PALE DIGEST
passport. However, she became the object of an
I. REVISIT:
MADRIA VS. ATTY. RIVERA
FACTS:
Complainant Flordeliza A. Madria consulted the
respondent to inquire about the process of annulling
her marriage with her husband, Juan C. Madria.
After giving the details of her marriage and other facts
relevant to the annulment, the respondent told her
that she had a strong case, and guaranteed that he
could obtain for her the decree of annulment. He told
her, too, that his legal services would cost P25,000.00.
The complainant returned to the respondent’s office.
Respondent showed her the petition for annulment, and
asked her to sign it. She paid to him an initial amount of
P4,000.00. He acknowledged the payment through a
handwritten receipt.
The complainant again went to the respondent’s office to
deliver another partial payment, and to follow up on the
case. The respondent advised her to just wait for the
resolution of her complaint, and assured her that she did
not need to appear in court. He explained that all the court
notices and processes would be sent to his office, and that
he would regularly apprise her of the developments. She
returned to his office to complete her payment, and he also
issued his receipt for the payment.
The complainant’s daughter Vanessa thereafter made
several follow- ups on behalf of her mother. The
respondent informed the complainant that her
petition had been granted. Thus, Vanessa went to the
respondent’s office and received a copy of the trial
court’s decision signed by Judge Lyliha Abella
Aquino.
According to the complainant, the respondent advised her
to allow five months to lapse after the release of the
decision before she could safely claim the status of
“single.” After the lapse of such time, she declared in her
Voter’s Registration Record (VRR) that she was single.
The complainant, again through Vanessa, received
from the respondent a copy of the certificate of finality
dated September 26, 2003 signed by one Jacinto C.
Danao.
Believing that the documents were authentic, the
complainant used the purported decision and
certificate of finality in applying for the renewal of her
investigation by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) because her former partner, Andrew Dowson
Grainge, had filed a complaint charging that she had
fabricated the decision for the annulment of her
marriage.
Only then did she learn that the decision and the
certificate of finality given by the respondent did not
exist in the court records, as borne out by the letter
signed by Atty. Aura Clarissa B. Tabag- Querubin, Clerk
of Court of the RTC Branch IV, to wit – As per records of
this Court, the above- entitled case was filed on April 25,
2003 but was dismissed as per Order of this Court dated
April 6, 2004. The signature of the [sic] Judge Lyliha
Abella Aquino as appearing in the alleged decision
attached to your letter is a blatant forgery.
As a result, the complainant faced criminal charges
for violation of the Philippine Passport Act. She claims
that she had relied in good faith on the representations of
the respondent; and that he had taken advantage of his
position in convincing her to part with her money and to
rely on the falsified court documents.
The respondent denies the allegations of the
complainant. He averred that he had informed her that he
would still be carefully reviewing the grounds to support
her petition; that she had insisted that he should prepare
the draft of her petition that she could show to her
foreigner fiance; that she had also prevailed upon him to
simulate the court decision to the effect that her marriage
had been annulled, and to fabricate the certificate of
finality; that she had assured him that such simulated
documents would be kept strictly confidential; that he had
informed her that the petition had been filed in April 2003,
but she had paid no attention to such information; that she
had not appeared in any of the scheduled hearings despite
notice; and that he had not heard from her since then, and
that she had not even returned to his office.
IBP concluded that the respondent had violated his
Lawyer’s Oath; and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for a period of two years. The
IBP Board of Governors modified it to disbarment.
ISSUE:
WON ATTY. RIVERA should be disbarred
HELD:
YES.
1
RATIO:
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the
petition for annulment of marriage, and of the
simulation of the decision and certificate of finality.
His explanation of having done so only upon the
complainant’s persistent prodding did not exculpate
him from responsibility. For one, the explanation is
unacceptable, if not altogether empty. Simulating or
participating in the simulation of a court decision and
a certificate of finality of the same decision is an
outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need
not be a lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the
respondent’s case because he was a lawyer. Thus, his
acts were legally intolerable. Specifically, his
deliberate falsification of the court decision and the
certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high
degree of moral turpitude on his part, and made a
mockery of the administration of justice in this
country. He thereby became unworthy of continuing
as a member of the Bar.
The respondent directly contravened the letter and spirit
of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1, and Rule 15.07, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 – A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence
in the legal system.
CANON 15 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE
CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS
CLIENTS.
Rule 15.07. – A lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of
fairness.
Surely, too, he could not have soon forgotten his express
undertaking under his Lawyer’s Oath to “do no
falsehood, nor consent to its commission,” Indeed; the
ethics of the Legal Profession rightly enjoined every
lawyer like him to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his
practice of law.
Also, Canon 15 and Rule 18.04 of Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility required the
respondent be true to the complainant as his client. By
choosing to ignore his fiduciary responsibility for the
sake of getting her money, he committed a further
violation of his Lawyer’s Oath by which he swore not
to “delay any man’s cause for money or malice,” and
to “conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best
of [his] knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
as well to the courts as to [his] clients.” He
compounded this violation by taking advantage of his
legal knowledge to promote his own selfish motives,
thereby disregarding his responsibility under Canon
17.
Under Section 27,23 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a
lawyer may be disbarred on any of the following
grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5)
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8)
corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party
to a case without authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to
deceit, malpractice or misconduct in office, any of
which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment
under Section 27, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned
for unprofessional conduct. In Cruz- Villanueva v. Rivera
he was suspended from the practice of law because he had
notarized documents without a notarial commission. This
circumstance shows his predisposition to beguile other
persons into believing in the documents that he had
falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such
proclivity. He should be quickly removed through
disbarment.
It is true that the power to disbar is always exercised with
great caution and only for the most imperative reasons or
in cases of clear misconduct affecting the standing and
moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and member of the bar. But we do not hesitate when the
misconduct is gross, like in the respondent’s case.
2
CAYETANO VS. MONSOD
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of chairman
of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not posses required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides
in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission
on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Issue:
Whether the respondent does not posses the required
qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years.
Held:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava,
stated: The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceeding, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance
before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have
been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law means
any activity, in or out court, which requires the application
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience.
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the
required qualification of having engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both
rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC
chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of
the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.
IN RE PETITION TO SIGN ROLL OF ATTY.
MEDADO
TOPIC:
Admission to the Bar, Unauthorized Practice of Law,
Canon 9, Signing of the Roll of Attorneys
FACTS:
Michael A. Medado passed the Philippine bar exams in
1979. On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the
PICC. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
on 13 May 1980, but failed to do so allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Several years later, while rummaging through his things,
he found said Notice. He then realized that he had not
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the
entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.
He thought that since he already took the oath, the signing
of the Roll of Attorneys was not as important. The matter
of signing in the Roll of Attorneys was subsequently
forgotten.
In 2005, when Medado attended MCLE seminars, he was
required to provide his roll number for his MCLE
compliances to be credited. Not having signed in the Roll
of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.
About seven years later, in 2012, Medado filed the instant
Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys. Medado justifies this lapse by characterizing
his acts as “neither willful nor intentional but based on a
mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the
instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross
negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit,
saying that petitioner could offer no valid justification for
his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
3
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner may be allowed to sign the Roll
of Attorneys.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court granted the petition subject to the
payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty
equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty
of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious
ethical transgressions. In this case, said action is not
warranted.
The Court considered Medado’s demonstration of good
faith in filing the petition himself, albeit after the passage
of more than 30 years; that he has shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine
Bar; and that he appears to have been a competent and
able legal practitioner, having held various positions at
different firms and companies.
However, Medado is not free from all liability for his
years of inaction.
A mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the
law and its consequences.
Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed
at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already
the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized
that what he had signed was just an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid
justification. At that point, he should have known that he
was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar, as it
was the act of signing therein that would have made him
so. When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue
practicing law, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law
likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. At the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s
duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This
duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates.
As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
conduct themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
Medado cannot be suspended as he is not yet a full-
fledged lawyer. However, the Court imposed upon him a
penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the
Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of the
Resolution. He was also made to pay a fine of P32,000.
Also, during the one-year period, petitioner was not
allowed to engage in the practice of law.
PARAS VS. PARAS
This administrative case stemmed from the disbarment
complaint1 (1995 complaint) filed by Rosa Yap Paras
(complainant) against her husband Justo de Jesus Paras
(respondent) for which he was suspended from the
practice of law for a year. The issues before the Court now
are (a) whether respondent should be held
administratively liable for allegedly violating his
suspension order and (b) whether his suspension should
be lifted.
The Facts
In a Decision2 dated October 18, 2000, the Court
suspended respondent from the practice of law for six (6)
months for falsifying his wife's signature in bank
documents and other related loan instruments, and for one
(1) year for immorality and abandonment of his family,
with the penalties to be served
simultaneously.3 Respondent moved for
4
reconsideration but the Court denied it with finality in a
Resolution5 dated January 22, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, complainant filed a Motion6 to declare
in contempt and disbar respondent and his associate, Atty.
Richard R. Enojo (Atty. Enojo), alleging that respondent
continued to practice law, and that Atty. Enojo signed a
pleading prepared by respondent, in violation of the
suspension order.7 Moreover, complainant claimed that
respondent appeared before a court in Dumaguete City on
February 21, 2001, thereby violating the suspension
order.8 On March 26, 2001, complainant filed a second
motion for contempt and disbarment,9 claiming that, on
March 13, 2001, Atty. Enojo again appeared for Paras and
Associates, in willful disobedience of the suspension
order issued against respondent.10 Complainant filed two
(2) more motions for contempt dated June 8, 200111 and
August 21, 200112 raising the same arguments.
Respondent and Atty. Enojo filed their respective
comments,13 and complainant filed her replies14 to both
comments. Later on, respondent filed a Motion to Lift
Suspension15 dated May 27, 2002, informing the Court
4
that he completed the suspension period on May 22, 2002.
Thereafter, respondent admitted that he started accepting
new clients and cases after the filing of the Motion to Lift
Suspension.16 Also, complainant manifested that
respondent appeared before a court in an election case on
July 25, 2002 despite the pendency of his motion to lift
suspension. In view of the foregoing, the Court referred
the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for report and recommendation.17
On March 26, 2003, complainant filed an Ex-Parte
Motion for Clarificatory Order18 on the status of
respondent' suspension, essentially inquiring whether
respondent can resume his practice prior to the Court's
order to lift his suspension.19 Meanwhile, the Office of the
Bar Confidant (OBC) received the same inquiry through
a Letter20 dated March 21, 2003 signed by Acting
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) Judge Romeo
Anasario of the Second MCTC of Negros Oriental.
Accordingly, the Court referred the foregoing queries to
the OBC for report and recommendation.21
In a Report and Recommendation22 dated June 22, 2004,
the OBC recommended that the Court issue an order
declaring that respondent cannot engage in the practice of
law until his suspension is ordered lifted by the
Court.23Citing case law, the OBC opined that the lifting
of a lawyer's suspension is not automatic upon the end of
the period stated in the Court's decision and an order from
the Court lifting the suspension is necessary to enable him
to resume the practice of his profession. In this regard, the
OBC noted that: (a) respondent's suspension became
effective on May 23, 2001 upon his receipt of the Court
resolution denying his motion for reconsideration with
finality; and (b) considering that the suspensions were to
be served simultaneously, the period of
suspension should have ended on May 22, 2002.24 To
date, however, the Court has not issued any order lifting
the suspension.
Soon thereafter, in a Resolution25 dated August 2, 2004,
the Court directed the IBP to submit its report and
recommendation on the pending incidents referred to it.
Since no report was received until 2013, the Court was
constrained to issue a Resolution26 dated January 20,
2014, requiring the IBP to submit a status report regarding
the said incidents. In response, the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline sent a letter27 to the Court, conveying that
the Board of Governors had passed a Resolution dated
April 15, 2013 affirming respondent's suspension from
the practice of law.28 However, in view of the pendency
of respondent's motion for reconsideration before it, the
IBP undertook to transmit the case records to the Court as
soon as said motion is resolved.29 Thereafter, in a
letter30dated September 22, 2015, the IBP advised the
Court that it denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration. The Court received the records and
relevant documents only on February 15, 2016.31
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
In the Report and Recommendation32 dated January 16,
2012, instead of resolving only the pending incidents
referred to the IBP, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
examined anew the 1995 complaint filed against
respondent which had been resolved with finality by the
Court in its Decision dated October 18, 2000 and
Resolution dated January 22, 2001. The Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years for
falsifying his wife's signature in the bank loan documents
and for immorality.33
In a Resolution34 dated April 15, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation dated January 16, 2012, with
modification decreasing the recommended penalty to
suspension from the practice of law for one (1)
year.35 Aggrieved, respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration,36 alleging that his administrative liability
based on the charges in the 1995 complaint had been
settled more than a decade ago in the Court's Decision
dated October 18, 2000. He added that to suspend him
anew for another year based on the same grounds would
constitute administrative double jeopardy. He stressed
that the post-decision referral of this case to the IBP was
limited only to pending incidents relating to the motion to
declare him in contempt and his motion to lift the
suspension. Such motion was, however, denied in a
Resolution dated June 7, 2015.37
The Issues Before the Court
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether respondent
should be administratively held liable for practicing law
while he was suspended; and (b) whether the Court
should lift his suspension.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant matters
referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and
recommendation pertain to respondent's alleged violation
of the suspension order and his request for the Court to
lift the suspension order. However, the IBP Investigating
5
Commissioner evidently did not dwell on such matters.
Instead, the IBP Investigating Commissioner proceeded
to determine respondent's liability based on the 1995
complaint filed by herein complainant - which was
already resolved with finality by no less than the Court
itself. To make things worse: (a) the IBP Board of
Governors failed to see the IBP Investigating
Commissioner's mishap, and therefore, erroneously
upheld the latter's report and recommendation; and (b) it
took the IBP more than a decade to resolve the instant
matters before it. Thus, this leaves the Court with no
factual findings to serve as its basis in resolving the issues
raised before it.
Generally, the IBP's formal investigation is a mandatory
requirement which may not be dispensed with, except for
valid and compelling reasons,38 as it is essential to accord
both parties an opportunity to be heard on the issues
raised.39 Absent a valid fact-finding investigation, the
Court usually remands the administrative case to the IBP
for further proceedings.40 However, in light of the
foregoing circumstances, as well as respondent's own
admission that he resumed practicing law even without a
Court order lifting his suspension, the Court finds a
compelling reason to resolve the matters raised before it
even without the IBP's factual findings and
recommendation thereon.
According to jurisprudence, the "practice of law embraces
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or
procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and
experience."41 During the suspension period and before
the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from
practicing law.42 It must be stressed, however, that a
lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the
lapse of the suspension period.43 The lawyer must submit
the required documents and wait for an order from the
Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the
practice of law.44
In this case, the OBC correctly pointed out that
respondent's suspension period became effective on May
23, 2001 and lasted for one (1) year, or until May 22,
2002. Therafter, respondent filed a motion for the lifting
of his suspension. However, soon after this filing and
without waiting for a Court order approving the same,
respondent admitted to accepting new clients and cases,
and even working on an amicable settlement for his client
with the Department of Agrarian Reform.45 Indubitably,
respondent engaged in the practice of law without waiting
for the Court order lifting the suspension order against
him, and thus, he must be held administratively liable
therefor.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court and
willfully appearing as an attorney without authority to do
so - acts which respondent is guilty of in this case - are
grounds for disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law,46 to wit:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent,
prevailing case law47 shows that the Court consistently
imposed an additional suspension of six (6) months on
lawyers who continue practicing law despite their
suspension. Thus, an additional suspension of six (6)
months on respondent due to his unauthorized practice of
law is proper. The Court is mindful, however, that
suspension can no longer be imposed on respondent
considering that just recently, respondent had already
been disbarred from the practice of law and his name had
been stricken off the Roll of Attorneys in Paras v.
Paras.48 In Sanchez v. Torres,49 the Court ruled that the
penalty of suspension or disbarment can no longer be
imposed on a lawyer who had been previously
disbarred.50 Nevertheless, it resolved the issue on the
lawyer's administrative liability for recording purposes in
the lawyer's personal file in the OBC. Hence, the Court
held that respondent therein should be suspended from the
practice of law, although the said penalty can no longer
be imposed in view of his previous disbarment. In the
same manner, the Court imposes upon respondent herein
the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months, although the said penalty can no
longer be effectuated in view of his previous disbarment,
but nonetheless should be adjudged for recording
6
purposes. That being said, the issue anent the propriety of
lifting his suspension is already moot and academic.
As for Atty. Enojo, complainant insists that by signing a
pleading dated February 21, 200151 and indicating therein
the firm name Paras and Associates, Atty. Enojo
conspired with respondent to violate the suspension order.
Complainant's contention is untenable.
As a lawyer, Atty. Enojo has the duty and privilege of
representing clients before the courts.1âwphi1 Thus, he
can sign pleadings on their behalf.1âwphi1 The Court
cannot give credence to complainant's unsubstantiated
claim that respondent prepared the pleading and only
requested Atty. Enojo to sign it. Furthermore, the
pleading averted to by complainant was dated February
21, 2001, when respondent's suspension was not yet
effective. Thus, the contempt charge against Atty. Enojo
must be denied for lack of merit.
As a final note, the Court reminds the IBP to
meticulously, diligently, and efficiently act on the matters
referred to it for investigation, report, and
recommendation, and to submit its report with reasonable
dispatch so as to ensure proper administration of justice.
Any inordinate delay cannot be countenanced.
WHEREFORE, respondent Justo de Jesus Paras is
hereby found GUILTY of violating Section 27, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months. However, considering that respondent has
already been previously disbarred, this penalty can no
longer be imposed.
The motion to declare Atty. Richard R. Enojo in contempt
is DENIED for lack of merit.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of
the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal
record as a member of the Bar. Likewise, let copies of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is
directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
II. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
ACA VS. ATTY. SALVADO
FACTS:
Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint3 for
disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.014 and Canon 7, Rule 7.035 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in
2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel
Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty.
Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a
businessman engaged in several businesses including but
not limited to the lending business; that on the same
occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to
invest in his business with a guarantee that he would
be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month;
and that he was assured of a profitable investment due
by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and
investors.
As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado
issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of
P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus
interests. All checks were drawn from PSBank.
Upon presentment, however, complainant was
shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were
dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient
funds or a closed account.
Complainant made several verbal and written
demands upon Atty. Salvado. As time went by,
however, Atty. Salvado began to avoid complainant’s
calls and text messages. This prompted complainant to
refer the matter to his lawyer Atty. Divina, for
appropriate legal action.
Atty. Divina personally served the Notice of Dishonor on
Atty. Salvado, directing him to settle his total obligation
in the amount of P747,000.00. Atty. Salvado refused to
receive the said notice.
Complainant went to Atty. Salvado’s house to personally
serve the demand letter. A certain “Mark” who opened the
gate told the filing clerk that Atty. Salvado was no longer
residing there and had been staying in the province
already.
7
As they were about to leave, a red vehicle arrived bearing
Atty. Salvado. Complainant quickly alighted from his
vehicle and confronted him as he was about to enter the
gate of the house. Obviously startled, Atty. Salvado told
him that he had not forgotten his debt. During this
conversation, Atty. Salvado assured complainant that he
was working on “something” to pay his obligations. He
still refused to personally receive or, at the least, read the
demand letter.
Despite his promises, Atty. Salvado failed to settle his
obligations.
Atty. Salvado denied that he told complainant that he had
previously entered into various government contracts and
that he was previously engaged in some other businesses
prior to engaging in the lending and rediscounting
business. Atty. Salvado asserted that he never enticed
complainant to invest in his business, but it was Atty.
Divina’s earnings of good interest that attracted him into
making an investment.
The checks he issued were merely intended as security or
evidence of investment.
Atty. Salvado also claimed that, in the past, there were
instances when he would request complainant not to
deposit a check knowing that it was not backed up by
sufficient funds. This arrangement had worked until the
dishonor of the checks, for which he readily offered his
house and lot located in Marikina City as collateral.
Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty.
Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for six (6) months.
IBP-BOG adopted and approved the recommendation
with modification – increased the period of suspension
from six (6) months to two (2) years.
ISSUE:
WON ATTY. SALVADO should be suspended for he
violated CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath
HELD:
YES.
RATIO:
1. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on
representations made by lawyers. As a man of
law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen. A
man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is
expected to make truthful representations when
dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. For the
Court, and as the IBP-BOG had observed,
complainant’s being beguiled to part with
his money and believe Atty. .Salvado as a lawyer
and businessman was typical human behavior
worthy of belief. The Court finds it hard to
believe that a person like the complainant would
not find the profession of the person on whose
businesses he would invest as important to
consider. Simply put, Atty. Salvado’s stature
as a member of the Bar had, in one way or
another, influenced complainant’s decision to
invest.
2. The excuse of “gullibility and inadvertence”
deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty.
Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the
Constitution and the laws of the land is the
primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued
the worthless checks, he discredited the legal
profession and created the public impression
that laws were mere tools of convenience that
could be used, bended and abused to satisfy
personal whims and desires. In Lao v. Medel,
the Court wrote that the issuance of worthless
checks constituted gross misconduct, and put
the erring lawyer’s moral character in serious
doubt, though it was not related to his
professional duties as a member of the Bar.
Covered by this dictum is Atty. Salvado’s
business relationship with complainant. His
issuance of the subject checks display his
doubtful fitness as an officer of the court.
Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of
the CPR.
3. The Court cannot overlook Atty. Salvado’s
deceiving attempts to evade payment of his
obligations.
DISPOSITION: SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of two (2) years
8
JIMENEZ VS. FRANCISCO
Facts:
Atty. Edgar Francisco was the legal counsel of Mark
Jimenez. What happened was Mark Jimenez filed a
complaint for estafa against Caroline Jimenez
(complainant) and several others. Jimenez alleged that he
was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in
Clarion Realty and Development Corporation, which was
incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a
residential house located in Forbes Park, Makati. In order
to achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property,
Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the
amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased
the Forbes property in the amount of P117,000,000.00
from Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed
a check in the said amount which was funded entirely by
Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed
of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was
purchased for P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money
used as the purchase price was not reflected in the books
of Clarion.
Caroline (complainant) was shocked with the complaint.
More so, she felt betrayed by Atty. Francisco who helped
Jimenez filed the estafa case. So, Caroline filed a
complaint against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations
of the Code of Professional responsibility before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Caroline claimed
that Atty. F represented conflicting interests. According
to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions.
More significantly, the principal documents relative to the
sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared
and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.
In his defense, Atty. F denied that he was ever the
personal lawyer of Caroline. He admitted that he acted as
legal counsel of Clarion, but then again, the corporation
has a personality separate from that of Caroline. He also
said that he helped Caroline under the impression that it
was what Jimenez would have wanted.
The CBD sided with Caroline and recommended that
Atty. F be suspended from the practice of law for one
year. This was upheld by the IBP.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. F was guilty of violations of
the CPR.
Held: Canon 1 and Rule 1.0 was violated, but he was not
guilty of representing conflicting interests.
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES. Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly
violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion,
to actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant
matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently,
its corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted
to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that
these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said
transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders
of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct
in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of
assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his
long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law
on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by
the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty
and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks.
Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his
clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the
loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property.
He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government
of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco
participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was
content to have granted the requests of the persons
involved.
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their
support for the cause of their clients should never be
attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer
owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so
only within the bounds of the law.
The rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-
client relationship. But here, there was no proof of such
lawyer-client relationship.
9
Elements of lawyer-client privilege: (1) There exists an
attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-
client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship
that the client made the communication; (2) The client
made the communication in confidence. (3) The legal
advice must be sought from the attorney in his
professional capacity.
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court
holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate the
claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant
failed to establish the professional relationship between
her and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of
any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in
confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what
she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential
communication was relayed. All that complaint alleged in
her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from
respondent in various occasions." Considering that
complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there
was no testimony as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco
without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not
impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the
rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado,
such confidential information is a crucial link in
establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and client. It is not
enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It
cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the
burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this
regard.
HECK VS. SANTOS
FACTS: The instant case arose when in a verified
LetterComplaint dated March 21, 2001 Heinz R. Heck
prayed for the disbarment of Judge Anthony E. Santos,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City.
The complainant alleged that prior to the respondents
appointment as RTC judge on April 11, 1989, he violated
the notarial law, thus:
Judge Santos, based on ANNEX A, was not duly
commissioned as notary public until January 9, 1984 but
still subscribed and forwarded (on a non-regular basis)
notarized documents to the Clerk of Court VI starting
January 1980 uncommissioned until the 9th of January
1984.
The complainant submitted a certification from Clerk of
Court, Atty. Beverly Sabio-Beja, Regional Trial Court,
Misamis Oriental, which contained the following:
1. The name Atty. Anthony E. Santos is listed as a duly
commissioned notary public in the following years:
a. January 9, 1984 to December 31, 1985
b. January 16, 1986 to December 31, 1987
c. January 6, 1988 to December 31, 1989
Records also fail to show any entry of transmittal of
notarial documents under the name Atty. Anthony Santos
on various dates.
Pursuant to the report of the Office of the Court
Administrator recommending the need to resort to a
fullblown investigation to determine the veracity of the
parties assertions, the Court, in a Resolution dated
September 10, 2001, resolved to: (a) treat the matter as a
regular administrative complaint; and (b) refer the case to
Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz of the Court of Appeals
(CA) for investigation, report and recommendation
Upon the complainants insistence the hearing was held at
in Cagayan de Oro City. The complainant presented his
evidence in Cagayan de Oro City before retired Court of
Appeals Justice Romulo S. Quimbo.
In a Sealed Report dated August 14, 2003, Investigating
Justice Edgardo P. Cruz made the following
recommendation:
It is recommended that [i] respondent (who retired on
May 22, 2002) be found guilty of violation of the Notarial
Law by (a) notarizing documents without commission;
(b) tardiness in
submission of notarial reports; and (c) nonforwarding of
his notarial register to the Clerk of Court upon expiration
of his commission; and [ii] that for these infractions, he
be suspended from the practice of law and barred from
being commissioned as notary public, both for one year,
and his present commission, if any, be revoked
According to the Investigating Justice, the respondent did
not adduce evidence in his defense, while the complainant
presented documentary evidence to support the charges.
The Investigating Justice said that it is noteworthy that in
his answer, respondent did not claim that he was
10
commissioned as notary public for the years 1980 to 1983
nor deny the accuracy of the first certification. He merely
alleged that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor
of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register.
And, as already observed, he presented no evidence,
particularly on his appointment as notary public for 1980
to 1983 (assuming he was so commissioned) and
submission of notarial reports and notarial register.
Thus, the Investigating Justice concluded, based on the
evidence presented by the complainant, that the
respondent notarized documents in 1980 and 1983
without being commissioned as a notary public therefor,
considering that his earliest commission of record was on
January 9, 1984
ISSUES:
Procedural Issues
a. W/N resolution AM No. 02-9-02-SC applies b. What
procedure to be followed in disbarment cases involving a
retired judge for acts committed while he was still a
practicing lawyer
Substantive Issues
a. W/N the retirement or resignation of a judge will
preclude the filing thereafter of an administrative charge
against him for which he shall still be held answerable if
found liable therefor b. W/N a judge may be disciplined
for acts committed before his appointment to the judiciary
c. W/N notarizing documents without the requisite
commission constitutes malpractice, if not the crime of
falsification of public documents d. W/N the charge
against Judge Santos is supported by evidence e. W/N an
administrative complaint against a member of the bar
prescribes
RULING
PROCEDURAL
a. No. It does not apply.
On September 17, 2002, we issued Resolution A.M. No.
02-9-02-SC, to wit: Some administrative cases against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan;
judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials
who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise
grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar
for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of
Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches
of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as
grounds for the discipline of lawyers.
So Before the Court approved this resolution,
administrative and disbarment cases against members of
the bar who were likewise members of the court were
treated separately. Thus, pursuant to the new rule,
administrative cases against erring justices of the CA and
the Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the
government service may be automatically treated as
disbarment cases. The Resolution, which took effect on
October 1, 2002, also provides that it shall supplement
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and shall apply to
administrative cases already filed where the respondents
have not yet been required to comment on the complaints.
Clearly, the instant case is not covered by the foregoing
resolution, since the respondent filed his
Answer/Comment on June 13, 2001.
b. The undisputed facts are as follows: (1) the respondent
is a retired judge; (2) the complainant prays for his
disbarment; and (3) the acts constituting the ground for
disbarment were committed when the respondent was still
a practicing lawyer, before his appointment to the
judiciary. Thus, the respondent is being charged not for
acts committed as a judge; he is charged, as a member of
the bar, with notarizing documents without the requisite
notarial commission therefor.
It is clear from the Rules then that a complaint for
disbarment is cognizable by the Court itself, and its
indorsement to the IBP is not mandatory. The Court may
refer the complaint for investigation, report and
recommendation to the Solicitor General, any officer of
the court or a judge of a lower court, on which the Court
will thereafter base its final action.
Although the respondent has already retired from the
judiciary, he is still considered as a member of the bar and
as such, is not immune to the disciplining arm of the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 6[16]of
the 1987 Constitution. Furthermore, at the time of the
filing of the complaint, the respondent was still the
presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Cagayan de Oro City. As such, the complaint was
cognizable by the Court itself, as the Rule mandates that
in case the respondent is a justice of the Court of Tax
Appeals or the lower court, the complaint shall be filed
with the Supreme Court
SUBSTANTIVE
11
a. No The practice of law is so ultimately affected with public
interest that it is both the right and duty of the State to
The fact that a judge has retired or has otherwise been
control and regulate it in order to promote the public
separated from the service does not necessarily divest the
welfare. The Constitution vests this power of control and
Court of its jurisdiction to determine the veracity of the
regulation in this Court.[29] The Supreme Court, as
allegations of the complaint, pursuant to its disciplinary
guardian of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary
authority over members of the bench.
power over attorneys, which authority is not only a right
However, recognizing the proliferation of unfounded or but a bounden duty as well. This is why respect and
malicious administrative or criminal cases against fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members
members of the judiciary for purposes of harassment, we
c. Yes
issued A.M. No. 03-10-01-SC[20] which took effect on
November 3, 2003. It must be remembered that notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is invested
Accdg to AM No 03-10-01-SC, in order for an
with substantive public interest, such that only those who
administrative complaint against a retiring or retired
are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public.[31]
judge or justice to be dismissed outright, the following
Notarization by a notary public converts a private
requisites must concur: (1) the complaint must have been
document into a public one, making it admissible in
filed within six months from the compulsory retirement
evidence without the necessity of preliminary proof of its
of the judge or justice; (2) the cause of action must have
authenticity and due execution.[32]
occurred at least a year before such filing; and, (3) it is
shown that the complaint was intended to harass the The requirements for the issuance of a commission as
respondent. notary public must not be treated as a mere casual
formality.[33] The Court has characterized a lawyers act
In this case, the Administrative Complaint dated March
of notarizing documents without the requisite commission
21, 2001 was received by the Office of the Court
therefore as reprehensible, constituting as it does not only
Administrator on March 26, 2001.[21] The respondent
malpractice, but also the crime of falsification of public
retired compulsorily from the service more than a year
documents.[34] For such reprehensible conduct, the Court
later, or on May 22, 2002. Likewise, the ground for
has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
disbarment or disciplinary action alleged to have been
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and
committed by the respondent did not occur a year before
disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.
the respondents separation from the service. Furthermore,
and most importantly, the instant complaint was not prima In the case of Nunga v. Viray,[36] the Court had the
facie shown to be without merit and intended merely to occasion to state -
harass the respondent.
Where the notarization of a document is done by a
Clearly, therefore, the instant case does not fall within the member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no
ambit of the foregoing resolution. authorization or commission to do so, the offender may
be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
b. Yes
notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of
It is settled that a judge may be disciplined for acts the lawyers oath to
committed prior to his appointment to the judiciary.[22]
obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then,
In fact, even the new Rule itself recognizes this, as it
too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned
provides for the immediate forwarding to the Supreme
when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes,
Court for disposition and adjudication of charges against
indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyers oath
justices and judges before the IBP, including those filed
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within
prior to their appointment to the judiciary.[23] It need not
the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
be shown that the respondent continued the doing of the
Professional Responsibility, which provides: A lawyer
act or acts complained of; it is sufficient that the evidence
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
on record supports the charge on the respondent,
deceitful conduct.[37]
considering the gravity of the offense.

12
The importance of the function of a notary public cannot,
therefore, be over-emphasized. No less than the public
faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in
every aspect of that function
d. Yes
The respondent did not object to the complainants formal
offer of evidence, prompting the Investigating Justice to
decide the case on the basis of the pleadings filed.[39]
Neither did he claim that he was commissioned as notary
public for the years 1980 to 1983, nor deny the accuracy
of the first certification. The respondent merely alleged in
his answer that there was no proper recording of the
commissioned lawyers in the City of Cagayan de Oro nor
of the submitted Notarized Documents/Notarial Register.
Furthermore, as found by the Investigating Justice, the
respondent presented no evidence of his commission as
notary public for the years 1980 to 1983, as well as proof
of submission of notarial reports and the notarial register.
The respondent in this case was given an opportunity to
answer the charges and to controvert the evidence against
him in a formal investigation. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he
deny the charges; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence against him.
The respondents allegation that the complainant was not
a party in any of the documents so notarized, and as such
was not prejudiced thereby, is unavailing. An attorney
may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his
oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor which
include the statutory grounds under Section 27, Rule
138[42] of the Revised Rules of Court. Any interested
person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. There can be no doubt as to the right of a
citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority acts
and doings of public officers which citizens feel are
incompatible with the duties of the office and from which
conduct the citizen or the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences
e. No
The qualification of good moral character is a requirement
which is not dispensed with upon admission to
membership of the bar. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession,
but its continued possession is essential to maintain ones
good standing in the profession. It is a continuing
requirement to the practice of law and therefore does not
preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning ones mental or
moral fitness before he became a lawyer. This is because
his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended
or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing
requirement to the practice of law.
Furthermore, administrative cases against lawyers belong
to a class of their own, distinct from and may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases. As we held in
the leading case of In re Almacen: [D]isciplinary
proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that an administrative complaint against
an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a judge,
albeit filed only after twentyfour years after the offending
act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the
rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be
emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as
lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no
private complainant would immediately come forward,
they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from
whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.
It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the
practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No
matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the
commission of the act complained of and the time of the
institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench
and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court.
This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous
members of the bench and bar, to deter them from
committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the
Lawyers Oath. This should particularly apply in this case,
considering the seriousness of the matter involved - the
respondents dishonesty and the sanctity of notarial
documents.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time, from the
commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint, will not erase the
administrative culpability of a lawyer who notarizes
documents without the requisite authority therefor.
Time and again, we have stressed the settled principle that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed
13
by the State on those who show that they possess the
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such
privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions. A high sense of morality, honesty, and
fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the
bar.[52] By his actuations, the respondent failed to live up
to such standards;[53] he undermined the confidence of
the public on notarial documents and thereby breached
Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for the law and legal
processes. The respondent also violated Rule 1.01 thereof
which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.[54] In
representing that he was possessed of the requisite
notarial commission when he was, in fact, not so
authorized, the respondent also violated Rule 10.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a
lawyer that he shall do no falsehood.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. While we will not hesitate to remove an erring
attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where
the evidence calls for it, we will likewise not disbar him
where a lesser penalty will suffice to accomplish the
desired end.[55] Furthermore, a tempering of justice is
mandated in this case, considering that the complaint
against the respondent was filed twenty-four years after
the commission of the act complained of;[56] that there
was no private offended party who came forward and
claimed to have been adversely affected by the documents
so notarized by the respondent; and, the fact that the
respondent is a retired judge who deserves to enjoy the
full measure of his well-earned retirement benefits.[57]
The Court finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is justified in this
case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Anthony E. Santos is
found GUILTY of notarizing documents without the
requisite notarial commission therefor. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a fine in the amount of Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00).
DE JESUS VS. ATTY. SANCHEZ-MALIT
FACTS
In the Affidavit-Complaint filed by complainant before
the Office of the Bar Confidant on 23 June 2004, she
alleged that on 1 March 2002, respondent had drafted and
notarized a Real Estate Mortgage of a public market stall
that falsely named the former as its absolute and
registered owner. As a result, the mortgagee sued
complainant for perjury and for collection of sum of
money. She claimed that respondent was a consultant of
the local government unit of Dinalupihan, Bataan, and
was therefore aware that the market stall was government-
owned. Prior thereto, respondent had also notarized two
contracts that caused complainant legal and financial
problems. One contract was a lease agreement notarized
by respondent sometime in September 1999 without the
signature of the lessees. However, complainant only
found out that the agreement had not been signed by the
lessees when she lost her copy and she asked for another
copy from respondent. The other contract was a sale
agreement over a property covered by a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA) which complainant
entered into with a certain Nicomedes Tala (Tala) on 17
February 1998. Respondent drafted and notarized said
agreement, but did not advise complainant that the
property was still covered by the period within which it
could not be alienated.
In addition to the documents attached to her complaint,
complainant subsequently submitted three Special
Powers of Attorney (SPAs) notarized by respondent and
an Affidavit of Irene Tolentino (Tolentino),
complainant’s secretary/treasurer. The SPAs were not
signed by the principals named therein and bore only the
signature of the named attorney in-fact, Florina B.
Limpioso (Limpioso). Tolentino’s Affidavit corroborated
complainant’s allegations against respondent.
With respect to the lease agreement, respondent countered
that the document attached to the Affidavit-Complaint
was actually new. She gave the court’s copy of the
agreement to complainant to accommodate the latter’s
request for an extra copy. Thus, respondent prepared and
notarized a new one, relying on complainant’s assurance
that the lessees would sign it and that it would be returned
in lieu of the original copy for the court. Complainant,
however, reneged on her promise.
14
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of violating Canon 1
and Rules 1.01, 1.02, and 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
RULING
The important role a notary public performs cannot be
overemphasized. The Court has repeatedly stressed that
notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act,
but one invested with substantive public interest.
Notarization converts a private document into a public
document, making it admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. Thus, a notarized
document is, by law, entitled to full faith and credit upon
its face. It is for this reason that a notary public must
observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public's
confidence in the integrity of a notarized document would
be undermined.
Where the notary public admittedly has personal
knowledge of a false statement or information contained
in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix the
notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline
the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the
case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of
the notarization process may be undermined, and public
confidence in notarial documents diminished. In this case,
respondent fully knew that complainant was not the
owner of the mortgaged market stall. That complainant
comprehended the provisions of the real estate mortgage
contract does not make respondent any less guilty. If at
all, it only heightens the latter’s liability for tolerating a
wrongful act. Clearly, respondent’s conduct amounted to
a breach of Canon 1 and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Respondent’s explanation about the unsigned lease
agreement executed by complainant sometime in
September 1999 is incredulous. If, indeed, her file copy
of the agreement bore the lessees’ signatures, she could
have given complainant a certified photocopy thereof. It
even appears that said lease agreement is not a rarity in
respondent’s practice as a notary public. Records show
that on various occasions from 2002 to 2004, respondent
has notarized 22 documents that were either unsigned or
lacking signatures of the parties. Technically, each
document maybe a ground for disciplinary action, for it is
the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a document
be signed in his or her presence.
A notary public should not notarize a document unless the
persons who signed it are the very same ones who
executed it and who personally appeared before the said
notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. Thus, in acknowledging that the parties
personally came and appeared before her, respondent also
violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and her oath as a lawyer that she shall do
no falsehood. Certainly, respondent is unfit to continue
enjoying the solemn office of a notary public. In several
instances, the Court did not hesitate to disbar lawyers who
were found to be utterly oblivious to the solemnity of their
oath as notaries public. Even so, the rule is that
disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct
that seriously affect the standing and character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and the Court will not
disbar a lawyer where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end. The blatant disregard by
respondent of her basic duties as a notary public warrants
the less severe punishment of suspension from the
practice of law and perpetual disqualification to be
commissioned as a notary public.
PEREZ VS. ATTY. CATINDIG
In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty.
Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s when they
were both students at the University of the Philippines,
but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in
1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again
crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to
court Dr. Perez.
Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already
wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the
latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church
in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic
wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon
City. Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only
married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was
afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her
pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could
have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law
School.
Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of
obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his
marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry
15
her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently,
sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a
divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez
claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said
divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no
longer any impediment to their marriage.
Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez
in the State of Virginia in the United States of America
(USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they
named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.
Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to
Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that
was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter
and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When
she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly
assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once
he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also
promised to legally adopt their son.
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of
his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to
nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that
he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said
petition.
Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an
anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of Atty.
Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that
sometime later, she came upon a love letter written and
signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25,
2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love
to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his
“impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into
their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to
put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to
obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13,
2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity
of his marriage to Gomez.
On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez
and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in
Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was
frequently seen.
Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, admitted that he married
Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that
immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that
she was incapable of complying with her marital
obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and
that while their union was blessed with four children, their
relationship simply deteriorated.
Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de
facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty.
Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how
the agreement to separate and live apart could be
implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt
a property regime of complete separation of property. She
likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree
from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may
have and comfort it may provide them.
Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a
divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise
admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by
the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further,
Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was
granted on June 23, 1984.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the
foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by
the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in
the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the
marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr.
Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus,
Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.
Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to
Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr.
Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of
losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a
modicum of legitimacy to their relationship.
Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez
turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October
2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr.
Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started
to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo
joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that
while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not
reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed
out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January
2001.
16
For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair
with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig
began courting her while she was employed in his firm.
She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic
overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his
feelings since he was married and that he was too old for
her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty.
Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she
resigned from his law firm.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondents committed gross
immorality, which would warrant their disbarment?
RULING
After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of
the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court
agrees with the findings and recommendations of the
Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit, the Court held:
[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much
greater import, as far as the general public is concerned,
than the possession of legal learning. Good moral
character is not only a condition precedent for admission
to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in
order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive
and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than
just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it
is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
wrong. This must be so because “vast interests are
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property,
reputation, his life, his all.”
“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” Immoral
conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the
opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled
as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting
circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of
decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the
supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct
requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a
previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.
The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the
parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is
grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled,
but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a
wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which
was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty.
Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths
crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage
and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his
first marriage was then already falling apart due to
Gomez’ serious intimacy problems.
A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de
facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal
partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a
court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez
in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so
enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved
heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away –
a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality.
From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the
divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our
jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens
at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to
Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous
marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his
subsequent marriage would be void. This
notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing
circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of
17
social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and
purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage.
It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty.
Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that
Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained
valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry
Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding
any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent
marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s
claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their
marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted
to various legal strategies in order to render a façade of
validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez.
Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is
reprehensible to the highest degree.
Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and
despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to
give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig
left her and their son. It was only at that time that he
finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first
marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already
entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an
associate lawyer employed by his firm.
While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate
from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be
considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms
part of the pattern showing his propensity towards
immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s
finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty.
Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting
of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his
previous marriage to Gomez.
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a
member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct
that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of
the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a
mockery of the inviolable social institution of
marriage.’” In various cases, the Court has held that
disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his
lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who has borne him a child.
Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed
by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made
a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking
advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited
a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of
him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the
penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a
clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty,
such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end
desired, disbarment should never be decreed.
Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense
compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it
appears to be the most appropriate penalty.
Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against
him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and not
supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B
of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration.
Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings
that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his
previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted.
Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the
Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between
the respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating
Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove
the claimed amorous relationship between the
respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by
Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an
anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were
indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to
Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig.
The Court has consistently held that in suspension or
disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer
enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations
in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or
disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.
The presentation of the anonymous letter that was
received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed
received a letter informing her of the alleged relations
between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of
the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter,
if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo
18
a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that
Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty.
Catindig.
GARCIA VS. SESBRENO
FACTS:
Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño
before the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan,
Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth,
filed an action for support against him and his sister
Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the
case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while
Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In
2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and
Garcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño filed
a Second Amended Complaint against him.
Garcia alleged that he learned that Sesbreño was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-
31733. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is only on parole.
Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against moral
turpitude; and thus, Sesbreño should not be allowed to
continue his practice of law.
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his
sentence was commuted and the phrase “with the inherent
accessory penalties provided by law” was deleted.
Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was
not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the
term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño
claimed that Garcia’s complaint was motivated by
extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against
him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
ISSUES:
1. WON conviction for the crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude.
2. WON Sesbreño should be disbarred
HELD:
1. YES.
2. YES.
RATIO:
1. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of
homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may
or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in
every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of
fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding
circumstances. While x x x generally but not always,
crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained
whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by
classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se
and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala
prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is
somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of
which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or
exclusion as the cases are reached.
The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and
Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They
did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing
done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of
Amparado.
We cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive
clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his
argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an
absolute and unconditional pardon” which restored his
“full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present
in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not
state that the pardon was absolute and unconditional.
There are four acts of executive clemency that the
President can extend: the President can grant reprieves,
commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the
executive clemency merely “commuted to an
indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10
years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio.
Commutation is a mere reduction of
penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished
criminal liability. The penalty for Sesbrefio’ s crime was
never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced
penalty, for which reason he was released from prison.
19
2. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states
that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by
final judgment for a crime involving moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his
fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
DISPOSITION: Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is
DISBARRED.
RAFAEL VS. ATTY. ALIBUTDAN DIAZ
FACTS:
This case involves the complaint for suspension or
disbarment of the respondent. PACE is the umbrella
association of 1stand 2ndlevel court employees held
in a convention seminar in Davao City in 2005.
Respondent is the National Treasurer of PACE, in which
she was trusted with all money matters of PACE.
That the liquidation for the 11th national PACE
convention was submitted only on March 2007 during the
12th PACE national convention in Iloilo City. That when
Diaz run for the election for national treasurer, she was
not elected, that on the last day of the convention, it
passed board resolution appropriating the amount of
30,000 as term-end bonus for each PACE official
qualified thereto. That Diaz did not submit a liquidation
as to the 12thPACE national convention and that there
was no turnover of monies belonging to the association as
a matter of procedure, despite a letter of demand sent to
her. That a board resolution was passed directing her to
explain why they failed to liquidate the past finances for
the PACE of Davao and Iloilo conventions.
In her defense, she said that she filed a statement of
liquidation for the 11th national PACE convention and that
the proceeds were fully accounted. That she also filed a
liquidation for the 12th PACE convention, that the report,
cash and receipts were fully accounted for and received
by former PACE officers. That the term end bonus did not
rest on her solely, rather it was approved by previous
board of directors, and that she never sponsored the
bonus.
GUARIN VS. LIMPIN
FACTS:
This case started in 2004, Guarin was hired by Mr. Celso
G. de los Angeles as Chief Operating Officer and
thereafter as President of OneCard Company, Inc., a
member of the Legacy Group of Companies. He resigned
from his post effective August 11, 2008 and transferred to
St. Luke’s Medical Center as the Vice President for
Finance.
On November 27, 2008, Atty. Limpin, the Corporate
Secretary of Legacy Card, Inc. (LCI), another corporation
under the Legacy Group, filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a General Information
Sheet (GIS) for LCI for “updating purposes”. The
GIS identified Guarin as Chairman of the Board of
Directors (BOD) and President.
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the IBP
CBD claiming that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him as a
stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI
when she knew that he had already resigned and had never
held any share nor was he elected as chairperson of the
BOD or been President of LCI. He also never received
any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up. He has never accepted any
appointment as Chairman and President of LCI.
Atty. Limpin admits that she filed the GIS with the SEC
listing Guarin as a stockholder, the Chairman of the BOD
and President of LCI. She averred that the GIS was made
and submitted in good faith and that her certification
served to attest to the information from the last BOD
meeting held on March 3, 2008. She asserted that Guarin
knew that he was a stockholder. Atty. Limpin said that
on October 13, 2008, she sent Guarin a text message and
asked him to meet with her so he may sign a Deed of
Assignment concerning shareholdings. Guarin
responded in the affirmative and said that he would meet
with her however, Guarin neglected to show up at the
arranged time and place for reasons unknown to Atty.
Limpin. On the strength of Guarin’s positive reply, Atty.
Limpin filed the GIS on November 27, 2008.
Moreover, Atty. Limpin stated that there were pending
criminal complaints against LCI, where she and Guarin
are co-respondents, thus, “when the criminal prosecution
based on the same act charged is still pending in court,
any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same
act must await the outcome of the criminal case to avoid
20
contradictory findings.”
Ruling of the IBP CBD: in favor of petitioner Guarin and
that Atty. Limpin violated Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02
of the CPRi and thus recommended that she be suspended
from the practice of law for three months. Based on the
evidence presented, it was noted that only Mr. Celso de
los Angeles had the authority to appoint or designate
directors or officers of Legacy. Atty. Limpin was aware
that this procedure was not legally permissible. Despite
knowing this to be irregular, she allowed herself to be
dictated upon and falsely certified that Guarin was a
stockholder, chairman and president of the company.
ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment case may
prosper.
RULING: YES. Atty. Limpin is hereby suspended for
6 months. The SC ruled in favor of petitioner Guarin.
Members of the bar are reminded that their first duty is to
comply with the rules of procedure, rather than seek
exceptions as loopholes. A lawyer who assists a client in
a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the law
commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against
the lawyer. Disbarment proceedings are sui generis and
can proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. As
Justice Malcolm stated “[t]he serious consequences of
disbarment or suspension should follow only where there
is a clear preponderance of evidence against the
respondent. The presumption is that the attorney is
innocent of the charges pr[o]ferred and has performed his
duty as an officer of the court in accordance with his
oath.”rary
Grounds for such administrative action against a lawyer
may be found in Section 27 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court. Among these are (1) the use of any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office and
(2) any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice.
There is no indication that Guarin held any share to the
corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a
seat in the BOD and be the president of the company. It is
undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed and certified that
Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS. While she
posits that she had made the same in good faith, her
certification also contained a stipulation that she made a
due verification of the statements contained therein. That
Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a Deed of
Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the
instrument. We also note that there was no submission
which would support the allegation that Guarin was in fact
a stockholder. We thus find that in filing a GIS that
contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an
infraction which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer
in accord with Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR.
We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be
swayed by the business practice of having Mr. de los
Angeles appoint the members of the BOD and officers of
the corporation despite the rules enunciated in
the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such
officers, Atty. Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the
CPR.
However, considering the seriousness of Atty. Limpin’s
action in submitting a false document we see it fit to
increase the recommended penalty to six months
suspension from the practice of law.
AMA LAND INC. AGAINST JUSTICES BUESER,
ET AL.
AMALI is the owner and developer of the 37-storey
condominium project located along Epifanio Delos
Santos Avenue corner Fordham Street in Wack Wack,
Mandaluyong City.1 Due to the project’s location,
AMALI would have to use Fordham Street as an access
road and staging area for the construction activities. In
that regard, AMALI needed the consent of the Wack
Wack Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI).
Accordingly, AMALI sent a notice to WWRAI, which
ignored the notice. Left with no option, AMALI set up a
field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a
temporary fence. WWRAI allegedly tried to demolish the
field office and set up a fence to deny access to AMALI’s
construction workers, which prompted AMALI to file a
petition for the enforcement of an easement of right of
way in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City. The
petition, which included an application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPMI), was docketed as Civil
Case No. 65668.2 On July 24, 1997, the RTC granted
AMALI’s prayer for the WPMI.3
In the meantime, AMALI converted the condominium
project into a 34-storey building of mixed use (to be
known as the AMA Residences) after AMALI’s petition
for corporate rehabilitation was approved.4
On January 26, 2010, WWRAI filed in Civil Case No.
65668 an urgent motion to set for hearing its prayer for a
21
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction (WPI)
contained in its answer. The denial of the prayer for
injunction by the RTC impelled WWRAI to bring a
petition for certiorari with an application for a TRO and/or
writ of preliminary injunction in the CA to enjoin the RTC
from proceeding in Civil Case No. 65668.5
After hearing, the CA issued a TRO, which prompted
AMALI to file an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve
Temporary Restraining Order and later on a Compliance
and Motion for Reconsideration.
On July 28, 2011, the CA issued a preliminary injunction
and required AMALI to file its Comment. AMALI
complied and filed a Comment which also served as its
motion for partial reconsideration of the July 28, 2011
Resolution. On October 12, 2011, AMALI filed an Urgent
Motion to Resolve and to Approve Counterbond.
Allegedly, these motions were left unresolved when the
CA Tenth Division, which included Associate Justices
Bueser and Rosario, required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda.6
On June 14, 2012, the Special Former Tenth Division of
the CA promulgated a decision granting the petition of
WWRAI.7
AMALI consequently filed a petition for review on
certiorari in this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 202342,
entitled AMA Land, Inc. v. Wack Wack Residents
Association, Inc.8
AMALI then brought this administrative complaint,
alleging that respondent Justices had conspired with the
counsels of WWRAI, namely: Atty. Archibald F. de Mata
and Atty. Myra Jennifer D. Jaud-Fetizanan, in rendering
an unjust judgment. AMALI stated that the decision of the
CA had been rendered in bad faith and with conscious and
deliberate intent to favor WWRAI, and to cause grave
injustice to AMALI. In thereby knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, respondent Justices were guilty of gross
misconduct, and violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon
1, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as well as Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue
Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment and violating Canon 1, Rule
1.01; Canon 10, Rules 10.01 and 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court?
Ruling
The administrative complaint is bereft of merit.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the
burden of proving the allegations of the complaint by
substantial evidence.9 Failure to do so will lead to the
dismissal of the complaint for its lack of merit. This is
because an administrative charge against any official of
the Judiciary must be supported by at least substantial
evidence.10But when the charge equates to a criminal
offense, such that the judicial officer may suffer the heavy
sanctions of dismissal from the service, the showing of
culpability on the part of the judicial officer should be
nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
especially because the charge is penal in character.11
AMALI fell short of the requirements for establishing its
charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
against respondent Justices.
Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment constitutes a
serious criminal offense. Article 204, Revised Penal
Code, provides that any judge who "knowingly render[s]
an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for
decision" is punished with prision mayor and perpetual
absolute disqualification. To commit the offense, the
offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to have
rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely
committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular
side of a controversial point of law.12 The term knowingly
means "sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate
intention to do an injustice."13 Thus, the complainant must
not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the judgment
is patently contrary to law or not supported by the
evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent
to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of
malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are
sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge
of rendering an unjust decision.14 In other words, the
judge was motivated by hatred, revenge, greed or some
other similar motive in issuing the judgment.15 Bad faith
is, therefore, the ground for liability.16 The failure of the
judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly
appreciate the evidence presented does not necessarily
render him administratively liable.17
But who is to determine and declare that the judgment or
final order that the judicial officer knowingly rendered or
issued was unjust? May such determination and
declaration be made in administrative investigations and
proceedings like a preliminary investigation by the public
22
prosecutor? The answers to these queries are obvious –
only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate
or supervisory jurisdiction over the judicial actions
involved may make such determination and declaration.
Otherwise, the public prosecutor or administrative
hearing officer may be usurping a basic judicial power of
review or supervision lodged by the Constitution or by
law elsewhere in the appellate court.
Moreover, AMALI’s allegations directly attacked the
validity of the proceedings in the CA through an
administrative complaint. The attack in this manner
reflected the pernicious practice by disgruntled litigants
and their lawyers of resorting to administrative charges
against sitting judges instead of exhausting all their
available remedies. We do not tolerate the practice. In Re:
Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, Chairman
of the Board/CEO of FH-GYMN Multi-Purpose and
Transport Service Cooperative, against Hon. Juan Q.
Enriquez, Jr., Hon. Ramon M. Bato, Jr. and Hon. Florito
S. Macalino, Associate Justices, Court of Appeals,18 we
emphatically held that the filing of administrative
complaints or even threats of the filing subverted and
undermined the independence of the Judiciary, to wit:
It is evident to us that Ongjoco’s objective in filing the
administrative complaint was to take respondent Justices
to task for the regular performance of their sworn duty of
upholding the rule of law. He would thereby lay the
groundwork for getting back at them for not favoring his
unworthy cause. Such actuations cannot be tolerated at
all, for even a mere threat of administrative investigation
and prosecution made against a judge to influence or
intimidate him in his regular performance of the judicial
office always subverts and undermines the independence
of the Judiciary.
We seize this occasion, therefore, to stress once again that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions brought
against any judge in relation to the performance of his
official functions are neither complementary to nor
suppletory of appropriate judicial remedies, nor a
substitute for such remedies. Any party who may feel
aggrieved should resort to these remedies, and exhaust
them, instead of resorting to disciplinary proceedings and
criminal actions. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It appears that AMALI is prone to bringing charges
against judicial officers who rule against it in its cases.
That impression is not at all devoid of basis.1âwphi1 The
complaint herein is actually the second one that AMALI
has brought against respondent Justices in relation to the
performance of their judicial duty in the same case. In its
first complaint entitled Re: Verified Complaint of AMA
Land, Inc. against Hon. Danton Q. Bueser, Hon.
Sesinando E. Villon and Hon. Ricardo R. Rosario,
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals,19 AMALI
accused respondent Justices of: (a) dishonesty and
violation of Republic Act No. 3019, gross misconduct,
and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, in
violation of Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court; and
(b) violating provisions of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct. The Court dismissed the first complaint upon
finding that it centered on the propriety of the
interlocutory orders issued by respondent Justices in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 118994. The Court appropriately
observed:
A perusal of the records of the case as well as the parties’
respective allegations disclosed that the acts complained
of relate to the validity of the proceedings before the
respondent CA Justices and the propriety of their orders
in CA-G.R. SP No. 118994 which were done in the
exercise of their judicial functions. Jurisprudence is
replete with cases holding that errors, if any, committed
by a judge in the exercise of his adjudicative functions
cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings,
but should instead be assailed through available judicial
remedies. Disciplinary proceedings against justices do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies
and, thus, cannot be pursued simultaneously with the
judicial remedies accorded to parties aggrieved by their
erroneous orders or judgments.
xxxx
In this case, AMALI had already filed a petition for
review on certiorari challenging the questioned order of
the respondent CA justices which is still pending final
action by the Court. Consequently, a decision on the
validity of the proceedings and propriety of the orders of
the respondent CA Justices in this administrative
proceeding would be premature. Besides, even if the
subject decision or portions thereof turn out to be
erroneous, administrative liability will only attach upon
proof that the actions of the respondent CA Justices were
motivated by bad faith, dishonesty or hatred, or attended
by fraud or corruption, which were not sufficiently shown
to exist in this case. Neither was bias as well as partiality
established. Acts or conduct of the judge clearly
indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice must be clearly
shown before he can be branded the stigma of being
biased and partial. In the same vein, bad faith or malice
cannot be inferred simply because the judgment or order
23
is adverse to a party. Here, other than AMALI’s bare and
self-serving claim that respondent CA Justices "conspired
with WWRAI’s counsel in knowingly and in bad faith
rendering an unjust judgment and in committing xxx other
misconduct," no act clearly indicative of bias and
partiality was alleged except for the claim that respondent
CA Justices misapplied the law and jurisprudence. Thus,
the presumption that the respondent judge has regularly
performed his duties shall prevail. Moreover, the matters
raised are best addressed to the evaluation of the Court in
the resolution of AMALI’s petition for review on
certiorari.
Finally, resort to administrative disciplinary action prior
to the final resolution of the judicial issues involved
constitutes an abuse of court processes that serves to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice and further clog the courts’ dockets. Those who
seek relief from the courts must not be allowed to ignore
basic legal rules and abuse of court processes in their
efforts to vindicate their rights. (Bold emphasis supplied)
This administrative case is no different from the first.
They are identical, with the complaint herein containing
only a few but insignificant changes in relation to the first.
Both were intended to intimidate or to disparage
respondent Justices in the performance of their judicial
functions.
The filing of the meritless administrative complaints by
AMALI was not only repulsive, but also an outright
disrespect of the authority of the CA and of this Court.
Unfounded administrative charges against judges truly
degrade the judicial office, and interfere with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary. Although the
Court did not then deem fit to hold in the first
administrative case AMALI or its representative
personally responsible for the unfounded charges brought
against respondent Justices, it is now time, proper and
imperative to do so in order to uphold the dignity and
reputation of respondent Justices, of the CA itself, and of
the rest of the Judiciary. AMALI and its representatives
have thereby demonstrated their penchant for harassment
of the judges who did not do its bidding, and they have
not stopped doing so even if the latter were sitting judges.
To tolerate the actuations of AMALI and its
representatives would be to reward them with undeserved
impunity for an obviously wrong attitude towards the
Court and its judicial officers.
Indeed, no judicial officer should have to fear or
apprehend being held to account or to answer for
performing his judicial functions and office because such
performance is a matter of public duty and responsibility.
The office and duty to render and administer justice area
function of sovereignty, and should not be simply taken
for granted. As a recognized commentator on public
offices and public officers has written:20
It is a general principle, abundantly sustained by authority
and reason, that no civil action can be sustained against a
judicial officer for the recovery of damages by one
claiming to have been injured by the officer’s judicial
action within his jurisdiction. From the very nature of the
case, the officer is called upon by law to exercise his
judgment in the matter, and the law holds his duty to the
individual to be performed when he has exercised it,
however erroneous or disastrous in its consequences it
may appear either to the party or to others.
A number of reasons, any one of them sufficient, have
been advanced in support of this rule. Thus it is said of the
judge: "His doing justice as between particular
individuals, when they have a controversy before him, is
not the end and object which were in view when his court
was created, and he was selected to preside over or sit in
it. Courts are created on public grounds; they are to do
justice as between suitors, to the end that peace and order
may prevail in the political society, and that rights may be
protected and preserved. The duty is public, and the end
to be accomplished is public; the individual advantage or
loss results from the proper and thorough or improper and
imperfect performance of a duty for which his
controversy is only the occasion. The judge performs his
duty to the public by doing justice between individuals,
or, if he fails to do justice as between individuals, he may
be called to account by the State in such form and before
such tribunal as the law may have provided. But as the
duty neglected is not a duty to the individual, civil redress,
as for an individual injury, is not admissible."21
Accordingly, we now demand that AMALI’s authorized
representative, Joseph B. Usita, its Senior Assistant Vice
President, and the Members of the Board of Directors of
AMALI who had authorized Usita to file the present
complaint, to show cause in writing why they should not
be held in indirect contempt of court for bringing the
unfounded and baseless charges against respondent
Justices not only once but twice. To be clear, the filing of
unfounded and baseless administrative charges against
sitting judicial officers may constitute indirect contempt
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
24
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge
and hearing. — After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of
any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a)Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance
of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b)Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person
who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real
property by the judgment or process of any court of
competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces
another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or
in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person
adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c)Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the
processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct
contempt under section 1 of this Rule;
(d)Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly,
to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
(e)Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and
acting as such without authority;
(f)Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order
or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to
prevent the court from issuing process to bring the
respondent into court, or from holding him in custody
pending such proceedings. (3a)
Anent indirect contempt, the Court said in Lorenzo
Shipping Corporation v. Distribution Management
Association of the Philippines:22
Contempt of court has been defined as a willful disregard
or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense,
contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or
orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption
of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its
proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body.
In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt
comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or
dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court is
generic, embracing within its legal signification a variety
of different acts.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts,
and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies at
the core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed,
there ought to be no question that courts have the power
by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect,
and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful
mandates, and to preserve themselves and their officers
from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to
punish for contempt essentially exists for the preservation
of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcement
of judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and,
consequently, for the due administration of justice. The
reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that
respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution; without such guarantee, the institution of the
courts would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.23 (Bold emphasis supplied)
ACCORDINGLY, the Court (a) DISMISSES the
administrative complaint against Associate Justice
Danton Q. Bueser, Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon
and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario for its utter lack
of merit; and (b) ORDERS Joseph B. Usita, the Senior
Assistant Vice President of AMA Land, Inc., and all the
members of the Board of Directors of AMA Land, Inc.
who had authorized Usita to bring the administrative
complaint against respondent Associate Justices to show
cause in writing within 10 days from notice why they
should not be punished for indirect contempt of court for
degrading the judicial office of respondent Associate
Justices, and for interfering with the due performance of
their work for the Judiciary.
SO ORDERED.
ORTIGAS VS. ATTY. TUMULAK
Under the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer is sworn to respect the law and
legal processes, and any violation thereof merits condign
disciplinary action against the lawyer.
The present complaint asks for the disbarment of Atty.
Eugenio S. Tumulak for his participation in the forcible
intrusion into the complainant's property.
25
Antecedents had no hand in procuring the documents; that he did not
himself enter the property; and that the entry into the
property was effected by the sheriff pursuant to a writ of
Complainant Ortigas Plaza Development Corporation
execution.
owned the parcel of land located in Ortigas Avenue
Extension, Pasig City and covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. PT-126797 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal Report and Recommendation of the
(property). Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

The complainant alleges that at around 11:00 a.m. of

After due hearing, IBP Commissioner of Bar Discipline
November 29, 2012, Atty. Tumulak, accompanied by
Ricardo M. Espina submitted his Report and
uniformed guards of the Nationwide Security Agency,
Recommendation,6 wherein he found Atty. Tumulak to
Inc., unlawfully entered and took control of the entrance
have violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code
and exit of the property. It appears that prior to the
of Professional Responsibility. Commissioner Espina
incident, Atty. Tumulak had furnished several documents
recommended the suspension of Atty. Tumulak from the
to the complainant, including the deed of assignment
practice of law for two years.
executed by one Henry F. Rodriguez as the administrator
of the Estate of the late Don Hermogenes R. Rodriguez
On October 28, 2015, the IBP Board of Governors issued
designating Atty. Tumulak as an assignee.1 The
Resolution No. XXII-2015-57 adopting the findings and
documents furnished by Atty. Tumulak were all related to
recommendation of Commissioner Espina7viz.:
the intestate proceedings of the Estate of the late Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez docketed as S.P. No. IR-1110 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Iriga City (RTC),
which involved the claim of the heirs of the late Don RESOLUTION NO. XXII-2015-57
Hermogenes Rodriguez to several parcels of land situated CIBD Case No. 13-3707
all over the country, including the Provinces of Rizal, Ortigas Plaza Dev't Corp. vs.
Quezon, and Bulacan, and Quezon City, Caloocan City, Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak
Pasay City, Antipolo City, Muntinlupa City, Parañaque
City, Marikina City, Baguio City, Angeles City, San
Fernando City and Tagaytay City.2 RESOLVED to ADOPT the findings of facts and
recommended penalty of 2 years su5pension of Atty.
The complainant charges Atty. Tumulak with deceit, Eugenio S. Tumulak by the Investigating Commissioner.
dishonesty and fraud for claiming to have coordinated
with the proper government agencies prior to the illegal Issue
and forcible intrusion.3 The complainant manifests that as
a lawyer, Atty. Tumulak ought to know that the claim of Did Atty. Tumulak violate Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1
his principal in the property was barred by res of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he
judicata due to the valid issuance of a Torrens title under facilitated the implementation of the writ of execution and
its name. Accordingly, his conduct constituted conduct the entry into the complainant's property?
unbecoming of a lawyer deserving of sanction.4
Ruling of the Court
In his answer to the complaint,5 Atty. Tumulak denies
having been present when the security guards of
Nationwide Security Agency entered the complainant's Atty. Tumulak deserves to be severely sanctioned for
property. He insists that the allegations against him were violating the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
pure hearsay because Ms. Montero, the representative of Responsibility.
the complainant, had no personal knowledge of the
incident; that the documents he had furnished to the Pertinent portions of Commissioner Espina's Report and
complainant included records of the intestate proceedings Recommendation, which adequately illustrated Atty.
in the RTC involving the Estate of the late Don Tumulak' s transgressions, are worth quoting
Hermogenes Rodriguez and Antonio Rodriguez; that he verbatim, viz.:
26

We enumerate respondent lawyer's violation of the
following rules/principles when he led the forcible
intrusion into OPDC office in Pasig City:
a)
Atty. Tumulak knew, or ought to know, that property
claims based on Spanish title can no longer be cited as
legitimate basis for ownership as of 16 February 1976
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892;
b)
Respondent lawyer, as a long-time practitioner (admitted
to the Bar in 1971), is presumed to know that the
Supreme Court has promulgated a case specifically
addressing the fake titles arising from spurious "Deed
of Assignment" of the supposed Estate of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez. This is the 2005 case
of Evangelista, et al. vs. Santiago[G.R. No. 157447;
April 29, 2005] where the same modus as the one
adopted by respondent lawyer, was used by an
"assignee" in claiming properties located in
Paranque, Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavitc, Batangas,
Pasay, Taguig, Makati, Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon
City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal, allegedly as part
of the Estate of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez;
c)
x x x;
d)
While respondent lawyer claims that the "deed of
assignment" in his favor has a consideration,
unfortunately we did not see any agreed consideration in
the document. If there is no monetary consideration, it
will be treated as a donation with the corresponding
payable taxes. Respondent lawyer's documents don't
show that taxes have been paid for the document to be
legally binding;
e)
Torrens title cannot be attacked collaterally but can only
be questioned in a principal action x x x. If respondent
lawyer thinks that OPDC's title on the Pasig property is
questionable, he could have tiled an action to annul
OPDC's title and not bring in the cavalry, so to speak, in
the form of uniformed security guards, to take over the
property; and
f)
We find respondent's actions highly questionable and
contrary to legal protocol; (i) the court documents were
issued by the RTC-Iriga City, Br. 94; (ii) it "affects" a
property located in Pasig City; (iii) respondent lawyer
became the "assignee" of a Pasig City property; (iv) no
taxes were paid for the "assignment"; (v) assistance of the
Sheriff of Pasig was not enlisted by respondent, instead,
he enlists the help of the Sheriff of Manila; (vi) all that the
Sheriff of Manila did was to deliver the RTC-Iriga, Br. 34
court documents to complainant but with a twist; the
Sheriff and respondent lawyer were escorted by a phalanx
of security guards; (vii) the uniformed guards, obviously
upon instruction, took over and/or controlled the gates of
OPDC offices with attendant force and intimidation.
Respondent lawyer's claimed innocence cannot prevail
over these illegalities of which he, or his agents, had a
hand.
With the above highly questionable acts totally
irreconcilable with a seasoned practitioner like
respondent lawyer, we find Atty. Eugenio S. Tumulak
liable for violation of Canon 1, Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 1.01 and 1.02 thereof.
(Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Commissioner Espina correctly observed that the Court in
the 2005 ruling in Evangelista v. Santiago8 had already
enjoined the successors and heirs of the late Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez from presenting the Spanish title
as proof of their ownership in land registration
proceedings, as follow:
In their Complaint, petitioners claimed title to the Subject
Property by virtue of their actual and continuous
possession of the same since time immemorial, by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest.
Yet, the Deeds of Assignment executed by lsmael Favila
27
in their favor, attached to and an integral part of their
Complaint, revealed that petitioners predecessors-in-
interest based their right to the Subject Property on the
Spanish title awarded to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
There existed a contradiction when petitioners based their
claim of title to the Subject Property on their possession
thereof since time immemorial, and at the same time, on
the Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Possession since time immemorial carried the
presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest. If the Subject Property was
already private property before the Spanish conquest, then
it would have been beyond the power of the Queen of
Spain to award or grant to anyone.
The title to and possession of the Subject Property by
petitioners predecessors-in-interest could be traced only
as far back as the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. Petitioners, having acquired portions of the
Subject Property by assignment, could acquire no better
title to the said portions than their predecessors-in-
interest, and hence, their title can only be based on the
same Spanish title.
Respondent maintained that P.D. No. 892 prevents
petitioners from invoking the Spanish title as basis of their
ownership of the Subject Property. P.D. No. 892
strengthens the Torrens system by discontinuing the
system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law,
and by categorically declaring all lands recorded under
the latter system, not yet covered by Torrens title,
unregistered lands. It further provides that within six
months from its effectivity, all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should apply for registration of their land under
what is now P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Decree. Thereafter, Spanish titles can no
longer be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.
Indubitably, P.D. No. 892 divests the Spanish titles of any
legal force and effect in establishing ownership over real
property.
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The
successors of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until
14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens title in their name
covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an
allegation in petitioners' Complaint that petitioners
predecessors-in-interest complied with P.D. No. 892, then
it could be assumed that they failed to do so. Since they
failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors
of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined
from presenting the Spanish title as proof of their
ownership of the Subject Property in registration
proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not
create or vest title, but only confirm and record title
already created and vested. By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the
courts, in registration proceedings under the Torrens
system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and
recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that
courts, likewise, are prevented from accepting and
indirectly confirming such Spanish title in some other
form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud
on or quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording
or registration. To rule otherwise would open the doors to
the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and give rise to the
existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the
courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens
system of registration. This would definitely undermine
the Torrens system and cause confusion and instability in
property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to
eliminate.9
Moreover, in Santiago v. Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority,10 the Court denied the petition of the
successors of the late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by
applying the principle of stare decisis, ruling therein that
the applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence were identical to those in the
situation in Evangelista v. Santiago, thusly:
The present petition is substantially infirm as this Court
had already expressed in the case of Nemencio C.
Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago, that the
Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de
Propriedad de Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any
evidentiary value to establish ownership over real
property.
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner
Pedro R. Santiago anchor their right to recover possession
of the subject real property on claim of ownership by
Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named
grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish
28
title Titulo de Propriedad de Torrenos.
x x x Estate, hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNOR;
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must
be denied by virtue of the principle of stare decisis. Not
only are the legal rights and relations of herein parties
substantially the same as those passed upon in the
aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the
applicable laws, the issues, and the testimonial and
documentary evidence are identical such that a ruling in
one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issue.11
Finally, the 2011 ruling in Pascual v. Robles 12 affirmed
the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) setting aside
the amended decision rendered in S.P. No. IR-1110 by the
RTC. This ruling should have alerted Atty. Tumulak from
taking the actions giving rise to the complaint against him
inasmuch as he has admitted to have derived his rights
from the deed of assignment executed in his favor by
Henry Rodriguez as the administrator of the Estate of the
late Don Hermogenes Rodriguez pursuant to said
amended decision. Moreover, Atty. Tumulak is presumed
as a lawyer to know the developments in S.P. No. IR-1110
not only by virtue of his becoming an assignee of the
estate but also because of his being a lawyer with the
constant responsibility of keeping abreast of legal
developments.13
Atty. Tumulak cannot shield himself from personal
responsibility behind the deed of assignment. The deed
was doubtful on its face, as borne out by the text, to wit:
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS
This Deed of Assignment is made and executed by and
between
The INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
HERMOGENES R. RODRIGUEZ AND ANTONIO
R. RODRIGUEZ, represented by HENRY F.
RODRIGUEZ, of legal age, widower, Filipino, x xx
Judicial Heir and Court-Appointed Administrator by
virtue of AMENDED DECISIONdated August 13,
19999 of Fifth Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, lriga City
in SPECS. PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue
of Heirship, Administratorship and Settled [sic] of the
Estate of Hem1ogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes
-and-
EUGENIO S. TUMULAK, of legal age, widower x x x
hereinafter referred to as the ASSIGNEE:
WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the ASSIGNOR is the Court-Appointed
Administrator and one of the Judicial heirs of the Intestate
Estate of the late HERMOGENES and ANTONIO
RODRIGUEZ y REYES Estate by virtue of
AMENDED DECISION dated Augsut 13, 1999 of Fifth
Judicial Region, RTC Branch 34, Iriga City in SPECS.
PROCS. No. IR-1110 which settled the issue of Heirship,
Administratorship and Settlement of the Estate of
Hermogenes and Antonio Rodriguez y Reyes Estate,
thereafter, petitions for certiorari tiled with
the SUPREME COURT assailing the aforesaid
Amended Decision were DENIED and declared FINAL
& EXECUTORY in G.R. Nos. 140271, 140915, 168648,
142477 and 182645, affirming the same Amended
Decision;
Whereas, the ASSIGNEE has secured the property
and actual occupant/s over the same property they arc
presently occupying and initiating steps for recovery
of the same parcel and has shown exemplary loyalty
and faithfulness to the ASSIGNOR and also
consistently protected the rights and interest of the
Estate against intruder, impostor, usurpers and false
claimant with spurious title/s over the same property;
NOW THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
foregoing, the ASSIGNOR has agreed to execute this
DEED OF ASSIGNMENT and the ASSIGNEE, has
accepted and both parties have mutually agreed to the
following terms and conditions herein stipulated;
A parcel of land situated in Ortigas Avenue corner
Raymundo Avenue, Barangay Rosario, Pasig City, Metro
Manila, Island of Luzon, with containing an area of
THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGTH [sic] HUNDRED
AND NINE[TY] ONE SQUARE METERS (35,891)
more or less technical description described below, to
x x x
29

1. That the ASSIGNEE shall shoulder all the expenses in
the performance of the task as indicated x x x above such
as payment for the real taxes, titling, researching, liaising
with government agencies, paying lawyers involved in the
litigation, and other incidental expenses relevant in the
consummation of the said transaction;
2. That the ASSIGNEE shall secure and facilities (sic] all
documents from Land Registration Authority, DENR-
LMB, DENR-LMS, Register of Deeds and such other
government agencies concerned for the completion of
titling process subject to the existing laws, rules and
regulation in accordance to Land Registration Act;
3. That the ASSIGNEE shall perform the task of
relocation and verification[,] land survey, possessing,
fencing, guarding, surveying and or reviving plans,
paying taxes, titling, selling, leasing, developing,
segregating and mortgaging;
4. That the ASSIGNEE shall be the AD-LITEM
representative of the ASSIGNOR, before of [sic] any
Court[,] Administrative and Quasi-Judicial body and to
bring suit, defend, in connection with the actions brought
for or against the ASSIGNOR of whatever nature and
kind; and
5. That the ASSIGNEE shall report regularly to the
ASSIGNOR per the above tasks and accomplishment.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto set
their respective signatures on the date 22 March 2010 and
place QUEZON CITY above written.14 (Bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
Atty. Tumulak cannot deny his personal participation in
the unlawful and forcible intrusion into the property just
because the complainant did not establish his physical
presence thereat at the time. In fact, such physical
participation was not even necessary in order to properly
implicate him in personal responsibility for the intrusion
after he admitted having furnished to the complainant the
deed of assignment and other documents as the source of
his authority. Specifically, his duties under the deed of
assignment included "shoulder[ing] all the expenses in
the performance of [securing the property x x x and
initiating steps for recovery of the same parcel] x x x such
as x x x or payment for the real taxes, titling, researching,
liaising with government agencies, paying lawyers
involved in the litigation, and other incidental expenses
relevant in the consummation of the said
transaction;" and "possessing, fencing, [and]
guarding" the property.
It is notable in this connection that Atty. Tumulak had
been discharging his role as the assignee since the time of
the execution of the deed of assignment on March 22,
2010. Considering that he had been in charge of doing all
the actions necessary to enforce the interest of his
principal since March 22, 2010, and that the forcible
intrusion complained about occurred on November 29,
2012, or more than two years from the execution of the
deed of assignment, he is reasonably and ineluctably
presumed to have coordinated all the actions leading to
the intrusion.
Finally, even assuming that the amended decision was
valid and enforceable, Atty. Tumulak could not
legitimately resort to forcible intrusion to advance the
interest of the assignor. The more appropriate action for
him would be to cause the annulment of the complainant's
title instead of forcibly entering the property with the aid
of armed security personnel.
All told, Atty. Tumulak was guilty of misconduct for
circumventing existing laws and disregarding settled
rulings in order to commit injustice against the
complainant. His conduct betrayed his Lawyer's Oath "to
support [the] Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." He breached Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR
LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 -A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 -A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
To the best of his ability, every lawyer is expected to
respect and abide by the law, and to avoid any act or
30
omission that is contrary thereto. The lawyer's personal
deference to the law not only speaks of his or her
commendable character but also inspires in the public a
becoming respect and obedience to the law.15
The sworn obligation of every lawyer under the Lawyer's
Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility to
respect the law and the legal processes is a continuing
condition for retaining membership in the Legal
Profession. The lawyer must act and comport himself or
herself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the Legal
Profession.16 Members of the Bar are reminded, therefore,
that their first duty is to comply with the rules of
procedure, rather than to seek exceptions as
loopholes.17 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest
scheme or who connives in violating the law commits an
act that warrants disciplinary action against him or her.18
The suspension from the practice of law or disbarment of
a lawyer is justified if he or she proves unworthy of the
trust and confidence imposed by the Lawyer's Oath, or is
otherwise found to be wanting in that honesty and
integrity that must characterize the members of the Bar in
the performance of their professional duties.19 Although
the Court imposed a six-month suspension from the
practice of law on erring lawyers found violating Canon
l, Rules 1.01 and 1.02,20 we adopt the recommendation of
the IBP to suspend Atty. Tumulak from the practice of
law for a period of two years. Such penalty was
appropriate and condign in relation to the misconduct he
committed as well as to the prejudice he caused the
complainant.
ACCORDINGLY, the
Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
EUGENIO S. TUMULAK guilty of violating the
Lawyer's Oath and Canon 1, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of
law for a period of TWO(2) YEARS EFFECTIVE
IMMEDIATELY, with the STERN WARNING that
any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.
This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
31