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To cite this article: Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik (2011) The EU’s Performance with and
within NATO: Assessing Objectives, Outcomes and Organisational Practices, Journal of European
Integration, 33:6, 743-757, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2011.606698
ARTICLE
ABSTRACT This article assesses the EU’s performance as a security actor in the
context of NATO, both at the institutional level and when acting as a bloc of member
states within NATO. Informed by a definition of ‘performance’ as the ability to achieve
preset objectives (effectiveness) in an efficient, relevant and viable manner, we observe
that the EU’s performance in the context of NATO remains limited. This could be seen
as a reflection of underlying political divergences between the two organisations, ham-
pering systematic and formalised intra-institutional cooperation as well as effective
cooperation between the EU member states in NATO. More importantly, it has
resulted in the emergence of more informal and ad hoc EU practices in the context of
NATO as well as parallel EU and NATO practices.
Introduction
The European Union (EU) has come a long way in developing a security
and defence policy of its own during the last decade, to the extent that
most scholars and decision-makers now consider it a relevant – though
still atypical – international security actor. A number of scholars have
engaged in analyzing what kind of security actor the EU is (e.g. Larsen
2002; Manners 2006; Sjursen 2006), what capabilities it possesses or lacks
in formal, high-level strategic discourse only once, with the Althea opera-
tion in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the only topic on the agenda (Daalder
2010). For the time being, informal practices seem to have taken over that
function. For instance, transatlantic (NATO-EU) informal ministerial
dinners have taken place since September 2005.3 In contrast, the NATO
Secretary General’s wish to hold a NATO-EU summit as part of NATO’s
60th-anniversary meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009 never materialized
(Lachmann 2010).
Unlike many other multilateral institutions with which the EU interacts,
NATO is not only a partner, but in some respects also a competitor.
Although cooperation and division of labour were underlined from the start
to avoid competition and duplication between the two, this has proved dif-
ficult to achieve in practice. Instead, parallel and sometimes competing
practices have emerged. One illustrative example is the fact that the perma-
nent NATO and EU headquarters remain separate – four miles from each
other – despite both being located in Brussels. The headquarters for military
and defence planning are also located separately: NATO has its strategic
command for operations in Mons, Belgium (although military representa-
tives are located at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels), whereas the EU
has separate military planning headquarters placed in five member states.4
NATO also has a number of military commands in its member states,
although this is continuously shrinking.5 In general, member states have
been eager to have military headquarters and commands on their soil, both
as a symbol of their importance in NATO or EU strategy and defence plan-
ning, and for national security concerns.6 For leading NATO members like
the United States, NATO basing policy not only provides material arrange-
ments for military operations, but arguably also political influence in these
regions (Cooley and Nexon 2007).
NATO and the EU also have separate, partly overlapping military capa-
bilities. The EU’s European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) (European
Council 2001) and NATO’s Prague Capabilities Commitment (2002)
remain poorly synchronised, despite the setting up of a joint NATO-EU
Capability Group. Meetings in the Group take place every four to six
weeks, alternating between the Council’s Justus Lipsius Building and
NATO HQ. Because briefing content is rarely exchanged before meetings,
however, they often lack substance and instead take the form of largely
formulaic information exchange. The EU and NATO’s more or less simul-
taneous decisions to establish rapid reaction forces – the EU Battlegroups
in 2002 and the NATO Response Force in 2003 – is one striking example
of the development of parallel practices. Both forces are designed for
rapid, temporary deployment and flexible use for the international com-
munity or, alternatively, the EU or NATO acting on its behalf. Single-issue
meetings initiated by the EU Presidency and meetings at the level of MOD
policy directors in the member states seem to have functioned somewhat
better (Sturm 2010).
While both the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative
have stressed the need to further integrate EU and NATO capabilities, the
building up of parallel structures, capabilities and practices seems to con-
748 Nina Græger & Kristin M. Haugevik
revising NATO’s Strategic Concept took place more or less in parallel dur-
ing 2009 and 2010, and could have provided a point of departure for more
coordinated policies and coherent practices, potentially also improving the
preconditions for the EU’s performance in the NATO context. However,
this did not happen to any extent. Before the Summit, no common EU
perspective was formulated on the Concept (de Vasconcelos 2010).
While the Berlin Plus framework was hoped to provide ‘the framework
for reconciling NATO and the EU . . . in a genuinely strategic partnership’
(Robertson 2003), this has not (yet) materialised. Both the Albright report
and the new Strategic Concept emphasise that NATO’s strategic partner-
ships, and especially with the EU, need to be strengthened (NATO 2010a;
2010b). As Sven Biscop observes, however, ‘no real choice has yet been
made on the nature of the transatlantic partnership and on the level of
ambition and the degree of autonomy of the EU as strategic actor vis-à-vis
NATO and the United States’ (Biscop 2006: 6). This still seems to be the
case: the EU remains internally divided, both with regard to capabilities,
politics and the future of European security, revealing an underlying diver-
gence within the union (Sturm 2010). Others have warned against the
CSDP becoming a ‘mini-NATO’ disconnected from the CFSP to boast a
specifically European, comprehensive approach to security (Lachmann
2010). Consequently, the Cyprus issue can only partly account for the lim-
ited inter-organisational cooperation. The conflict seems to transcend the
parties involved, serving at times as a cover for other interests in the mat-
ter.8 Arguably, even if the stalemate were resolved, EU-NATO relations
would still suffer from tension because of different views concerning what
the main threats are and how security is best achieved. In the absence of
substantive agreement regarding political and military priorities and how
things are to be done, practical solutions have instead emerged in the field,
as well as informally. Over time, these ad hoc, informal solutions may
develop into standard practices, either improving cooperation or further
cementing the build-up of parallel and separate NATO-EU practices.
NATO is one of the EU’s taboos. Within the framework of the Atlantic
Alliance, EU Member States take decisions that vitally affect the secu-
rity of all Europeans, and yet such decisions are not concerted among
the EU’s members (unlike the established practice at the United
Nations). Arguably EU Member States’ decisions in their capacity as
NATO members are more likely to affect EU security options than
what member countries decide at the UN (de Vasconcelos 2009a: 1).
official website informing the public about the EU’s work with and within
NATO. In contrast, the EU has been present at the UN since 1964, with a
diplomatic delegation there since 1974. Relevant information concerning
cooperation and dialogue between the two organisations is found at the
EU’s official website European Union @ United Nations: Partnership in
Action (EU External Action. n.d.). This website also collects joint UN-EU
publications and reports, and presents a list of EU priorities, policies,
statements and declarations at the UN.
Notes
1. The 21 EU member states in NATO are Belgium, Britain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain.
2. In contrast, Norway signed such an agreement with the EDA in 2006 (see Utenriksdepartementet
2006-2006).
3. For a list of NATO-EU informal and formal meetings, see NATO (2011a).
4. In France (outside of Paris), Britain (outside of London), Germany (Potsdam), Italy (outside of
Rome) and Greece (Larissa).
5. In the Netherlands (Brunssum), Italy (Naples), Portugal (Lisbon), Poland and Britain.
6. It should also be mentioned that NATO commands tend to be seen as a positive contribution to
the local community where the headquarter is located. This also goes for NATO’s military bases.
7. http://esdc.mil-edu.be/
8. According to a Norwegian government official. Seminar in Oslo, 19 October 2010.
9. Rasmussen said this after the EU’s Political and Security Committee and NAC met on 25 May 2010
(NATO 2010c). According to a Danish source, Rasmussen’s engagement reflects his aspirations to
become EU High Representative for CSDP at a later stage (personal interview, 10 June 2010).
10. The non-EU member states in NATO are the United States, Norway, Canada, Iceland, Turkey,
Albania, and Croatia.
11. Some non-EU NATO members also have bilateral agreements about participation in EU crisis
management operations and with the European Defence Agency in 2004 and 2006 respectively
(see Utenriksdepartementet 2006-2006).
12. The former two signed a bilateral agreement in 2009 with the United States as part of the Ameri-
can plans for a missile defence system in Europe.
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