Civil Law Review Case Digests
Ruben Balane
Title 1. OBLIGATIONS
Chapter 1. General Provisions (Art. 1156-1162)
Art. 1157
1. Sagrada Orden v. Nacoco
G.R. No. L-3756 | June 30, 1952 | J. Labrador
Petitioner: Sagrada Orden De Predicadores Del Santismo Rosario De Filipinas
Respondent: National Coconut Corporation
Summary:
Sagrada Orden owned a land which was acquired by Taiwan Tekkosho, a Japanese
corporation during the Japanese military occupation. After the liberation, the US Alien
Property Custodian took control and custody of the land. Copra Export Management
Company then occupied the property and when it vacated, Nacoco occupied it through
the representation made by the Philippine Government to the US Alien Property
Custodian. The property was then returned to Sagrada Orden upon judgment that the
contract of sale in favor of Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void. Sagrada Orden was
also given the right to recover from Nacoco reasonable rentals for the use and
occupation of the premises. And so, Sagrada Orden filed an action to recover rentals
from Nacoco from the time it used and occupied the premises. Nacoco is now
contending that it is only liable for rentals from the time the property was returned to
Sagrada Orden and not before, for it occupied the property in good faith and under no
obligation to pay rentals.
The SC held that Nacoco is liable only from the time judgment was rendered against
its possession. For Nacoco’s liability to start from the time it occupied the premises, its
obligation must arise from the law, contract or quasi-contract, crime or negligence as
provided by Article 1157 of the Civil Code which was taken from Article 1089 of the old
Civil Code. As none of these sources were present, Nacoco cannot be held liable.
Another reason why Nacoco has no obligation to pay rentals prior thereto is that there
was no express agreement between US Alien Property Custodian and Nacoco for the
latter to pay rentals on the property.
FACTS:
 Sagrada Orden owned a land and warehouse in Pandacan, Manila which was
acquired by a Japanese corporation Taiwan Tekkosho during the Japanese
military occupation. Consequently, the original TCT in the name of Sagrada Orden
was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of Taiwan Tekkosho.
 After the liberation, the Alien Property Custodian of the United States of America
(US Alien Property Custodian) took possession, control and custody of the land
under Sec. 12 of the “Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States”. The
Copra Export Management Company occupied the property under a
custodianship agreement with US Alien Property Custodian, and when it vacated
the National Coconut Corporation (Nacoco) occupied it through the representation
made by the Philippine Government to the US Alien Property Custodian. Nacoco
then repaired the warehouse on the land, and leased it to one Dioscoro Sarile.
 1st Court Case: Sagrada Orden then made claim to the property before the US
Alien Property Custodian but as this was denied, it brought an action in the Manila
CFI to annul the sale of property of Taiwan Tekkosho, and recover its possession.
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o Judgment: The contract of sale in favor of Taiwan Tekkosho was null and void
because it was executed under threats, duress, and intimidation. As a
consequence, the claims, rights, title, and interest of the US Alien Property
Custodian should be cancelled and that the occupant Nacoco should vacate
the premises. Sagrada Orden was also given the right to recover from
Nacoco reasonable rentals for the use and occupation of the premises.
 2nd Court Case: Sagrada Orden then filed an action to recover rentals from
Nacoco from the time it used and occupied the premises (August 1966) to the
date it vacated it. Nacoco on the other hand claimed that it was willing to pay but
only from the time the property was returned to Sagrada Orden (February 28,
1949 - the date specified in the judgment in the 1 st case) and not before, for it
occupied the property in good faith and under no obligation to pay rentals for the
use and occupation of the warehouse.
o Judgment: In favor or Sagrada Orden (from the time Nacoco occupied the
premises).
ISSUE: WON Nacoco is liable for rentals from the time Nacoco occupied the premises.
– NO. Nacoco starts only to be liable for rentals after the date the court rendered
judgment (in the 1st case) ordering the return of the land to Sagrada Orden.
RATIO:
 For Nacoco to be liable, its obligation must arise from the law, contract or quasi-
contract, crime or negligence as provided by Art. 1157 of the Civil Code which
was taken from Art. 1089 of the old Civil Code. None of these sources were
present.
o Nacoco is not guilty of any offense, because it entered the premises and
occupied it with the permission of the entity which had the legal control and
administration thereof, the US Alien Property Custodian.
o Neither was there any negligence on the part of Nacoco.
o There was also no privity (of contract or obligation) between the US Alien
Property Custodian and Taiwan Tekkosho, which had secured the possession
of the property from Sagrada Orden by the use of duress, such that the US
Alien Property Custodian or its permittee (Nacoco) may be held responsible
for the supposed illegality of the occupation of the property of Taiwan
Tekkosho. The US Alien Property Custodian had the control and
administration of the property not as successor to the interests of the enemy
holder of the title but by express provision of law.
 Second, there was also no express agreement between the US Alien Property
Custodian and Nacoco for the latter to pay rentals on the property. The existence
of an implied agreement to that effect is also contrary to the circumstances.
 Thus, the judgment may not be predicated on any negligence or offense of
Nacoco, or any contract, express or implied, or any principle in quasi contracts or
equity.
Art. 1159
2. People’s Car v. Commando Security
51 SCRA 40 | May 22, 1973 | J. Tehankee
Plaintiff-appellant: PEOPLE'S CAR INC.
Defendant-appellee: COMMANDO SECURITY SERVICE AGENCY
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Summary: People’s Car and Commando had a guard service contract. Sometime in
April 1970, the Commando security guard assigned to People’s Car premises brought
out one of People’s customer’s car without permission from either Commando or
People’s Car. The car fell into a ditch and qualified theft was filed against said guard.
People’s Car discharged its liability to the affected customer Luy, but it is now seeking
reimbursement for the entire amount from Commando by virtue of ¶ 5 of their contract.
Commando says it may only be held liable for P1,000, as stated in ¶ 4. SC said
Commando must shoulder the entire liability because ¶ 4, which limits Commando’s
liability to P1,000.00 per guard post, is by its own terms applicable only for loss or
damage “through the negligence of its guards ... during the watch hours.” Said
paragraph is manifestly inapplicable to the stipulated facts herein, which involve
neither property of People’s Car that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor
mere negligence of Commando’s security guard on duty. As ordained in Article 1159,
Civil Code, “obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith.”
Facts:
 On April 5, 1970 at around 1:00 A.M., Commando Security’s security guard
on duty at People’s Car Inc.’s premises, “without any authority, consent,
approval, knowledge or orders of People’s Car and/or Commando Security
brought out of the compound People’s Car a car belonging to its customer,
and drove said car for a place/s unknown, abandoning his post as such
security guard on duty inside People’s Car compound, and while so driving
said car in one of the city streets, lost control of said car, causing the same to
fall into a ditch along J.P. Laurel St., Davao City by reason of which People’s
Car's complaint for qualified theft against said driver, was blottered in the
office of the Davao City Police Department.”
 As a result of these wrongful acts of Commando’s security guard, the car of
Joseph Luy (People’s Car customer), which had been left with People’s Car
for servicing and maintenance, “suffered extensive damage in the total
amount of P7,079” besides the car rental value “chargeable to Commando” in
the sum of P1,410.00 for a car that People’s Car had to rent and make
available to its said customer to enable him to pursue his business and
occupation for the period of 47 days that it took People’s Car to repair the
damaged car, or total actual damages incurred by People’s Car in the sum of
P8,489.10.
 People’s Car claimed that Commando was liable for the entire amount under
¶ 51 of their contract whereunder Commando assumed “sole responsibility for
the acts done during their watch hours” by its guards, whereas Commando
contended, without questioning the amount of the actual damages incurred by
People’s Car, that its liability “shall not exceed P1,000.00 pesos per guard
post” under ¶ 42 of their contract.
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Par. 5 — The party of the Second Part (Commando) assumes the responsibility for the proper
performance by the guards employed, of their duties and (shall) be solely responsible for the
acts done during their watch hours, the Party of the First Part (People’s Car) being specifically
released from any and all liabilities to the former’s employee or to the third parties arising from the
acts or omissions done by the guard during their tour of 
 duty.
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Par. 4. — Party of the Second Part (Commando) through the negligence of its guards, after an
investigation has been conducted by the Party of the First Part (People’s Car) wherein the Party
of the Second Part has been duly represented shall assume full responsibilities for any loss or
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Issue: How must the contract be interpreted as to the extent of the liability of
Commando to People’s Car by reason of the acts of Commando’s employee?
Commando must be liable.
Held: Judgment is hereby rendered sentencing Commando to pay People’s Car the
sum of P8,489.10 as and by way of reimbursement of the stipulated actual damages
and expenses, as well as the costs of suit in both instances.
Ratio: Commando is undoubtedly liable to indemnify People’s Car for the entire
damages incurred, citing ¶ 5.
 ¶ 4, which limits Commando’s liability to P1,000.00 per guard post, is by its
own terms applicable only for loss or damage “through the negligence of its
guards ... during the watch hours.” Said paragraph is manifestly inapplicable
to the stipulated facts herein, which involve neither property of People’s Car
that has been lost or damaged at its premises nor mere negligence of
Commando’s security guard on duty.
 Here, instead of Commando, through its assigned security guards, complying
with its contractual undertaking “to safeguard and protect the business
premises of People’s Car from theft, robbery, vandalism, and all other
unlawful acts of any person/s,” Commando’s own guard on duty unlawfully
and wrongfully drove out of People’s Car premises a customer’s car, lost
control of it on the highway causing it to fall into a ditch, thereby directly
causing People’s Car to incur actual damages in the total amount of
P8,489.10.
 As People’s Car had duly discharged its liability to the third party, its
customer, Joseph Luy, Commando in turn must indemnify People’s Car in the
same amount.
 People’s Car was in law liable to its customer for the damages caused the
customer’s car, which had been entrusted into its custody. People’s Car
therefore was in law justified in making good such damages and relying in
turn on Commando to honor its contract and indemnify it for such undisputed
damages, which had been caused directly by the unlawful and wrongful acts
of Commando’s security guard in breach of their contract. As ordained in
Article 1159, Civil Code, “obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.”
 People’s Car could not tell its customer that “under the Guard Service
Contract it was not liable for the damage” since the customer could not hold
Commando to account for the damages as he had no privity of contract with
Commando. Such an approach of telling the adverse party to go to court,
notwithstanding his plainly valid claim, aside from its ethical deficiency, could
hardly create any goodwill for People’s Car’s business.
damages that may occur to any property of the Party of the First Part for which it is accountable,
during the watch hours of the Party of the Second Part, provided the same is reported to the Party
of the Second Part within 24 hours of the occurrence, except where such loss or damage is due
to force majeure, provided however that after the proper investigation to be made thereof that the
guard on post is found negligent and that the amount of the loss shall not exceed P1,000.00 per
guard post.
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3. FGU v. Sarmiento
G.R. No. 141910 | August 6, 2002 | Vitug
Petitioner: FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION
Respondents: G.P. SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORP. & LAMBERT EROLES
Emergency: Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. GPS was
contracted to deliver 30 refrigerators from Concepcion Industries to another corp. in
Dagupan City. It encountered an accident with another truck and fell into a ditch. FGU
Insurance indemnified Concepcion Ind. and as subrogee, sued GPS for damages and
as a common carrier. In its answer, GPS asserted that it is not a common carrier since
its only client is Conception Ind.; and so the provisions of common carrier don't apply.
RTC and CA – GPS is not a common carrier and therefore negligence cannot be
presumed; the incident was purely accidental. SC – notwithstanding the fact that GPS
is NOT a common carrier (they agreed with RTC and CA), it may STILL BE HELD
LIABLE under culpa contractual. The mere proof of the existence of the contract and
the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law,
recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from
liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a
contravention of the tenor thereof.
Facts:
1. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) undertook to deliver on 18 June
1994, 30 Condura S.D. white refrigerators aboard one of its Isuzu truck,
driven by Lambert Eroles, from the plant site of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
along South Superhighway in Alabang, to the Central Luzon Appliances in
Dagupan City.
2. While the truck was traversing the north diversion road along McArthur
highway, it collided with an unidentified truck, causing it to fall into a deep
canal, resulting in damage to the cargoes.
3. FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), an insurer of the shipment, paid to
Concepcion Industries, Inc., the value of the covered cargoes ( P204,450.00).
FGU, in turn, became a subrogee and sued GPS for damages and breach of
contract of carriage.
4. In its answer, GPS asserted that it was the exclusive hauler only of
Concepcion Industries, Inc., since 1988, and it was not so engaged in
business as a common carrier; and the cause was purely accidental. During
trial, GPS filed a demurrer to evidence.
5. RTC – granted the motion to dismiss
a. "Accordingly, the application of the law on common carriers is not
warranted and the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of a
common carrier in case of loss, damage or deterioration of goods
during transport under 1735 of the Civil Code is not availing.
b. "Under the law on obligation and contract, negligence or fault is not
presumed. The law on quasi delict provides for some presumption of
negligence but only upon the attendance of some circumstances.
6. CA – affirmed RTC
Issue: W/N GPS can be held liable? YES, despite it not being a common carrier
1. GPS, being an exclusive contractor and hauler of Concepcion Industries, Inc.,
rendering or offering its services to no other individual or entity, cannot be
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considered a common carrier. Common carriers are persons, corporations,
firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting
passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for hire or compensation,
offering their services to the public, whether to the public in general or to a
limited clientele in particular, but never on an exclusive basis.
2. The above conclusion nothwithstanding, GPS cannot escape from liability. In
culpa contractual, upon which the action of petitioner rests as being the
subrogee of Concepcion Industries, Inc., the mere proof of the existence of
the contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a
corresponding right of relief.
3. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party
to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual
undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof.
4. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to
preserve the interests of the promisee that may include his "expectation
interest," which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put
in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being reimbursed
for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position
as he would have been in had the contract not been made; or his "restitution
interest," which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has
conferred on the other party.
5. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
recompense to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to
observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating
circumstances, like proof of his exercise of due diligence (normally that of the
diligence of a good father of a family or, exceptionally by stipulation or by law
such as in the case of common carriers, that of extraordinary diligence) or of
the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing liability.
6. Respondent trucking corporation recognizes the existence of a contract of
carriage between it and petitioner’s assured, and admits that the cargoes it
has assumed to deliver have been lost or damaged while in its custody. In
such a situation, a default on, or failure of compliance with, the obligation – in
this case, the delivery of the goods in its custody to the place of destination -
gives rise to a presumption of lack of care and corresponding liability on the
part of the contractual obligor the burden being on him to establish otherwise.
GPS has failed to do so.
7. Respondent driver, on the other hand, without concrete proof of his
negligence or fault, may not himself be ordered to pay petitioner. The driver,
not being a party to the contract of carriage between petitioner’s principal and
defendant, may not be held liable under the agreement.
8. A word in passing. Res ipsa loquitur, a doctrine being invoked by petitioner,
holds a defendant liable where the thing which caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the latter’s management and the accident is such
that, in the ordinary course of things, cannot be expected to happen if those
who have its management or control use proper care.
a. For the doctrine to apply, should be understood as being confined
only to cases of pure (non-contractual) tort since obviously the
presumption of negligence in culpa contractual, as previously so
pointed out, immediately attaches by a failure of the covenant or its
tenor.
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9. In the case of the truck driver, whose liability in a civil action is predicated on
culpa acquiliana, while he admittedly can be said to have been in control and
management of the vehicle which figured in the accident, it is not equally
shown, however, that the accident could have been exclusively due to his
negligence, a matter that can allow, forthwith, res ipsa loquitur to work against
him.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated 30 April 1996, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66,
of Makati City, and the decision, dated 10 June 1999, of the Court of Appeals, are
AFFIRMED only insofar as respondent Lambert M. Eroles is concerned, but said
assailed order of the trial court and decision of the appellate court are REVERSED as
regards G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation which, instead, is hereby ordered to pay
FGU Insurance Corporation the value of the damaged and lost cargoes in the amount
of P204,450.00. No costs.
4. LRTA v. Navidad
G.R. No. 145804 | February 6, 2003 | Vitug
Petitioners: LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN
Respondents: MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
Summary: While Nicanor Navidad was drunk and standing on the platform near the
LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad and Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight and eventually, Navidad feel on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously. Navidad’s widow is now claiming for damages. LRTA is liable.
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of
a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where
they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. The foundation of LRTA’s
liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from
the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the
safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task.
FACTS:
 On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven o’clock in the evening,
Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing
a "token" (representing payment of the fare).
 While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad.
 A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that
led to a fist fight. No evidence was adduced to indicate how the fight started
or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on
the LRT tracks.
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 At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and
he was killed instantaneously.
 On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie
Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against
Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband.
 LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim
against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent denied liability and averred that it had
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its guards.
 The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin,
filed a demurrer contending that negligence was not proven.
Issue:
1. Who is liable? – LRTA
2. Should Prudent be made likewise liable?
RATIO:
1. LRTA is liable
 Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of
its business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of
exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.
 Common carriers are required to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.
 Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so
obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance
to the contract of carriage.
 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury
to passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b)
on account of wilful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers if
the common carrier’s employees through the exercise of due diligence could
have prevented or stopped the act or omission.
 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the
duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees
and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.
 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident
occurred, which petitioners have failed to show, the presumption would be
that it has been at fault,10 an exception from the general rule that negligence
must be proved.11
 The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation
to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its
failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the
discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider
or an independent firm to undertake the task.
 In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under
the contract of carriage.
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2. Prudent is not liable
 If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of Article
217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the CC.
 The premise, however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the
part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then
be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer
failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision
of its employees.
 The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due diligence in
the selection and supervision of the employee.
 Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of
the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the
other hand, be described? It would be solidary.
 A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in
culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which
breaches the contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said
to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17
 Here, the SC is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that
"there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the
reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly
proven."
 There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is
guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself
a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made
liable only for his own fault or negligence.
5. L.G. Foods v. Agraviador
G.R. No. 158995 | September 26, 2006 | Garcia
Petitioners: L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President
and General Manager
Respondents: HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG-AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Bacolod City, and SPS.
FLORENTINO and THERESA VALLEJERA
Emergency Recit: Spouses Vallejera’s 7-year old son was hit by a Ford Fiera, owned
by petitioners and driven by their employee at the time of the accident. A criminal case
was filed but before trial could be concluded, the driver committed suicide. Thereafter,
spouses Vallejera filed a complaint for damages against the employers alleging that
the latter failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their
employees. The petitioners, however, insist that the case should be dismissed since
the spouses are suing under the RPC and that thereunder, a conviction of the driver is
required to hold the employers liable. Issue in this case is whether or not the spouses
Vallejera are suing under the RPC or under the Civil Code. The Court ruled that it is
clear that the spouses are suing under the Civil Code for quasi-delict. The complaint
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sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor son was caused by the
negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly
liable for the negligence of their driver for failing "to exercise the necessary diligence
required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said
accident. Besides, victims of negligence are given the choice of suing under the RPC
or the Civil Code. RPC requires conviction while the Civil Code does not. In the case at
bar, it is clear that the complainants elected to sue under the Civil Code.
Guys this case was assigned under 1159 (obligations arising from contract). But the
case made no mention at all whatsoever of 1159. Also, the digest assignment said to
include the 1162 issue. But there was also no express mention of 1162. But 1162
refers to quasi-delict and there is a discussion of quasi-delict but the court used 1161
and the articles referred to thereunder. Just fyi.
Facts:
 On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses
Florentino Vallejera and Vallejera, was hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by
the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman
Yeneza y Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
 In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was
filed against the driver before the MTCC of Bacolod City.
 Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver
committed suicide, evidently bothered by conscience and remorse. On
account thereof, the MTCC dismissed the criminal case.
 On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a
complaint for damages against the petitioners as employers of the deceased
driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees.
 During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that the case be dismissed.
Hence, the trial court required them to file within ten days a memorandum of
authorities supportive of their position.
 Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, principally arguing that the complaint is
basically a "claim for subsidiary liability against an employer" under the
provision of Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
o Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a
judgment of conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua
non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the
pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua non condition for their
subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack of cause of
action on the part of the plaintiffs.
Issue/Held: Whether the spouses Vallejeras' cause of action is founded on Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
Nothing in the complaint suggests that complainants are suing under Article 103
of the RPC.
 That complaint in the civil case alleged, inter alia,
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
o “That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the
negligence/imprudence of its employee since it failed to exercise the
necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza
y Ferrer which diligence if exercised, would have prevented said
incident.”
 Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein
petitioners are being made to account for their subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint did not even aver the basic
elements for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the driver in the criminal
case filed against him nor his insolvency.
 Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were
suing the defendant petitioners for damages based on quasi-delict. Clear it is,
however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their
choice of remedy against the petitioners (e.g. complaint alleged gross fault
and negligence on the part of the driver and the failure of the employers to
exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees).
The complainants elected to sue under quasi-delict.
 Victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under
Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code.
o If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold
the employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to
the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father
of the family.
o On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the
plaintiff can hold the employer subsidiarily liable only upon proof of
prior conviction of its employee.18
 Article 116119 of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from
criminal offenses shall be governed by penal laws subject to the provision of
Article 217720 and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.
o Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies the plaintiff
may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising
indirectly from the delict/crime or directly from quasi-delict/tort.
o The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action
in his initiatory pleading or complaint,21 and not with the defendant
who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiff's cause of action or
lack of it based on the defendant's perception that the plaintiff should
have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.
o Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is
direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior recourse against
the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such
employee.22
 Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couple's minor
son was caused by the negligent act of the petitioners' driver; and that the
petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for
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Atty. Ruben Balane
failing "to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of [their] employee, the driver, which
diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident."
 Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, they would have alleged, inter alia, that the
guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The employers have impliedly admitted that the cause of action is one for quasi-
delict.
 Petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,24 repeatedly
made mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on
their allegation that "they had exercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of [their] employees." The Court views this defense as an
admission that indeed the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents'
cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners. SO ORDERED.
Art. 1161
6. Caminos v. People
587 SCRA 348 | May 8, 2009 | Tinga, J.
Petitioner: Larry V. Caminos, Jr.
Respondent: People of the Philippines
Summary: Larry and Arnold’s car collided in the intersection of
EDSA and Ortigas Avenue. Arnold’s car, which was turning left ,
was heavily damaged and he sustained around P170k worth of
damages. Larry was prosecuted for reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property. Issue now is whether or not Larry should
be held liable for damages even if Arnold was also negligent . SC
held, first, Arnold was not negligent in driving his car. Though he
was not in the right of way according to the rep ort of the police
investigator, Larry was still driving his car at an unreasonable
speed and was not able to control it in such a way as to prevent
damage to other motorists. Besides, the Court said, evidence of
contributory negligence is not material in a charge of reckless
imprudence. It won’t acquit him. But in the end, Court said that
only Larry was at fault and he should pay for the damages
sustained by Arnold’s car.
Facts:
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
1. The case is rooted on a vehicular collision that happened on the night of 21
June 1988 at the intersection of Ortigas Avenue and Columbia Street in
Mandaluyong City. The vehicles involved were a Mitsubishi Super Saloon driven
by Larry Caminos (Larry) and a Volkswagen Karmann Ghia driven by Arnold
Litonjua (Arnold). The mishap occurred at approximately 7:45pm. That night, the
road was wet. Arnold was traversing Ortigas Avenue toward the direction of
EDSA and as soon as he had maneuvered the turn through the break in the
traffic island the Mitsubishi car driven by Larry suddenly came ramming into his
car from his right-hand side. Larry was headed towards the direction of San
Juan and he approached the same intersection from the opposite direction. The
force heaved Arnold’s car several feet away, sent it turning 180 degrees until it
finally settled on the outer lane of Ortigas Avenue.
2. Arnold immediately summoned to the scene of the collision Patrolman Ernesto
Santos (Patrolman Santos), a traffic investigator of the Mandaluyong Police,
who at the time was manning the police outpost in front of the POEA. At the
close of the investigation, a traffic accident investigation report (TAIR) was
issued by P/Cpl. Antonio N. Nato of the Eastern Police District. The report
revealed that at the time of the collision, Arnold’s car, which had "no right of
way," was "turning left" whereas Larry’s car was "going straight" and was
"exceeding lawful speed." It also indicated that the vision of the drivers was
obstructed by the "center island flower bed."
3. Larry was subsequently charged before the RTC of Pasig with reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property. At the ensuing trial, Patrolman
Santos admitted having executed the sketch which depicts the post-collision
positions of the two vehicles. Arnold’s testimony established that his vehicle was
at a full stop at the intersection when the incident happened.
4. Antonio Litonjua (Antonio), the father of Arnold in whose name the Volkswagen
car was registered, testified that the estimation of the cost of repairs to be made
on the car was to P139,294.00.
5. Larry was a company driver in the employ of Fortune Tobacco, Inc. assigned to
drive for the company secretary, Mariano Tanigan, who was with him at the time
of the incident. In an effort to exonerate himself from liability, he imputed
negligence to Arnold as the cause of the mishap. He lamented that it was
Arnold’s car which bumped his car and not the other way around and that he
had not seen Arnold’s car coming from the left side of the intersection—which
seems to suggest that Arnold’s car was in fact in motion or in the process of
making the turn when the collision occurred. His speed at the time, according to
his own estimate, was between 25 and 30 kph because he had just passed by
the stoplight located approximately 100 meters away at the junction of Ortigas
Avenue and EDSA, and that he even slowed down as he approached the
intersection.
6. TC found Larry guilty as charged. The TC relied principally on the sketch made
by Patrolman Santos depicting the post-collision positions of the two vehicles—
that piece of evidence which neither of the parties assailed at the trial—and
found that of the two conflicting accounts of how the collision happened it was
Arnold’s version that is consistent with the evidence. It pointed out that just
because Arnold had no right of way, as shown in the TAIR, does not account for
fault on his part since it was in fact Larry’s car that came colliding with Arnold’s
car. It concluded that petitioner, by reason of his own admission that he did not
notice Accordingly, the TC ordered Larry to pay civil indemnity in the amount
of P139,294.00 as well as a fine in the same amount.
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Atty. Ruben Balane
7. The CA agreed with the factual findings of the TC. However, it mitigated the
award of civil indemnity on its finding that Arnold himself was likewise reckless
in maneuvering a left turn inasmuch as he had neglected to look out, before
entering the other lane of the road, for vehicles that could likewise be possibly
entering the intersection from his right side.
8. Seeking an acquittal, Larry filed the present petition for review in which he
maintains Arnold’s own negligence was the principal determining factor that
caused the mishap and which should thus defeat any claim for damages.
Issue: W/N Larry should be held liable for damages? YES
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 14819 dated 28 February 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 163 in Criminal Case No. 76653
dated 18 September 1992 is REINSTATED.
1. Imprudence connotes a deficiency of action. It implies a failure in precaution or
a failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes
foreseen. Thus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a
motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a
willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required. In prosecutions
for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of
the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a question that
lies in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle, and
a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt requires the concurrence of the
following elements, namely, (a) that the offender has done or failed to do an act;
(b) that the act is voluntary; (c) that the same is without malice; (d) that material
damage results; and (e) that there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on
the part of the offender. Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what
perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that
the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable
lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so
indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the
operation of the penal law.
2. Aside from the entry in the TAIR, which noted Larry’s speed to be beyond what
is lawful, the physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate Larry’s
contention. The photographs taken of Arnold’s car clearly show that the extent
of the damage to it could not have been caused by Larry’s car running on
second gear at the speed of 25-30 kph. The fact that the hood of Arnold’s car
was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on impact the car even turned
around 180 degrees and was hurled several feet away from the junction clearly
demonstrate that the force of the collision had been created by a speed way
beyond what Larry’s estimation was. Rate of speed, in connection with other
circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining whether a
motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile, such proof raises the
presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence, or, as
otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to require the accused to show
that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless or imprudent
manner. We find, however, that Larry has not been able to discharge that
burden. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is
nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate
of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the
vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway.
3. In traffic law parlance, the term "right of way" is understood as the right of one
vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another approaching
vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give
rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the
other. Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of
statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision, it is
generally recognized, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter, that
the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it
becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the intersection to
proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right without danger
of collisions.
4. Proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of
his automobile bears little weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing
the accused’s culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, even if we are to
hypothesize that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper
lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, will
nevertheless not support an acquittal. At best, it will only determine the
applicability of several other rules governing situations where concurring
negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of
the award of damages in favor of the private offended party. Clearly, however, it
was Larry’s negligence, as pointed out by the OSG, that proximately caused the
accident.
5. Finally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as Larry had not extended efforts to
present countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage
sustained by Arnold’s car, the award assessed and ordered by the TC must
stand.
Art. 1162
7. Cangco v. MRR
38 SCRA 768 | October 14, 1918
Petitioner: Jose Cangco
Respondent: Manila Railroad Co
ER: Cangco alighted from MRR’s train while it was still moving. He stepped on a sack
of watermelons and fell back on the tracks. The train dragged him and so he lost his
arm. Held: MRR is liable. Art. 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu,
but only to extra-contractual obligations. When it is a contractual undertaking, it is not
necessary for plaintiff to specify whether the breach is due to willful fault or to
negligence of the defendant, or of his agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery. As it is not necessary in
an action for the breach of a contract to show the negligence, proof that the negligence
or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not
constitute a defense to the action. The contract of MRR to transport Cangco carried
with it the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving
its trains. That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to
defendant's servants
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Atty. Ruben Balane
Facts:
 Jose Cangco, was a clerk of MRR. He lived in San Mateo, Rizal
 In coming daily by train to the MRR’s Manila office, he used a pass, supplied by
MRR, which entitled him to ride the MRR’s trains for free
 On the side where passengers alight there is a cement platform which begins to
rise with a moderate gradient.
 As the train slowed down, Zuñiga, got off the same car, alighting safely
 When the train had proceeded a little farther Cangco stepped off, but one or both
of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons. His feet slipped and he fell
violently on the platform. His body rolled from the platform and was drawn under
the moving car, where his right arm was crushed and lacerated. After he alighted
from the train the car moved forward possibly 6 meters before it came to a full
stop.
 The accident occurred between 7 -8 on a dark night, and as the station was
lighted dimly by a single light some distance away
 Cangco failed to see these objects in the darkness.
 Cangco was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and his
injuries were very serious. He was brought to a hospital where his arm was
amputated. The result was unsatisfactory, and Cangco was carried to another
hospital where the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder.
 CFI: although MRR was negligent, Cangco failed to use due caution in alighting
and was precluded from recovering.
Issue: W/n Cangco can recover frm MRR? Yes. Employees of MRR were negligent.
Negligence of one’s employees is not a defense in culpa contractual:
 The foundation of MRR’s liability is the contract of carriage. Its liability is
direct and immediate, differing from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of servants, under Art. 1903.
 Art. 1903 is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to
extra-contractual obligations (culpa aquiliana)
 Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co clearly point out the difference between the
2: Art. 1903 is not applicable to acts of negligence, which constitute the
breach of a contract. The acts to which art. 1902 and 1903 are applicable are
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract
or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103,
1104
 The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases imposed upon
employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their
employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in
the English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were,
the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally — but upon the
principle in art. 1902, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another. The obligation to make good the damage arises
at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his
employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct.
But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence in the selection and
direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, if the damage
done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
 Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (re: extra-contractual liability of the defendant to
respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting
within the scope of his employment): From this art. 1903, 2 things are apparent:
(1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee
there instantly arises a presumption that there was negligence by the master
either in selection of the servant, or in supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and may
be rebutted. It follows that if the employer shows that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. This theory bases the
responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant.
 Manresa, says that the liability created by art. 1903 is imposed by reason of the
breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who
was the cause of it.
 Every legal obligation must be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which
civilized society imposes upon its members, other than contractual.
 The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which
arise from contract, is that in non-contractual obligations it is the wrongful or
negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in
contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual
relation.
 The legislature has elected to limit extra-contractual liability — with well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to
the persons to be charged.
 The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to
render service to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903
relates. When the sources of the obligation is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff.
 When it is a contractual undertaking, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify
whether the breach is due to willful fault or to negligence of the defendant, or of
his agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
 As it is not necessary in an action for the breach of a contract to show the
negligence, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the
negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the
contract would not constitute a defense to the action.
 If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked, the anomalous result
would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the
performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in
person.
 Ph cases involving the liability of employers for damage done by the negligent
acts of their servants show that the court never decided that the negligence of the
defendant's agents constitutes a defense to an action for damages for breach of
contract.
 Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co: it is true
that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon art.
1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff
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Atty. Ruben Balane
constituted a breach of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the
decision was that art. 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent
acts of his servantsn “makes the distinction between private individuals and public
enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of
negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case
the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
 It is evident, that in Yamada, the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded
in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage. From the
defendant’s standpoint the practical result must have been the same in any event.
The proof disclosed that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that
his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively
appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise
proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable
for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be
regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual.
 Manresa: whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance
of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual
undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is
always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant.
 It follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case
that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a
person to whom it was bound by contract, that in such a case the court would
have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have
proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
 The true explanation of such cases: the field of non- contractual obligation is much
more broad than that of contractual obligations. The mere fact that a person is
bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual
liability. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of
an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
 The contract of MRR to transport Cangco carried with it the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (art. 1258).
That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance
could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's
servants.
Cangco was not negligent, so no contributory negligence.
 Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, if the accident was caused by
plaintiff's own negligence, damages should be apportioned.
 MRR contends that it is negligence per se to alight from a moving train.
 We do not subscribe to this doctrine absolutely.
 The train was barely moving when Cangco alighted. Thousands of person alight
under these conditions everyday, and sustain no injury.
 The test of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving train is that of ordinary
or reasonable care, whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and
condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the
circumstances. (Thompson)
 Picart vs. Smith: Was there anything which would have admonished a person of
average prudence that doing so was dangerous?
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
 Cangco was ignorant of the obstruction; since MRR was bound to afford facilities
for safe egress, Cangco had a right to assume that the platform was clear. The
place was dark which is also proof of MRR’s failure .
 Cangco was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was not
risky for him to get off while the train was moving
 Cangco was earning P25 a month and the injuries he suffered have permanently
disabled him from continuing as a clerk. His expectancy of life, according to the
standard mortality tables, is approximately 33 years. A fair compensation is the
sum of P2,500, and the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention for the
treatment of his injuries
8. Viron v. De los Santos
345 SCRA 509
G.R. No. 138296 November 22, 2000
P: VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
R: ALBERTO DELOS SANTOS y NATIVIDAD and RUDY SAMIDAN
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Summary:
The said civil case is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict filed as a
result of a vehicular accident in the afternoon of August 16, 1993 between a passenger
bus owned by petitioner Viron Transportation Co., Inc. and a Forward Cargo Truck
owned by private respondent Rudy Samidan.1. W/N THE ACCIDENT WAS DUE TO
THE FAULT OF THE VIRON’S DRIVER- YES. 2. W/N VIRON IS LIABLE FOR
DAMAGES-YES but not actual damages and atty’s fees
1. Viron’s driver is at fault. There is no doubt whatsoever that the vehicular collision
was due to the negligence of Viron’s regular driver, Wilfredo Villanueva y Gaudia, at
that time. The cargo truck was on its proper lane at the time of the collision. In fact, the
cargo truck even swerved to the right shoulder of the road to give much room for the
Viron bus to pass. Notwithstanding the condition of the road and the in-coming
Dagupan Bus from the opposite direction, the Viron bus nonetheless proceeded to
overtake the cargo truck, bringing about the collision. 2. Viron is liable for damages;
not actual damages, not attorney’s fees. Viron contends that private respondents’
counterclaim failed to state a cause of action for there is no averment therein that Viron
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its drivers or employees. It is not necessary to state that Viron was
negligent in the supervision or selection of its employees, as its negligence is
presumed by operation of law. As employers of the bus driver, Viron is, under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primary liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only possible
defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. Viron, through its witnesses, namely, Danilo Azardon, a shop supervisor
and Fernando Mallare, an administrative officer, failed to rebut such legal presumption
of negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, thus, Viron as the
employer is responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship
of pater familias or on the employer’s own negligence.
FACTS:
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Atty. Ruben Balane
 The said civil case is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict filed as a
result of a vehicular accident in the afternoon of August 16, 1993 between a
passenger bus owned by petitioner Viron Transportation Co., Inc. and a Forward
Cargo Truck owned by private respondent Rudy Samidan.
 The version of Viron is as follows:
o Plaintiff, a public utility transportation company, is the registered owner of Viron
Transit Bus No. 1080, with Plate No. TB-AVC-332; while the defendant Rudy
Samidan is the registered owner of the Forward Cargo Truck with Plate No. TDY-
524 which, at the time of the vehicular accident in question, was driven and
operated by the defendant Alberto delos Santos y Natividad.
o On August 16, 1993, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, the aforesaid bus was driven
by plaintiff’s regular driver Wilfredo Villanueva along MacArthur Highway within the
vicinity of Barangay Parsolingan, Gerona, Tarlac coming from the North en route
to its destination in Manila.
o It was following the Forward Cargo Truck proceeding from the same direction then
being driven, as aforesaid, by the defendant Alberto delos Santos. The cargo truck
swerved to the right shoulder of the road and, while about to be overtaken by the
bus, again swerved to the left to occupy its lane.
o It was at that instance that the collision occurred, the left front side of the truck
collided with the right front side of the bus causing the two vehicles substantial
damages."
 On the other hand, the version of private respondents is as follows:
o Defendant Alberto delos Santos was the driver of defendant Rudy Samidan of the
latter’s vehicle, a Forward Cargo Truck with Plate No. TDY-524, on that fateful day
in question.
o At about 12:30 in the afternoon of August 16, 1993, he was driving said truck
along the National Highway within the vicinity of Barangay Parsolingan, Gerona,
Tarlac.
o The Viron bus with Body No. 1080 and Plate No., TB-AVC-332, driven by Wilfredo
Villanueva y Gaudia, tried to overtake his truck, and he swerved to the right
shoulder of the highway, but as soon as he occupied the right lane of the road, the
cargo truck which he was driving was hit by the Viron bus on its left front side, as
the bus swerved to his lane to avoid an incoming bus on its opposite direction.
o With the driver of another truck dealing likewise in vegetables, Dulnuan, the two of
them and the driver of the Viron bus proceeded to report the incident to the
Gerona Police Station. A Vehicular Traffic Report was prepared by the police (See
Exhibit "D"), with a Sketch of the relative positions of the circumstances leading to
the vehicular collision.
 After trial, the lower court dismissed Viron’s complaint and sustained the private
respondents’ counterclaim for damages.
ISSUES:
1. W/N THE ACCIDENT WAS DUE TO THE FAULT OF THE VIRON’S DRIVER- YES
2. W/N VIRON IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES-YES but not actual damages and atty’s
fees
RATIO:
1. Viron’s driver is at fault.
 Viron endeavors to have this Court review the factual findings of the trial court as
sustained by the Court of Appeals finding the driver of the Viron passenger bus at
10
Civil Law Review Case Digests
fault as the collision resulted from the latter’s failed attempt to overtake the cargo
truck.
 The rule is settled that the findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record.
 The Supreme Court will not assess and evaluate all over again the evidence,
testimonial and documentary adduced by the parties to an appeal particularly where,
such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter
coincide.
 Indeed, Viron has failed to show compelling grounds for a reversal of the following
findings and conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals:
o There is no doubt whatsoever, in the mind of the Court, on the basis of the
documentary evidence and the testimonies of the witnesses, that the vehicular
collision was due to the negligence of plaintiff’s regular driver, Wilfredo
Villanueva y Gaudia, at that time.
o The cargo truck was on its proper lane at the time of the collision. In fact, the
cargo truck even swerved to the right shoulder of the road to give much room for
the Viron bus to pass. Notwithstanding the condition of the road and the in-
coming Dagupan Bus from the opposite direction, the Viron bus nonetheless
proceeded to overtake the cargo truck, bringing about the collision.
o The evidence is uniform as to that fact. Indeed, no witnesses for the plaintiff ever
contradicted the obtrusive fact that it was while in the process of overtaking the
cargo truck that the Viron bus collided with the former vehicle.
o It is here well to recall that the driver of an overtaking vehicle must see to it that
the conditions are such that an attempt to pass is reasonably safe and prudent,
and in passing must exercise reasonable care.
o In the absence of clear evidence of negligence on the part of the operator of the
overtaken vehicle, the courts are inclined to put the blame for an accident
occurring while a passage is being attempted on the driver of the overtaking
vehicle. As already intimated elsewhere in this judgment, no evidence was
presented by the plaintiff to even intimate at the negligence of the driver of the
cargo truck.
 It is plain to see that the fault or negligence was attributable to the driver of the Viron
passenger bus. Viron proceeds to attack, albeit feebly, the credibility of the two
witnesses presented by private respondents, namely, Alberto delos Santos himself,
who was then the driver of the Forward Cargo Truck and a certain Manuel Dulnuan,
who was then travelling along the same highway coming from the opposite direction
when the accident occurred.
 According to Viron, the two witnesses contradicted each other when "witness
Dulnuan testified that the Viron’s passenger bus while attempting to overtake the
respondents’ truck, noticed the Dagupan passenger bus coming from the opposite
direction and to avoid hitting said passenger bus, the Viron Transit passenger bus
swerved to the right, hitting in the process the front left side portion of the
respondents’ truck;" while, "witness Alberto delos Santos testified that prior to the
accident, he swerved his truck to the right shoulder of the road (western lane) and
when he attempted to return to his lane, the accident happened." Contrary to Viron’s
assertion, the testimonies of the two witnesses complement, if not corroborate each
other.
2. Viron is liable for damages; not actual damages, not attorney’s fees.
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Atty. Ruben Balane
 Viron contends that private respondents’ counterclaim failed to state a cause of
action for there is no averment therein that Viron failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers or employees.
 It is to be noted that petitioner Viron Transportation Co., Inc., as the registered
owner of the bus involved in the subject vehicular accident originally brought the
action for damages against private respondents.
 Private respondents as defendants in the court a quo denied any liability and filed
instead a counterclaim for damages claiming that it was the driver of the bus who
was at fault in the operation of the bus. We find that the counterclaim of private
respondents alleges the ultimate facts constituting their cause of action.
 It is not necessary to state that Viron was negligent in the supervision or selection of
its employees, as its negligence is presumed by operation of law.
 As employers of the bus driver, Viron is, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly
and primary liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they are
negligent flows from the negligence of their employee.
 That presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not juris et de jure. Their only
possible defense is that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent the damage.
 The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.
 In fine, when the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while
performing his own duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that the
employer is negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a
good father of a family.
 Viron, through its witnesses, namely, Danilo Azardon, a shop supervisor and
Fernando Mallare, an administrative officer, failed to rebut such legal presumption of
negligence in the selection and supervision of employees, thus, Viron as the
employer is responsible for damages, the basis of the liability being the relationship
of pater familias or on the employer’s own negligence.
 Hence, with the allegations and subsequent proof of negligence against the bus
driver of Viron, the lower courts correctly adjudged Viron liable for damages.
Re: Actual Damages and attorney’s fees
 We find that with respect to the award of damages, an oversight was committed by
the Court of Appeals.
 Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must
actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely
on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.
 To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual
amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by
receipts. Considering that the actual damages suffered by private respondents were
based only on a job estimate and a photo showing the damage to the truck, there is
absence of competent proof on the specific amounts of actual damages suffered.
 Neither were the transportation and accommodation expenses during the trial
supported by competent proof, the lower court having relied merely on the
unsubstantiated allegations of private respondents.
 Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a
party is entitled to temperate damages.
 There is no doubt that the damage sustained by private respondents' cargo truck
was due to the fault or negligence of Viron's bus driver. The Court deems the
amount of P10,000.00 to be reasonable given the circumstances.
11
Civil Law Review Case Digests
 With respect to the award of attorney’s fees, there is likewise neither factual nor
legal basis therefor. This case does not fall under any of the instances found in
Article 2208 of the Civil Code for the proper award of attorney’s fees. The futility of
Viron’s resort to judicial action without more could not be taken against it. It cannot
be said that Viron filed a clearly unfounded civil action against the private
respondents. A resort to judicial processes and a subsequent defeat therein are
not per se evidence of a clearly unfounded suit, this is in line with the policy that no
penalty should be placed on the right to litigate.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
October 27, 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 54080 affirming that of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 55, is hereby modified insofar as it awarded actual damages to
private respondents Alberto delos Santos y Natividad and Rudy Samidan in the
amount ofP19,500.00 and an additional P10,000.00 as expenses for transportation
and accommodation during the trial for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. Considering
the fact, however, that the cargo truck sustained damages due to the negligence or
fault of Viron, the award of P10,000.00 in favor of private respondents as and for
temperate damages is in order. The award of P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees is
DELETED for reasons above-stated.
9. Cerezo v. Tuason
G.R. No. 141538 | March 23, 2004 | Justice Carpio
Petitioner: Hermana Cerezo
Respondent: David Tuazon
Summary: A passenger bus driven by Danilo Foronda & owned by Hermana Cerezo
collided with a tricycle driven by David Tuazon, which injured the latter. Tuazon filed a
complaint for damages against the Cerezo spouses and Foronda. The Cerezos failed
to file an answer and they were declared in default. Judgment was rendered, but only
against the Tuazons, since no summons were served on Foronda. Hermana filed a
petition for relief for judgment, but was denied by TC, CA, & SC. She then filed a
petition for annulment of judgment before the CA. W/N the annulment of the decision
based on lack of jurisdiction is proper. NO! Hermana asserts that the TC could not
validly render judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda, and also,
Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the
criminal action. Her contention proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not
of civil law, while the basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the
Civil Code, not delict under the RPC. In a criminal suit, Foronda is the one directly
liable, while Hermana will only be subsidiarity liable for damages. However, Tuazon
chose to file a civil suit. An employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is not just
solidary, but also primary and direct. Hence, there is no need to acquire jurisdiction
over Foronda. The Cerezos were thus held liable.
Facts:
 Around noontime of 26 June 1993, a Country Bus Lines passenger bus
collided with a tricycle along Palo St, Sta. Ines, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
 Tricycle driver Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as
owner of the bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo, and bus driver
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Atty. Ruben Balane
Danilo Foronda. The complaint alleged that Foronda was driving in a
negligent manner without due regard to traffic rules there being a "Slow
Down" sign near the scene of the incident. Tuazon was not unable to walk &
became disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left hand being cut.
 Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial court
(TC) issued summons against the Cerezo spouses" at the Makati address
stated in the complaint. However, the summons was returned unserved as
the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati.
 The TC issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses at their address in
Tarlac. The alias summons and a copy of the complaint were finally at the
office of Atty. Cerezo, who was then working as Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.
Atty. Cerezo reacted angrily on learning of the service of summons upon his
person. Atty. Cerezo allegedly told Sheriff William Canlas: "Punyeta, ano ang
gusto mong mangyari? Gusto mong hindi ka makalabas ng buhay dito?
Teritoryo ko ito. Wala ka sa teritoryo mo."
 Among others, the Cerezos’ counsel filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the
issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service.
 The TC granted Tuazon’s motion to litigate as a pauper. However, it denied
the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion requiring new summons to be served to the
defendants. It said that any infirmity in the service of the summons to the
defendant before plaintiff was allowed to prosecute his complaint in this case
as a pauper has been cured by this Order. Cerezos’ MR denied.
 The TC issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer, but
the spouses did not file an answer. Tuazon filed a motion to declare the
Cerezo spouses in default. The TC then issued an order declaring the Cerezo
spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to present his evidence.
 TC  Ruled for Tuazon. No pronouncement on Foronda’s liability because
there was no service of summons on him. Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the
damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezo’s
employee. Atty. Cerezo not liable as Tuazon failed to show that Mrs. Cerezo’s
business benefited the family, pursuant to the Family Code.
 Mrs. Cerezo filed before the TC a petition for relief from judgment because of
FAME. The couple denied receipt of notices of hearings & court orders.
 Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the
participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case.
 TC  Denied the petition for relief from judgment. Appeal is the proper
remedy. Also, FAME was not proven by conclusive evidence and the Cerezos
have no good and substantial defense. It noted that the Cerezos failed to
appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the case.
 CA Denied the Cerezo’s Rule 65 petition. Affirmed RTC. MR denied.
 Cerezos filed before the SC a Rule 45, but the SC denied for failure to attach
an affidavit of service of copies of the petition to the CA & to adverse parties.
Furtjer, Cerezos failed to show that the CA committed a reversible error.
 Undaunted, the Cerezos filed before the CA a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 (KULIT UGH), under the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. CA denied. BEH! MR denied.
Issue: W/N the annulment of the decision based on lack of jurisdiction is proper. NO!
Ratio: (totally omitted the summons & default part)
 Mrs. Cerezo contends that the basis of the present petition for annulment is
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
lack of jurisdiction. Mrs. Cerezo asserts that the TC could not validly render
judgment since it failed to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. Mrs. Cerezo
points out that there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover,
Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for
damages in the criminal action.
 SC  Such contention betrays a faulty foundation. Mrs. Cerezo’s contention
proceeds from the point of view of criminal law and not of civil law, while the
basis of the present action of Tuazon is quasi-delict under the Civil Code, not
delict under the Revised Penal Code.
 The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, or may give rise to an action for
a quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action based on a quasi-delict may
proceed independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a
distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising
from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy, whether to sue for a delict or a
quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.
 Tuazon chose to file an action for damages based on a quasi-delict. In his
complaint, Tuazon alleged that Mrs. Cerezo, "without exercising due care and
diligence in the supervision and management of her employees and buses,"
hired Foronda as her driver. Tuazon became disabled because of Foronda’s
"recklessness, gross negligence and imprudence," aggravated by Mrs.
Cerezo’s "lack of due care and diligence in the selection and supervision of
her employees, particularly Foronda.”
 The TC thus found Mrs. Cerezo liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code
(“Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees…”)
 Contrary to Mrs. Cerezo’s assertion, Foronda is not an indispensable party to
the case. Mrs. Cerezo’s liability as an employer in an action for a quasi-
delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and direct. Foronda is not
an indispensable party to the final resolution of Tuazon’s action for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo.
 The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. Where there is a solidary obligation on the part of debtors, as in this
case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is
liable to pay for the entire obligation in full. Where the obligation of the parties
is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a
necessary party because complete relief is available from either. Therefore,
jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect
damages from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
 Moreover, an employer’s liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct,
while the employer’s liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words
"primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refer to the remedy
provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and
limits of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the
negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer
directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the
employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or
avoiding the damage.
 The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for
another), without including the author of the act. Thus, there is no need in this
case for the TC to acquire jurisdiction over Foronda. The TC’s acquisition of
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Atty. Ruben Balane
jurisdiction over Mrs. Cerezo is sufficient to dispose of the present case.
 In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability
of the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art
103 of RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under delict,
the aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee’s delict
and corresponding primary liability are established.
 If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the TC’s jurisdiction over
Foronda is necessary. However, the present action is clearly for the quasi-
delict of Mrs. Cerezo and not for the delict of Foronda.
 Thus the TC had jurisdiction to decide the case in favor of Tuazon and
against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda. Contrary to Mrs.
Cerezo’s contention, Foronda is not an indispensable party to the present
case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to reserve the filing of a separate
civil action because he opted to file a civil action for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo who is primarily and directly liable for her own civil negligence.
 In any event, she is estopped from questioning jurisdiction of the TC as she
participated actively in the proceedings below.
Held: WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition for review. CA affirmed. Only
modification was that interest was increased from 6% to 12% per annum.
10. L.G. Foods v. Agraviador
503 SCRA 170 (2006) – already assigned (see above)
11. Mindanao Terminal v. Phoenix
587 SCRA 429 | May 8, 2009 | Tinga
Petitioner: MINDANAO TERMINAL AND BROKERAGE SERVICE, INC.
Respondent: PHOENIX ASSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK/MCGEE & CO.,
INC.
Facts:
 Del Monte contracted Mindanao Terminal, a stevedoring company, to load
and stow a shipment of 146,288 cartons of Philippine bananas and 15,202
cartons of fresh pineapples belonging to Del Monte Produce into the cargo
hold of the vessel M/V Mistrau. The vessel was docked at the port of Davao
and the goods were to be transported by it to Inchon, Korea in favor of
consignee Taegu Industries, Inc.
 Del Monte Produce insured the shipment under an "open cargo policy" with
Phoenix Assurance, a non-life insurance company, and McGee & Co. Inc.
(McGee), the underwriting manager/agent of Phoenix.
 Mindanao Terminal loaded and stowed the cargoes aboard the M/V Mistrau.
The vessel set sail from the port of Davao and arrived at the port of Inchon,
Korea. It was then discovered upon discharge that some of the cargo was in
bad condition. The Marine Cargo Damage Surveyor of Incok Loss and
Average Adjuster of Korea, through Byeong Yong Ahn (Byeong), surveyed
the extent of the damage of the shipment. In a survey report, it was stated
that 16,069 cartons of the banana shipment and 2,185 cartons of the
pineapple shipment were so damaged that they no longer had commercial
value.
13
Civil Law Review Case Digests
 Del Monte Produce filed a claim under the open cargo policy for the damages
to its shipment. McGee’s Marine Claims Insurance Adjuster evaluated the
claim and made payment in the amount of $210,266.43 be made. A check for
the recommended amount was sent to Del Monte Produce; the latter then
issued a subrogation receipt to Phoenix and McGee.
 Phoenix and McGee instituted an action for damages against Mindanao
Terminal in the RTC of Davao City. After trial, the RTC held that the only
participation of Mindanao Terminal was to load the cargoes on board the M/V
Mistrau under the direction and supervision of the ship’s officers, who would
not have accepted the cargoes on board the vessel and signed the foreman’s
report unless they were properly arranged and tightly secured to withstand
voyage across the open seas. Accordingly, Mindanao Terminal cannot be
held liable for whatever happened to the cargoes after it had loaded and
stowed them.
 Moreover, citing the survey report, it was found by the RTC that the cargoes
were damaged on account of a typhoon which M/V Mistrau had encountered
during the voyage. It was further held that Phoenix and McGee had no cause
of action against Mindanao Terminal because the latter, whose services were
contracted by Del Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte Produce, had
no contract with the assured Del Monte Produce.
 Phoenix and McGee appealed to CA – reversed. It imposed on Mindanao
Terminal, as the stevedore of the cargo, the duty to exercise extraordinary
diligence in loading and stowing the cargoes. It further held that even with the
absence of a contractual relationship the cause of action of Phoenix and
McGee could be based on quasi-delict under Article 2176.
ISSUE: W/N it was careless and negligent in the loading and stowage of the cargoes
onboard M/V Mistrau making it liable for damages; and, whether Phoenix and McGee
has a cause of action against Mindanao Terminal under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
on quasi-delict? NO.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 66121 is SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 12 in Civil Case No. 25,311.97 is hereby REINSTATED MINUS
the awards of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P83,945.80 as actual damages.
Phoenix and McGee have a cause of action against Mindanao Terminal
 We agree with the CA that the complaint filed by Phoenix and McGee against
Mindanao Terminal, from which the present case has arisen, states a cause
of action.
 The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and
careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce.
Even assuming that both Phoenix and McGee have only been subrogated in
the rights of Del Monte Produce, who is not a party to the contract of service
between Mindanao Terminal and Del Monte, still the insurance carriers may
have a cause of action in light of the Court’s consistent ruling that the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort.
 Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce
and Mindanao Terminal, the allegation of negligence on the part of the
defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from
quasi-delict.
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Atty. Ruben Balane
Mindanao Terminal, as a stevedoring company, is under NO obligation to
observe extraordinary degree of diligence
 Article 1173 of the Civil Code is very clear that if the law or contract does not
state the degree of diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an
obligation then that which is expected of a good father of a family or ordinary
diligence shall be required.
 Mindanao Terminal, a stevedoring company which was charged with the
loading and stowing the cargoes of Del Monte Produce aboard M/V Mistrau,
had acted merely as a labor provider in the case at bar. There is no specific
provision of law that imposes a higher degree of diligence than ordinary
diligence for a stevedoring company or one who is charged only with the
loading and stowing of cargoes. It was neither alleged nor proven by Phoenix
and McGee that Mindanao Terminal was bound by contractual stipulation to
observe a higher degree of diligence
 Phoenix and McGee failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that
Mindanao Terminal had acted
o Phoenix and McGee relied heavily on the deposition of Byeong and
on the survey report of the damage to the cargoes. Byeong found
that the cause of the damage was improper stowage due to the
manner the cargoes were arranged such that there were no spaces
between cartons, the use of cardboards as support system, and the
use of small rope to tie the cartons together but not by the negligent
conduct of Mindanao Terminal in loading and stowing the cargoes.
 As admitted by Phoenix and McGee, the latter is merely a stevedoring
company which was tasked by Del Monte to load and stow the shipments of
fresh banana and pineapple of Del Monte Produce aboard the M/V Mistrau.
How and where it should load and stow a shipment in a vessel is wholly
dependent on the shipper and the officers of the vessel. In other words, the
work of the stevedore was under the supervision of the shipper and officers of
the vessel. Even the materials used for stowage, such as ropes, pallets, and
cardboards, are provided for by the vessel. Even the survey report found that
it was because of the boisterous stormy weather due to the typhoon Seth, as
encountered by M/V Mistrau during its voyage, which caused the shipments
in the cargo hold to collapse, shift and bruise in extensive extent.
 Since Mindanao Terminal had duly exercised the required degree of diligence
in loading and stowing the cargoes, which is the ordinary diligence of a good
father of a family, the grant of the petition is in order.
12. Ramos v. CA
G.R. No. 124354 | December 29, 1999 | Kapunan
Petitioners: Rogelio and Erlinda Ramos, in their own behalf and as natural guardians
of minors, Rommel, Roy Roderick and Ron Raymond Ramos
Respondents: CA, De Los Santos Medical Center, Dr. Orlino Hosaka and Dra.
Perfecta Gutierrez
Facts: (No mention of Art. 1162. Just talks about res ipsa loquitor. I guess because it
is applicable to quasi-delicts.)
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
 Erlinda Ramos was a 47-year old robust woman except for occasional
complaints of discomfort due to pains allegedly caused by the presence of a
stone in her gall bladder. She was married to Rogelio with whom she has 3
children – Rommel, Roy Roderick and Ron Raymond.
 Because of the discomforts, she sought professional advice. She was
advised to undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her gall bladder.
She underwent a series of examinations which included blood and urine tests
which indicated she was fit for surgery.
o The spouses met Dr. Hosaka. He decided that Erlinda should
undergo a “cholecystectomy” operation after examining the
documents presented to him.
 (9AM – scheduled operation) At the operating room, Herminda (Erlinda’s
sister-in-law) saw Dr. Gutierrez, who was to administer anesthesia. Although
not a member of the hospital staff, Herminda introduced herself as Dean of
the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical Center who was to provide
moral support to the patient, to them. Herminda was allowed to stay inside
the operating room.
 Dr. Gutierrez informed Herminda about the prospect of a delay in the arrival
of Dr. Hosaka. It was around 12:15PM when Dr. Hosaka arrived. Inside the
operating room, Herminda was holding the hand of Erlinda, while Dr.
Gutierrez was intubating her. She thereafter heard Dr. Gutierrez say, “ang
hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan”.
Herminda noticed bluish discoloration of the nailbeds of the left hand of
Erlinda. Dr. Hosaka ordered someone to call another anesthesiologist to
intubate the patient. The patient’s nailbed became bluish and the patient was
placed in a trendelenburg position - a position where the head of the patient is
placed in a position lower than her feet which is an indication that there is a
decrease of blood supply to the patient’s brain. At almost 3PM, Erlinda was
taken to the ICU. She stayed at the ICU for a month. About 4 months
thereafter, she was released from the hospital. Since her surgery, she has
been in a comatose condition. She suffered brain damage as a result of the
absence of oxygen in her brain for 4 to 5 minutes
 Thus, the Ramoses filed a civil case for damages with the QC RTC against
Hosaka and Gutierrez alleging negligence in the management and care of
Erlinda. During the trial, both parties presented evidence as to the possible
cause of Erlinda’s injury. Plaintiff presented the testimonies of Dean
Herminda and Dr. Gavino to prove that the damage sustained by Erlinda was
due to lack of oxygen in her brain caused by the faulty management of her
airway by doctors during the anesthesia phase. On the other hand, the
doctors primarily relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Jamora, a
pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s
allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent, Thiopental Sodium (Pentothal).
Issues:
1. W/N res ipsa loquitor is applicable – YES.
2. W/N Hosaka, Gutierrez and the hospital were negligent – YES.
Ratio:
 Res ipsa loquitur (“the thing or the transaction speaks for itself”) is a maxim
for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the
surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption
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of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing
which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the management
of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary
course of things does not happen if those who have its management or
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of
explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by
the defendant’s want of care.
 Medical malpractice cases do not escape the application of this doctrine.
Generally, expert medical testimony is relied upon in malpractice suits.
However, when the doctrine is appropriate, all that the patient must do is
prove a nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the
injury sustained while under the custody and management of the defendant.3
 It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is
able to say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as would ordinarily have
followed if due care had been exercised.
 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. The damage
sustained by Erlinda in her brain prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation
presents a case for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Erlinda submitted
herself for cholecystectomy and expected a routine general surgery to be
performed on her gall bladder. She delivered her person over to the care,
custody and control of the doctors who exercised complete and exclusive
control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound
and was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However, during the
administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of cholecystectomy
she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without undergoing
surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate and totally
incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is an injury
which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.
o This kind of situation does not happen in the absence of negligence
of someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of
endotracheal tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia
is not rendered decerebrate as a consequence of administering such
anesthesia if the proper procedure was followed. Furthermore, the
instruments used in the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control of private
respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge. Likewise, petitioner
Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory negligence
because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered
her unconscious.
 In view of the evidence at hand, we are inclined to believe that it was the
faulty intubation which was the proximate cause of Erlinda’s comatose
condition. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
3
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the doctrine in the following situations: leaving of
a foreign object in the body of the patient after an operation, injuries sustained on a healthy part
of the body which was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of the wrong part of the
body when another part was intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw was under
anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under
the influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation for appendicitis, among others.
15
Civil Law Review Case Digests
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
 Dr. Gutierrez was negligent during the anesthesia phase. She failed to
properly intubate the patient. She did not do a pre-operative evaluation of
Erlinda. She only saw her in the operating room. Thus, she was not properly
informed of the possible difficulties she would face during the administration
of anesthesia to Erlinda. Her failure to follow this medical procedure is,
therefore, a clear indicia of her negligence.
 Dr. Hosaka’s negligence can be found in his failure to exercise the proper
authority in not determining if his anesthesiologist observed proper
anesthesia protocols. Furthermore, Dr. Hosaka had scheduled another
procedure in a different hospital at the same time as Erlinda’s
cholecystectomy, and was in fact over 3 hours late for the latter’s
operation. Because of this, he had little or no time to confer with his
anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery. This indicates that he
was remiss in his professional duties towards his patient. Thus, he shares
equal responsibility for the events which resulted in Erlinda’s condition.
 As for the hospital, it hires, fires and exercise real control over their attending
and visiting “consultant” staff. We rule that for the purpose of allocating
responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee
relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians.
o The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code
which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but
also for those of others based on the former’s responsibility under a
relationship of patria potestas. Such responsibility ceases when the
persons or entity concerned prove that they have observed the
diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage.
o The hospital, apart from a general denial of its responsibility over the
physicians, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of
the latter. It failed to adduce evidence with regard to the degree of
supervision which it exercised over its physicians Having failed to do
this, it is consequently solidarily responsible with its physicians for
Erlinda’s condition.
WHEREFORE, the decision and resolution of the appellate court appealed from are
hereby modified so as to award in favor of petitioners, and solidarily against private
respondents the following: 1) P1,352,000.00 as actual damages computed as of the
date of promulgation of this decision plus a monthly payment of P8,000.00 up to the
time that petitioner Erlinda Ramos expires or miraculously survives; 2) P2,000,000.00
as moral damages, 3) P1,500,000.00 as temperate damages; 4) P100,000.00 each as
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees; and, 5) the costs of the suit.
13. Nogales v. Capitol Medical Center
G.R. No. 142625 | December 19, 2006 | Carpio
Petitioners: ROGELIO P. NOGALES, for himself and on behalf of the minors, ROGER
ANTHONY, ANGELICA, NANCY, and MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER, all surnamed
NOGALES
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Respondents: CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, DR. OSCAR ESTRADA, DR. ELY
VILLAFLOR, DR. ROSA UY, DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ, DR. PERPETUA LACSON, DR.
NOE ESPINOLA, and NURSE J. DUMLAO
SUMMARY: Corazon Nogales was under the exclusive pre-natal care of Dr. Estrada
and before her delivery Corazon started experiencing mild labor pains, which prompted
her immediate admission in the Capitol Medical Center (CMC). During her delivery,
she was administered various drugs (valium, magnesium sulfate) bled profusely, her
blood pressure dropped and eventually she died. The husband, Rogelio, filed a
complaint for damages against Dr. Estrada and the other doctors involved in the
operation, including CMC. For failure to file an answer the doctors and CMC were
declared in default. After 11 years, the court held Dr. Estrada solely liable. Issue now is
whether CMC should be held responsible with Dr. Estrada. SC said yes but not
because of the doctrine of respondeat superior since CMC does not exercise control
over Dr. Estrada. CMC was held liable because of the doctrine of apparent authority.
Under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the
negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the
physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have
known, that the physician is an independent contractor. In this case, CMC impliedly
held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC
clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority leading the Spouses Nogales to believe
that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such
authority (estoppel). These acts include CMC granting staff privileges to Dr. Estrada.
CMC extended its medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada's
request for Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily accommodated
Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition. The spouses also signed consent
forms which in no way indicated that Estrada is only an independent contractor. No
one from CMC informed them that he is not a resident physician. Similarly, the consent
forms do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to
negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do the consent forms expressly
exempt CMC from liability for Corazon's death due to negligence during such treatment
or operation.
The Facts
 Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales, then 37 years old, was
under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her
fourth month of pregnancy. While Corazon was on her last trimester of
pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her blood pressure and
development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous
complication of pregnancy.
 Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and
Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon,
Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center
("CMC").
 Dr. Rosa Uy, who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an
internal examination of Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify
him of her findings. Dr. Estrada ordered for 10 mg. of valium to be
administered immediately by intramuscular injection. Dr. Estrada later ordered
the start of intravenous administration of syntocinon admixed with dextrose,
5%, in lactated Ringers' solution, at the rate of eight to ten micro-drops per
minute.
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
 Subsequently, when asked if he needed the services of an anesthesiologist,
Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estrada's refusal, Dr. Enriquez stayed to
observe Corazon's condition.
 Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the CMC. After this a
series of medical events happened (she was administered magnesium
sulfate, her cervical tissue was torn, her blood pressure dropped, she bled
profusely etc). Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with
bottled blood. It took approximately 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory,
headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson ("Dr. Lacson"), to comply with Dr. Estrada's
order and deliver the blood.
 At 8:00 a.m., Dr. Noe Espinola head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology
Department of the CMC, was apprised of Corazon's condition by telephone.
Upon being informed that Corazon was bleeding profusely, Dr. Espinola
ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to sign a "Consent to
Operation."
 Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from his
residence by an ambulance, arrived at the CMC about an hour later or at 9:00
a.m. He examined the patient and ordered some resuscitative measures to be
administered. Despite Dr. Espinola's efforts, Corazon died at 9:15 a.m.
The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum."
 Petitioners, the husband and the minor children, filed a complaint for
damages with the RTC-Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy,
Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, and a certain Nurse J. Dumlao for the
death of Corazon. They contended that defendant physicians and CMC
personnel were negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon's
condition. They charged CMC with negligence in the selection and
supervision of defendant physicians and hospital staff.
 The respondents (CMC et al) were declared in default for failing to file answer
and after 11 years, Dr. Estrada was made solely liable for damages.
Issue: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada. (YES,
because of the doctrine of apparent authority)
Held: WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY GRANTS the petition. The Court finds
respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar
Estrada. The amounts of P105,000 as actual damages andP700,000 as moral
damages should each earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
computed from the date of the judgment of the trial court. The Court affirms the rest of
the Decision dated 6 February 1998 and Resolution dated 21 March 2000 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45641.
Ratio:
On the Liability of CMC
 Dr. Estrada's negligence in handling the treatment and management of
Corazon's condition which ultimately resulted in Corazon's death is no longer
in issue. Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for
damages. Accordingly, the finding of the trial court on Dr. Estrada's
negligence is already final.
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 Nogales maintains that CMC is is vicariously liable for Dr. Estrada's
negligence based on Article 21804 in relation to Article 21765 of the Civil
Code.
 Similarly, in the United States, a hospital which is the employer, master, or
principal of a physician employee, servant, or agent, may be held liable for
the physician's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
 SC cited the case of Ramos v. Court of Appeal which stated that hospitals
can be made liable if they have control over the physician, even if a
contractor, because of a relationship of patria potestas.
 AS APPLIED IN THIS CASE: SC found no single evidence pointing to CMC's
exercise of control over Dr. Estrada's treatment and management of
Corazon's condition. It is undisputed that throughout Corazon's pregnancy,
she was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Estrada. CMC merely
allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when Corazon was about to give birth,
which CMC considered an emergency. Considering these circumstances, Dr.
Estrada is not an employee of CMC, but an independent contractor.
SECOND QUESTION: Whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability
considering that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor-physician.
 General Rule: A hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor-physician.
o Exception: The hospital may be liable if the physician is the
"ostensible" agent of the hospital.44 This exception is also known as
the "doctrine of apparent authority.”
 Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital: Under the doctrine of apparent
authority a hospital can be held vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a
physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician
is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have
known, that the physician is an independent contractor. It has the following
elements to make a doctor liable:
o the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a
reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged
to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital;
o where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the
plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and
acquiesced in them;
o the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its
agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence.
 The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. In
the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its
medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent
4
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.xxx Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
5
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
authority leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an
employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority.
o CMC granted staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its
medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Upon Dr. Estrada's request
for Corazon's admission, CMC, through its personnel, readily
accommodated Corazon and updated Dr. Estrada of her condition.
o CMC made Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead.
Prior to Corazon's admission and supposed hysterectomy, CMC
asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which
reinforced Rogelio's belief that Dr. Estrada was a member of CMC's
medical staff. The Consent on Admission and Agreement explicitly
provides that the physician by or through CMC may use measures
for the treatment of Corazon and in turn they have to abide by
CMC’s rules. While the Consent to Operation pertinently reads that
they shall submit the to the surgical stuff and anesthesiologists of
CMC.
 Without any indication in these consent forms that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor-physician, the Spouses Nogales could not have
known that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor. Significantly, no
one from CMC informed the Spouses Nogales that Dr. Estrada was an
independent contractor. On the contrary, Dr. Atencio, who was then a
member of CMC Board of Directors, testified that Dr. Estrada was part of
CMC's surgical staff.
 The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived
employment relationship with CMC in accepting Dr. Estrada's services.
Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle
Corazon's delivery not only because of their friend's recommendation, but
more importantly because of Dr. Estrada's "connection with a reputable
hospital, the [CMC]." In other words, Dr. Estrada's relationship with CMC
played a significant role in the Spouses Nogales' decision in accepting
Dr. Estrada's services as the obstetrician-gynecologist for Corazon's
delivery.
 The Court notes that prior to Corazon's fourth pregnancy, she used to give
birth inside a clinic. Considering Corazon's age then, the Spouses Nogales
decided to have their fourth child delivered at CMC, which Rogelio regarded
one of the best hospitals at the time.
 CMC's argued that petitioners are estopped from claiming damages based on
the Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation. Both release forms
consist of two parts. The first part gave CMC permission to administer to
Corazon any form of recognized medical treatment which the CMC medical
staff deemed advisable. The second part of the documents, which may
properly be described as the releasing part, releases CMC and its employees
"from any and all claims" arising from or by reason of the treatment and
operation.
 The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to
Corazon due to negligence during her treatment or operation. Neither do
the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazon's
death due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such
release forms, being in the nature of contracts of adhesion, are construed
strictly against hospitals. Besides, a blanket release in favor of hospitals "from
any and all claims," which includes claims due to bad faith or gross
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negligence, would be contrary to public policy and thus void. (NOTE: Did not
include anymore the liability of the other doctors)
On the Award of Interest on Damages
The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211 of
the Civil Code, which states that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part
of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the
court.
14. Professional Services v. Agana
G.R. No. 126297 January 31, 2007
Petitioner: PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC
Respondent: NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE
G.R. No. 126467 January 31, 2007
Petitioner: EMMA AGANA ANDAYA, JESUS AGANA, and RAYMUND AGANA) and
ENRIQUE AGANA
Respondent: JUAN FUENTES
G.R. No. 127590 January 31, 2007
Petitioner: MIGUEL AMPIL
Respondent: NATIVIDAD AGANA and ENRIQUE AGANA
Summary: Guys, mahaba ung case and it discusses medyo specific things about
hospitals and physician responsibility, applying negligence in specific situations. Sorry
kung mahaba but hinbaan ko din ung summary para mas madali.
Agana was operated on by Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil in Medical City (owned by PSI)
for difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge. First, Dr. Ampil perfomed
an operation, the Dr. Fuentes, then, again Dr. Ampil, who completed the operation and
closed the incision. After the operations, the nurses remarked that there were missing
2 sponges, and the surgeon was informed of this but still continued to close the
incision. After being released, Agana was in pain so she consulted with Ampil and
Fuentes who told her it was fine. However, later on, she and her daughter found was a
gauze protruding from her vagina. Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded
to her house and extracted a piece of gauze and told her the pain will vanish. When it
didn’t, she consulted with Dr. Gutierrez who found another gauze that created damage
and necessitated another surgery.
(1) Whether or not Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice YES
Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he
even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of
her operation. What was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a
deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient. This is a clear case of medical
malpractice or more appropriately, medical negligence.
ELEMENTS TO PROVE MALPRACTICE: (1) Duty – Ampil had the duty to remove all
foreign objects and to inform Agana if he wasn’t able to; (2) breach - he failed to do
so; (3) injury – she needed additional surgeries and consultations with other doctors
and (4) proximate causation – it was caused by the negligence of Ampil.
(2) Whether or not Dr. Fuentes should be absolved of liability YES
Res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." REQUISITES: (1) the occurrence
of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the injury was under the control and
18
Civil Law Review Case Digests
management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course
of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used
proper care; and (4) the absence of explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing
requisites, the most instrumental is the "control and management of the thing which
caused the injury. Element of Control is missing.
Under "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete
charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty
is to obey his orders. The control and management of the thing which caused the injury
was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
(3) Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr.
Ampil YES
As a general rule, Professionals engaged by an employer, such as physicians,
dentists, and pharmacists, are not "employees" under this article because the manner
in which they perform their work is not within the control of the latter (employer). For
purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting
physicians. Also, under the agency principle of apparent authority or agency by
estoppels, the principal (the hospital) is bound by the acts of his agent (physicians)
with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which
he holds the agent out to the public as possessing and the a hospital has the duty to
see that it meets the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty
includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff.
Facts:
 Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City General Hospital (Medical City
Hospital) because of difficulty of bowel movement and bloody anal discharge.
o Dr. Miguel Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from "cancer of the sigmoid.
 On April 11, 1984, Dr. Ampil performed an anterior resection surgery on Natividad.
He found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread on her left ovary,
necessitating the removal of certain portions of it.
o After Dr. Fuentes had completed the hysterectomy, Dr. Ampil took over,
completed the operation and closed the incision.
 However, the operation appeared to be flawed. In the corresponding Record of
Operation dated April 11, 1984, the attending nurses entered these remarks:
o "sponge count lacking 2
o "announced to surgeon searched (sic) done but to no avail continue for
closure."
 On April 24, 1984, Natividad was released from the hospital.
o After a couple of days, Natividad complained of excruciating pain in her anal
region. She consulted both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes about it. They told her
that the pain was the natural consequence of the surgery.
o Dr. Ampil then recommended that she consult an oncologist to examine the
cancerous nodes which were not removed during the operation.
 On May 9, 1984, Natividad, accompanied by her husband, went to the United
States to seek further treatment. After four months of consultations and laboratory
examinations, Natividad was told she was free of cancer. Hence, she was advised
to return to the Philippines.
 On August 31, 1984, Natividad flew back to the Philippines, still suffering from
pains. Two weeks thereafter, her daughter found a piece of gauze protruding from
her vagina.
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o Upon being informed about it, Dr. Ampil proceeded to her house where he
managed to extract by hand a piece of gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width.
He then assured her that the pains would soon vanish.
o Instead, the pains intensified, prompting Natividad to seek treatment at the
Polymedic General Hospital.
 While confined there, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the presence of another
foreign object in her vagina -- a foul-smelling gauze measuring 1.5 inches in width
which badly infected her vaginal vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her
reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina. Another
surgical operation was needed to remedy the damage. Thus, in October 1984,
Natividad underwent another surgery.
 Thus, Natividad and her husband filed a complaint for damages against the
Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil,
and Dr. Fuentes, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-43322.
 On February 16, 1986, pending the outcome of the above cases, Natividad died
and was duly substituted by her above-named children (the Aganas).
RTC Ruling: Decision in favor of the Aganas, finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes
liable for negligence and malpractice.
CA Ruling: Decision affirmed.
Issues:
 Whether or not Dr. Ampil liable for negligence and malpractice YES
 Whether or not Dr. Fuentes should be absolved of liability YES
 Whether or not PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil
YES
Held: WHEREFORE, we DENY all the petitions and AFFIRM the challenged Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 42062 and CA-G.R. SP No. 32198.
Ratio:
Issue#1:
SC’s Findings: Dr. Ampil’s arguments are purely conjectural and without basis.
 First, the surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding of the patient
during the surgical operation. Second, immediately after the operation, the nurses
who assisted in the surgery noted in their report that the ‘sponge count (was)
lacking 2’; that such anomaly was ‘announced to surgeon’ and that a ‘search was
done but to no avail’ prompting Dr. Ampil to ‘continue for closure’ x x x. Third,
after the operation, two (2) gauzes were extracted from the same spot of the body
of Mrs. Agana where the surgery was performed.
 An operation requiring the placing of sponges in the incision is not complete until
the sponges are properly removed, and it is settled that the leaving of sponges or
other foreign substances in the wound after the incision has been closed is at
least prima facie negligence by the operating surgeon. To put it simply, such act is
considered so inconsistent with due care as to raise an inference of negligence.
 IN THE CASE AT BAR: Here, Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the
missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was
experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. What was initially an
act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of
deceiving his patient. This is a clear case of medical malpractice or more
appropriately, medical negligence.
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
o ELEMENTS TO PROVE MALPRACTICE: (1) Duty; (2) breach; (3) injury
and (4) proximate causation.
o (1) Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to remove all foreign
objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure of the
incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad about it.
o (2) Dr. Ampil breached both duties.
o (3) Such breach caused injury to Natividad, necessitating her further
examination by American doctors and another surgery.
o (4) That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate causeof Natividad’s injury
could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite the information
given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were still missing.
That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina established the
causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And what further
aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the missing
gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.
Issue#2
SC’s Findings:
 Res ipsa loquitur means "the thing speaks for itself." It means, where the thing
which caused the injury, without the fault of the injured, is under the exclusive
control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not have occurred if
he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation that the injury arose from the defendant’s want of care,
and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish that he has observed due
care and diligence.
 REQUISITES: (1) the occurrence of an injury; (2) the thing which caused the
injury was under the control and management of the defendant; (3) the occurrence
was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those
who had control or management used proper care; and (4) the absence of
explanation by the defendant. Of the foregoing requisites, the most instrumental is
the "control and management of the thing which caused the injury."
 IN THE CASE AT BAR: The element of "control and management of the thing
which caused the injury" is lacking. Hence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not
lie.
o Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He
requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy. Dr.
Fuentes performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work
to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order,
allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed
operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the
attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A
"diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found.
Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire
period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in
fact, left the hospital.
o WHO HAS CONTROL? Under "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating
surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all
personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders.
 Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. He was the "Captain of the Ship."
That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1)
calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work
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of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes’
permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our
mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision
notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for,
that caused injury to Natividad’s body. Clearly, the control and
management of the thing which caused the injury was in the
hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes.
Issue#3
NOTE: The Court discusses the history of hospitals. Basically, it says that those who
can afford medical treatment are treated at home while those of the lowest class of
society, in the hospitals which charitable institutions. Now, health care services and
hospitals become business related. And now, there are increased hospital liabilities for
medical malpractice. Many courts now allow claims for hospital vicarious liability under
the theories of respondeat superior, apparent authority, ostensible authority, or agency
by estoppel.
 Negligent acts under our jurisdiction is covered under Article 21766 and Article
21807.
 Professionals engaged by an employer, such as physicians, dentists, and
pharmacists, are not "employees" under this article because the manner in which
they perform their work is not within the control of the latter (employer).
o In other words, professionals are considered personally liable for the fault or
negligence they commit in the discharge of their duties, and their employer
cannot be held liable for such fault or negligence.
o "Schloendorff doctrine": A physician, even if employed by a hospital, as
an independent contractor because of the skill he exercises and the lack of
control exerted over his work. Hospitals are exempt from the application of
the respondeat superior principle for fault or negligence committed by
physicians in the discharge of their profession.
 HOWEVER: Courts came to realize that modern hospitals are increasingly taking
active role in supplying and regulating medical care to patients.
o Bing v. Thunig: (deviating from the Schloendorff doctrine) Modern hospitals
actually do far more than provide facilities for treatment. Rather, they
regularly employ, on a salaried basis, a large staff of physicians, interns,
nurses, administrative and manual workers. They charge patients for
medical care and treatment, even collecting for such services through legal
action, if necessary.
6
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
7
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
o Ramos v. Court of Appeals: For purposes of apportioning responsibility in
medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect
exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.
 Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their
attending and visiting ‘consultant’ staff. While ‘consultants’ are not,
technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring, and the
right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. In assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the
control test is determining.
 IN THE CASE AT BAR: Using the Ramos case, PSI is liable. Also, its liability is
also anchored upon the (1) agency principle of apparent authority or agency
by estoppel and the (2) doctrine of corporate negligence.
o Apparent authority8 or "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible
agency or agency by estoppels:
 "The principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent
authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, or which he
holds the agent out to the public as possessing.
 IN THE CASE AT BAR: PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the
Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians
associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr.
Fuentes. Thus, it "is now estopped from passing all the blame to the
physicians whose names it proudly paraded in the public directory
leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and
competence." By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes and publicly
advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that
they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical
services for its patients.
o Doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility: the duty of
providing quality medical service is no longer the sole prerogative and
responsibility of the physician.
 Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital: A hospital’s corporate
negligence extends to permitting a physician known to be incompetent
to practice at the hospital.
 Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevich: A hospital, following the
doctrine of corporate responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets
the standards of responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty
includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff.
 Bost v. Riley: A patient who enters a hospital does so with the
reasonable expectation that it will attempt to cure him. The hospital
accordingly has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and
oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians
practicing in its premises.
 IN THE CASE AT BAR: PSI operates the Medical City Hospital for the
purpose and under the concept of providing comprehensive medical
services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its
8
ART. 1869. Agency may be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or
lack of action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is acting on his
behalf without authority.
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facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such
duty. Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes operated on Natividad with the
assistance of the Medical City Hospital’s staff, composed of resident
doctors, nurses, and interns. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that
PSI, as the operator of the hospital, has actual or constructive
knowledge of the procedures carried out, particularly the report of the
attending nurses that the two pieces of gauze were missing. The
failure of PSI, despite the attending nurses’ report, to investigate and
inform Natividad regarding the missing gauzes amounts to callous
negligence. This renders PSI, not only vicariously liable for the
negligence of Dr. Ampil under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, but
also directly liable for its own negligence under Article 2176
15. Cantre v. Spouses Go
G.R. No. 160889 / April 27, 2007
Petitioner: DR. MILAGROS L. CANTRE
Respondents: SPS. JOHN DAVID Z. GO and NORA S. GO
SUMMARY: (Note that this case is a quasi-delict) Dr. Cantre is an OB-GYNE at the
Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital and was in charge of delivering the fourth child
of Nora Go. After delivery though, Nora suffered profuse bleeding which caused her
blood pressure to drop to “0”. Dr. Cantre did several procedures to stop the bleeding
including using a droplight and a sphygmomanometer to monitor her blood pressure.
While recovering, Nora’s husband, John David noticed a gaping wound on her side
near the armpit which was explained to him by the nurse as caused by a burn. Upon
investigation by the hospital, it was found out the burn was caused by a burn by the
blood pressure cuff. John David took Nora to the NBI, and upon examination by a
medico-legal officer (Dr. Arizala), a droplight caused the burn and not a blood cuff. The
wound was referred to a plastic surgeon in the same hospital. Nora underwent skin
grafting and scar revision shouldered by the hospital but it still left a mark. To add to
this, the pain in her left arm remained and she had difficulty in moving and sleeping
with the arm. Thus, the spouses Go filed a complaint for damages. TC ruled in their
favor granting them award for damages, CA reduced the same. Doctor Cantre
questioned the award for damages and the evidence presented. Issue now is whether
there was negligence and whether the award for damages was proper. SC affirmed the
CA decision. In ruling for the Spouses, the CA stated the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere
existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person
who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the requisites are present
(see below). More importantly, it was noted that both instruments (droplight and blood
cuff) are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under
the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an
operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those
assistants are under the surgeon’s control. In this particular case, it can be logically
inferred that Dr. Cantre, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Nora’s
baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight
and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure. There was also no negligence on Nora’s part
that she contributed to her injury because she was unconscious. Clearly, under the
law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral damages suffered by the latter as a
proximate result of petitioner’s negligence.
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
FACTS:
 Petitioner Dr. Milagros L. Cantre is a specialist in Obstetrics and Gynecology
at the Dr. Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital. She was the attending physician
of respondent Nora S. Go.
 At 1:30AM, Nora gave birth to her fourth child, a baby boy. However, at
around 3:30 a.m., Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to
some parts of the placenta which were not completely expelled from her
womb after delivery.
 Nora suffered hypovolemic shock, resulting in a drop in her blood pressure to
"40" over "0." Cantre and the assisting resident physician performed various
medical procedures to stop the bleeding and to restore Nora’s blood
pressure. Her blood pressure was monitored with a sphygmomanometer.
While petitioner was massaging Nora’s uterus for it to contract and stop
bleeding, she ordered a droplight to warm Nora and her baby. Nora remained
unconscious until she recovered.
 While in the recovery room, her husband, respondent John David Z. Go
noticed a fresh gaping wound 2 ½ by three and a half 3 ½ inches in the inner
portion of her left arm, close to the armpit. He asked the nurses what caused
the injury. He was informed it was a burn.
 John David filed a request for investigation. In response, Dr. Rainerio S.
Abad, the medical director of the hospital, called Cantre and the assisting
resident physician to explain what happened. Cantre said the blood pressure
cuff caused the injury.
 John David brought Nora to the NBI for a physical examination, which was
conducted by medico-legal officer Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr. The medico-legal
officer later testified that Nora’s injury appeared to be a burn and that a
droplight when placed near the skin for about 10 minutes could cause such
burn. He dismissed the likelihood that the wound was caused by a blood
pressure cuff as the scar was not around the arm, but just on one side of the
arm.
 Nora’s injury was referred to a plastic surgeon at the Dr. Jesus Delgado
Memorial Hospital for skin grafting. Her wound was covered with skin sourced
from her abdomen, which consequently bore a scar as well. About a year
after, scar revision had to be performed at the same hospital. The surgical
operation left a healed linear scar in Nora’s left arm. The costs of the skin
grafting and the scar revision were shouldered by the hospital.
 Unfortunately, Nora’s arm would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly
mark, the pain in her left arm remains. When sleeping, she has to cradle her
wounded arm. Her movements now are also restricted. Her children cannot
play with the left side of her body as they might accidentally bump the injured
arm, which aches at the slightest touch.
 The spouses Go filed a complaint for damages against Dr. Cantre, Dr.
Abad, and the hospital.
 The trial court favored the spoises granting the damages (moral, exemplary,
nominal, etc). When appealed, CA affirmed the TC’s judgment only reducing
the amount of damages and deleting the exemplary damages, attorney’s fees
and expenses of litigation. The petitioners appealed the case.
ISSUE: (Note: There were eight assigned errors but some of them are matters of
evidence, I will only discuss it briefly, the main issue here I think is the negligence and
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the award for damages since this is a quasi-delict) Whether or not CA erred in
awarding damages to the Spouses, even if the same was reduced? (CA WAS
CORRECT)
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 3, 2002
and Resolution dated November 19, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
58184 are AFFIRMED.
EVIDENCE MATTERS:
 SC said that the exhibits presented are admissible in evidence. The
questioned exhibits consist mostly of Nora’s medical records, which were
produced by the hospital during trial pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum. Dr.
Cantre’s counsel admitted the existence of the same when they were formally
offered for admission by the trial court. In any case, given the particular
circumstances of this case, a ruling on the negligence of petitioner may be
made based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine even in the absence of such
additional exhibits.
 Also, as to the contention that the medico-legal officer who conducted Nora’s
physical examination never saw her original injury before plastic surgery was
performed is without basis and contradicted by the records. Records show
that the medico-legal officer conducted the physical examination after Nora’s
skin grafting and scar revision.
Is petitioner liable for the injury suffered by respondent Nora Go? YES, THERE
WAS NEGLIGENCE.
 The Hippocratic Oath mandates physicians to give primordial consideration to
the well-being of their patients. If a doctor fails to live up to this precept, he is
accountable for his acts. Intent is immaterial in negligence cases because
where negligence exists and is proven, it automatically gives the injured a
right to reparation for the damage caused.
 In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument
causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur:
o The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the
absence of someone’s negligence;
o It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant or defendants; and
o The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff
responsible is eliminated.
 As to the first requirement, the gaping wound on Nora’s arm is certainly not
an ordinary occurrence in the act of delivering a baby, far removed as the arm
is from the organs involved in the process of giving birth. Such injury could
not have happened unless negligence had set in somewhere.
 Second, whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood
pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the
exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the
ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation
liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those
assistants are under the surgeon’s control. In this particular case, it can be
logically inferred that Dr. Cantre, the senior consultant in charge during the
22
Civil Law Review Case Digests
delivery of Nora’s baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to
both the use of the droplight and the taking of Nora’s blood pressure.
 Third, the gaping wound on Nora’s left arm, by its very nature and considering
her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside
her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own
injury.
 Dr. Cantre argues that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a
cosmetic procedure, but rather as a measure to prevent complication does
not help her case. It does not negate negligence on her part.
 Based on the foregoing, the presumption that petitioner was negligent in the
exercise of her profession stands unrebutted. In this connection, the Civil
Code provides:
o ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done.…
o ART. 2217. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be
recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful
act or omission.
 Clearly, under the law, petitioner is obliged to pay Nora for moral
damages suffered by the latter as a proximate result of petitioner’s
negligence.
 SC notes however that Dr. Cantre has served well as Nora’s obstetrician for
her past three successful deliveries. This is the first time petitioner is being
held liable for damages due to negligence in the practice of her profession.
The fact that petitioner promptly took care of Nora’s wound before infection
and other complications set in is also indicative of petitioner’s good intentions.
We also take note of the fact that Nora was suffering from a critical condition
when the injury happened, such that saving her life became petitioner’s
elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these could not
justify negligence on the part of petitioner.
 Hence, considering the specific circumstances in the instant case, we find no
grave abuse of discretion in the assailed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals. Further, we rule that the Court of Appeals’ award of Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000) as moral damages in favor of respondents and
against petitioner is just and equitable.
16. Phil. Hawk v. Tan Lee
G.R. No. 166869 | February 16, 2010 | J. Peralta
Petitioner: Philippine Hawk Corporation
Respondent: Vivian Tan Lee
[I included all the issues in the case para safe. But main issue is the 2 nd issue.]
Summary:
Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages against
Philippine Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila based on quasi-delict arising from a
vehicular accident which involved her who was riding on a motorcycle in tandem with
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her husband, a passenger jeep, and a bus owned/operated by Philippine Hawk and
driven at that time by Avila. Based on her testimony, they were on a stop position at
the side of the highway; and when they were about to make a turn, she saw a bus
running at fast speed coming toward them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the
roadside, and their motorcycle as well which resulted in the death of her husband,
Silvino Tan, and caused her physical injuries. The RTC rendered judgment against
Philippine Hawk and Avila and ordered them to pay jointly and solidarily P745,575
representing loss of earnings & actual damages plus P50,000 as moral damages. CA
affirmed with modification in the award of damages.
Main issue: The SC held that Philippine Hawk is liable to Tan Lee for damages.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees. To avoid
liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an employer must overcome this
presumption by presenting convincing proof. This Philippine Hawk failed to do.
FACTS:
 Vivian Tan Lee filed before the RTC of Quezon City a complaint against Philippine
Hawk Corporation and Margarito Avila for damages based on quasi-delict, arising
from a vehicular accident that occurred in Gumaca, Quezon. The accident
involving a motorcycle, a passenger jeep, and a bus owned/operated by Philippine
Hawk and driven at that time by Avila resulted in the death of her husband, Silvino
Tan, and caused her physical injuries.
 The amended complaint sought the payment of indemnity for the death of her
husband, moral and exemplary damages, funeral and interment expenses,
medical and hospitalization expenses, the cost of the motorcycle’s repair,
attorney’s fees, and other just and equitable reliefs.
 Philippine Hawk denied liability, alleging that the immediate and proximate cause
of the accident was the recklessness or lack of caution of Silvino Tan. It also
asserted that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its employees.
[details on the accident  FYI]
 Version of Tan Lee:
o She was riding on their motorcycle in tandem with her husband, who was on
the wheel, at a place after a Caltex gasoline station in Gumaca, Quezon on
the way to Lopez, Quezon. They came from the Pasumbal Machine Shop.
They were on a stop position at the side of the highway; and when they were
about to make a turn, she saw a bus running at fast speed coming toward
them, and then the bus hit a jeep parked on the roadside, and their
motorcycle as well. She lost consciousness and was brought to the hospital.
She suffered a fracture on her left chest, her left arm became swollen, she felt
pain in her bones, and had high blood pressure. While her husband died due
to the vehicular accident, the immediate cause of death as massive cerebral
hemorrhage.
 Version of the driver of Passenger Jeep (Ernest Ovial):
o His jeep was parked on the left side of the highway near the Pasumbal
Machine Shop. He did not notice the motorcycle before the accident. But he
saw the bus dragging the motorcycle along the highway, and then the bus
bumped his jeep and sped away.
 Version of the driver of the bus (Avila):
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Civil Law Review Case Digests
o A motorcycle ran from his left side of the highway, and as the bus came near,
the motorcycle crossed the path of the bus, and so he turned the bus to the
right. He heard a loud banging sound. From his side mirror, he saw that the
motorcycle turned turtle (“bumaliktad”). He did not stop to help out of fear for
his life, but drove on and surrendered to the police. He denied that he
bumped the motorcycle.
 RTC: Rendered judgment against Philippine Hawk and Avila and ordered them to
pay jointly and solidarily P745,575 representing loss of earnings & actual
damages plus P50,000 as moral damages.
 CA: Affirmed with modification in the award of damages: (a) P168,019.55 as
actual damages; (b) P10,000 as temperate damages; (c) P100,000 as moral
damages; (d) P590,000 as unearned income; and (e) P50,000 as civil indemnity.
ISSUE 1: WON negligence may be attributed to Avila, and whether negligence on his
part was the proximate cause of the accident, resulting in the death of Silvino Tan and
causing physical injuries to Tan Lee. – YES.
RATIO:
 Foreseeability is the fundamental test of negligence. To be negligent, a defendant
must have acted or failed to act in such a way that an ordinary reasonable man
would have realized that certain interests of certain persons were unreasonably
subjected to a general but definite class of risks.
 In this case, the SC agreed with the factual findings of the trial court. Avila, who
was driving on the right side of the road, already saw the motorcycle on the left
side of the road before the collision. However, he did not take the necessary
precaution to slow down, but drove on and bumped the motorcycle, and also the
passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road, showing that the bus was
negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle and the
passenger jeep.
ISSUE 2: WON Philippine Hawk is liable to Tan Lee for damages. – YES. [main]
RATIO:
 Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there
instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the due
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its
employees. To avoid liability for a quasi-delict committed by his employee, an
employer must overcome the presumption by presenting convincing proof that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee.
 In this case, Philippine Hawk failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of its bus driver Avila, for having failed to
sufficiently inculcate in him discipline and correct behavior on the road. This is
because its tests were concentrated on the ability to drive and physical fitness to
do so [Physical examination to determine his fitness to drive, Test of his driving
ability, particularly his defensive skill, Review of his driving skill every six months].
It also did not know that Avila had been previously involved in sideswiping
incidents.
ISSUE 3: WON the damages awarded by CA are proper. – YES. But CA erred in the
computation of damages based on loss of earning capacity, actual damages, and
moral damages.
RATIO:
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Atty. Ruben Balane
 FIRST, Philippine Hawk’s argument that the CA erred in awarding other kinds of
damages in favor of Tan Lee who did not appeal from the trial court’s decision is
incorrect. It has been held that the CA is clothed with ample authority to review
matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. (PNB v. Rabat
citing the book of Justice Florenz D. Regalado)
 Damages Based on Loss of Earnings  provided for by Article 2206 of the Civil
Code. Generally documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim.
 Records show that Silvino Tan was leasing and operating a Caltex gasoline
station in Gumaca, Quezon. Tan Lee testified that her husband earned an annual
income of P1 Million. However, no documentary evidence was presented
regarding the income derived from their copra business; hence, the testimony of
Tan Lee as regards such income cannot be considered.
 Computation:
Net earning capacity = (Life Expectancy) x (Gross annual income -
reasonable expenses) - necessary expenses
Note: Life Expectancy = 2/3 (80 – age at the time of death)
[estimates due to the absence of documentary evidence]
Reasonable and Necessary Expenses = 80% of Gross Annual
Income
Living Expenses = 50% of the Net Income
X = {[2/3 (80-65)] x (P1,000,000 - P800,000)} – [50% x (P1,000,000 -
P800,000)]
X = [2/3 (15) x P200,000] - P100,000
X = P1,000,000
 Actual damages  Must be substantiated by documentary evidence, such as
receipts, in order to prove expenses incurred as a result of the death or the
physical injuries sustained by the victim. A review of the valid receipts submitted
in evidence showed that the funeral and related expenses amounted only to
P114,948.60, while the medical expenses of respondent amounted only to
P12,244.25, yielding a total of P127,192.85 in actual damages.
 Moral damages  are awarded to allow the plaintiff to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone due to the defendant’s culpable action and must, perforce, be
proportional to the suffering inflicted. CA correctly sustained the award of moral
damages of P50,000 for the death of Tan Lee’s husband. As for the physical
injuries Tan Lee sustained due to the vehicular accident, the award of P50,000
which is permitted under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code concerning quasi-delicts
causing physical injuries, should be reduced to P30,000 in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence.
 Temperate damages  CA correctly awarded temperate damages of P10,000
for the damage caused on Tan Lee’s motorcycle. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil
Code, temperate damages “may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.” .
 Civil indemnity  CA correctly awarded civil indemnity for the death of Tan Lee’s
husband which is proper under Art. 2206 of the Civil Code, which has been fixed
by current jurisprudence at P50,000.
24
Civil Law Review Case Digests
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alex Go is absolved from any liability to Sps. Ong and that Nancy
Go is solely liable to them for the judgment award.
17. Li v. Spouses Soliman
G.R. No. 165279 | June 7, 2011 | VILLARAMA
Petitioner: DR. RUBI LI
Respondents: SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN, as parents/heirs of
deceased Angelica Soliman
SUMMARY: Respondents’ daughter, Angelica, underwent a biopsy at St. Luke’s. Her
leg was amputated to remove tumor. Chemo was then suggested and Angelica then
was referred to Dr. Li. She was admitted to St. Luke’s however she died 11 days after
the (intravenous) administration of chemotherapy first cycle. Respondents brought
their daughter’s body to PNP Crime Laboratory for post-mortem examination after the
refusal of the hospital to release the death certificate without full payment of bills. The
Medico-Legal Report showed that the cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock
secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular
Coagulation. The respondents filed charges against St. Luke’s and physicians involve
for negligence and failure to observe the essential precautions in to prevent Angelica’s
untimely death. Petitioner denied the allegation for damages as she observed best
known procedures, highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy
drugs despite all efforts the patient died. The trial court was in favor of the petitioner
and ordered to pay their unpaid hospital bill, which CA reversed. SC pointed that there
are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon
the doctrine of informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material
risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and
proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she
otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed
treatment. SC ruled that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents. When Li
informed the Spouses Soliman beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which
includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets,
possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation
on the part of the doctor that the Spouses Soliman understood very well that the
severity of these side effects will not be the same for all patients undergoing the
procedure.
FACTS:
 Angelica Soliman underwent a biopsy at the St. Luke’s Medical Center
(SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering from osteosarcoma, a
high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually afflicts
teenage children.
 Angelica’s right leg was amputated by Dr. Tamayo in order to remove the
tumor. To minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from
spreading to other parts of the patient’s body (metastasis), chemotherapy was
suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to another doctor at
SLMC, herein Li Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.
 Angelica was admitted to SLMC but died 11 days after administration of the
first cycle of the chemotherapy.  Because SLMC refused to release a death
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certificate without full payment of their hospital bill, Spouses Soliman brought
the cadaver of Angelica to PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-
mortem examination.
o The Medico-Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the
cause of death as "Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ
hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)."
 Spouses Soliman filed a damage suit against Li, other doctors and SLMC.
Spouses Soliman charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelica’s
safety, health and welfare by their careless administration of the
chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the essential precautions in
detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping
early on the chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that
caused Angelica’s untimely demise.
o Further, it was specifically averred that Li assured the Spouses
Soliman that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of
healing with chemotherapy. Spouses Soliman thus claimed that they
would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had Li not
falsely assured them of its side effects.
 Li denied having been negligent and asserted that she had fully explained to
Spouses Soliman how the chemotherapy will affect not only the cancer cells
but also the patient’s normal body parts, including the lowering of white and
red blood cells and platelets.
 Since the medical records of Angelica were not produced in court, the trial
and appellate courts had to rely on testimonial evidence. (Case had long
narration of what happened before Angelica’s death ).
o Dr. Vergara: wasn’t a pathologist but based her statements and
testimonies on opinion of oncologist that she interviewed. Oncologist
said that if victim had DIC prior to chemo, hospital staff could have
detected it
o Dr. Balmaceda declared that it’s physician’s duty to inform and
explain to patient every known side effect of procedure before
securing consent. Patient/relatives must be informed of all side
effects.
o Dr. Tamayo: Dr. Li was one of the most proficient in the treatment of
cancerand the patient was afflicted with a very aggressive type
of cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant treatment
 RTC: dismissed complaint. Li was not liable for damages as she observed the
best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the
administration of chemotherapy drugs. Li has taken the necessary precaution
against the adverse effect of chemotherapy on the patient, adding that a
wrong decision is not by itself negligence. Spouses Soliman were ordered to
pay their unpaid hospital bill.
 CA: Concurred RTC’s finding that there was no negligence committed by the
Li in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, HOWEVER
found that Li as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the Spouses
Soliman all the known side effects of chemotherapy.
ISSUE: Whether the Li can be held liable for failure to fully disclose serious side
effects to the parents of the child patient who died while undergoing chemotherapy,
despite the absence of finding that Li was negligent in administering the said treatment
– NO
25
Civil Law Review Case Digests
RATIO:
NEGLIGENCE NOT PROVEN
 The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm. To successfully pursue such a
claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider (ie. physician), either
failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would
have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent
provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to
the patient.
 Medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses
belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon.
o RTC & CA concurred in finding that the alleged negligence of Li in
the administration of chemotherapy drugs to Spouses Soliman’ child
was not proven considering that Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not
being oncologists or cancer specialists, were not qualified to give
expert opinion as to whether Li’s lack of skill, knowledge and
professional competence in failing to observe the standard of care in
her line of practice was the proximate cause of the patient’s death.
INFORMED CONSENT
 The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient
relationships goes far back into English common law.
o As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of "battery" (i.e.,
an unauthorized physical contact with a patient) if they had not
gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery or
procedure.
o Schoendorff v. Society of New York Hospital: Every human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient’s consent, commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages.
o Informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician in the medical community in the exercise of reasonable
care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury
might be incurred from a proposed course of treatment
o Canterbury v. Spence: the disclosure rule only requires of him a
reasonable explanation, which means generally informing the patient
in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the therapy alternatives
open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that
may ensue from particular treatment or no treatment.
o Cobbs v. Grant: patient’s right of self-decision can only be effectively
exercised if the patient possesses adequate information to enable
him in making an intelligent choice. For liability of the physician for
failure to inform patient, there must be causal relationship between
physician’s failure to inform and the injury to patient and such
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connection arises only if it is established that, had revelation been
made, consent to treatment would not have been given.
 There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice
action based upon the doctrine of informed consent:
o (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks;
o (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks;
o (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the
patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have
consented to; and
o (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.
 The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to “point to
significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have
altered her decision to undergo it.”
 There was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the chemotherapy
procedure performed with the consent of Angelica’s parents.
o When Li informed the Spouses Soliman beforehand of the side
effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and
red blood cells, decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart
damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation on the
part of the doctor that the Spouses Soliman understood very well
that the severity of these side effects will not be the same for all
patients undergoing the procedure.
o In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient’s
reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-treatment laboratory
tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician.
o That death can possibly result from complications of the treatment or
the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the
administration of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled
out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such
conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of
chemotherapy already disclosed.
 The element of ethical duty to disclose material risks in the proposed medical
treatment cannot thus be reduced to one simplistic formula applicable in all
instances.
 Further, in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent,
"the plaintiff must prove both the duty and the breach of that duty through
expert testimony. Such expert testimony must show the customary standard
of care of physicians in the same practice as that of the defendant doctor.
 In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a
Medical Specialist of the DOH’s Operational and Management Services
charged with receiving complaints against hospitals, does not qualify as
expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for
chemotherapy treatment.
 In the absence of expert testimony in this regard, the Court feels hesitant in
defining the scope of mandatory disclosure in cases of malpractice based on
lack of informed consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that, even in
foreign jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
dated June 15, 2004 and the Resolution dated September 1, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58013 are SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 5,
26
Civil Law Review Case Digests
1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 8904 is
REINSTATED and UPHELD.
18. Cereno v. CA
682 SCRA 18 (2012)
Petitioners: DR. PEDRO DENNIS CERENO, and DR. SANTOS ZAFE
Respondents: CA, SPOUSES DIOGENES S. OLAVERE and FE R. SERRANO
Summary: Raymond, a stabbing incident victim, was brought to Bicol Regl Medical
Center. During his operation, he suffered cardiac arrest. According to his death
certificate, he suffered “hypovolemic shock” or the cessation of the functions of the
organs of the body due to loss of blood. His parents alleged that his death was due to
his surgeons’ (Cereno and Zafe) negligence. They failed to immediately operate and
transfuse blood on him. The trial court ruled in Raymond’s parents’ favor, relying on Dr.
Tatad’s testimony (head of Anesthesiology). SC said the case at bar is a medical
malpractice/negligence suit wherein the complainant must prove: (1) that the health
care provider, either by his act or omission, had been negligent, and (2) that such act
or omission proximately caused the injury complained of. The parents of Raymond
failed in this respect. Their cause stands on the mere assumption that Raymond’s life
would have been saved had petitioner surgeons immediately operated on him; had the
blood been cross-matched immediately; and had the blood been transfused
immediately. There was, however, no proof presented that Raymond’s life would have
been saved had those things been done. Those are mere assumptions and cannot
guarantee their desired result. Such cannot be made basis of a decision in this case,
especially considering that the name, reputation, and career of Cereno and Zafe are at
stake.
Facts:
 At about 9:15 P.M. of 16 Sep 1995, Raymond S. Olavere, a victim of a
stabbing incident, was rushed to the emergency room of the Bicol Regional
Medical Center (BRMC). There, Raymond was attended to by Nurse Arlene
Balares and Dr. Ruel Levy Realuyo — the emergency room resident
physician.
 Subsequently, the parents of Raymond — the spouses Deogenes Olavere
and Fe R. Serrano — arrived at the BRMC. They were accompanied by one
Andrew Olavere, the uncle of Raymond.
 After extending initial medical treatment to Raymond, Dr. Realuyo
recommended that the patient undergo emergency exploratory laparotomy.
Dr. Realuyo then requested the parents of Raymond to procure 500 cc of type
“O” blood needed for the operation. Complying with the request, Deogenes
and Andrew Olavere went to the Philippine National Red Cross to secure the
required blood.
 At 10:30 P.M., Raymond was wheeled inside the operating room. During that
time, the hospital surgeons, Drs. Zafe and Cereno, were busy operating on
gunshot victim Charles Maluluy-on. Assisting them in the said operation was
Dr. Rosalina Tatad, who was the only senior anesthesiologist on duty at
BRMC that night. Dr. Tatad also happened to be the head of Anesthesiology
Department of the BRMC.
 Just before the operation on Maluluy-on was finished, another emergency
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case involving Lilia Aguila, a woman who was giving birth to triplets, was
brought to the operating room.
 At 10:59 P.M., the operation on Charles Maluluy-on was finished. By that
time, however, Dr. Tatad was already working with the obstetricians who will
perform surgery on Lilia Aguila. There being no other available
anesthesiologist to assist them, Drs. Zafe and Cereno decided to defer the
operation on Raymond.
 Drs. Zafe and Cereno, in the meantime, proceeded to examine Raymond and
they found that the latter’s blood pressure was normal and “nothing in him
was significant.” Dr. Cereno reported that based on the xray result he
interpreted, the fluid inside the thoracic cavity of Raymond was minimal at
around 200-300 cc.
 At 11:15 P.M., Deogenes and Andrew Olavere returned to the BRMC with a
bag containing the requested 500 cc type “O” blood. They handed over the
bag of blood to Dr. Realuyo.
 After Dr. Tatad finished her work with the Lilia Aguila operation, Drs. Cereno
and Zafe immediately started their operation on Raymond at around 12:15
A.M. of 17 Sep 1995. Upon opening of Raymond’s thoracic cavity, they found
that 3,200 cc of blood was stocked therein. The blood was evacuated and
they found a puncture at the inferior pole of the left lung.
 In his testimony, Dr. Cereno stated that considering the loss of blood suffered
by Raymond, he did not immediately transfuse blood because he had to
control the bleeders first.
 Blood was finally transfused on Raymond at 1:40 A.M. At 1:45 A.M., while the
operation was ongoing, Raymond suffered a cardiac arrest. The operation
ended at 1:50 A.M. and Raymond was pronounced dead at 2:30 A.M.
 Raymond’s death certificate indicated that the immediate cause of death was
“hypovolemic shock” or the cessation of the functions of the organs of the
body due to loss of blood.
 Claiming that there was negligence on the part of those who attended to their
son, the parents of Raymond filed before the RTC, Branch 22, Naga City a
complaint for damages against Nurse Balares, Dr. Realuyo, and attending
surgeons Dr. Cereno and Dr. Zafe.
 The trial court found Drs. Cereno and Zafe negligent in not immediately
conducting surgery on Raymond and made them liable for the following
amounts: P 50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P 150,000.00 as moral
damages; P 100,000.00 as exemplary damages; P 30,000.00 for attorney’s
fees; and Cost of suit.
 On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC finding
Drs. Cereno and Zafe guilty of gross negligence in the performance of their
duties and awarding damages.
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Issue: WON Drs. Cereno and Zafe were grossly negligent in the performance of their
duties — NO.
Held: The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The earlier
CA decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
Ratio:
Medical malpractice/negligence suit
27
Civil Law Review Case Digests
 The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more
appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has
available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue
such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in most
cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did
something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and
that the failure or action caused injury to the patient. Stated otherwise, the
complainant must prove: (1) that the health care provider, either by his act or
omission, had been negligent, and (2) that such act or omission proximately
caused the injury complained of.
 The best way to prove these is through the opinions of expert witnesses
belonging in the same neighborhood and in the same general line of practice
as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert
opinion of qualified physicians stems from the former’s realization that the
latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are
incapable of intelligently evaluating, hence, the indispensability of expert
testimonies.
Drs. Cereno and Zafe Not Negligent
A. On Cereno and Zafe’s failure to perform operation on Raymond immediately
 The trial court first imputed negligence on the part of Cereno and Zafe by their
failure to perform the operation on Raymond immediately after finishing the
Maluluy-on operation. It rejected as an excuse the nonavailability of Dr.
Tatad. The trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Tatad about a
“BRMC protocol” that introduces the possibility that a standby
anesthesiologist could have been called upon.
 From there, the trial court concluded that it was the duty of Drs. Cereno and
Zafe to request Dr. Tatad to call on Dr. Rosalina Flores, the standby
anesthesiologist. Since petitioners failed to do so, their inability to promptly
perform the operation on Raymond becomes negligence on their part.  SC
does not agree with the aforesaid conclusion.
 First. There is nothing in the testimony of Dr. Tatad, or in any evidence on the
record, which shows that Drs. Cereno and Zafe were aware of the “BRMC
protocol” that the hospital keeps a standby anesthesiologist available on call.
Indeed, other than the testimony of Dr. Tatad, there is no evidence that
proves that any such “BRMC protocol” is being practiced by the hospital’s
surgeons at all.
 Evidence to the effect that Drs. Cereno and Zafe knew of the “BRMC
protocol” is essential, especially in view of the contrary assertion of Cereno
and Zafe that the matter of assigning anesthesiologists rests within the full
discretion of the BRMC Anesthesiology Department. Without any prior
knowledge of the BRMC protocol, it is quite reasonable for Drs. Cereno and
Zafe to assume that matters regarding the administration of anesthesia and
the assignment of anesthesiologists are concerns of the Anesthesiology
Department, while matters pertaining to the surgery itself fall under the
concern of the surgeons. Certainly, We cannot hold Cereno and Zafe
accountable for not complying with something that they, in the first place, do
not know.
 Second. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that there is such “BRMC
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protocol” and that Cereno and Zafe knew about it, their failure to request for
the assistance of the standby anesthesiologist is reasonable when taken in
the proper context. There is simply no competent evidence to the contrary.
 From the testimony of Dr. Tatad herself, it is clear that the matter of
requesting for a standby anaesthesiologist is not within the full discretion of
Cereno and Zafe. The “BRMC protocol” described in the testimony requires
Cereno and Zafe to course such request to Dr. Tatad who, as head of the
Dept. of Anesthesiology, has the final say of calling the standby
anesthesiologist.
 As revealed by the facts, however, after the Maluluy-on operation, Dr. Tatad
was already assisting in the Lilia Aguila operation. Given that Dr. Tatad was
already engaged in another urgent operation and that Raymond was not
showing any symptom of suffering from major blood loss requiring an
immediate operation, We find it reasonable that Cereno and Zafe decided to
wait for Dr. Tatad to finish her surgery and not to call the standby
anesthesiologist anymore. There is, after all, no evidence that shows that a
prudent surgeon faced with similar circumstances would decide otherwise.
 Here, there were no expert witnesses presented to testify that the course of
action taken by Cereno and Zafe were not in accord with those adopted by
other reasonable surgeons in similar situations. Neither was there any
testimony given, except that of Dr. Tatad’s, on which it may be inferred that
Cereno and Zafe failed to exercise the standard of care, diligence, learning,
and skill expected from practitioners of their profession. Dr. Tatad is an expert
neither in the field of surgery nor of surgical practices and diagnoses. Her
expertise is in the administration of anesthesia and not in the determination of
whether surgery ought or not ought to be performed.
B. On their failure to immediately transfuse blood on Raymond
 Another ground relied upon by the trial court in holding Cereno and Zafe
negligent was their failure to immediately transfuse blood on Raymond. Such
failure allegedly led to the eventual death of Raymond through “hypovolemic
shock.” Again, the trial court relied on Dr. Tatad’s testimony.
 From the aforesaid testimony, the trial court ruled that there was negligence
on the part of Cereno and Zafe for their failure to have the blood ready for
transfusion. It was alleged that at 11:15 P.M., the 500 cc of blood was given
to Dr. Realuyo by Raymond’s parents. At 11:45 P.M., when Dr. Tatad was
asking for the blood, 30 minutes had passed. Yet, the blood was not ready for
transfusion as it was still being cross-matched. It took another two hours
before blood was finally transfused to Raymond at 1:40 A.M. of 17 September
1995.  Again, such is a mistaken conclusion.
 First, the alleged delay in the cross-matching of the blood, if there was any,
cannot be attributed as the fault of Cereno and Zafe. It is highly unreasonable
and the height of injustice if they were to be sanctioned for lapses in
procedure that does not fall within their duties and beyond their control.
 Second, Dr. Cereno, in his unchallenged testimony, aptly explained the
apparent delay in the transfusion of blood on Raymond before and during the
operation. Before the operation, Dr. Cereno explained that the reason why no
blood transfusion was made on Raymond was because they did not then see
the need to administer such transfusion (there was no gross bleeding inside
the body and the bleeders had to be controlled first). Again, the testimonies of
Dr. Cereno went unchallenged or unrebutted. The parents of Raymond
28
Civil Law Review Case Digests Atty. Ruben Balane

were not able to present any expert witness to dispute the course of action
taken by Cereno and Zafe.

Causation Not Proven

 In medical negligence cases, it is settled that the complainant has the burden
of establishing breach of duty on the part of the doctors or surgeons. It must
be proven that such breach of duty has a causal connection to the resulting
death of the patient. A verdict in malpractice action cannot be based on
speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven within a reasonable
medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.
 The parents of Raymond failed in this respect. Aside from their failure to
prove negligence on the part of Cereno and Zafe, they also failed to prove
that it was Cereno and Zafe’s fault that caused the injury. Their cause stands
on the mere assumption that Raymond’s life would have been saved had
petitioner surgeons immediately operated on him; had the blood been cross-
matched immediately and had the blood been transfused immediately. There
was, however, no proof presented that Raymond’s life would have been
saved had those things been done. Those are mere assumptions and cannot
guarantee their desired result. Such cannot be made basis of a decision in
this case, especially considering that the name, reputation, and career of
Cereno and Zafe are at stake.
 The Court understands the parents’ grief over their son’s death. That
notwithstanding, it cannot hold Cereno and Zafe liable. It was noted that
Raymond had multiple wounds when brought to the hospital. Upon opening of
his thoracic cavity, it was discovered that there was gross bleeding inside the
body. Thus, the need for Cereno and Zafe to control first what was causing
the bleeding. Despite the situation that evening i.e., numerous patients being
brought to the hospital for emergency treatment considering that it was the
height of the Peñafrancia Fiesta, it was evident that Cereno and Zafe exerted
earnest efforts to save the life of Raymond. It was just unfortunate that the
loss of his life was not prevented.
 In Dr. Cruz v. CA, it was held that “[d]octors are protected by a special law.
They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good result.
They are not insurers against mishaps or unusual consequences.
Furthermore, they are not liable for honest mistake of judgment.”

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