03/20/2001

Radiation Safety Manual

Duke University Free-Electron Laser Laboratory

March 2001
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................................5
a. Biological Effects of Radiation ...........................................................................5
b. Risk .........................................................................................................................6
c. Permissible Radiation Exposures .......................................................................7
2. RADIATION SAFETY POLICIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ........................................8
a. The DFELL Radiation Safety Committee ........................................................8
b. The Radiation Safety Manager .........................................................................11
c. The Operations Supervisor ...............................................................................11
d. The Accelerator Operator .................................................................................12
e. The Experimenter...............................................................................................13
f. Radiation Workers..............................................................................................14
g. Visitors..................................................................................................................14
3. ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS................................................................................15
a. Training and Tour Requirements .....................................................................15
b. Posting and Labeling Requirements ................................................................15
c. Radiation Safety Logbook .................................................................................17
d. Radioactive Sources............................................................................................18
e. Removal of Radioactive Materials....................................................................19
f. Dosimeter Badges ...............................................................................................19
4. RADIATION MONITORS.......................................................................................................20
a. Portable Radiation Monitors .............................................................................20
b. Control Radiation Monitors..............................................................................21
c. Dosimetry at the Perimeter ...............................................................................22
d. Air Activation Monitors ....................................................................................22
5. ACCESS CONTROLS AND THE PERSONNEL PROTECTION SYSTEM ...............22
a. Access to Radiation Areas .................................................................................26
b. PPS Layout ..........................................................................................................33
c. The Search Systems ............................................................................................34
d. Turn on Procedure .............................................................................................35
e. Restricted Access Mode .....................................................................................37
f. Gamma mode .....................................................................................................39

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 APPENDIX A - Emergency Procedures ................................................................................. 42

I. Radiation Emergencies Acute Overexposure or Gross Contamination................. 42

II. Major spills of radioactive materials............................................................................. 43

1. Spills involving no external radiation hazard to personnel .................... 43

2. Spills involving an external radiation hazard to personnel..................... 44
III. Accidents Involving Radioactive Dust, Mists, Fumes, Vapors and
Gases............................................................................................................................................. 45
IV. Overexposure (Less than Acute).................................................................................. 46
V. Minor Spills...................................................................................................................... 46
VI. Contamination of Body Surfaces and Clothing........................................................ 46
VII. Methods of Decontamination...................................................................................... 47
APPENDIX B—Training Coursework ......................................................................................... 48
APPENDIX C—Beam Permit ....................................................................................... 1 through 8

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1. INTRODUCTION
The Radiation Safety Program at the Duke University Free-Electron Laser Laboratory
(DFELL) has been established to protect staff, students, visitors, the general public and the
environment. We have a legal and moral responsibility to operate our facilities in a safe manner in
accordance with North Carolina and Federal regulations.
This manual contains radiation safety procedures that are specific to the DFELL, and should
be considered an addendum to the Duke University Radiation Safety Manual.
The DFELL houses three major sources of ionizing radiation: the electron linac, the MKIII
FEL, and the storage ring. In addition ionizing radiation is produced by the high-power RF sources
used to drive our accelerators.

a. BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATION

It was recognized early after the discovery of x-rays and radioactivity that exposure to ionizing
radiation could have detrimental effects on biological systems. The detrimental effects against which
protection is required are both somatic and genetic. The somatic effects are those which become
manifest in the exposed individuals; the genetic (or hereditary) effects are those which affect the
descendants of the exposed individuals.
The harmful effects may be classified also as to whether the effects vary in severity as a
function of dose (called non-stochastic effects) or vary in probability of occurrence (with similar
severity) as a function of dose (called stochastic effects). Non-stochastic effects are those usually
associated with high dose, such as radiation burns or radiation sickness. Non-stochastic effects
exhibit a "safe" threshold dose and would not be expected to occur in individuals exposed to levels
within occupational limits. Stochastic effects, such as genetic mutation and carcinogenesis (causing
of cancer), exhibit no threshold. This means that all exposure to radiation bears some risk of genetic
harm or of increasing the risk of cancer in the exposed individual. Minimizing stochastic effects is
now the main concern of radiation protection. The radiation dose limits have been established so
essentially no non-stochastic (threshold)

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effects would occur even if a person were to be exposed to the limit over his entire working life.
Limiting the stochastic effects (especially cancer induction) is achieved by keeping all justifiable
exposures as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Different dose limits have been set for
various organs in the body because of varying sensitivity of tissues or organs to stochastic damage.
Also, young individuals are more sensitive than adults to damage from ionizing radiation. This is
especially true if an embryo or fetus is exposed in utero. For this reason, occupational exposure is
more restricted (by a factor of 10) for individuals below the age of 18. Also, current regulations
require that pregnant individuals restrict their occupational exposure so that a fetus does not receive
more than 1/10 the yearly dose equivalent limit for workers (500 mrem or 5 mSv).
The usual units used for radiation dose are the rem or sievert, which quantifies the biological
damage caused by the radiation. The North Carolina State regulations set limits to the radiation dose
received from an accelerator both for radiation workers and for those who are only nearby in
unrestricted areas. The limit for radiation workers is 5 rem per year (0.05 Sv). The allowable limit
for non-radiation workers or workers in unrestricted areas is 100 mrem (1 mSv) per year above
background.
In comparison, the average dose to persons living in the Durham Area from natural
background radiation is about 100 mrem (1 mSv) per year (this does not include the dose due to radon gas)
and the average medical exposure is about 100 mrem (1 mSv) per year.

b. RISK

The lifetime mortality risk to an adult from radiation induced cancer of all types is of the order
of 1 in 10,000 per rem (compared to 1 in 6 from natural incidence). Thus, if one were to receive the
maximum allowable dose for a radiation worker of 5 rem per year for 40 years (200 rem lifetime
dose), the risk of cancer would increase from 16.7% to 18.7%. The total genetic risk to future
generations is approximately the same order of magnitude. About half of the genetic risk would be
expressed in the first two generations of the descendants of exposed individuals. The spontaneous
incidence of obvious hereditary disorders at birth is about 5 in 100.

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c. PERMISSIBLE RADIATION EXPOSURES

Unnecessary radiation exposures must be avoided and all doses must be kept as low as is reasonably achievable.
The limits listed below are legal limits and should not be construed as being acceptable doses. The
ALARA policy is the main guideline for setting radiation exposure. The OESO Division of
Radiation Safety will advise on methods of working best suited to this end and best suited to the
particular requirements of Duke personnel. Limiting the working time spent in radiation areas most
easily controls radiation exposure. As an example, at times it is necessary to enter radiation areas
where the dose equivalent rates are sufficiently high such that there is the possibility that in one
month a dose of 50 mrem may be received by an individual. Such a possibility exists during the
maintenance of equipment in the linac vault during accelerator shutdowns. Such work should be
limited as much as reasonably possible in duration or the work should be delayed until the radiation
has decayed to acceptable levels.
The following exposure limits are to be observed for personnel over the age of 18 years:
1. 5rem (0.05 Sv)/year to the whole body
2. 500 mrem over full gestation period of fetus due to occupational exposure of
mother (NCDEHNR regulations).
3. 15 rem to the lens of eye (where major fraction of trunk of body is not exposed)
(State and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Limit)
The limit of 500-mrem/year whole-body exposure is observed for individuals 18 years of age
or under (National Council on Radiation Protection).
The current maximum permissible levels of radiation in uncontrolled areas are:
1. 2 mrem in any one hour; or,
2. 100 mrem in any one year.
The relevant paragraphs of the NCDEHNR regulations are .1604, .1609, .1610 and .1611. A
copy of the regulations is held in the control room.

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2. RADIATION SAFETY POLICIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
The radiation guidelines set forth here are prepared specifically for the professional research
staff employing the electron accelerators in the DFELL Laboratory. All statements relating to
radiation protection comply with the requirements of the Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety.
All persons involved with the use of the MK III FEL, linac and storage ring must have a working
knowledge of these guidelines and must comply with them. Failure to comply with the procedures
in this document may result in disciplinary action.
The formal statement of these rules and regulations must be approved by the Duke FEL Lab
Radiation Safety Committee and by the OESO Division of Radiation Safety.
The OESO Division of Radiation Safety in the Environmental Safety Building (684-2194) is
available to give assistance in matters relating to radiation safety from 8:30 A.M. to 5 P.M., Monday
through Friday. In the event of an emergency, call 911. Emergency procedures are given in
Appendix A.
A flow chart representing the levels of authority in dealing with radiation safety issues is
shown in fig. 1. The responsibilities of the DFELL Radiation Safety Committee and individuals
within DFELL are given below.

A. THE DFELL RADIATION SAFETY COMMITTEE

The precise formulation of the radiation safety program at an experimental facility such as the
Free Electron Laser Laboratory will change with the experimental configuration. Consequently,
radiation rules and procedures will change with time. Sections of these procedures will be revised as
necessary. A Radiation Safety Committee has therefore been formed to assist in this process. The
committee has the following responsibilities:

• Reviewing and approving proposed changes in accelerator and shielding configurations that
could change the radiation dose rates to personnel and the general public.

• Updating and approving the rules and procedures contained in this document to reflect new
information or changing conditions.

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• Approving operators capable of safely operating the accelerators.

Provost
Duke Radiation Safety C ommittee

Duke Radiation
Safety Office

DFELL Radiation
Safety Committee
DFELL Director
DFELL Radiation Safety Manager
DFELL Associate Director
Member of Duke Rad. Safety Committee
Duke Radiation Safety Appointee
DFELL Operations Supervisor
Director NCCU electron gun facility

FEL Lab. Radiation

Safety Manager
Operations Supervisor

Laboratory Staff Operators Visitors

Figure 1. Organizational chart for radiation safety chain of authority.

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 The DFELL Radiation Safety Committee will consist of 7 members:
1. The DFELL Radiation Safety Manager (chair)
2. The DFELL Director;
3. The DFELL Associate Director for Research;
4. The DFELL Operations Supervisor;
5. An appointee of the Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety
6. One member from the Duke University Radiation Safety Committee
7. Director of the NCCU electron gun facility

This committee will meet as needed to review radiation safety issues for the Laboratory’s
accelerators but at least four times per year. Any member of the committee as well as anyone from
the Duke University Radiation Safety Committee can call a meeting of the committee. The
committee chair will develop the agenda with assistance from other members. The quorum for a
committee meeting will be four members.
Situations will arise where the rules and procedures in this document may need special
interpretation. When a special interpretation is needed quickly (i.e. before a meeting with the
Radiation Safety Committee can give an authoritative opinion), it may be given by the DFELL
Operations Supervisor, the Radiation Safety Manager, or the DFELL Director. All operations
involving rule interpretations must be recorded in the Radiation Safety Logbook located at the
control panel for later consideration by the DFELL Radiation Safety Committee. The person
authorizing the action must be noted and that person must sign off on the action. It is the re-
sponsibility of the person making the interpretation or extension of the rules to bring such to the
attention of the full committee, at its next meeting.
In the event of a dispute, the Radiation Safety Manager or the Director of the Laboratory can
give a decision. If the Radiation Safety Manager or the Director cannot resolve a dispute, the matter
should be presented to the DFELL Radiation Safety Committee for a decision. The ultimate
authority for interpretation of radiation safety related issues resides with the University OESO
Division of Radiation Safety and the Duke Radiation Safety Committee.

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 B. The Radiation Safety Manager (RSM)
The Radiation Safety Manager, is authorized to terminate immediately any project or operation
that is found to be a threat to the health of employees or members of the public, or to property and
environment of the university or local community. Operational decisions made and actions taken by
the local RSM are subject to full review by the Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety and by the
Duke Radiation Safety Committee.
The RSM is responsible for:
• Ensuring that established policies of radiation safety are followed and ensuring compliance
with the State of North Carolina license conditions.
• Provides local oversight of radiation control activities.
• Halting operations if unsafe or unacceptable conditions exist. Operation may resume only
when authorized by the OESO Division of Radiation Safety upon recommendation of the
RSM.

Note that the RSM’s responsibility is one of oversight. The responsibility for implementation
of the rules, procedures and policies in regard to radiation safety is vested in the DFELL Operations
Supervisor (see below)

c. OPERATIONS SUPERVISOR (OS)

The DFELL Operations Supervisor (OS) is responsible for the day-to-day supervision of
accelerator operations and for the implementation of radiation safety rules, procedures and policies.
The OS supervises the accelerator operators. As a member of the FEL Radiation Safety Committee,
he acts as an intermediary between that committee and the experimental users of the facilities.
In matters of Radiation Safety, the Operations Supervisor will report to the Radiation Safety
Manager.
If the Operations Supervisor will be away from the laboratory for an extended period of time,
he, with the approval of the Radiation Safety Manager, will assign one of the members of the FEL
Radiation Safety Committee to assume his responsibilities for Radiation Safety.
In general, the Operations Supervisor is responsible for the implementation of the Radiation
Rules and Procedures set forth by the FEL Radiation Safety Committee.

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D. THE ACCELERATOR OPERATOR (AO)

An Accelerator Operator is a person who has been trained as an operator, and has been
approved by the DFELL Radiation Safety Committee. An AO may be given Class I authority i.e.
authority to operate any accelerator, or Class II authority, i.e. limited authority to operate certain
accelerators or subsystems.
During normal operation of the accelerators, the immediate responsibility for radiation safety
is vested in the AO. The AO has the responsibility of ensuring safe operation of the accelerator. The
AO reports to the Operations Supervisor, who will provide continuing advice on issues regarding
the safe operation of the accelerator. When in doubt, the AO must consult the Operations
Supervisor, the RSM or DFELL Director for decision authority. The operator must always err on
the side of caution. Safety will always take precedence over pressure to operate the accelerators.
The most important responsibility of the operator is to ensure personnel safety, and that the
personnel protection system (see section 5) is not compromised. Safe operation is partially assured
through hardware interlocks. Complete safety is only ensured by operator vigilance. The operator
must take no unauthorized action that might compromise the personnel protection interlocks.
The operator must insist that all experimenters follow the rules and regulations. If in the
operator's opinion the experimenter is not complying with the radiation rules or if a dangerous
situation arises due to excessive radiation produced, the operator must discontinue operation, and
report the incident to the OS.

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 The number of operators required in the control room will depend on the number of
accelerators operating. If only one accelerator is operating, one operator is required. However, a
second individual, who is a trained DFELL radiation worker, must be available in the facility to help
in the event of an emergency. This individual must remain in close contact with the accelerator
operator while the machine is running. If more than one accelerator is operating two operators
must staff the control room.
The operator is responsible for:
• Operation of the accelerators in a safe manner according to the Beam Permit (see Appendix B)
• Terminating any unsafe operations
• Maintaining the Radiation Safety logbook
• Performing routine checks of radiation safety monitors and interlocks
• Performing radiation surveys of accelerator beam lines and posting any activated areas

E. THE EXPERIMENTER

The experimenter is responsible for radiation safety aspects associated with his experiment. In
planning his experiment, potential radiation hazards must be studied and wherever possible radiation
levels generated during the experiment maintained at as low a level as reasonable by the
incorporation of shielding or other appropriate methods. In cases where access to accelerator
components is required, a Work Permit (see appendix C) regarding radiation safety is to be
submitted to the DFELL Radiation Safety Manager through the Operations Supervisor for approval.
Particular care must be exercised if it is proposed to change the configuration of an accelerator
system. Advice and assistance in planning may be obtained from the Operations Supervisor, the
Radiation Safety Manager, and from members of the FEL Radiation Safety Committee.
In the event of unusual operational conditions, the experimenter must consult with the
Operations Supervisor. The DFELL Radiation Safety Committee must approve experiments that
will involve modification of radiation shielding, new accelerator beamlines, or that will produce a
large quantity of activated components. Such an experimenter's plan is to be

14
submitted to the Operations Supervisor for his approval and then, if accepted at that stage, be
forwarded to the DFELL Radiation Safety Manager for communication to the DFELL Radiation
Safety Committee for consideration. (See the Work Permit in Appendix C).

F. RADIATION WORKERS

Other authorized radiation workers are responsible for following all applicable regulations in
this document and the Duke Radiation Safety Manual. An authorized radiation worker is a person
who has satisfied the radiation safety training requirements for unescorted access to the Controlled
Radiation areas of the DFELL (see under training). An authorized radiation worker need not
necessarily be a Duke University Employee.

G. VISITORS

Persons who are not authorized DFEL radiation workers are considered to be visitors and are
not allowed in the Controlled Radiation Areas without an escort. Only authorized DFELL radiation
workers are allowed to act as visitor escorts.
Escorted visitors:
• All visitors to the controlled areas must be under the supervision of a trained radiation
worker
• All visitors must be advised that they are entering a controlled radiation area
• A pocket dosimeter must be given to each visitor (one per group)
• All visitors must be logged in logbook at ring room main entry. On entry: Log name of
visitor, time of entry, dosimeter number reading, name of escort, On exit: log time, and
exit reading of dosimeter.

Visitors who require unescorted access must be trained as radiation workers, i.e. attend a
Radiation Safety Training Session, receive orientation materials, and pass the Radiation Safety Quiz,
and be issued a TLD badge.

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3. ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
Certain administrative procedures are required to protect laboratory personnel, to comply with
North Carolina State radiation safety guidelines, and to monitor radiation dose rates. These include
training, proper posting of radiation sources, keeping proper records of the performance of the
personnel protection system, radiation survey meters, establishing emergency procedures, and
handling radioactive sources. These procedures are detailed in this section. The following official
records must be kept—
• A Radiation Safety logbook
• A visitor log and sign out log for temporary pocket dosimeters, and visitor’s TLD badges.
• A record of training of operators and radiation workers
• A Beam Permit

A. TRAINING

All Duke University personnel and laboratory visitors operating or working with the
accelerators must have a working knowledge of the radiation rules and procedures and be familiar
with the facility. This knowledge and familiarity will be obtained by an orientation course. This
course is a safety orientation by senior staff explaining hazards, procedures and policies. In order to
be allowed unescorted access to controlled areas, in addition to the training course, all persons must
pass a Radiation Safety Quiz. An outline of the topics covered in the Radiation Safety training
course can be found in Appendix C.
Operators must take a more complete course (See Appendix C). This course is designed to
acquaint the operator with a general knowledge of the effects of radiation, dose reduction
techniques, accelerator operating procedures, the personnel protection system, and administrative
safeguards.

B. POSTING AND LABELING REQUIREMENTS

The following is a description of the types of radiation warning signs likely to be found in at
DFELL.

1. A "CAUTION CONTROLLED RADIATION AREA" sign to identify an

area where a person could receive a whole body dose of up to 5 mrem in the

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 course of one hour. A controlled radiation area is a restricted access area, and
acts as a buffer between the public access areas and areas where higher levels of
radiation may be present.
2. A "CAUTION RADIATION AREA" sign to identify an area where a person
could receive a whole body dose of 5-100 mrem in one hour. There is currently
no designated Radiation Area at DFELL.
3. A "CAUTION HIGH RADIATION AREA" sign to identify an area where a
person could receive a whole body dose of greater than 100 mrem in one hour.
Such areas are interlocked and the sign should indicate that no entry is permitted
when the magenta lights are on. During Compton γ-ray production the SE
Optics Shack adjacent to the ring shielding falls into this category.

4. A "VERY HIGH RADIATION AREA - GRAVE DANGER" sign to

identify an area where a person could receive a whole body exposure of 500 rem
in the course of an hour. Such an area is doubly interlocked such that any entry
shuts off the machine. The sign should indicate that no entry is permitted when
the magenta lights are on, and that entry could result in serious or lethal injuries.
The linac tunnel and the interior of the storage ring shielding are the only such
areas in the facility.
5. A "CAUTION RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL" sign to identify a spot along
the beam line where observable induced radioactivity has been produced. In
addition to having the standard warning label, this sign must include columns for
specific information describing the level of activity to be written on it with
marker (the sign is coated with plastic). The sign should specify the
(i.) observer
(ii.) date
(iii.) hour

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 (iv.) distance (in.)
(v.) exposure rate (mrem/hour).
These should also be used on any items removed from the accelerator tunnel and
on any radioactive sources used by Duke FEL lab personnel. Operational
accelerator beamlines should be surveyed and posted (if necessary) at the end of
each operational run. The operators are responsible for carrying out the survey
procedure and posting warning signs. Experimenters and other persons may
also do this if approved by the RSM.

6. A “PUSH RED BUTTON IN CASE OF RADIATION

EMERGENCY/Notify Radiation Safety (911) in case of suspected
overexposure” sign in the control room on or near the personnel protection
panel. This sign refers to the large red scram button mounted on the personnel
protection panel. It prevents the production of high power microwave power
and cannot be reset without a full search of the tunnel.
Signs of Types (1) and (2) have been installed to warn against prompt radiation. Type (3) signs
are to warn of the presence of activated material when the accelerators are not operating.
Radioactive sources may be used to check or calibrate radiation monitors or experimental
equipment. These sources must be used under the supervision of personnel from the Duke OESO
Division of Radiation Safety and are also subject to posting and labeling requirements as specified in
the 1988 North Carolina Regulations for Protection against Radiation.
In addition to warning signs, it is necessary to post a list of qualified operators in the control
room, and provide a copy of this manual.

C. RADIATION SAFETY LOGBOOK

The DFELL must keep a radiation logbook in the accelerator control room. The AO is
responsible for maintaining the radiation logbook. This log should include the following
information:
1. Radiation levels outside the vault measured during operations if above back-
ground.
2. Radiation levels measured during tunnel entry. This should include activated
locations, levels, and the reason for any abnormal readings.
3. Entries of the personnel dosimeter readings when personnel enter the tunnel
when residual activity results in the presence of a “High Radiation Area” (>100
mrem/hr), or when visitors enter areas with dose rates above 0.5 mrem/hr.

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 4. Radiation Alarms. If any of the perimeter radiation detector alarms goes off, the
time of the fault, the level of the detector and the reason for the excess radiation
should be entered in the log.
5. Investigations of unusual exposures.
6. Failures in the protection system and corrective measures.
7. The results of measurements on components removed from the tunnel and the
destination of the components.
8. Any modification to the shielding or to the personnel protection system (these
must of course be authorized).
9. The bypass of any interlock or protective system. Circumstances may arise
where it is necessary to bypass a portion of the personnel protection system on a
temporary basis . The operator must list the reasons for the bypass, the name of
the individual who authorized the action, and methods of assuring safety.
Countersignature approvals by the Operations Supervisor, or FEL Laboratory
Director, or the Radiation Safety Manager or by the OESO Division of
Radiation Safety are also needed. An acknowledgement signature is required
from each new operator who receives the machine with personnel protection
system compromised. To ensure that new operators note that the personnel
protection system is compromised, a tag stating the change must be attached to
the personnel protection panel in clear sight of the operator console.
10. An analysis of operations in abnormal conditions.
11. Loss of interlock keys and corrective actions taken.

D. RADIOACTIVE SOURCES

Personnel at the FEL Laboratory do not normally use radioactive sources. Routine calibration
of radiation detectors using radioactive sources will be performed under the supervision of
personnel from the Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety. Anyone planning to use radioactive
sources at the FEL Laboratory must first inform the RSM. The RSM will consult with the Duke
OESO Division of Radiation Safety to ensure the appropriate procedures are put in place to ensure
the safe use of the source.

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E. REMOVAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

Equipment or material exposed to a high-energy electron beam such as those in the FEL
Laboratory may become radioactive. Such equipment includes, but is not limited to, vacuum pipes,
and internal components, vacuum flanges, gaskets, vacuum pumps, magnets, beam dumps, and
accelerator cavities. None of these items are to be removed from the accelerator beamlines without
being monitored for radioactivation and appropriately tagged if necessary. Note that it is illegal to
discard radioactive materials in the regular trash receptacles. Before any operations involving the
removal of accelerator beamline components is begun, the OESO Division of Radiation Safety must
be contacted so that monitoring and tagging can be arranged. The OESO Division of Radiation
Safety will arrange for the disposal of unwanted radioactive material.
In the event of an accelerator being decommissioned, the Operations Supervisor must prepare
a decommissioning plan. The plan must be forwarded to the DFELL Radiation Safety Committee
for approval. If approved by the DFELL Radiation Safety Committee, the decommissioning plan
must be forwarded to the Duke Radiation Safety Committee for final approval.

F. DOSIMETER BADGES

All laboratory personnel who require unescorted access to the controlled areas are issued
dosimeter badges. Dosimeter badges must be worn at all times in the controlled radiation areas.
Visitors to the laboratory must be issued badges or pocket dosimeters if they will enter controlled
areas. These will be available at the west hall entrance to the ring room.
The Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety is responsible for examining quarterly
dosimeter reports and for investigating any exposures exceeding the Duke University ALARA Policy
Investigational Levels. All such exposures will be discussed with the personnel involved so that
future exposures are reduced.
In the event that an individual loses a dosimeter badge, it must be reported immediately to the
Operations Supervisor. The person losing the badge must make a written report to the OS
indicating the circumstances surrounding said loss. The OS will report the loss to the RSM and
Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety.
If a person finds a lost badge, he/she is to immediately report that fact, the name on the
badge, and the time and place of the discovery to the Operations Supervisor who is to relay that
information to Radiation Safety Manager and Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety. Failure to
promptly respond to this situation, especially when the badge is found in a radiation area, may
severely impair the laboratory's efforts to assess the badge wearer's exposure.

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4. RADIATION MONITORS

A variety of detectors are used at DFELL to monitor the performance of the shielding and
personnel protection system. These detectors are described below.

A. PORTABLE RADIATION MONITORS

Portable ionization chamber radiation monitors are useful in monitoring gamma radiation
levels. Laboratory personnel must carry one whenever entering any area where the possibility of a
high radiation level exists. Note that Geiger counters and all other pulse counting radiation monitors
should not be used when the Laboratory’s accelerators are operating because they are very badly
effected by pulse pile-up. Only ionization chamber gauges should be used with the accelerator
running.
There are Victoreen model 450P ionization chambers located in the control room. These
meters are checked monthly by the DFELL operators and calibrated yearly by the Duke OESO
Division of Radiation Safety. Note that because of its enhanced accuracy at low radiation levels, the
Victoreen Model 450P (a pressurized ionization chamber monitor) should be used for measuring
radiation levels between background and 1 mR/hr, in preference to the unpressurized Model 450.

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B. CONTROL RADIATION MONITORS

The following is a table of the area radiation monitors in use at DFELL.

Type Location Alarm setting Interlock

Setting

Ionization Chamber Tunnel shielding blocks 2.5 mR/hr -

Ionization Chamber Tunnel roof inside 5 mR/hr 5 mR/hr
fenced area
Ionization Chamber Control room 5 mR/hr 5 mR/hr
Ionization Chamber Inside linac tunnel - -
GM tube Inside linac tunnel air - -
vents
Pressurized Ring room SE outside 2mR/hr (low) -
Ionization Chamber shielding 5 mR/hr(high)

Radiation levels in occupied controlled areas are not expected to exceed 1 mrem/hour with
the shielding presently installed. Radiation levels on the roof of the linac tunnel could exceed 5
mrem/hr. Radiation monitors outside the linac vault at weak points in the shielding have been
equipped with audible alarms which are set to trip at 2.5 mrem/hour.
A radiation monitor is mounted on the roof of the linac tunnel, inside the fenced area in order
to ensure that radiation levels do not exceed 5 mR/hr. This monitor is interlocked to the tunnel PPS
and will shut off the electron beam if the radiation level exceeds 5 mR/hr averaged over a 15 second
period.
Pressurized ionization chambers with easily read displays are mounted on the walls of the ring
room outside of the shielding. These monitors have a low alarm setting of 2 mR/hr, and a high-level
alarm at 5 mR/hr.
A very high-level radiation monitor is located inside the vault and used to precisely monitor
the radiation production. Since there is almost no shielding on this detector it allows the operator to
reduce the radiation dose at the source. The instrument is an Eberline EC1-6. It has a logarithmic
scale covering 1 to 10,000 R/hr. A low-level GM tube monitor (Eberline EC1-1) is in the vault to
monitor radiation levels when the machine is off. This instrument reads down to 0.01 mR/hr.

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C. DOSIMETRY AT THE PERIMETER

The OESO Division of Radiation Safety monitors radiation levels at various locations on the
perimeter of the tunnel using integrating TLD detectors.

D. AIR ACTIVATION MONITORS

Air activation monitors based on sensitive GM tube detectors (Eberline EC1-1) are installed
on the tunnel air exhaust vents. One is installed in the tunnel exhaust-fan enclosure (V2). The
second one is installed at the far end of the tunnel (V3).

5. ACCESS CONTROLS AND THE PERSONNEL

PROTECTION SYSTEM

The primary hazard from ionizing radiation at DFELL arises from the prompt x and γ-ray
bursts generated by the accelerators and high voltage equipment. A secondary hazard arises from
residual activation of beamline components following operations.
The Personnel Protection System (PPS) is a hardware system designed to protect personnel
from hazards associated with ionizing radiation present during accelerator operation. This system
must be maintained with utmost care since its proper functioning is essential to ensure the safety of
laboratory personnel.
When the DFELL accelerator systems are not being operated, the sources of residual radiation
are:
• Induced radioactivity of the accelerator structure, beam transport components, target
assemblies and beam dumps.
• Radioactive components removed from the accelerator
• Radioactive sources used for calibration or other purposes
• x-rays emitted by high voltage systems (e.g. klystrons)

All radioactive sources, source storage areas, radioactive components, and areas
of high radiation will be clearly marked. It is the duty of all employees to note and observe the
restrictions identified by these signs.

23
 Fig. 2, a), b) and c) show the limited restricted access areas at DFELL under
various operating conditions.

24
25
26
27
A. ACCESS CONTROLS TO RADIATION AREAS

Uncontrolled Areas: These are areas in which the dose rate does not exceed 2 mrem/hr. and the
yearly dose does not exceed 100 mrem. ALARA dose rates are a factor of ten smaller than this. All
office areas in the FEL lab to be in this category. No active measures are needed in these regions.
Area Dosimeter monitoring is provided to ensure that the average dose rates are within ALARA
limits.

Controlled Radiation Areas: This is the lowest level of limited access area at the FEL Laboratory.
A Controlled Area is one in which there exists a potential for dose levels up to 5 mrem/hr. In
keeping with our ALARA Program, DFELL will strive to keep radiation dose rates below 1 mR/hr
in all Controlled Areas of the laboratory. Access to these areas is controlled by locked doors or
gates, which are not interlocked, i.e. authorized personnel may come and go through these access
points while the accelerators are operating. These access doors or gates must not be left open and
unattended at any time during accelerator operation. Monitors are required in these areas to
minimize the actual dose. A number of two-level radiation alarms (2.5 and 5 mR/hr) are installed
outside of the storage ring shielding. Radiation warning signs must be posted warning that radiation
may be present. Radiation monitoring badges must be worn in the area.
During operation of the MKIII FEL all of the ring room and the fenced area on top of the
linac tunnel are controlled areas. During operation of the injection linac and storage ring the
controlled areas consist of the exterior of the ring room shielding, the ring room mezzanine, and the
fenced areas on top of the linac tunnel and the fenced area outside the north side of the ring room.
Following the termination of an operational run, the ring and or linac tunnel will normally
make a transition from very-high radiation areas to controlled radiation areas. Before the linac tunnel may
be opened for general access by radiation workers, the AO will be responsible for carrying out a
radiation survey. The AO will post a warning in areas where doses from residual activation exceed 1
mrem/hr at a distance of 1-m from the source, before

28
allowing anyone else to enter the tunnel. The opening of the linac tunnel, and the results of the
radiation survey must be entered in the radiation log.
Radiation Areas (5-100 mrem/hr) and High Radiation Areas (>100 mrem/hr): Such
areas may exist from time to time at DFELL. Safety procedures will be implemented as necessary.

Very High Radiation Area: This is an area in which the dose rate of 500 rem/hr or greater is
possible. This category includes the interior of the linac tunnel when the MKIII or linac is operating,
and the interior of the storage ring shielding during beam injection. These areas have several levels
of interlocks. These interlocks are described below.
Linac tunnel interlocks
The interlocks for the linac tunnel (injection linac and MKIII) are as follows:

1. The access doors must be closed and locked before the system can be turned on. Any
attempt at entry in which a door is opened will immediately shut off the system. All
door switches must be closed for the interlock to be made up. There are two separate
loops of door switches for each door. The failure of any one switch shuts off the
system. There is a third loop on the entry door that is used for the search system. The
door closes via a spring closure. The lock prevents entry but not exit. Therefore, it is
locked from outside at all times unless a key is inserted into it, and is never locked
from the inside.

2. The emergency exit hatch at the east-end of the linac tunnel cannot be opened from
the outside.

3. The blocks that close off the west-end of the tunnel are removable and are therefore
interlocked so that the top block must be in place for the interlock to make up. Note
that the top block cannot be in place without the blocks that support it, thus ensuring
that all of the blocks are in place.

4. All keys must be locked into a key bank for the interlock to be made up. The keys are
kept at the control room PPS panel. Removal of any key shuts off the machine. There
are no spare keys. In the event of a lost key, the entire key bank must be re-keyed
before operations can resume. In the event of a damaged key, a

29
 replacement key may be made so long as the damaged key is destroyed and certified by
the RSM.

5. A thorough search of the tunnel must be made before the machine can be started. The
search procedure assumes that there may be someone in the tunnel who may be
unconscious and hidden. A series of pushbuttons are used to ensure that the search
has been carried out prior to startup.

V3 l
4
Figure 3. Search diagram showing
elements of personnel protection
p system.
a - PPS power box
p b - interlocked maze door
c - maze
k d - accelerator gun with momentum
p filter tied to radiation monitors
e - accelerator
p f - spectrometer
g - free-electron laser
h - beam dump (underground)
3 i - pull rope
j - klaxon
5 V2 k - panic buttons (13 in all including
h
the search stations)
g l - emergency exit hatch
m - removable concrete blocks
i p V1 - Air intake
f V2 - Fan & exhaust
V3 - Fan & exhaust
e
d Search boxes are represented by
1 boxes with numbers. They must be
j pressed in the order in which they
2 c are numbered. Search stations also
m have panic buttons in them.
V1 b
6
a

30
 6. There is a set of panic buttons and pull ropes that, in an emergency, can be used to
shut off the machine. The panic buttons are mounted in the search boxes and in other
boxes along the tunnel as shown in figure 3. The pull rope is mounted between the
Mark III FEL system and the 1 GeV linac. Pushing a panic button or pulling the pull
rope immediately shuts off the machine. Exit from the tunnel must not be impeded.
Emergency lighting is provided which turns on with power loss to the lighting circuit.

7. Visual and audible warnings are given to personnel in and around the tunnel and or
the interior of the ring room shielding before the machine starts. There is a flashing
magenta light at the tunnel entrance indicating that the machine is in a radiation
producing state (i.e., all interlocks made up and beam permit received). Inside the
tunnel there are several magenta beacons that flash when the machine is in a radiation
producing state as well as a klaxon which sounds for 15 seconds after the interlock is
made up. There is a two-minute delay after the interlock makes up before the machine
can run. This is necessary in order to give the person trapped inside the tunnel plenty
of time to stop the machine or to leave the tunnel. The beam permit signals are
derived from the power for these warning devices so that the machine cannot operate
without power being applied to them.

8. Closed-circuit cameras monitor the tunnel interior and main entry door. If the
operator sees anyone in the tunnel when the machine is in operation he/she must
immediately press the PPS scram button (the large red button on the PPS panel in the
control room).

The PPS system is designed such that any failure state is latched. For example, if someone
enters through a door the lights for that door will first turn red while the door is open and then will
turn yellow after the door is closed. They will not turn green until the system is reset. The system
will also not reset until a search of the tunnel is carried out since

31
the opening of the door will interrupt the search loop. The buttons or rope can only be reset in the
tunnel in conjunction with a new search. If any interlock trips it is mandatory that the reason be
found and the problem be corrected before the machine is restarted.
The PPS must be tested and checked at least every 6 months to ensure that they are in
working order. A PPS test and check procedure is available in the control room. The Operations
Supervisor will be responsible for assigning personnel to test the PPS system. A least one member of
the test team will be a qualified Accelerator Operator.

Storage ring Interlocks:

The primary radiation hazard in the storage ring is from beam that is lost during injection
from the linac into the ring. A concrete wall 2 feet thick and 8 feet high surrounds the storage ring
and linac to ring beam transport section. Some parts of the wall, adjacent to the mezzanine floor,
are 12 feet high. The concrete wall consists of interlocking pre-cast blocks. There are three keyed
and interlocked gates to the ring: two leading from the ring room floor to entry stairways, and one
from the mezzanine to the south entry stairway.
Access to the area inside the shielding wall is controlled by a Personnel Protection System that
is similar to the one used to protect the linac vault. When any of the interlock gates to the central
ring area are opened, the linac RF systems are disabled which inhibits the injection of beam (stored
beam is not inhibited or dumped). When the linac vault door is opened, the linac beam is inhibited,
without inhibiting the stored electron beam.

The ring PPS system contains the following features:

1. All three gates (KG) shown in Figure 4 must be closed and locked before the linac can be
turned on. Opening any of these gates will immediately shut off the linac so as to prevent
the injection of electrons into the storage ring. There are two separate loops of gate
switches for each gate. The failure of any one switch shuts off the linac. There is a third
loop on the gate adjacent to the search box S7. This gate is used for the search system
and is designed to be fail-safe. The key can only be removed if the door is locked. The
gate is fitted with a spring closure. All three gates are locked for entry only. They can be
used for exit at all times.

32
 ND ND

Electron Beam Path

FD KG

V1
P P RF P P P S5
S3 ID ID
S4 P
P W HIGH RADIATION AREA P
L L
PC S7
L S1 S6
P S2 P P P P P
CB KD
K
PC KD
ND KG ND
FD

CD CD

FIGURE 4 ACCESS CONTROL

KG KEYED INTERLOCK GATE
KD KEYED INTERLOCK DOOR
ID INTERLOCK DOOR
CD CODE LOCK CONTROLLED ACCESS DOOR
ND NORMALLY LOCKED EMERGENCY EXIT DOOR
FD NORMALLY LOCKED FREIGHT DOOR

PERSONNEL
K KLAXON
W WARNING BELL
L RED WARNING LIGHT
P PANIC BUTTON
Sx SEARCH BUTTON WITH SEARCH INDEX

SHIELDING/ACC
CB CONCRETE SHIELDING BLOCKS (2 ' THICK)
RF STEEL RF SHIELDING SHACK

VENTILATION
V1 VENTILATION INTAKE

CONTROLS
PC PERSONNEL PROTECTION SYSTEM ELECTRONICS BOX

33
 2. All keys must be locked into a key bank for the interlocks to be made up. The keys are
kept in a PPS panel in the control room. Removal of any key shuts off the injection
linac. This key panel is similar to the one used for tunnel access and is subject to the
same key security safeguards. There are no spare keys. In the event of a lost key, the
entire key bank must be re-keyed before operations can resume. In the event of a
damaged key, a replacement key may be made so long as the damaged key is destroyed
and certified by the RSM.

3. A thorough search of the area inside the ring shielding-wall must be made before the
injection linac can be started. The search assumes that anyone inside is unconscious
or hidden. A series of push buttons (S1 through S6) are used to ensure that the search
has been carried out. All seven buttons must be pressed in the correct sequence to
enable start-up. The operators are responsible for ensuring that the search is
thorough.

4. There are many panic buttons (P) inside the ring shielding which can be used to shut
off the machine. The panic buttons are mounted as shown in Figure 4.

5 Visual and audible warnings are given to personnel in and around the ring room
before the machine starts. There are 2 flashing red lights mounted inside the storage
ring that indicate when high voltages are present. A bell sounds for 15 seconds before
the high voltage supplies become active. There is a klaxon that sounds for 15 seconds
when the machine is about to enter a radiation producing state (i.e., all interlocks made
up and beam permit received). There is a two-minute delay after the interlock makes
up, before the machine can run. The beam permit signals are derived from the power
supplying these warning devices so that the machine cannot operate without power
being applied to them.

6. Closed circuit cameras monitor the area inside the ring shielding and the search access gate.
A "scram" button is provided to enable the operators to shut the machine down immediately
if unauthorized access is detected.

34
 7. High-energy spectrometer permit: When energized, the high-energy spectrometer (HES)
magnet directs the beam from the injection linac into a beam dump in the linac vault. The
HES is interlocked to both the Personnel Protection System and the Machine Protection
System. The HES PPS interlock operates through a magnetically sensitive switch. The HES
MPS interlock operates through a current transductor and comparator circuit. The HES
current must be above threshold to give an MPS permit.

There are two modes of HES permit:

A) Startup mode: A linac start permit is only given when the HES is energized above
threshold (80 A current). In this mode the electron beam is directed to the linac dump and
injection into the ring is not possible.

B) Injection mode: To allow injection of beam from the linac tunnel into the ring, both
the HES PPS bypass key and HES MPS bypass keys must be activated. These keys are to be
stored in the interlock key-box when not in use, and are only to be inserted by a qualified
operator. The operator must secure and post the entrances to the second floor mezzanine, and
the roll-gate on the fenced area on the north side of the ring room. No injection is permitted if
the roll-up doors at the west end of the ring room are open.

B. PPS LAYOUT

The personnel protection system is a hard-wired relay logic system. While computers may be
used to monitor the status of elements of the PPS system, at no time do computers play an active
role in the PPS system. The core of the PPS system is a set of hardware boxes in the control room.
These boxes accept signals from the various PPS indicators such as door switches, search indicators,
or the key banks, and use them to activate the actuators of the systems such as warning lights,
klaxons, and the rf switches to enable or disable machine operation. Each indicator has a latching
failsafe relay, an LED for status, and a computer monitor output. There is a reset button that resets
all indicators simultaneously. The tunnel PPS system has 16 indicators:

35
 • 4 for doors (the door in the entry maze and emergency exit at the east end of the tunnel
have two indicators each),
• one indicating that the stacked blocks at the west end of the tunnel are in place,
• one for a search indicator, one for the panic buttons,
• one for the pull rope,
• one for the key bank, and one for area radiation monitors.
• The other channels are spares that can be used for other permits such as a computer
permit, a machine protection permit, and an experimenter's permit (these are not actually
interlocks and so are not redundant). The LED is red if a fault exists (e.g. a door is open).
If the fault is cleared but the system is not reset the LED is yellow. If the fault is cleared
and the relay is reset the LED is green.

The indicator relays are connected in series so that if any one relay is open, the system cannot
work. If the entire loop is closed, a relay which supplies power to the actuators will close. There are
5 actuators in the present system—one set of magenta flashing lights for the tunnel, two magenta
warning lights, the klaxon, the high voltage enable for the drive klystron, and the power to open a
failsafe RF switch on the input to the main klystron. The power for the last two have a two minute
time delay and is passed through another set of contacts on the 16 loop relays to provide re-
dundancy. The klaxon turns on immediately but turns off after 15 sec.
The storage ring PPS system uses the same principles as the tunnel PPS. Placement of
interlock switches and alarms is shown in Fig. 4. The power relays, the power supplies for the 24
volts supplying the relays as well as the 5 volts powering the LEDs are all mounted in a box next to
the door of the ring search gate.

C. THE SEARCH SYSTEMS

The search system for the tunnel consists of a loop of relays in boxes and a control box at the
door. Each box contains a three color LED and a relay similar to those in the master

36
control box. Each relay in the chain derives its power from the previous relay so that the relays
must be reset in the correct order. All LEDs start out red before the search. When the search is
started the LED on the first box turns yellow. When it is reset it turns green and the LED on the
next box turns yellow. The power for the entire loop comes through the door interlock so the entire
search is cancelled if the door is opened during a search. Once the search is completed, a push
button at the exit door will give the searcher 10 seconds to leave the tunnel and close the exit door.
A buzzer sounds when the search interlock is bypassed. The search process will have a time limit of
up to 5 minutes. If the search is not finished in this time the system will reset and the search will
have to be restarted.
The search system for the ring is similar to the tunnel search system. Although there are three
gates for access to the area inside the ring shielding, only one can be used to initiate a search. The
ring search system requires that the seven search buttons be processed in the correct order to make
up the search interlock. There is a control box near the search gate, and a key bank in the control
room to secure all the ring access keys.

D. TURN ON PROCEDURE

The proper turn-on procedure for the MK III FEL, 1 GeV linac and 1 GeV storage ring
consists of the following steps:
1.) The tunnel PPS system is enabled with an operator’s key using a switch in the
box mounted at the maze entrance. This provides power to the PPS
components.
2.) The operator, accompanied by one other responsible person, initiates the search
and enters the tunnel. The doors must close behind them. The operator should
check that all the removable blocks in the maze and local shielding bricks are in
place during the search.
3.) The operator searches the tunnel along the path shown in figure 3, enabling each
search button in turn. Each relay in the search system will derive its power from
the previous relay so they must be activated in the correct order. Pressing the
small black button activates the box. The LED should

37
 turn green. The panic buttons should be checked to make sure that they are all
pulled out. Any personnel who are found during the search must report to the
exit door but must not leave the tunnel until the operator does.
4.) The operator activates a temporary override of the door interlock to exit the
tunnel. At this point the search status relay is activated. The search system relay
monitor in the control room, as well as the tunnel door, pull rope and panic
button relay monitor LEDs should be yellow.
5.) All keys must be inserted into the tunnel key bank and the keybank must be
locked. At this point the tunnel personnel protection loop should be fully closed
and all relay monitors should indicate yellow. When the system is reset they
should all turn green and the 30 A contactor which powers the tunnel PPS
actuators should close. This should start the delay relays for enabling the MkIII
FEL. A yellow light on the tunnel PPS panel will light during this time. The
magenta lights are powered up at this point and the klaxon inside the tunnel
sounds for 15 seconds.
6.) When the two-minute delay is finished the beam grant loop closes and a green
beam permit light should light on the tunnel PPS panel. With this level of beam
permit, it is possible to operate the MkIII FEL only.
7.) In order to start the 1GeV linac and 1 GeV storage ring, steps 1 through 6 must
be completed before a search of the area inside the ring is initiated.
8.) The ring PPS system is enabled with an operator key using a switch in the box
mounted near the search entry gate.
9.) The operator, accompanied by one other responsible person initiates the search
and enters the ring interior. The search entry gate must close behind them.
10.) The operator searches along the path starting at search box S1 in Figure 3 and
finishing at S6. The buttons in the search boxes must be pressed in the correct
order.
11.) The operator activates a temporary override of the gate interlock to exit the ring.

38
 12.) All keys must be inserted into the ring key bank and the key bank must be
locked. At this point the ring PPS loop should be fully closed and all relay
monitors should indicate yellow. When the system is reset, they should all turn
green and the contactor which powers the ring PPS activators should close. This
should start the delay relays for enabling the 1 GeV linac and the storage ring. A
yellow light on the ring PPS panel will light at this time.
13.) When the two-minute delay is finished, the beam grant loop is closed and a green
permit light on the ring PPS panel should light.

E. RESTRICTED ACCESS MODE FOR LINAC TUNNEL AND RING AREAS

For some quick entries by technically qualified personnel it is useful to go into a "restricted
access mode" (RAM). We will refer to either the linac tunnel or the interior of the ring shielding as
restricted areas. In this mode only people who have a key can enter the ring or the tunnel restricted
areas.
During a RAM access, the search status is not reset, so no search needs to be redone, unless
there is a violation of the RAM rules (see later). A video camera is mounted at the entrance to the
tunnel and the search entrance to the ring. These cameras enable the operator to verify from the
control room that no more personnel enter than those who removed keys from the appropriate key
bank.
To enter a linac tunnel restricted area in RAM, an additional access key is required (Key #1).
This key is attached to a special RF coupler attached to the output of the system master oscillator.
When this key is withdrawn, no RF source is available to drive either the 1 GeV linac or the MkIII
FEL. This key may be used to activate a search exit bypass switch mounted on the tunnel PPS panel
in the control room. The bypass operates for ten seconds during which time a buzzer will sound.
Only the access door to the restricted area is affected.
In order to enter the ring restricted area another access key is required (Key #2). This key is
attached to a special coupler in the 1 GeV linac RF system. When this key is withdrawn the 1
GeV linac is disabled but the MkIII FEL can continue to operate.
Key #2 may be used to activate a search exit bypass mounted on the ring PPS panel
in the control room. This bypass operates for ten seconds during which time a buzzer
will sound. Only the ring search access gate is affected. At least one person of any

39
group entering restricted areas must carry a survey meter to warn of situations in which
an individual might be exposed to a dose equivalent rate of more than 5 mrem/hr. If
there is likelihood that this value will be exceeded for individuals during an entry, then
the operator is to be advised and estimates of individual exposures should be entered
into the logbook.
It is important to note that the only interlocks that can be bypassed in this procedure are the
search loop interlocks. It is essential that only these interlocks be bypassed. The door interlocks,
the key-bank interlocks and the panic buttons and pull rope are all still active during this procedure.
It is also important to note that the permission to enter the tunnel must be by the operator in
charge. Thus, two people must be present for this procedure to work: one who enters the restricted
areas, and one who activates the “bypass button” in the control room.
It is the responsibility of the operator to:
• Issue an interlock key to each individual who enters a restricted area in restricted access
mode
• Log the time of entry, names of the individuals who enter the restricted area, and the
purpose of the entry
• Activate the bypass button on the PPS panel in the control room
• Secure all interlock keys from those individuals when they exit the restricted area, and to
note the time of exit.
• Be on duty in the control room at all times during a restricted access-mode entry.

Violation of restricted access mode rules include:

• Individuals leaving the restricted area without reporting to operator in the control room

• Failure to return interlock key to the operator on leaving the restricted area

• Failure to press the search-exit button prior to leaving the restricted area.

Such violations will require a complete search of the restricted area in question.

40
F. GAMMA MODE

The installation of cooled crotch chambers into the storage ring in November 2000 has
enabled higher beam currents to be achieved at all stored beam energies. Higher beam currents
increase the gamma flux capability of the OK-4 by several orders of magnitude. These gamma rays
strike the OK-4 output mirror, causing a significant flux of neutrons. Anticipating this, changes
have been made to upgrade the shielding around the mirror and the Gamma PPS Box has been
extensively modified. The lower floor of the Keck building is dedicated to beam lines emerging
from the south east corner of the ring shielding. The gamma beam line is aligned with the OK-4
optical beam line. It provides an unbroken vacuum path for transporting gamma rays from the
southern straight section of the storage ring to the inside of the Gamma Vault.
The gamma beam line runs for about 25 meters through the Keck laboratory. The beam pipe
consists of 4” stainless steel tube with no radiation shielding. As this is an occupied area, it is
essential that the beam pipe is clear of all obstructions that could scatter the beam when operating in
gamma mode. To ensure this, all valves and periscopes are fitted with micro-switches to monitor
their status. The micro-switches are used to provide inputs to the Gamma PPS Box. The gamma
PPS disables gamma mode by inserting the upstream periscope to interrupt the OK-4 optical cavity
and thereby inhibit lasing unless all downstream valves and periscopes are out. Area radiation
monitors are positioned down stream from each downstream insertion device to monitor radiation
levels immediately outside of the beam pipe.
The gamma PPS box has green LED indicators to show the status of the interlocked devices.
A lit LED signifies that the associated loop is made up. There are indicator lamps and buttons that
have the same functions as the corresponding controls on the ring and linac PPS boxes.
The gamma PPS box has a Gamma/Normal mode switch which retains the key when in the
“Normal” state. To enter “Gamma” mode, remove the key from the mode switch and place it in a
safe under control of the operators. In this mode, the periscope will be inserted unless the beam
permit is available (lamp LP3 lit). When the searches have been completed and all interlocks are
made up, pressing the “Reset” button will initiate the warning delay sequence. After the warning
delay, the gamma beam permit light will be on and a yellow sign will flash in the control room. The
operator can then remove the up stream periscope using the EPICS controls provided that the
periscope switch (S7) is in the “Out” position. The gamma beam permit requires:

41
 1. Mode switch in the gamma mode position
2. All interlock loops are made up including the Keck vault search.
3. The reset button be pressed.
4. A start up delay of 45 seconds.

To enter the “Normal” mode, obtain the key from the operators and use it to set the mode
switch to the “Normal” position. When the PPS box is in the “Normal” mode, all of the interlocks
are disabled except for the radiation detector (item 5 in the Beam Permit ring map) . When the PPS
box is in the “Gamma” mode, an alarm from this radiation detector has no effect. In this mode the
detector is used only as an indicator of gamma ray flux. When the PPS box is in the “Normal”
mode, an alarm from the monitor unlatches a relay in the PPS box which causes the up stream
periscope to be inserted. The relay may be latched again by pressing the reset button when the
radiation flux falls below the “high alarm” setting of 5 mRem/hour.
Two search boxes (SD-02-002-070) are located inside the Keck vault. The search is initiated
using the search/arm key to cycle the switch in the Keck door search box (SD-02-002). The Keck
vault can be accessed using one of the keys from the ring key bank. To complete the search, the
search buttons on the two search boxes are pressed in the correct order. Press the door bypass
button, exit the vault and close the door within 15 seconds to make up the search loop.
The vacuum in the Keck beam line is maintained by two ion pumps. Each pump has a
window detector to ensure that the operating current is in the correct range. The window detectors
provide a loop interlock to the Gamma PPS box.

Hardware
• Gamma PPS box located in the control room.
• Keck vault search box located outside the door to the Keck vault.
• Two search boxes
• Two panic boxes
• Two flashing signs, one in the control room and one outside the Keck vault.

42
Devices interlocked
• Keck vault search
• Gamma beam line vacuum valves
• Panic buttons
• Beam line vacuum (ion pump)
• Down stream periscope
• Three spare inputs are available for additional devices

Documentation
• System drawing SD-02-002-06b
• Gamma PPS box SD-02-002-05e
• Keck door PPS box SD-02-002-07a

43
APPENDIX A - Emergency Procedures

OUTLINE

An outline is given here of the text given in Appendix A. It is quite unlikely that any situation
except for I, IV and V would occur at DFELL but the others are listed in case they are needed.:
I. Radiation Emergencies - Acute Overexposure or Gross Contamination
II. Major Spills of radioactive materials
1) Spills involving no external radiation hazard to personnel
2) Spills involving an external radiation hazard to personnel
III. Accidents Involving Radioactive Dusts, Mists, Fumes, Vapors and Gases
IV. Overexposure (Less Than Acute)
V. Minor Spills
VI. Contamination of Body Surfaces and Clothing
VII. Methods of Decontamination

I. RADIATION EMERGENCIES - ACUTE OVEREXPOSURE OR GROSS CONTAMINATION

Radiation emergencies are incidents which involve actual or suspected exposure to 25 R or

more to any part of the body, or gross radioactive contamination resulting in ingestion, inhalation,
absorption, or wound contamination of hazardous amounts of radioisotopes. (Hazardous amounts
cannot be given a general specification. When in doubt, one should err on the side of caution.)
In any emergency situation, it is important to shut off the linac first. This can be done with the
scram button (the large red button on the PPS panel). In case of fire, the high voltage must also be
shut off by turning off the master key to the system.
1. a. If there is a serious injury with or without contamination, call 911 and
dispatch patient to the Emergency Room of the Duke Hospital at once. If
there is contamination, request that they activate their Radiation Emergency
Procedures.

b. If there is contamination without serious injury, call Radiation Safety (911),

remove contaminated clothing and carry out initial skin decontamination,
then dispatch patient to the emergency room.
c. If there is a suspected overexposure without contamination, call Radiation
Safety (911) and advise them of the situation. They will contact the

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 emergency room and inform them of procedures to follow. Send the person
to the emergency room without delay. High speed travel is not necessary.
2. If possible, preserve all conditions contributing to the accident, to allow
retrospective dose measurement. Nothing should be moved or changed without
authorization of the Director of Radiation Safety unless necessary for immediate
hazard control. Notify the Director of Radiation Safety immediately (911).

II. MAJOR SPILLS OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS.

It is the user's responsibility to decontaminate in accordance with appropriate procedures,

wearing protective clothing, and following other precautions specified by The OESO Division of
Radiation Safety. The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will survey and assure that
decontamination is complete.
The following is a list of procedures to follow in the event of a spill. Procedures for two cases
are given: the case where the spill does not constitute an external radiation hazard and the case
where an external radiation hazard exists. The steps are arranged in order of their urgency.

1. Spills involving no external radiation hazard to personnel.

a) Confine the spill immediately

i) If the spill is a liquid, drop absorbent paper on the entire area. (Wear
appropriate protective clothing including rubber gloves and lab coat.)
ii) If the spill is a dry material, with due caution to prevent material from
becoming airborne, place dampened absorbent material (paper or towels) over
the contamination.
b) Verbally notify all persons within hearing distance that a spill has occurred,
vacate the room and assemble in a nearby area to await The OESO Division of
Radiation Safety assistance. Caution personnel not to move unnecessarily, thus
avoiding the spread of contamination.
c) Permit to enter the area only the minimum number of persons necessary to deal
with the spill.
d) If such a spill occurs during machine operating time in an interlocked area, notify
the machine operator and request him to notify The OESO Division of
Radiation Safety, and also the Operations Supervisor or the Radiation Safety
Manager, or in their absence, the Director of the lab.. If the machine is not
running, the discoverer of the spill must notify these individuals directly.

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 e) After The OESO Division of Radiation Safety personnel arrive, begin de-
contamination according to their instructions.
i) Decontamination shall be carried out by the project group responsible for
causing the spill.
ii) Protective clothing, as specified by The OESO Division of Radiation Safety,
shall be worn during decontamination. This may include but is not limited to:
rubber gloves and shoe covers, lab coats or overalls, and respirators. These will
be available in the control room.
f) Persons may leave the spill area only after The OESO Division of Radiation
Safety has monitored them and found no contamination.
g) Work may be resumed in the area after the OESO Division of Radiation Safety
has conducted complete surveys and given approval.
h) The project personnel responsible for the spill shall prepare a history of the
incident and the subsequent activity thereto for the laboratory records and The
OESO Division of Radiation Safety file.

2. Spills involving an external radiation hazard to personnel.

a) Verbally notify all persons in the area who are not involved in the spill to leave at
once.
b) Move away from the immediate area at once.
c) If the spill is on the skin, flush thoroughly using the nearest appropriate solvent.
d) If the spill is on clothing, remove all outer clothing at once.
e) Move to an area where there is no external radiation hazard. Maintain traffic
control in the room, hallways where contaminated people have walked, etc.
f) If such a spill occurs during machine operating time in an interlocked area, notify
the machine operator and request him to notify The OESO Division of
Radiation Safety, and also the Operations Supervisor or the Radiation Safety
Manager,
g) or in their absence, the Director of the lab. If the machine is not running, the
discoverer of the spill is to directly notify these individuals.
g) While waiting for The OESO Division of Radiation Safety assistance, begin to
decontaminate any personnel involved. (See section below on Contamination of
Body Surfaces and Clothing.)

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 h) The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will supervise decontamination of the
area. Decontamination work shall be carried out by the project group responsible
for the spill.
i) The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will monitor all persons and conduct a
complete survey of the area to determine the adequacy of the decontamination.
j) Work may be resumed in the area only after The OESO Division of Radiation
Safety gives approval.
k) The project personnel responsible for the spill shall prepare a history of the
incident and the subsequent activity thereto for the laboratory records and The
OESO Division of Radiation Safety file.

III. ACCIDENTS INVOLVING RADIOACTIVE DUST, MISTS, FUMES, VAPORS AND GASES

In case of such an accident

1. Notify all other persons to vacate the room immediately.
2. Hold breath and switch off air circulating devices, etc., if time permits.
3. Vacate the room.
4. If such an accident occurs during machine operating time in an interlocked area,
notify the machine operator and request him to notify The OESO Division of
Radiation Safety and the Associate Director for Research or, in his absence, the
Director of the lab. If the machine is not running, the discoverer of the accident
is to directly notify The OESO Division of Radiation Safety and also the
Operations Supervisor, or the RSM, or the Director of the lab.
5. Ascertain that all doors giving access to the room are closed and post
conspicuous warnings or guards to prevent accidental opening of doors.
6. The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will evaluate the hazard and the
necessary safety devices for safe reentry. It will be necessary to determine the
cause of contamination. This condition must be rectified before decontamination
procedures can begin.
7. The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will recommend and/or supervise the
decontamination.
8. The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will perform an air survey of the area
before permitting work to be resumed.

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 9. The OESO Division of Radiation Safety will monitor all persons suspected of
contamination and may request that a urine sample, blood sample or fecal
sample be submitted for bioassay.
10. The project personnel responsible for the spill shall prepare a history of the
incident and the subsequent activity thereto for the laboratory and The OESO
Division of Radiation Safety file.

IV Overexposure (Less than Acute)

All cases of suspected overexposure to radiation workers must be reported at once by

telephone (684-2194) to The OESO Division of Radiation Safety (911, out of normal working
hours). No immediate medical assistance is required but it is likely that such persons will be referred
to a physician for appropriate examinations.

V. Minor Spills.

A radioactive spill is to be considered “minor” when it can be satisfactorily cleaned up by

laboratory personnel in a reasonable period of time without danger to any individual. In the event
that the clean-up turns out to be more difficult than expected, Radiation Safety must be consulted (a
practical limit might be 1/2 hour to accomplish clean-up with no significant radiation exposure. See
section VII for instruction regarding removing contaminants from personnel).

VI. Contamination of Body Surfaces and Clothing.

When hands, body surfaces, clothing or shoes become contaminated, steps must be taken as
soon as possible to remove loose contamination. (See Section VII) Do not move unnecessarily or
handle objects, thus avoiding spread of contamination. If you must move, keep mental note of
where you go and what objects you touch. Notify the OESO Division of Radiation Safety, (911).

VII. Methods of Decontamination

The following procedures have been used for removal of a wide variety of contaminants from
personnel. (More drastic methods must be performed under medical supervision.)
1. Remove contaminated clothing and place it in a suitable container.

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2. Monitor the person carefully to determine the level and location of
contamination.
3. Decontaminate in the following manner:
First, if possible, use masking or adhesive tape to remove loosely attached
contamination. Often most of the contamination can be removed in this
manner without risk of spreading the material. (Generally, avoid the use of
solvents because they can dissolve the materials which can then pass through
the skin.)
Second, if one knows a suitable solvent for the material (which is not injurious
to the skin), this should be tried.
Third, if the first method fails and there is no special solvent known, (or the
second method fails), cleanse the contaminated area with mild detergent and
water - giving special attention to hair and finger nails.
Note: If the contamination is localized, it is often more practical to mask off the
affected area before risking the danger of spreading the contamination by
general washing.
4.
If the procedures outlined above fail to remove the contaminants, soft brushes may be
used for cleansing, but care must be taken to avoid use of abrasive or strongly
alkaline cleansers which may allow the contamination to penetrate the skin.
5. Use copious amounts of water. However, use caution to avoid contaminating
minor cuts or breaks in the skin.
6. Where readily available, special (dry) hand cleansers may facilitate
decontamination. (These are available in the control room).
7. Apply hand cream or lanolin to areas to prevent chapping.

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50
APPENDIX B—TRAINING COURSEWORK

This section gives a synopsis of the training course for radiation workers and operators of
accelerators at DFELL. Some of the training material may be given to the trainees in written form.
Written material will include the DFELL Radiation Safety Manual, and the Duke University
Radiation Safety Manual.

Radiation Workers and Unescorted Visitors

The following topics will be covered in the user orientation and facility tour.

1.) Definition of terms

a.) Roentgen
b.) Rad
c.) Rem, Gray
d.) Curie, Bequerel
e.) Conversion equations.
2.) Dose limits
a.) Radiation workers
b.) Non-radiation workers.
3.) The ALARA concept.
4.) Types of radiation present in the FEL Laboratory facility
a.) X-rays
b.) Gammas
c.) Neutrons
d.) Beta rays
5.) Dose reduction methods.
6.) Dosimeters
a.) Badges
b.) Personal active dosimeters.
c.) Geiger counters
d.) Ionization chambers.
e.) Local area ionization chambers.
f.) Area monitoring TLDs.
7.) Warning signs, lights, and sirens.
a.) Posted signs.

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 b.) Radiation warning beacons and sirens.
8.) Personnel protection system
a.) Interlocks for tunnel and beam dump area access.
b.) Key system.
c.) Panic buttons and pull ropes.
d.) Search procedures.
e.) Emergency procedures.

A facility tour will review the last three major topics, showing the trainees the actual hardware
in question. The trainee will be required to pass a quiz on the material of the course.

Operator training course

The Operator training course consists of :

• The general radiation worker training course.
• Additional topics outlined below
• Hands-on apprenticeship under the guidance of a Class I operator

1. RADIATION FUNDAMENTALS
1.1 Definitions
1.2 Introductory concepts
1.2.1 Structure of the atom
1.2.2 Mass and Energy
1.3 Ionizing Radiation–Introductory concepts
1.3.1 Biological effects due to ionizing radiation
1.3.2 Effects of ionizing radiation on materials
1.3.3 Detection of ionizing radiation
1.3.4 Accelerator produced radiation
1.3.5 Klystron produced radiation
1.3.6 Radiation from activated materials
1.4 Protective measures
1.4.1 Units of radiation
1.4.2 Action to reduce dose
1.4.3 Shielding for the accelerator

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2. THE NATURAL RADIATION ENVIRONMENT
2.1 Cosmic rays
2.2 Terrestrial sources
2.2.1 Medical exposures
2.3 Summary
2.4 Biological effects of ionizing radiation
2.4.1 Cellular biology
2.4.2 Cancer biology
2.4.3 Causes of Cancer—what is known
2.4.4 Summary
2.4.5 Heredity and cancer induction
2.4.6 Fetal effects from radiation exposure
2.4.7 Acute effects

3. REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

3.1 Organization
3.1.1 Duke OESO Division of Radiation Safety and committee
3.1.2 FEL lab Radiation Safety committee
3.1.3 Operations Supervisor Duties and Authority
3.1.4 Radiation Safety manager Duties and Authority
3.1.5 Operator duties and authority
3.2 Labeling and record keeping
3.2.1 Radiation warning signs.
3.2.2 Radiation logbook
3.2.3 Radiation source logbook
3.2.4 Dosimeter logbook
3.3 Handling of sealed radioactive sources
3.4 Removal of activated components from beamlines.

4. RADIATION SAFETY SYSTEMS AT DFELL

4.1 Dosimeters
4.1.1 Film badges
4.1.2 Personal active dosimeters.
4.1.3 Geiger counters
4.1.4 Ionization chambers
4.1.5 Local area ionization chambers

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 4.1.6 Area monitoring TLDs
4.1.7 Calibrating ionization chambers.

4.2 Personnel protection system

4.2.1 Architecture
4.2.2 Interlocks for tunnel and beam dump access
4.2.3 Warning systems
4.2.4 The key system
4.2.5 Panic buttons and pull ropes.
4.2.6 Search procedures
4.2.7 Restricted access modes
4.2.8 Maintenance of the system
4.2.9 Administrative procedures for system
modification.

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