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Journal of European Integration

ISSN: 0703-6337 (Print) 1477-2280 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/geui20

The EU’s Performance with and within


NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and
Organisational Practices

Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

To cite this article: Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik (2011) The EU’s Performance with and
within NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational Practices, Journal of European
Integration, 33:6, 743-757, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2011.606698

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European IntegrationAquatic Insects
Vol. 33, No. 6, 743–757, November 2011

ARTICLE

The EU’s Performance with and


within NATO: Assessing Objectives,
Outcomes and Organisational
Practices

NINA GRÆGER* & KRISTIN M. HAUGEVIK


Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway

ABSTRACT This article assesses the EU’s performance as a security actor in the
context of NATO, both at the institutional level and when acting as a bloc of member
states within NATO. Informed by a definition of ‘performance’ as the ability to achieve
preset objectives (effectiveness) in an efficient, relevant and viable manner, we observe
that the EU’s performance in the context of NATO remains limited. This could be seen
as a reflection of underlying political divergences between the two organisations, ham-
pering systematic and formalised intra-institutional cooperation as well as effective
cooperation between the EU member states in NATO. More importantly, it has
resulted in the emergence of more informal and ad hoc EU practices in the context of
NATO as well as parallel EU and NATO practices.

KEY WORDS: NATO, EU, ESDP, performance, practice, inter-organisational coop-


eration

Introduction
The European Union (EU) has come a long way in developing a security
and defence policy of its own during the last decade, to the extent that
most scholars and decision-makers now consider it a relevant – though
still atypical – international security actor. A number of scholars have
engaged in analyzing what kind of security actor the EU is (e.g. Larsen
2002; Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006), what capabilities it possesses or lacks

Correspondence Address: Nina Græger, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs


(NUPI), Pb. 8159 Dep., 0033 Oslo, Norway. Email: ng@nupi.no
ISSN 0703–6337 Print/ISSN 1477–2280 Online/11/060743-15 Ó 2011 The Author(s). Published by
Taylor & Francis. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2011.606698
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/Licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/),
which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
744 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

to act as a security actor (Rieker 2009; Shake, Block-Lainé, and Grand


1999; Toje 2010; Weis 2009; Whitman 2011), and how well it has
succeeded in implementing its security tasks and peace-building efforts so
far (e.g. Björkdahl 2011; Bono and Ulriksen 2004; Gross 2009). Increas-
ingly, this literature has also come to include studies on how the EU
relates to and works with other security organisations in the international
arena, both generally and with specific organisations (Howorth 2003;
Jørgensen 2009b; Ojanen 2006; Ortega 2005). Recently, a small but grow-
ing literature has taken interest in how the EU works within other interna-
tional institutions in which some or all of its member states are
represented (de Vasconcelos 2009a; Laatikainen and Smith 2006; Lind-
ström 2007). Adding to these efforts, this article offers an empirically
grounded assessment of the EU’s performance as a security actor working
with and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). NATO
is a particularly interesting case to study as it is simultaneously a partner
and an arena for the EU. The two organisations share historical roots in
the post–World War II era, have developed alongside one another, and
also share 21 member states.1
Our analysis is informed by Charles Lusthaus et al.’s (2002) indicators for
assessing institutional performance, presented in the introduction to this
collection. Adapted to our case, we operationalise ‘performance’ as, firstly,
the degree to which predetermined objectives are being realized when work-
ing with and within NATO, in concrete policy output (effectiveness). We
also ask whether the accomplishment of these objectives has taken place in
an efficient manner, in the context of NATO operationalised as the value of
these achievements weighed against the diplomatic, political, military and
financial resources invested in pursuing them (efficiency). We also touch
briefly on the degree to which the EU is regarded ‘relevant’ by various stake-
holders (relevance) and whether it currently has the necessary resources to
meet its functional requirements and acquire its stated objectives with and
within NATO (viability). From this analytical starting point, we conclude
that the EU’s performance as a security actor both with and within NATO
is currently very limited. This rings true both if we understand ‘the EU’ to
mean the institutions and individuals acting on behalf of the EU, and if we
widen it to include formal and informal constellations involving some or all
of the 21 EU member states that are also members of NATO.
Our analysis starts by identifying the EU’s stated objectives for its per-
formance with and within NATO as spelled out in official EU documents
and statements and in bilateral agreements between the EU and NATO. In
the second section, we make some overall empirical observations concern-
ing the EU’s present achievement of these, relatively vague, objectives. In
the third section, we identify some factors that may shed light on the EU’s
limited performance with and within NATO. We end with a recommenda-
tion for a future research agenda, suggesting an alternative assessment
model for the EU’s performance with and within NATO. Focusing instead
on performance as everyday formal and informal practices, we argue,
might provide a somewhat different picture of EU achievements and short-
comings in its relationship with NATO.
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO 745

Identifying the EU’s Objectives with and within NATO


Since 1992, EU treaties have routinely established guidelines for the EU’s
and EU member states’ relationship with and strategic objectives in rela-
tion to other international organisations as part of the EU’s Common For-
eign and Security Policy (CFSP). Specific objectives for the EU’s relations
with NATO, however, are surprisingly few and far between. Even after
the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty, NATO is mentioned by name only
twice in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), and in both cases with
reference to the precautionary Article 42, Section 2, stating that the EU is
to ‘respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their com-
mon defence realised in [NATO]’ (European Council. 2010).
An early milestone in the institutional relationship between the EU and
NATO was the establishment of the European Security and Defence Iden-
tity (ESDI) within the framework of NATO in 1996. Two years later, the
French-British Saint-Malo declaration also opened the possibility for EU
military action outside NATO’s structures (France and the United King-
dom 2008), eventually leading to the adoption of the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP) (European Council. 1999a, 1999b). In
response to then US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s warnings
against EU structures that would compete with NATO (Albright 1998),
then NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson made it clear that the
‘ESDI does not mean “less US” – it means more Europe, and hence a
stronger NATO’ (Robertson 1999). This view marked the discourse on
EU-NATO relations in the subsequent years. A formal letter exchange
between the EU Presidency and NATO’s Secretary General of January
2001 – the details of which remain classified – became the starting point
for the two organisations’ formalised security cooperation. In 2002, the
‘EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP’ outlined the political principles for the
relationship, identified objectives for their effective joint performance in
the international arena, and established a strategic partnership (EU and
NATO 2002). A set of formal arrangements between the two organisa-
tions, collectively and better known as the Berlin Plus framework, has
been in effect since March 2003 (for a full overview of the agreement, see
NATO 2003). This remains the main formal framework for EU-NATO
cooperation, outlining the conditions under which the EU can draw on
NATO assets in operations where NATO as a whole does not wish to act
(EU and NATO 2002). The Berlin Plus arrangements also provide the EU
access to NATO planning, European command options and assets and
capabilities in these situations (Consilium. 2003).
When it comes to the EU’s objectives for its performance within NATO,
they are even harder to unearth. Accordingly, an assessment of the EU’s
effectiveness within NATO will have to depend on the general objectives
set out for the EU’s performance in international institutions, listed in
Articles 32, 34 and 35 of the Treaty on European Union (European Coun-
cil 2010). Adapted to the case of NATO, they can be summarised as fol-
lows: first, the EU member states are to coordinate their action and
uphold common EU positions in NATO. This work should be organised
by the EU High Representative. Second, the EU member states in NATO
746 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

should keep non-NATO EU member states as well as the High Represen-


tative informed of matters of common interests. Third, EU member states
should ensure that their diplomatic and consular delegations to NATO
cooperate and contribute to the formulation and implementation of com-
mon EU approaches. Member states must further ensure that decisions
defining EU positions and actions are complied with and implemented and
that cooperation is enhanced through the exchange of information and by
carrying out joint assessments (European Council 2010).
With these objectives in view, the next section looks at cooperation
between the two organisations, before we move on to studying how the
21 EU member states in NATO are performing within the alliance. This
distinction between ‘with’ and ‘within’, it should be noted, is primarily an
analytical one. In practice, the EU’s work with NATO and within the
NATO context must be seen in relation to one another.

The EU’s Performance with NATO


Practical and institutional cooperation between NATO and the EU is
mainly regulated by the Berlin Plus framework arrangements of March
2003. This package of agreements has unleashed both formal and informal
cooperation practices between the EU and NATO, of which the most
important ones will be analysed here.
NATO and EU officials meet on a regular basis at the level of foreign
ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors to
discuss issues of common interest. There are monthly meetings between
the EU’s Security and Political Committee and the North Atlantic Council,
alternating between NATO Headquarters (HQ) and the EU’s Justus
Lipsius Building in Brussels. Meetings at the military level take place
between the EU Military Committee and the NATO Military Committee,
and between NATO’s International Staff and the EU International Mili-
tary on lower levels. Permanent military liaison arrangements have been
established to facilitate EU-NATO cooperation at the operational level as
well. Since 2005, a NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at
the EU Military Staff, and an EU Cell was set up at Supreme Headquar-
ters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in 2006. There are also regular staff
contacts between the European Union’s Council Secretariat and Military
Staff, as well as with the European Defence Agency (EDA).
The Berlin Plus framework has, however, not worked as intended, largely
because of the political disagreement between two participating states, Tur-
key and Cyprus, also involving Greece. In short, because EU officials have
dismissed Turkey’s demands to be more involved in EU decision-making on
security issues, Turkey rejects Cyprus’ wish to take part in NATO meetings
(Pop 2010). Greece has called for a security agreement between the EU and
Turkey as a prerequisite for the latter’s signing of an administrative
arrangement with the EDA, which is being blocked by Cyprus (Sturm
2010).2 This situation has hampered political dialogue, coordination of
strategy, institutional cooperation and, consequently, joint EU-NATO
action. During 2010, national representatives to both organisations engaged
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO 747

in formal, high-level strategic discourse only once, with the Althea opera-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only topic on the agenda (Daalder
2010). For the time being, informal practices seem to have taken over that
function. For instance, transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial
dinners have taken place since September 2005.3 In contrast, the NATO
Secretary General’s wish to hold a NATO-EU summit as part of NATO’s
60th-anniversary meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009 never materialized
(Lachmann 2010).
Unlike many other multilateral institutions with which the EU interacts,
NATO is not only a partner, but in some respects also a competitor.
Although cooperation and division of labour were underlined from the start
to avoid competition and duplication between the two, this has proved dif-
ficult to achieve in practice. Instead, parallel and sometimes competing
practices have emerged. One illustrative example is the fact that the perma-
nent NATO and EU headquarters remain separate – four miles from each
other – despite both being located in Brussels. The headquarters for military
and defence planning are also located separately: NATO has its strategic
command for operations in Mons, Belgium (although military representa-
tives are located at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels), whereas the EU
has separate military planning headquarters placed in five member states.4
NATO also has a number of military commands in its member states,
although this is continuously shrinking.5 In general, member states have
been eager to have military headquarters and commands on their soil, both
as a symbol of their importance in NATO or EU strategy and defence plan-
ning, and for national security concerns.6 For leading NATO members like
the United States, NATO basing policy not only provides material arrange-
ments for military operations, but arguably also political influence in these
regions (Cooley and Nexon 2007).
NATO and the EU also have separate, partly overlapping military capa-
bilities. The EU’s European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) (European
Council 2001) and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002)
remain poorly synchronised, despite the setting up of a joint NATO-EU
Capability Group. Meetings in the Group take place every four to six
weeks, alternating between the Council’s Justus Lipsius Building and
NATO HQ. Because briefing content is rarely exchanged before meetings,
however, they often lack substance and instead take the form of largely
formulaic information exchange. The EU and NATO’s more or less simul-
taneous decisions to establish rapid reaction forces – the EU Battlegroups
in 2002 and the NATO Response Force in 2003 – is one striking example
of the development of parallel practices. Both forces are designed for
rapid, temporary deployment and flexible use for the international com-
munity or, alternatively, the EU or NATO acting on its behalf. Single-issue
meetings initiated by the EU Presidency and meetings at the level of MOD
policy directors in the member states seem to have functioned somewhat
better (Sturm 2010).
While both the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative
have stressed the need to further integrate EU and NATO capabilities, the
building up of parallel structures, capabilities and practices seems to con-
748 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

tinue. For example, NATO’s new Strategic Concept establishes a NATO


civilian capacity. The idea is to train NATO personnel in civilian compe-
tence to enhance cooperation with other actors, including the EU, in com-
plex emergencies and operations, and improve the implementation of
NATO’s ‘comprehensive approach’ (NATO 2010a). How the new civilian
capacity will be integrated or coordinated with EU civilian capabilities,
however, remains unspecified. While a NATO civilian capacity may
enhance EU-NATO cooperation in the field, the risk of duplication of
non-military capabilities is also present. By establishing a civilian capacity,
NATO is moving into the EU’s traditional area of competence.
Cooperation is also hampered by the fact that the EU and NATO must
take different priorities into account – defined by their respective organisa-
tions – and they also follow different methodologies. Hence, it could be
argued that politics and military organisational cultures encourage the
development of separate practices. Regarding methodology, (higher) mili-
tary education practices provide a clue. While the NATO Defence College
was established in 1951, the European Security and Defence College was
set up only in 2005. Unlike the former, which provides senior military edu-
cation for military and civilian staff, the latter is a network of European
Defence academic institutions set up to promote and train EU member
states in the implementation of the ESDP/CSDP and CFSP.7 The members
of the EU Military Committee have followed similar careers, however, and
many have attended the NATO Defence College or American military
schools like the National Defence University (Washington, D.C.) and even
the US Army War College (Carlisle, Pennsylvania). Accordingly, they lar-
gely share professional norms and values (Cross 2010). Education is a
strong socialising mechanism and NATO has been an influential norm
entrepreneur within military professionalism and doctrine (Forster 2006). A
more coherent education of military staff could lead to more coherent con-
duct of joint operations, increasing military interoperability as well as polit-
ical interoperability (‘a common world view’).
The EU’s cooperation and performance with NATO also suffers from
the fact that NATO and EU defence planning processes – defined as the
collective setting of targets and performance reviews – have not been
brought together (see e.g. Biscop 2010). Vital practices like defence plan-
ning, defence reviews and coherence in capability development remain a
member-state concern (Cameron 2009; Sturm 2010). Also within defence
procurement, national – usually industrial – concerns are hampering coop-
eration, although examples of routinised cooperation among EU-countries
exist. Standardising military hardware is a huge challenge for the EU (de
Vasconcelos 2009b).
Despite the mutual employment of expertise and capabilities by both
organisations in missions, EU and NATO often seem to pursue parallel
instead of synchronized policies in the field. Examples include the transition
of security responsibilities to an independent Kosovo, the fight against piracy
off the coast of Somalia, and the training of police officers in Afghanistan
(Daalder 2010). This tells of weak synchronisation between EU and NATO
at the strategic level. The processes of adopting the Lisbon Treaty and of
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO 749

revising NATO’s Strategic Concept took place more or less in parallel dur-
ing 2009 and 2010, and could have provided a point of departure for more
coordinated policies and coherent practices, potentially also improving the
preconditions for the EU’s performance in the NATO context. However,
this did not happen to any extent. Before the Summit, no common EU
perspective was formulated on the Concept (de Vasconcelos 2010).
While the Berlin Plus framework was hoped to provide ‘the framework
for reconciling NATO and the EU . . . in a genuinely strategic partnership’
(Robertson 2003), this has not (yet) materialised. Both the Albright report
and the new Strategic Concept emphasise that NATO’s strategic partner-
ships, and especially with the EU, need to be strengthened (NATO 2010a;
2010b). As Sven Biscop observes, however, ‘no real choice has yet been
made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and on the level of
ambition and the degree of autonomy of the EU as strategic actor vis-à-vis
NATO and the United States’ (Biscop 2006: 6). This still seems to be the
case: the EU remains internally divided, both with regard to capabilities,
politics and the future of European security, revealing an underlying diver-
gence within the union (Sturm 2010). Others have warned against the
CSDP becoming a ‘mini-NATO’ disconnected from the CFSP to boast a
specifically European, comprehensive approach to security (Lachmann
2010). Consequently, the Cyprus issue can only partly account for the lim-
ited inter-organisational cooperation. The conflict seems to transcend the
parties involved, serving at times as a cover for other interests in the mat-
ter.8 Arguably, even if the stalemate were resolved, EU-NATO relations
would still suffer from tension because of different views concerning what
the main threats are and how security is best achieved. In the absence of
substantive agreement regarding political and military priorities and how
things are to be done, practical solutions have instead emerged in the field,
as well as informally. Over time, these ad hoc, informal solutions may
develop into standard practices, either improving cooperation or further
cementing the build-up of parallel and separate NATO-EU practices.

The EU’s Performance within NATO


EU-NATO divergences also complicate the EU and its member states’ per-
formance within NATO. Significant achievements on the EU’s part are dif-
ficult to spot, at least on account of our analytical point of departure
where performance essentially equals the achievement of preset objectives.
Starting with the general objective of establishing common EU positions
and actions within international organisations, little has been accom-
plished in NATO at the time of writing. While the general trend in the
UN General Assembly has been greater coordination within ‘the EU bloc’
(see Laatikainen and Smith 2006), the 21 EU member states that are also
NATO members have rarely been seen to coordinate their positions or
attempt to speak with a single voice in NATO. One observer notes that
while the overlapping or parallel goals of the EU and NATO in theory
might be expected to trigger ‘some form of commitment to inter-EU con-
sultation and “alignment”’ to strengthen the EU’s position inside NATO,
this has so far not been the case. Instead, he claims,
750 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

NATO is one of the EU’s taboos. Within the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance, EU Member States take decisions that vitally affect the secu-
rity of all Europeans, and yet such decisions are not concerted among
the EU’s members (unlike the established practice at the United
Nations). Arguably EU Member States’ decisions in their capacity as
NATO members are more likely to affect EU security options than
what member countries decide at the UN (de Vasconcelos 2009a: 1).

Indeed, few formal or informal practices inside NATO appear to have


been generated by the EU as an institution or by constellations of EU
member states. There is, for example, no formal or informal coordination
mechanism for EU positions and actions in NATO. One analyst observes
that ‘several attempts throughout the first half of [the 2000s] to establish
a coordination mechanism among EU NATO members have failed’, in
turn raising ‘serious questions about the prospects for the emergence of a
greater unity among EU member states within NATO’ (Garbers 2008: 2).
In contrast, before each new session of the UN General Assembly, the EU
member states have preparatory meetings to discuss and approve a paper
outlining the EU’s priorities for the forthcoming session.
The second objective identified above was operationalised as the EU
member states’ commitment to keeping non-NATO EU members (cur-
rently Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) and the EU
High Representative informed of ‘matters of common interest’ within
NATO. For a long time, however, this communication has been highly
problematic, because of the dispute between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus.
NATO’s Fogh Rasmussen has emphasised that the EU needs to accommo-
date Turkey’s demand for a security agreement with the EU as well as
with the EDA, and to include non-EU NATO members in ESDP decision
making, while Lady Ashton has stressed the importance of a realist, prag-
matic approach (see Rasmussen 2010).9 This includes ‘“practical,” confi-
dence-building measures between NATO and the EU, such as in-theatre
co-operation on medical assistance, joint exercises and seminars’ (Pop
2010). The fact that seven of today’s NATO members – including the Uni-
ted States – are not in the EU,10 also complicates the dialogue between the
two organisations. Under the Berlin Plus agreement, these states are enti-
tled to meet with the EU Troika four times a year to be informed and con-
sulted about ESDP-related issues, but in practice these meetings have
taken the form of one-way information sharing rather than of political
substance discussions (Græger 2007). These meeting formats were dis-
solved upon the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and have not yet been
replaced by new formal formats.11
A final EU objective for its performance in international organisations
concerns the obligations of the EU member states’ diplomatic delegations
to NATO. It is a stated EU objective to formulate and implement common
approaches, to ensure information exchange and compliance with and
implementation of EU positions and actions in the relevant field. At this
point too, EU performance within NATO comes across as limited. There
is, for example, presently no EU delegation to NATO, nor is there an
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO 751

official website informing the public about the EU’s work with and within
NATO. In contrast, the EU has been present at the UN since 1964, with a
diplomatic delegation there since 1974. Relevant information concerning
cooperation and dialogue between the two organisations is found at the
EU’s official website European Union @ United Nations: Partnership in
Action (EU External Action. n.d.). This website also collects joint UN-EU
publications and reports, and presents a list of EU priorities, policies,
statements and declarations at the UN.

Explaining the EU’s Limited Performance with and within NATO


The EU’s limited performance in the context of NATO might be reflective
of several factors, and in the following we will briefly highlight some of
the most important.
Firstly, what may be described as ‘great power politics’ appears to affect
both the institutional relationship between the EU and NATO and the EU’s
prospects for playing a greater role as an actor or bloc inside NATO. In
NATO, the impact of US officials’ warning against the development of a sta-
ble EU caucus should not be underrated. Furthermore, it could be argued
that France’s long-term absence from NATO’s military structures has disal-
lowed the French-German and French-British cooperation and initiatives
that often have pushed European integration forward. France’s return as a
full-fledged member in NATO’s military cooperation and the recent signing
of a historic French-British agreement on strategic security and defence
cooperation (see Taylor 2010) may therefore ease future discussions about
greater EU coordination and dialogue within NATO (Garbers 2008). Ulti-
mately, however, enhanced dialogue and cooperation between the EU and
NATO and greater coordination of the EU bloc inside NATO largely rely
on shared political priorities and agreement on how to reach them.
Secondly, a complicating factor regarding the prospects for an EU bloc
in NATO concerns the existence of other sub-groups and constellations
among member states in NATO, which often seem to take priority over
EU unity. Such informal constellations have existed in NATO since the
beginning. Some are fairly persistent, based on factors like geographic
location and shared history; others are formed on a case-by-case basis.
Examples include ‘the Atlanticists’ (and various sub-groups thereof), ‘Core
Europe’ and ‘Club Med’ (see Græger and Haugevik 2009). Notably, how-
ever, the EU is rarely listed among these constellations. On the contrary,
those (few) observers who have taken an interest in the matter of EU per-
formance in NATO either point out that there are few indications of an
‘EU caucus’ emerging inside NATO (Burwell et al. 2006; Whitney 2008),
or they warn against such a development. Instead, the current case seems
to be that the EU member states operate flexibly and pragmatically in
NATO, spreading themselves on other sub-constellations.
Closely related to this, it remains a trend in both NATO and the EU
that much informal decision-making depends on bilateral relationships
between member states. For a key NATO and EU member state like
Britain, for example, the value of ‘working bilaterally’ is now recognised
752 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

in official documents (Ministry of Defence 2010). Most importantly, the


United States maintains close bilateral relationships with a number of
NATO and EU countries. In most cases, these bonds were established dur-
ing and immediately after the Second World War, forming an important
backdrop for the establishment of NATO and the United States’ commit-
ment to the territorial defence of European states. Bilateral relationships
have also been upheld outside NATO’s structures. During the Cold War,
the United States’ overseas basing strategies were characterised by ‘largely
bilateral, variegated and asymmetric contracts between the U.S. govern-
ment and host government’ (Cooley and Nexon 2007: 3). Similarly, schol-
ars have argued that, during the second Bush administration and around
the invasion of Iraq, bilateral relationships appeared to be replacing multi-
lateral alliances (Dumbrell and Schäfer 2009: 2).
Today, the United States maintains close bilateral relationships with
many NATO-and-EU members. Some of these relationships are short-term
and practically motivated. Others are more long-term ‘special relation-
ships’, characterised by extensive cooperation and shared political prac-
tices. Here, Britain has historically been in a category of its own, followed
by other ‘Atlanticist’ NATO members such as Norway, Denmark and the
Netherlands. In recent years, however, new NATO and EU member states
like Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary seem to be playing ‘the
bilateral card’ too.12 In light of this, one could hypothesize that the emer-
gence of a stable EU caucus inside NATO, formally or informally and
accompanied by a distinct set of shared EU practices, could complicate
bilateral relationships with the United States. A divided and fragmented
NATO was a central concern in the internal NATO debates in the 1990s
leading up to the establishment of the ESDI in NATO. From this perspec-
tive, a potential EU caucus in NATO has been described as the ‘elephant
in the room’, one that could complicate relations between the EU and
NATO and weaken decision-making in NATO (deCamp 2005).
At the same time, it could be argued that the 21 EU member states in
NATO currently lack the military and financial capabilities to play a greater
role as a collective bloc within NATO. Although representing 75% of
NATO’s member states, the EU 21 possessed in 2008 only about 47.2% of
NATO’s armed forces. In comparison, the United States alone had about
37% and Turkey 13.8% (NATO 2011b). Similarly, in late 2010 the 26 EU
countries participating in the NATO-led ISAF operation collectively pro-
vided only 24% of the troops. In the midst of severe budgetary cuts across
Europe, including in leading EU members in NATO like Britain and France,
the EU’s financial capability to act with a stronger collective voice can be
questioned. Consequently, one might ask what the incentives would be for
the EU to play a stronger role within NATO, politically and practically. As
Jolyon Howorth has noted, even if the EU 21 were to act as one bloc in the
North Atlantic Council, they would still only possess one out of eight
voices, since decision-making here remains intergovernmental. Besides, he
notes, the fact that one of these ‘others’ is the United States really ‘makes
all the difference’ (Howorth 2009: 5). For the EU, it could therefore make
more sense to concentrate on further strengthening its own security and
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO 753

defence dimension, rather than using NATO as an arena. This, in turn,


could materialize into the establishment of further parallel institutional
practices where organisational labels and footprints are given priority over
EU-NATO cooperation and joint ventures.
A third important factor for the lack of EU performance in the NATO
context is the build-up of separate structures for the daily, routinised (‘nit-
ty-gritty’) military planning and other activities (e.g. headquarters), as well
as the organisational culture growing out of or being confirmed by these
practices. Arguably, organisation, working procedures, as well as capabili-
ties are more than ways of organising activity; they also symbolise an
organisation’s identity, power and prestige. From this viewpoint, the EU
and NATO remain competitors rather than partners and collaborators.
Indeed, both institutions have a stated objective to obtain a position as
security actors beyond their own territories, seeking a role in regional, and
increasingly also global security.
Clearly, NATO has impacted profoundly on the development of ESDP
institutions and particularly on the set-up of the EU military committee
and staff (Jørgensen 2009a: 192). With its stronger influence on the EU
than vice versa, long-term experience with operations, defence planning
and integrated command structure, NATO could potentially infringe upon
the autonomy of the EU in this field. However, inter-organisational learn-
ing has also taken place in missions like Concordia and Althea, deepening
EU-NATO relations in the field (Warvick and Koops 2009: 116). Yet,
there are also examples of NATO policies being modelled after the EU,
such as the ‘comprehensive approach’ to conflict management and post-
conflict operations. In the EU Military Committee, where posts are dou-
ble-hatted (both EU and NATO), a post-modern culture and doctrine has
emerged where the civilian dimension of military thinking is deemed
important (Cross 2010: 19).
An alternative explanation could be that EU objectives have been
reframed – de facto if not de jure – not to compete with NATO but as a
result of the poor functioning of the Berlin Plus framework. Years of politi-
cal stalemate and lack of progress in EU-NATO cooperation may have
pushed for the development of separate EU capacities and practices. Such an
explanation would emphasise the pragmatic rather than ideological or com-
petitive aspects of EU institution building and policy in the field of security.
On a final note, several practices within the field of security continue to
be seen as sensitive. At the end of the day, they therefore remain national
matters. This presumably affects EU performance more than NATO per-
formance, inasmuch as the consensus principle in NATO has been seen as
a buffer against at least formal loss of sovereignty to the alliance.

Measuring Performance: Towards a New Research Agenda?


This article has suggested that the EU is currently neither a relevant nor
visible performer in the context of NATO, whether in its institutional
cooperation with NATO or as a bloc of EU member states within NATO.
Firstly, at the institutional level of EU-NATO interaction, both
754 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik

the updating of shared objectives as well as effective practical cooperation


(i.e. capability development and in the field) and information sharing con-
tinue to be hampered by the Cyprus stalemate. In addition, diverging
agendas and priorities among member states on both sides make it difficult
for the two organisations to find a shared way ahead.
Secondly, inside NATO there is a noteworthy lack of formal as well as
informal practices involving the 21 EU members in NATO acting collec-
tively or as a bloc. At the time of writing, other bi-, tri- and multilateral con-
stellations, whether long-term or ad hoc, and especially those involving the
United States, seem to take precedence over the formation of an EU caucus.
As noted above, the EU has set out few objectives for its performance in
NATO, making it challenging to measure the degree to which objectives
have been achieved (and in an efficient, relevant and viable manner). But
there is also an apparent lack of EU-generated practices inside the frame-
work of NATO. This is true even if we broaden the definition of perfor-
mance to encompass how the EU, intentionally or not, de facto works
inside NATO on a daily basis.
At the end of our discussion, we identified some possible explanations as
to why future assessments of EU performance with and within NATO in the
near future are likely to produce the same conclusion, if they are based on
Lusthaus et al.’s (2002) understanding of performance as achievement of
preset, stated objectives. This does not mean that the EU cannot improve its
performance in NATO in the future; however, it suggests that the EU’s
performance in NATO is complicated by a number of contextual and
structural factors.
Taking this into consideration, let us end with a suggestion for how
future research on the EU’s performance with and within NATO could be
conducted. After all, it seems clear that any assessment of performance
will depend on how we define performance in the first place. Although a
‘comprehensive approach’ has trumped a purely military approach in crisis
management also in NATO, this is often overlooked in the literature.
Numerous articles have been published about the EU’s lack of ability to
underpin its political ambitions in security and defence with military pos-
ture since the Bosnia operation in 1995. These contributions often mea-
sure the Union’s performance according to how it fulfils its stated goals as
a security actor, focusing on access to EU (autonomous) military means.
When ‘hard numbers’ are what counts, NATO remains the big brother of
the two, because of its interoperable military capabilities and integrated
command structure. As argued by Peter Viggo Jakobsen (2009), the mili-
tary focus in scholarly (and especially Nordic) studies of ESDP has led to
a neglect of the civilian dimension of ESDP, where EU performance has
proved to be effective, efficient and relevant, to use the Lusthaus et al,
(2002) terminology. The EU is now a major actor within civilian crisis
management and peace building (Björkdahl 2011).
An alternative definition of performance, which looks more systemati-
cally at performance as practice (see Adler and Pouliot 2011; Pouliot
2010) might therefore produce other findings, leaving more room for an
analysis of what the EU is de facto doing with and within NATO, despite
The EU’s Performance with and within NATO 755

the lack of a coherent EU-NATO policy or poor institutional cooperation.


A practice-based approach would focus less on the correspondence
between institutional objectives and outcomes, and rather pay attention to
the establishment of the everyday formal and informal activities, proce-
dures and habits that can be seen as indicative of the EU’s performance
with and within NATO.

Notes
1. The 21 EU member states in NATO are Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.
2. In contrast, Norway signed such an agreement with the EDA in 2006 (see Utenriksdepartementet
2006-2006).
3. For a list of NATO-EU informal and formal meetings, see NATO (2011a).
4. In France (outside of Paris), Britain (outside of London), Germany (Potsdam), Italy (outside of
Rome) and Greece (Larissa).
5. In the Netherlands (Brunssum), Italy (Naples), Portugal (Lisbon), Poland and Britain.
6. It should also be mentioned that NATO commands tend to be seen as a positive contribution to
the local community where the headquarter is located. This also goes for NATO’s military bases.
7. http://esdc.mil-edu.be/
8. According to a Norwegian government official. Seminar in Oslo, 19 October 2010.
9. Rasmussen said this after the EU’s Political and Security Committee and NAC met on 25 May 2010
(NATO 2010c). According to a Danish source, Rasmussen’s engagement reflects his aspirations to
become EU High Representative for CSDP at a later stage (personal interview, 10 June 2010).
10. The non-EU member states in NATO are the United States, Norway, Canada, Iceland, Turkey,
Albania, and Croatia.
11. Some non-EU NATO members also have bilateral agreements about participation in EU crisis
management operations and with the European Defence Agency in 2004 and 2006 respectively
(see Utenriksdepartementet 2006-2006).
12. The former two signed a bilateral agreement in 2009 with the United States as part of the Ameri-
can plans for a missile defence system in Europe.

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