NERI VS. HEIRS OF UY
"
In the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should
have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then
minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid
and binding upon them and consequently, a total
nullity.
The partition in the present case was invalid
because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were
entitled to equal shares in the partitioned property.
Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition
was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded
heirs, it was not correct for the trial court to hold
that their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution.
However, while the settlement of the estate is null
and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
properties made by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents is valid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares therein
BAUTISTA V. BAUTISTA
The Deed of extra judicial partition in the case at
bar was invalid. As the partition was a total nullity
and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not
correct for the trial court to hold that their right to
challenge the partition had prescribed after two
years.
The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at
bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled
does not prescribe. Furthermore, it transmitted no
rights to the Petitioner’s co-heirs. Consequently,
the subsequent transfers are invalid, hence,
conferring no rights upon the transferees under the
principle of nemo dat quod non habet.
MACABADBAD V. MASIRAG
Ingjug-Tiro is again instructive on this point:
Article 1458 of the New Civil Code provides: "By
the contract of sale one of the contracting parties
obligates himself of transfer the ownership of and
to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
It is essential that the vendors be the owners of the
property sold otherwise they cannot dispose that
which does not belong to them. As the Romans put
it: "Nemo dat quod non habet." No one can give
more than what he has. The sale of the realty to
respondents is null and void insofar as it prejudiced
petitioners' interests and participation therein. At
best, only the ownership of the shares of Luisa,
Maria and Guillerma in the disputed property
could have been transferred to respondents.
In actions for reconveyance of the property
predicated on the fact that the conveyance
complained of was null and void ab initio, a claim
of prescription of action would be unavailing. "The
action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe."
Neither could laches be invoked in the case at bar.
Laches is a doctrine in equity and our courts are
basically courts of law and not courts of equity.
II. In an action for reconveyance, all the owners of
the property sought to be recovered are
indispensable parties. Thus, if reconveyance were
the only relief prayed for, impleading petitioners
Macababbad and the spouses Chua and Say would
suffice. On the other hand, under the claim that the
action is for the declaration of the nullity of
extrajudicial settlement of estate and sale, all of
the parties who executed the same should be
impleaded for a complete resolution of the case.
This case, however, is not without its twist on the
issue of impleading indispensable parties as the
RTC never issued an order directing their
inclusion. Under this legal situation, particularly
in light of Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court,
there can be no basis for the immediate dismissal
of the action.
FERNANDEZ V. DIMAGIBA
Finality of Probate Decree
It is elementary that a probate decree finally and
definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution
and witnessing of his last will and testament,
irrespective of whether its provisions are valid and
enforceable or otherwise. There being no
controversy that the probate decree of the Court
below was not appealed on time, the same had
become final and conclusive. Hence, the appellate
courts may no longer revoke said decree nor review
the evidence upon which it is made to rest. Thus,
the appeal belatedly lodged against the decree was
correctly dismissed.
ACAIN V. LAC
The general rule is that the probate court's
authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the
requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The
intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only
after the Court has declared that the will has been
duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the
proceedings is not called upon to rule on the
intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the
will.
The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute.
Under exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation
constraints it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will.
For private respondents to have tolerated the
probate of the will and allowed the case to progress
when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically
void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were
instituted as universal heirs coupled with the
obvious fact that one of the private respondents
had been preterited would have been an exercise in
futility. It would have meant a waste of time, effort,
expense, plus added futility. The trial court could
have denied its probate outright or could have
passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved.
MANINANG V. CA
Respondent Bernardo, however, relies on the
pronouncement in Nuguid vs. Nuguid 8, reading:
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will, the
due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the
court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the Court should meet that issue
Our ruling in Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez 9 had a
similar thrust:
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the
will's intrinsic validity even before its formal
validity had been established. The probate of a will
might become an Idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the court should meet the issue.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the
exception rather than the rule. The intrinsic
validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon
even before probate because "practical
considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the
parties in the Nuguid case, the "meat of the
controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will;
in fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the
question of whether or not the Will should be
allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now
where the probate of the Will is insisted on by
petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the Will demanded.
NUGUID V. NUGUID
In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court’s
area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and
resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will; the due
execution thereof; the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity; and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribed the by law. In the case at bar,
however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties
shunted aside the question of whether or not the
will should be allowed probate. They questioned
the intrinsic validity of the will. Normally, this
comes only after the court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. But if the case
were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing
will be gained. In the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
come up once again before this Court on the same
issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.
The result would be waste of time, effort, expense,
plus added anxiety. These practical considerations
induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the
nullity of the provisions of the will in question,
there being a justiciable controversy awaiting
solution.

ALABAN V. CA
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting
that they are not or have not become parties to the
probate proceedings. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all persons
interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate
of the decedent. Thus, even though petitioners were
not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a
consequence of the publication of the notice of
hearing.
On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is
required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. Petitioners,
as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the
Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or
to personally notify them of the same. Besides,
assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to
be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured by
the publication of the notice.
PALAGANAS V. PALAGANAS
Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills
executed by foreigners abroad although the same
have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be
given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of
the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who
is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made
in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
the law of the place where he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his country.
In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been
first probated and allowed by the court of California,
petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in
mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before
admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-
authentication of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first
time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of
Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this
latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it
cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding
the findings of the foreign probate court provided
its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
VDA, DE PEREZ V. TOLETE
The SC ruled that the wills of Cunanan spouses,
who were American citizens, will only be effective
in this country upon compliance with the CC of the
Philippines.
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is
abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made with the
formalities prescribed by the law of the
place in which he resides, or according
to the formalities observed in his
country, or in conformity with those
which this Code prescribes.
Hence, proof that both wills conform with the
formalities prescribed by New York laws or by PH
laws is imperative.
Further, the Court ruled that the evidence
necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills
which have been probated outside of the
Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of
the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the
testator has his domicile in the foreign country and
not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been
admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact
that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5)
the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills.
ANCHETA V. GUERSET-DALAYGON
Audrey Guersey was an American citizen
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will that at the time of Audrey’s
death, she was residing in the Philippines but is
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.;
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property
is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever
may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found. ;
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that
"capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
In this case, given that the pertinent law of the
State of Maryland has been brought to record
before the CA, and the trial court in Special
Proceeding, Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be
distributed according to their respective wills, and not
according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is
invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the
flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. In
this case, since the Makati property had already
passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then
whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition
by the Guerseys of the Makati property is now
inconsequential, as the objective of the
constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
LIM V. MILLAREZ
Whether or not Cirilio Lim is suitable for the
appointment as administrator of the estate of Jose
Millarez.
It cannot, therefore, be denied that Cirilo Lim, as a
relative of the deceased has some interest adverse
to that of Basilisa. Shown to have some liabilities
to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole, Cirilo
cannot compatibly perform the duties of an
administrator. In this jurisdiction, one is
considered to be unsuitable for appointment as
administrator when he has adverse interest of
some kind or hostility to those immediately
interested in the estate
The determination of a person’s suitability for the
office of judicial administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and said
judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal
unless the said court is clearly in error.
SUNTAY III V. COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
General rule in the appointment of administrator
of the estate of a decedent:
SEC. 6. If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the
husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty
(30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is not such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
The paramount consideration in the appointment
of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is
the prospective administrator’s interest in the
estate. This is the same consideration taken into
account in establishing the order of preference in
the appointment of administrator for the estate.
The rationale behind the rule is that those who will
reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, in the alternative,
suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or
mismanagement, have the highest interest and
most influential motive to administer the estate
correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an
order of preference, the person to be appointed
administrator of a decedent’s estate must
demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an
interest therein greater than any other candidate.
QUIASON V. BELEN
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one
who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate,
such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the
phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose
relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who
stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s
estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise
to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’
pounding on her lack of interest in the administration
of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt
to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on
good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an
interested party within the purview of the law.
GONZALES V. AGUINALDO
The court is invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it however must have
some fact legally before it in order to justify a
removal. There must be evidence of an act or
omission on the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the
orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or
substantial to warrant the removal of the
administrator.
Judge removed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales as
co-administratrix of the estate on the ground that
she had been absent from the country.
Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state
does not disqualify one to be an administrator of
the estate. Thus, temporary residence outside of
the state, maintained for the benefit of the health
of the executors' family, is not such a removal from
the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
Suffice it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices
and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the
estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would
result in orderly and efficient administration.
As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F.
Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for
her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely
abused its discretion in removing her. Stated
differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was
removed without just cause. Her removal was
therefore improper.
ANGELES V. MAGLAYA
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of
appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the
next of kin of the decedent.38 When the law speaks
of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are
entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the
decedent’s property;39 one whose relationship is
such that he is entitled to share in the estate as
distributed,40 or, in short, an heir. In resolving,
therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for
letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir
of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to
determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of
suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted
within bounds when it looked into and pass upon
the claimed relationship of respondent to the late
Francisco Angeles.
VENTURA V. VENTURA
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration
granted. -If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate,
a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;"
The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent's property. It is
generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose
interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator.
'Among members of a class the strongest
ground for preference is the amount or
preponderance of interest. As between next of
kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.