, since the ordinance in
question partakes of a special penal statute Act No. 3326
is then applicable; hence, it is the filing in the proper
court of the complaint or information which suspends
the running of the period of prescription. In Zaldivia,
this Court categorically interpreted Section 9 of the Rule
on Summary Procedure to mean that "the running of the
prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that,"
which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act No. 3326.
What is then left to be determined is whether the filing
of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral
defamation with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas
is equivalent to filing the complaint in the prosecutor's
office such that it interrupted the prescriptive period for
grave oral defamation.
Page 5 of 142
Sections 12 and 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution
provide:
SEC. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as
protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall,
in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the
action taken and the result thereof.
SEC. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person,
any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to
be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Corollarily, Sections 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770,
otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 8[26] of
the aforementioned Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, provide as follows:
SEC. 13. Mandate. The Ombudsman and his Deputies,
as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers
or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and
enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability
in every case where the evidence warrants in order to
promote efficient service by the Government to the
people.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint
by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN
or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage
from any investigatory agency of the Government, the
investigation of such cases.
SEC. 16. Applicability. The provisions of this Act shall
apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his
tenure in office.
Needless to state, these broad constitutional and
statutory provisions vest upon the Ombudsman and his
Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary
investigations in criminal cases filed against public
officers or employees, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs. Domingo,
[27] this Court held:
As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman
has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate x x x any act or
omission of any public official x x x when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient." (Sec. 13[1]) The Ombudsman is also
empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case
the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action
against a public official x x x and to recommend his
prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).
The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify
the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public
official or employee that the Ombudsman may
investigate. It does not require that the act or omission
be related to or be connected with or arise from, the
performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
Page 6 of 142
It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or omission of
any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it
is a "shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged."[28]
A public officer, as distinguished from a government
"employee," is a person whose duties involve the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the
functions of government.[29] The petitioner, being an
Education Supervisor II of the Regional Office of
Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer. The
Ombudsman-Visayas then has authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of the private respondent's
complaint against the petitioner for grave oral
defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the first Olarte
case, reiterated as the controlling doctrine in the second
Olarte case, which was broadened in Francisco and
reiterated in Calderon-Bargas, must apply to complaints
filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against public
officers and employees for purposes of preliminary
investigation. Accordingly, the filing of the private
respondent's complaint for grave oral defamation against
the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the
running of the period of prescription of the said offense.
Since the complaint was filed on 13 October 1993, or
barely twenty days from the commission of the crime
charged, the filing then of the information on 28 March
1994 was very well within the six-month prescriptive
period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for
want of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Romero, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., on leave.
[1] Erroneously captioned as "Reply to Petition."
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 7 of 142
SEC 1. LLENES V DICDICAN

[2] Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 26. The complaint is [23] 122 SCRA 538 [1983].
dated 30 September 1993.
[24] 227 SCRA 56, 63 [1993].
[3] Annex "C", Id.; Id., 30.
[25] 211 SCRA 277, 283-84 [1992].
[4] Annex "D", Id.; Id., 33.
[26] It provides:
[5] Annex "E" of Petition: Rollo, 35.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such
[6] Should be Zaldivia. other powers or perform such functions or duties as may
be provided by law.
[7] Annex "F" of Petition; Rollo, 38.
[27] 191 SCRA 545, 550 [1990].
[8] Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 44.
[28] Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, G.R. No. 98452, 26
[9] Annex "H", Id.; Id., 46. September 1991; Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
627, 637 [1993].
[10] Annex "I", Id.; Id., 50.
[29] Section 2, Introductory Provisions, Administrative
[11] Annex "J", Id.; Id., 51. Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292).


[12] Annex "K", Id.; Id., 63.

[13] 13 SCRA 309 [1965].

[14] 239 SCRA 48 [1994].

[15] Annex "L" of Petition; Rollo, 67.

[16] Annex "M", Id.; Id., 74.

[17] See People vs. Paz del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67 [1955].

[18] 73 Phil. 509 [1941].

[19] 110 Phil. 476 [1960].

[20] 8 SCRA 349 [1963].

[21] 108 Phil. 756 [1960], citing U.S. vs. Lazada, 9 Phil.
509 [1908]; People vs. Joson, 46 Phil. 380 [1924];
People vs. Parao, 52 Phil. 712 [1929].

[22] 19 SCRA 494, 499-501 [1967].

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v TAYCO
G.R. No. 100283 August 25, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
LEOPOLDO TAYCO, Accused-Appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Cyril A. Tagle for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information, 1dated November 27, 1986, accused
LEOPOLDO TAYCO was charged with the crime of
RAPE, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of September, 1986, in the
evening, in Barangay Buswang Old, Municipality of
Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a knife, with
lewd designs and by means of violence and intimidation,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
have carnal knowledge of said JELLY INOCENCIO,
against her will and without her consent, thereby causing
upon the latter physical injuries, as follows:
Presence of 3 linear abrasions right,
thigh middle 3rd, medial side.
Presence of redness inner portion of the
left labia minora and region of the
fourchet.
Hymenal tear 3:00; 7:00 & 9:00 o'clock
positions but no bleeding noted.
As per Medico-Legal Report on Physical Injuries signed
by Dr. Velvet C. Diangson, Senior Resident Physician of
Dr. Rafael S. Tumbokon Memorial Hospital, Kalibo,
Aklan, hereto attached and forming an integral part
hereof.
That as a result of the criminal acts of the herein
accused, the offended party suffered damages in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) Pesos.
Page 8 of 142
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2393
before the Regional Trial Court (Branch VII) of Kalibo,
Aklan. After his arraignment on July 6, 1987, accused
pleaded not guilty 2and was tried.
The essential facts, as stated in the assailed trial court
Decision, dated February 28, 1991, are as follows:
The offended party Jelly Inocencio was, at the time of
the incident, a 16 year old high school student. She was
residing with her parents at Buswang Old, Kalibo,
Aklan. The uncontradicted facts disclose that in the early
evening of September 13, 1986, the accused Leopoldo
Tayco, with his friends Rey Ismael and Jimmy Inisa,
arrived at the girl's house, bringing (with them) a native
drink known as tuba. While they were drinking . . ., they
were entertained by Jelly and her parents Juanito and
Sherlita Inocencio, sisters Joela and Jelsen (sic), and
Joela's common-law husband, Joni Inisa, who was the
(sic) brother of Jimmy. The rest of the people in the
house were small children aged 12 to 3 (years old). . . . .
The complainant and her mother testified that Juanito
suffered an attack of asthma, compelling Sherlita to go
out to buy medicines. Sherlita said she left the house at
9:00 P.M. Ten minutes after her mother (had) left, Jelly
went out of the kitchen and urinated. She pulled up her
pants and was fastening its hook when she was accosted
by the accused with a drawn knife. He held her left arm
and led her to the coconut grove more than 50 meters
away (from their house) and raped her. The accused then
left the scene, while she proceeded to her grandparents'
house, afraid that Leopoldo and his companions might
still be around. Sherlita returned home at about 11:00
P.M., and saw that Leopoldo and her daughter Jelly were
not in the house. Leopoldo's companions went home,
while she retired for the night. At about 4 o'clock the
following morning, she went to her parents' house and
found Jelly with them. (emphasis ours)
The accused Leopoldo Tayco testified, on the other
hand, that when he left at 9 PM (sic), Jelly and her
mother were still in the sala, while the father, Juanito,
had gone upstairs to take medicines. Leopoldo asked
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v TAYCO
permission to leave from Sherlita, went home directly,
and slept. Rey Ismael testified that after Leopoldo
departed, Jelly and her mother went upstairs, leaving
them in the sala with Joela's husband Joni. They went
home about 30 minutes later but before leaving, Joela
came to them murmuring that Jelly was not in the house.
Jimmy Inisa was equivocal. He said that Jelly and her
mother were in the sala when they left, but (when)
confronted by (sic) his affidavit, (he) admitted that Jelly
left the sala about 10 minutes after Leopoldo went out,
and (she) did not return. Leopoldo said that at about
midnight, he was awakened by the arrival of Joela and
Joni who were looking for Jelly. He told them that she
was not with him.
The physical examination to which the offended party
was subjected in the morning of September 14, 1986,
disclosed incontrovertibly that a man had a (sic) carnal
knowledge of her the night before. Spermatozoa, or
male sex cells, were found in the vagina of the girl (Exh.
A). The doctor who made the examination affirmed that
the life span of spermatozoa inside the vagina can
extend up to 36 hours. There is no question that a man
had gained access to the offended party in the night of
September 13.
In the afternoon of September 15, 1986, Sherlita,
Juanito, Jelly and her sister, Joselle, went to the house of
Crestito Tayco, elder brother of the accused. Later,
accused and his parents were summoned to got to
Crestito's house. According to Leopoldo, a confrontation
ensued and the parents of the victim wanted him to
marry their daughter, saying: "If you will not marry her,
something will happen to you." 3He refused and denied
the accusation of rape. In the afternoon of September 15,
1986, another confrontation took place in the house of
policeman Jimmy Melgar. The victim and her family
were there. They were allegedly forcing the accused to
marry the victim. Accused, again, demurred.
Pfc. Franklin Pastrana of Kalibo Integrated National
Police investigated the complaint. On September 20,
1986, he conducted an ocular inspection and found that
the sala and the kitchen (where the victim urinated) were
separated by a lawanit (Exhibit "C-3"), about one and
Page 9 of 142
one-half meter wide and eight feet in height. 4The
clothes worn by the victim the night she was molested,
i.e., her soiled pants and blouse; torn panty; 5and the
knife 6left behind by accused, were submitted to him.
The defense presented witnesses 7to show that the
victim is of loose moral character. Witness Conrado
Tayco testified that the victim and her boyfriend, a
certain Boboy, had coitus in the evening of July 28,
1986. 8On October 10, 1986, he also saw Jelly and a
certain "Toto" embracing each other in a cassava farm. 9
After trial, accused was found guilty of rape. He was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay the offended party thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00), as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.
Hence, the appeal.
These are the assigned errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE CASE WAS FILED TO FORCE THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO MARRY THE
COMPLAINANT.
We affirm the judgment of conviction.
In rape cases, trial courts discharge the difficult task of
weighing the testimony of the victim vis-a-vis the
testimony of the accused. We accord great respect, if not
finality, to their findings since they observed the
demeanor of witnesses at the trial and, therefore, could
discern better their credibility. 10
In its assailed decision, 11the trial court analyzed the
evidence as follows:
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v TAYCO
In open Court, the girl pointed to the accused Leopoldo
Tayco as the person who threatened her into submitting
to his advances. Again, there is no reason to doubt her
ability to make the identification. She and the accused
definitely knew each other prior to the incident.
Contrary to his claim that it was only on September 13
when he came to know her, his companion Rey Ismael
admitted that he had known her previously (tsn, May 17,
1988, at 20-21). Rizaldo Ismael, a neighbor of the
Inocencios, testified that he had seen Leopoldo several
times in August 1986 going to Jelly's house. The place
where the girl said the aggression was initiated, was
outside the kitchen of the house. There was a lamp in the
kitchen which cast its light to the area. Leopoldo's
companion Jimmy Inisa said that the light . . . was put
off only when he and Rey departed from the house.
They were the last to leave. (tsn, July 5, 1988, at 18-19).
The girl disclosed that the doorway of the kitchen was
open, and she was about 4 1/2 meters away from the
lamp. (tsn, December 21, 1987, at 27-28). . . . there was
a toilet some distance away from the house . . . . The girl
said that the toilet was about 15 or 20 meters away from
the kitchen (tsn, December 21, 1987, at 29). Considering
the setting, and the circumstances of the aggression
which involved the most intimate physical proximity,
the offended party would have no difficulty knowing the
identity of her aggressor.
The Court has searched the records for anything to even
remotely suggest that the offended party had a motive to
falsely accuse him of the offense, and could not find
none (sic). The girl was a student, young and unmarried.
It is very difficult to believe that she would have had the
resolve and cunning to cry rape, and consequently,
expose herself to public embarrassment and humiliation.
(emphasis ours)
We have carefully examined the records of this case, and
we agree with the foregoing findings of the trial court.
The aforequoted findings are fully supported by the
evidence adduced during trial. It is also meet to note the
observation of the trial court on the sincerity of the
victim, viz:
Page 10 of 142
Indeed, the Court finds no reason to doubt the sincerity
and candor of the offended party in bringing this case
against the accused. Having observed her deportment,
and manner of testifying and reaction to the often
intense and embarrassing questioning by counsels, we
are morally convinced of the truthfulness of the
accusation. (emphasis ours)
(Decision, February 28, 1991, p. 26)
Even then, accused-appellant points out that there were
many persons in the sala when the victim went to the
kitchen to urinate. Hence, when accused-appellant
accosted her, she had the opportunity to call their
attention, yet she did not. He also alleges that the knife
poking incident was but a product of the leading
question propounded by the prosecution counsel. He
stresses that the victim did not sustain injuries on her
neck. The defense concludes that, since force and
intimidation were not substantiated, accused-appellant
should be acquitted. We disagree.
The prosecution had sufficiently established the
elements of force and intimidation. Jelly testified:
(FISCAL PERALTA)
Q: Now, after your mother left to buy medicine for
your father, do you know of any incident that took place
in your house?
(JELLY INOCENCIO)
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened?
A: I urinated in the kitchen.
Q: While you were urinating in your kitchen, what
happened, if there is (sic) any?
A: Leopoldo Tayco went near me.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 11 of 142
SEC 1. PP v TAYCO

Q: After Leopoldo Tayco went near to (sic) you, it produces fear-fear that if the victim does not yield to
what happened next (sic)? the lecherous demands of the accused, something would
happen to her at that moment or even thereafter, as when
A: The accused threatened me using a knife and told she is threatened with death if she reports the incident."
me not to shout, or else he will (sic) kill me.
Consistent with this doctrine, Jelly's failure to resist,
Q: After the accused pointed a knife at your neck, shout or make an outcry does not necessarily negate the
did you shout or not? use of force against her. So is it with the absence of any
wound on the victim's neck. What matters is that
A: No, because I was afraid he might kill me. accused-appellant threatened the victim with a knife
and, as a result thereof, the latter was petrified by fear.
Q: Now, after Leopoldo Tayco pointed a knife at Jelly stifled any protest, fearful that accused-appellant
your neck, what else happened? would kill her if she did. Moreover, it is a settled rule
fashioned from the anvils of experience that there is no
A: He dragged me to the coconut groves. standard form of human behavioral response when one
is confronted with a strange, startling, and frightful
Q: Did you not resist when the accused dragged you experience. 13The variety of human reaction to
to the coconut groves? anecdotes of sexual crimes has yet to be fully captured
by the calculus.
A: No, because he was a man, and I cannot
overpower him. Be that as it may, the victim's conduct immediately after
the rape throws a light in many of the opaque aspects of
xxx xxx xxx the crime. In the case at bench, Jelly sought refuge at her
grandparents' house after the dastardly act. She did not
Q: Now, after the accused dragged you to the return home, afraid that her father, who was then ill,
coconut groves about more than fifty meters, what would die if he should learn of her misfortune, 14not to
happened? mention that Leopoldo's companions were still in their
house when the incident happened. 15In fine, her
A: He box(ed) me at the stomach. conduct is consistent with the horrible experience she
had just gone through.
Q: Now, after the accused box(ed) you at the
stomach, what happened to you? The defense doubts why Jelly's grandparents did not
disclose the rape to her aunt whose house was only a
A: He pushed me. few meters away from her grandparents'. The defense
further avers that it was unnatural for Sherlita to wait
Q: After you were pushed, what happened next? until 4:00 in the morning before looking for her missing
daughter. These arguments deserve scant consideration.
A: He had intercourse with me. These incidents occurred after the rape and would not
exculpate accused-appellant. Moreover, accused-
(TSN, November 20, 1987, pp. 5-7). appellant himself admitted that at around 12:00
midnight of September 13, 1986, the victim's sister,
In People vs. Codilla, 12we held: "Intimidation must be Joela, together with her husband, Joni Inisa, came to his
viewed in the light of the victim's perception and (accused-appellant's) house, looking for Jelly.
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and
not by any hard and fast rule; it is, therefore, enough that
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v TAYCO
Accused-appellant also claims that Jelly committed
inconsistencies during the trial. We have reviewed the
transcript of stenographic notes of this case to verify
whether or not the alleged inconsistent testimonies
would materially affect the trial court's conclusion on
the guilt of accused-appellant. They will not.
On direct examination, Jelly testified that she was
urinating when accused, then armed with a knife,
accosted her. He held her right hand and dragged her
towards the coconut grove some fifty meters away from
their house and, thereafter, boxed her in the stomach. He
pushed her to the ground, pulled her pants and panty,
and mounted her. She felt pain as he inserted his penis
into her vagina. After two minutes, accused dismounted
and fled, leaving behind the knife beside her. 16She
recognized the accused through his voice. When asked
by her counsel whether there was light in the kitchen,
she claimed that the kitchen was lighted by a kerosene
lamp. 17
However, on cross-examination, Jelly claimed she had
just finished urinating and was about to put on her pants,
or was about to fasten its hook, when accused came near
her. 18Accused boxed her in the stomach and pushed her
hard to the ground. She was rendered unconscious upon
hitting the ground. Thus, she was not aware as to when
accused pulled down her panty and pants. When she
regained her consciousness, he had already left.
Nonetheless, the victim knew she was raped because she
felt pain. 19
On re-direct examination, she alleged that after she hit
the soil, she was not rendered totally unconscious. She
was also aware that accused pulled down her pants and
inserted his organ into hers. 20
Defense counsel then asked victim to explain her
conflicting testimonies as follows:
ATTY. BRIONES:
Q: Miss Witness, when I cross-examined you, you
said that you did not know from the time you fell to the
ground up to the time you recovered consciousness, you
Page 12 of 142
did not know what happened to you. However, in the re-
direct examination, you remember the accused putting
his penis inside your organ. There is a difference in your
testimony, is it because your recollection of the incident
is quite hazy now?
ATTY. BRIONES:
I would like to make of records (sic) that the witness
could not answer the question.
FISCAL PERALTA:
We would like to manifest that the witness is nervous.
ATTY. BRIONES:
We cannot agree to that. In fact, she is smiling.
COURT:
Both manifestations are noted.
(TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 19)
It ought not to be overlooked that the victim was a
minor and, as observed by Assistant Prosecutor Peralta,
not intelligent. 21Thus, despite some inconsistencies,
the trial court gave credence to her testimony. We, too,
hold that her inconsistent statements did not crack her
credibility. We fully concur with the trial court's ruling,
viz:
. . . . We are not disposed to treat this particular lapse in
her testimony as an indication of a tendency to
prevaricate. It is probable that the event may have
placed her mind in a confused state. While she may have
fainted at some point of (sic) time, she was certain,
however, that the man entered her. Defense counsel
asked her:
So you did not know how the accused committed or if
the accused ... committed sexual intercourse with you?'
She answered:
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 13 of 142
SEC 1. PP v TAYCO

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision

I know because I felt pain (tsn, February 17, 1988, at 9).
There is nothing in her testimony to indicate that she
was totally unaware of the sex act itself. It is possible
that, as she passed into unconsciousness, she retained
some experience or sensation of the penetration. What is
positive is that the accused intimidated her, brought her
to a secluded place, and threw her to the ground. Even if
we were to assume that she lost all recollection of (the)
succeeding events until the accused had abandoned her
in that secluded place, the basic facts shown, i.e., that it
was the accused who led her there by force, and semen
was later found on her private parts, (would) suffice to
establish the existence of the rape, and the responsibility
of the accused therefor.
appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.
Endnotes:
1 Original Records, p. 23.
2 Order, dated July 6, 1987; Original Records, p. 81.
3 Ibid, pp. 14-15.
4 TSN, September 23, 1987, pp. 17, 23.
5 Marked as Exhibits "E to F."
6 Marked as Exhibit "G."

7 Luciano Reyes and Conrado Tayco.

(Decision, dated February 28, 1991, p. 26)
8 TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 4-7.

Indeed, a public denunciation by a Filipina, whose virtue 9 TSN, March 21, 1990, p. 12.

has heretofore been unblemished, that she has been 10 People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 102409-10, December 21, 1992, 216 SCRA 754,
759-760.
raped carries a lot of credence. 22Absent any proof that
11 See Decision, dated February 28, 1991, pp. 22-23.
she had ill-motive to falsely accuse a man of raping her,
12 G.R. Nos. 100720-23, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 104, 119.
she deserves full faith and credit. 23
13 People vs. Arnan, G.R. No. 72608, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 37, 43.

14 TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 11.

Accused-appellant alleges that the victim's family filed
the instant case because he refused to marry her. Even if 15 TSN, August 4, 1987, p. 23.

this fact is conceded, accused-appellant cannot escape 16 TSN, November 20, 1987, pp. 5-8, 14; TSN, February 17, 1988, p. 8.

conviction. The prosecution had proved beyond 17 TSN, November 20, 1987, p. 8.

reasonable doubt that he forced his bestial desire on the 18 TSN, December 21, 1987, pp. 21-22.

victim. The later attempts of the victim's family to 19 TSN, February 17, 1988, pp. 8-10.

compel him to marry the victim constitute nothing more 20 Ibid, pp. 18-19.
than a demand for him to restore the shattered honor of 21 TSN, December 21, 1987, p. 22.
Jelly. They should be viewed in light of Filipino customs 22 People vs. Caballes, G.R. No. 93437-45, July 12, 1991, 199 SCRA 152; People vs.
and traditions still strong, especially in the province, Vinas, G.R. No. 91363-73, October 15, 1991, 202 SCRA 720; People vs. Pido, G.R. No. 92427,
August 2, 1991, 200 SCRA 45.
which put premium to family name, honor and 23 People vs. Villamayor, G.R. No. 97475-76, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 472.

reputation and eschew public scandal.

We reject the defense of denial and alibi of accused-

appellant. Alibi is a weak defense and, unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot
prevail over the positive declaration of the victim
pointing to the accused-appellant as the culprit.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v COQUIA
EN BANC
June 29, 1963
G.R. No. L-16456
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DOLORES COQUIA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
M. B. Palma for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
From an incident which occurred on July 1, 1957, one
David C. Naval filed with the Municipal Court of the
City of Naga a complaint for grave oral defamation
against the herein defendant-appellee, Dolores Coquia.
Thereafter and by virtue of that complaint, the same
court ordered her arrest. On July 22, 1957, however, the
same court forwarded the records of the case to the
Court First Instance of Camarines Sur for the
continuance of the proceedings since the accused had
renounced her right to the second stage of preliminary
investigation. In turn, on August 2, 1957, the last
mentioned court endorsed the case to the Office of the
City Attorney for reinformation. For some explained
reasons, the case was left completely unacted on by the
City Fiscal's office until January 26, 1959 when the City
Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur the corresponding, information for grave
oral defamation against the accused, appellee herein.
The defense filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
prescription which was opposed by the prosecution
Ruling on the motion, the court a quo sustained the
movant and dismissed the case. A motion for
reconsideration therefor having been denied, the City
Attorney, represented by the Solicitor General's Office,
appealed to this Court.
The Solicitor General concedes that the delay in the
filing of the information for this case had been unduly
long. Quite subtly even, the concession extends to an
admission that prescription had indeed set in. It was
Page 14 of 142
expressed, however, that the instant appeal was
nevertheless interposed so that a ruling may be secured
as to the precise period when a criminal proceeding
should be considered as having been "unjustifiably
stopped to mark the resumption of the running of the
period of prescription" pursuant to the provisions of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, hereunder quoted:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. —
The period of prescription shall commence to run from
the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall
be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information, and shall commence to run again when
such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender
is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant a
resolution of the issue raised. It is sufficient to indicate
and conformably to the doctrine expressed in the case of
People v. Juan del Rosario, G. R. No. L-15140,
December 29, 1960, the prescriptive period for the case
at bar was never interrupted. In the said case, We
declared that —
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light
offenses prescribe in two months. Article 91 of the same
Code provides that "the period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime was
discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information, and shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
him." The complaint or information referred to in the
above provisions which interrupts the running of the
prescriptive period, as ruled in the case of People v.
Tayco (73 Phil. 509), is that which is filed in the proper
court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by the
offended party in the Fiscal's Office . . .
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 15 of 142
SEC 1. PP v COQUIA

It should be recalled that the proper court in the present

litigation was the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur. The records of this case clearly show that no formal
complaint or information is contemplated by the
aforementioned Article 91 of the Penal Code was ever
filed therein within the reglementary period. As a matter
of fact, the said formal complaint or information was
filed only after the lapse of more than one year.
Considering that under the Code, the prescriptive period
for grave oral defamation is six months (Art. 90,
Revised Penal Code), the only conclusion deducible is
that the same has prescribed.

Applying the principle laid down in the aforecited case

of People v. Del Rosario, supra, We can not speak of the
resumption of the prescriptive period since it has never
been interrupted.

WHEREFORE, the appeal taken by the Government is

hereby dismissed and the order dismissing the
information is hereby affirmed in full. Costs de oficio.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v OLARTE
EN BANC
February 28, 1967
G.R. No. L-22465
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
ASCENSION P. OLARTE, defendant-appellee.
Saturnino D. Bautista for plaintiff-appellant Meris.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and
Solicitor Ceferino S. Gaddi for plaintiff-appellant People
of the Philippines.
Chuidian Law Offices, P. V. Sison, D. Acuna, J.
Asuncion, E. G. Bruno and Silverio B. de Leon for
defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is the second time the present case is brought on
appeal to this Supreme Court on the identical issue of
prescription.
The antecedents of this case are briefly stated in the
decision of the previous appeal (L-13027):
Defendant 'Ascension P. Olarte is charged with libel. It
is alleged in the information that on or about the 24th
day of February, 1954 and subsequently thereafter said
defendant had willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
written certain letters which were libelous,
contemptuous and derogatory to Miss Visitacion M.
Meris, 'with evident and malicious purpose of insulting,
dishonoring, humiliating and bringing into contempt the
good name and reputation' of said complainant.
It appears that on January 7, 1956, Miss Meris lodged
the corresponding charge of libel with the provincial
fiscal of Pangasinan, who assigned it to an assistant
provincial fiscal; that upon the latter's advice, on
February 22, 1956, she filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan, a complaint for
libel against Ascencion P. Olarte that the defendant
waived her right to a preliminary investigation,
Page 16 of 142
whereupon the justice of the peace court forwarded the
case to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, in
which the corresponding information was filed on July
3, 1956; that the defendant seasonably moved to quash
the information upon the ground of prescription of the
offense; and that, after due hearing, the court of first
instance granted said motion and dismissed the case,
with costs de oficio. Hence, this appeal by complainant
Miss Meris with the conformity of the special counsel of
the office of the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan, who
represented the prosecution in said court.
This Court, likewise, stated in said previous appeal:
It is conceded that, as provided in Article 90 of the
Revised Penal Code, 'the crime of libel ... shall prescribe
in two (2) years, which, pursuant to Article 91 of the
same Code, 'shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by
the filing of the complaint or information ....' In an
affidavit, attached to the complaint filed with the justice
of the peace court, Miss Meris stated that one
defamatory letter was received by her on February 27,
1954 and that there were other libelous letters,
seemingly written after the first. According to another
affidavit, likewise, attached to said complaint, the
subsequent letters were received on or about March 1
and 13, April 26 and May 9, 1954. The issue in the
lower court, as well as in this appeal, is whether the
statute of limitations was suspended by the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace court on
February 22, 1956, as claimed by appellant, or continued
to run until July 3, 1956, when the information was filed
with the court of first instance, as contended by the
defendant. His Honor, the trial Judge adopted the latter
alternative, and, accordingly, held that the prescriptive
period had expired before the filing of said information.
(Emphasis supplied)
Resolving the issue thus posed on the basis of the
abovequoted facts, this Court, speaking through the then
Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Roberto
Concepcion, and after an extensive and exhaustive
dissertation on the applicable laws and pertinent
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v OLARTE
decisions on the subject, rendered a decision,
promulgated on June 30, 1960, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is our considered
opinion that the filing of the complainant with the
justice of the peace court of Pozorrubio, Pangasinan,
interrupted the running of the statute of limitations, as
regards the crime of libel with which defendant herein is
charged, and that said crime has not been extinguished,
therefore, by prescription, for which reason the order
appealed from is reversed, and the records of this case
are hereby remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings, conformably with law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The above ruling became final and executory, and,
pursuant thereto, the lower court set the case for hearing
on the merits and the prosecution started presenting its
evidence. However, on August 26, 1963, the defense
presented anew a motion to quash the information,
supplemented by another motion of September 5, 1963,
on the ground of prescription of the offense charged in
the information. In said motions, the defense invoked
the subsequent ruling of this Court in the case of People
vs. Coquia, G.R. No. L-15456, promulgated on June 29,
1963. On November 4, 1963, the prosecution opposed
said motions. The defense submitted its reply on
November 13, 1963.
After due hearing on this incident, the lower court issued
the appealed order, dated January 16, 1964, sustaining
the defense's new motion to quash upon the ground of
prescription. In this order, the lower court, after
comparing and finding that the set of facts obtaining in
the case at bar is practically identical with those of the
Coquia case, opined that inasmuch as the latter is
inconsistent with or contradicts the previous decision
(L-13027) in the case at bar, promulgated on June 30,
1960, the 1963 ruling in the Coquia case indicates that
this Supreme Court intended to abandon the one made in
1960 in the first appeal of this same case (L-13027).
Page 17 of 142
Not satisfied, the prosecution (special counsel of the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan and the
private prosecutor jointly) interposed the present appeal
to this Court on a pure question of law.
The complainant Miss Meris through her private
prosecutor, filed her brief. Subsequently, the Solicitor
General, in representation of plaintiff-appellant People
of the Philippines, instead of filing a brief, filed, on
August 18, 1964, a manifestation, stating to the effect
that they are submitting the case without any brief, said
complainant having filed a brief in her behalf; and that
they are of the opinion that the order of the lower court
dismissing the case was well taken. In view of this
manifestation, defendant-appellee presented, on
September 7, 1964, a motion to dismiss the appeal.
This Court, by resolution dated October 2, 1964, denied
said motion for the present.
Defendant-appellee moved to reconsider said denial but
this Court, in its resolution of October 21, 1964,
overruled the defendant's motion.
Thereafter, said defendant-appellee filed her brief and
the case was submitted for decision.
The only issue presented for determination in this appeal
is the effect of this Court's ruling on the first appeal to
this very same case (L-13027) and whether the decision
in the later case of People vs. Coquia, G.R. No.
L-15456, June 29, 1963, warrants the dismissal of the
information in the case at bar on the ground of
prescription.
Suffice it to say that our ruling in Case L-13027,
rendered on the first appeal, constitutes the law of the
case, and, even if erroneous, it may no longer be
disturbed or modified since it has become final long ago.
A subsequent reinterpretation of the law may be applied
to new cases but certainly not to an old one finally and
conclusively determined (People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No.
L-11374, May 30, 1958; 55 O.G. 4228).
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 1. PP v OLARTE
'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established as
the controling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated
continue to be the facts of the case before the court. (21
C.J.S. 330). (cited in Pinuila case, supra)
As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the
same case is held to be the law of the case whether that
decision is right or wrong, the remedy of the party being
to seek a rehearing (5 C.J.S. 1277). (also cited in Pinuila
case)
It is also aptly held in another case that:
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court, being the
court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal
question properly brought before it and that its decision
in any given case constitutes the law of that particular
case. Once its judgment becomes final it is binding on
all inferior courts, and hence beyond their power and
authority to alter or modify. (Kabigting vs. Acting
Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-15548, October 30,
1962).
More categorical still is the pronouncement of this Court
in Pomeroy vs. Director of Prisons, 1,14284-85,
February 24, 1960:
It will be seen that the prisoner's stand assumes that
doctrines and rulings of the Supreme Court operate
retrospectively, and that they can claim the benefit of
decisions in People vs. Hernandez; People vs.
Geronimo, and People vs. Dugonon (L-6025-26, July
18, 1956; L-8936, Oct. 31, 1956; and L-8926, June 29,
1957, respectively), promulgated four or more years
after the prisoner applicants had been convicted by final
judgment and started serving sentence. However, the
rule adopted by this Court (and by the Federal Supreme
Court) is that judicial doctrines have only prospective
operation and do not apply to cases previously decided
Page 18 of 142
(People vs. Pinuila, L-11374, promulgated May 30,
1958.)
In the foregoing decision, furthermore, this Court quoted
and reiterated the rule in the following excerpts from
People vs. Pinuila, G.R. No. L-11374, jam cit.:
'The decision of this Court on that appeal by the
government from the order of dismissal, holding that
said appeal did not place the appellants, including
Absalon Bignay, in double jeopardy, signed and
concurred in by six justices as against three dissenters
headed by the Chief Justice, promulgated way back in
the year 1952, has long become the law of the case. It
may be erroneous, judged by the law on double jeopardy
as recently interpreted by this same Tribunal. Even so, it
may not be disturbed and modified. Our recent
interpretation of the law may be applied to new cases,
but certainly not to an old one finally and conclusively
determined. As already stated, the majority opinion in
that appeal is now the law of the case.'
The same principle, the immutability of the law of the
case notwithstanding subsequent changes of judicial
opinion, has been followed in civil cases:
Fernando vs. Crisostomo, 90 Phil. 585;
Padilla vs. Paterno, 93 Phil. 884;
Samahang Magsasaka, Inc. vs. Chua Guan, L-7252,
February, 1955.
It is thus clear that posterior changes in the doctrine of
this Court can not retroactively be applied to nullify a
prior final ruling in the same proceeding where the prior
adjudication was had, whether the case should be civil
or criminal in nature.
Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription
discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents
holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of
the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course
of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte L-13027, June
30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs. Uba,
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 19 of 142
SEC 1. PP v OLARTE

L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil.
588, 590. Another series of decisions declares that to
produce interruption the complaint or information must
have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction
to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario,
L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs. Coquia,
L-15456, June 29, 1963.
or acquittal, if the court should discharge the accused
because no prima facie case has been shown.
Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby
overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del
Rosario L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to And it having been finally decided in the previous
provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has appeal that the criminal action here was not barred, the
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, issue of prescription is utterly foreclosed, and all that
has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, remains is to try and decide the case on the merits. It is
and should be, the one established by the decisions expected that it will be done with the utmost dispatch,
holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal this case having been already pending for many years.
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt Wherefore, the appealed order of dismissal is hereby set
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, aside and reversed, and the records of this case ordered
even if the court where the complaint or information is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings
filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons conformably with this decision. With costs against
buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of defendant-appellee.
the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of
prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
complaint or information" without distinguishing J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

whether the complaint is filed in the court for
preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for
action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the
complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
investigate the case, its actuations already represent the
initial step of the proceedings against the offender.
Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right
to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not
under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that

the interrupted prescription " shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the
accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby
indicating that the court in which the complaint or
information is filed must have power to acquit or convict
the accused. Precisely, the trial on the merits usually
terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But
it is in the court conducting a preliminary investigation
where the proceedings may terminate without conviction
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 6. PP v PAILANO
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43602 January 31, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO PAILANO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Raul T. Montesino for accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
At the time the rape was allegedly committed by the
accused-appellant, he was already sixty-nine years old. 1
The prosecution will have to contend not only with the
presumption of innocence but also of impotence.
The crime was allegedly perpetrated in October of 1971
in Barrio Sampinit, Baybay in the City of Bago. 2 It was
reported to the authorities on December 24, 1971, 3 and
the corresponding criminal complaint was filed on July
10, 1972. 4 Judgment was rendered on January 30,
1976, sentencing the accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua plus civil indemnity of P2,000 and the costs. 5
He now wants this decision reversed.
The complainant is Anita Ibañez, who was fifteen years
old at the time of the alleged offense. She says that on
the day in question, she was dragged by the accused-
appellant to a bushy place on the seashore where she
was waiting for her mother. She could not resist because
he was threatening her with a scythe he was carrying. In
the bushes, be pointed the scythe at her neck and then
forcibly took her. She could not cry out because she was
afraid. She did not report the matter to her mother
because the accused-appellant bad warned her he would
kill her if she did. 6
The accused-appellant has a different version. He does
not deny he had sexual intercourse with Anita, but he
Page 20 of 142
insists it was voluntary. As a matter of fact, he says, it
was the complainant who enticed him into the bushes,
where she wantonly opened herself to him. He was
unable at first to have an erection because of his age.
But Anita herself rubbed his organ in hers until, thus
stimulated, he succeeded in penetrating her. Afterwards,
noticing some people nearby who might have seen them,
the girl put back her panty on and left. He followed a
few minutes later. 7
As the medical examination of the complainant was
made more than two months afterwards, there naturally
could not be any finding of the bruises, cuts and
scratches that usually attend forcible rape. But there was
the tell-tale hymeneal laceration in the complainant that
even the accused-appellant could not dispute. 8
Given the choice between the separate accounts of the
complainant and the accused-appellant, the court
inclines in favor of the latter. It is in our view more
believable. Anita never spoke of any difficulty on the
part of Pailano in violating her. She simply said he
removed her panty and entered her. No effort was
mentioned; it seemed she was talking of a vigorous stud.
Yet, the accused-appellant was not a teenager or even
only in the prime of his life at the time of their sexual
encounter. He was all of sixty-nine years old.
Considering his age and the emotional pressures of the
moment, we doubt if Pailano could have accomplished
the rape as easily as Anita narrated it. The prosecution
has not offered any proof of his sexual prowess, and
under stress at that. By contrast, the accused-appellant
did not hesitate to testify, at the risk of his manly pride,
that he did not easily have an erection during the tryst
with Anita and that it took some fondling from her
before his organ could respond. This was a hard and
humiliating fact but it had to be admitted.
We are disposed to believe the testimony of Leonardo
Filomeno that he saw Pailano and Anita coupling on the
day in question, 9 but not on the other previous
occasions claimed by him. His presence in all of these
meetings seems too much of a coincidence to be
credible. However, Pailano is also corroborated by
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 6. PP v PAILANO
Natividad Madrigal, who declared she saw Anita and
Pailano caressing each other, with the girl in fact
assuming the more aggressive role. 10 There is no
reason not to believe this witness.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the
two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The criminal complaint in this case alleged the
commission of the crime through the first method
although the prosecution sought to establish at the trial
that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its purpose
in doing so is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not
succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-
appellant on the ground that he violated Anita while she
was deprived of reason or unconscious, such conviction
could not have been possible under the criminal
complaint as worded. This described the offense as
having been committed by "Antonio Pailano, being then
provided with a scythe, by means of violence and
intimidation, (who) did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant, Anita Ibañez, 15 years of age, against her
will." No mention was made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that
he had raped Anita while she was unconscious or
otherwise deprived of reason and not through force and
intimidation, which was the method alleged would have
violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. 11 This right is
safeguarded by the Constitution to every accused so he
can prepare an adequate defense against the charge
Page 21 of 142
against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged
while he is concentrating his defense against the ground
alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. This
right was, of course, available to the herein accused-
appellant.
In People v. Ramirez, 12 we held that a person charged
with rape could not be found guilty of qualified
seduction, which had not been alleged in the criminal
complaint against him. In the case of People v. Montes,
13 the Court did not permit the conviction for homicide
of a person held responsible for the suicide of the
woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he
was accused of and acquitted was not homicide but rape.
More to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines,
14 where the accused was charged with the
misappropriation of funds held by him in trust with the
obligation to return the same under Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was
convicted of swindling by means of false pretenses,
under paragraph 2(b) of the said Article, which was not
alleged in the information. The Court said such
conviction would violate the Bill of Rights.
It may be argued that although initially deficient, the
criminal complaint was deemed corrected when the
prosecution introduced evidence of the complainant's
mental condition and the defense did not object, thereby
waiving the procedural defect. Even so, the charge has
not been adequately establish established.
In the first place, the doctor who examined Anita
reported that he saw no evidence of insanity in her
family history nor was there any indication of such
condition in the complainant herself. 15 He did observe
that she had the mentality of a thirteen-year old, 16
which was not that serious an impediment as her age at
the time was only fifteen.
Secondly, and more importantly, the prosecution has not
proved that during that encounter in the bushes, Anita's
mental condition was so weakened that she could not
resist Pailano's supposed advances.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 22 of 142
SEC 6. PP v PAILANO

The statutory presumption of sanity 17 and the 4 Id., p. 3.

constitutional presumption of innocence 18 have not
been overcome. There is evidence that Filomeno 5 Id., p. 19.
reported the incident in the bushes on the same day to
Anita's mother, 19 but she took no action whatsoever, 6 TSN, August 14, 1973, pp. 8-10.
for reasons not disclosed. It was only two-and-a-half
months later that she decided to complain to the 7 TSN., January 2, 1975, pp. 14-25.
authorities, but then it was already suspiciously late. The
only possible explanation for her delay is that the liaison 8 Rollo, p. 9.
between her daughter and Pailano had already become a
scandal by that time and she must have thought she 9 T.S.N., June 11, 1974, pp. 8-10.
could redeem Anita's honor by initiating the criminal
complaint. The delay, however, blunts the charge of 10 TSN., April 11, 1975, pp. 7-8.
rape.
11 Article TV, Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973; now
What we see here is an aging Lothario having his last Article III, Sec. 14(2).
lustful fling and a young girl with a rather weak mind
and a ripe body offering him a flaccid return to his 12 69 SCRA 144.
youth. We do not mean to romanticize this sordid affair.
It is wrong and is not here excused, made light of, or 13 122 SCRA 409.
dismissed. It is disdained for what it is an unseemly
seduction where it is not clear who the tempter and the 14 101 Phil. 114.
tempted are although neither can really claim to be
blameless. But, in our view, it is definitely not rape. 15 T.S.N., August 14, 1973, p. 4.

WHEREFORE, the appealed conviction is REVERSED 16 Ibid., p. 3.

and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt. No costs. 17 Art. 800, Civil Code.

SO ORDERED. 18 Art. III, Sec. 14(2).

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and Medialdea, JJ., 19 TSN., June 11, 1974, p. 11.

concur.

Footnotes

1 Orig. Records, p. 313; Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief,

p. 2.

2 Rollo, p. 6.

3 Ibid., p. 7.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 6. PP v BUGTONG
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75853 January 31, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANDRES BUGTONG, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Leonardo Rilloraza and Benjamin L. Fernando for
accused-appellant.
FERNAN, C.J.:
What makes this case of rape most unfortunate is that
the victim is a fifteen-year old lass with a mental age of
between five (5) and eight (8) years and a numerical I.Q.
of 47.
Irene Cutiam, the minor complainant, was born on
December 30, 1968 in Sitio Duban, Tublay, Benguet.
The accused, Andres Bugtong, is her neighbor.
Sometime in July, 1984, Luisa Cutiam noticed that the
stomach of her daughter Irene was growing bigger and
bigger. Dr. Salome Pilit, a government physician who
conducted a medical examination confirmed that Irene
was pregnant. Irene, at first, would not reveal the
identity of the man responsible for her condition, but
when she felt something moving inside her belly, she
confessed to her mother Luisa that accused raped her
and that her refusal to talk earlier was due to the fear
that accused would make good his threats to kill her
should she squeal.
With this information, Luisa, together with Irene, went
to the Acop Tublay Police Station to report the crime
which resulted in Irene's pregnancy. Irene gave birth to a
baby boy later on. 1
Page 23 of 142
Andres Bugtong was thereafter charged before the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet with the
crime of Rape allegedly committed as follows:
... the above-named accused by means of force and
intimidation and threats, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse and
carnal knowledge of one Irene Cutiam, a fifteen-year old
girl against her will and consent. 2
On accused's plea of not guilty, trial ensued. When Irene
was called to the witness stand, it was observed that she
had difficulty understanding the questions propounded
to her. On motion of the fiscal, she was made to undergo
pyschological testing which revealed that she had an
Intelligence Quotient (IQ) of only 47, equivalent to the
mental age of a person between the ages of 5 and 8
years, far below her actual age of 15 years. Her mental
retardation was classified as moderate. 3
Her testimony, as summarized by the trial court, is as
follows:
On November 13, 1984, Irene Cutiam testified. ... One
day in January 1984, she was sent by her mother Luisa
Cutiam to the house of Andres Bugtong, the herein
accused to pay her account to the latter in the amount of
TEN PESOS (P10.00).This fact of indebtedness and
payment of the same was previously testified on by
Luisa Cutiam. 4 Witness claimed that when she handed
the money to Andres Bugtong, the latter grabbed her
other hand and placed her on the bed, and when she tried
to shout, the accused covered her mouth with his hand
and allegedly threatened her by saying: 'If you will
report the matter, I will kill you, anyway our house (sic)
are near each other. 5 After having uttered those
threatening words, Irene was apparently released from
the hold of the accused as could be inferred from the
following:
Q After saying that, what is the next thing he did, if any?
A While he was removing his pants, I tried to open the
door but it was locked then he came again and pulled
me.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 6. PP v BUGTONG
Q And when he came again to pull you, where did he
bring you?
A In their bed just the same, Sir.
Q What did he do when you were already in bed?
A He did the act and after doing the act he opened the
door and let me go out. 6
xxx xxx xxx
On recross-examination, complainant disclosed that at
one time the accused came to their house when she was
with her two younger brothers. The accused sent the two
boys to the mountain to gather guavas and after they
have left, had again sexual intercourse with her; that
when the two boys came back and knocked at the door,
accused barred her from opening and again was
threatened with death if she would do so; that she just
kept on crying until the accused sneaked out through the
other door of the house. 7
Accused Andres Bugtong, testifying on January 23,
1985 gave the following version:
... He and his wife are farmers with a vegetables garden
near their house and another one which is farther. They
usually start working early in the morning and go home
for breakfast after having watered the plants and then go
back to continue with their garden works (sic). At 2:00
o'clock noon they go home for lunch after which the
wife goes back to the garden while the accused
sometimes stays behind for some works (sic) at home.
They have two houses which are near each other. Seven
(7) of their eight (8) children occupy one of these two
houses while he and his wife stay in the other house. 8
Occasionally especially during harvesting season, they
used to engage the services of Irene Cutiam to help them
in the garden.
One day in January 1984, Irene came to their house after
lunch. Andres Bugtong was then alone. Without any
word, she just entered the one-room house, sat on the
Page 24 of 142
bed and kept on smiling and never talked although
repeatedly asked by the accused of what she needed
because he was then about to leave for the garden. He
served her with coffee and while both of them were
drinking, the accused, without any word sat beside the
complainant, who in turn leaned on the former with her
breast on his left shoulder. At this juncture, the accused
said:
Q And what happened after that?
A So I told her, 'your breast is big.'
Q What did she answer you if any?
A None, she was just smiling.
Q So what did you do?
A And so I put my left arm around her shoulders.
Q What did she do when you put your left hand or arm
around her shoulder?
A I took hold of her breast.
xxx xxx xxx
Q And what did she do when you held her breast?
A She was placing down her coffee and then she
encircled her two arms around my body (Witness
illustrating his both hands.) 9
At this stage when accused was already sexually
aroused, he laid down the complainant on the bed and
after closing the door, he removed his clothes, sat
between the legs of the former, lifted her skirt and when
he noticed that complainant had no panty, he proceeded
with the sexual intercourse with both hands holding her
shoulders while the latter took hold of his waist. This
was the first sexual intercourse which was repeated four
or five times during the succeeding months of 1984. All
were done in his house after lunch time. Accused said
further that during all these sex contacts with
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 6. PP v BUGTONG
complainant and thereafter, no words were uttered
neither they (sic) converse with each other. He only
learned that the latter was already pregnant after this
case was filed. (Ibid., pp, 12-16) 10
Giving credence to the prosecution's version, the trial
court rendered judgment finding Andres Bugtong guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined
in Article 335 (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; to recognize the child born to Irene Cutiam as
a result of the crime; to indemnify the complainant in
the sum of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as
moral damages and to pay the costs. From said
judgment, Bugtong interposed the present appeal.
He alleges that:
The lower court erred:
I punishment of the culprit. The complaint required in
IN TAKING JURISDICTION OF THE CASE
II
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AS DEFINED IN
ART. 335 (1) AND (2), AS AMENDED, OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
III
IN NOT DISMISSING THE CASE. 11
Appellant contends that as rape is a personal offense
which, under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code and
Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, now Section
5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
must be prosecuted upon a complaint filed by the
offended party, the trial court erred in assuming
jurisdiction over the instant case on the basis of the
Information signed by the fiscal alone.
Only recently, did this Court reiterate its ruling on the
meaning and import of this requirement. We said in
Page 25 of 142
People vs. Hon. Santiago Tañada G.R. No. L-32215,
October 17, 1988, that:
... In the 1966 case of Valdepenas v. People this Court,
through then Associate, later Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion clarified:
... It is true that pursuant to the third paragraph of Art.
344 of the Revised Penal Code,
... the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents ...
... The provision does not determine, however, the
jurisdiction of our courts over the offenses therein
enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because
the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not
by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with
the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the
said Article is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to
prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has
been imposed out of consideration for the offended
woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the
outrage in silence rather than go through, with the
scandal of a public trial. 12
xxx xxx xxx
This ruling was followed in the subsequent case of
People v. Babasa where the Court, citing the Valdepeñas
case, ruled that Act 344 was not enacted for the specific
purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is said that
the requirement in Article 334 that there should be a
complaint of the offended party or her relatives is
jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint
that starts the prosecutory proceeding. It is not the
complaint which confers jurisdiction on the Court to try
the case. The Court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law.
In the case at bar, it is evident that the prosecution for
rape was initiated by the offended party herself with the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 6. PP v BUGTONG
assistance of her mother. The Information filed by the
Fiscal said so, thus:
the undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Fiscal, upon a
sworn originally filed by the offended party accuses
Andres Bugtong of the crime of Rape... 13
And extant on record is Exhibit "B", 14 the criminal
complaint 15 filed by Irene Cutiam with the assistance
of her mother. The appellant's insinuation that the
Information should have been signed and sworn to by
the complainant is incorrect for it is not necessary for
the complainant to sign and verify the Information for
rape filed by the Fiscal. 16
Based on the foregoing, no error can be imputed to the
trial court in taking cognizance of the Information filed
by the fiscal.
Appellant questions next the trial court's finding that he
is guilty of the crime of rape as defined in Article 335
(1) and (2) of the Revised Penal Code. He contends that
since it is clear from the allegations in the Information
that the offense charged falls under par. 1 of Art. 335, to
find him guilty of rape under par. 2 thereof is violative
of his constitutional right to be informed of the charges
against him.
There is merit in this contention. While the conviction of
accused-appellant under paragraphs (1) and (2) of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code appears to be an
innocuous error as these paragraphs refer merely to the
modes of commission of the same crime of rape
punishable by the same penalty of reclusion perpetua,
the harm inflicted upon accused-appellant gains
considerable proportion when we consider not only the
no win situation in which appellant was placed by
reason of such conviction, but more importantly, the
surprise attendant to his conviction for a crime under a
mode of commission different from that alleged in the
information.
Having been charged with Rape allegedly committed
thru force or intimidation, it is to be expected that
appellant should focus his defense on showing that the
Page 26 of 142
sexual intercourse complained of was the result of
mutual consent, rather than of force or intimidation. This
defense, however, has been rendered futile and
ineffective by the appellant's further conviction under
par. (2) of Art. 335, for even if he should succeed in
convincing us that the sexual act under consideration
was born out of mutual consent, he nonetheless remains
liable under par. (2) of Art. 335, wherein consent of the
offended party is not a defense, the latter being
considered to be legally incapable of giving her consent.
Furthermore, and more importantly, as herein appellant
was tried on an information charging him with rape
committed thru force and intimidation, his conviction
for rape committed when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconcious would be violative of
his constitutional right as an accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 17
This is not to say however, that the conviction of
accused-appellant should be set aside altogether. Only
his conviction under par. (2) of Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code is nullified as his guilt of the crime
of rape committed thru force and intimidation, as
charged in the Information, has been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. 18
That accused-appellant succeeded in obtaining carnal
knowledge of Irene thru force and intimidation has been
established by Irene's testimony that appellant uttered
the following threat:
If you will report the matter, I will kill you, anyway our
house (sic) are near each other. 19
with respect to which we share the Solicitor-General's
observation, thus:
At first blush, it would seem that the force employed by
the appellant and the resistance put up by Irene would
not meet the degree of force and resistance required to
qualify the sex act for rape. However, it is to be stressed
that force and intimidation are not limited to physical
force, it includes the moral kind such as fear especially
in the case at bar where it was established that Irene, had
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 27 of 142
SEC 6. PP v BUGTONG

the mental capacity of a child between five (5) to eight "The undersigned offended party and complainant, under oath,
accuses Andres Bugtong of the crime of Rape, committed as
(8) years old. 20 follows:

Moreover, it has been ruled that the force used need not
be irresistible. As long as it is present and brings the
desired result, all consideration of whether it was more
or less irresistible is beside the point. 21
WHEREFORE, except for the modifications that (1) the
conviction of accused-appellant under paragraph (2) of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is set aside and
(2) the civil indemnity to be paid to the victim is
increased to P30,000.00, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respect.
"That in and about the month of January, 1984, and subsequent
thereto, in the Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Andres Bugtong, by means of force and
intimidation and threats, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously have sexual intercourse and carnal knowledge of
the undersigned against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(SGD) IRENE CUTIAM
Offended party
Assisted by:

Thumbmarked
SO ORDERED.
LUISA CUTIAM
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur. (Mother)

"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 24th day of July,

Footnotes 1984 at La Trinidad, Benguet, Philippines.

1 T.s.n., pp. 1-6, Oct. 4 1984. ASTERIO A. MARRERO

2 P. 7, Rollo. Provincial Fiscal"

3 P. 32, Rollo. 16 People vs. Cerena, 106 Phil. 570.

4 T.s.n., p. 13, October 4, 1984. 17 Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution; Sec. 14 Art. III, 1987
Constitution.
5 T.s.n., p. 3, Nov. 3, 1984.
18 See People vs. Tarroza, No. 2932-R, May 13, 1949, 47
6 T.s.n., pp. 3 & 4, Nov. 13, 1984. O.G. 2449.

7 Ibid., pp. 20-22, Rollo, pp. 24-27. 19 T.S.N., p. 3, November 3, 1984.

8 T.s.n., pp. 3-5, Jan. 23, 1985. 20 P. 7, Brief for the Appellee; p. 64, Rollo.

9 T.s.n., p. 10, January 23, 1985. 21 People vs. Momo; 56 Phil. 86; People vs. Jimenez, 98 Phil,
137).

10 Pp. 28-29, Rollo.

11 P. 2, Appellant's Brief, p. 48, Rollo.

12 Samilin v. CFI of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298,304.

13 P. 7, Rollo.

14 P. 3, Folder of Exhibit.

15 The Criminal Complaint filed by Irene Cutiam reads:

"CRIMINAL COMPLAINT"
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 8. PP v ELESTERIO
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63971 May 9, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RICARDO ELESTERIO y CARPENTERS, defendant-
appellant.
FE CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
EX-JUDGE ENRIQUE AGANA, THE CHIEF, NEW
BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA, METRO
MANILA, respondents.
Carreon & Associates Law Office for defendant-
appellant and Fe Cruz.
CRUZ, J.:
At two o'clock in the morning of 8 June 1981, a police
car sighted a group of three men and one woman on the
sidewalk of Libertad street in Pasay City and stopped to
investigate. Patrolmen Joseph Nepomuceno and Ernesto
Maneja alighted. While they were frisking two of the
men, the third male made a run for it but was caught
after a brief pursuit. A search of his person yielded a .32
caliber revolver and two rounds of live ammunition. The
holster he had dropped while attempting to escape was
also recovered. Ricardo Elesterio for that was his name
— admitted that he had no permit or authority to carry
the firearm. 1
In due time an information was flied against him in the
Court of First Instance of Pasay City reading as follows:
The undersigned Assistant City Fiscal accuses
RICARDO ELESTERIO Y CARPENTERS of the crime
of VIOLATION OF GENERAL ORDER NO. 6 in rel.
to PAR. 2, PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9, as
amended, committed as follows:
Page 28 of 142
That on or about the 8th day of June, 1981, in Pasay
City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, RICARDO
ELESTERIO y CARPENTERS, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and carry outside of his residence a .32
caliber revolver with SN-23271 and (2) two rounds live
ammunitions, without having been permitted or
authorized by law.
General Order No. 6, dated September 22,1972, reads in
material part as follows:
WHEREAS, in order to restore the tranquility and
stability of the nation and secure the people from
violence, injuries and loss of lives in the quickest
possible manner and time, it is necessary to prohibit the
inhabitants of the country from keeping any firearm
without a permit duly and legally issued for that purpose
as well as to prohibit the carrying of such firearm
outside the residence of the duly licensed holder thereof;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, do hereby order that
henceforth and until otherwise ordered by me or lay my
duly designated representative, no person shall keep,
possess or carry outside of his residence any firearm
unless such person is duly authorized to keep possess or
carry any such firearm and any person violating this
order shall forthwith be arrested and taken into custody
and held for the duration of the emergency unless
ordered released by me or by my duly designated
representative.
Presidential Decree No. 9, promulgated on October 2,
1972, reads partly as follows:
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081,
General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have
been promulgated by me;
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 8. PP v ELESTERIO
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder
mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives
and other deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Order
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Order
Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon
conviction suffer:
xxx
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from
twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military Court/
Tribunal/Commission may direct, when the violation is
not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated
under the preceding paragraph.
The accused pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15
July 1981. 2 Trial was held on 14 August 1981. 3
Patrolman Nepomuceno testified for the prosecution and
narrated the arrest and search of the accused. The
accused, testifying for himself, said the firearm did no
belong to him but was passed to him by one Ray Arong
minutes before the patrol car passed by them. The judge
then asked if the defense had any more witnesses to
present. The defense counsel said he had, to corroborate
the testimony of the accused that he had earlier gone to
several discotheques. The judge said this would only be
cumulative, whereupon the counsel said, "Well, if that is
the case, Your Honor, we rest our case with the
testimony of our lone witness." 4 The judge thereupon
dictated his decision in open court finding the accused
guilty and sentencing him to life imprisonment. 5 The
defense counsel manifested his intention to appeal, to
which the judge replied: "The appeal is automatic. In the
meantime he has to be held in custody. I am cancelling
the bailbond." 6
Page 29 of 142
Elesterio was committed to the national penitentiary on
17 August 1981. He escaped on 21 October 1981, and
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on
18 November 1981. He was recaptured on 30 March
1983. On 12 May 1983, his aunt, Fe Cruz, filed a
petition for habeas corpus on his behalf, alleging that: a)
the sentence imposed upon him was unlawful and
excessive; b) he was denied due process because the trial
was held only in one sitting and the defense was not
allowed to present additional witnesses; and c) the
person who represented him at the trial was not a lawyer.
In its resolution dated 3 December 1984, the Court
dismissed the petition for habeas corpus after
considering the same with the return to the writ
submitted by the Solicitor General. However, it resolved
"to consider the said accused to have filed a timely
notice of appeal; to REQUIRE the court a quo to elevate
the records of Criminal Case No. 81-913-P to this Court
within ten (10) days from notice; and to ALLOW the
accused to post a bail bond of P5,000.00 for his
provisional release. 7 The parties subsequently
submitted their respective briefs.
In dispensing with the testimony of the other defense
witnesses who were only intended to corroborate the
averment of the accused that he had been to several
discotheques before his apprehension, the trial court was
not acting arbitrarily. The trial judge had the right to
control the conduct of the trial and to bar unnecessary
testimony, such as that intended merely to corroborate
relatively unimportant matters, that would only
unnecessarily delay the case. In People v. Barabasa, 8
we held that suppression of that kind of evidence "did
not deprive the accused of any substantial right" as "the
evidence was merely cumulative and unnecessary
because it would not have affected the result of the case
in the least."
The mere fact that the trial was concluded in one sitting
only is not necessarily indicative of irregularity or
inordinate haste. If all the evidence needed by both
parties could be presented by them in that single session,
there is no reason why any reseting had to be made.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 8. PP v ELESTERIO
As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned
out later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed that he was
chosen by the accused himself and that his
representation does not change the fact that Elesterio
was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he
was arrested. At any rate, he has since been represented
by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the
petition for habeas corpus and the appellant's brief. 9
The Court agrees, however, that Judge Enrique Agana
was exceptionally careless, if not deliberately high-
handed, when he immediately after the trial dictated his
decision in open court. One may well suspect that he had
prejudged the case and had a prepared decision to foist
upon the accused even before the submission of the
case. And what is worse is that the decision was wrong.
The elements of the offense punished by General Order
No. 6 in relation to Par. 2, Presidential Decree No. 9, as
amended, are first, the carrying of a firearm outside
one's residence, and second, the motive for such act,
which is "in furtherance of or to abet, or in connection
with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos or public disorder."
A reading of the information filed against the accused
will readily show that the second element of the imputed
crime is not alleged at all. All that is averred is that
Elesterio on the date and place indicated, had in his
possession and was carrying outside his residence a
firearm and two live bullets without the proper permit or
authorization. That is only the first element. There is no
allegation in the information that the accused was
carrying the weapon outside his residence for the
purposes mentioned in the laws supposedly violated.
This omission was all too obvious, and it is a wonder
that the trial judge did not see it at all. Perhaps he did
not choose to see it. In any event, it is clear that the
accused could not have been convicted of a violation of
General Order No. 6 in relation to P.D. No. 9, par. 2, and
so should not have been sentenced to the severe penalty
of life imprisonment.
Page 30 of 142
But all this notwithstanding, the accused-appellant is not
entirely guiltless. For, although his act is not punishable
under the laws invoked by the prosecution, it is
undeniable that it comes under the provision of Section
2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Rep. Act No. 4, for illegal possession of firearms.
This provision reads as follows:
SEC. 2692. Unlawful manufacture, dealing in,
acquisition, disposition, or possession of firearms, or
ammunitions therefor, or instrument used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms or ammunition.
— Any person who manufactures, deals in, acquires
poses, or possesses, any firearm, parts of firearms, or
ammunition therefor, or instrument or implement used
or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition in violation of any provision of sections
eight hundred and seventy-seven to nine hundred and
six, inclusive, of this Code, as amended, shall, upon
conviction, be punished by imprisonment for a period of
not less than one year and one day nor more than five
years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand
pesos, in the discretion of the court. If the article
illegally possessed is a rifle, carbine, grease gun,
bazooka, machine gun, submachine gun, hand grenade,
bomb, artillery of any kind or ammunition exclusively
intended for such weapons, such period of imprisonment
shall not be iless than five years nor more than ten years.
A conviction under this section shall carry with it the
forfeiture the prohibited article or articles to the
Philippine Government.
The possession of any instrument or implement which is
directly useful in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition on the part of any person whose business or
employment does not deal with such instrument or
implement shall be "prima facie" proof that such article
is intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms or
ammunition.
Under this provision, mere possession of an unlicensed
firearm is malum prohibitum and is punishable
regardless of lack of criminal intent or proof of the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 8. PP v ELESTERIO
ownership of the firearm by another person. Even if it
were not, the accused in the case at bar still has not been
able to explain his possession of the revolver short of the
unsupported statement that it had been handed to him by
one Ray Arong who, by his own testimony, was a casual
acquaintance he had met only two days earlier. He does
not even explain why he received the gun when it was
for no apparent reason shoved on him by the said Arong.
It is well-settled that the nature and cause of the
accusation are determined not by the name given to the
offense but by the description of the manner and
circumstances in which it was committed. The
designation of the offense or of the law violated is a
conclusion of law made by the prosecuting officer but
this is not binding on the court. That conclusion must
ultimately be made only by the court itself after the trial
and following its own ascertainment of the facts needed
to constitute the elements of the crime attributed to the
accused. If an essential element is not alleged to prove a
graver crime, no conviction therefore may be rendered.
Conversely, if the elements proved constitute a less
serious offense, conviction therefor is justified although
it is the higher offense that is alleged. In other words, it
is the recitals of the facts of the commission of the
offense, and not the nomenclature of the offense, that
should determine the crime being charged in the
information. 10
Of particular relevance is the case of People v.
Mamogay, 11 where the failure of the information to
allege that the murder had been committed with the use
of an illegally possessed firearm removed it from the
coverage of P.D. No. 9 in relation to G.O. No. 6.
Nevertheless, the recitals in the information were
specific enough to justify the conviction of the accused
under Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code
for illegal possession of firearms.
The information in the case at bar contained allegations
(later established at the trial) which were sufficient to
warrant the conclusion that the offense committed by the
accused was violation of Section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended. He should therefore
have been meted the penalty prescribed therein, not the
Page 31 of 142
sentence of life imprisonment for violation of the
presidential decree.
The prescribed penalty is imprisonment for a period of
not less than one year nor more than five years and a
fine of not less than P1,000.00 nor more than P5,000.00
in the discretion of the court. The recommendation of
the Solicitor General, considering the facts and
circumstances of this case, is "an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from three years and one day as
minimum to five years as maximum and a fine of
P3,000.00, deducting from the sentence such period of
detention, if any, to which the accused may be entitled."
But since the records show that he has been under
detention since 1983, or for more than the maximum
sentence imposable on him, there is no question that he
is entitled to be released immediately upon payment of
the fine, as an indispensable part of the penalty, which
we hereby fix at P1,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the accused is declared guilty of Illegal
Possession of Firearms under Section 2692 of the
Revised Administrative Code as amended. Inasmuch as
he has been detained for more than the maximum period
of imprisonment imposable for the offense, he is hereby
ordered released immediately upon payment of the fine
of P1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Griño-Aquino, and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 4; 47.
2 Original Records, p. 15.
3 Ibid., p. 32.
4 Rollo, p. 50.
5 Ibid., pp. 50-51.
6 Id., p. 51.
7 Id., p. 5.
8 64 Phil. 399.
9 Rollo, pp. 32-37; Rollo (G.R. No. 63971-Habeas Corpus), p. 39.
10 US v. Reyes 14 Phil. 270; US v. Lim San, 17 Phil. 273; Oca v. Judge
Jimenez and Inocentes, 115 Phil. 420.
11 114 SCRA 900.

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18202 April 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
PERCIVAL GILO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Eugenio G. Gemarino for defendant-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Appellant was charged before the Justice of the Peace
Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, with a crime labelled as "Acts
of Lasciviousness" described in a complaint filed by the
offended party. After conducting the required
preliminary investigation, the justice of the peace
forwarded the case to the court of first instance where
the provincial fiscal filed an information charging a
similar crime of "Acts of Lasciviousness." It was alleged
this time that the act were committed "with lewd
design."
Trial was conducted by the latter court, and after the
prosecution had rested its case, appellant filed a motion
to dismiss alleging lack of jurisdiction in view of the
lack of allegation of lewd design in the complaint
subscribed by the offended party. The court, however,
deferred action on the motion until after trial had been
completed. Thereafter, the court rendered decision
finding that the act committed was merely one of unjust
vexation and sentence appellant to pay a fine of P20.00.
Appellant interposed the present appeal.
The complaint filed before the Justice of the Peace Court
of Guimbal, Iloilo, by the offended party, which was
labelled as "Acts of Lasciviousness", reads as follows:
That on or about December 11, 1957, in the
Municipality of Guimbal, Province of Iloilo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused Percival Gilo taking advantage of his being
drank with force and intimidation did then and there
Page 32 of 142
PP v GILO
intentionally, maliciously, feloniously, and criminally
touch the breast and face of Verna Genzola against her
will and consent and as a result of which Verna Genzola
suffered shame, embarrassment, and lost her self-
respect.
Considering that in order that a crime constitution acts
of lasciviousness may be committed it is necessary that
it be alleged that it was committed with lewd design, the
latter being an indispensable element of all crimes
against chastity, such as abduction, seduction and rape,
including acts of lasciviousness, the complaint copied
above cannot really be considered as charging a crime of
acts of lasciviousness because of the absence of such
element, event if the complaint is labelled as "Acts of
Lasciviousness."1 What characterizes a criminal charge
is not the title but the body of the complaint or
information. In this sense, the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the case, even if the
information filed by the provincial fiscal be one of acts
of lasciviousness, because the complaint that gave initial
life to the case is merely one of unjust vexation. This
fatal defect can only be cured by making the proper
correction in the complaint filed by the offended party,
which here was not done. Verily, the lower court acted
without jurisdiction, thereby rendering all its
proceedings null and void.
The contention of the government that the complaint
filed by the offended party before the Justice of the
Peace Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, is sufficient even if it
does not allege that the act was committed with lewd
design is untenable, because the words "feloniously and
criminally" that are alleged in the complaint are mere
general terms which denote the criminal intent of the
accused but which do not necessarily connote the idea of
lust needed in the act. Lust or lewd design is an element
that characterizes all crimes against chastity, apart from
the felonious or criminal intent of the offender, and such
element must be always present in order that they may
be considered in contemplation of law. The absence of
element converts the act into another crime, which this
case is unjust vexation.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 33 of 142
SEC. 9 PP v GILO

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is It is

ordered that this case be remanded to the lower court
with the directive that it be in turn remanded to the
Justice of the Peace Court of Guimbal, Iloilo, so that
trial proceed under the complaint filed by the offended
No costs.1äwphï1.ñët

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal JJ.,
concur.

Footnotes

1People v. Crisostomo, 46 Phil. 775; People v.

Aguinaldo, O.G., 1896; People v. Parentela G.R. No.
41804, February 16 1935, III Lawyer's League Journal,
416: Viado, 3 Cod. Pen., 124.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARTIN SIMON y SUNGA, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ricardo M.Sampang for accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
Herein accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga was
charged on November 10, 1988 with a violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972, under an indictment alleging that on or about
October 22, 1988, at Barangay Sto. Cristo, Guagua,
Pampanga, he sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer in
consideration of the sum of P40.00, which tea bags,
when subjected to laboratory examination, were found
positive for marijuana. 1
Eventually arraigned with the assistance of counsel on
March 2, 1989, after his rearrest following his escape
from Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga where he
was temporarily detained, 2 he pleaded not guilty. He
voluntarily waived his right to a pre-trial conference, 3
after which trial on the merits ensued and was duly
concluded.
I appellant after the latter's arrest. He was likewise the one
The evidence on record shows that a confidential
informant, later identified as a NARCOM operative,
informed the police unit at Camp Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, of the illegal drug activities of a certain
"Alyas Pusa" at Sto. Cristo, Guagua, Pampanga. Capt.
Francisco Bustamante, Commanding Officer of the 3rd
Narcotics Regional Unit in the camp, then formed a buy-
Page 34 of 142
PP v SIMON
bust team composed of Sgt. Buenaventura Lopez, Pfc.
Virgilio Villaruz and Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, all members
of the same unit. After securing marked money from
Bustamante, the team, together with their informant,
proceeded to Sto. Cristo after they had coordinated with
the police authorities and barangay officers thereof.
When they reached the place, the confidential informer
pointed out appellant to Lopez who consequently
approached appellant and asked him if he had marijuana.
Appellant answered in the affirmative and Lopez offered
to buy two tea bags. Appellant then left and, upon
returning shortly thereafter, handed to Lopez two
marijuana tea bags and Lopez gave him the marked
money amounting to P40.00 as payment. Lopez then
scratched his head as a
pre-arranged signal to his companions who were
stationed around ten to fifteen meters away, and the
team closed in on them. Thereupon, Villaruz, who was
the head of the back-up team, arrested appellant. The
latter was then brought by the team to the 3rd Narcotics
Regional Unit at Camp Olivas on board a jeep and he
was placed under custodial investigation, with Sgt.
Pejoro as the investigator. 4
Pfc. Villaruz corroborated Lopez' testimony, claiming
that he saw the deal that transpired between Lopez and
the appellant. He also averred that he was the one who
confiscated the marijuana and took the marked money
from appellant. 5
Sgt. Domingo Pejoro, for his part, declared that although
he was part of the buy-bust team, he was stationed
farthest from the rest of the other members, that is,
around two hundred meters away from his companions.
He did not actually see the sale that transpired between
Lopez and appellant but he saw his teammates accosting
who conducted the custodial investigation of appellant
wherein the latter was apprised of his rights to remain
silent, to information and to counsel. Appellant,
however, orally waived his right to counsel. 6
Pejoro also claimed having prepared Exhibit "G", the
"Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated" which
appellant signed, admitting therein the confiscation of
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
four tea bags of marijuana dried leaves in his possession.
Pejoro likewise informed the court below that,
originally, what he placed on the receipt was that only
one marijuana leaf was confiscated in exchange for
P20.00. However, Lopez and Villaruz corrected his entry
by telling him to put "two", instead of "one" and "40",
instead of "20". He agreed to the correction since they
were the ones who were personally and directly
involved in the purchase of the marijuana and the arrest
of appellant. 7
Dr. Pedro S. Calara, a medical officer at Camp Olivas,
examined appellant at 5:30 p.m. of the day after the
latter's apprehension, and the results were practically
normal except for his relatively high blood pressure. The
doctor also did not find any trace of physical injury on
the person of appellant. The next day, he again examined
appellant due to the latter's complaint of
gastro-intestinal pain. In the course of the examination,
Dr. Calara discovered that appellant has a history of
peptic ulcer, which causes him to experience abdominal
pain and consequently vomit blood. In the afternoon,
appellant came back with the same complaint but,
except for the gastro-intestinal pain, his physical
condition remained normal. 8
As expected, appellant tendered an antipodal version of
the attendant facts, claiming that on the day in question,
at around 4:30 p.m., he was watching television with the
members of his family in their house when three
persons, whom he had never met before suddenly
arrived. Relying on the assurance that they would just
inquire about something from him at their detachment,
appellant boarded a jeep with them. He was told that
they were going to Camp Olivas, but he later noticed
that they were taking a different route. While on board,
he was told that he was a pusher so he attempted to
alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead.
When they finally reached the camp, he was ordered to
sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in
the stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was
then compelled to affix his signature and fingerprints on
the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge
of the P20.00 or the dried marijuana leaves, and insisted
that the twenty-peso bill came from the pocket of
Page 35 of 142
PP v SIMON
Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the hands of Pejoro.
He admitted having escaped from the NARCOM office
but claimed that he did so since he could no longer
endure the maltreatment to which he was being
subjected. After escaping, he proceeded to the house of
his uncle, Bienvenido Sunga, at San Matias, Guagua,
reaching the place at around 6:30 or 7:30 p.m. There, he
consulted a quack doctor and, later, he was accompanied
by his sister to the Romana Pangan District Hospital at
Floridablanca, Pampanga where he was confined for
three days. 9
Appellant's brother, Norberto Simon, testified to the fact
that appellant was hospitalized at Floridablanca,
Pampanga after undergoing abdominal pain and
vomiting of blood. He likewise confirmed that appellant
had been suffering from peptic ulcer even before the
latter's arrest. 10 Also, Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a
resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital,
declared that she treated appellant for three days due to
abdominal pain, but her examination revealed that the
cause for this ailment was appellant's peptic ulcer. She
did not see any sign of slight or serious external injury,
abrasion or contusion on his body. 11
On December 4, 1989, after weighing the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered judgment convicting
appellant for a violation of Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine
of twenty thousand pesos and to pay the costs. The four
tea bags of marijuana dried leaves were likewise ordered
confiscated in favor of the Government. 12
Appellant now prays the Court to reverse the
aforementioned judgment of the lower court, contending
in his assignment of errors that the latter erred in (1) not
upholding his defense of "frame-up", (2) not declaring
Exhibit "G" (Receipt of Property Seized/Confiscated)
inadmissible in evidence, and (3) convicting him of a
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 13
At the outset, it should be noted that while the People's
real theory and evidence is to the effect the appellant
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
actually sold only two tea bags of marijuana dried
leaves, while the other two tea bags were merely
confiscated subsequently from his possession, 14 the
latter not being in any way connected with the sale, the
information alleges that he sold and delivered four tea
bags of marijuana dried leaves. 15 In view thereof, the
issue presented for resolution in this appeal is merely the
act of selling the two tea bags allegedly committed by
appellant, and does not include the disparate and distinct
issue of illegal possession of the other two tea bags
which separate offense is not charged herein. 16
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the
sale must be clearly and unmistakably established. 17 To
sell means to give, whether for money or any other
material consideration. 18 It must, therefore, be
established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold
and delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to
Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange
for two twenty-peso bills.
After an assiduous review and calibration of the
evidence adduced by both parties, we are morally certain
that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto engaging
in the illegal sale of prohibited drugs. The prosecution
was able to prove beyond a scintilla of doubt that
appellant, on October 22, 1988, did sell two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez. The latter himself
creditably testified as to how the sale took place and his
testimony was amply corroborated by his teammates. As
between the straightforward, positive and corroborated
testimony of Lopez and the bare denials and negative
testimony of appellant, the former undeniably deserves
greater weight and is more entitled to credence.
We are aware that the practice of entrapping drug
traffickers through the utilization of poseur-buyers is
susceptible to mistake, harassment, extortion and abuse.
19 Nonetheless, such causes for judicial apprehension
and doubt do not obtain in the case at bar. Appellant's
entrapment and arrest were not effected in a haphazard
way, for a surveillance was conducted by the team
before the
buy-bust operation was effected. 20 No ill motive was or
could be attributed to them, aside from the fact that they
Page 36 of 142
PP v SIMON
are presumed to have regularly performed their official
duty. 21 Such lack of dubious motive coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses, should prevail over the self-
serving and uncorroborated claim of appellant of having
been framed, 22 erected as it is upon the mere shifting
sands of an alibi. To top it all, appellant was caught
red-handed delivering prohibited drugs, and while there
was a delimited chance for him to controvert the charge,
he does not appear to have plausibly done so.
When the drug seized was submitted to the Crime
Laboratory Service of the then Philippine Constabulary-
Integrated National Police (PC-INP) at Camp Olivas for
examination, P/Cpl. Marlyn Salangad, a forensic
chemist therein, 23 confirmed in her Technical Report
No. NB-448-88 that the contents of the four tea bags
confiscated from appellant were positive for and had a
total weight of 3.8 grams of marijuana. 24 Thus, the
corpus delicti of the crime had been fully proved with
certainty and conclusiveness. 25
Appellant would want to make capital of the alleged
inconsistencies and improbabilities in the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses. Foremost, according to him,
is the matter of who really confiscated the marijuana tea
bags from him since, in open court, Pejoro asserted that
he had nothing to do with the confiscation of the
marijuana, but in the aforementioned "Receipt of
Property Seized/Confiscated," he signed it as the one
who seized the same. 26
Suffice it to say that whether it was Villaruz or Pejoro
who confiscated the marijuana will not really matter
since such is not an element of the offense with which
appellant is charged. What is unmistakably clear is that
the marijuana was confiscated from the possession of
appellant. Even, assuming arguendo that the prosecution
committed an error on who actually seized the marijuana
from appellant, such an error or discrepancy refers only
to a minor matter and, as such, neither impairs the
essential integrity of the prosecution evidence as a
whole nor reflects on the witnesses' honesty. 27 Besides,
there was clearly a mere imprecision of language since
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
Pejoro obviously meant that he did not take part in the
physical taking of the drug from the person of appellant,
but he participated in the legal seizure or confiscation
thereof as the investigator of their unit.
Next, appellant adduces the argument that the twenty-
peso bills allegedly confiscated from him were not
powdered for finger-printing purposes contrary to the
normal procedure in buy-bust operations. 28 This
omission has been satisfactorily explained by Pfc.
Virgilio Villaruz in his testimony, as follows:
Q: Is it the standard operating procedure of your
unit that in conducting such operation you do not
anymore provide a powder (sic) on the object so as to
determine the thumbmark or identity of the persons
taking hold of the object?
A: We were not able to put powder on these
denominations because we are lacking that kind of
material in our office since that item can be purchased
only in Manila and only few are producing that, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it not a fact that your office is within (the) P.C.
Crime Laboratory, CIS, as well as the office of NICA?
A: Our office is only adjacent to those offices but
we cannot make a request for that powder because they,
themselves, are using that in their own work, sir. 29
The foregoing explanation aside, we agree that the
failure to mark the money bills used for entrapment
purposes can under no mode of rationalization be fatal to
the case of the prosecution because the Dangerous
Drugs Act punishes "any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions." 30 The dusting of said bills with
phosphorescent powder is only an evidentiary technique
for identification purposes, which identification can be
supplied by other species of evidence.
Page 37 of 142
PP v SIMON
Again, appellant contends that there was neither a
relative of his nor any barangay official or civilian to
witness the seizure. He decries the lack of pictures taken
before, during and after his arrest. Moreover, he was not
reported to or booked in the custody of any barangay
official or police authorities. 31 These are absurd
disputations. No law or jurisprudence requires that an
arrest or seizure, to be valid, be witnessed by a relative,
a barangay official or any other civilian, or be
accompanied by the taking of pictures. On the contrary,
the police enforcers having caught appellant in flagrante
delicto, they were not only authorized but were also
under the obligation to effect a warrantless arrest and
seizure.
Likewise, contrary to appellant's contention, there was
an arrest report prepared by the police in connection
with his apprehension. Said Booking Sheet and Arrest
Report 32 states, inter alia, that "suspect was arrested for
selling two tea bags of suspected marijuana dried leaves
and the confiscation of another two tea bags of
suspected marijuana dried leaves." Below these remarks
was affixed appellant's signature. In the same manner,
the receipt for the seized property, hereinbefore
mentioned, was signed by appellant wherein he
acknowledged the confiscation of the marked bills from
him. 33
However, we find and hereby declare the
aforementioned exhibits inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant's conformance to these documents are
declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the
crime charged. They were obtained in violation of his
right as a person under custodial investigation for the
commission of an offense, there being nothing in the
records to show that he was assisted by counsel. 34
Although appellant manifested during the custodial
investigation that he waived his right to counsel, the
waiver was not made in writing and in the presence of
counsel, 35 hence whatever incriminatory admission or
confession may be extracted from him, either verbally or
in writing, is not allowable in evidence. 36 Besides, the
arrest report is self-serving and hearsay and can easily
be concocted to implicate a suspect.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
Notwithstanding the objectionability of the aforesaid
exhibits, appellant cannot thereby be extricated from his
predicament since his criminal participation in the illegal
sale of marijuana has been sufficiently proven. The
commission of the offense of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs requires merely the consummation of the selling
transaction 37 which happens the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. 38 In the present case,
and in light of the preceding discussion, this sale has
been ascertained beyond any peradventure of doubt.
Appellant then asseverates that it is improbable that he
would sell marijuana to a total stranger. 39 We take this
opportunity to once again reiterate the doctrinal rule that
drug-pushing, when done on a small scale as in this
case, belongs to that class of crimes that may be
committed at any time and in any place. 40 It is not
contrary to human experience for a drug pusher to sell to
a total stranger, 41 for what matters is not an existing
familiarity between the buyer and seller but their
agreement and the acts constituting the sale and delivery
of the marijuana leaves. 42 While there may be
instances where such sale could be improbable, taking
into consideration the diverse circumstances of person,
time and place, as well as the incredibility of how the
accused supposedly acted on that occasion, we can
safely say that those exceptional particulars are not
present in this case.
Finally, appellant contends that he was subjected to
physical and mental torture by the arresting officers
which caused him to escape from Camp Olivas the night
he was placed under custody. 43 This he asserts to
support his explanation as to how his signatures on the
documents earlier discussed were supposedly obtained
by force and coercion.
The doctrine is now too well embedded in our
jurisprudence that for evidence to be believed, it must
not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness
but must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. 44 The evidence on
record is bereft of any support for appellant's allegation
of maltreatment. Two doctors, one for the prosecution 45
Page 38 of 142
PP v SIMON
and the other for the defense, 46 testified on the absence
of any tell-tale sign or indication of bodily injury,
abrasions or contusions on the person of appellant. What
is evident is that the cause of his abdominal pain was his
peptic ulcer from which he had been suffering even
before his arrest. 47 His own brother even corroborated
that fact, saying that appellant has had a history of
bleeding peptic ulcer. 48
Furthermore, if it is true that appellant was maltreated at
Camp Olivas, he had no reason whatsoever for not
divulging the same to his brother who went to see him at
the camp after his arrest and during his detention there.
49 Significantly, he also did not even report the matter to
the authorities nor file appropriate charges against the
alleged malefactors despite the opportunity to do so 50
and with the legal services of counsel being available to
him. Such omissions funnel down to the conclusion that
appellant's story is a pure fabrication.
These, and the events earlier discussed, soundly refute
his allegations that his arrest was baseless and
premeditated for the NARCOM agents were determined
to arrest him at all costs. 51 Premeditated or not,
appellant's arrest was only the culmination, the final act
needed for his isolation from society and it was
providential that it came about after he was caught in the
very act of illicit trade of prohibited drugs. Accordingly,
this opinion could have concluded on a note of
affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. However,
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was further
amended by Republic Act No. 7659 effective December
31, 1993, 52 which supervenience necessarily affects the
original disposition of this case and entails additional
questions of law which we shall now resolve.
II
The provisions of the aforesaid amendatory law,
pertinent to the adjudication of the case at bar, are to this
effect:
Sec. 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to
read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. — The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation
and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of the
Crime. — The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4,
7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16
of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous
drugs involved is in any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the
foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity.
1. Considering that herein appellant is being
prosecuted for the sale of four tea bags of marijuana
with a total weight of only 3.8 grams and, in fact, stands
to be convicted for the sale of only two of those tea
bags, the initial inquiry would be whether the patently
favorable provisions of Republic Act
Page 39 of 142
PP v SIMON
No. 7659 should be given retroactive effect to entitle
him to the lesser penalty provided thereunder, pursuant
to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code.
Although Republic Act No. 6425 was enacted as a
special law, albeit originally amendatory and in
substitution of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the
Revised Penal Code, 53 it has long been settled that by
force of Article 10 of said Code the beneficient
provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be
given retrospective effect to crimes punished by special
laws. 54 The execution in said article would not apply to
those convicted of drug offenses since habitual
delinquency refers to convictions for the third time or
more of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification. 55
Since, obviously, the favorable provisions of Republic
Act No. 7659 could neither have then been involved nor
invoked in the present case, a corollary question would
be whether this court, at the present stage, can
sua sponte apply the provisions of said Article 22 to
reduce the penalty to be imposed on appellant. That
issue has likewise been resolved in the cited case of
People vs. Moran, et al., ante., thus:
. . . . The plain precept contained in article 22 of the
Penal Code, declaring the retroactivity of penal laws in
so far as they are favorable to persons accused of a
felony, would be useless and nugatory if the courts of
justice were not under obligation to fulfill such duty,
irrespective of whether or not the accused has applied
for it, just as would also all provisions relating to the
prescription of the crime and the penalty.
If the judgment which could be affected and modified by
the reduced penalties provided in Republic Act No. 7659
has already become final and executory or the accused is
serving sentence thereunder, then practice, procedure
and pragmatic considerations would warrant and
necessitate the matter being brought to the judicial
authorities for relief under a writ of habeas corpus. 56
2. Probably through oversight, an error on the
matter of imposable penalties appears to have been
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
committed in the drafting of the aforesaid law; thereby
calling for and necessitating judicial reconciliation and
craftsmanship.
As applied to the present case, Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 6425, as now further amended, imposes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 upon any person who
shall unlawfully sell, administer, deliver, give away,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug. That penalty, according to the amendment to
Section 20 of the law, shall be applied if what is
involved is 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana; otherwise, if the quantity involved is less, the
penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.
In other words, there is here an overlapping error in the
provisions on the penalty of reclusion perpetua by
reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of
the penalty where the marijuana is less than 750 grams,
and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same
error has been committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section
20. To harmonize such conflicting provisions in order to
give effect to the whole law, 57 we hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs
involved is less than the quantities stated in the first
paragraph shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua. This is
also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal
law that all doubts should be construed in a manner
favorable to the accused.
3. Where, as in this case, the quantity of the
dangerous drug is only 3.8 grams, hence covered by the
imposable range of penalties under the second paragraph
of Section 20, as now modified, the law provides that
the penalty shall be taken from said range "depending
upon the quantity" of the drug involved in the case. The
penalty in said second paragraph constitutes a complex
one composed of three distinct penalties, that is, prision
correccional, prision mayor, and reclusion temporal. In
such a situation, the Code provides that each one shall
Page 40 of 142
PP v SIMON
form a period, with the lightest of them being the
minimum, the next as the medium, and the most severe
as the maximum period. 58
Ordinarily, and pursuant to Article 64 of the Code, the
mitigating and aggravating circumstances determine
which period of such complex penalty
shall be imposed on the accused. The peculiarity of the
second paragraph of Section 20, however, is its specific
mandate, above quoted, that the penalty shall instead
depend upon the quantity of the drug subject of the
criminal transaction. 59 Accordingly, by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Code and to subserve the
purpose of Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7659, each of
the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as
a principal imposable penalty depending on the quantity
of the drug involved. Thereby, the modifying
circumstances will not altogether be disregarded. Since
each component penalty of the total complex penalty
will have to be imposed separately as determined by the
quantity of the drug involved, then the modifying
circumstances can be used to fix the proper period of
that component penalty, as shall hereafter be explained.
It would, therefore, be in line with the provisions of
Section 20 in the context of our aforesaid disposition
thereon that, unless there are compelling reasons for a
deviation, the quantities of the drugs enumerated in its
second paragraph be divided into three, with the
resulting quotient, and double or treble the same, to be
respectively the bases for allocating the penalty
proportionately among the three aforesaid periods
according to the severity thereof. Thus, if the marijuana
involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be imposed
shall be prision correccional; from 250 to 499 grams,
prision mayor; and 500 to
749 grams, reclusion temporal. Parenthetically, fine is
imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. 60
Now, considering the minimal quantity of the marijuana
subject of the case at bar, the penalty of prision
correccional is consequently indicated but, again,
another preliminary and cognate issue has first to be
resolved.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
4. Prision correccional has a duration of 6 months
and 1 day to 6 years and, as a divisible penalty, it
consists of three periods as provided in the text of and
illustrated in the table provided by Article 76 of the
Code. The question is whether or not in determining the
penalty to be imposed, which is here to be taken from
the penalty of prision correccional, the presence or
absence of mitigating, aggravating or other
circumstances modifying criminal liability should be
taken into account.
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was
held that, in imposing the penalty for offenses under
special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and
should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as
applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided
their own specific penalties for the offenses punished
thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since
the penalties then provided by the special laws
concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible
to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances
whose main function is to determine the period of the
penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the
Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous
cases that the provisions of the Code on the graduation
of penalties by degrees could not be given
supplementary application to special laws, since the
penalties in the latter were not components of or
contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by
Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there
is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in
the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the
offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a
special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from
Page 41 of 142
PP v SIMON
the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature
and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code.
When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision
correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it
would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit
otherwise. More on this later.
For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision
correccional, to be taken from the medium period
thereof pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code, there being no attendant mitigating or aggravating
circumstance.
5. At this juncture, a clarificatory discussion of the
developmental changes in the penalties imposed for
offenses under special laws would be necessary.
Originally, those special laws, just as was the
conventional practice in the United States but differently
from the penalties provided in our Revised Penal Code
and its Spanish origins, provided for one specific
penalty or a range of penalties with definitive durations,
such as imprisonment for one year or for one to five
years but without division into periods or any technical
statutory cognomen. This is the special law
contemplated in and referred to at the time laws like the
Indeterminate Sentence Law 61 were passed during the
American regime.
Subsequently, a different pattern emerged whereby a
special law would direct that an offense thereunder shall
be punished under the Revised Penal Code and in the
same manner provided therein. Inceptively, for instance,
Commonwealth Act No. 303 62 penalizing non-payment
of salaries and wages with the periodicity prescribed
therein, provided:
Sec. 4. Failure of the employer to pay his employee or
laborer as required by section one of this Act, shall
prima facie be considered a fraud committed by such
employer against his employee or laborer by means of
false pretenses similar to those mentioned in article three
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
hundred and fifteen, paragraph four, sub-paragraph two
(a) of the Revised Penal Code and shall be punished in
the same manner as therein provided. 63
Thereafter, special laws were enacted where the offenses
defined therein were specifically punished by the
penalties as technically named and understood in the
Revised Penal Code. These are exemplified by Republic
Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act) where the penalties
ranged from arresto mayor to
death; 64 Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing
Decree) where the penalties run from arresto mayor to
prision mayor; and Presidential Decree
No. 1866 (illegal possession and other prohibited acts
involving firearms), the penalties wherefor may involve
prision mayor, reclusion temporal, reclusion perpetua or
death.
Another variant worth mentioning is Republic Act No.
6539
(Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) where the penalty is
imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months
and not more than 17 years and 4 months, when
committed without violence or intimidation of persons
or force upon things; not less than 17 years and 4
months and not more than 30 years, when committed
with violence against or intimidation of any person, or
force upon things; and life imprisonment to death, when
the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed.
With respect to the first example, where the penalties
under the special law are different from and are without
reference or relation to those under the Revised Penal
Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules for
the application of penalties under said Code or by other
relevant statutory provisions based on or applicable only
to said rules for felonies under the Code. In this type of
special law, the legislative intendment is clear.
The same exclusionary rule would apply to the last
given example, Republic Act No. 6539. While it is true
that the penalty of 14 years and
8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually
equivalent to the duration of the medium period of
Page 42 of 142
PP v SIMON
reclusion temporal, such technical term under the
Revised Penal Code is not given to that penalty for
carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping
attended by the qualifying circumstances stated in the
law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily
apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of the
same formulation.
On the other hand, the rules for the application of
penalties and the correlative effects thereof under the
Revised Penal Code, as well as other statutory
enactments founded upon and applicable to such
provisions of the Code, have suppletory effect to the
penalties under the former Republic Act
No. 1700 and those now provided under Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1612 and 1866. While these are special
laws, the fact that the penalties for offenses thereunder
are those provided for in the Revised Penal code lucidly
reveals the statutory intent to give the related provisions
on penalties for felonies under the Code the
corresponding application to said special laws, in the
absence of any express or implicit proscription in these
special laws. To hold otherwise would be to sanction an
indefensible judicial truncation of an integrated system
of penalties under the Code and its allied legislation,
which could never have been the intendment of
Congress.
In People vs. Macatanda, 65 a prosecution under a
special law (Presidential Decree No. 533, otherwise
known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), it was
contended by the prosecution that Article 64, paragraph
5, of the Revised Penal Code should not apply to said
special law. We said therein that —
We do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533
is a special law entirely distinct from and unrelated to
the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty
imposed which is in terms of the classification and
duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal
Code, which is not for penalties as are ordinarily
imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D.
533 shall be deemed as an amendment of the Revised
Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
cattle (Art. 310) or otherwise to be subject to applicable
provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised
Penal Code . . . . Article 64 of the same Code should,
likewise, be applicable, . . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
More particularly with regard to the suppletory effect of
the rules on penalties in the Revised Penal Code to
Republic Act No. 6425, in this case involving Article
63(2) of the Code, we have this more recent
pronouncement:
. . . Pointing out that as provided in Article 10 the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall be
"supplementary" to special laws, this Court held that
where the special law expressly grants to the court
discretion in applying the penalty prescribed for the
offense, there is no room for the application of the
provisions of the Code . . . .
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by P.D.
No. 1623, contains no explicit grant of discretion to the
Court in the application of the penalty prescribed by the
law. In such case, the court must be guided by the rules
prescribed by the Revised Penal Code concerning the
application of penalties which distill the "deep legal
thought and centuries of experience in the administration
of criminal laws." (Emphasis ours.) 66
Under the aforestated considerations, in the case of the
Dangerous Drugs Act as now amended by Republic Act
No. 7659 by the incorporation and prescription therein
of the technical penalties defined in and constituting
integral parts of the three scales of penalties in the Code,
67 with much more reason should the provisions of said
Code on the appreciation and effects of all attendant
modifying circumstances apply in fixing the penalty.
Likewise, the different kinds or classifications of
penalties and the rules for graduating
such penalties by degrees should have supplementary
effect on Republic Act No. 6425, except if they would
result in absurdities as will now be explained.
While not squarely in issue in this case, but because this
aspect is involved in the discussion on the role of
modifying circumstances, we have perforce to lay down
Page 43 of 142
PP v SIMON
the caveat that mitigating circumstances should be
considered and applied only if they affect the periods
and the degrees of the penalties within rational limits.
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the
graduation and consequently determine the degree of the
penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the
Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71,
are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature of
the participation of the accused. However, under
paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more
ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by one
degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can
reduce the penalty by one or two degrees, or even more.
These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty
under the aforestated second paragraph of section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results
which could not have been contemplated by the
legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the
law prescribes a penalty in some manner not specially
provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof,
the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence,
when the penalty prescribed for the crime consists of
one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent,
the penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of
as many penalties which follow the former in the scale
in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since
the complex penalty in this
case consists of three discrete penalties in their full
extent, that is,
prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion
temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto
menor, destierro and arresto mayor. There could,
however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three
penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public
censure remain in the scale.
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce
the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this
reason that the three component penalties in the second
paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest
penalty should in any event be prision correccional in
order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat.
Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may
continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect
judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law,
which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.
6. The final query is whether or not the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable to the case
now before us. Apparently it does, since drug offenses
are not included in nor has appellant committed any act
which would put him within the exceptions to said law
and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusion
perpetua or death, provided, of course, that the penalty
as ultimately resolved will exceed one year of
imprisonment. 68 The more important aspect, however,
is how the indeterminate sentence shall be ascertained.
It is true that Section 1 of said law, after providing for
indeterminate sentence for an offense under the Revised
Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any
other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which
shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same." We hold that this quoted
portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense
under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was not
taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal
Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such
that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under
that law.
There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule
on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special
laws was necessary because of the nature of the former
Page 44 of 142
PP v SIMON
type of penalties under said laws which were not
included or contemplated in the scale of penalties in
Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no
minimum "within the range of the penalty next lower to
that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the
rule for felonies therein. In the illustrative examples of
penalties in special laws hereinbefore provided, this rule
applied, and would still apply, only to the first and last
examples. Furthermore, considering the vintage of Act
No. 4103 as earlier noted, this holding is but an
application and is justified under the rule of
contemporanea expositio. 69
We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical signification
and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining the
maximum of said sentence, we
have applied the provisions of the amended Section 20
of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article
64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for in a special
law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised
Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum,
we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1
which directs that "in imposing a prison sentence for an
offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which
shall be that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis
ours.)
A divergent pedantic application would not only be out
of context but also an admission of the hornbook maxim
that qui haeret in litera haeret in cortice. Fortunately, this
Court has never gone only skin-deep in its construction
of Act. No. 4103 by a mere literal appreciation of its
provisions. Thus, with regard to the phrase in Section 2
thereof excepting from its coverage "persons convicted
of offenses punished with death penalty or life
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
imprisonment," we have held that what is considered is
the penalty actually imposed and not the penalty
imposable under the law, 70 and that reclusion perpetua
is likewise embraced therein although what the law
states is "life imprisonment".
What irresistibly emerges from the preceding
disquisition, therefore, is that under the concurrence of
the principles of literal interpretation, which have been
rationalized by comparative decisions of this Court; of
historical interpretation, as explicated by the antecedents
of the law and related contemporaneous legislation; and
of structural interpretation, considering the interrelation
of the penalties in the Code as supplemented by Act No.
4103 in an integrated scheme of penalties, it follows that
the minimum of the indeterminate sentence in this case
shall be the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the
offense. Thereby we shall have interpreted the seeming
ambiguity in Section 1 of Act No. 4103 in such a way as
to harmonize laws with laws, which is the best mode of
interpretation. 71
The indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social
measure of compassion, and should be liberally
interpreted in favor of the accused. 72 The "minimum"
sentence is merely a period at which, and not before, as
a matter of grace and not of right, the prisoner may
merely be allowed to serve the balance of his sentence
outside of his confinement. 73 It does not constitute the
totality of the penalty since thereafter he still has to
continue serving the rest of his sentence under set
conditions. That minimum is only the period when the
convict's eligibility for parole may be considered. In
fact, his release on parole may readily be denied if he is
found unworthy thereof, or his reincarceration may be
ordered on legal grounds, even if he has served the
minimum sentence.
It is thus both amusing and bemusing if, in the case at
bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a
minimum sentence within the range of arresto mayor,
the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is
the maximum range we have fixed through the
application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal
Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the
Page 45 of 142
PP v SIMON
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto mayor, instead
of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional. The
difference, which could thereby even involve only one
day, is hardly worth the creation of an overrated tempest
in the judicial teapot.
ACCORDINGLY, under all the foregoing premises, the
judgment of conviction rendered by the court a quo
against accused-appellant Martin Simon y Sunga is
AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that he
should be, as he hereby is, sentenced to serve an
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as the minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as the maximum thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Romero, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in
appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed
would be prision correccional pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended
by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be
meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower,
i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or more
mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating
circumstances or of a privileged mitigating circumstance
shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the
penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity
of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision
correccional.
I
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A.
No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under
the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
also their technical signification and effects, then what
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses
penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.
6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be
considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code
for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No.
4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203)
also provides that:
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum prescribed by the same
(Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which
should be taken into account in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by
the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by
other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are
those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is
thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES.
To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under
Page 46 of 142
PP v SIMON
the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none
other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is
included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II,
Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished
under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined
and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such
other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised
Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by
a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the special law. That the latter imports or
borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature
of penalties does not make an offense in the special law
punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special
law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty
therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of
penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no
means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished
or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No.
7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to
drugs should now be considered as punished under the
Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also
bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are
mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal
Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the
nature of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties
(Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.),
complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties
(Article 61), among others. We cannot do otherwise
without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is
extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised
Penal Code does not make an offense under the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper
penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused
should be that whose minimum should not be less than
the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the
penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and
reclusion temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the
Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the
lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the
medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet,
considering that under the said second paragraph of
Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the
drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of
the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as
a principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying
circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty
shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g.,
marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty
should be prision correccional, but there is one
mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the
penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional in
its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a
limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce
the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
Page 47 of 142
PP v SIMON
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section
20 shall each be considered as an independent principal
penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event
be prision correccional in order to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from
reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the
basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two
degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64,
Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68,
Revised Penal Code), or under circumstances covered
by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the
proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor,
regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is
proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because
the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision
correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed
is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be
allowed.
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and
unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second
paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we both
allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5),
Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of
drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the
determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine
only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of
possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which
case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum
because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an
accused who is found guilty of possession of only one
(1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled
to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of
privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens
to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to
the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant
to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person
under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of
Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years
of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of
the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed,
but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen
years of age the penalty next lover than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section
20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section
17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the
Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in
another.
Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur.
# Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:
I am still unable to agree with the view that (a) in
appropriate cases where the penalty to be imposed
Page 48 of 142
PP v SIMON
would be prision correccional pursuant to the second
paragraph of Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended
by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the sentence to be
meted out, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(Act No. 4103, as amended), should be that whose
minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower,
i.e., arresto mayor; and (b) the presence of two or more
mitigating circumstances not offset by any mitigating
circumstances or of a privileged mitigating circumstance
shall not reduce the penalty by one or two degrees if the
penalty to be imposed, taking into account the quantity
of the dangerous drugs involved, would be prision
correccional.
I
The first view is based on the proposition that since R.A.
No. 7659 had unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under
the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence
also their technical signification and effects, then what
should govern is the first part of Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which directs that:
in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view
of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the
offense.
Elsewise stated, by the adoption of the penalties
provided for in the Revised Penal Code for the offenses
penalized under the Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.
6425), as amended, the latter offenses would now be
considered as punished under the Revised Penal Code
for purposes of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act. No.
4103, as amended by Act. No. 4225 and R.A. No. 4203)
also provides that:
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
if the offense is punished by any other law, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the
maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not
be less than the minimum prescribed by the same
(Emphasis supplied).
There are, therefore, two categories of offenses which
should be taken into account in the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law: (1) offenses punished by
the Revised Penal Code, and (2) offenses punished by
other laws (or special laws).
The offenses punished by the Revised Penal Code are
those defined and penalized in Book II thereof, which is
thus appropriately titled CRIMES AND PENALTIES.
To simplify further, a crime is deemed punished under
the Revised Penal Code if it is defined by it, and none
other, as a crime and is punished by a penalty which is
included in the classification of Penalties in Chapter II,
Title III of Book I thereof.
On the other hand, an offense is considered punished
under any other law (or special law) if it is not defined
and penalized by the Revised Penal Code but by such
other law.
It is thus clear that an offense is punished by the Revised
Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty therefor
are found in the said Code, and it is deemed punished by
a special law if its definition and the penalty therefor are
found in the special law. That the latter imports or
borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature
of penalties does not make an offense in the special law
punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal
Code. The reason is quite simple. It is still the special
law that defines the offense and imposes a penalty
therefor, although it adopts the Code's nomenclature of
penalties. In short, the mere use by a special law of a
penalty found in the Revised Penal Code can by no
means make an offense thereunder an offense "punished
or punishable" by the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, I cannot subscribe to the view that since R.A. No.
7659 had adopted the penalties prescribed by the
Page 49 of 142
PP v SIMON
Revised Penal Code in drug cases, offenses related to
drugs should now be considered as punished under the
Revised Penal Code. If that were so, then we are also
bound, ineluctably, to declare that such offenses are
mala in se and to apply the Articles of the Revised Penal
Code regarding the stages of a felony (Article 6), the
nature of participation (Article 16), accessory penalties
(Articles 40-45), application of penalties to principals,
accomplices, and accessories (Article 46 et seq.),
complex crimes (Article 48), and graduation of penalties
(Article 61), among others. We cannot do otherwise
without being drawn to an inconsistent posture which is
extremely hard to justify.
I respectfully submit then that the adoption by the
Dangerous Drugs Act of the penalties in the Revised
Penal Code does not make an offense under the
Dangerous Drugs Act an offense punished by the
Revised Penal Code. Consequently, where the proper
penalty to be imposed under Section 20 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is prision correccional, then,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
indeterminate sentence to be meted on the accused
should be that whose minimum should not be less than
the minimum prescribed by the special law (the
Dangerous Drugs Act), i.e., not lower than six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
II
The majority opinion holds the view that while the
penalty provided for in Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is a complex one composed of three distinct
penalties, viz., prision correccional, prision mayor, and
reclusion temporal, and that pursuant to Article 77 of the
Revised Penal Code, each should form a period, with the
lightest of them being the minimum, the next as the
medium, and the most severe as the maximum, yet,
considering that under the said second paragraph of
Section 20 the penalty depends on the quantity of the
drug subject of the criminal transaction, then by way of
exception to Article 77 of the Revised Penal Code and to
subserve the purpose of Section 20, as amended, each of
the aforesaid component penalties shall be considered as
a principal penalty depending on the quantity of the drug
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 9
involved. Thereafter, applying the modifying
circumstances pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, the proper period of the component penalty
shall then be fixed.
To illustrate, if the quantity of the drugs involved (e.g.,
marijuana below 250 grams) the proper principal penalty
should be prision correccional, but there is one
mitigating and no aggravating circumstance, then the
penalty to be imposed should be prision correccional in
its minimum period. Yet, the majority opinion puts a
limit to such a rule. It declares:
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying
circumstances may be appreciated to determine the
periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce
the penalty by degrees, in no case should such
graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than
prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section
20 shall each be considered as an independent principal
penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event
be prision correccional in order to depreciate the
seriousness of drug offenses.
Simply put, this rule would allow the reduction from
reclusion
temporal — if it is the penalty to be imposed on the
basis of the quantity of the drugs involved — by two
degrees, or to prision correccional, if there are two or
more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance is present (paragraph 5, Article 64,
Revised Penal Code) or if there is a privileged
mitigating circumstances of, say, minority (Article 68,
Revised Penal Code), or under circumstances covered
by Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. Yet, if the
proper penalty to be imposed is prision mayor,
regardless of the fact that a reduction by two degrees is
proper, it should only be reduced by one degree because
the rule does not allow a reduction beyond prision
correccional. Finally, if the proper penalty to be imposed
is prision correccional, no reduction at all would be
allowed.
Page 50 of 142
PP v SIMON
I find the justification for the rule to be arbitrary and
unfair. It is arbitrary because within the same second
paragraph involving the same range of penalty, we both
allow and disallow the application of Article 64(5),
Article 68, and Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.
The reason for the disallowance, viz., in order not to
depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses, is
unconvincing because Section 20 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, has in fact "depreciated" the seriousness of
drug offenses by providing quantity as basis for the
determination of the proper penalty and limiting fine
only to cases punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
It is unfair because an accused who is found guilty of
possessing MORE dangerous
drugs — say 500 to 749 grams of marijuana, in which
case the penalty to be imposed would be reclusion
temporal — may only be sentenced to six (6) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum
because of privileged mitigating circumstances. Yet, an
accused who is found guilty of possession of only one
(1) gram of marijuana — in which case the penalty to be
imposed is prision correccional — would not be entitled
to a reduction thereof even if he has the same number of
privileged mitigating circumstances as the former has.
Also, if the privileged mitigating circumstance happens
to be the minority of the accused, then he is entitled to
the reduction of the penalty as a matter of right pursuant
to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person
under eighteen years of age. — When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming
under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of
Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years
of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of
the court having declared that he acted with
discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed,
but always lower by two degrees at least than that
prescribed by law for the crime which he committed.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 51 of 142
SEC. 9 PP v SIMON

2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen

years of age the penalty next lover than that prescribed 11 Ibid., August 18, 1989, 36, 41-43, 47-49.
by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper
period. 12 Original Record, 174-175; per Judge Arsenio P.
Roman.
I do not think that as to the second paragraph of Section
20 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended by Section 13 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 3; Rollo, 54.
17 of R.A. No. 7659, we can be at liberty to apply the
Revised Penal Code in one aspect and not to apply it in 14 Exhibits F and G, folder of Exhibits; TSN, July
another. 10, 1989, 53.

Feliciano and Quiason, JJ., concur. 15 Original Record, 2.

16 See People vs. Salamat, G.R. No. 103295,

August 20, 1993.
#Footnotes
17 People vs. Alilin, G.R. No. 84363, March 4,
* This case was initially raffled to the Second 1992, 206 SCRA 772.
Division of the Court but due to the novelty and
importance of the issues raised on the effects of R.A. 18 See People vs. Querrer, G.R. No. 97147, July 15,
No. 7659 in amending R.A. No. 6425, the same was 1992, 211 SCRA 502.
referred to and accepted by the Court
en banc pursuant to Circular No. 2-89 and Bar Matter 19 People vs. Lati, G.R. No. 70393, April 17, 1990,
No. 209, as amended. 184 SCRA 336.

1 Original Record, 2; Criminal Case No. G-2320, 20 TSN, May 5, 1989, 5.

Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Guagua, Pampanga.
21 Sec. 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
2 Ibid., 11.
22 See People vs. Labra, G.R. No. 98427,
3 Ibid., 23. November 20, 1992, 215 SCRA 822.

4 TSN, April 6, 1989, 5-32. 23 TSN, August 18, 1989, 3.

5 Ibid., May 5, 1989, 2. 24 Ibid., id., 12; Exhibit M, Folder of Exhibits.

6 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 18; May 5, 1989, 11. 25 People vs. Celiz, et al., G.R. No. 92849, October
20, 1989, 214 SCRA 755.
7 Ibid., May 24, 1989, 21-24.
26 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4-5; Rollo, 55-56.
8 Ibid., June 14, 1989, 3-22.
27 People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 86495, May 13,
9 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 5-26. 1992, 209 SCRA 1.

10 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 8-16. 28 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6; Rollo, 57.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 52 of 142
SEC. 9 PP v SIMON

47 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 15-16.

29 TSN, May 5, 1989, 7.
48 Ibid., October 23, 1988, 15-16.
30 People vs. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August, 6,
1990, 188 SCRA 376. 49 Ibid., July 17, 1989, 22; October 23, 1988, 15.

31 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 6-7; Rollo, 57-58. 50 Ibid., July 10, 1989, 26-27.

32 Exhibit F, Folder of Exhibits. 51 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 4; Rollo, 55.

33 Exhibit G, ibid. 52 Sec. 28 of Republic Act No. 7659 provides that it

"shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
34 People vs. Mauyao, G.R. No. 84525, April 6, two (2) national newspapers of general circulation," and
1992, 207 SCRA 732. it was so published in the December 16, 1993 issues of
the Manila Bulletin, Philippine Star, Malaya and
35 TSN, May 5, 1989, 11. Philippine Times Journal.

36 Sec. 12(1), Art. III, 1987 Constitution. 53 Title Five, Crimes Relative to Opium and Other
Prohibited Drugs.
37 People vs. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5,
1991, 200 SCRA 194. 54 U.S. vs. Hocbo, 12 Phil. 304 (1908); U.S. vs.
Parrone, 24 Phil. 29 (1913); U.S. vs. Almencion, 25
38 People vs. Sibug, G.R. No. 108520, January 24, Phil. 648 (1913); Peoplevs. Moran, et al., 44 Phil. 387
1994. (1923); People vs. Parel, 44 Phil. 437 (1923); People vs.
Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225 (1935).
39 Brief for Accused-Appellant, 11; Rollo, 62.
55 Article 62(5), Revised Penal Code.
40 People vs. Tandoy, G.R. No. 80505, December 4,
1990, 192 SCRA 28. 56 See Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil. 741
(1948); Gumabon, et al. vs. Director of the Bureau of
41 Cf. People vs. Cina, G.R. No. 88220, October 1, Prisons, L-30026, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 420.
1990, 190 SCRA 199.
57 Lopez and Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals,
42 People vs. Consuelo, G.R. No. 77755, April 18, et al., 100 Phil. 850 (1957).
1990, 184 SCRA 402.
58 Article 77, Revised Penal Code.
43 TSN, July 10, 1989, 12-13.
59 This graduated scheme of penalties is not stated
44 People vs. Eslaban, G.R. Nos. 101211-12, with regard and does not apply to the quantities and their
February 8, 1993, 218 SCRA 534. penalties provided in the first paragraph, the penalties
therein being the same regardless of whether the
45 TSN, June 14, 1989, 22. quantities exceed those specified therein.

46 Ibid., August 18, 1989, 48. 60 Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 20, R.A. No. 7659.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 53 of 142
SEC. 9 PP v SIMON

61 Act. No. 4103, effective on December 5, 1993.
62 Effective on June 9, 1938.
63 See a similar format in P.D. No. 330 which
penalizes the illegal taking of timber and forest products
under Arts. 308, 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
by reference.
64 In fact, the penalty for officers or ranking leaders
was prision mayor to death, just like the penalty for
treason by a resident alien under Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code.
construed, such as a custom or statute, originated
(Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 390).
70 People vs. Roque, et al., 90 Phil. 142 (1951);
People vs. Dimalanta, 92 Phil. 239 (1952); People vs.
Moises, et al., G.R. L-32495, August 13, 1975, 66,
SCRA 151.
71 Interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est
optimus interpretandi modus (Black's Law Dictionary,
4th ed., 953).
72 People vs. Nang Kay, 88 Phil. 515 (1951).

65 G.R. No. 51368, November 6, 1981, 109 SCRA 73 24 C.J.S., Indeterminate Sentence, Sec. 1993,
35. 1217-1218.


66 People vs. Tsang Hin Wai, et al., G.R. No.

66389, September 8, 1986, 144 SCRA 22. In his
sponsorship speech of Senate Bill No. 891 as Chairman
of the Special Committee on the Death Penalty, Senator
M. Tolentino made this enlightening explanation as
reported in the records of the Senate and which is
pertinent to our present discussion: ". . . Article 190,
referring to prohibited drugs, actually was repealed by
the enactment of a special law referring to drugs. But
since we were only amending the Revised Penal Code in
this proposed bill or draft, we reincorporated Article 190
in an amended form. . . . It reincorporates and amends
Article 190 on the importation, manufacture, sale,
administration upon another, or distribution of
prohibited drugs, planting or cultivation of any plant,
which is a source of prohibited drugs, maintenance of a
den, dive or similar place, as defined in the Dangerous
Drugs Law" (9th CRP, 1st Regular Session, Vol., No. 71,
12).

67 See Articles 25, 70 and 71, revised Penal Code.

68 Section 2, Act No. 4103, as amended.

69 Contemporaneous exposition, or construction; a

construction drawn from the time when, and the
circumstances under which, the subject-matter to be
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v.
BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is
appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794, which
affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04–
1556–CFM and 04–1557–CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of
Rape and one Attempted Rape. The Informations for the
three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of
Rape:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of
February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above–named accused, Bernabe Pareja y
Cruz, being the common law spouse of the minor
victim’s mother, through force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of
[AAA3 ], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there
mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her
vagina against her will.4
Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of
December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above–named accused, Bernabe Pareja y
Cruz, being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of
Page 54 of 142
PP v PAREJA
age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of said minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04–1558–CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named
accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the
common law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means
of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the
commission of the crime of Rape against the person of
minor, [AAA], a 13 years old minor by then and there
crawling towards her direction where she was sleeping,
putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of
execution which would have produce[d] the crime of
rape for the reason other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victim’s
mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of
child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the
intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant as
a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment,
pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him.7
After the completion of the pre–trial conference on
September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged
acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on
three (3) different dates, particularly [in December
2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years
old9 ]. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother
and with herein accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja who,
by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11)
and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the
December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was not in the
house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking
advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was
asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja],
who was already naked, begun to undress AAA.
[Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not
satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s
anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt,
AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their
house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told
anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that
[Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA
in the event that she would expose the incident to
anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident
had happened more than once. According to AAA, [i]n
February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had
again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same
circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her
mother not around while she and her half–siblings were
asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to
suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed [her]
and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.
With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the
March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw
[Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter
AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s
mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay
officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated
to the barangay officials that she had been sexually
abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother,
proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital for a medical and genital examination.
On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional Medico–
Legal Report Number 2004–03–0091. Her medico–
Page 55 of 142
PP v PAREJA
legal report stated the following
conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5–7
o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
xxx
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or
Penetrating Trauma.
After the results of the medico–legal report confirmed
that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then filed a
complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both
denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his defense.
He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her
as she is the daughter of his live–in partner and that they
all stay in the same house.
Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it
would have been impossible that the alleged incidents
happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the
layout of their house and argued that there was no way
that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.
According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood,
only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters, and
was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit
inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house
is located was thickly populated with houses constructed
side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to
sleep beside her siblings.
All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was
hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about
with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors
noticing the same.
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as
to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He
contended that AAA filed these charges against him only
as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him] for
being the reason behind her parents’ separation.10
Ruling of the RTC
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the
charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the
December 2003 and February 2004 incidents,
respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y
Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of attempted
rape in Crim. Case No. 04–1558, for want of evidence.
In Crim. Case No. 04–1556, the said accused is
CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is
meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2
months of prision [correccional] as maximum.
In Crim. Case No. 04–1557, the said accused is
CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his
preventive imprisonment.
The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party
[AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and
Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless
denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the
failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to
testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004, the
RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted
Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of evidence.
The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAA’s
testimony for being hearsay evidence as she had no
personal knowledge of what happened on March 27,
2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Page 56 of 142
PP v PAREJA
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja
appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January
19, 2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in
Criminal Case Nos. 04–1556 and 04–1557, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is hereby DENIED and, consequently,
DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by
Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16,
2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04–1556 to 04–1557 are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14
Issues
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and
posited before us the following errors as he did before
the Court of Appeals:
I
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT
HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS’ TESTIMONY.16
In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following
argument:
The private complainant’s actuations after the incident
negate the possibility that she was raped.18
Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the
lower courts on the testimony of AAA in convicting him
for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is
attacking the credibility of AAA for being inconsistent.
Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing
happened after the alleged sexual abuse.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
Ruling of this Court
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s
conviction.
Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone
basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
inconsistencies.19
We find such argument untenable.
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented
before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that have
overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v.
Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s
evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering
its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of
a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial
court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness
of witnesses.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would
justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by
the lower court’s findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the
outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded.
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the
CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted.)
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the
“assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain
best left to the trial court judge because of his unique
opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor
on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate
courts–and when his findings have been affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and
conclusive upon this Court.”21 While there are
recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found
Page 57 of 142
PP v PAREJA
no substantial reason to overturn the identical
conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the
matter of AAA’s credibility.
Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape
victim’s testimony are generally expected.22 As this
Court stated in People v. Saludo23 :
Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not
remembered in detail. For such an offense is not
analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment
as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is
something which causes deep psychological wounds and
casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche for
life and which her conscious and subconscious mind
would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be
expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate
account of the traumatic and horrifying experience she
had undergone. (Citation omitted.)
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses
of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has never
been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a
witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by Pareja are
trivial and non–consequential matters that merely caused
AAA confusion when she was being questioned. The
inconsistency regarding the year of the December
incident is not even a matter pertaining to AAA’s ordeal.
25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of
rape becomes important only when it creates serious
doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the
sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction.
In other words, the “date of the commission of the rape
becomes relevant only when the accuracy and
truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically
hinge on the date of the commission of the crime.”26
Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not
an essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling
in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein
are applicable to his case. However, the factual
circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in
Pareja’s case. In particular, the main factor for
Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case was because his
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him was violated when
the Information against him only stated that the crime
was committed “on or about the year 1992.” We said:
The peculiar designation of time in the Information
clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court
which requires that the time of the commission of the
offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the
information or complaint will permit. More importantly,
it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The Information is not
sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform
accused–appellant of the date on which the criminal act
is alleged to have been committed.
The phrase “on or about the year 1992” encompasses not
only the twelve (12 ) months of 1992 but includes the
years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993,
for which accused–appellant has to virtually account for
his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution
to allege with particularity the date of the commission of
the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the
trial the date of the commission of the offense as alleged
in the Information, deprived accused–appellant of his
right to intelligently prepare for his defense and
convincingly refute the charges against him. At most,
accused–appellant could only establish his place of
residence in the year indicated in the Information and
not for the particular time he supposedly committed the
rape.
xxx
Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its
allegation in the Information that accused–appellant
raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the
date of the commission of the offense as alleged was
based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a
conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the
quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of
guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed on the date and place indicated in
the Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
Page 58 of 142
PP v PAREJA
In this case, although the dates of the December 2003
and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the
period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short,
unlike “on or about the year 1992.” Moreover, Ladrillo
was able to prove that he had only moved in the house
where the rape supposedly happened, in 1993, therefore
negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that
house in 1992.30
While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the
testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to his
eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were
not enough to reverse Ladrillo’s conviction, viz:
Moreover, there are discernible defects in the
complaining witness’ testimony that militates heavily
against its being accorded the full credit it was given by
the trial court. Considered independently, the defects
might not suffice to overturn the trial court’s judgment
of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality,
and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as
logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful
compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than
just a mere denial of the crime charged against him to
exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi,
which, together with the other evidence, produced
reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as
charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the
accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on
AAA.
As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony
being the basis of his conviction, this Court has held:
Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a
single witness may be sufficient to produce a conviction,
if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If
credible and convincing, that alone would be sufficient
to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a
rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
Improbability of sexual abuse
in their small house and in the
presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have
sexually abused AAA, considering that their house was
so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in
fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was
sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have
noticed if anything unusual was happening.33
This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions
could have prevented him from acting out on his beastly
desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that
many of the rape cases appealed to us were not always
committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or
place,34 and rape defies constraints of time and space.
In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such
occurrence in this wise:
In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the
interesting fact that among poor couples with big
families living in small quarters, copulation does not
seem to be a problem despite the presence of other
persons around them. Considering the cramped space
and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have
gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual
congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost
impossible to copulate with them around even when
asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the
family members to be in deep slumber and not be
awakened while the sexual assault is being committed.
One may also suppose that growing children sleep more
soundly than grown–ups and are not easily awakened by
adult exertions and suspirations in the night. There is no
merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no rape
in a room where other people are present. There is no
rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We
have repeatedly declared that “lust is no respecter of
time and place,” and rape can be committed in even the
unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)
Demeanor of AAA
Page 59 of 142
PP v PAREJA
as a rape victim
Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct
belie her claim that she was raped. He said that “the
ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce
of her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to
besmirch her honor and blemish her purity.” Pareja
pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area
such that any commotion inside their house would have
been easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA
the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover,
Pareja said, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her
mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he
indeed committed the crimes. AAA’s belated
confession, he claimed, “cannot be dismissed as trivial
as it puts into serious doubt her credibility.”37
A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will
tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the
victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse.
However, this Court has recognized the fact that no
clear–cut behavior can be expected of a person being
raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure
of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape.
Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim has
consented to the sexual act, especially when that person
was intimidated into submission by the accused. In
cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a
father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38
In this case, AAA’s lack of resistance was brought about
by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to
kill her if she ever spoke of the incident.
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after
being sexually abused by Pareja is also not enough to
discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape,
cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance
with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to
demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational
experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot
be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation as
it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind
placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is wrong to
say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
victims of the crime of rape since each of them had to
cope with different circumstances. 39
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her
mother or the proper authorities is insignificant and does
not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be
remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if she told
anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we
explained why a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the
crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation,
to wit:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement
without loss of time to persons close to her or to report
the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant
the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and
that her charges against the accused are all baseless,
untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense
is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many
victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges
against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy
and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or
risk the offenders’ making good their threats to kill or
hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)
Medical examination
not indispensable
Pareja avers that the Medico–Legal Report indicating
that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating
trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, “cannot be
given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and
when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted.”
Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s hymen
sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against
him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred in
December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41
This Court has time and again held that an accused can
be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of
the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the
commission of rape, as even a medical examination of
the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.
Page 60 of 142
PP v PAREJA
Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character
and not essential to conviction. x x x.
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical
certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she was
examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the
medical examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim of
being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and
not just by anal penetration. However, as the
prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and
prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot
be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266–A
of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full
credence, considering that no young woman, especially
of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter
pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if she
was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice
for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly
improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any
man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not
true. (Citations omitted.)
Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
In Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM or the December
2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of the
crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of
Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti–Rape Law of 1997,
revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition
of sexual violence on “sex–related” orifices other than a
woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and the
crime’s expansion to cover gender–free rape. “The
transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification
of rape as a crime against persons and the introduction
of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the
traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’ or ‘rape
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
through sexual intercourse.’”44 Republic Act No. 8353
amended Article 335, the provision on rape in the
Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article
266–A which reads:
Article 266–A. Rape, When and How Committed. –
Rape is committed –
1)
By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a)
Through force, threat or intimidation;
b)
When the offended party is deprived of reason or is
otherwise unconscious,
c)
By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority;
d)
When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2)
By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in
two ways:
1. Article 266–A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through
sexual intercourse, also known as “organ rape” or
“penile rape.” 45 The central element in rape through
sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be
proven beyond reasonable doubt.46
Page 61 of 142
PP v PAREJA
2. Article 266–A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual
assault, also called “instrument or object rape,” or
“gender–free rape.”47 It must be attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of
paragraph 1.48
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two
modes of committing rape as follows:
(1)
In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in
the second, the offender may be a man or a woman;
(2)
In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman,
while in the second, the offended party may be a man or
a woman;
(3)
In the first mode, rape is committed through penile
penetration of the vagina, while the second is committed
by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or
anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital
or anal orifice of another person; and
(4)
The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than
that under the second.
Under Article 266–A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is “[b]y any
person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned
in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.”
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in
December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus. While
she may not have been certain about the details of the
February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja had
anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly
establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In
other words, her testimony on this account was, as the
Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable.50
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
However, since the charge in the Information for the
December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by
sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial
distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the
first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and
vice–versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by
sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape
through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser
crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation
and proof. – When there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused
shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense
charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in
another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or
ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense
charged is necessarily included in the offense proved,
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or
form part of those constituting the latter.
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who
shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by
prisión correccional.
Page 62 of 142
PP v PAREJA
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
(1)
That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness;
(2)
That it is done under any of the following
circumstances:
a.
By using force or intimidation; or
b.
When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or
c.
When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3)
That the offended party is another person of either sex.
53 (Citation omitted.)
Clearly, the above–mentioned elements are present in
the December 2003 incident, and were sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, even though the crime
charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness without violating any of his constitutional
rights because said crime is included in the crime of
rape.54
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity
to remind the State, the People of the Philippines, as
represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more
diligence in crafting the Information, which contains the
charge against an accused. The primary duty of a
lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is
done55 – to the State, that its penal laws are not broken
and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights
are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 11.
punished for his crime. A faulty and defective
Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 04–
1556–CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the
offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public
prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is
accurate and appropriate.
Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM:
The February 2004 Incident
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the
evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja,
especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC
found AAA’s declaration on the rape in the December
2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction,
albeit this Court had to modify it as explained above.
However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e.,
beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the
prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second
count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04–
1556–CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC
considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she
was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually
resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.
This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her
Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking
her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina.
However, she was not able to give a clear and
convincing account of such insertion during her
testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the
prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were
sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja
also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later
on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina
during that incident. Thus, because of the material
omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be
convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident.
Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of
AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of
acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed
above, is included in the crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her
account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the
Page 63 of 142
PP v PAREJA
February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly
convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges
against him, coupled with the attribution of ill motive
against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases
against him because she was angry that he caused her
parents’ separation. Pareja added that these cases were
initiated by AAA’s father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. “AAA’s credibility cannot
be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill
motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to
falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives
or grudge.”58 Furthermore, motives such as
resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this
Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a
minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct
a story of defloration, allow examination of her private
parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she
has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to
seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled
jurisprudence that testimonies of child–victims are given
full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl–
child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all
that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the Revised Penal Code is prisión correccional in its
full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61
the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken
from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree,
62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1 month and 1
day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate
penalty shall come from the proper penalty64 that could
be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 64 of 142
SEC 11. PP v PAREJA

Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case, absent any 2004” and its implementing rules, the real name of the
aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium victim and those of her immediate family members are
period of prisión correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 withheld and fictitious initials are instead used to protect
months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66 the victim’s privacy.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies 4 CA rollo, p. 10.

the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and 5 Id. at 11.
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of
acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal 6 Id. at 53.
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this judgment. 7 Records, p. 20.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of 8 Id. at 37–38.

the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find 9 TSN, November 4, 2004, p. 3.
accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of
two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and 10Rollo, pp. 4–7.
penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate 11 CA rollo, pp. 52–62.
prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as 12 Id. at 62.
maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA,
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral 13 Id. at 28.
damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for
each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at 14Rollo, pp. 14–15.
the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment. 15 Id. at 16–18.

SO ORDERED. 16 CA rollo, pp. 45–46.

Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama, Jr., 17Rollo, pp. 31–35.

and Reyes, JJ. concur.
18 Id. at 31.

Endnotes:

1Rollo, pp. 2–15; penned by Associate Justice Isaias P.

Dicdican with Associate Justices Jane Aurora C. Lantion
and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring.

2 CA rollo, pp. 17–27.

3 Under Republic Act No. 9262 also known as “Anti–

Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140871. August 8, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
RESTY SILVA, RODOLFO SANDANGO, alias
Dupong and JUN-JUN FLORES, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For automatic review is the decision dated October 27,
1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Baler, Aurora,
Branch 66, finding herein accused-appellants Resty
Silva and Rodolfo Sandangao guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crimes of murder and attempted murder and
imposing on them the maximum penalty of death for the
murder of Manuel Ceriales and an indeterminate penalty
of six years prision correccional as minimum to twelve
(12) years prision mayor as maximum for the attempted
murder of Edmundo Ceriales.
In an Amended Information dated September 23, 1996,
herein accused-appellants were charged with the crimes
of murder and attempted murder committed as follows:
That on September 3, 1996 at around 10:00 oclock in
the evening, purposely sought to better accomplish their
criminal design, at Sitio Diaboyo, Barangay Ditumabo,
San Luis, Aurora, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation and use of superior strength, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person
of one Manuel Ceriales after abducting him and his
brother Edmund Ceriales and while his feet were both
tied with a rope and his hands tied at his back, by
stabbing and beheading him causing his instantaneous
death; that the accused also commenced the commission
of the crime of murder upon the person of Edmund
Ceriales directly by overt acts by also tying his two feet
and his hands at his back with intent to kill, but the said
accused did not perform all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crime of Murder as a
consequence, by reason of causes other than their own
Page 65 of 142
spontaneous desistance, that is, said Edmund Ceriales
was able to escape while the accused were about to kill
his brother Manuel Ceriales.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment, accused-appellants Resty Silva and
Rodolfo Sandangao both pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged. Accused Jun-Jun Flores, however,
remained at large. The case then proceeded to trial.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Edmundo
Ceriales; police officers Maximo Galope, Antonio
Mendigoren, Eligio Fernandez, and Waldo Andrada;
Andres Macatiag; Agapito Regalado; and Dr. Maria Pura
Valenzuela-Uy.
As summarized in the Peoples Brief, Edmundo Ceriales
testified as follows:
On September 3, 1996, around 8:30 p.m., Edmundo
Ceriales, passed by his brother Manuels house at
Diaboyo, Ditumabo, San Luis, Aurora. There, he saw
Boy Tagalario, Jimmy Tagalario, Marlon Flores, Mardie
Alejandro, a certain Onoy, and Pogi Salvador. Some of
these men were playing a card game known as tong-its
while the others were merely watching the game.
Suddenly three men arrived. One pointed an armalite
gun to all those present and ordered them to lie on their
stomach. Another ordered brothers Edmundo and
Manuel to get out of the house. (TSN, February 26,
1998, pp. 2-3)
As soon as they were out, they were made to lie face
down. Upon the orders of a person whom Edmundo later
recognized as appellant Resty Silva, he and his brother
were tied by two armed men whom he also recognized
later as Rodolfo Sandangao, also known as Dupong and
Jun-jun Flores. Thereafter, they walked towards the
highway. An incoming vehicle light enabled Edmundo
to recognize Sandangao at this point. They hid and
continued walking after the vehicle left. Since Edmundo
and Manuel were tied together, they walked side by side.
It was at this point that Edmundo whispered to his
brother that he recognized Sandangao to be their
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
childhood neighbor. Although there were houses along
the way, the brothers were prevented from asking help
because they were threatened with bodily harm by the
three men. When they reached a coconut plantation
owned by a certain Almonte, appellant Silva cut his T-
shirt and stuck some of its portion to Edmundos mouth.
It was removed later by appellant Silva after being
assured that they would not fight back. As they
continued walking, they reached the plantation of a
certain Henyo who happened to be Edmundos godfather.
Edmundo tried to convince their abductors to kill them
there and not to bring them away anymore. Jun-jun
Flores was about to stab him but his brother Manuel
begged Flores not to do it. (Ibid, p. 3-5)
Upon reaching Lucing Guerreros coconut plantation,
they were made to sit on a hollow block. It was at this
point where appellant Resty Silva focused a flashlight
on himself. He then asked the brothers if they knew their
abductors. When he and Manuel positively answered,
appellant Silva retorted Papano yan Dupong, kilala pala
tayo, obligado na nating patayin. (TSN dated February
25, 1998, p. 10)
Edmundo was thereafter separated from Manuel. He was
brought twenty meters away from Manuel by Sandangao
and herein appellant while Flores was left to take care of
Manuel. After appellant Sandangao tied his feet,
appellant left them. He then pleaded to Sandangao to set
him free and promised to forget the incident. But
Sandangao refused. After which, Sandangao left him. He
then tried to free himself jumping away from where he
was until he fell into a hole. While there, he tried to
untie his hands and feet till he heard the scream of
Manuel followed by sound akin to the cutting of a tree.
When Edmundo was already untying his feet he was
given a warning to come out or they would kill Manuel
if he failed. He slowly stuck out his head from the hole
and failing to see the three men, he ran away fast until
he reached the place of his godfather Andres Macatiag
(Ibid pp. 10-11). The latter advised him to spend the
night in his house. Around 5'o clock in the morning of
September 4, 1996, Macatiag went to Edmundo s house
to verify the condition of the latters family. Seeing that
they were unharmed, he returned to his house and
Page 66 of 142
related the matter to Edmundo. Later that day, the
headless body of Manuel was found. Macatiag
proceeded were the body was found. He saw that the
feet were still tied (TSN, April 29, 1998, p. 6). When
policemen Galope, Andrada and Mendigoren arrived,
Edmundo went with them to see the body of Manuel
which he was able to identify because of the clothes he
was wearing. Several days after the beheading incident
the missing head of the victim Manuel Ceriales was
found at Baler, Aurora (TSN, February 25, 1998, p. 11).
[2]
Witness Andres Macatiag corroborated Edmundos
testimony. He alleged that he was in his house around
ten oclock in the evening of September 3, 1996, when
his godson Edmundo Ceriales arrived. The latter was
shaking and could hardly speak and his right hand and
foot were tied. The only words Edmundo uttered at that
time were, yong familia ko ang baka pag-uwian ng
tinakasan ko. Not knowing what to do, Macatiag sought
the help of a certain Danny Bihasa, a barangay
councilman. However, he was told that there were no
more barangay tanods at that time so he went home. It
was only then that Edmundo was able to fully relate to
Macatiag what happened.[3]
Edmundo told him that he and his brother Manuel were
abducted by Resty Silva, Rodolfo Sandangao and Jun-
jun Flores and brought to the plantation of Querijero.
When Silva learned that the Ceriales brothers recognized
them, he uttered, Kung ganon, patayin na ito dahil kilala
tayo. Edmundo was brought by Silva and Dupong
(referring to accused-appellant Sandangao) several
meters away from Manuel who was guarded by accused
Flores. While Dupong was tying UP Edmundos feet,
Silva joined Flores and Manuel. Edmundo begged
Dupong to untie him but the latter refused. After a while,
Dupong joined Silva and Flores, so Edmundo tried to
escape by jumping into a hole. He was able to loosen the
ties in his hands and feet. While inside the hole, he heard
shouts from his brother Manuel so he ran as fast as he
could until he reached Macatiag s house.[4]
After hearing Edmundos story, Macatiag asked him to
spend the night in his house. The following morning,
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
Macatiag left to inquire if Edmundos family was safe.
Upon seeing that they were not harmed, he went back
home to tell Edmundo. Macatiag and Edmundo then
proceeded to the place of the incident and saw that there
were already a lot of people gathered in the area.
Edmundo, accompanied by several persons, went to
fetch the police who then brought the headless body to a
detachment in Diaboyo.[5]
Witness Agapito Regalado averred that around eight
thirty in the evening of September 3, 1996, he was
playing tong-its in the house of victim Manuel Ceriales
with several other people when a man carrying a long
firearm suddenly arrived and ordered them to stop the
game. The man then commanded Manuel and Edmundo
Ceriales to come out while the rest were made to lie face
down. When the armed man and the Ceriales brothers
were already outside, witness heard somebody say,
gapusin. After a while, Regalado and the others went out
but the armed man and the Ceriales brothers were
already gone.[6]
The following day, Macatiag summoned Regalado to his
house. Edmundo was there and requested them to look
for his brother Manuel in the land of Lucing Querijero.
Regalado fetched barangay councilman Danilo Bihasa
and together with Edmundo and Macatiag, they
proceeded to Querijeros property where they found
Manuels headless body. Regalado identified the body as
that of Manuels because of the shorts the latter was
wearing the night before. They called the police and
summoned a certain Dr. Valenzuela to autopsy the body.
[7]
On rebuttal, Regalado testified that he saw accused-
appellant Resty Silva twice in Barangay Ditumabo. The
first time was during in the last week of August 1996 at
the house of a certain Belo Reyes in Sitio Diaboyo. The
second time was around ten oclock in the morning of
September 3, 1996, in Purok Bagong Silang, Brgy.
Ditumabo in the house of one Manang Tunay
Esperancilla.[8]
SPO4 Maximo Galope, police investigator on duty at
San Luis, Aurora, narrated that around eight thirty in the
Page 67 of 142
morning of September 4, 1996, a barangay tanod arrived
in the police station and reported that the body of
Manuel Ceriales was found dead. The police then
formed a team composed of witness, SPO4 Antonio
Mendigoren, SPO3 Andrada, SPO3 Eligio Fernandez
and several other police officers. They proceeded to the
crime scene to investigate and saw a body lying on its
stomach. Both hands were tied behind the back and the
head was severed. Edmundo Ceriales identified the body
as that of his brother Manuel. They brought the body to
the roadside and summoned Dr. Pura Valenzuela-Uy
who conducted the autopsy.[9] Upon information from
Edmundo that the perpetrators were a certain Resty
Silva, Jun-jun Flores and Rodolfo Sandangao, they
proceeded to the house of the latter but did not find
Sandangao. He was later found hiding in a hut at a citrus
plantation. Upon seeing Sandangao, Edmundo asked
him, bakit ganon ang ginawa mo? Sandangao was
brought to the police headquarters in San Luis. A few
days after, the police received a report that the head of
Manuel Ceriales was found.[10]
SPO4 Antonio Mendigoren, OIC police commander at
San Luis PNP, corroborated the testimony of SPO4
Galope and testified that at around eight thirty in the
morning of September 4, 1996, councilman Bihasa of
Brgy. Ditumabo reported that a certain Manuel Ceriales
was abducted and found in the copra kiln of a certain
Lucing Querijero. A police team was formed and,
together with barangay officials and Edmundo Ceriales,
they proceeded to the place of the incident. They saw a
headless body with hands and feet tied with a rope. The
body was identified by Edmundo as that of his brother
Manuel. Using an improvised stretcher, they brought the
body down the roadside where a certain Dr. Uy
conducted an autopsy.[11] The police, together with
Edmundo, proceeded to the house of one of the suspects,
Rodolfo Sandangao who was apprehended and brought
to the police station. In coordination with the police
officers in Baler, the head of Manuel Ceriales was
recovered five days after. Accused-appellant Resty Silva
was thereafter arrested in Cabanatuan City through the
help of the Nueva Ecija police. Accused-appellant Jun-
Jun Flores, however, managed to escape.[12]
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
The prosecution also presented SPO3 Eligio Fernandez
and SPO3 Waldo Andrada as witnesses but the defense
agreed to stipulate that their testimonies merely
corroborate the testimonies of SPO4 Galope and
Mendigoren in connection with the investigation and
arrest of accused-appellant Sandangao, the identification
of accused-appellant Silva and the recovery of the
headless body of Manuel Ceriales.[13]
Finally, Dr. Maria Pura Valenzuela-Uy, rural health
physician of San Luis, Aurora, testified that around
eleven thirty in the morning of September 4, 1999, she
was summoned to conduct a medico-legal examination
on the cadaver of the victim Manuel Ceriales inside a
barangay station in Sitio Diaboyo. The decapitated body
was already in a state of rigor mortis. Both hands and
feet were tied by a black rope and the body bore shallow
stab wounds over the left shoulder and in the epigastric
area. Dr. Uy concluded that the cause of death was
hyperbolemic shock secondary to decapitation and at the
time of examination, the victim might have already been
dead for more than ten (10) hours.[14]
The evidence for the defense, on the other hand
consisted of the testimonies of accused-appellants Resty
Silva and Rodolfo Sandangao; Cipriano de Francisca;
Ricardo Silva; and Bernardito Alzona.
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Sandangao alleged that
around eight thirty in the evening of September 3, 1996,
he was at home with his family in Brgy. Ditumabo, San
Luis, Aurora when Jun-jun Flores and a man carrying an
armalite gun arrived. He was ordered at gunpoint to
accompany them to the house of Manuel Ceriales under
threat that his family would be killed if he did not
cooperate. Upon reaching Manuels house, Flores and the
armed man ordered everyone to lie face down. The
Ceriales brothers were then asked to come out. When
Edmundo and Manuel were already outside, Flores
ordered him (Sandangao) to tie them. They proceeded to
the land owned by Lucing Querijero where Edmundo
and Manuel were separated. He was ordered by the
armed man to guard Edmundo and to tie his feet. When
Edmundo managed to escape, Sandangao also ran away
towards Nestor Aguilas citrus plantation. Manuel
Page 68 of 142
Ceriales was left In the coconut plantation of Querijero
with Flores and the armed man. Sandangao spent the
night inside a hut because he was too afraid to go home.
[15] The following morning, the owner of the plantation
arrived and asked to him to gather coconuts. While he
was working, the police officers arrived asking him to
point to them the location of the head of Manuel
Ceriales. He denied that he knew anything about the
incident so he was brought to the police station. He
claimed that he did not recognize the man carrying the
gun that night and met accused-appellant Silva for the
first time when the latter was incarcerated.[16]
Accused-appellant Resty Silva also denied the charges
against him. He claimed that on the night of the incident,
he was in the house of his brother Ricardo Silva in the
compound of the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong City playing tong-its with security guards
Alsona and Cifriano.[17] From May 1996 to September
3, 1996, he had no occasion to be in San Luis, Aurora
because he was staying with his brother in Mandaluyong
who worked as a security guard in the said hospital.[18]
He was about to return to San Luis when he was arrested
in Cabanatuan City. He was brought to the Aurora
Provincial Jail where he met accused-appellant
Sandangao for the first time.[19] He denied the
accusations against him and claimed that he did not
know the Ceriales brothers and the other two accused,
Flores and Sandangao.[20]
Ricardo Silva, brother of accused-appellant Resty Silva,
testified that he and his family resided inside the
compound of the National Mental Hospital in
Mandaluyong City where he worked as a security guard.
From May 1996 to March 1997, Resty was staying with
them. His brother went home only during harvest time.
On September 3, 1996, Resty was playing tong-its in his
(witness) house in Mandaluyong together with two other
security guards, de Francisca and Alzona, from seven
oclock in the evening until midnight.[21]
Cipriano de Francisca, security guard at the National
Center for Mental Health in Mandaluyong City, claimed
that on September 3, 1996, he was playing tong-its with
accused-appellant Resty Silva and another guard named
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
Alzona. The game lasted from seven oclock in the
evening until around midnight.[22] This was
corroborated by defense witness Bernardito Alzona.[23]
Finally, witness Josephine Sunico, neighbor of a certain
Esperancilla, testified that in the morning of the
incident, September 3, 1996, there was no game of tong-
its being played in the house of Esperancilla and neither
witness Regalado nor accused-appellant Silva were in
the said house.[24]
On October 27, 1999, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting accused-appellants of the crimes of murder
and attempted murder, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds
accused Resty Silva and Rodolfo Sandangao alias
Dupong GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of murder for the death of Manuel Ceriales qualified by
evident premeditation and considering the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and nighttime without any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same hereby
sentences each of them to the maximum penalty of death
and likewise, this Court finds Resty Silva and Rodolfo
Sandangao alis Dupong GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of attempted murder for the attempt
in the life of Edmundo Ceriales qualified by evident
premeditation and considering the aggravating
circumstances of treachery and nighttime without any
mitigating circumstance to offset the same hereby
sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from six (6) years of prision correccional as
minimum to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum; to pay proportionately the heirs of Manuel
Ceriales the sum of P50,000.00 as civil liability; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[25]
By reason of the imposition of the death penalty, the
case is now before us on automatic review. Accused-
appellant Resty Silva raised the following errors in his
Brief:
Page 69 of 142
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF MAIN
PROSECUTION WITNESS EDMUNDO CERIALES
THAT IS CONTRARY TO COMMON KNOWLEDGE
AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND TO THE
TESTIMONY OF OTHER PROSECUTION
WITNESSES THAT WERE TAINTED WITH
UNCERTAINTIES AND IMPROBABILITIES AND IN
REJECTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT RESTY
SILVAS DEFENSE OF DENIAL AND ALIBI
SHOWING HIS PRESENCE AT ANOTHER PLACE
AT THE TIME OF THE PERPETRATION OF THE
OFFENSE AND DEMONSTRATING THAT IT WAS
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO BE AT
THE SCENE OF THE CRIME.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
ACCUSED- APPELLANT SILVA CONSPIRED WITH
THE OTHER ACCUSED IN ABDUCTING THE
CERIALES BROTHERS AND KILLING ONE OF
THEM.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
KILLING OF THE VICTIM WAS ATTENDED BY
THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE KILLING OF THE VICTIM WAS ATTENDED
BY THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
TREACHERY AND NOCTURNITY.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IMPOSING (SIC) ON
ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE PENALTY OF DEATH
DESPITE THAT ASIDE FROM HIS NON-
INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME, THE LAW HAS NOT YET COMPLIED
WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICATION IN A
NATIONAL NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL
CIRCULATION FOR EFFECTIVITY.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT SILVA LIABLE FOR
ATTEMPTED MURDER WHERE THE
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE MERELY INDICATES
THAT MANUEL CERIALES WAS TIED.
Accused-appellant Rodolfo Sandangao, on the other
hand, alleged that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT RODOLFO SANDANGAO
BASED ONLY ON THE LONE TESTIMONY OF THE
COMPLAINING WITNESS WITHOUT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION THE PROVISION OF
ARTICLE 12, PARAGRAH 5 OF THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, AS THE DEFENSE OF RODOLFO
SANDANGAO WHICH ENTITLED HIM TO AN
ACQUITTAL.
It is a well-settled rule that findings of fact of trial courts
are entitled to great weight and generally should not be
disturbed on appeal unless substantial facts and
circumstances have been overlooked, which if properly
considered, would alter the result of the case.[26] After a
careful review of the records of the present case, the
Court is convinced that the trial court was correct in its
findings and conclusion.
Edmundo Ceriales testimony as to what transpired on
the night of September 3, 1996 is clear, positive and
categorical:
Q On Sept. 3, 1996 at around 8:30 p.m., do you recall
where were you?
A I was in the house of my elder brother Manuel
Ceriales at Diaboyo, Ditumabu, sir.
Q Where was your brother then?
A He was there, sir.
Q Where there any other persons present there then?
A We were 9 in all in that house; they were Boy
Tagalario, Jimmy Tagalario, Jimboy Tagalario, Marlon
Flores, Mardie Alejandro, a certain Onoy, Pogi Salvador
and the 2 of us brothers.
Page 70 of 142
xxx
Q While you were in the house of Manuel Ceriales
watching those who were gambling, do your recall any
unusual incident that happened?
A There was; a gun was pointed to us and I and my
brother Manuel were ordered to go out; I was not able to
recognize them then very well because they ordered to
extinguish the light.
Q Where were the persons located when the gun was
pointed at you?
A By the door, sir.
Q What kind of gun was pointed at you?
A Armalite, sir.
xxx
Q What did you do when you heard that the one pointed
the gun at you ordered you to get out of the house?
A Since and I and my brother were ordered to get out,
we went out.
Q When you went out, what happened?
A We were made to lie face down, outside the house.
Q What happened next?
A We were tied by Dupong upon order of Resty Silva.
Q Where were you tied?
A The arms, sir. (Witness placed his 2 arms behind his
back.)
Q Who between you were tied?
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
A Both of us were tied at the same time; the one who
was tying my brother was Jun-jun Flores.
Q What happened next when you were tied?
A I asked them to get my bolo which was tied in a
cavern around my waist and Dupong took it.
Q Why did you let him took your bolo?
A Since I could not use it anymore.
Q After you and your brother were tied and your bolo
was taken from you, what happened?
A We walked towards the highway and we were lighted
by incoming vehicle; that was when I recognized
Dupong; then we ran towards a place where there were
plenty of bamboo and when the vehicle passed, we came
out from where we hid.
Q After that, what happened next?
A We walked along the highway and in the highway,
there was light again so I was able to recognize him.
Q How about the 2?
A They were quite far away from us; I was not able to
recognize the other 2 very well.
Q How were you walking?
A The 2 of us were almost ahead side by side since we
were tied.
Q What was used in tying your hands?
A A rope, sir.
Q What happened next when you were walking?
A I whispered to my brother that it was Dupong.
Q What happened next?
Page 71 of 142
A We went inside a coconut plantation from the
highway; while we were there. Resty Silva sliced my t-
shirt which he stucked (sic) in my mouth which he later
removed because I told him I would not be fighting back
anyway.
xxx
Q What happened next?
A We continued walking until we reached the coconut
plantation of my Ninong Henyo; I told them to kill me
there and not to bring us far away anymore. I was about
to be stabbed by Jun-jun but he was stopped by my elder
brother.
Q What happened next?
A We continued walking until we reached the place
where the killing was done.
Q What kind of land was that?
A Still coconut plantation owned by Lucing Guerrero; it
is not Querijero but Guerrero.
Q What happened next?
A We were made to sit on a hollow block which is quite
low.
Q Why was hollow block present there?
A There was a house there that was abandoned.
Q What happened next?
A The 3 of them faced us and Resty Silva asked me do
you know us and we brothers answered we have
recognized you for quite a long time.
Q What was Resty doing then?
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
A He flashed the flashed light (sic) on his face and the
faces of his other 2 companions.
Q What happened next?
A He said, papano yan Dupong, kilala pala tayo;
obligado na nating patayin.
Q When Resty uttered that, what happened next?
A We were separated; the ties binding us together was
removed.
Q What happened next?
A I was brought away from my elder brother about 20
meters away. The one who came with me were Dupong
and Resty while Jun-jun Flores was left with my elder
brother. That was the time my two feet were tied by
Dupong.
Q What happened next?
A Resty left me but Dupong stayed with me.
Q What happened next?
A I begged Dupong to release me and I will forget
everything.
Q What was his reaction?
A He said he could not do anything as he might be
blamed.
Q What happened next?
A After that, he left me; so I thought of jumping away
and so I jumped and jumped. In so doing I happened to
fall in a hole.
Q What happened when you jumped away?
A I heard as if they were cutting a tree?
Page 72 of 142
Q What happened next?
A After that I heard a scream.
Q Do you know who was screaming?
A I recognized it was the voice of my elder brother.
Q What did you do?
A I heard another shout saying that if I will not come
out, they will kill my brother; that was when I was
untying my feet. Then I put out slowly my head from the
hole trying to see if there were still people around.
xxx
Q How long have you heard your brother screaming?
A When I ran away and I was already far away, I heard
another shout.
Q Where did you proceed when you ran away?
A To my Ninong Andres Macatiag, sir.
Q What happened at the place of your Ninong?
A They did not allow me to go out from the house. I
related to them the incident and I told them the names of
the persons I recognized. Then, I slept in the house of
my Ninong Andres Macatiag.
xxx
Q What did you do that morning?
A I asked my godfather to go to my family and he went
there. After that, he called the barangay tanod and
councilman. I told them where we were brought and
asked them to look for my brother if he was still alive. I
did not go with them.
Q What happened next?
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
A They came back and said that he was already dead and
headless; they reported it to the police.
Q What happened next when they reported it to the
police?
A The policemen arrived and I went with them to see the
body of my brother.
Xxx
Q How were you able to identify the headless body of
your brother.
A Because of the clothes he was wearing when the
incident happened.[27]
The facts as related by Edmundo, who was a direct
witness to the crime, being a victim himself, and as
corroborated by the other witnesses, clearly established
the crimes of murder and attempted murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659 defines the crime of murder as follows:
xxx Any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder
and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death if
committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength,
with the aid of armed men, or employing means to
weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or
afford impunity.
2.
xxx
3. With evident premeditation.
xxx
Page 73 of 142
Whenever a killing is attended with any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 248, such killing is
qualified to murder.
Evidence shows that the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation attended the killing of Manuel
Ceriales. There is evident premeditation when the
following elements are present: (1) the time when the
accused determined to commit the crime, (2) an act
manifestly indicating that the accused clung to that
determination, and (3) a lapse of time between the
determination and the execution sufficient to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act.[28]
To establish evident premeditation, it must be shown
that there was a period sufficient to afford full
opportunity for meditation and reflection, a time
adequate to allow the conscience to overcome the
resolution of the will, as well as outward acts showing
the intent to kill.[29] It must appear not only that the
accused decided to commit the crime prior to the
moment of its execution but also that this decision was
the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or
persistent attempt.[30]
Accused-appellants deliberately planned to kill the
Ceriales brothers. They arrived at the house of Manuel
Ceriales in the evening of September 3, 1996 purposely
armed with an armalite, bolo and rope. They ordered the
Ceriales brothers to come out while the other persons
inside the house were told to lie face down. They
abducted the brothers, tied them up and brought them to
an isolated place several kilometers away where the
brothers were questioned about a misunderstanding
between the victim Manuel and the father of accused
Flores over a parcel of land. This dispute apparently
provided the motive for the crime and engendered the
plan. From the time that the brothers were abducted
from their house until they reached the isolated
plantation of a certain Querijero several kilometers
away, accused-appellants had sufficient time to reflect
upon the consequences of their act but they persisted in
their determination to commit the crime. While in that
isolated place, they separated the brothers from each
other in an apparent plan to kill them consecutively.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
Manuel Ceriales was stabbed and decapitated. The same
fate would have met Edmundo Ceriales were he not able
to escape. These acts of accused-appellants were
manifestly deliberate, calculated and carefully planned
leading to the inevitable conclusion that the crime was
premeditated.
The killing of Manuel Ceriales was also characterized
by treachery. There is treachery when there is (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate;
and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the
means of execution.[31] The essence of treachery is the
sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor and without
the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[32]
The Ceriales brothers were innocently playing tong-its
inside their house when accused-appellants suddenly
arrived. The suddenness of their arrival in the middle of
the night while the victims were playing a card game,
ensured that the victims could be taken without
difficulty to an isolated place several kilometers away
and killed there. The fact that accused-appellants arrived
armed with an armalite gun, a bolo, a rope and a
flashlight showed that they deliberately and consciously
adopted the means of execution. The act of tying up both
hands and feet of the victims with a rope ensured the
killing and deprived the victims of any chance to defend
themselves.
By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating
circumstance, however, it becomes aggravating only
when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it
is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the
commission of the crime by ensuring the offenders
immunity from capture.[33] In this case, the trial court
correctly appreciated nighttime as aggravating
considering that nighttime facilitated the abduction of
the Ceriales brothers, the killing of Manuel Ceriales and
the attempt to kill Edmundo Ceriales. Evidence shows
that accused-appellants took advantage of the darkness
to successfully consummate their plans. The fact that
Page 74 of 142
they brought with them a flashlight clearly shows that
they intended to commit the crime in darkness.
Clearly, in the present case, the killing of Manuel
Ceriales by decapitation was characterized by treachery
and evidently premeditated qualifying such killing to
murder. The fact that the Ceriales brothers were taken
together, tied up and brought to an isolated place point
to no other conclusion than that accused-appellants
intended to kill not only Manuel but also Edmundo.
Indeed, the latter would have likewise been stabbed and
decapitated had he not been able to escape. The fact that
accused-appellants were not able to kill Edmundo was
not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but
due to Edmundos miraculous escape; hence, they are
also liable for the attempted murder of Edmundo.[34]
Accused-appellant Resty Silva denied his participation
in the abduction of the Ceriales brothers and the killing
of Manuel. He insisted that he was at his brother
Ricardos house in Mandaluyong City on the day of the
incident. He attempted to bolster his claim by presenting
as witnesses his brother Ricardo and two security guards
who were allegedly playing tong-its with him from
seven oclock in the evening until midnight of September
3, 1996.
We have repeatedly stressed that in order for alibi to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him
to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
[35] By its nature, alibi is the weakest of all defenses as
it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove, and it is
practically worthless in the face of positive
identification.[36] A positive identification of the
accused, where categorical and consistent and without
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter, prevails over mere alibi and
denial.[37]
Edmundo Ceriales positively identified accused-
appellant as one of their abductors. In fact, accused-
appellant Silva himself revealed his identity to Edmundo
and Manuel by flashing a flashlight upon his face and
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 13. PP v SILVA
asking the brothers if they recognize him and the other
two abductors:
Q What happened next?
A We were made to sit on a hollow block which is quite
low.
Q Why was hollow block present there?
A There was a house there that was abandoned.
Q What happened next?
A The 3 of them faced us and Resty Silva asked me do
you know us and we brothers answered we have
recognized you for quite a long time.
Q What was Resty doing then?
A He flashed the flashed light (sic) on his face and the
faces of his other 2 companions.[38]
As between accused-appellant Silvas alibi and the
positive testimony of Edmundo identifying him as one
of the perpetrators of the crime, the latter must prevail.
[39]
Accused-appellant Sandangao, on the other hand, sought
to evade criminal liability by alleging that he was
threatened by accused Flores and an unidentified armed
man at gunpoint to accompany them to the house of
Manuel Ceriales. He claims that the two threatened to
kill his family if he refused to go with them and did not
comply with their orders.
Indeed, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts a
person from criminal liability if he acts under the
compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse
of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
because such person does not act with freedom.[40]
Accused-appellant Sandangao, however, failed to
sufficiently prove his claim of irresistible force. The
positive and categorical testimony of Edmundo Ceriales
clearly established his participation in the crime.
Page 75 of 142
Edmundo testified that Sandangao and Flores tied his
hands and that of his brother Manuel before proceeding
to Querijeros plantation. Sandangao was also the one
who tied Edmundos feet upon reaching the property of
Querijero. Edmundo never testified that Sandangao
committed those acts upon order of accused-appellant
Silva or Flores. Neither did he state that Sandangao was
threatened at gunpoint by the two. When the Ceriales
brothers identified them, accused-appellant Silva even
told Sandangao, Papano yan Dupong, kilala pala tayo,
obligado na nating patayin. This statement of accused-
appellant Silva clearly implies Sandangaos participation
in the crime. Moreover, when Sandangao was left alone
to guard Edmundo, the latter begged him to be set free
but Sandangao refused.
Sandangaos claim is also belied by his conduct after the
incident. He claimed that like Edmundo Ceriales he
managed to escape from Flores and the armed man.
However, instead of reporting to the police, he tried to
flee and hid in the hut of a certain Nestor Aguila until he
was apprehended by the police. While he was in
detention, he did not report to the police that he was
threatened at gunpoint by Flores and the armed man to
accompany them. When asked why he did not make
such a report, his reason was merely that he was never
asked by the police.[41]
The evidence on record thus positively established that
accused-appellants Silva, Sandangao and Flores
conspired to abduct and kill the Ceriales brothers. Their
acts of going to Manuels house together at night armed
with an armalite, bladed weapons and rope, tying up the
Ceriales brothers, abducting them and bringing them to
an isolated place and decapitating Manuel, these acts
taken together manifest a unity of purpose and a
common design to kill the two brothers. We have ruled
that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.[42] Where the acts of the
accused collectively and individually demonstrate the
existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose,
conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be
liable as principals.[43] In this case, conspiracy among
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 76 of 142
SEC 13. PP v SILVA

accused-appellants were sufficiently born and proven by [1] Records, p. 11.

evidence.
[2] Rollo, pp. 132-136 (Consolidated Brief of the
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA Solicitor General, pp. 3-7).
7659, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for the crime of murder. Considering the [3] TSN, April 29, 1998, pp. 3-4.
qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation and
the presence of two aggravating circumstances of [4] Id., at 4-6.
treachery and nighttime without any mitigating
circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the [5] Id.
maximum penalty of death as prescribed under Art.
63[44] for the murder of Manuel Ceriales. The penalty [6] Id., at 12-14.
of an indeterminate sentence ranging from six (6) years
prision correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years of [7] Id., at 15.
prision mayor as maximum imposed by the trial court
for the attempted murder of Edmundo Ceriales is [8] TSN, June 21, 1999, pp. 2-4.
likewise affirmed.
[9] TSN, March 5, 1997, pp. 3-5.
Finally, in keeping with recent jurisprudence,[45] in
addition to civil indemnity of P50,000.00, we hereby [10] Id., at 5, 7-9.
impose the additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages without need of proof for the death of the [11] TSN, February 25, 1998, pp. 2-3.
victim Manuel Ceriales.

Three (3) members of this Court maintain their position

that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death [34] Art. 6 (RPC) - x x x There is an attempt when the
penalty is unconstitutional. Nevertheless, they submit to offender commences the commission of a felony directly
the ruling of the majority that the said law is not by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
unconstitutional and that the death penalty should be execution which should produce the felony by reason of
imposed in this case. some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED. In accordance with Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A.
7659, upon finality of this decision, let the record of this
case be forwarded to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of clemency and pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,

Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, and
Corona, JJ., concur.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG & PP
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103102 March 6, 1992
CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, petitioner principally seeks: (1) to nullify the
order 1 of respondent judge admitting the amended
information for murder filed in Criminal Case No.
91-4606; (2) to nullify the arraignment and the plea of
not guilty entered by order of respondent judge when
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended
information for lack of preliminary investigation
therefor; (3) to nullify the appointment of a counsel de
oficio/PAO lawyer to represent petitioner; (4) to prohibit
respondent judge from "over-speedy and preferential
scheduling of the trial of the aforementioned criminal
case;" and (5) to compel respondent judge to order
preliminary investigation of the crime charged in the
amended information.
Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an
information 2 for the crime of frustrated murder
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of July 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a handgun,
with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman
on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which
ordinarily would have caused the death of said Maureen
Navarro Hultman, thereby performing all the acts of
execution which would have produced the crime of
Murder as a consequence, but nevertheless did not
produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of
Page 77 of 142
her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Maureen Navarro Hultman
which prevented her death.
After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was
allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to
evidence. However, before the said motion could be
filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.
Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan
filed an omnibus motion 3 for leave of court to file an
amended information and to admit said amended
information. The amended information, 4 filed on
October 31, 1991, reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun,
with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by
means of treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was
hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which
directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.
Petitioner filed an opposition 5 thereto, as well as a
rejoinder 6 to the reply 7 of the prosecution. On
November 13, 1991, the trial court issued the questioned
order admitting the amended information.
At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991,
petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended
information for lack of a preliminary investigation
thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge
ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for
petitioner.
Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. When petitioner's counsel
manifested that he would not take part in the
proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial
court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein
petitioner.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG & PP
Petitioner now raises the following issues before us:
(a) Whether or not an amended information
involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary
investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the
original information, may legally and validly be
admitted;
(b) Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally
and validly be appointed to represent an accused who is
represented by counsel of choice who refuses to
participate in the proceedings because of a perceived
denial of due process and after a plea for appellate
remedies within a short period is denied by the trial
court; and
(c) Whether or not a particular criminal case may
legally and validly be rushed and preferentially
scheduled for trial over and at the expense and sacrifice
of other, specially older, criminal cases. 8
In our resolution of January 14, 1992, we required the
Solicitor General to file a comment to the basic petition.
It appearing from a further review of the record that the
operative facts and determinant issues involved in this
case are sufficiently presented in the petition and the
annexes thereto, both in regard to the respective
positions of petitioner and respondents, the Court has
decided to dispense with the aforesaid comment to
obviate needless delay in fairness to petitioner.
I. Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in
the amended information, as herein underscored, that the
accused ". . . did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said
handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the
head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Maureen Hultman . . ."
constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a
change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from
frustrated to consummated murder. Petitioner further
submits that "(t)here is a need then to establish that the
same mortal wounds, which were initially frustrated
(sic) by timely and able medical assistance, ultimately
caused the death of the victim, because it could have
Page 78 of 142
been caused by a supervening act or fact which is not
imputable to the offender." 9 From this, he argues that
there being a substantial amendment, the same may no
longer be allowed after arraignment and during the trial.
Corollary thereto, petitioner then postulates that since
the amended information for murder charges an entirely
different offense, involving as it does a new fact, that is,
the fact of death whose cause has to be established, it is
essential that another preliminary investigation on the
new charge be conducted before the new information
can be admitted.
We find no merit in the petition. There are sufficient
legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the
trial court.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 14. Amendment. — The information or complaint
may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of
court, at any time before the accused pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form,
by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the
same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake
has been made in charging the proper offense, the court
shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon
the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the
accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of
the information or complaint, while the second
paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or
complaint.
It may accordingly be posited that both amendment and
substitution of the information may be made before or
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG & PP
after the defendant pleaded, but they differ in the
following respects:
1. Amendment may involve either formal or
substantial changes, while substitution necessarily
involves a substantial change from the original charge;
2. Amendment before plea has been entered can be
effected without leave of court, but substitution of
information must be with leave of court as the original
information has to be dismissed;
3. Where the amendment is only as to form, there is
no need for another preliminary investigation and the
retaking of the plea of the accused; in substitution of
information, another preliminary investigation is
entailed and the accused has to plead anew to the new
information; and
4. An amended information refers to the same
offense charged in the original information or to an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the original charge, hence substantial
amendments to the information after the plea has been
taken cannot be made over the objection of the accused,
for if the original information would be withdrawn, the
accused could invoke double jeopardy. On the other
hand, substitution requires or presupposes that the new
information involves a different offense which does not
include or is not necessarily included in the original
charge, hence the accused cannot claim double jeopardy.
In determining, therefore, whether there should be an
amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule
110, or a substitution of information under the second
paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second
information involves the same offense, or an offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the first information, and amendment of the information
is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information
charges an offense which is distinct and different from
that initially charged, a substitution is in order.
There is identity between the two offenses when the
evidence to support a conviction for one offense would
Page 79 of 142
be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or
when the second offense is exactly the same as the first,
or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a
frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first
information. In this connection, an offense may be said
to necessarily include another when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is
alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And,
vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily
included in another when the essential ingredients of the
former constitute or form a part of those constituting the
latter. 10
Going now to the case at bar, it is evident that frustrated
murder is but a stage in the execution of the crime of
murder, hence the former is necessarily included in the
latter. It is indispensable that the essential element of
intent to kill, as well as qualifying circumstances such as
treachery or evident premeditation, be alleged in both an
information for frustrated murder and for murder,
thereby meaning and proving that the same material
allegations are essential to the sufficiency of the
informations filed for both. This is because, except for
the death of the victim, the essential elements of
consummated murder likewise constitute the essential
ingredients to convict herein petitioner for the offense of
frustrated murder.
In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of
offenses charged in both the original and the amended
information. What is involved here is not a variance in
the nature of different offenses charged, but only a
change in the stage of execution of the same offense
from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being
the case, we hold that an amendment of the original
information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the
filing of the amended information for murder is proper.
Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional
allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen
Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment
which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been
entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG & PP
As earlier indicated, Section 14 of Rule 110 provides
that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be
made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the
charge and, thereafter, as to all matters of form with
leave of court.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts
constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of
form. 11 Thus, the following have been held to be
merely formal amendments, viz: (1) new allegations
which relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction; 12 (2) an
amendment which does not charge another offense
different or distinct from that charged in the original
one; 13 (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume; and (4) an amendment which does not
adversely affect any substantial right of the accused,
such as his right to invoke prescription. 14
We repeat that after arraignment and during the trial,
amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form
and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of
the accused. 15 The test of whether an amendment is
only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such
amendment has been said to be whether or not a defense
under the information as it originally stood would be
equally available after the amendment is made, and
whether or not any evidence the accused might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the
one form as in the other; if the answer is in the
affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of
substance. 16
Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information
for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily
show that the nature of the offense originally charged
was not actually changed. Instead, an additional
allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of
the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in
determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the
accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the
victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is
Page 80 of 142
no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may
adduce under the original information for frustrated
murder equally applies to the amended information for
murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is
irremissible that the amended information for murder is,
at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even
during the trial of the case.
It consequently follows that since only a formal
amendment was involved and introduced in the second
information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary
and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of
the amended information without the requisite
preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's
right to be secured against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an
open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from
the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The
amended information could not conceivably have come
as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious
reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that
charged under the original information. Furthermore, as
we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged
is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry
into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an
inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary
investigation is not necessary. 17
We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial
court of a counsel de oficio for herein petitioner whose
counsel of record refused to participate in the
proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such
issue having been demonstrated herein as baseless, we
apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as
causative of or contributive to the delay in the
disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the
substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons
charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of
cases should be left to the sound discretion of the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent
judge did not commit the errors speciously attributed to
him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 81 of 142
SEC 14 TEEHANKEE VS MADAYAG & PP

DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for 15 People vs. Montenegro, et al., 159 SCRA 236
lack of merit. (1988).

SO ORDERED. 16 42 C.J.S., Indictment and Information 1250.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, 17 People vs. Magpale, 70 Phil. 176 (1940).
Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 18-19.

2 Annex B, id.; ibid., 20-21.

3 Annex C, id.; ibid., 22-23.

4 Annex G, id.; ibid., 37-38.

5 Annex D, id.; ibid., 27-29.

6 Annex F, id.; ibid., 34-36.

7 Annex E, id.; ibid., 30-33.

8 Rollo, 4-5.

9 Ibid., 10.

10 Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950); Section 5,

Rule 120, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.

11 Almeda vs. Villaluz, et al., 66 SCRA 38 (1975).

12 Id., ibid.

13 Guinto vs. Veluz, et al., 77 Phil. 801 (1946).

14 Vega vs. Panis, et al., 117 SCRA 269 (1982).

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 VILLAFLOR VS VIVAR
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134744. January 16, 2001]
GIAN PAULO VILLAFLOR, petitioner, vs. DINDO
VIVAR y GOZON, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not
impair the validity of an information or render it
defective. Neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the
court or constitute a ground for quashing the
information. Instead of dismissing the information, the
court should hold the proceedings in abeyance and order
the public prosecutor to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the Orders issued by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa City
(Branch 276) in Civil Case No. 97-134.[1] Dated
January 20, 1998,[2] the first Order granted the Motion
to Quash the Informations and ordered the dismissal of
the two criminal cases. The second Order dated July 6,
1998, denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
Culled from the records and the pleadings of the parties
are the following undisputed facts.
An Information[3] for slight physical injuries, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 23365, was filed against
Respondent Dindo Vivar on February 7, 1997. The case
stemmed from the alleged mauling of Petitioner Gian
Paulo Villaflor by respondent around 1:00 a.m. on
January 27, 1997 outside the Fat Tuesday Bar at the
Ayala Alabang Town Center, Muntinlupa City. After the
severe beating he took from respondent, petitioner
decided to leave the premises together with a friend who
was in the restroom when the mauling incident took
place. On his way out, petitioner again met respondent
Page 82 of 142
who told him, Sa susunod gagamitin ko na itong baril
ko[4] (Next time, I will use my gun on you).
When the injuries sustained by petitioner turned out to
be more serious than they had appeared at first, an
Information[5] for serious physical injuries, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 23787, was filed against respondent.
[6] The earlier charge of slight physical injuries was
withdrawn.
At the same time, another Information[7] for grave
threats, docketed as Criminal Case No. 23728,[8] was
filed against respondent on March 17, 1997.
On April 14, 1997, respondent posted a cash bond of
P6,000 in Criminal Case No. 23787 (for serious physical
injuries).[9] Instead of filing a counter-affidavit as
required by the trial court, he filed on April 21, 1997, a
Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No.
23728 (for grave threats). He contended that the threat,
having been made in connection with the charge of
serious physical injuries, should have been absorbed by
the latter. Thus, he concluded, Criminal Case No. 23728
should be dismissed, as the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it.[10]
In an Order dated April 28, 1997 in Criminal Case No.
23728, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) denied the
Motion to Quash, as follows:
For consideration is a motion to quash filed by accused
counsel. Considering that jurisdiction is conferred by
law and the case filed is grave threats which is within
the jurisdiction of this Court and considering further that
a motion to quash is a prohibited [pleading] under the
rule on summary procedure, the motion to quash filed by
accused counsel is DENIED.
WHEREFORE, the motion to quash filed by accused
counsel is hereby DENIED and let the arraignment of
the accused be set on June 25, 1997 at 2:00 oclock in the
afternoon.[11]
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent was
denied by the MTC on June 17, 1997.[12] Thus, he was
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 VILLAFLOR VS VIVAR
duly arraigned in Criminal Case No. 23728 (for grave
threats), and he pleaded not guilty.
On July 18, 1997, respondent filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the RTC of Muntinlupa City. This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-134. On January 20,
1998, after the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the RTC issued the assailed Order which
reads as follows:
The Judicial Officer appears to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
declaring and denying the MOTION TO QUASH as a
prohibitive motion. The same should have been treated
and [should have] proceeded under the regular rules of
procedure. The MOTION TO QUASH THE
INFORMATIONS filed without preliminary
investigation is therefore granted and these cases should
have been dismissed.
Let this Petition be returned to the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 80-Muntinlupa City for appropriate
action.[13]
The RTC, in an Order dated July 6, 1998, denied the
unopposed Motion for Reconsideration, as follows:
Submitted for resolution is the unopposed Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Private Respondent.
This Court agrees with the contention of private
respondent that the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner
in the inferior court is a prohibited pleading under Rules
on Summary Procedure so that its denial is tenable.
However, it would appear that the criminal charges were
filed without the preliminary investigation having been
conducted by the Prosecutors Office. Although
preliminary investigation in cases triable by inferior
courts is not a matter of right, the provision of Sec. 51
par 3(a) of Republic Act 7926 entitled An Act
Converting the Municipality of Muntinlupa Into a
Highly Urbanized City To Be Known as the City of
Muntinlupa provides that the city prosecutor shall
conduct preliminary investigations of ALL crimes, even
violations of city ordinances. This Act amended the
Page 83 of 142
Rules on Criminal Procedure. Since this procedure was
not taken against accused, the Order dated January 20,
1998 stands.
The Motion for Reconsideration is therefore denied.[14]
Hence, this Petition.[15]
The Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our
consideration:[16]
I
Can the court motu propio order the dismissal of the two
(2) criminal cases for serious physical injuries and grave
threats on the ground that the public prosecutor failed to
conduct a preliminary investigation?
II
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation be considered a ground to
quash the criminal informations for serious physical
injuries and grave threats filed against the accused-
respondent?
III
Should respondents entry of plea in the [grave] threats
case and posting of cash bond in the serious physical
injuries case be considered a waiver of his right, if any,
to preliminary investigation?
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
First Issue: Lack of Preliminary Investigation
Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender
a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 VILLAFLOR VS VIVAR
should be held for trial.[17] A component part of due
process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a
statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused
before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary
investigation would be to deprive them of the full
measure of their right to due process.[18]
However, the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective.[19] Neither does it affect
the jurisdiction of the court or constitute a ground for
quashing the information.[20] The trial court, instead of
dismissing the information, should hold in abeyance the
proceedings and order the public prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation.[21]
Hence, the RTC in this case erred when it dismissed the
two criminal cases for serious physical injuries
(Criminal Case No. 23787) and grave threats (Criminal
Case No. 23728) on the ground that the public
prosecutor had failed to conduct a preliminary
investigation.
Furthermore, we do not agree that a preliminary
investigation was not conducted. In fact, a preliminary
investigation for slight physical injuries was made by
the assistant city prosecutor of Muntinlupa City. The
said Information was, however, amended when
petitioners injuries turned out to be more serious and did
not heal within the period specified in the Revised Penal
Code.
We believe that a new preliminary investigation cannot
be demanded by respondent. This is because the change
made by the public prosecutor was only a formal
amendment.[22]
The filing of the Amended Information, without a new
preliminary investigation, did not violate the right of
respondent to be protected from a hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution; an open and public accusation
of a crime; or from the trouble, the expenses and the
anxiety of a public trial. The Amended Information
could not have come as a surprise to him for the simple
and obvious reason that it charged essentially the same
Page 84 of 142
offense as that under the original Information. Moreover,
if the original charge was related to the amended one,
such that an inquiry would elicit substantially the same
facts, then a new preliminary investigation was not
necessary.[23]
Second Issue: Motion to Quash
As previously stated, the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective. Neither
does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case
or constitute a ground for quashing the information.[24]
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides the grounds on which an accused
can move to quash the complaint or information. These
are: (a) the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged (c) the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d) the
officer who filed the information had no authority to do
so; (e) the information does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is
charged, except in those cases in which existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; (g)
the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (h)
the information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the
accused has been previously convicted or is in jeopardy
of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged.
[25]
Nowhere in the above-mentioned section is there any
mention of a lack of a preliminary investigation as a
ground for a motion to quash. Moreover, such motion is
a prohibited pleading under Section 19 of the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure. In the present case, the
RTC therefore erred in granting herein respondents
Motion to Quash
Furthermore, we stress that the failure of the accused to
assert any ground for a motion to quash before
arraignment, either because he had not filed the motion
or had failed to allege the grounds therefor, shall be
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 VILLAFLOR VS VIVAR
deemed a waiver of such grounds.[26] In this case, he
waived his right to file such motion when he pleaded not
guilty to the charge of grave threats.
In view of the foregoing, we find no more need to
resolve the other points raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the
assailed Orders of the Regional Trail Court of
Muntinlupa City are REVERSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and
Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] The title of the case is Dindo Vivar, Petitioner, vs.
Hon. Judge Jose L. Bautista, in his capacity as Assisting
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch LXXX,
Muntinlupa City, and People of the Philippines,
Respondents.
[2] Both Orders were issued by Judge N. C. Perello;
rollo, pp. 48-51 and 52.
[3] Signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Dale Dick M.
Liban.
[4] Rollo, p. 55.
[5] Signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Thelma B.
Medina.
[6] Rollo, p. 65.
[7] Signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Thelma B.
Medina.
[8] Rollo, p. 66.
[9] Rollo, p. 69.
[10] Rollo, p. 73.
[11] Rollo, p. 75.
Page 85 of 142
[12] Rollo, p. 78.
[13] Rollo, p. 51.
[14] Rollo, p. 52.
[15] The case was deemed submitted for decision on
May 4, 2000, upon the Courts receipt of respondents
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Merlo P. Fernandez. Filed
earlier were petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty.
Ma. Theresa Gonzales of V.E. Del Rosario & Partners;
and that of the Office of the Solicitor General, signed by
Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Magdangal
M. De Leon and Sol. Bernard G. Hernandez.
[16] Petition, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 30-31.
[17] Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which became effective on
December 1, 2000. A substantially similar provision is
found in the old Rules.
[18] Go v. CA, 206 SCRA 138, February 11, 1992.
[19] People v. Deang et al., GR No. 128045, August 24,
2000; People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 72, September 30,
1982; People v. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478, February 16,
1961.
[20] People v. Deang, supra.
[21] Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464, January
28, 1991; Sanciangco Jr. v. People, 149 SCRA 1, March
24, 1987.
[22] The following have been held to be merely formal
amendments, viz.: (1) new allegations that relate only to
the range of the penalty that the court might impose in
the event of conviction; (2) an amendment that does not
charge another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations
that do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as
to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of
defense to be assumed; and (4) an amendment that does
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 86 of 142
SEC 14 VILLAFLOR VS VIVAR

not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused,

such as the right to invoke prescription. Teehankee Jr. v.
Madayag, 207 SCRA 134, March 6, 1992. (Emphasis
supplied.)

[23] Ibid.

[24] People v. Deang, supra.

[25] The old Rules of Criminal Procedure contained a

substantially similar provision. However, paragraphs (b)
and (c) of the Revised Rules were found in paragraph
(b) of the old Rules, which read: That the court trying
the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged or
the person of the accused.

[26] Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of

Criminal Procedure, provides that the exceptions found
in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of Section 3 of this
Rule are the grounds of no offense charged, lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the
offense or penalty, and jeopardy. Under Section 8, Rule
117 of the old Rules, the exceptions were paragraphs (a),
(b) (f) and (h).

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 PP VS BORROMEO
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.
RELOVA, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal
Court, Fourteenth Judicial District, Cebu-Bohol (now
Regional Trial Court), finding accused Elias Borromeo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law; to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-
Borromeo, in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the
costs.
Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the
four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo
reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of Susana, that
Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias
was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told
the child to go to Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was
then working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing
the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father
and together they went to Susana's hut. The windows
and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep
through the bamboo slats at the wall where he saw
Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside
her one-month old child who was crying. Elias
Borromeo was lying near Susana still holding on to a
bloody kitchen bolo.
Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a
few minutes, police officer Fernando C. Abella and three
policemen arrived. The peace officers shouted and
ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly
that he would smoke first before he would open the
Page 87 of 142
door. When he did, the peace officers found Susana
already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her
abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side.
When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could
only mumble incoherent words.
Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted
his necropsy report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states
that the cause of death was "stab wounds, multiple chest,
abdomen, left supraclavicular region and left shoulder."
There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab
wounds on the deceased.
In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial
court erred (1) in holding as it did that appellant and
Susana Taborada (the deceased) were legally and validly
married in a church wedding ceremony, when the
officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no
marriage contract executed on the occasion or later on;
hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide; (2)
in failing to appreciate in favor of appellant the
mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation
and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same; and, (3) in convicting
appellant of the crime of parricide and in imposing upon
him the penultimate penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial
court's finding to the effect that he killed Susana
Taborada (the deceased) without legal justification" The
main issue raised by him is that he and Susana were not
legally married and therefore the crime committed is not
parricide, but homicide.
Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the
existence of marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the
penalty imposable upon his client, accused Elias
Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim
was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on
this point: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Q Please state your name, age and other personal
circumstances?
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 PP VS BORROMEO
A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer,
resident of Putingbato, Babag Cebu City.
The COURT:
Q You say you are married, who is your wife?
A Susana Taborada.
Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada?
A I forgot.
Q Where did you get married?
A Near the RCPI station in Babag.
Q There is a church there?
A There is a chapel.
Q Were you married by a priest or a minister?
A By a priest.
Q Who is this priest?
A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.
Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada?
A We have one.
Q How old is the child?
A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long time
already. (pp. 4-5, tsn., December 12, 1981 hearing)
There is no better proof of marriage than the admission
of the accused of the existence of such marriage.
(Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525).
Person living together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or
evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The
reason is that such is the common order of society, and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in constant violation of
decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216)
The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the
strongest known in law. The law presumes morality, and
not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage:
legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the presumption
Page 88 of 142
that persons living together as husband and wife are
married to each other. The reason for this presumption
of marriage is well stated in Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA
97, thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil
contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legal matrimony. ...
And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists
in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said
marriage, as long as in the celebration thereof, all
requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not
one of said requisites. (Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).
Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to
say that the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to
death. (Article 246, Revised Penal Code) Paragraph 3,
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that
where the law prescribed a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstances, with no
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be
applied. Thus, assuming the presence of the mitigating
circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the penalty is still
reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity of
P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00. With costs.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-38215, 38216 December 22, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FAUSTINO RIVERA, defendant-appellee.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellant.
Gregorio A. Seña for appellee.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal filed by the Attorney-General from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas
sustaining demurrers to the two amended informations
and dismissing the cases filed against the appellee
Faustino Rivera. The amended information in G. R. No.
38215 is as follows:
El Fiscal Provincial que subscribe, acusa a Faustino
Rivera, del delito de "inculpacion de un inocente",
previsto y castigado en el articulo 363 del Codigo Penal
Revisado, cometido como sigue:
Que en o hacia el dia 23 de junio de 1932, en el
Municipio de Lucena, Provincia de Tayabas, Islas
Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado, el
referido acusado Faustino Rivera voluntaria, ilegal y
maliciosamente ejecuto un acto que directamente tendio
a inculpar a Domingo Vito la comision de un delito de
hurto siendo este incoente de dicho delito, consistiendo
el acto ejecutado por el acusado en la presentacion de
una denuncia por escrito y bajo juramento en el Juzgado
de Paz de Lucena, Tayabas (causa criminal No. 6543),
acusando, falsamente y sin causa probable alguna, a
Domingo Vito de dicho delito, causa que fue sobreseida
definitivamente por falta de pruebas. Con infraccion de
la ley.
The amended information in G. R. No. 38216 is as
follows:
Page 89 of 142
PP VS RIVERA
El Fiscal Provincial que suscribe, acusa a Faustino
Rivera, del delito de "inculpacion de un inocente",
previsto y castigado en el articulo 363 del Codigo Penal
Revisado, cometido como sigue:
Que en o hacia el dia 23 de junio de 1932, en el
Municipio de Lucena, Provincia de Tayabas, Islas
Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado, el
referido acusado Faustino Rivera voluntaria, ilegal y
maliciosamente ejecuto un acto que directamente tendio
a inculpar a Felisa Moreno la comision de un delito de
hurto siendo este inocente de dicho delito, consistiendo
el acto ejecutado por el acusado en la presentacion de
una denuncia por escrito y bajo juramento en el Juzgado
de Lucena, Tayabas (causa criminal No. 6543),
acusando, falsamente y sin causa probable alguna, a
Felisa Moreno de dicho delito, causa que fue sobreseida
definitivamente por falta de pruebas. Con infraccion de
la ley.
To these informations the defendant interposed a single
demurrer alleging that the facts averred in said
informations do not constitute the crime defined and
punished by article 363 of the Revised Penal Code. The
court below heard the two cases together and sustained
the demurrer. Upon the government's declining to amend
the cases were dismissed and this appeal brought.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
1. In not holding that the facts alleged in the
informations filed in these two cases properly fall under
article 363 of the Revised Penal Code; and
2. In sustaining the demurrer interposed to said
informations and in dismissing both of these cases.
It appears from the record in criminal case No. 6543 of
the justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, that on June
23, 1932, the defendant-appellee Faustino Rivera signed
and swore to a complaint (Exhibit A) before said justice
of the peace which is as follows:
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
The undersigned accuses Domingo Vito and Felisa
Moreno, of the crime of theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22 day of June, 1932, in the
municipality of Tayabas, Lucena, Province of Tayabas,
Philippine Islands, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the said accused, conspiring and confederating
together, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without
the use of force upon things, took and carried away, on
white American suit, containing one eye glass, to the
value of P30, and one buntal hat, valued at P3, two
buttons at P3 each, total value, is P39, to the prejudice of
the undersigned.
Act committed is contrary to the statute in such cases
made and provided:
Witnesses:
1. NICANOR ZOLETA.
2. Sgt. RANAS, Q.
(Fdo.) FAUSTINO RIVERA
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 23rd day of
June, 1932, in Lucena, Tayabas.
(Fdo.) FEDERICO M. UNSON
Juez de Paz de Lucena
On June 29, 1932, the justice of the peace entered the
following decision (omitting the caption):
Comparecen los acusados Domingo Vito y Felisa
Moreno, ambos vec. de Lucena, Tayabas, acompañados
de sus abogados. Estos hicieron constar no culpables.
Oidas las pruebas de los testigos de cargo el Juzgado
sobresee el asunto por falta de pruebas con costas de
oficio.
Lucena, junio 29, 1932.
Asi se ordena.
(Fdo.) FEDERICO M. UNSON
Page 90 of 142
PP VS RIVERA
Juez de Paz de Lucena
After the justice of the peace rendered his decision on
June 29, 1932, dismissing the complaint filed against
Domingo Vito and Felisa Moreno, the latter filed
separate complaints against Faustino Rivera before the
same justice, charging Rivera with the offense of
incriminating an innocent person (article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code) by the act of filing the said
information charging them with the crime of theft. The
defendant raised the same question and objection which
he repeated in the Court of First Instance on appeal,
namely, that the facts alleged did not fall under the
condemnation of article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no doubt that the facts alleged in the
informations above-quoted within the definition of the
offense of "acusacion" or "denuncia falsa" which is
contained in article 363 of the Codigo Penal, which was
superseded on January 1, 1932, by the Revised Penal
Code.
This article is as follows:
ART. 363. Se comete el delito de acusacion o
denuncia falsa imputando falsamente a alguna persona
hechos que, si fueren ciertos constituirian delito de los
que dan lugar a procedimiento de oficio, si esta
imputacion se hiciere ante funcionario administrativo o
judicial que por razon de su cargo debiera proceder a su
averiguacion o castigo.
No se procedera, sin embargo, contra el denunciador o
acusador sino en vertud de sentencia firme o auto,
tambien firme, de sobreseimiento del tribunal que
hubiere conocido del delito imputado.
Este mandara proceder de oficio contra el denunciador o
acusador, siempre que de la causa principal resultaren
meritos bastantes para abrir el nuevo proceso.
Article 326 of the Codigo Penal does not appear in the
Revised Penal Code, which contains no offense
denominated "acusacion o denuncia falsa" or its
equivalent. But the Solicitor-General contends that
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
article 363 of the Revised Penal Code should be
construed to embrace the crime of false accusation or
complaint as formerly penalized under article 326 of the
Codigo Penal.
Article 363 in the Spanish text which is decisive is as
follows, under the heading of "Asenchanzas
Inculpatorias";
ART. 363. Inculpacion de un inocente. — El que, de
cualquier manera que no constituyere falso testimonio,
ejecutare un acto que tienda directamente a inculpar o
imputar a un inocente la comision de un delito, sera
castigado con la pena de arresto mayor.
As article 363 of the Revised Penal Code is new and this
is the first case before the court calling for its
interpretation, a comparison of the article with article
326 of the former Penal Code seems expedient in view
of the argument of the Government that the former "is a
reproduction of both the crime of false accusation or
complaint and the crime of calumny described under
said article 326 and article 452 of the old Penal Code."
In passing it may be stated that if article 363 of the
Revised Penal Code could be construed to include
article 452 of the old Revised Penal Code it would have
no application to the case that we are considering
because article 452 of the old Penal Code which is as
follows:
ART. 452. Calumny is the false imputation of a
crime upon which a prosecution might be instituted by
the government of its own motion.
does not refer to false accusations or denuncias made
before an administrative or judicial officer whose duty it
is to investigate or punish such crime.
Comparing now article 363 of the Revised Penal Code
with article 326 of the Revised Penal Code, it will be
observed that under article 326 of the former Penal
Code, the gravamen of the offense is the imputation
itself when made before an administrative or judicial
officer, whereas in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code
Page 91 of 142
PP VS RIVERA
the gravamen of the offense is performing an act which
"tends directly" to such an imputation. Article 326 of the
old Penal Code punishes false prosecutions whereas
article 363 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any act
which may tend directly to cause a false prosecution.
It is well settled law that where the text of a statute is
clear, it is improper to resort to a caption or title to make
it obscure. Such secondary sources may be resorted to in
order to remove, not to create doubt. (Cf. People vs.
Yabut, 58 Phil., 499.) In the present case we think it
proper to call attention to the title immediately
preceding article 363 of the Revised Penal Code which
is as follows: "Asechanzas Inculpatorias", as throwing
some light on the classes of acts tend directly to lead to
false prosecutions. The word asechanza, as defined in
standard dictionaries, means as follows:
"Intriga, lazo, red, zancadilla, tranquilla, amaño, engaño,
artificio, trama, treta, especie de maquinacion urdida, de
celada dispuesta contra alguno, bien sea para perderlo
enteramente, bien para jugarle (sin hundirlo) alguna
mala pasada. Engaño o artificio para hacer daño a otro.
Usase, por lo comun, en el plural, asechanzas. Accion y
efecto de asechar." It seems to us a forced extension of
the term asechanza to bring a formal criminal complaint
within the conception of intriga, engaño, artificio, etc. It
seems the more reasonable and sensible interpretation to
limit article 363 of the Revised Penal Code to acts of
"planting" evidence and the like, which do not in
themselves constitute false prosecutions but tend
directly to cause false prosecutions.
It is a well settled rule that statutes should receive a
sensible construction, such as will give effect to the
legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. (Lau Ow Bew vs. United States, 144
U. S., 47, 59; 36 Law. ed., 340, 344.)
It is to be noted that article 326 of the old Penal Code
contains the provision that the accuser could be
prosecuted only on the order of the court, when the court
was convinced upon the trial of the principal cause that
there was sufficient basis for a charge of false
accusation. Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
contains no such safeguard. If we extended said article
by interpretation to administrative and judicial
proceedings, it is apparent that we would open the door
to a flood of prosecutions in cases where the defendants
were acquitted. There is no reason to believe that the
Legislature intended such a result.
The judgment intended such a result.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Hull, and
Imperial, JJ., concur.
Abad Santos concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
DIAZ, J., concurring in the result:
I concur in the result. The acts committed by the
defendant-appellee according to the version thereof
given in the majority opinion do not constitute the crime
of incrimination of an innocent person as defined and
penalized in article 363 of the Revised Penal Code, but
that of libel by means of writings as defined and
penalized in article 355 in connection with article 353 of
the said Code, or that of false testimony in one of its
forms stated in article 183, depending upon the
circumstances present during the commission thereof. In
the first case, all the essential elements of the said crime
are present, to wit: (1) malicious imputation of a crime,
and which is that of theft, (2) committed by means of
writing, and (3) with publicity, inasmuch as the
defendant-appellee necessarily gave publicity to such
imputation, which was found to be untrue, when he
delivered his written charges falsely accusing Felisa
Moreno and Domingo Vito of the crime of theft, to the
justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas. In the latter
case, the only thing to be proven is whether or not the
defendant acted knowingly therein. But under the terms
Page 92 of 142
PP VS RIVERA
of the informations filed in these cases, neither the crime
of libel nor that of false testimony could be proven, nor
could the accused be found guilty of the aforesaid
crimes in view of the fact that the informations in
question are not in accordance with the law. I am
compelled to express this opinion in order to offset any
belief to the effect that the defendant-appellee is not
liable.
VICKERS, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
The facts alleged in the informations in question
constitute the crime of perjury as defined and punished
in article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, because it is
charged that the defendant falsely and maliciously
accused the offended party in a verified complaint of the
crime of theft. With respect to the nature of the offense
contemplated by article 363, I cannot agree to restricting
it as proposed in the majority opinion, because when the
article refers to "any act not constituting perjury" it is
clear that it is not limited to "planting evidence" or
similar acts. The effect of the majority opinion is that a
person may falsely and maliciously accuse another of a
crime in a complaint under oath without incurring in any
criminal responsibility. If he should publicly make the
same statements orally or in writing he would be guilty
of slander or libel, but because he made oath to his
statements and filed them in court he is exempt from
criminal responsibility, no matter how false and
malicious his accusation may have been. I cannot
believe that such was the intention of the Legislature.
The suggestion is unwarranted that the victim of a crime
will be deterred from denouncing the perpetrator for fear
of being prosecuted himself in case the person accused
of committing the crime should be acquitted. It must be
alleged and proved that the original accusation was false
and malicious.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-781 November 29, 1946
CEFERINO M. REGALA, recurrente,
vs.
EL JUEZ DEL JUZGADO DEL PRIMERA
INSTANCIA DE BATAAN, recurrido.
Sres. Hernandez y Laquian en representacion del
recurrrente.
El Juez recurrido en su propia representacion.
PABLO, J.:
El recurrente es acusado en la causa criminal No. 4307
del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Bataan por el delito
de asesinato. En mayo 20, 1946 fue informado de la
querella y se declaro no culpable. Los testigos, segun
aquella, eran Wenceslao Cruz, Conrado Manalac y otros.
En junio 6, dia designado para la vista, el Fiscal
Provincial en vez de aducir sus pruebas presento una
querella enmendada incluyendo como acusados a los
testigos nombrados en la querella, Wenceslao Cruz y
conrado Mañalac. En esta segunda querella se alego que
entre el recurrente y sus dos co-acusados hubo
conspiracion, confederacion y ayuda mutua cometer el
delito. Admitida por el juzgado la querella en cuanto a
los acusados Conrado Manalac y Wenceslao Cruz para
ser utilizados como testigos de la acusacion, alegando
las cinco condiciones que require el articulo 9, Regla
115. A esta peticion accedio el Juez en su orden de 6 de
junio de 1946.
En junio 14 el recurrente presento el aviso de apelacion
contra dicha orden, y fue denegada el 19 del mismo mes.
En junio 26 el recurrente presento una mocion de
reconsideracion que fue denegada en 11 de julio.
Alegando estos hechos, el recurrente presento su
peticion original de certiorari pidiendo que sean
anuladas por este Tribunal las ordenes de 6 de junio y 11
Page 93 of 142
REGALA VS CFI BATAAN
de Julio de 1946 del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Bataan.
El recurrente alega que si no se diese curso a su citada
apelacion se causaria irreparable dano a sus derechos
sustanciales porque no tiene otro remedio facil, sencillo
y adecuado. En caso de condena, el acusado puede
apelar y en el juzgado ad quem puede discutir todos los
errores cometidos por el juzgado inferior. Es el remedio
ordinario que concede la legislacion vigente.
El recurrente alega que la orden del juez de 11 de julio
denegando la mocion de reconsideracion es nula y de
ningun valor porque dicho juez obro sin jurisdiccion,
pues su nombramiento no ha sido aprobado por la
Comision de Nombramientos, segun publico un
periodico de la misma fecha. No consta en autos que el
juez haya tenido conocimiento de tal desaprobacion
antes de dictar su orden, impugnada de ilegal. Un juez
que desempana su cargo antes de enterarse de la
desaprobacion de su nombramiento es un juez de facto.
Todas sus actuaciones oficiales, como juez de facto, son
tan validas para todos los fines legales y para toda clase
de asuntos, como las de un juez dejure. (Tayko contra
Capistrano, 53 Jur. Fil., 923.)
El recurrente y los disidentes arguyen que el juez, al
permitir la inclusion de dos acusados y la adicion de las
palabras: "by conspiring, confederating and helping one
another" en la querella enmendada, abuso de su
discrecion con infraccion del articulo 13, Regla 106
porque que esa enmienda sea tal. En la primera querella
se acusa al recurrente de autor y en la enmemdada
decoautor, pero su responsabilidad es la misma en
ambas. El cambio solo se refiere a la forma de ejecucion
del delito; pero no a la substancia del delito mismo. La
forma de ejecucion es mas bien materia de pruebas y no
de alegaciones, y los detalles alegados en la querella
enmendada pudieron haberse probado bajo la querella
original.
Los solicitantes en este expendiente de certiorari,
acusados en una querella por asesinato, alegan que el
juzgado se excedio de su jurisdiccion y abuso de ella al
permitir la enmienda de la querella. En la querella
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 REGALA VS CFI BATAAN
original se algaba que Bruno Arevalo iba armado de
cortaplumas y Cecilio Arevalo de revolver. En el
querella enmendada, que fue admitada, se alega que
Bruno Arevalo era el que llevaba el revolver y Cecilio
Arevalo el cortaplumas.
En nuestra opinion, el juzgado no abuso de su
discrecion. La enmienda de la querella era meramente de
forma. No afecta ni altera la naturaleza del delito,pues,
sea Bruno o Cecilio ell que haya causado la herida
mortal, el delito serial el mismo. Tampoco afecta a la
extension de la responsibilidad de los solicitantes, toda
vez que, alegandose en el querella que ambos acusados
conspiraron y se ayudaron el uno al otro para cometer el
delito, serian responsables en la misma medida, sea una
u otro el que infirio la herida que produjo la muerte del
occiso. Es, por tanto, una enmienda puramente de forma
que no altera sustancialmente la querella ni afecta a los
derechos de los acusados (Arevalo y Arevalo contra
Nepomuceno, 63 Jur. Fil., 665.)
Ademas, si el juez actuo con infraccion o no del
Reglamento fue a lo mas un error de procedimiento, y
no un abuso de discrecion, ni exceso o falta de
jurisdiccion. Tal error, si lo es en realidad, puede ser
corregido en apelacion,despues de dictada sentencia
definitiva en primera instancia, y no en una accion de
certiorari.
Solamente procede el remedio de certiorari cuando un
tribunal, en el ejecucion de sus funciones judiciales,
haya actuado sin jurisdiccion o con exceso de ella o con
grave abuso de discrecion y que, en la tramitacion
ordinaria, no tiene el recurrente el remedio sencillo y
expedito de apelacion (Regla 67, articulo 1). Si por cada
error cometido por un juzgado de certiorari, los asuntos
serian interminables.
Se deniga la solicitud con las costas contra el recurrente.
Moran, Pres., Paras, Bengzon y Padilla, MM., estan
conformes.
Separate Opinions
Page 94 of 142
FERIA, J., concurring:
I concur in the result for the following reasons:
According to section 1, Rule 67, certiorari lies when a
tribunal or officer exercising judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.
There is no doubt that appeal does not lie against an
order of a court admitting or denying the amendment of
a complaint or information, because such order is
incidental or interlocutory and not final in character, that
is, it does nor put an end to the ordinary proceedings of
the case in court. Interlocutory or incidental order may
be impugned as erroneous in the appellate court, when
appeal is taken from the judgment or order of the lower
court which is final in character.
The question to determine, therefore, is whether or not
the respondent judge acted (a) without or in excess of
the court's jurisdiction, or (b) with grave abuse of
discretion, in allowing the amendment of the
information in this case.
(a) As to the first question, it is well known rule that
a court having jurisdiction over the offense charged and
the territory wherein it was committed, has also
jurisdiction to decide all questions incidental to the
criminal proceeding, such as the sufficiency of a
complaint or information, or whether the defendant has
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or is
insane. If the decision or resolution on such questions is
not conformity with or against the law, the court would
commit an error, but not exceed its jurisdiction. A judge
would act in excess of the court's jurisdiction if he
performs or does an act which he has no power or
authority to do, in connection with the proceeding over
which the court has jurisdiction. But to decide
erroneously a question which it is within the court's
jurisdiction to decide, is not acting beyond or in excess
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 REGALA VS CFI BATAAN
of its jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to sustain
the absurdity that a court acts within its jurisdiction if it
decides a case in conformity with the law, and in excess
of its jurisdiction of its decision is erroneous or contrary
to law.
From the foregoing, it necessarily follows that the
decision or order of the respondent judge allowing the
amendment of the information after the defendant
petitioner has pleaded would be erroneous if it is an
amendment of substance and not of form, but it would
not be an act beyond or in excess of the court's
jurisdiction, because the court has power or jurisdiction
to decide that question. The respondent judge has not,
therefore, acted without or in excess of the court's
jurisdiction in allowing the amendment of the
information, however erroneous that resolution may be.
(b) With respect to the second, it goes without
saying, for it is of common sense, that if a person has no
power to do an act, and therefore no discretion to do or
not to do it, it cannot be said that he has acted within, or
with grave abuse of, his discretion in doing or not doing
it. No one may abuse a thing that he does not have. If the
respondent judge has no discretion to act in one way or
another, as in the present case, he could not have acted
with grave abuse of discretion, for he can not abuse a
discretion which does not have.
Therefore the question is reduced to whether or not the
court has power to allow the amendment in substance of
an information after the defendant has pleaded. If it has
no power to permit such amendment, it does have
discretion to allow it or not because discretion supposes
power to do.
Section 13, Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 13. Amendment. — the information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
Page 95 of 142
According to the above quoted provisions, after the
discretion to allow the amendment of an information or
complaint in matters of form, but not in matters of
substance. The court having no power to allow
amendment in substance it could not have discretion to
allow it or not, and hence it could not have acted with
grave abuse of discretion, which the court did not have.
Therefore, the respondent judge has not acted with grave
abuse of discretion in admitting the amendment, even
assuming that the amendment is of substance.
Wherefore, certiorari does not lie in the present case,
and the petition is denied.
Tuason, J., concurs.
HILADO, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
Paragraph 6 of the petition alleges that on May 20, 1946,
petitioner was arraigned upon the information first filed
by the Provincial Fiscal under date of May 6, 1946. In
the original information the act imputed upon the
petitioner, and upon him alone, was that of having killed
one Efrain Brillo by shooting with a firearm. After
petitioner had thus been arraigned, the Provincial Fiscal
presented an amended information dated June 5, 1946,
charging three persons, namely, petitioner Ceferino M.
Regala, one Conrado Manalac and one Wenceslao Cruz
with the act of having killed Efrain Brillo by shooting
with a firearm, the amended information charging that
said three accused conspired, confederated and helped
one another in thus killing Efrain Brillo.
Paragraph 5 of the respondent's answer expressly admits
that petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
original information when the respondent court ordered
the discharge of the two new defendants Conrado
Manalac and Wenceslao Cruz. That discharge was so
ordered upon the Provincial Fiscal's motion of June 5,
1946, quoted in Paragraph 8 of the petition.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 REGALA VS CFI BATAAN
It, therefore, appears that the amendment of the
information was made by the Provincial Fiscal and
allowed by the respondent court after the defendant
(now petitioner) had pleaded not guilty to the original
information.
Was the amendment merely formal, or was it
substantial? To charge a person with having alone killed
another is not the same as to the charge him and the two
others with the killing. That the first act is substantially
— nay, essentially — different from the second is to my
mind too obvious to require argument. The first act is
the act of only one individual while the second is the act
of three. The first act is the act of only one individual
while the second, if duly established, will result in the
conviction of three. To say that the act of one person is
substantially the same as the act of three persons, would
virtually be tantamount to saying that one and three are
the same. How, then, can the first and the second acts be
substantially the same? Consequently, in the amended
information petitioner was charged with an act entirely
different and distinct from that charged against him in
the original information. Hence, the amendment was not
merely in form but in substance. The subsequent
discharge of the accused Conrado Manalac and
Wenceslao Cruz could not, of course, alter the principle.
The amendment does not refer merely to the form of
execution of the crime. If the one executing were the
same person in both cases, then the statement would be
correct. But such is not the situation here — Ceferino M.
Regala, Conrado Manalac and Wenceslao Cruz, the
alleged perpetrators of the crime according to the
amended information, are not the same as Ceferino M.
Regala, the sole offender according to the original
information.
To further support their thesis, the majority affirm that
the form of execution is rather a matter of evidence than
of allegations and that the details alleged in the amended
information could have been proven under the original
information. We beg to point out the weakness of the
argument: by proving the so-called details under the
original information the conviction of the three killers
could never have been attained for the simple reason that
Page 96 of 142
two of them were not being prosecuted under said
original information; while by proving the allegations of
the amended information (to test the strength of the
argument we must suppose that Conrado Mañalac and
Wenceslao Cruz were not discharged) the conviction of
all three defendants who have been secured. This
difference between the original and amended
informations, a difference which necessarily involves a
substantial change in the charge. The charge under the
amended information is no less substantially different
from the charge contained in the original information
than the difference between three and one. The case of
Arevalo and Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno (63 Phil., 627) is
not in point. There are the accused under the original
and amended informations were the same two persons,
Bruno Arevalo and Cecilio Arevalo, the only difference
in the allegations consisting in the detail of which one of
them was armed with a penknife and which was armed
with revolver, but in the original information, as well as
in the amended one, the accused were the self-same two
persons. There it was rightly said that whether Bruno
was armed with a penknife and Cecilio with a revolver
or vice versa, since they were charged with having
conspired and helped each other in the commission of
the crime, both could be convicted to the same extent in
one or other case.
In the case at bar, if it had been alleged in the amended
information that the accused Regala ordered Conrado
Mañalac and Wenceslao Cruz to kill Efrain Brillo and
only the said Regala was charged with the crime, it
might be contended with stronger reason that the change
was merely in the form in the form of execution. But
such is not the case, as already demonstrated above.
Another substantial amendment involved in the change
from the original to the amended information is the
augmentation of the jeopardy or danger of punishment
to which the accused was subjected. Under the original
information, in order to convict him, the evidence must
established beyond reasonable doubt that he, by his own
direct act, killed the victim. Under the amended
information, after proof of conspiracy between him and
his two co-accused, he could be convicted as co-author
of the crime even without proof of his having personally
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 REGALA VS CFI BATAAN
and directly killed or physically participated in the
killing of the victim, if sufficient evidence were adduced
proving that the other two or anyone of the other two
accused committed the direct act of killing. The
amendment which gives rise to this difference of danger
of punishment cannot in any rational sense be called
merely formal.
Neither can I agree with the view of the majority that we
are here concerned at most with an error of procedure,
and not an abuse of discretion. Neither can I subscribe to
the corollary of said proposition, that the error is only
corregible by appeal and not through certiorari. That we
are dealing with the exercise — according to my theory,
with a grave abuse — of the Court's discretion, is patent
from the provision of Rule 106, section 13 which says
that after plea and during the trial the information or
complaint may be amended as to all matters of form
(and may I add, as to matter of form only) by leave and
"at the discretion of the court," when the same can be
done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
Rule 106, section 13, in providing that after plea and
during the trial the information or complaint may be
amended "as to all matters of form," by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant,
necessarily denies all power and discretion to the court
at that stage of the proceedings, to allow any amendment
in substance.
The present Chief Justice of this court, in his
Commentaries on the Rules of Court (Vol. II, 1940 ed.,
p. 389), in part says:
Under this section, the amendment of the complaint or
information, either in substance or in form, is as to the
plaintiff, practically a matter of right, if made before the
defendant pleads; thereafter, amendments are at the
discretion of the court and then only as to matters of
form. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
This leads to the conclusion that the respondent court
acted with grave abuse of its discretion in allowing the
amendment in question.
Page 97 of 142
And I am of opinion, with all due respect to the majority,
that this action of the lower court may and should be
corrected by certiorari.
But it is said that appeal was the proper remedy. I
understand this to mean that the accused, now petitioner,
should go into trial under the amended information,
await judgment and, if convicted, appeal therefrom, and
only upon such appeal should he be allowed to complain
against the error which, to my mind, was palpably
committed by the respondent court. Supposing that upon
that appeal it should be decided that the error was really
committed by the trial court. What then would the
appellate court do? To correct the error, it must declare
that the amended information was erroneously admitted;
and that trial court had gravely abused its discretion in
so admitting said pleading. In such a case the amended
information will necessarily be held illegally admitted;
and I can not see how the appellate court can then avoid
declaring invalid all the proceedings had thereunder, and
to which the accused will have been so injuriously
subjected.
The error under consideration is of such nature by
reason of its incidence, that, if it should be declared to
have been committed, all the proceedings had under the
amended information would have to be annulled and the
case would need a re-trial. Such an error should, I think,
be distinguished from an error corregible upon appeal
without need of annulling the proceedings in the court
below and remanding the case for re-trial. The first kind
of error strikes at the very foundation of the proceedings
below, while the second merely concerns details of such
proceedings. In the first, appeal will fall far short of
being a speedy and adequate remedy; in the second, it
will not. It is in cases of the first class only where I think
certiorari is the proper remedy. All other cases would
fall under the second class, and we can safely say they
constitute by far the greater number.
We must remember that this is not a civil case — it is a
criminal prosecution for murder, during the progress and
pendency of which — it may well last over one year —
the accused, who is presumed to be innocent until
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14 REGALA VS CFI BATAAN
validly convicted, will be subjected to the moral and
nervous torture incident to the nature of the case, and
even his personal liberty may be adversely affected if he
be denied bail.
In view of the foregoing considerations, I submit that
appeal would fall far short of being a speedy and
adequate remedy for this petitioner.
If the amended information is held to be invalid for
having been erroneously admitted, there should be no
fear that this accused would go unpunished without trial.
In such a case the amended information being invalid,
the original information must be deemed never to have
been superseded thereby and, therefore, still stands. The
accused should then be prosecuted under the said
original information. But if this court hold that a mistake
has been made charging the proper offense in the
original information, then in that case the Court of First
Instance and order the filing of a new one charging the
proper offense, provided the defendant would not
thereby place in double jeopardy, pursuant to Rule 106,
section 13, second paragraph.
I think petitioner is entitled to the writ of certiorari that
he seeks, and that this court should annul the action of
the respondent court in admitting the amended
information and all proceedings had thereafter, with the
proper instructions.
BRIONES, M., disidente:
El articulo 13, Regala 106, del Reglamento de los
Tribunales, prescribe lo siguente:
SEC. 13. Amendments. — The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, any time before the defendants
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, whenn the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Page 98 of 142
Resulta evidente, de lo transcrito, que despues de haber
contensado el acusado a la querella, esta no puede
enmendarse sustancialmente, en su fondo, sino solo en
cuestion de forma, previo permiso del tribunal, y aun
ello solamente cuando puede hacerse sin perjuicio de los
derechos del acusado. La cuestion, pues, que tenemos
que determinar en el presente caso es (1) si la reforma de
la contestacion de "no culpable," es o no sustancial; y
(2) si dicha reforma puede o no prejudicar los derechos
del acusado.
No cabe duda de que la enmienda en cuestion es
sustancial, de fondo. Evidentemente el Fiscal reformo la
querella, en el sentido de incluir como acusados a
Conrado Mañalac y Wenceslao Cruz y alegando que
estos conspiraron con el recurrente, Ceferino Regala,
para cometer el delito de asesinato, a fin de poder pedir
inmediatamente el sobreseimiento de la causa contra los
nuevos acusados y utilizarlos como testigos de cargo
contra dicho Regala. Efectivamente, esto fue lo que hizo
el fiscal, y en consecuencia el juzgado ordeno el
sobreseimiento pedido decretando la libeberacion de los
nuevos acusados y habilitandolos de esta manera para
ser testigos de la acusacion.
No es dificil maginarse la situacion del Fiscal. Sin los
nuevos acusados como testigos de cargo, probablemente
tuviera un caso muy flojo contra Regala. Esto, por un
lado. Por otro, se debe presumir que Conrado Manalac y
Wenceslao Cruz no estarian dispuestos a delarar a favor
de la acusacoin incriminandose a si mismos, a menos
que fuesen liberados prenviamente de toda
responsibilidad al tenor del articulo 9, Regla 115, del
Reglamento de los Tribunales. De ahi que el Fiscal se
haya visto obligado a reformar la querella en el sentido
indicato. ¿Como ha de ser, pues, de mera forma una
enmienda que cambia tan radicalmente las posiciones
juridicas respectivas del acusado y de la prosecucion?
Que la enmienda es perjudicial a los derechos del
recurrente, es cosa salta a la vista. Por virtud de esa
enmienda, que permite al Fiscal amparar a Mañalac y
Cruz con la coraza de la inmunidad, el recurrente tiene
ahora que encararse con dos testigos que pueden pesar
decisivamente en el resultado de la causa contra el.

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 99 of 142
REGALA VS CFI BATAAN

Se arguye, sin embargo, que el remedio procedente no es

el certiorari, sino la apelacion, cuando la causa se
termine de modo adverso al acusado. Creo que esto es
un error. Es doctrina firmemente establecida que el
certiorari procede, aun cuando sea factible la apelacion,
cuando esta no ofrece un remedio expedito y adecuando.
Tal es el caso que nos ocupa. El abuso de discrecion
cometido por el tribunal inferior puede afectar y
trastornar radicalmente el plan de defensa del acusado;
asi que le interesa a este prevenir el daño antes de que
ocurra, y esto solamente se puede conseguir por medio
de un recurso rapido y eficaz el certiorari. La apelacion
seria, a lo mas, un remedio curativo, pero tardio, cuando
el daño a los derechos del acusado ya se habria
consumado, acaso irreparablemente. Entre ambas
terapeuticas-la preventiva y la curativa-la primera es
indudablemente la mejor, no solo en medicina, sino en
todos los ordenes de la vida.

Creo, pues, que el remedio solicitado debe concederse.

DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4017 August 30, 1951
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.,
petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JOSE C. ZULUETA, respondent-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo
and Special Counsel Pedro Quinto for petitioners and
appellants.
Manuel C. Briones and Mariano A. Albert for
respondent and appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of decision of the Court of Appeals that
annulled the order of Hon. Juan R. Liwag, Judge
admitting the amended information filed in Criminal
Case No. 11232 of Manila.
There is no question about these facts:
1. On October 15, 1949 an information was filed in said
criminal case charging Jose C. Zulueta with the crime of
malversation of public property. Copy of the information
is appended hereto (App. A.). The substance of the
accusation is that the accused, as Acting Chairman of the
Surplus Property Commission, wilfully or thru
abandonment permitted Beatriz Poblete to take and
convert 3,000 kegs of nails of the aforesaid
Commission. It is alleged that he secured the approval of
sale to her of said nails at very low prices by "astutely"
prevailing upon Commissioner Angel Llanes to approve
it on the pretext of urgency to expedite the liquidation of
surplus properties. As an alternative charge the
information states that at least through abandonment the
accused permitted Beatriz Poblete to carry the hardware
away.
2. Arraigned on November 24, 1949, the accused
pleaded "not guilty."
3. On January 14, 1950, the prosecution submitted an
amended information (App. B), which practically
Page 100 of 142
PP v CA
reproducing the original accusation, contained the
additional assertion — among others — that in
permitting the misappropriation the accused Jose C.
Zulueta acted in conspiracy with Commissioner Llanes,
who had subsequently been booked for malversation of
the identical public property (nails) in Criminal Case no.
11727 of the same court.
4. The accused objected to the admission of the
amended information contending that it introduced
allegations about acts and omission constituting another
offense, and that the amendments were substantial and
prejudicial to his right.
5. The court admitted amended information by its order
dated February 28, 1950.
6. Having failed a in a motion to reconsider, the accused
started proceedings on certiorari in the Court of Appeals
to annul the last mentioned order of admission.
7. The appellate court upheld his contentions. Hence, the
People presented this petition for review, which was
given due course.
The issue require application of the principles that after
the defendant has pleaded, the information may be
amended as to all matters of form, in the discretion of
the court, when the same can be done without prejudice
to the rights of the defendant. (Sec. 13, Rule 106). At
that stage, no substantial amendment may be permitted.
The question for decision is: Was the amendment purely
a matter of form? Or did it touch upon matters of
substance?
The amended pleading, with its deletions, transportation
and rephrasing, practically added a full page to the
original seven-page information. Seeing the
prosecution's insistence in its admission, to the extent of
appealing to this Court even at the risk of delaying the
proceedings, one would naturally suppose that its moves
are dictated by the necessities — neither formal nor
unsubstantial — of the case for the People.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
Indeed, contrasting the two informations one will
perceive that whereas in the first the accused is charged
with misappropriation, of public property because: (1)
he deceived Angel Llanes into approving the bargain
sale of nails to Beatriz Poblete or (2) at least, by his
abandonment he permitted that woman to obtain
information a third ground responsibility is inserted,
namely, that he connived and conspired with Angel
Llanes to consummate the give-away transaction.
Again it will be observed that the third ground of action
in effect contradicts the original theory of the
information: if the accused conspired with Llanes, he did
not deceive the latter, and did not by mere negligence
permit the sale.
Now therefore, an amended information stating forth a
different manner of committing the felony, — a totally
new proposition-does it merely introduce a formal
amendment?
We do not think so. Even in civil cases — wherein the
rules are more liberal as to amendments — its not
generally permissible to alter plaintiff's theory of the
case, alteration being substantial.1
In this connection it must be recalled that under the rules
of criminal procedure there is further limitation to
formal amendments, namely, that the amendment "can
be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant." Surely the preparation made by herein
accused to face to meet the new situation. For
undoubtedly the allegations of conspiracy enables the
prosecution to attribute and ascribe to the accused
Zulueta all the facts, knowledge, admission and even
omissions2 of his co-conspirator Angel Llanes in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The amendments thereby
widens the battlefront to allow the use by the
prosecution of newly discovered weapons, to the evident
discomfiture of the opposite camp. Thus it would seem
inequitable to sanction the tactical movement at this
stage of the controversy, bearing in mind that the
accused is only guaranteed two-days' preparation for
trial. Needless to emphasize, as in criminal cases the
liberty, even the life, of the accused is the at stake, it is
Page 101 of 142
PP v CA
always wise and proper that he be fully apprised of the
charges, to avoid any possible surprise that may lead to
injustice. The prosecution has too many facilities to
covet the added advantage of meeting unprepared
adversaries.
Some passages from "Regala contra El Juez de Juzgado
de Primera Instancia de Bataan"3 are quoted by
petitioners. Therein the accused pleaded not guilty to an
formation for murder, and later the fiscal amended the
indictment by including two other persons charged with
the same offense and alleging conspiracy between the
three. Five justices held that the amendment was not
substantial. But that situation differs from the one at bar.
The amendment there did not modify the basic theory of
the prosecution that the accused had killed the deceased
by a voluntary act and deed. Here there is an innovation,
or the introduction of another alternative imputation,
which, to Make matters worse, is inconsistent with the
original allegations. In view of the above, we believe it
unnecessary to discuss the defendant's proposition that
the original information did not actually describe the
crime, of malversation (but only of theft), which the
amended information sets forth. Neither is it
unnecessary to pass on the other minor amendments
objected to.
One other point remains to be threshed out. The
petitioners insist that certiorari is improper, because the
accused has an adequate remedy by appeal. Of course
these special civil actions may not generally be
entertained if the party has an adequate remedy by
appeal. However there have been exceptions. (Cf.
Moran 3rd Ed. Vol. II, p. 148). For instance, in Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad 47 Phil. 385 this Court took cognizance
of a petition for certiorari and prohibition
notwithstanding the accused could have appealed in due
time. The Court's action was premised on the public
welfare and the advancement of public policy, in view of
the many merchants interested in the Chinese
Bookkeeping Law.
In Dimayuga vs. Fajardo (43 Phil., 304) this Court
admitted a petition to enjoin the prosecution of certain
chiropractors. Although these could have appealed if
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
convicted, the petition was given due course for the
orderly administration of justice to avoid possible
oppression by the strong arm of the law.
And Arevalo vs. Nepomuceno (63 Phil. 627), was a
petition for certiorari to challenge the trial judge's action
permitting an amended information. This Court passed
on the petition, despite the availability of appeal at the
proper time.
Now, inasmuch as the surplus properly cases have
attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to
proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof, and
inasmuch as the Court of Appeals delving into the legal
question has reached a conclusion which we do not
reckon to be erroneous, it would not be in furtherance of
justice presently to dismiss the whole proceedings on the
technical ground that the accused has a remedy by
appeal at the proper time.
Wherefore the judgment under review will be affirmed.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Padilla, Tuason and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
APPENDIX "A"
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
——————
[Criminal Case No. 112323 for Malversation; of Public
Property]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
JOSE C. ZULUETA, Accused.
Page 102 of 142
PP v CA
——————
INFORMATION
NOW COMES the undersigned Special Attorney,
Division Special Attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor
General, and appointed by the Secretary of Justice as
Special Counsel under Article 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code and accuses JOSE C. ZULUETA
Of a violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
committed as follows:
That on or about the period from January 10, 1949 to
April 6, 1949, and for sometime prior and subsequent
thereto, in the Cities of Manila and Rizal, Philippines,
the herein accused Jose C. Zulueta after having been
duly appointed to the Office of Acting Chairman of the
Surplus Property Commission, qualified and discharged
and Performed the functions and duties pertaining to his
aforementioned public office; that as such Acting
Chairman of the Surplus Property Commission the
herein accused was entrusted and charged with proper
"administration, care, custody protect disposition and
sale" and "under such terms and conditions as may be
deemed advantageous" to the Government, of the
surplus properties acquired under the Agreement
between the United States of America and the Republic
of the Philippines as approved by the Congress of the
Philippines under of the Republic Act No. 33, which by
virtue thereof have become public properties for which
the said accused Jose C. Zulueta was and is accountable
by reason of his said position; that during the period
from January 10, 1949 to April 6 and 1949, for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines where the offices of the Surplus
Property Commission were located and in the City of
Rizal where the said accused as Acting Chairman
established subsidiary office without the consent of the
commission and over and above the objection of the
Auditor, the said as Acting Chairman of the Surplus
Property Commission, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulently consent or at
least, through abandonment permit one Beatriz Poblete
to take and misappropriate, as she did take and
misappropriate Depot No. 14 of the Surplus Property
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 103 of 142
SEC 14 PP v CA

Commission 3,000 kegs of surplus nails in the following

manner; That on January 10, 1949 Mrs. Constantina Eastern Commercial Corporation by:
Reyes filed with the Surplus Commission an offer to
purchase nails at Depot No. 14 at seventy per cent (70%) Kegs (SALVAGED)
of procurement cost and immediately thereafter the
accused assumed almost absolute control over the at 100 per cent of
processing, offers to purchase and invoices for nails; that Procurement cost
thereafter appeared offers to purchase and invoices in
the name of Beatriz Poblete, Jose del Rosario, Ruben Constantina Reyes
Adriano and Eugenia Adriano purportedly dated and
filed "January 17, 1949", but in fact not officially filed 2,225
on that day but sometime between January 18 and
January 26, 1949, for the purchase of nails in Depot No. Lourdes Angeles David
14 at twenty-five per cent (25%) of procurement at as
follows: 1,500

Kegs (SALVAGED) Fortunata Estanislao

at 25 per cent of 2,010

Procurement cost
Grato Ranara
Beatriz Poblete
750
3,000
Jacinto Baldeo
Jose del Rosario
12
3,000
Clarito Baldeo
Ruben Adriano
12
1,500
that on or about 16, or 18, 1949, the set of invoices of
Eugenia Adriano Eastern Commercial Corporation filed by Constantina
Reyes, Lourdes Angeles David, Fortunate Estanislao,
4,020 Grato Ranara, Jacinto Baldeo, and Clarito Baldeo, all at
100 per cent of procurement cost, were unanimously,
that on January 18, 1949, Depot No. 14 was frozen recommended by then Technical Review Committee of
allegedly preparatory to public bidding, which was not five (5) members, and by the Sales Manager, for
carried out, but in fact was to prevent the filing of other approval of Surplus Property Commission, while the act
offers at a higher percentage; that on February 5, 1949, invoices of Beatriz Poblete Jose del Rosario, Eugenia
Depot No. 14 was declared open for negotiated sale; that Adriano and Ruben Adriano, all at 25 per cent only of
on February 7, 1949, the following offers to purchase procurement cost were "conditionally" recommended by
nails, SALVAGED at Depot No. 14 at one hundred per only two of the five members of the said Technical
cent (100%) of procurement cost, were duly filed: Review Committee; that on February 23, 1949 the set of
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
invoices of Eastern Commercial Corporation by
Constantina Reyes, and others, at 100 per cent of
procurement cost was submitted to the Acting Chairman,
the accused Jose C. Zulueta and to Commissioner
Romero Llanes; that Commissioners Romero and Llanes
upheld the opinion of the Auditor that "nails" were
"critical" materials and must be bidded in accordance
with Presidential directive on the matter; [that] the, (said
accused, Acting Chair-man Jose C. Zulueta [did not
oppose this opinion and] the set of invoices were
returned to the Sales Manager, but, upon a petition for
reconsideration filed by the parties concerned, the same
set of invoices were again submitted to the Commission
for further consideration; that on March 2, 1949, the
Surplus Property Commission received the letter of the
Procurement Office dated February 25, 1949, advising
that said Office is ready to acquire all the "stock of 4-
inch to 6-inch long nails available at the time in
Engineering Depot No. 14"; that the Acting Chairman,
the accused herein, in order to subserve his ulterior
interested purposes, did not indorse to Commissioner
Romero and Llanes the said letter of the procurement
Office, although he well knew that Government Offices
had preferential right over (needed) surplus articles: that
on March 3, 1949, Commissioner Romero formally
made of record his "comment" on "nails" as follows:
The Auditor . . . certified that common nails are a critical
item and must be bidded in accordance with the
Presidential directive, . . .. If the Control Committee,
however, should waive the bidding requirement . . . and
authorized the sale at 100 per cent of Procurement
Costs, the undersigned will concur therein. . . ..;
that on March 7, 1949, the Acting Chairman, the
accused herein, indorsed to the Government Enterprises
Council, the aforesaid intent" of Commissioner Romero
at the same time recommending that the requirement of
public bidding for common nails as critical items be
waived provided the sale be at 100 per cent of
Procurement cost" and forwarded to Government
Enterprises Council his indorsement together with the
invoices of Eastern Commercial Corporation by
Constantina Reyes, Lourdes Angeles David, Fortunata
Estanislao Grata Ranara, Jacinto Baldeo and Clarito
Page 104 of 142
PP v CA
Baldeo and the aforestated letter of the Procurement
Office that invoices of Beatriz Poblete Jose del Rosario,
Ruben Adriano and Eugenia Adriano were kept by the
accused and did not submit them to Commissioners
Romero (and Llanes) for consideration on February
(22,23,) 1949, and craftily did not endorse them to the
Government Enterprises Council [together the Acting
Chairman] the accused herein, knowing or at least
having reason to believe, that [the original and] the
renovated invoices of [Beatriz Poblete and its sister
invoices] were not properly acted upon by the Technical
Review Committee and were not recommended by the
Sales Manager and knowing,, or at least having motives
to suspect that the original and /or the renovated
invoices of Beatriz Poblete and Jose del Rosario were
not signed by them personally, [the acting Chairman
readily signed and approved said invoices at twenty five
per cent (25%) only of procurement cost]
notwithstanding his knowledge that there were other
pending invoices at one hundred per cent (100%) of
procurement cost; that pursuant to his interest in having
them approved by at least the majority, the said accused,
as Acting Chairman, exerted all efforts to convinced
Commissioner Llanes to approve the said invoice of
Beatriz Poblete and its sister invoices, [but the
Commissioner Llanes twice disapproved them on the
ground that] the price offered was very low, nails being
critical item that should be bidded and the invoices were
not recommended for approval by the Sales Manager;]
[that the Acting Chairman, the accused herein, submitted
for the third time said invoices to Commissioner Llanes
and statutely prevailed upon him to approved the same
on the pretext of "urgent need to speed up liquidation" of
surplus properties, and commissioner Llanes for that
alleged reason and because of the strong
recommendation of the herein accused, finally consented
to approve them provided that the accused secure first,
the recommendation of the Sales Manager; [that before
and after the approval of said invoices by Commissioner
Llanes, the accused withheld said invoices from the
consideration of and action of Commissioner Romero, in
view of the latter's comments on the subject which, the
accused himself had previously favorable Government
Enterprises Council;] that on or about March 21), 1949,
[the herein accused] received from the Purchasing Agent
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
of the Procurement Office a letter advising him that they
were definitely buying and wanted to take delivery of
seventy-seven (77 ) tons of surplus nails from Depot No.
14 and enclosed with said letter the needed certification
of the availability of funds for the purchase, but the
herein accused, fearing that said purchase would defeat
his ultimate interested purpose. did not submit said letter
to, the Commissioner Romero and Llanes for their
consideration and action: that on April 1, 1949, the
Acting Chairman issued on order. "for immediate and
strict compliance", for the delivery of the 3,000 kegs of
nails covered by the invoices of Beatriz Poblete, which
was not carried out due to the opposition of the Auditor's
representative; that on April 2, 1949, the accused had
learned of the advise of Atty. Gregorio S. Licaros.
Executive Secretary of the Government Enterprises
Council, that deliveries on invoices for nails be
suspended that the anticipating that the formal decision
by the Government Enterprise Council was imminently
forthcoming and would adversely affect the invoice of
Beatriz Poblete, as in fact said decision of the
Government Enterprises Council was rendered and
forwarded to the Commission on April 4, 1949,
declaring that "Under no circumstances should sale of
nails of any type, classification or quantity be made at
less than 100% of procurement cost, any such sale
pending delivery to be cancelled, and that the quantity of
nails requisitioned by the Procurement Office should be
reserved, the [herein accused, as] Acting Chairman, in
order to consummate the sale in favor of Beatriz Poblete
in which they (be) had become [greatly] interested,
issued a second order to different officer of (the
Superintendent, Officer-in- Charge, and Security Officer
of Depot No. 14 and to other subordinate officers in] the
Surplus Property Commission urging complete delivery
of the nails covered by the invoice of Beatriz Poblete,
regardless of tag numbers; that as a direct and necessary
consequence of all the afore-stated actuations,
(machinations and omissions) of the herein accused,
(all) committed, incurred, and/or carried out in the Cities
of Manila, Rizal and Quezon the said accused capacity
as Acting Commissioner (Chairman) of the Surplus
Property Commission and as an accountable Public
officer did there and or about March 24, then on April 4,
and 5, 1949 wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
Page 105 of 142
PP v CA
fraudulently, or at least, through abandonment,
constraint and permit Beatriz Poblete, through her
representative Ngo Teck, to appropriate and carry away,
as she did in fact appropriate and take three thousand
(3,000) kegs of nails form Engineer Depot No. 14 them
with a market value of P81,000, for which public
property the said accused as such accountable, to the
damage and prejudice of the Surplus Property
Commission. an agency of the Republic of the
Philippines, in the total amount of twenty-five thousand
two hundred pesos (25,200) including compensating tax,
representing 100 per cent of original procurement cost,
minus six thousand three (P6,300) which was paid to the
Surplus Property Commission under the fraudulent guise
of purchase price of the said three thousand (P3,000)
kegs of nails.
Contrary to Law.
Contrary to Law City of Manila, Philippines, this 15th
day of October, 1949.
(Sgd.) PEDRO C. QUINTO
Special Attorney
Office of the Solicitor General
and Special Counsel
appointed by the Secretary of Justice
under section 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code
—————
In this copy of the original information, the words or
phrases inclosed by brackets refer to deletions,
transpositions, rephrasing made in the amended
information.
PEDRO C. QUINTO
Special Attorney
Office of the Solicitor General
and Special Counsel appointed
by the Secretary of Justice
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
APPENDIX "B"
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MANILA
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
BRANCH IX
—————
[Criminal Case No. 11232 for Malversation of Public
Property]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
JOSE C. ZULUETA, accused.
————
AMENDED INFORMATION
NOW COMES the undersigned Special Attorney,
Division of Special Attorneys of the Office of the
Solicitor General, and appointed by the Secretary of
Justice as Special Counsel under Articles 1686 of the
Revised Administrative Code and, with the leave of
Court amends the information as to matter of form, by
accusing Jose C. Zulueta, of a violation of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code committed as follows:
That on or about the period from January 10, 1949, to
April 6, 1949, and for something prior and subsequent
thereto, in the Cities of Manila and Rizal, Philippines,
the herein accused Jose C. Zulueta, after having been
duly appointed to the Office of Acting Chairman
performed the functions and duties pertaining to his
aforementioned public office; that as such Acting
Chairman of the Surplus Property Commission the
herein accused was entrusted and charged with the
proper 'administrative, care, custody, protection,
disposition and /or sale" and "under such terms and
conditions as may be deemed most advantageous" to the
Government of the Surplus properties acquired under the
Page 106 of 142
PP v CA
Agreement between the United States of America and
the Republic of the Philippines, as approved by the
Congress of the Philippines under Republic Act No. 33,
which by virtue thereof have become public properties
for which the said accused Jose C. Zulueta was and is
accountable by reason of his said position; that during
the period from January 10, 1949 to April 6, 1949, and
for some time prior and subsequent thereto, in the City
of Manila, Philippines, where the offices of the Surplus
Property Commission were located and in the City of
Rizal where the said accused as Acting Chairman
established subsidiary office without the consent of the
Commission and over and above the objection of the
Auditor, the said accused, as Acting Chairman of the
Surplus Property Commission, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and fraudulent consent
or at least, through abandonment permit one Beatriz
Poblete to take and misappropriate, as she did take and
misappropriate from Depot No. 14 of the Surplus
Property Commission 3,000 kegs of surplus nails in the
following manner: that on January 10, 1949, Mrs.
Constantina Reyes filed with the surplus Property
Commission an offer to purchase nails at Depot No. 14
at seventy per cent (70%) of procurement cots and
immediately control over the processing of offers to
purchase and invoices in the name of Beatriz Poblete,
Jose del Rosario, Ruben Adriano and Eugenia Adriano
purportedly dated and filed "January 17, 1949", but in
fact not officially filed on that day but sometime
between January 18 and January 28, 1949, for the
purchase of nails in Depot No. 14 at twenty-five per cent
(25%) of procurement cost as follows:
Kegs (SALVAGED)
at 25 per cent of
Procurement cost
Beatriz Poblete
3,000
Jose del Rosario
3,000
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 107 of 142
SEC 14 PP v CA

Clarito Baldeo
Ruben Adriano
12
1,500
that on or about February 16, 0r 18, the act of invoices
Eugenia Adriano of Eastern Commercial Corporation filed by Constantina
Reyes, Lourdes Angeles David, Fortunata Estanislao,
4,020 Grate Ranara, Jacinto Baldeo and Clarito Baldeo, all at
100 per cent of procurement cost, were unanimously
That on January 18 1949, Depot No. 14 was frozen recommended by then Technical Review Committee of
allegedly preparatory to public bidding, which was not five (5) members, and by the Sales Manager, for
but in fact was to prevent the filing of other offers at a approval of the Surplus Property Commission, while the
higher percentage; that on February 5, 1949, Depot No. set of invoices of Beatriz at 25 per cent only of
14 negotiated sale; that on February 7. 1949, the procurement cost, irregularly filed and processed, were
following officers to purchase nails, SALVAGED at conditionally recommended for personal use or
Depot one hundred per cent (100%) of procurement rehabilitation purposes only by two of the five members
costs, were duly filed. of the said Technical Review Committee; that on
February 23, 1949, the set of invoices of Eastern
Eastern Commercial Corporation by Commercial Corporation by Constantina Reyes, and
others, at least 100 per cent of procurement cost was
Kegs (SALVAGED) submitted to the Acting Chairman the accused, Jose C.
Zulueta, and to Commissioners Romero and Llanes; that
at 100 per cent of Commissioners Romero and Llanes upheld in writing
Procurement cost the opinion of the Auditor that "nails" were critical
materials and must be bidded in accordance with
Constantina Reyes Presidential directive on the matter, and with the
acquiescence of invoices were returned to the Sales
2,225 Manager, but, upon a petition for reconsideration filed
by the parties concerned, the same set of invoices were
Lourdes Angeles David again submitted to the Commission on February 26,
1949, for further consideration; that on March 2, 1949
1,500 the Surplus Property Commission received the letter-
officer of the Procurement Office dated February 25,
Fortunata Estanislao 1949, advising that said Office was ready to acquire all
the "stock of 4-inch to 6-inch long nails available at the
2,010 time in Engineering Depot No. 14; that the Acting
Chairman, the accused herein, in order to subverse his
Grato Ranara ulterior interested purposes, did not indorse to
Commissioners Romero and Llanes the said letter of the
750 Procurement Office, although he well knew that
Government Offices had preferential right over
Jacinto Baldeo PRIVATE PARTIES to acquire surplus articles; that on
March 3, 1949, Commissioner Romero formally made
12 of record his "comment" on "nails" as follows:
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
The Auditor . . . certified that common nails are critical
item and must be bidden in accordance with the
Presidential directive, . . . If the control Committee,
however, should waive the bidding requirement ..and
authorize will concur therein . . .., ;
that on March 7, 1949, the accused herein, as Acting
Chairman, indorsed to the Government Enterprises
Council, the aforesaid "comment" of Commissioner
Romero at the same time recommending that the
requirement of public bidding for common nails as
critical items be waived provided the sale be at 100 per
cent of procurement cost" and forwarded to the
Government Enterprises Council his indorsement
together with the invoices of Eastern Commercial
Corporation by Constantina Reyes, Lourdes Angeles
David, Fortunata Estanislao, Grata Ranara, Jacinto
Baldeo, and Clarito Baldeo, the AFOREMENTIONED
LETTER OF EASTERN COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION ASKING FOR
RECONSIDERATION, the aforestated letter of the
Procurement Office, AND OTHER PERTINENT
PAPERS; that the invoices of Beatriz Poblete, Jose del
Rosario, Ruben Adriano and Eugenia Adriano AT 25
PER CENT PROCUREMENT COST were purposely
retained by the herein accused and did not submit them
to, Commissioner Romero for consideration on February
23, 1949, and crafty did not indorse them to the
Government Enterprises Council; and the accused
herein, knowingly, or at least having reason to believe,
that the said renovated invoices AT 25 PER CENT OF
PROCUREMENT COST were not properly acted upon
by the Technical Review Committee, ONE OF WHOSE
MEMBERS HAVING RECOMMENDED THEM FOR
PERSONAL USE ONLY AND NOT FOR RESALE,
and were not recommended by the Sales Manager,
knowing, or at least having motives to suspect that the
original and/or the renovated invoices of Beatriz Poblete
and Jose del Rosario were not signed by them
personally, notwithstading his knowledge that there were
other pending invoices at one hundred per cent(100%)
of procurement cost, AND IT WAS PENDING
DECISION HIS INDORSEMENT AND
RECOMMENDATION ABOVE-MENTIONED and
pursuant to his interest in having them approved the said
Page 108 of 142
PP v CA
accused as Acting Chairman, exerted all efforts to
convince Acting Commissioner Llanes to approve the
said invoices of Beatriz Poblete and its sister invoices,
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT
ADOLFO Q. LLANES, BROTHER OF ACTING
COMMISSIONER LLANES, HAD A PENDING
OFFER TO PURCHASE ALSO 2,000 KEGS OF
NAILS AT DEPOT NO. 14 AT A LOW RECOVERY
PRICE OR PERCENTAGE OF PROCUREMENT
COST, AND IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH HIS
PURPOSE, THE HEREIN ACCUSED BEFORE OR
ABOUT FEBRUARY 23, 1949 SUBMITTED, THRU
HIS REPRESENTATIVE, THE RENOVATED
INVOICES OF BEATRIZ POBLETE. JOSE DEL
ROSARIO, EUGENIA ADRIANO, AND RUBEN
ADRIANO PRICE OF 25 PER CENT ONLY OF
PROCUREMENT AND OTHER PERTINENT
PAPERS TO ACTING COMMISSIONER ANGEL
LLANES FOR HIS CONSIDERATION, WHO
RETURNED AND DISAPPROVED THEM ON THE
GROUND THAT NAILS WERE OF GREAT
DEMAND AND SHOULD BE SOLD ON A BID
BASIS, THE INVOICES WERE IMPROPERLY
ACCOMPLISHED, AND WERE NOT
RECOMMENDED BY THE SALES MANAGER;
THAT ON MARCH 18, 1949, OR THEREABOUTS,
THE HEREIN ACCUSED RESUBMITTED TO
ACTING COMMISSIONER ANGEL LLANES THE
AFOREMENTIONED INVOICES OF BEATRIZ
POBLETE, JOSE DEL ROSARIO, EUGENIA
ADRIANO, AND RUBEN ADRIANO, ALREADY
SIGNED BY THE SAID ACTING CHAIRMAN, AND
ACTING COMMISSIONER LLANES ON MARCH
19, 1949 DISAPPROVED THEM FOR THE SECOND
TIME IN VIEW OF THE DIRECTIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES DATED
FEBRUARY 17,1947 AND ON THE GROUND THAT
NAILS WERE CRITICAL CONSTRUCTION ITEMS
WHICH SHOULD BE SOLD TO MANY PEOPLE AS
POSSIBLE ON A BID BASIS: THAT ON OR ABOUT
MARCH 22, 1949 THE SET OF INVOICES OF
BEATRIZ POBLETE JOSE DEL ROSARIO,
EUGENIA ADRIANO AND RUBEN ADRIANO
WERE SUBMITTED FOR THE THIRD TIME BY
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN JOSE C. ZULUETA TO
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
THE SAID ACTING COMMISSIONER LLANES FOR
HIS FURTHER CONSIDERATION; THAT ON THE
OCCASION THE HEREIN ACCUSED AS ACTING
CHAIRMAN. AND ANGEL LLANES, AS ACTING
COMMISSIONER, BOTH OF THE SURPLUS
PROPERTY COMMISSION, CONSPIRED AND
MUTUALLY COOPERATED BY ACTS WITHOUT
WHICH THEY COULD NOT HAVE
ACCOMPLISHED THEIR, ILLEGAL PURPOSE,
AND TO THIS EFFECT, ACTING COMMISSIONER
ANGEL LLANES VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO
APPROVE ALSO SAID INVOICES AT 25 PER CENT
OF PROCUREMENT Cost provided the herein accused
secure first the recommendation of the Sales Manager,
AS HE DID SECURE THE SAME, AFTER WHICH
ON OR ABOUT MARCH 24, 1949, ACTING
COMMISSIONER R. ANGEL LLANES ACTUALLY
APPROVED ALSO SAID INVOICES WITH HIS
INITIALS; THAT IN FURTHERANCE OF SAID
CONSPIRACY, THE ACTING CHAIRMAN, WHO,
OR ABOUT MARCH 29,1949, received ANOTHER
LETTER from the Procurement Office advising that
they were definitely buying 77 tons of surplus nails,
ACCOMPANYING said letter with the NECESSARY
certification of the availability of funds for the purchase;
but fearing that said purchase would defeat their
ultimate interested purpose, did not submit said letter to
the COMMISSION for consideration and action; that on
April 1, 1949 the Acting Chairman issued an order, "for
immediate and strict compliance for the delivery of
3,000 kegs of nails covered by the invoice No. 10248 of
Beatriz Poblete, which was not carried out ON
ACCOUNT OF the opposition of the AUDITOR, AND
DUE TO SAID OPPOSITION THE ACTING
CHAIRMAN AND THE AUDITOR AGREED THAT
NO ACTION ON THE MATTER OF NAILS AND ON
THE INVOICE OF BEATRIZ POBLETE SHALL BE
TAKEN PENDING DECISION OF THE
GOVERNMENT ENTERPRISES COUNCIL; that on
April 2, 1949, the Acting Chairman Jose C. Zulueta had
learned of the advice of Atty. Gregorio Licaros,
Executive Secretary of the Government Enterprises
Council, that deliveries on invoices for nails be
suspended; that anticipating that the formal decision by
the government enterprises council was immediately
Page 109 of 142
PP v CA
forthcoming and would adversely affect the invoice of
Beatriz Poblete AND ITS SISTER INVOICES, as in
fact said decision of the Government Enterprises
Council was rendered and forwarded to the Commission
on April 4, 1949, declaring that "under no circumstances
should sale of nails of any type classification or quantity
be made at less than 100% of procurement cost, and
such sale pending delivery to be cancelled." and that
quantity of nails requisitioned by the Procurement
Office should be reserved, the Acting Chairman,
CONTRARY TO SAID AGREEMENT AND THE
ADVICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY of the
Government Enterprises Council and in order to
consummate the sale IN FAVOR of Beatriz Poblete IN
WHICH HE AND ACTING COMMISSIONER ANGEL
LLANES had become interested, ISSUED A
PEREMPTORY order, to DIFFERENT officers of the
Surplus Property Commission urging complete delivery
of the nails covered by the invoice of Beatriz Poblete,
regardless of tag numbers; that as direct and necessary
consequence of all the aforestated joint actuations of the
herein accused Acting Chairman of the Surplus Property
Commission, and of Commissioner Angel Llanes,
subsequently accused also for malversation of public
property in criminal case No. 11727 of this court,
committed, incurred, and/or carried out in the Cities of
Manila, Rizal and Quezon, the said accused Jose C.
Zulueta, in his capacity as Acting Chairman of the
Surplus Property Commission, and as an accountable
officer and in conspiracy with the aforesaid Acting
Commissioner Angel Llanes did then and there on or
about February 23, 1949, March 24, 1949, April 4, and
5, 1949, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently or at least, through abandonment or
negligence, consent and permit Beatriz Poblete through
her representative Ngo Teck, to appropriate and carry
away, as she did in fact appropriate and take, three
thousand (3,000) kegs of nails from Engineer Depot No.
14, then with a market value of P81,000, for which
public property the herein accused and Acting
Commissioner Angel Llanes, who as a public officers,
were then and are still accountable, to the damage and
prejudice of the Surplus Property Commission, an
agency of the Republic off the Philippines, in the total
amount of twenty-five thousand two hundred pesos
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 110 of 142
SEC 14 PP v CA

(P25,200), including compensating tax, representing

100% of original procurement cost, minus six thousand
three hundred pesos (P6,300) which was paid to the
Surplus Property Commission under the fraudulent guise
of purchase price of the said three thousand (3,000) kegs
of nails.

Contrary to Law.

City of Manila, Philippines, this 14th day of January,

1950.

(Sgd.) PEDRO C. QUINTO

Special Attorney
Office of the Solicitor General
and Special Counsel
appointed by the Secretary of Justice

Footnotes

1 Moran, Comments 3rd E. Vol. I p. 317 citing Torrens

vs. Tomacruz, 499 Phil., 913.

2 U.S. vs. Ipil, 27 Phil., 530; U.S. vs. Remigio, 37 Phil.,

599; U.S. vs. Raymundo, 14 Phil., 416.

Amendment calling for different defense is substantial.

People vs. Sims, 241 N. W. 247; State vs. Walton, 164 S.
W. 211.

3 44 Off. Gaz., p. 45; 77 Phil., 684.


DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
G.R. No. , 121 SCRA 733
EN BANC
DECISION
March 31, 1983
In our resolution of February 25, 1976, the petition for
review filed by petitioners was treated as a Special Civil
Action. It seeks (1) to annul and set aside the decision
and resolution, dated December 18, 1974 and July 11,
1975, respectively, of the Court of Appeals: and, (2) to
sustain in toto the orders, dated January 25, 1974 and
June 15, 1974, of the trial Judge which allowed the
retention of the allegation of conspiracy in reference to
Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 in the informations
filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674; or, in the
alternative, to direct the trial judge to allow the
amendment of the informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
4747 and 4748 so as to include Luiz Padilla and
Magsikap Ongchenco as co-accused of Sixto Ruiz and
to dismiss the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673
and 9674.
As a result of a shooting incident at Sta. Lucia Street,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, on June 5, 1971, two informations
for frustrated homicide were filed against Sixto Ruiz in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal on February 21,
1972. In Criminal Case No. 4747, Ernesto Bello was
named as the victim, while in Criminal Case No. 4748,
Rogelio Bello was the complainant.
Upon arraignment, Sixto Ruiz pleaded "not guilty" to
the two informations in said Criminal Cases Nos. 4747
and 4748. However, a reinvestigation of these two cases
was made in the then Department of Justice, following
which State Prosecutor Lilia C. Lopez filed a motion for
leave of court to amend the informations on the ground
that the evidence disclosed a prima facie case against
Luis Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco who acted in
conspiracy with Sixto Ruiz.
Page 111 of 142
PP v CA
Sixto Ruiz filed his opposition to the motion, while Luis
Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco submitted their
comment.
The trial Judge denied the motion to amend the
information saying that allowance of the amendment
alleging conspiracy would be amending the manner of
committing the crime and thereby would constitute a
substantial amendment.
As a consequence, State Prosecutor Lilia C. Lopez filed
two new informations for frustrated homicide against
Luis Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco (Criminal Cases
Nos. 9673 and 9674) alleging that the two conspired
with Sixto Ruiz who was referred to as the accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748.
Padilla and Ongchenco moved to quash the two new
informations. The motion was denied by the lower court
in its order of January 25, 1974, saying:
[T]he informations in the above-entitled cases state the
names of the accused Luis Padilla and Magsikap
Ongchenco; the offense of frustrated homicide is clearly
designated in each information; the acts or omissions
constituting the offense charged are stated in ordinary
and concise language without repetition sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is charged and for the Court to pronounce proper
judgment; the names and surnames of the persons,
Ernesto Bello and Rogelio Bello, against whom the
offenses were committed are stated in the informations;
and that both offenses were committed on or about the
5th day of June, 1971, in the Municipality of
Mandaluyong, Province of Rizal, Philippines.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion to quash is hereby denied
for lack of merit.
Likewise, Sixto Ruiz filed in said Criminal Cases Nos.
9673 and 9674 a motion to permit to quash and/or strike
out the allegation of conspiracy in the two informations.
The trial Judge, on June 15, 1974, ordered the striking
out from the records the aforesaid motion and clarified
that "the allegation of conspiracy in those cases does not
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
alter the theory of the case, nor does it introduce
innovation nor does it present alternative imputation nor
is it inconsistent with the original allegations. "
From these orders of the lower court, Sixto Ruiz, Luis
Padilla and Magsikap Ongchenco went to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction (CA G.R. No. 03146-SP) alleging that the
trial Judge exceeded his jurisdiction or abused his
judicial discretion in issuing the orders, dated January
25, 1974 and June 15, 1974, in Criminal Cases Nos.
9673 and 9674.
The Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, we hold that the -respondent Judge
exceeded his jurisdiction and/or abused his discretion in
denying the motion of petitioner Sixto Ruiz for
permission to file a motion to strike out the allegation of
conspiracy in the informations filed in Criminal Cases
Nos. 9673 and 9674 (CA Rollo, p. 89), in striking out
from the records the motion of petitioner Sixto Ruiz to
strike out the allegation of conspiracy inserted in the
informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and
9674 (Ibid., p. 93), and in denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Luis Padilla and
Magsikap Ongchenco (Ibid., p. 81).
Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is hereby granted
and the questioned orders of the respondent court dated
January 25, 1974 and June 15, 1974 (Annexes K and Q,
CA Rollo, pp. 76, 107) are partially annulled and set
aside insofar as the petitioner Sixto Ruiz is concerned.
The allegation of conspiracy implicating Sixto Ruiz and
the reference to Criminal Cases Nos. 4748 and 4747 in
the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and
9674, respectively, are hereby ordered deleted and
stricken out of the said informations and records of the
said cases.
The motion for reconsideration filed by herein
petitioners to the foregoing decision, dated December
18, 1974 of the Court of Appeals was denied "for lack of
merit" in its resolution, dated July 11, 1975.
Page 112 of 142
PP v CA
There is merit in this special civil action. The trial Judge
should have allowed the amendment in Criminal Cases
Nos. 4747 and 4748 considering that the amendments
sought were only formal. As aptly stated by the Solicitor
General in his memorandum, "there was no change in
the prosecution's theory that respondent Ruiz wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and shot
with a gun Ernesto and Rogelio Bello ... . The
amendments would not have been prejudicial to him
because his participation as principal in the crime
charged with respondent Ruiz in the original
informations, could not be prejudiced by the proposed
amendments."
In a case (Regala vs. CFI, 77 Phil. 684), the defendant
was charged with murder. After plea, the fiscal presented
an amended information wherein two other persons were
included as co-accused. There was further allegation that
the accused and his co-defendants had conspired and
confederated together and mutually aided one another to
commit the offense charged. The amended information
was admitted, following which the fiscal sought the
discharge of the two other co-defendants in order to
utilize them as prosecution witnesses. The court granted
the discharge. His appeal having been denied as well as
his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
appeal, defendant filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.
It was alleged that the admission of the amendment was
an abuse of discretion. This Court held:
La inclusion de dos acusados y la adicion de las
palabras: 'by conspiring, confederating and helping one
another' en la querella enmendada es una enmienda de
forma. En la primera querella se acusa al recurrente de
autor y en la enmendada de coautor pero su
responsabilidad es la misma en ambas. El cambio solo
se refiere a la forma de ejecucion del delito; pero no a la
sustancia del delito mismo. La forma de ejecucion es
mas bien materia de pruebas y no de algaciones, y los
detalles alegados en la querella enmendada pudieron
haberse probado bajo la querella original.
Otherwise stated, the amendments of Criminal Cases
Nos. 4747 and 4748 would not have prejudiced Ruiz
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 113 of 142
SEC 14 PP v CA

whose participation as principal in the crimes charged
did not change. When the incident was investigated by
the fiscal's office, the respondents were Ruiz, Padilla
and Ongchenco. The fiscal did not include Padilla and
Ongchenco in the two informations because of
"insufficiency of evidence." It was only later when
Francisco Pagcalinawan testified at the reinvestigation
that the participation of Padilla and Ongchenco surfaced
and, as a consequence, there was the need for the
amendment of the informations or the filing of new ones
against the two.
retention of the allegation of conspiracy and the
reference to Criminal Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 in the
informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and
9674, are SUSTAINED.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera Plana, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no part.

The fact that the trial court denied the motion of the Separate Opinions
prosecution to amend the informations in Criminal
Cases Nos. 4747 and 4748 was no bar to the filing of the Separate Opinions
new informations. The allegation in Criminal Cases Nos.
9673 and 9674 filed against Luis Padilla and Magsikap Vasquez, J., concurring:
Ongchenco that the two conspired and confederated with
Sixto Ruiz merely describe the fact that the latter was I concurr in the result. The complications that arose in
already charged with the same offense. It is only a this case could have been avoided if the trial granted, as
reference to the two cases already filed against Ruiz he should have, the motion of Special Prosecutor Lopez
wherein he alone stands as the defendant. It does not to amend the two informations in CC Nos. 4747 and
make Ruiz a co-defendant of Padilla and Ongchenco in 4748 so as to include Padilla and Ongchenco as co-
the two new informations. It is incorrect to say that the accused of Ruiz, and in conspiracy with the latter. The
allegation of conspiracy in Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 effect would be the same as the result upheld in the main
and 9674 include Ruiz as a defendant in the said cases. opinion, if all the cases win be consolidated for joint
In fact, and as aptly observed by the petitioners, the trial.

lower court did not order the arrest of Sixto Ruiz in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674. Padilla and
Ongchenco were the only ones against whom warrants
were issued; nor was he arraigned in said cases. Padilla
and Ongchenco were the only ones arraigned and they
pleaded not guilty.

Thus, inasmuch as Ruiz is not a defendant in Criminal

Cases Nos. 9673 and 9674, he can not file a motion to
quash the same. He has no personality or standing in
said cases and, therefore, it was improper for him to
have filed the motion to quash.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision and resolution, dated

December 18, 1974 and July 11, 1975, respectively, of
the Court of Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE.
Furthermore, the orders of the lower court, dated
January 25, 1974 and June 15, 1974, allowing the
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
EN BANC
DECISION
February 24, 1981
G.R. No. L-30146
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
JOSEPH CASEY alias "Burl" and RICARDO FELIX
alias "CARDING TUWAD", defendants-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:Automatic review of the judgment of
the Circuit Criminal Court in Criminal Case No. CCC-
VI -6 Rizal (1 7857), imposing upon Joseph Casey alias
"Burl" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" the
capital punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. The
dispositive portion thereof, states:
Guerrero, J.:
Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit
Criminal Court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI -6 Rizal
(1 7857), imposing upon Joseph Casey alias "Burl" and
Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" the capital
punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. The
dispositive portion thereof, states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Joseph
Casey alias "Buri" and Ricardo Felix alias "Carding
Tuwad", GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
commission of the crime of Murder, under Article No.
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in an
Information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the
PENALTY OF DEATH, with accessory penalties as
prescribed by law; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased, Alfredo Valdez, in the amount of TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000) PESOS, jointly and severally;
and to pay the costs.
On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito
filed an Information for Murder against accused-
appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging:
Page 114 of 142
PP v CASEY
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the
municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, being then armed with a knife,
together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad"
who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still
at large, and the two of them conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation
and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm
and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon
the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law. 1
On June 24, 1968, upon arraignment, said accused
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said
complaint. Then, sometime in September, 1968, accused
' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was
arrested. Accordingly, an Amended Information was
filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as an
accused, stating as follows:
That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the
municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being
then armed with a knife, together with the accused
Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then
armed with a firearm, and the two of them conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident
premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength, did, then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and
stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez,
thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which
directly caused his death.
Contrary to law. 2
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
On October 15, 1968, accused Ricardo Felix entered the
plea of not guilty upon being arraigned and trial was
accordingly had.
Mercedes Palomo, 28, resident of 242 Mahinhin Street,
San Juan, Rizal, testified that on March 31, 1968, at
around three o'clock in the afternoon, while in the house
of her aunt, she heard a shot coming from the pool room
located near her aunt's place. She then looked towards
the direction of the pool room and saw three men
coming out, one of them being pursued by the two
others. She recognized the man being pursued as Alfredo
Valdez alias "G.I." She, however, did not know the
names of the pursuers but described one of them as a
short man, with curly black hair and black complexion
while the other as having a fair complexion. When asked
as to whether she can Identify them, she answered in the
affirmative and pointed to Joseph Casey and Ricardo
Felix. 3
Continuing her testimony, she said that she saw the one
with curly hair overtake and stab the victim several
times, while in the meantime, Ricardo Felix stood
nearby holding a gun which he later fired once at the
victim. 4
Jose Rivera, 57 years old, a policeman, was presented by
the prosecution to testify on the investigation he
conducted before Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio on April
1, 1968 involving the accused Joseph Casey. He
submitted in evidence the extrajudicial statement of the
said accused, contained in a two page sworn statement
wherein said accused narrated having a rendezvous with
the accused Ricardo Felix and with another person
named Rudy at Cubao Rotonda, Quezon City at about
nine o'clock in the morning of March 31, 1968 and
thereafter proceeding to Barrio Halo-Halo, San Juan,
Rizal at about three o'clock in the afternoon, where the
incident happened. 5
Patrolman Honorio Carritero, 46 years old, also a
policeman, testified that in the afternoon of March 31,
1968. he was awakened by noise that somebody was
stabbed and shot. Upon going out to investigate, he saw
the victim lying down near the toilet with stab wounds
Page 115 of 142
PP v CASEY
but still alive, hovering between life and death. He then
called for a jeep and brought him to a hospital. 6
Finally, Dr. Mariano B. Cueva, 32 years of age, a
physician, was presented to testify on the Necropsy
Report No. 58-425 of Alfredo Valdez, herein quoted as
follows:
Marked paleness of lips, nailbeds, and integument.
Abrasion, 1.5 x 0.7 cm., right scapular region of back,
12.0 cm. from posterior median line.
Stab wounds: (1) 1.1 cm. long, spindle shape, located at
left hypochondriac region of abdomen, 11.0 cm. from
anterior median line, level of 8th intercostal space; long
axis is oriented horizontally, medial extremity sharp,
lateral extremity contused, edges clean-cut and slightly
gaping, with bevelled lower border; attract is directed
backward upward medially, entering abdominal cavity
and perforating along its track the greater momentum,
body of stomach, body of pancreas, and partly severing
the abdominal aorta at the level of 12th thoracic
vertebra; approximate depth, 10.0 cms.
(2) 1.1 cm. long, spindle shape, located at umbilical
region of abdomen, 2.3. cm. to the left of anterior
median line, 6.0 cm. above the level of navel; long axis
oriented horizontally, medial extremity sharp, lateral
extremity contused, edges clean- cut and gaping, with
bevelled lower border; track is directed backward
upward and medially, entering abdominal cavity and
perforating along its track the greater momentum,
pylorus of stomach and body of pancreas; approximate
depth, 10.0 cms.
(3) 1.0 cm. long, spindle shape, located at left infra
scapular region of the back, 8.5 cm. from posterior
median line, level of 9th rib; long axis is oriented
slightly downward and laterally, lateral extremity sharp,
medial extremity contused, edges clean-cut and gaping
with bevelled upper border; track is directed downward
slightly forward and medially taking a deep intra-
muscular route at left posterior lumbar region to a depth
of 9.0 cm.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
(4) 1.2 cm. long, slightly curvilinear in shape, located at
right posterior lumbar region, 8.0 cm. from posterior
lumbar region, 8.0 cm. from posterior median line, 12.0
cm. above iliac crest convexity of wound is directed
upward, medial extremity sharp, lateral extremity
contused, edges clean-cut and gaping, with bevelled
upper border; track is directed downward slightly
forward and laterally, taking a subcutaneous route at
right lateral lumbar region to a depth of 6.5 cm.
Hemoperitoneum - 840 cc.
Hematomas, retroperitoneal, severe, bilateral.
Heart and its big vessels, almost empty of blood.
Brain and other visceral organs, markedly pale.
Stomach, filled with dark fluid and clotted blood about
800 cc. 7
Case of Death: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to stab
wounds of abdomen.
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense
consisted of the testimonies of the two accused. Joseph
Casey, when called to testify on his behalf, admitted
having stabbed the victim, Alfredo Valdez but alleged
that he did so in self-defense. His version of the incident
was that on March 31, 1968, he went to the house of
Ricardo Felix but was told that he was not in. So he
proceeded to the pool room, located around two or three
meters away from the residence of Ricardo Felix. At the
start, he simply witnessed those playing pool and when
they were through, he himself played. While playing, he
accidentally bumped the victim with the pool cue (tako).
He accordingly asked for apoloy but the victim simply
ignored him and left the place immediately. 8
When he was through playing, he went out and saw the
victim waiting for him outside, accompanied by six or
seven persons holding pieces of wood. As the place had
no other exit, he proceeded on his way together with one
person named "Rody." While passing by, the victim
Page 116 of 142
PP v CASEY
suddenly drew a "balisong" and lunged it on him. But he
was able to parry the thrust. He then took hold of the
victim's right hand and grappled with him. In the
process, he successfully wrested the knife from him. He
then used the weapon against him, hitting him about two
or three times. While he was contending with the victim,
the latter's companions joined in and hit him with pieces
of wood, inflicting "gasgas" or abrasions on his back. 9
The other accused, Ricardo Felix, testified that he did
not see Joseph Casey on March 31, 1968. Likewise, he
said that he knew the victim, Alfredo Valdez; that he last
saw him alive in a store on the same day that he was
killed when he was about to leave for Manila; and that
he learned that he was dead when he returned home. 10
On the basis of the aforesaid evidence, the court a quo
rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. It
found that two aggravating circumstances attended the
commission of the crime, namely: employing or taking
advantage of superior strength and evident
premeditation, one of which qualified the killing to
murder. Hence, this automatic review.
The able counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant
raised the following assignments of errors in a well-
prepared brief:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey
on the amended information without arraignment, and in
finding him guilty after such illegal trial.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in holding that the appellants
acted with evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength, and in qualifying the crane committed as
aggravated murder.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in holding that the appellants had
forged a conspiracy to kill the victim, Alfredo Valdez.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in holding that both appellants
were liable for the death of Alfredo Valdez; if any crime
had been committed at all, the only person responsible
therefore was appellant Casey, and, at that, only for
homicide, instead of murder.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in discounting appellant Casey's
defense that he acted in legitimate self-defense.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in discounting the defense of alibi
interposed by appellant Felix.
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Court a quo erred in not acquitting both appellants.
11
We do not find merit in the first assignment of error. The
lack of arraignment under the amended information is
objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly
on the ground that there is a violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the charge against
him. There can be a violation of such right, however,
only when the amendment pertains to matters of
substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced
in the information refer to the inclusion of accused
appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder.
They do not change the nature of the crime against
accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident
premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength are similarly alleged in both
informations. No extenuating circumstance is likewise
alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information
as far as accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of
form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial to his
rights.
Page 117 of 142
PP v CASEY
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the
amendment of an information has been said to be
whether a defense under the information as it originally
stood would be available after the amendment is made,
and whether any evidence defendant might have would
be equally applicable to the information in the one form
as in the other. 12 A look into Our jurisprudence on the
matter shows that an amendment to an information
introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty
thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime
alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge
which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the
accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had
each been held to be one of form and not of substance -
not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not
prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court. 13
We, however, find the second assignment of error of
accused- appellants meritorious. The lower court erred
in its findings and conclusions, herein quoted below, that
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation
and abuse of superior strength attended the commission
of the crime:
In the morning of March 31, 1968, from the evidence on
the record, the two (2) accused, Joseph Casey and
Ricardo Felix, had rendezvous in Cubao, Quezon City,
and planned to kill the victim, Alfredo Valdez. (Evident
premeditation and conspiracy) There was superior
strength that was used because the victim, Alfredo
Valdez, was alone, being pursued by the two accused,
who were both armed. The two accused did not waste
time in planning the killing of the victim on March 31,
1968. They clung to their determination of killing the
victim. From 9:00 o'clock in the morning, they had the
firm conviction and strong determination of killing the
victim up to the time of the execution of their evil
motive. (People vs. Caushi, G. R. No. L16495) 14
Indeed, accused-appellant Joseph Casey gave an
extrajudicial sworn statement that he met accused-
appellant Ricardo Felix and another person named Rudy
in Cubao, Quezon City on that fateful day. However,
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
there is no showing that this meeting was purposely
arranged to plan the killing of the victim. In fact, the
following questions and answers in the said sworn
statement show that there was no preconceived design to
kill the victim:
7. T- Sino ang sinasabi mong binaril at sinaksak mo?
S - Hindi ko po kilala dahil noon ko po lamang nakita
ang nasabing tao.
8. T- Maari mo bang isalaysay ang buong pangyayari?
S - Kami po ay nagkita nila Carding Tuwad at isang
nagngangalang Rody sa Cubao, Quezon City, ng mga
alas 9:00 ng umaga, Marzo 31, 1968, at kami ay nag-
inuman. Matapos kaming mag-inuman, ng mga mag-
aalas 3:00 ng hapon ng araw ding iyon, nagyaya po si
Carding doon sa kanila sa Barrio Halo-Halo, San Juan,
Rizal, at sa paglalakad namin doon sa daang Mahinhin,
San Juan, Rizal, nakita ni Carding ang isang lalaki, at
ang ginawa ay nilapitan niya. Ng makita ng lalaki si
Carding, tumakbo po, at ang ginawa ni Carding ay
kanyang hinabol. 15
The subsequent portions of the said sworn statement
further militate against the existence of evident
premeditation. Thus, when accused-appellant Casey was
asked why Ricardo Felix shot the victim, he answered:
"Noon pong nakasakay na kami sa jeep, tinanong ko
siya kung bakit nangyari ang away na yaon at ang sabi
ni Carding ay. DATI KO NANG NAKAENKWENTRO
YAONG TAO" (Question No. 28). And when asked why
he stabbed the victim, he replied: Dahilan kasama ko po
si Carding kaya ko po nasaksak ang tao. Hindi ko
kusang kagustuhan na saksakin ang tao kung hindi dahil
sa nakasama ko si Carding.
(Question No. 29)
There is evident premeditation when the killing had
been carefully planned by the offender or when he had
previously prepared the means which he had considered
adequate to carry it out, when he had prepared
beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into
Page 118 of 142
PP v CASEY
execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider
and accept the final consequences, and when there had
been a concerted plan. 16 It has also been held that to
appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation, it
is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2)
the act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to
his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time
between the determination and execution to snow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his
conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he
desired to hearken to its warning. 17
From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said
sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was
not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any
reflection or deep thought. It was just a spontaneous
decision reached when the victim started to run away
upon being approached by accused-appellant Ricardo
Felix. Evident premeditation cannot, thus, be considered
in this case. The Solicitor General himself agrees with
the defense that this circumstance has not been duly
proved (People's Brief, p. 8). Hence, the crime
committed is simple homicide (Article 249, Revised
Penal Code).
There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case
charged with the murder of not one victim but
superiority in number does not necessarily mean
superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that the
aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure
advantage from their superiority in strength." 18 In the
case of U.S. vs.. Devela, et al., 19 there were two
accused who were armed with a bolo and a dagger. But
the circumstance of abuse of superiority was not taken
into consideration because the mere fact, according to
this Court, of there being a superiority of number is not
sufficient to bring the case within this provision. There
must be proof of the relative physical strength of the
aggressors and the assaulted party; 20 or proof that the
accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. 21 As
likewise held in People vs. Trumata and Baligasa, 22 the
mere fact that the two accused may have inflicted fatal
wounds on the deceased with their respective bolos does
not justify a finding that advantage was taken of superior
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
strength in the absence of proof showing that they
cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from
their superiority of strength.
Thus, in the face of the evidence on record showing that
although the victim was pursued by both of the accused-
appellants 23 and that he was unarmed 24 while the
accused-appellants were both armed, one with a gun and
the other with a long pointed weapon, 25 since it is also
duly proved that it was only accused-appellant Casey
who assaulted and inflicted stab wounds on him as the
other accused-appellant merely stood nearby toying with
his gun, abuse of superiority cannot be said to have
attended the commission of the crime.
The third essential issue to be resolved is whether or not
there is conspiracy between the two accused in the
commission of the crime. Conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 26 This
agreement need not be in writing or be expressly
manifested. 27 It is sufficient that there is a mutual
implied understanding between the malefactors as
shown by their concerted action towards the fulfillment
of the same objective. In People v. Cadag, 28 it was
held: "Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement
for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence; from
the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of
the commission of the offense, the accused had the same
purpose and were united in its execution." To the same
effect is the ruling in other cases decided by this Court.
29
Pursuant to this uniform and consistent jurisprudence on
the existence of conspiracy by the mere proof of
community of design and purpose on the part of the
accused, We hold that conspiracy exists in this case,
True enough that there is no direct showing that the
accused had conspired together, but their acts and the
attendant circumstances disclose that common motive
that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal
with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he
performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. In
People vs. Peralta, 30 it was held that such overt act may
consist in actively participating in the actual commission
Page 119 of 142
PP v CASEY
of the crime, in lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime,
or in exerting moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators as to move them to executing the
conspiracy. In the case at bar, Ricardo Felix's overt acts
consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in
firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph Casey
encouragement by his armed presence while the latter
inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased.
From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-
appellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that
Ricardo Felix was the moving factor of the evil act
perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it
was Joseph Casey who inflicted the mortal wounds that
caused the death of the victim, he did so out of his
perverted sense of friendship or companionship with
Ricardo Felix.
Hence, it would be incongruous to acquit Ricardo Felix
and put all the blame of the killing on Joseph Casey
when it was the latter who merely joined the former in
his criminal resolution. The fact that he did nothing but
toyed with his gun when Joseph Casey successively
stabbed the victim means that he concurred with the
wife of Casey to do away with the victim. For this
reason, he should also be held accountable,
notwithstanding the fact that his shot did not hit the
victim and that the cause of death of the victim is the
stab wounds inflicted by Casey. In People vs. Peralta, 31
it was held that the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of
each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime.
The above discussion also disposes of the fourth
assignment of error of accused-appellants. So We
proceed with the fifth assignment of error.
We find that the respondent court correctly disregarded
Joseph Casey's claim of self-defense. Besides being
unworthy of credence, said claim is uncorroborated and
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 14
contrary to the testimony of the eyewitness, Mercedes
Palomo.
The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds
while the accused complained merely of abrasions on
his back indicates the falsity of the claim. The accused
failed to present a medical certificate for the bruises he
allegedly sustained. He likewise failed to present
anybody to attest to the truth of his allegations. There is
no clear and convincing evidence that the elements of
self-defense are present. On the other hand, the
prosecution had not only one but several eyewitnesses to
the crime as shown by the different affidavits attached to
the records of the case. Although only one of the
eyewitnesses was presented in court, her lone testimony
on what actually transpired, negating the claim of self-
defense, is more credible than the version of Joseph
Casey. Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself. Human perception can be warped by
the impact the events and testimony colored by the
unconscious workings of the mind. No better test has yet
been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony
than its conformity to the knowledge and common
experience of mankind. 32
We likewise find that respondent court correctly denied
the defense of alibi of Ricardo Felix. Alibi, in order to be
given full faith and credit must be clearly established
and must not leave any room for doubt as to its
plausibility and verity. 33 In the case at bar, said
accused-appellant failed to show clearly and
convincingly that he was at some other place about the
time of the alleged crime. He merely said that he was at
home and that he went to Manila. 34 As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, he did not even specify the exact
place at Manila where he had gone and the purpose for
going there. Then, while said defense was corroborated
by Joseph Casey, the latter's testimony lacks that
character of trustworthiness since it is very apparent that
he was merely attempting to assume full and exclusive
responsibility for the crime. Finally, said defense is
unavailing when there is positive Identification.
Prosecution witness, Mercedes Palomo, gave distinct
attributes of Ricardo Felix in her sworn statement that
Page 120 of 142
PP v CASEY
leave no iota of doubt that he was one of the perpetrators
of the crime.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court under
automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-
appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
without any attending circumstances and should be
sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period.
But applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of
the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The accused are likewise
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfredo
Valdez in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P12,000.00) jointly and severally, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Fernando, CJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting.
I agree with the Solicitor General that the crime
committed is murder qualified by abuse of superiority.
The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.
Makasiar, J., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The trial court correctly convicted the accused for the
crime of murder, the killing having been attended by the
qualifying circumstance of superior strength. The fact
that the two accused pursued and overpowered their
victim and one of them, Casey, inflicted several fatal
stab wounds on the victim's abdomen while the other,
Felix, stood nearby with a gun clearly shows the
accused's abuse of superiority which insured impunity
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 121 of 142
SEC 14 PP v CASEY

and weakened any defense on the part of the victim. The

murder having been committed without any attending
circumstances, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

Makasiar, J., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting.

I agree with the Solicitor General that the crime

committed is murder qualified by abuse of superiority.
The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Makasiar, J., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

The trial court correctly convicted the accused for the

crime of murder, the killing having been attended by the
qualifying circumstance of superior strength. The fact
that the two accused pursued and overpowered their
victim and one of them, Casey, inflicted several fatal
stab wounds on the victim's abdomen while the other,
Felix, stood nearby with a gun clearly shows the
accused's abuse of superiority which insured impunity
and weakened any defense on the part of the victim. The
murder having been committed without any attending
circumstances, the proper imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua.

Makasiar, J., concur.


DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 GANCHERO v BELLOSILLO
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26340 June 30, 1969
JESUS GANCHERO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANACLETO BELLOSILLO in his capacity as
Judge of CFI of Iloilo, etc., respondents.
Jose Zambarrano and German M. Lopez for petitioner.
Judge Anacleto Bellosillo in his own behalf as
respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Petition for a writ of certiorari quash and set aside, for
lack of jurisdiction, an order of respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo, in its Case No. 11189,
denying a motion to quash and dismiss an information
for bigamy, and directing the trial to proceed.
Petitioner Jesus Ganchero was charged in the said Court
of First Instance, presided over by respondent Judge,
Hon. Anacleto Bellosillo, with the crime of bigamy
committed, according to the information, 1 in the
following manner:
That on or about the period covered from 6 June 1963 to
6 February 1965, inclusive, in the City of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court,
said accused entered into a contract of marriage with
Erlinda Soquatoso before the Municipal Judge of the
City of Iloilo and while the said marriage was still
existing and valid said accused, with bad faith and
fraudulent intent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and criminally contracted (sic) a second marriage with
Alita Aranjuez, his second wife, before the Parish Priest
of Sto. Niño Church, Mabini, Davao, knowing fully well
that his first marriage to his first wife, Erlinda
Soquatoso, who is still living contracted on such a date
at the City of Iloilo has not been legally dissolved, but
existing.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Page 122 of 142
The accused moved to dismiss the charge, "on the
ground that this Court hasno jurisdiction over the same,
inasmuch as the venue of action is
improperlylaid" (Petition Annex B). Counsel for the
accused argued that on the face ofthe information of the
crime of bigamy was committed in the province of
Davao, where the second marriage took place, and that
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo has no jurisdiction to
try the accused, because in criminal proceedings
improper venue is lack of jurisdiction. The Judge below
denied the motion to dismiss, and also the subsequent
plea for reconsideration filed by the accused. In view of
the court's adamant stand, the accused resorted to this
Court.
The answer avers that the crime charged is triable in
Iloilo, because one ofthe essential ingridients of the
crime, the prior marriage of the accused, had taken place
in Iloilo. This the accused disputes.1awphil.nêt
The writ must be granted. The rule laid down by this
Court is that where crimes "committed partly in one
province and partly in onother, that is tosay, where some
acts material and essential to the crime, and requisite
toits consummation, occur in one province and some in
another, are triable ineither province." 2 This means that
to make the offense triable in more thanone province the
acts perpetrated in any one of them must be impelled by
thesame criminal purpose or aim. In Peo. vs. Zapata and
Bondoc, 88 Phil. 691,this Court stated:
The notion of concept of continuous crime has its origin
in the juridicial fiction favorable to the law transgressors
and in many a case against the interest of society (Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, p. 521). For it toexist
there should be plurality of acts performed separately
during a periodof time; unity of penal provision
infringed upon or violated; and unity ofcriminal intent or
purpose, which means that two or more violations of
thesame penal provision are united in one and the same
intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purposes or aim (Ibid., page 520).
———————————
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 123 of 142
SEC 15 GANCHERO v BELLOSILLO

Bigamy being defined by Article 349 as the contracting 2U.S. vs. Santiago, 27 Phil. 411.
"of a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent 3Rule 110, section 14(a), Revised Rules of Court.
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceeding," it is
self-evident that the place where the first marriage was
celebrated is immaterial to the criminal act, intent and
responsibility of the accused. What is essential is that
thefirst marriage be not legally terminated, actually or
by legal presumption, when the subsequent wedlock
takes place; and it is upon the celebration of that
subsequent marriage that bigamy is committed, not
before. The continued existence of the first marriage is
without definite locus.

To hold with the trial court that the celebration of the

first marriage was an essential ingredient of the bigamy
is to assume that when the petitionermarried his first
wife he did so with intent already to marry his second
consort; and there is nothing on record to warrant such
assumption.

Since the second marriage of the accused occurred in

Davao, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
respondent court, and in all criminal prosecutions the
action must be instituted and tried in the municipality or
province where the offense or any of its essential
ingredients was committed, 3 the Court of First Instance
for the Province of Iloilo is devoid of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the crime charged.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is granted, the order

denying the quashing of the information is set aside, and
the case ordered dismissed. The preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,

Fernando, Capistrano, Techankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1Petition, Annex A.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
EN BANC
DECISION
November 26, 1970
G.R. No. L-32282-83 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. MARIO J. GUTIERREZ, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur, CAMILO PILOTIN,
FRANCISCO PIANO, DELFIN PIANO PEDRO
PATAO, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, CAMILO PIANO,
CAMILO PATAO, PEDRING PIANO, ISIDRO
PUGAL, ANTONIO TABULDO, LORENZO
PERALTA, VENANCIO PACLEB ANTONIO PIANO,
FERMIN PUGAL, CARLITO PUGAL, FLOR PIANO,
ERNING ABANO and EIGHTY-TWO (82) JOHN
DOES, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio,
Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco,
Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya and Special Attorney Juan
A. Sison for petitioners. Adaza, Adaza and Adaza for
respondent Erning Abano.
, J.:
Petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, with
preliminary injunction, filed by the Solicitor General
and State Prosecutors, to annul and set aside the order of
Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance
of Ilocos Sur (respondent herein), dated 20 July 1970,
denying the prosecution's urgent motion to transfer
Criminal Case Nos. 47-V and 48-V of said Court of First
Instance, entitled "People vs. Pilotin, et al.," to the
Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District; to
direct the respondent Judge to effectuate such transfer;
and to restrain the trial of the cases aforesaid in the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, sitting in Vigan,
capital of the province.
In the morning of 22 May 1970, a group of armed
persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of
Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various
inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same
Page 124 of 142
day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and
province, several residential houses were likewise
burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of
various houses and in the death of an old woman named
Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities,
the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors
assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate
with him, on 10 June 1970 filed in the Court of First
Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations
(Criminal Cases 47-V for arson with homicide and 48-V
for arson) charging that the seventeen private
respondents herein, together with 82 other unidentified
persons, "confederating, conspiring, confabulating and
helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously burn or cause to be burned
several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be
occupied" and belonging to certain persons named in the
filed informations in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro,
Bantay, Ilocos Sur (Petition, Annexes B and B-1).
Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo
furnished bail, and on 15 June 1970 voluntarily appeared
before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned and
pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for 27, 28 and 29
July 1970.
It appears that on the same day, 15 June, the Secretary of
Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing
Judge Lino Anover, of the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District, with official station at San
Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur,
from and after 1 July 1970. Three days thereafter, on 18
June 1970, the Secretary further issued Administrative
Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to
transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the
Circuit Criminal Court, "in the interest of justice and
pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by
Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274" of the
Department of Justice.
On 22 June 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent
judge for a transfer of cases 47-V and 48-V to the
Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the Administrative
Orders just mentioned and calling attention to the
circumstance that they were issued at the instance of the
witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for
reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their
affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed such
transfer, and on 20 July 1970, the respondent judge
declined the transfer sought, on the ground that
Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer
of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest
of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of
the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had
already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed
transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue
from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic
Act No. 5179 the same should have been done right at
the very inception of these cases.
In view of the lower court's denial of the motion to
transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the
prosecution resorted to Us for writs of certiorari and
mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying
this Court to set aside the order of denial of the transfer
and to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to
remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the
Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter
to try the cases (47-V and 48-V) at either San Fernando,
La Union, or Baguio City.
Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of
discretion in view of the fact that the Administrative
Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but
did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in
question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise
denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer.
At petitioners' request this Court enjoined the
respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the
trial of the cases until further orders.
We agree with respondents that the present laws do not
confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine
what court should hear specific cases. Any such power,
even in the guise of administrative regulation of
executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored
separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while
not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it
would endanger the rights and immunities of the
Page 125 of 142
accused or civil party. It could be much too easily
transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome
of individual cases, so as to produce a result in harmony
with the Administration's preferences. The creation by
Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts
for the purpose of alleviating the burden of the regular
Courts of First Instance, and to accelerate the disposition
of criminal cases pending or to be filed therein, nowhere
indicates an intent to permit the transfer of preselected
individual cases to the circuit courts. Neither do
Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 evidence any
such intention; particularly since Administrative Order
No. 258, Series of 1968, in Section 2 of its Part V, as
confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274 of the same
year, in Section 3 of Part III thereof, provides that the
transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in
the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by
raffle, chance here operating to nullify any executive
arbitration of what particular cases should be
apportioned to either tribunal. The very terms of
Administrative Order No. 226, issued on 18 June 1970
by Secretary of Justice Makasiar, relied upon by the
petitioners, in merely authorizing, and not directing,
Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur to transfer Criminal Cases Nos.
44-V and 47-V (People vs. Pilotin, et al.) to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, reveals
that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety
of imperatively directing transfer of specified cases.
Respondent Judge Gutierrez, therefore in construing
Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not
mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and
violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders
heretofore mentioned.
It is unfortunate, however, that in refusing to consider
Department Administrative Order No. 226 of the
Secretary of Justice as mandatory respondent Judge
Gutierrez failed to act upon the contention of the
prosecuting officers that the cases against private
respondents herein should be transferred to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District because a
miscarriage of justice was impending, in view of the
refusal of the prosecution witnesses to testify in the
court sitting in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where they felt their
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15
lives would be endangered. This claim was buttressed by
the affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution
witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to
testify in cases 47-V and 48-V and expressing their
willingness to testify if the cases are heard outside of
Ilocos Sur, where they can be free from tension and
terrorism (Petition, Annex J). The fear thus expressed
can not be considered fanciful and unfounded when
account is taken of the circumstances that the
informations filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Sur show that of the one hundred armed participants in
the burning of the houses at barrios Ora Este and Ora
Centro, Municipality of Bantay, some eighty-two (82)
are still unidentified and at large; that one of the
accused, private respondent Vincent Crisologo, belongs
to an influential family in the province, being
concededly the son of the Congressman for the first
district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor that the
reluctant witnesses are themselves the complainants in
the criminal cases, and, therefore, have reasons to fear
that attempts will be made to silence them; that it is not
shown that the Executive branch is able or willing to
give these witnesses full security during the trial and for
a reasonable time thereafter, that even if armed security
escorts were to be provided, the same would be no
guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault
against the affiant witnesses, as recent events have
proved; that Constabulary reports (Annex H) show that
between 1 January and 31 May 1970 no less than 78
murders have been reported committed in said province,
of which number only 21 were solved; and, finally, that
the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge
Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the
Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial District,
Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and
Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent
Crisologo (Annexes H, H-1, and K to N-2 to petitioner's
supplemental memorandum).
This just refusal to testify in Ilocos Sur manifested by
the complaining witnesses, who had on a previous
occasion freely given evidence before the investigators
in Manila, renders manifest the imperious necessity of
transferring the place of trial to a site outside of Ilocos
Sur, if the cases are to be judicially inquired into
Page 126 of 142
PP VS GUTIERREZ
conformably to the interest of truth and justice and the
State is to be given a fair chance to present its side of the
case.
The respondents vigorously contend that a transfer of
the trial site can not be made, because it is a long
standing rule of criminal procedure in these Islands that
one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in
the jurisdiction where the crime is committed, for the
reason pointed out in U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376,
and People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665, that the
jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance in the
Philippines is limited to certain well-defined territory
and they can not take jurisdiction of persons charged
with one offense committed outside of that limited
territory, and they invoke Rule 110, Section 14 (a), of
the Revised Rules of Court providing that "in all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein
the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredient thereof took place."
It is well to note that this Court has explained in Beltran
vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150, that the purpose of the rule
invoked by accused respondents herein was "not to
compel the defendant to move to and appear in a
different court from that of the province where the crime
was committed, as it would cause him great
inconvenience in looking for his witnesses and other
evidence in another place." Where the convenience of
the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, as in
the case at bar, it is but logical that the court should have
power to decide where the balance of convenience or
inconvenience lies, and to determine the most suitable
place of the trial according to the exigencies of truth and
impartial justice.
In the particular case before Us, to compel the
prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its
witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know
is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to
betray the very purpose for which courts have been
established. Since the rigorous application of the general
principle of Rule 110, Section 14 (a), would result here
in preventing a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
facts of the case, it must be admitted that the exigencies
of justice demand that the general rule relied upon by
accused respondents should yield to occasional
exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor.
Otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the
highest injustice - "summum jus, summa in juria."
The respondents accused can not complain that to
transfer the trial to a site where the prosecution's
witnesses can feel free to reveal what they know would
be equivalent to railroading them into a conviction.
Because regardless of the place where its evidence is to
be heard, the prosecution will be always obligated to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The scales of justice clearly lean in favor of the
prosecution being given full opportunity to lay its case
before a proper arbiter: for a dismissal of the charges for
lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can
neither challenge nor appeal.
We must thus reject the idea that our courts, faced by an
impasse of the kind now before Us, are to confess
themselves impotent to further the cause of justice. The
Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the
Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be
established by law (Article VIII, Section 13), and such
judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent
attributes reasonably necessary for an effective
administration of justice. The courts "can by appropriate
means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain
every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective
institution of government" (Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41
Phil. 322).
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is
that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to
another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever
the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of
preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This
authority was early recognized in England as inhering in
the courts of justice even prior to the eighteenth century.
The opinion in Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior
Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067, has shown
how the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, in Rex
vs. Cowle (Eng.) 2 Burr 834, decided in 1759, said that,
Page 127 of 142
in this respect, "the law is clear and uniform as far back
as it can be traced."
And in Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507, the question
was fully discussed, and all the judges appear to have
agreed as to the power of the court, Cramption, Jr.,
saying at page 525:
There is another common-law right, equally open to
defendants and prosecutors, ... that where it appears that
either party cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in the
proper county, then this court ... has jurisdiction to take
the case out of the proper county, as it is called, and to
bring it into an indifferent county ... This jurisdiction to
change the venue ... has been exercised by this court
from a very early period. We have reported cases, where
the doctrine is laid down in emphatic language; we have
the practice of the Court of Queen's Bench in England
independently of any practice of our own court ... The
general jurisdiction of the court, in a proper case, to
change the venue from one county to any other, cannot
be the subject of doubt.
This power to transfer trial of criminal cases in
furtherance of justice, exercised through writs of
certiorari, has, according to the weight of authority,
passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American
Union. 1 In Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H.
428, at page 436, it was held that the power to transfer
the place of holding trials -
became thoroughly engrafted upon the common law,
long before the independence of this country; and from
that time forth, not only has the practice prevailed in the
courts of England, but the power is now exercised by the
Courts of very many if not all of our states, either by
force of express statute or the adoption of the common
law in the jurisprudence of the same.
That such inherent powers are likewise possessed by the
Philippine courts admits of no doubt, because they were
organized on the American pattern with the enactment of
the first judicial organic law, Act 136, on 11 June 1901,
by the Philippine Commission, then composed by a
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15
majority of able American lawyers, fully familiar with
the institutions and traditions of the common law.
In Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333, this
Court stated:
And it is safe to say that in every volume of the
Philippine Reports, numbers of cases might be cited
wherein recourse has been had to the rules, principles
and doctrines of the common law in ascertaining the true
meaning and scope of the legislation enacted in and for
the Philippine Islands since they passed under American
sovereignty.
Among the earliest measures of the Philippine
Commission, after the establishment of Civil
Government under American sovereignty, was the
enactment on June 11, 1901, of Act No. 136, "An Act
providing for the organization of courts in the Philippine
Islands." This Act in express terms abolished the then
existing Audiencia or Supreme Court and Courts of First
Instance, and substituted in their place the courts
provided therein. It sets out in general terms the
jurisdiction, duties, privileges, and powers of the new
courts and their judges. The majority of the members of
the body which enacted it were able American lawyers.
The spirit with which it is informed, and indeed its very
language and terminology would be unintelligible
without some knowledge of the judicial systems of
England and the United States. Its manifest purpose and
object was to replace the old judicial system, with its
incidents and traditions drawn from Spanish sources,
with a new system modeled in all its essential
characteristics upon the judicial systems of the United
States. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that any incident
of the former system which conflicts with the essential
principles and settled doctrines on which the new system
rests, must be held to be abrogated by the law organizing
the new system.
While not expressly conferred by Act 136, We find it
difficult to believe that the framers' intent was to deny,
by silence, to the Philippine Courts, and particularly
upon this Supreme Court, the inherent jurisdiction
possessed by the English and American courts under
Page 128 of 142
PP VS GUTIERREZ
their common law heritage to transfer the place of trial
of cases in order to secure and promote the ends of
justice, by providing fair and impartial inquiry and
adjudication.
Like the exemption of judges of courts of superior or
general authority from liability in a civil action for acts
done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions,
upheld in the Alzua case as essentially inherent in the
courts established by Act 136, even if not expressly
provided for, the power to transfer the place of trials
when so demanded by the interest of justice is equally
essential and possesses no inferior rank. To it apply,
mutatis mutandis, the words of this Court in the Alzua
case just cited:
The grounds of public policy and the reasoning upon
which the doctrine is based are not less forceful and
imperative in these Islands than in the countries from
which the new judicial system was borrowed; and an
examination of the reasons assigned ... leaves no room
for doubt that a failure to recognize it as an incident to
the new judicial system would materially impair its
usefulness and tend very strongly to defeat the ends for
which it was established. (21 Phil. 333-334)
Not only has there been since then no proof of any
specific pronouncement, by Constitution or Congress,
against the exercise by our Courts of the power
discussed heretofore: on the contrary, the law
establishing the Circuit Criminal Courts, Republic Act
No. 5179, in its Section 4, provides express legislative
recognition of its existence:
SEC. 4. The Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions
anywhere within their respective districts: Provided,
however, that cases shall be heard within the province
where the crime subject of the offense was committed.
And provided further, that when the interest of justice so
demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court,
cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the
district ... (Emphasis supplied)
Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been
satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in question
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15
with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which
province the offenses charged were committed,
according to the informations; since the holding of the
trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue,
rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and
justice can not be subserved by compelling the
prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in
Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty
reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the
respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively
denied the motion to have the case transferred to another
court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial
power possessed by it under the Constitution and the
statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and
48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in
San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier
available date. This arrangement would have the
advantage that the same trial judge could later be
authorized to hear the defense witnesses in Vigan, if
circumstances so demanded. Furthermore, the
adjudication of the case by a judge other than respondent
Gutierrez, if resulting in acquittal, would remove any
doubt or suspicion that the same was in any way
influenced by the trial Judge's being beholden to the
Crisologo family.
The solution thus adopted is in harmony with the ideals
set by this Court in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney
General, 20 Phil. 523, where We said:
... The most perfect procedure that can be devised is that
which gives opportunity for the most complete and
perfect exercise of the powers of the court within the
limitations set by natural justice. It is that one which, in
other words, gives the most perfect opportunity for the
powers of the court to transmute themselves into
concrete acts of justice between the parties before it. The
purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter but to
give it effective facility in righteous action.
It may be said in passing that the most salient objection
which can be urged against procedure today is that it so
restricts the exercise of the court's power by
Page 129 of 142
PP VS GUTIERREZ
technicalities that part of its authority effective for
justice between the parties is many times in
inconsiderable portion of the whole. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties. It was created not to hinder and
delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which
courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is
designed as the means best adapted to obtain that thing.
In other words, it is a means to an end. It is the means by
which the powers of the court are made effective in just
judgments. When it loses the character of the one and
takes on that of the other the administration of justice
becomes incomplete and unsatisfactory and lays itself
open to grave criticism. (Manila Railroad Co. v.
Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 [1911]. Emphasis
and paragraphing supplied.)
In resume, this Court holds, and so rules:
(1) That Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit
Criminal Courts did not, and does not, authorize the
Secretary of Justice to transfer thereto specified and
individual cases;
(2) That this Supreme Court, in the exercise of the
Judicial Power vested by the Constitution upon it and
other statutory Courts, possesses inherent power and
jurisdiction to decree that the trial and disposition of a
case pending in a Court of First Instance be transferred
to another Court of First Instance within the same
district whenever the interest of justice and truth so
demand, and there are serious and weighty reasons to
believe that a trial by the court that originally had
jurisdiction over the case would not result in a fair and
impartial trial and lead to a miscarriage of justice.
(3) That in the present case there are sufficient and
adequate reasons for the transfer of the hearing of
Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District, in the interest of truth and
justice.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writs of certiorari
and mandamus prayed for are granted; the order of the
respondent Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, dated
20 July 1970, is sustained in so far as it holds that the
Administrative Order No. 221 of the Department of
Justice is not mandatory, but only directory;
nevertheless, said order is declared in grave abuse of
discretion and set aside in so far as it declines to transfer
the trial of its cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to another court
within the district; and said respondent Court is
accordingly directed and ordered to remand the two
criminal cases aforesaid to the Circuit Criminal Court of
the Second Judicial District for hearing of the evidence
for the prosecution either in Baguio or San Fernando, La
Union, at the earliest available date, and such other
proceedings as the Circuit Criminal Court may
determine in the interest of justice.
The accused are required to file bail bonds to answer for
their appearance at the trial and sentence by the Circuit
Criminal Court for the Second Judicial District, in the
same amount, and under the same terms and conditions
as their present bail bonds, which will be replaced by
those herein ordered, all within fifteen (15) days from
finality of this decision.
No special pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., took no part.
Villamor, J., reserves his vote.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes renders crystal-clear why the decision reached by
this Court should be what it is. It is a manifestation of
the jurist's art at its most exemplary. It belies the belief
not infrequently given utterance that hard cases make
Page 130 of 142
bad law. The problem before us is unique and
unprecedented as far as our previous decisions go. It
calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences
and far-flung in its implications. Fortunately for the
administration of justice according to law, there is the
recognition of power vested in this Court, in the past
perhaps only imperfectly discerned but nonetheless in
existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do so.
This is one such occasion. Even without resort then to
precedents coming from jurisdictions after which our
judicial system was patterned, the same result would
have been reached. For only thus, to paraphrase
Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of
the judicial process assert themselves.
The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for
assent, which I readily yield. Nor does it seem
inappropriate if it be stressed that the conclusion reached
by the Court is solidly buttressed not only in law as
history but likewise in law as logic and as social control.
Hence this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will
afford me the opportunity to give expression to the view
that the Constitution and the proceedings in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934-1935 point
unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the sole
body vested with judicial power by the fundamental law
itself is not devoid of supervisory authority over inferior
courts. Necessarily the prerogative to transfer the venue
of criminal prosecutions whenever there is a persuasive
showing that there would be a failure of justice is therein
included. On such an assumption, I do not feel called
upon to inquire into any asserted authority, even if
denominated administrative, of an alter ego of the
Executive, the Secretary of Justice, over the lower
courts. For my belief gets stronger with the years that it
would be difficult to assert that such a competence, even
as thus limited, is warranted under a Constitution based
on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily
committed to the principle of judicial independence.
1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial
power to this Court and to such inferior courts as may be
established by law. 1 Thus is conferred the authority to
decide cases through the ascertainment of facts and the
application of the law, involving many a time its
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
interpretation. 2It connotes, in the language of the
decision, "the imperative of securing a fair and impartial
trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. ...."
3Where, as this did develop in this case, there is more
than a probability of an impasse with the witnesses for
the prosecution displaying the utmost reluctance to
testify if the trial would be held in Vigan, entailing the
risk that there be, again in the language of the opinion,
"a mockery of the judicial process." 4it would appear
undeniable, and we have so held today, that this Court is
not to be denied the necessary competence to set matters
right. It is not to fold its hands as if in helpless
submission to a binding decree of Providence but must
meet the problem squarely, possessed of power adequate
to cope with such an exigency. In the same way that the
two other coordinate departments, the Executive and
Congress, being constitutional organs, can rely on the
fundamental law to justify the exercise of certain
prerogatives, 5 so may this Court, the only constitutional
court, exercise supervision over all other judicial
agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately
termed by the Constitution as inferior courts.
There would be a void in the framework of government
thus established if there is no official body of a higher
rank that can take the necessary steps to avoid a
frustration of the exercise of judicial power. It is my firm
conviction that neither the Presidency nor Congress can
rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus,
then the doctrine of separation of powers becomes a
myth. Such an approach necessarily and logically
compel the conclusion that the so called administrative
supervision exercised by the Secretary of Justice is, to
put it at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as
to its constitutionality.
There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this
case as is so aptly demonstrated in the opinion of the
Court. What appears to me undisputed is that where the
question partakes of a judicial character, only this Court
can perform that function and trace its source to the
Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from
the reproach that a situation is left unprovided for. What
is more, it assures the utmost respect for the principle
that like the other two coordinate and co-equal branches,
Page 131 of 142
Court is likewise the recipient of power conferred by the
Constitution itself. 6
2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical
jurisprudence of law as logic. If the matter be viewed
from the approach found congenial by sociological
jurists, law as one of the most effective forms of social
control, the same conclusion appears to be inescapable.
This is to examine legal institutions in terms of how they
function. It certainly would be a blot on the
administration of justice if by the reluctance of
witnesses to testify, based on what they consider to be a
feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the
circumstances as having no basis in reason, no trial
could be had of a criminal case. It is a matter of great
public interest that crime should not go unpunished. Of
course, it is equally important that the rights of whoever
is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an
impasse is likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom
of a breakdown in the orderly legal processes, the loss of
public confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable.
That is an eventuality which at all pains must be
avoided. The only question is how. If the legal doctrine
and principles, which under the system of legal norms
followed must be grounded in the Constitution itself do
not recognize such a competence in this Court, then for
some all may well be lost.
It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not
entirely without basis, that the two other branches of the
government cannot escape political considerations, to
assume that either Congress or the Executive can be
trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would it do
to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts,
unless whatever is decided by them is subject to
correction and review by the only constitutional court,
certainly vested with the needed supervisory authority. It
would thus appear, if a breakdown in the legal system is
to be averted, that the power of this Court is undeniable.
There would seem to be no other way to avoid a serious
disruption in the legal order.
The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a
full concurrence with what has been so persuasively and
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
ably put forth in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes.
December 5, 1970
BARREDO, J., concurring:
The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the
unerring logic of the resolution of the various facets of
this case evidence in the main opinion written by our
erudite colleague Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes could not but
impel the unanimous assent given thereto by the
members of this Court. Indeed, I could give the best
evidence of my full concurrence therein by merely
signing the same without this separate opinion. I feel,
however, that the impact of this decision is of such
transcendental importance to the administration of
justice in this country, particularly now when some
sectors of our people make no secret of lingering doubts
as to the fairness and impartiality by judicial actuations
and decisions, that my duty as a member of this highest
tribunal of the land calls for more than just the giving of
my vote in favor thereof. I consider it incumbent upon
me, since none of my brethren seems to be minded to do
it, to project more emphatically certain relevant matters,
the significance of which should go hand in hand with
the resolution of the case itself.
I can neither control nor conceal the feeling of full
satisfaction that overwhelms me now, because I consider
this decision as probably the first one of national
importance, in a long time, that will receive universal
and unqualified approval throughout the length and
breath of this Republic. I am sure it will yield for our
constitutional government as a whole and for the
judiciary in particular a rich harvest of regained trust and
confidence in the administration of justice. This decision
is a great leap forward. We are shaking away from a
long standing jurisprudential rule; We are casting aside
technical procedural roadblocks; We are here and now
proclaiming to all and sundry the plenitude, under the
Constitution, of Our power and authority to "insure to
(our people) and their posterity, the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice" (Preamble of
the Constitution) by holding that the "judicial power ...
Page 132 of 142
vested in ... (the) Supreme Court" necessarily carries
with it the power to lay down procedures that will
effectively and fully guarantee, as far as it is humanly
possible to do so, that substantial justice shall not be
defeated thru technicalities of procedure; and what is
most important today, as I view it, is that this is one
decision the essence of which spells simple justice that
will be plainly understood by the common man. In the
clearest terms, this Court holds in effect in this decision
that inspite of the traditional rule that a person charged
with an offense may not be tried in a province outside of
the one ill which the alleged offense or any essential
ingredient thereof has been committed, it is the duty of
the corresponding trial court, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, to see to it that when the demands of
justice require it, the venue is moved to another province
wherein the circumstantial environment will insure a full
disclosure of all material facts essential in the pursuit of
truth and justice. Surely, the common man would not
understand why the Supreme Court in whom the totality
of judicial power is vested by the Constitution would not
have the authority and the right, nay the duty, to prevent
a trial from being held in a place where it would be
nothing more than a farce and an empty show, the final
chapter of which may have already been prewritten,
even independently of the honesty and integrity of the
presiding judge, because of external factors and forces
that impede the witnesses from making a free and
fearless exposition of what they know. I am exceedingly
happy that by this decision, the common man will
understand that neither the Constitution nor this Court
will ever be found wanting in what is needed top render
justice in its truest sense.
Now, for some views of my own on the specific legal
issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. The
problem revolves around the power of the Secretary of
the Department of Justice vis-a-vis the operation of the
Circuit Criminal Courts created by Republic Act 5179.
The People contends that by Administrative Order 258
and 271, Series of 1968 and Administrative Order No.
226, Series of 1970, of the Secretary of Justice, issued
pursuant allegedly to Republic Act 5179, (presumably
Section 8 thereof) the transfer of the criminal cases
herein involved, Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District is legally
justifiable. On the other hand, the defense submits that
under the uniformly announced doctrine of this Court
regarding the jurisdictional nature of the venue of
criminal cases and principally because to give effect to
the administrative orders aforementioned would be
impairing the independence of the judiciary, the accused
in aforesaid cases must be tried in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by
the Court of First Instance in which, it is a fact, the case
was filed on June 15, 1970, the very day Administrative
Order No. 221 of the Secretary of Justice authorizing
Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court to hold
sessions in Vigan beginning July 1, 1970 was issued.
It is my considered view that the less said about the
intervention of the Department of Justice with the
Circuit Criminal Courts by the issuance of
Administrative Orders 258 and 274, Series of 1968 and
worse Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970 the
better, for I find absolutely no legal authority for the
issuance of said Orders. The first two purportedly direct
and instruct the judges of the various judicial districts of
the Philippines as to how to apportion among
themselves, together with the corresponding circuit
criminal court judges, the cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction. I feel very strongly that the
distribution of the powers of government by the
Constitution places, even in its broadest sense,
everything that judges have to do that might in one way
or another affect or be related to the ultimate disposition
of the controversies and cases to be tried by them,
including the distribution of the cases to be tried by
them, entirely and exclusively with the judges
themselves by common agreement among them, and so I
hold that whatever be the import of Section 8 of
Republic Act 5179 providing that "for administrative
purposes, the Circuit Criminal Courts shall be under the
supervision of the Department of Justice," the same
cannot be considered as contemplating any intervention
of the Secretary of Justice in the distribution of cases
among judges. That the common impression and long
standing practice on the matter are otherwise, cannot
alter what, in my humble view, the Constitution ordains.
Page 133 of 142
I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal
Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular
Courts of First Instance in their respective districts with
the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of,
try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1
of the Act. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the
Act which says:
SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of
Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First
Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal
cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and
the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
It is also my conviction that when Congress enacted
Republic Act 5179, it was conscious of the existing
doctrinal rule laid down by this Court, in Cunanan 1 that
in criminal cases, venue is equivalent to territorial
jurisdiction and precisely because of this consciousness
and the knowledge that the nature of the crimes placed
within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Courts is
such that their successful prosecution might be impaired
or obstructed by the doctrinal rule aforementioned that
in Section 4 of the Act, Congress expressly provided that
as a rule, "cases shall be heard within the province
where the crime subject of the offense (sic) was
committed" but "when the interest of justice so
demands, with the prior approval of the Supreme Court,
cases may be heard in a neighboring province of the
district."
It is contended that these quoted provisions of Section 4
contemplate only those cases already in the Circuit
Criminal Court. That may be so, but my view is that by
the said provisions, Congress has precisely opened the
door for the regular courts trying cases of the nature
enumerated in the Act to shift those cases to the circuit
criminal court in instances like the present wherein it
appears quite evident that to maintain Vigan as the
venue of the trials in question will defeat the ends of
justice, for, after all, the circuit court is just another
branch of the Court of First Instance, and once it is in
the former court, then Section 4 may be easily applied.
Moving of cases from one branch of a Court of First
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
Instance to another branch thereof is neither new nor
unusual when the judges concerned are agreed that such
a step would best promote the interests of justice. In the
light of this practice, commendable in its motivation,
why cannot the transfer be made from the Court of First
Instance to circuit criminal court? Indeed, this should
not be treated as merely a matter of discretion; judges
should feel bound to act accordingly, as a matter of duty,
hence a negative action in the appropriate cases is
ground for certiorari or mandamus. In this connection,
however, I must hasten to advert, that the interested
parties should be duly heard on the matter and, in
accordance with the spirit, if not the letter of the law,
approval of the Supreme Court be secured.
Apropos of all this discussion, I would like to make it
clear that the rule invoked by the defense to the effect
that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional in character
has no foundation in any act of the legislature. There can
be no question that jurisdiction is conferred only by law
and that it is only venue that may be fixed by the Rules
of Court because jurisdiction is substantive and venue is
merely procedural. The rule the defense invokes is found
only in a decision of this Court rendered way back in
1913. In Cunanan, supra, this Court held: "The
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain
well-defined territory. They cannot take jurisdiction of
persons charged with an offense alleged to have been
committed outside of that limited territory."
As can be noted, no provision of law is cited in support
of the ruling. The reason is simple. There is no such law.
In other words, whatever force such invoked ruling may
have is no more than that of a construction given by this
Court. I dare say that when a previous construction by
this Court runs counter to fundamental principles now
separating the rule making power of the courts from the
legislative faculty to define and apportion jurisdiction, it
is best to lean in favor of recognizing the constitutional
boundaries of our prerogatives when they are plain and
the contrary cannot be implied. And since it was this
Court that made the construction, there is nothing to stop
Us from modifying the same, and inasmuch as Section
14, par. (a) of Rule 110 is purely a rule of venue, not
Page 134 of 142
legislated upon by Congress as a jurisdictional matter,
Our power to change the same is unquestionable. I,
therefore, reiterate my concurrence in the resolution of
this point in the main opinion.
Accordingly, I agree that the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in not yielding to the suggested
transfer of the cases in question to the circuit criminal
court. Court trials and proceedings mean nothing unless
the pronouncement and decisions of the courts merit the
faith and trust of the parties in particular and the people
in general. To the common man specially, the
imperatives of justice administered by our courts are: (1)
judge who can be trusted and (2) procedures that
insulate the proceedings from all factors that may taint
the ultimate outcome of litigations with doubt and
skepticism. To my mind, it is not enough that a judge
trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in
good faith, it is equally important that no circumstance
attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of
trustworthiness. It is thus clear that by Our decision in
this case, We are not expressing any distrust as to the
impartiality of respondent judge; it should be clearly
understood, however, that it is possible for his decision
to be unfair not because he has made it so, but because
under the circumstances, the adulterated evidence before
him leaves him no other alternative.
May I say as I close that what is most striking in this
decision is that it is a unanimous one, in spite of the fact
that at first blush it appeared that there were formidable
adverse precedents on our way. After long and careful
deliberation and after viewing all its angles, factual and
legal, when the time for voting came, there was no
hesitation in the assent that all of us gave to the
rationalizations and conclusions contained in the
scholarly main opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes and the
dispositive part of the decision, but by no means and in
absolutely no degree did the public discussion generated
by the peculiary circumstances and personages involved
in this case ever influence any of Us, as such things,
indeed, never will.
# Separate Opinions
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
The learned and scholarly opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes renders crystal-clear why the decision reached by
this Court should be what it is. It is a manifestation of
the jurist's art at its most exemplary. It belies the belief
not infrequently given utterance that hard cases make
bad law. The problem before us is unique and
unprecedented as far as our previous decisions go. It
calls for a resolution far-reaching in its consequences
and far-flung in its implications. Fortunately for the
administration of justice according to law, there is the
recognition of power vested in this Court, in the past
perhaps only imperfectly discerned but nonetheless in
existence, to be utilized whenever there is need to do so.
This is one such occasion. Even without resort then to
precedents coming from jurisdictions after which our
judicial system was patterned, the same result would
have been reached. For only thus, to paraphrase
Cardozo, would the flexibility and the creativeness of
the judicial process assert themselves.
The opinion of Justice J.B.L., Reyes therefore calls for
assent, which I readily yield. Nor does it seem
inappropriate if it be stressed that the conclusion reached
by the Court is solidly buttressed not only in law as
history but likewise in law as logic and as social control.
Hence this brief concurring opinion, which likewise will
afford me the opportunity to give expression to the view
that the Constitution and the proceedings in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934-1935 point
unerringly to the conclusion that this Court as the sole
body vested with judicial power by the fundamental law
itself is not devoid of supervisory authority over inferior
courts. Necessarily the prerogative to transfer the venue
of criminal prosecutions whenever there is a persuasive
showing that there would be a failure of justice is therein
included. On such an assumption, I do not feel called
upon to inquire into any asserted authority, even if
denominated administrative, of an alter ego of the
Executive, the Secretary of Justice, over the lower
courts. For my belief gets stronger with the years that it
would be difficult to assert that such a competence, even
as thus limited, is warranted under a Constitution based
Page 135 of 142
on the doctrine of separation of powers and necessarily
committed to the principle of judicial independence.
1. We start with the grant by the Constitution of Judicial
power to this Court and to such inferior courts as may be
established by law. 1 Thus is conferred the authority to
decide cases through the ascertainment of facts and the
application of the law, involving many a time its
interpretation. 2It connotes, in the language of the
decision, "the imperative of securing a fair and impartial
trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice. ...."
3Where, as this did develop in this case, there is more
than a probability of an impasse with the witnesses for
the prosecution displaying the utmost reluctance to
testify if the trial would be held in Vigan, entailing the
risk that there be, again in the language of the opinion,
"a mockery of the judicial process." 4it would appear
undeniable, and we have so held today, that this Court is
not to be denied the necessary competence to set matters
right. It is not to fold its hands as if in helpless
submission to a binding decree of Providence but must
meet the problem squarely, possessed of power adequate
to cope with such an exigency. In the same way that the
two other coordinate departments, the Executive and
Congress, being constitutional organs, can rely on the
fundamental law to justify the exercise of certain
prerogatives, 5 so may this Court, the only constitutional
court, exercise supervision over all other judicial
agencies thereafter legislatively created, appropriately
termed by the Constitution as inferior courts.
There would be a void in the framework of government
thus established if there is no official body of a higher
rank that can take the necessary steps to avoid a
frustration of the exercise of judicial power. It is my firm
conviction that neither the Presidency nor Congress can
rightfully be entrusted with such a task. If it were thus,
then the doctrine of separation of powers becomes a
myth. Such an approach necessarily and logically
compel the conclusion that the so called administrative
supervision exercised by the Secretary of Justice is, to
put it at its mildest, infected with the gravest doubts as
to its constitutionality.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
There is no need to go that far to reach a decision in this
case as is so aptly demonstrated in the opinion of the
Court. What appears to me undisputed is that where the
question partakes of a judicial character, only this Court
can perform that function and trace its source to the
Constitution itself. That is to free the Constitution from
the reproach that a situation is left unprovided for. What
is more, it assures the utmost respect for the principle
that like the other two coordinate and co-equal branches,
Court is likewise the recipient of power conferred by the
Constitution itself. 6
2. So much for law from the standpoint of analytical
jurisprudence of law as logic. If the matter be viewed
from the approach found congenial by sociological
jurists, law as one of the most effective forms of social
control, the same conclusion appears to be inescapable.
This is to examine legal institutions in terms of how they
function. It certainly would be a blot on the
administration of justice if by the reluctance of
witnesses to testify, based on what they consider to be a
feeling that cannot be stigmatized under the
circumstances as having no basis in reason, no trial
could be had of a criminal case. It is a matter of great
public interest that crime should not go unpunished. Of
course, it is equally important that the rights of whoever
is accused are duly safeguarded. Where as in this case an
impasse is likely to occur, in itself an alarming symptom
of a breakdown in the orderly legal processes, the loss of
public confidence in the rule of law itself is incalculable.
That is an eventuality which at all pains must be
avoided. The only question is how. If the legal doctrine
and principles, which under the system of legal norms
followed must be grounded in the Constitution itself do
not recognize such a competence in this Court, then for
some all may well be lost.
It would be unthinkable, again given the assumption, not
entirely without basis, that the two other branches of the
government cannot escape political considerations, to
assume that either Congress or the Executive can be
trusted to take care of such a situation. Nor would it do
to leave such matters in the hands of the lower courts,
unless whatever is decided by them is subject to
correction and review by the only constitutional court,
Page 136 of 142
certainly vested with the needed supervisory authority. It
would thus appear, if a breakdown in the legal system is
to be averted, that the power of this Court is undeniable.
There would seem to be no other way to avoid a serious
disruption in the legal order.
The above considerations necessarily lead me to yield a
full concurrence with what has been so persuasively and
ably put forth in the masterly opinion of Justice J.B.L.
Reyes.
December 5, 1970
BARREDO, J., concurring:
The accuracy of the technical bases as well as the
unerring logic of the resolution of the various facets of
this case evidence in the main opinion written by our
erudite colleague Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes could not but
impel the unanimous assent given thereto by the
members of this Court. Indeed, I could give the best
evidence of my full concurrence therein by merely
signing the same without this separate opinion. I feel,
however, that the impact of this decision is of such
transcendental importance to the administration of
justice in this country, particularly now when some
sectors of our people make no secret of lingering doubts
as to the fairness and impartiality by judicial actuations
and decisions, that my duty as a member of this highest
tribunal of the land calls for more than just the giving of
my vote in favor thereof. I consider it incumbent upon
me, since none of my brethren seems to be minded to do
it, to project more emphatically certain relevant matters,
the significance of which should go hand in hand with
the resolution of the case itself.
I can neither control nor conceal the feeling of full
satisfaction that overwhelms me now, because I consider
this decision as probably the first one of national
importance, in a long time, that will receive universal
and unqualified approval throughout the length and
breath of this Republic. I am sure it will yield for our
constitutional government as a whole and for the
judiciary in particular a rich harvest of regained trust and
confidence in the administration of justice. This decision
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
is a great leap forward. We are shaking away from a
long standing jurisprudential rule; We are casting aside
technical procedural roadblocks; We are here and now
proclaiming to all and sundry the plenitude, under the
Constitution, of Our power and authority to "insure to
(our people) and their posterity, the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice" (Preamble of
the Constitution) by holding that the "judicial power ...
vested in ... (the) Supreme Court" necessarily carries
with it the power to lay down procedures that will
effectively and fully guarantee, as far as it is humanly
possible to do so, that substantial justice shall not be
defeated thru technicalities of procedure; and what is
most important today, as I view it, is that this is one
decision the essence of which spells simple justice that
will be plainly understood by the common man. In the
clearest terms, this Court holds in effect in this decision
that inspite of the traditional rule that a person charged
with an offense may not be tried in a province outside of
the one ill which the alleged offense or any essential
ingredient thereof has been committed, it is the duty of
the corresponding trial court, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, to see to it that when the demands of
justice require it, the venue is moved to another province
wherein the circumstantial environment will insure a full
disclosure of all material facts essential in the pursuit of
truth and justice. Surely, the common man would not
understand why the Supreme Court in whom the totality
of judicial power is vested by the Constitution would not
have the authority and the right, nay the duty, to prevent
a trial from being held in a place where it would be
nothing more than a farce and an empty show, the final
chapter of which may have already been prewritten,
even independently of the honesty and integrity of the
presiding judge, because of external factors and forces
that impede the witnesses from making a free and
fearless exposition of what they know. I am exceedingly
happy that by this decision, the common man will
understand that neither the Constitution nor this Court
will ever be found wanting in what is needed top render
justice in its truest sense.
Now, for some views of my own on the specific legal
issues raised by the parties in their pleadings. The
problem revolves around the power of the Secretary of
Page 137 of 142
the Department of Justice vis-a-vis the operation of the
Circuit Criminal Courts created by Republic Act 5179.
The People contends that by Administrative Order 258
and 271, Series of 1968 and Administrative Order No.
226, Series of 1970, of the Secretary of Justice, issued
pursuant allegedly to Republic Act 5179, (presumably
Section 8 thereof) the transfer of the criminal cases
herein involved, Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V of
the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District is legally
justifiable. On the other hand, the defense submits that
under the uniformly announced doctrine of this Court
regarding the jurisdictional nature of the venue of
criminal cases and principally because to give effect to
the administrative orders aforementioned would be
impairing the independence of the judiciary, the accused
in aforesaid cases must be tried in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by
the Court of First Instance in which, it is a fact, the case
was filed on June 15, 1970, the very day Administrative
Order No. 221 of the Secretary of Justice authorizing
Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court to hold
sessions in Vigan beginning July 1, 1970 was issued.
It is my considered view that the less said about the
intervention of the Department of Justice with the
Circuit Criminal Courts by the issuance of
Administrative Orders 258 and 274, Series of 1968 and
worse Administrative Order No. 226, Series of 1970 the
better, for I find absolutely no legal authority for the
issuance of said Orders. The first two purportedly direct
and instruct the judges of the various judicial districts of
the Philippines as to how to apportion among
themselves, together with the corresponding circuit
criminal court judges, the cases falling within their
concurrent jurisdiction. I feel very strongly that the
distribution of the powers of government by the
Constitution places, even in its broadest sense,
everything that judges have to do that might in one way
or another affect or be related to the ultimate disposition
of the controversies and cases to be tried by them,
including the distribution of the cases to be tried by
them, entirely and exclusively with the judges
themselves by common agreement among them, and so I
hold that whatever be the import of Section 8 of
Republic Act 5179 providing that "for administrative
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15 PP VS GUTIERREZ
purposes, the Circuit Criminal Courts shall be under the
supervision of the Department of Justice," the same
cannot be considered as contemplating any intervention
of the Secretary of Justice in the distribution of cases
among judges. That the common impression and long
standing practice on the matter are otherwise, cannot
alter what, in my humble view, the Constitution ordains.
I take it that under Republic Act 5179, Circuit Criminal
Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular
Courts of First Instance in their respective districts with
the limited concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of,
try and decide only those cases enumerated in Section 1
of the Act. This is readily implied from Section 3 of the
Act which says:
SEC. 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of
Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First
Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal
cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge and
the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act.
It is also my conviction that when Congress enacted
Republic Act 5179, it was conscious of the existing
doctrinal rule laid down by this Court, in Cunanan 1 that
in criminal cases, venue is equivalent to territorial
jurisdiction and precisely because of this consciousness
and the knowledge that the nature of the crimes placed
within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Courts is
such that their successful prosecution might be impaired
or obstructed by the doctrinal rule aforementioned that
in Section 4 of the Act, Congress expressly provided that
as a rule, "cases shall be heard within the province
where the crime subject of the offense (sic) was
committed" but "when the interest of justice so
demands, with the prior approval of the Supreme Court,
cases may be heard in a neighboring province of the
district."
It is contended that these quoted provisions of Section 4
contemplate only those cases already in the Circuit
Criminal Court. That may be so, but my view is that by
the said provisions, Congress has precisely opened the
door for the regular courts trying cases of the nature
Page 138 of 142
enumerated in the Act to shift those cases to the circuit
criminal court in instances like the present wherein it
appears quite evident that to maintain Vigan as the
venue of the trials in question will defeat the ends of
justice, for, after all, the circuit court is just another
branch of the Court of First Instance, and once it is in
the former court, then Section 4 may be easily applied.
Moving of cases from one branch of a Court of First
Instance to another branch thereof is neither new nor
unusual when the judges concerned are agreed that such
a step would best promote the interests of justice. In the
light of this practice, commendable in its motivation,
why cannot the transfer be made from the Court of First
Instance to circuit criminal court? Indeed, this should
not be treated as merely a matter of discretion; judges
should feel bound to act accordingly, as a matter of duty,
hence a negative action in the appropriate cases is
ground for certiorari or mandamus. In this connection,
however, I must hasten to advert, that the interested
parties should be duly heard on the matter and, in
accordance with the spirit, if not the letter of the law,
approval of the Supreme Court be secured.
Apropos of all this discussion, I would like to make it
clear that the rule invoked by the defense to the effect
that venue in criminal cases is jurisdictional in character
has no foundation in any act of the legislature. There can
be no question that jurisdiction is conferred only by law
and that it is only venue that may be fixed by the Rules
of Court because jurisdiction is substantive and venue is
merely procedural. The rule the defense invokes is found
only in a decision of this Court rendered way back in
1913. In Cunanan, supra, this Court held: "The
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance of the
Philippine Islands, in criminal cases, is limited to certain
well-defined territory. They cannot take jurisdiction of
persons charged with an offense alleged to have been
committed outside of that limited territory."
As can be noted, no provision of law is cited in support
of the ruling. The reason is simple. There is no such law.
In other words, whatever force such invoked ruling may
have is no more than that of a construction given by this
Court. I dare say that when a previous construction by
this Court runs counter to fundamental principles now
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC 15
separating the rule making power of the courts from the
legislative faculty to define and apportion jurisdiction, it
is best to lean in favor of recognizing the constitutional
boundaries of our prerogatives when they are plain and
the contrary cannot be implied. And since it was this
Court that made the construction, there is nothing to stop
Us from modifying the same, and inasmuch as Section
14, par. (a) of Rule 110 is purely a rule of venue, not
legislated upon by Congress as a jurisdictional matter,
Our power to change the same is unquestionable. I,
therefore, reiterate my concurrence in the resolution of
this point in the main opinion.
Accordingly, I agree that the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion in not yielding to the suggested
transfer of the cases in question to the circuit criminal
court. Court trials and proceedings mean nothing unless
the pronouncement and decisions of the courts merit the
faith and trust of the parties in particular and the people
in general. To the common man specially, the
imperatives of justice administered by our courts are: (1)
judge who can be trusted and (2) procedures that
insulate the proceedings from all factors that may taint
the ultimate outcome of litigations with doubt and
skepticism. To my mind, it is not enough that a judge
trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in
good faith, it is equally important that no circumstance
attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of
trustworthiness. It is thus clear that by Our decision in
this case, We are not expressing any distrust as to the
impartiality of respondent judge; it should be clearly
understood, however, that it is possible for his decision
to be unfair not because he has made it so, but because
under the circumstances, the adulterated evidence before
him leaves him no other alternative.
May I say as I close that what is most striking in this
decision is that it is a unanimous one, in spite of the fact
that at first blush it appeared that there were formidable
adverse precedents on our way. After long and careful
deliberation and after viewing all its angles, factual and
legal, when the time for voting came, there was no
hesitation in the assent that all of us gave to the
rationalizations and conclusions contained in the
scholarly main opinion of Mr. Justice Reyes and the
Page 139 of 142
PP VS GUTIERREZ
dispositive part of the decision, but by no means and in
absolutely no degree did the public discussion generated
by the peculiary circumstances and personages involved
in this case ever influence any of Us, as such things,
indeed, never will.
# Footnotes
1 56 Am. Jur. (Venue), pages 47-48, 50. For an
exhaustive review of precedents, see Crocker vs.
Justices of the Superior Courts, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann.
Cas. 1067; Barry vs. Truax 99 NW 769, 65 LRA 762.
FERNANDO, J., concurring: 1 According to the
Constitution: "The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law." Art. VIII, Sec. 1. 2 Cf. City of
Baguio v. de Leon, L-24756, Oct. 31, 1968, 25 SCRA
938; Vera v. Arca, L-25721, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA
351; Pecson Jose v. Santos, L-25510, Oct. 30, 1970. 3
Opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, p. 5, Editor's Note: p.
180 this volume). 4 Ibid. 5 Cf. Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62
(1939); Villena v. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451
(1939); Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950). 6 Cf.
Debates in the Constitutional Convention with Delegate
Jose P. Laurel explaining his draft proposal as found in
V Laurel, ed., Proceedings of the Philippine
Constitutional Convention pp. 724-731; 911-928.
BARREDO, J., concurring: 1 26 Phil. 376.G.R. No.
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
SEC. 15 PARULAN v DIR OF PRISONS
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28519 February 17, 1968
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
RESOLUTION
ANGELES, J.:
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by
Ricardo Parulan, directed to the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to release
immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner
from unlawful and illegal confinement", anchoring the
relief prayed for on certain allegations in the petition, to
the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state
penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the
administrative and supervisory control of the respondent
Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the
sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for
the crime of evasion of service of sentence, penalized
under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, was
rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person
and of the offense with which he was charged.
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the
petition, was confined in the state penitentiary at
Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life
imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty
(20) years by the President of the Philippines. In
October, 1964, he was transferred to the military
barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm.
McKinley) situated at Makati, Rizal, under the custody
of the Stockade Officer of the said military barracks. In
that month of October, 1964, while still serving his
prison term as aforesaid, he effected his escape from his
confinement. Petitioner was recaptured in the City of
Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service of
sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised
Page 140 of 142
Penal Code, before the Court of First Instance of Manila,
after due trial, petitioner was found guilty of the offense
charged and sentenced accordingly with the imposable
penalty prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966.
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in
the petition, and on the basis thereof, we shall proceed to
discuss the merits of the case regarding the validity and
legality of the decision sentencing the petitioner to a
prison term for the crime of evasion of sentence.
Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any
fundamental or constitutional rights, lack of jurisdiction
of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive penalty
affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.
The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is:
Was the Court of First Instance of Manila with
jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose the
sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which
he was charged — evasion of service of sentence?
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides:
Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all
criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality of province where
the offense was committed or any of the essential
ingredients thereof took place.
There are crimes which are called transitory or
continuing offenses because some acts material and
essential to the crime occur in one province and some in
another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court
of either province where any of the essential ingredients
of the crime took place has — jurisdiction to try the
case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos
resultados como hechos independientes en sentido
natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar el
forum delicti commisi, y ha de aceptarse que el delito se
comete en cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca
uno de pesos plurales resultados.2
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES Page 141 of 142
SEC. 15 PARULAN v DIR OF PRISONS

1U.S. v. Santiago, 27 Phil. 408; U. S. v. Cardell 23 Phil.

There are, however, crimes which although all the 207.
elements thereof for its consummation may have
occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the very 2VI-Nueva Enciclopedia Juridica for F Seix Editor, p.
nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law 463.
is deemed to be continuing. Of the first class, the crime
of estafa or malversation3 and abduction 4 may be 3U.S. v. Santiago, supra.
mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the
crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the 4People v. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154.
deprivation of liberty is persistent and continuing from
one place to another 5 and libel where the libelous 5U.S. v. Laureaga 2 Phil. 71; People v. Parulan, L-2025,
matter is published or circulated from one province to April 25, 1951.
another. 6 To this latter class may also be included the
crime of evasion of service of sentence, when the 6Art. 360, par. 3, as amended by Rep Act 1289.; People
prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the v. Borja, 43 Phil. 618.
sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus
defeat the purpose of the law, moves from one place to 7Salonga v. Holland, 76 Phil. 412.
another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped prisoner
is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long it may be. It may not be validly said that
after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his
confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as
long as he continues to evade the service of his sentence,
he is deemed to continue committing the crime, and may
be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may
be found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may
be invoked in support of this conclusion, for, under
section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a person
may be arrested without warrant is where he has escaped
from confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest
without a warrant is founded on the principle that at the
time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act of
committing a crime — evading the service of his
sentence.

WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal,

Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando,
JJ., concur. 1äwphï1.ñët

Footnotes
DONQUIXOTE CRIMPROC CASES
PP VS PILOTIN
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35377-78 July 31, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
CAMILO PILOTIN, VINCENT CRISOLOGO, ISIDRO
PUGAL and ERNING ABANO, defendants-appellants.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified
motion praying for the transfer to the New Bilibid
Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or
Olivas, of the place of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949
of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he,
as sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions.
As justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be
in jeopardy if he were to be confined in the Vigan
municipal jail during the trial because there are many
political enemies of the Crisologo family in that vicinity;
some of the adherents of the Crisologos had in fact been
murdered in Ilocos Sur, and his father, Congressman
Floro Crisologo, was shot to death while hearing mass at
the Vigan cathedral.
Bluntly, he affirmed that inside that jail he would be a
sitting duck for a gunwielder or grenade-thrower who
wants to assassinate him. He could even be lynched or
shot to death on the specious pretext that he was trying
to escape.
Asked to comment on the motion, the Provincial Fiscal
of Ilocos Sur signified his conformity to the transfer of
the venue of the trial to the New Bilibid Prisons.
Section 5(4), Article X of the Constitution expressly
empowers this Court to "order a change of venue or
place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice". Here,
what is involved is not merely a miscarriage of justice
but the personal safety of movant Crisologo, the
Page 142 of 142
accused. It would be absurd to compel him to undergo
trial in a place where his life would be imperilled.
Present hostile sentiment against the accused at the place
of trial is a justification for transfer of venue (See State
vs. Siers, 136 S. E. 503, 103, W. Va. 30; 22 C.J.S. 310).
1äwphï1.ñët
We find Crisologo's motion to be meritorious. The
change of venue involves not merely the change of the
place of hearing but also the transfer of the expediente
of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court. According
to Crisologo's motion, the alleged evidence against him
is in the custody of the authorities at Camp Crame,
Quezon City. The transfer of Criminal Case No. 3949 to
the City Court of Quezon City and the holding of the
trial at Camp Crame appear to be the most convenient
arrangement.
WHEREFORE, the municipal court of Vigan is directed
to transfer the record of Criminal Case No. 3949 to the
City Court of Quezon City where it should be re-
docketed and raffled to any Judge thereof. The case may
be tried at Camp Crame. The usual precautions and
security measures should be adopted in bringing
defendant Crisologo to Camp Crame on the occasion of
the hearing.
SO ORDERED.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo and Concepcion Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Antonio, J, took no part.